The Issue The issue is whether either respondent bore a relationship to Petitioner, as described in Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, that confers jurisdiction upon the Florida Commission on Human Relations to investigate Petitioner's claims of racial discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Sections 760.01-760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been a registered nurse licensed in Florida for 14 years. Her specialty is intensive care. Seeking advancement within the profession of nursing, Petitioner decided to pursue certification as a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist (CRNA). A CRNA has advanced training and education in anesthesia and passes a national certification examination, which is administered by neither Respondent. Upon passing the examination and meeting other requirements, an applicant is entitled to certification from the Council on Certification of Nurse Anesthetists. After obtaining this certificate and completing other requirements, such as financial responsibility, the applicant is eligible for certification by the Florida Board of Nursing as an advanced registered nurse practitioner in anesthesiology, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B9-4.002. In Florida, a CRNA is authorized to administer anesthesia in in- and out-patient settings and bears significant responsibilities for the safety of anesthetized patients. Petitioner enrolled at Barry University to fulfill the educational requirements for certification. Barry University is a private institution headquartered in Miami Shores and is one of several institutions in Florida that offer a program to satisfy the educational requirements for CRNA certification. The 28-month program at Barry University leads to a master of science degree in anesthesiology. A major component of the educational program is clinical practice. The clinical practice requires a student to perform clinical responsibilities, under supervision, with an anesthesiology group. At the time in question, Barry University maintained relationships with different anesthesiology groups in most major urban areas in Florida. Petitioner began the Barry University program in January 2005 and withdrew from the program in May 2006. She chose to take her clinical training in Orlando, where Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants accepted Barry University students for clinical practice. Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants served various hospitals forming part of the Orlando Regional Healthcare System. Petitioner began the clinical portion of the program in May 2005. No cash is exchanged between Barry University and Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants as part of the arrangement described above. The obvious benefit for Barry University, whose program is not inexpensive, is that Wolverine's supervision of its students in the clinical practice allows Barry to offer a comprehensive anesthesiology program that qualifies its students to sit for the CRNA examination. The obvious benefits to Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants are access to newly certified CRNAs, who are in high demand, and the ability to recruit the students likeliest to excel within the profession. It is less clear, from the present record, if Wolverine is able to bill for the services of more advanced students. From time to time, Wolverine provides Barry with financial support, such as a stipend so that a financially needy student may attend an out-of-town conference, as the tuition charged by Barry does not cover the cost of the program or incidental student costs. The economic relationship between the respondents is only of relevance, however, in providing the background from which to assess the economic relationship between the respondents, on the one hand, and Petitioner--and, more specifically, the value that flows to Petitioner from one or both respondents. Clearly, the educational and clinical programs provide educational value, and potential economic value, if and when certification is obtained, but, as explained in the Conclusions of Law, the key question is what, if any, economic value flows to Petitioner from either respondent during her relationship with each respondent. Neither respondent paid Petitioner any income, compensation, or other benefit, directly or indirectly. Neither respondent ever provided Petitioner with an IRS W-2 statement or Form 1099, as evidence of payments to an employee or independent contractor. She never received compensation of any type from either respondent, nor did she receive an IRS Form 1099, reflective of the payment of compensation to an independent contract. Petitioner never received any other employment- related benefits from either respondent, such as health insurance or retirement benefits. Neither respondent provided Petitioner with housing or a housing allowance. Wolverine did not insure Petitioner on its medical malpractice insurance policy. Neither respondent covered Petitioner under workers' compensation. Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants required Petitioner to sign her name on any anesthesia record pertaining to a case in which she was involved. When Petitioner was required, due to the needs of a particular patient, to work in excess of her scheduled time, she was entitled, from Barry University, to "comp time," which means only that she could receive credit for the additional time worked when setting a subsequent schedule. However, apart from a grant from Barry University as part of her financial-aid package, Petitioner never received any financial benefit from either respondent. In addition to the occasional stipend, which Petitioner does not appear to have received, Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants provided minor items, such as lunches for meetings of the interns, which Petitioner may not have attended, and $50 Christmas gift certificates to all interns, including Petitioner. In no way does the record support an interpretation of these minor acknowledgements or courtesies as compensation because Wolverine is under no obligation to provide them, no relationship exists between the recipient of the item and the amount of time worked, and no relationship exists between the value of the item or stipend and the amount of time worked by the student receiving the item or stipend. Although Barry University administers a comprehensive test to all candidates for a master's degree in anesthesiology, passage of which is required for a degree, Petitioner withdrew from the program prior to the administration of this test. She withdrew essentially due to reports from Wolverine to Barry University that she had failed to make adequate progress in the clinical program.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petitions of Petitioner in these two cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Andrea Bateman, Esquire 1999 West Colonial Drive Orlando, Florida 32804 Cecil Howard, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Susan T. Spradley, Esq. Deborah L. La Fleur, Esq. GrayRobinson, P.A. 301 East Pine Street, Suite 1400 Orlando, Florida 32801 John A. Walker, General Counsel Barry University Division of Legal Affairs and Human Resources LaVoie Hall, Office 209 11300 Northeast Second Avenue Miami Shores, Florida 33161
The Issue The issues for consideration in this case are those promoted by an administrative complaint in which the Petitioner has accused the Respondent of violating certain provisions within Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes, pertaining to licensure. This relates to the contention by Petitioner that Respondent has obtained his license to practice medicine in Florida by fraudulent means. These allegations are more completely described in the conclusions of law.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed physician having been issued license number ME0043541. On or about September 9, 1983, Respondent submitted an application to the Board of Medical Examiners, now known as the Board of Medicine, seeking a license to practice medicine in Florida. This request was for licensure by endorsement. On the form application there is a section which refers to the applicant's medical education. It instructs the applicant to be specific and account for each year of the medical education calling upon the applicant to give the name of the medical school and the location. In response to this requirement, Respondent indicated that he attended the Universidad del Noreste in Tampico, Mexico, from July, 1977 to May, 1978; from July, 1978 to May, 1979 and from June, 1979 until May, 1980. He further stated that he attended Universidad Cetec, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, from June, 1980 until May, 1981 and received a degree of doctor of medicine from that university on June 8, 1981. In submitting the application for licensure by endorsement, he did so under oath and in the course of signing the application he acknowledged the following in his affidavit and oath: "I have carefully read the questions in the foregoing application and have answered them completely, without reservation of any kind, and I declare under penalty of perjury that my answers and all statements made by me herein are true and correct. Should I furnish any false information in this application, I hereby agree that such action shall constitute cause for the denial, suspension or revocation of my license to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Florida. As part of the application process, Dorothy J. Faircloth, Executive Director to the Board of Medical Examiners, sent a letter to Dr. Traynor on September 30, 1983, requesting additional information. The text of that letter was as follows: Dear Dr. Traynor: With further reference to your application for licensure in Florida by you are required to provide to this office, in the form of an affidavit, a narrative report on all your activities relating to your medical education beginning with date of enrollment in medical school. Such report should include, but not be limited to, all classes attended (dates and name and location of institution) which were not conducted at the main teaching hospital of the medical school from which you received a medical diploma. You are also required to complete the enclosed form, providing additional information regarding your medical education and places of residence while in medical training. Upon receipt of the above requested material, you may be required to make a personal appearance before the Board for consideration of your application. The form referred to in the second paragraph of the correspondence from Ms. Faircloth is the form entitled: Attachment for Application for Licensure. Within that form it asks that the applicant "list all places of residence during medical school." This is broken down into various lines on the form requiring the applicant to state the city, state or country and the various period in which he resided in those places. A copy of the executed form offered by the Respondent on October 7, 1983 may be found as a part of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5 admitted into evidence. In the course of describing his residence, he refers to Tampico, Mexico in the period August, 1977 through July, 1978; August, 1978 through July, 1979 and August, 1979 through July, 1980. He then describes his place of residence during medical school as being Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, in the period July, 1980 through June, 1981. The attachment for application for licensure form then has a section which states "Medical Education: be specific. Account for each year. List all universities or colleges where you attended classes and received training as a medical student." In response to this request, the Respondent provided the same information which he had given in his initial endorsement application form described before. In swearing to the accuracy of those matters set forth in the Attachment for Application for Licensure offered on October 7, 1983, Respondent gave the same oath as related to the endorsement application form acknowledging the possibility of denial, suspension or revocation of any license which was received by the giving of false information. In reply to the first paragraph of the September 30, 1983 correspondence from Ms. Faircloth, Respondent offered a document entitled "Clinical Training." A copy of that document may be found as part of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. That document states: CLINICAL TRAINING Kevin M. Traynor Aug. '77 - July '79: Basic science courses at Del Noreste; Tampico, Mexico August - Dec. '79: Del Noreste Hospital, Tampico, Mexico Pulmonary Ear, nose & throat Cardiology Ophthalmology Jan. - June '80: Del Noreste Hospital; Tampico, Mexico Traumatology (orthopedics) Forensic medicine Gastroenterology Dermatology July - Dec. '80: University Hospital; Cetec School of Medicine, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Neurology Infectious disease Endocrinology General surgery Jan. - June '81: University Hospital; Uni- versity Cetec School of Medicine, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Psychiatry Internal medicine OB-GYN Pediatrics By the representations set forth in the statement of clinical training which were made by the Respondent, the impression is given that all of his activities related to his medical education from the point of enrollment to the completion of his medical school training were conducted at the Universidad del Noreste and University Cetec and the hospitals affiliated with those institutions. Given that the Respondent is silent on other activities outside those settings, a reading of his explanation leads one to believe that he had no such activities. This is not a true depiction of his training in medical school. In this respect, the Respondent has misled the Florida Board of Medical Examiners in that the vast majority of clinical rotations which the Respondent participated in during his medical school education occurred during externships in the United States. In addition, Respondent, in his comments in the endorsement application form and in the Attachment for Application for Licensure form, has misled the Board of Medical Examiners by describing his residence in medical school as Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, in the period July, 1980 through June, 1981. He was not residing in the Dominican Republic until January, 1981. Respondent's domicile or official residence was in Tampico, Mexico, until the end of 1980. Respondent did not receive medical education in the sense of attending classes and receiving training as a medical student in affiliation with the Universidad Cetec until January, 1981. This is contrary to his representations about residence and medical education in which he describes his association with Universidad Cetec dating from July, 1980. Respondent had made an inquiry about being admitted to Universidad Cetec in December, 1980, and was given the impression that that request would be approved. Respondent's official acceptance by Universidad Cetec occurred on January 8, 1981. In referring to the activities related to medical education spoken to in the September 30, 1983 correspondence from Ms. Faircloth, the records reveal that Respondent did externship at St. Francis Hospital in Miami Beach, Florida from July 9, 1975 through November 20, 1979. He further did externship at Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center in Brooklyn, New York, from January, 1980 through May, 1980, rotations involving medicine, pediatrics and surgery. In that same institution from June 30, 1980 through July 13, 1980, Respondent did a rotation in neurology. In the period July, 1980 through December, 1980, Respondent performed unofficial and uncredited externship at Kingsbrook. All of these activities occurred under the aegis of his status as a medical student at Universidad del Noreste. In the period February, 1981 through May, 1981, while at Universidad Cetec, Respondent did an externship at Brookdale Hospital Medical Center in New York in hematology and renal and electrolytes. In April, 1981, as an extern at Nassau County Medical Center in East Meadow, New York, Respondent performed a clerkship in urology. Under the circumstances in examining the places of residence during medical school, while Respondent may have been in official residence in Mexico and the Dominican Republic, his actual residence was in various locations within the United States in the periods described in the preceding paragraphs. Following his graduation, Respondent also participated in training programs at Brookdale Hospital Medical Center related to an elective in emergency services from the period August 10, 1981 through September 4, 1981. He performed an elective in the period September, 1981 through October, 1981 in the Division of Pulmonary Medicine at the Down State Medical Center which is affiliated with the Department of Medicine, AIE University of New York. From 1981 through June, 1984, Respondent was involved in an internal medicine residency at Jersey Shore Medical Center/Fitken Hospital in Neptune, New Jersey. Beginning in 1984 through June, 1986, Respondent completed a cardiology fellowship program in Jacksonville, Florida, at the University Hospital which is part of JHEP, a training program associated with the University of Florida medical school. In explaining why he has reported his residence in his medical education as commencing in July, 1980 at Universidad Cetec, Respondent indicates that he had been told by the dean of the medical school at Cetec, upon his admission there, that his enrollment would be back-dated to the beginning of the fall semester, or June, 1980. To this end Respondent paid Universidad Cetec $2,500 which represented a tuition payment for the seventh semester running from approximately June, 1980 to December, 1980. This payment for back-dating and credit for the seventh semester was made on April 23, 1981. There is no indication that those records were back-dated to show acceptance of a seventh semester under association with Universidad Cetec. Respondent did not undertake any clinical training in that period which could be credited, with the exception of his urology clerkship at Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center in the period June 30, 1980 through July 13, 1980. He did not stand examination in any of the subject areas pertaining to his medical education in that seventh semester running from June, 1980 to December, 1980, having foregone the examination sessions given by Universidad del Noreste at the conclusion of that seventh semester. In the final analysis, Respondent did not accomplish anything toward advancing his medical education in the seventh semester running from approximately June, 1980 through December, 1980 as recognized by either medical school which he attended. There is evidence that part of the unofficial work done by the Petitioner in the fall of 1980 at Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center related to dermatology and E.R. Even accepting the concept explained by the Respondent to the effect that both of the medical schools he attended would allow a student to stand examination in medical subjects at times not correlated with the performance of clinical clerkships, to the extent that the seventh semester unofficial clinical clerkships being performed are germane, they have not been credited. Respondent claims that the period from the end of the fall of 1980 was not crucial in that he had fulfilled enough weeks in clinical rotation to allow his graduation. In any event, Respondent did graduate, was certified by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates, passed the FLEX examination and has been licensed in the states of Georgia and New Jersey. In explaining his response to the requirements related to his application for licensure in Florida to practice medicine, Respondent indicates that he was of the persuasion that he need only provide information pertaining to his clinical training as credited by the two schools he attended. This is not a fair reading of the requirements expressed in the correspondence of September 30, 1983, in which all activities involving the medical education are sought. This contemplates that specific information as to the exact nature and location of the externship rotations performed in the United States should be explained. Respondent failed to do this and what he did offer by way of explanation is misleading in that clerkships are set forth pertaining to experience in the period July, 1980 through December, 1980 associated with the Universidad Cetec which did not occur at that time because the Respondent was not enrolled at Universidad Cetec during that period. In addition, the statement about clinical training given by the Respondent would have one believe that the training occurred in the affiliated hospitals associated with the two medical schools he attended which is erroneous. The clinical training statement by the Petitioner does not coincide with his actual clinical training, an example being that during the period January, 1980 through June, 1980 while affiliated with the Universidad del Noreste, he says that he received training in traumatology (orthopedics), forensic medicine, gastroenterology, and dermatology when in fact the training he was receiving at that time at Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center was in the fields of medicine, pediatrics and surgery. It appears that Universidad del Noreste gave him credit for those subjects he relates, but this was not the clinical training he was undergoing in that time sequence. During the period July through December 1980 where he indicates that he received clinical training in neurology, infectious disease, endocrinology and general surgery, the only official training he received was in neurology. It is debatable whether the requirements for establishing residence as described in the endorsement application form and the Attachment for Application for Licensure form sought the official residence, that is, his residence in the country where he attended medical school or the actual residence where externships were being performed as well as when he was actually at the university. In any event, if it was seeking the official residence, his information is misleading in that he describes his official residence as Santo Domingo in the period July, 1980 through December, 1980, when in fact his official residence was Tampico, Mexico. Respondent was given his medical license by the State of Florida on December 5, 1983, based in part upon the information as set out in the endorsement application form, the Attachment for Application for Licensure form and the narrative on clinical training provided by the Respondent. Before the occasion of the present administrative complaint, there is no indication that the Respondent has been disciplined by the State of Florida. At present, Respondent is practicing medicine in Florida and is a resident of Stuart, Florida.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offense set forth in Petitioner's letter of agency action dated March 9, 2012, and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, New Life was issued individual Medicaid provider number 140680900. At all times material hereto, New Life was enrolled as an assisted living facility. At all times material hereto, New Life had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA (Agreement). Under the Agreement, New Life was authorized to provide assistive living services to Medicaid recipients. The Florida Medicaid Assistive Care Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, effective July 2009, hereinafter Handbook, provides, among other things, requirements of Medicaid home health services providers and sets forth pertinent Medicaid policies and service requirements. The Handbook is provided to each Medicaid provider upon enrollment into the Medicaid program and is available online. Each provider is expected and presumed to be familiar with the Handbook. The Handbook was incorporated by reference into rule 59G-4.025, Assistive Care Services. No dispute exists that, at all times material hereto, New Life was an assistive care services provider as defined by the Handbook. The Handbook provides in pertinent part: Recipients receiving Assistive Care Services must have a complete assessment at least annually . . . or sooner if a significant change in the recipient's condition occurs . . . . An annual assessment must be completed no more than one year plus fifteen days after the last assessment. An assessment triggered by a significant change must be completed no more than fifteen days after the significant change. The assessment for a resident of a ALF . . . must be completed by a physician or other licensed practitioner of the healing arts (Physician Assistant, Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner, Registered Nurse) acting within the scope of practice under state law, physician assistant or advanced registered practitioner. * * * The assessment for ALF [assisted living facility] residents must be recorded on the Resident Health Assessment for Assisted Living Facilities, AHCA Form 1823. * * * Along with the annual assessment requirement, all recipients receiving ACS [Assistive Care Services] must have an updated Certification of Medical Necessity for Medicaid Assistive Care Services, AHCA- Med Serv Form 035, July 2009, signed by a physician or other licensed practitioner of the healing arts (Physician Assistant, Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner, Registered Nurse) and the Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services, AHCA-Med Serv Form 036, July 2009, completed and available in the recipient's case file at the facility. * * * Every ACS recipient must have a service plan completed by the ACS service provider. The Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services, AHCA-Med Serv Form 036, July 2009, shall be used for each recipient receiving ACS. The form must be included in the recipient's case file at the facility. The ALF, RTF [residential medical facility] and AFCH [adult family care home] are responsible for ensuring the service plan is developed and implemented. * * * The Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services (AHCA-Med Serv Form 036) must be completed within 15 days after the initial health assessment or annual assessment, be in writing and based on information contained in the health assessment. . . . * * * A new service plan is required on an annual basis or sooner if a significant change in the recipient's condition occurs. The new service plan must be completed no more than 15 days after the annual assessment or an assessment because of a significant change in the recipient's condition. * * * In addition to records required by the applicable licensure standards, ACS records that must be kept include: Copies of all eligibility documents; Health Assessment Forms, AHCA Form 1823 . . .; Certification of Medical Necessity for Medicaid Assistive Care Services, AHCA-Med Serv Form 035; The Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services, AHCA-Med Serv Form 036; and The Resident Service Log, AHCA-Med Serv Form 037. This documentation must be maintained at the facility, kept for at least five years, and be made available to the Agency for Health Care Administration monitoring or surveyor staff or its designated representative, upon request. . . . * * * ACS documentation may be in electronic format. The original, signed . . . documents must be kept in the recipient's case file in the facility . . . for audit, monitoring and quality assurance purposes. . . . Handbook at P 2-7 through 2-11. AHCA's investigator performed a site visit at New Life on December 8, 2011. The investigator reviewed case files of residents for the service-period covering January 1, 2011, through November 30, 2011 (service-period). AHCA's investigator found deficiencies in the case files of seven residents at New Life: M.B.; R.F.; E.H.; R.J.; I.M.; K.L.; and J.S. Additional documents, not contained in the case files during the site visit, were provided subsequent to the site visit. Regarding Resident M.B., the Health Assessment and the Resident Service Plan were dated August 17, 2010, which was after the service-period; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated March 28, 2012, which was not within the service-period and after the site visit. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident M.B. lacked the Health Assessment, Resident Service Plan, and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service- period. As to Resident R.F., the Health Assessment was dated January 1, 2011, which was within the service-period but not up- to-date; the Resident Service Plan was up-to-date; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated March 1, 2012, which was not within the service-period and after the site visit. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident R.F. lacked the Health Assessment and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period. Regarding Resident E.H., the Health Assessment was dated January 24, 2011, and was up-to-date; the Resident Service Plan was not provided; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated September 27, 2002, with no more recent Certification of Medical Necessity. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident E.H. lacked the Resident Service Plan and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period. As to Resident R.J., the parties stipulated that the Health Assessment was up-to-date; the Resident Service Plan was not provided; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated February 29, 2012, which was not within the service-period and after the site visit. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident R.J. lacked the Resident Service Plan and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period. Regarding Resident I.M., the Health Assessment and the Resident Service Plan were up-to-date; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated March 1, 2012, which was not within the service-plan and after the site visit. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident I.M. lacked the Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period. As to Resident K.L., the Health Assessment was dated March 1, 2012, which was not within the service-period and after the site visit; the Resident Service Plan was not provided; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was provided, but the date as to the year was unintelligible even though the month and day were intelligible, i.e., March 1. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident K.L. lacked the Health Assessment, Resident Service Plan, and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service- period. Regarding Resident J.S., the Health Assessment was dated August 22, 2009, which was not within the service-period; the Resident Service Plan was not provided; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated February 29, 2012, which was not within the service-period and was after the site visit. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident J.S. lacked the Health Assessment, Resident Service Plan, and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service period. The Director and owner of New Life is Ethel Newton. Ms. Newton has been the Director and owner for the past 13 years. She was not familiar with the Health Assessment form, the Resident Service Plan form, or the Certification of Medical Necessity form. Ms. Newton advised AHCA's investigator that she was not familiar with the forms and admitted same at the hearing. Ms. Newton historically depended upon the assistance of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) to complete any required forms. She depended upon DCF until 2005 when DCF closed its local office which had been assisting her. After DCF closed its local office, Ms. Newton depended upon the residents' case managers at New Horizons, an agency where the residents' physicians are located, to complete any required forms. Five of the seven residents had case managers at New Horizons; J.S. and E.H. did not have case managers at New Horizons. E.H. is no longer a resident at New Life. Ms. Newton is willing to cooperate with AHCA and do whatever it takes to have the required forms completed timely and correctly. The evidence does not demonstrate that Ms. Newton intentionally failed to complete the required forms. None of the seven residents were harmed as a result of the deficiencies in the documentation. No evidence was presented demonstrating that New Life has any prior administrative sanction or penalty. No evidence was presented demonstrating that New Life has any prior violations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order: Finding that New Life Assisted Living, Inc., d/b/a New Life Assisted Living Facility, violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e) by failing to have in the case files of Resident M.B., Resident K.L., and Resident J.S. a Health Assessment, Resident Service Plan, and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period covering January 1, 2011, through November 30, 2011; by failing to have in the case file of Resident R.F. a Health Assessment and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period covering January 1, 2011, through November 30, 2011; by failing to have in the case file of Resident E.H. and Resident R.J. a Resident Service Plan and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period covering January 1, 2011, through November 30, 2011; and by failing to have in Resident I.M.'s case file a Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period covering January 1, 2011, through November 30, 2011; Requiring New Life Assisted Living, Inc., d/b/a New Life Assisted Living Facility to enter into a corrective action plan; and Imposing a fine against New Life Assisted Living, Inc., d/b/a New Life Assisted Living Facility in the amount of $1,750.00. S DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2012.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency or AHCA) is entitled to recover certain Medicaid funds paid to Lee Memorial Health System, d/b/a Lee Memorial Hospital (Respondent or Lee Memorial), for services provided to undocumented aliens: between January 1 through December 31, 2006, as alleged in AHCA’s Amended Final Audit Report, dated July 25, 2014 (DOAH Case 14-4171); and January 1 through December 31, 2007, as alleged in AHCA’s Final Audit Report, dated March 12, 2015 (DOAH Case 15-3271).
Findings Of Fact THE PARTICIPANTS Lee Memorial was, at all relevant times, an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered goods and services provided to Medicaid recipients. As an enrolled provider, Lee Memorial’s participation in the Florida Medicaid Program is subject to the terms of the Medicaid Provider Agreement. The Florida Medicaid Program requires compliance with all state and federal laws governing the Medicaid program, including the state and federal laws limiting Medicaid payments for services provided to aliens. As indicated, the Agency is the single state agency responsible for administering or supervising the administration of the Florida Medicaid Program (Medicaid). § 409.901(15), Fla. Stat. PRELIMINARY: FLORIDA MEDICAID PROGRAM Section 409.901(16), Florida Statutes, provides that the Medicaid program is “authorized under Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act which provides for payments for medical items or services, or both, on behalf of any person who is determined by the Department of Children and Families, or, for Supplemental Security Income, by the Social Security Administration, to be eligible on the date of service for Medicaid assistance.” The Medicaid program is jointly funded by the federal government and the individual states that have elected to participate in the program, of which Florida is one. Federal payments to the states for a portion of the cost of Medicaid are referred to as federal financial participation (FFP). AHCA administers the Medicaid program. AHCA is authorized to make payments to Medicaid providers for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. However, in order to receive Medicaid assistance, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) must determine the eligibility of applicants for that assistance. Pursuant to section 409.902(1), DCF has adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 65A-1.715 which addresses Medicaid eligibility for aliens. This rule provides: Aliens who would be eligible for Medicaid but for their immigration status are eligible only for emergency medical services. Section 409.901(10) F.S., defines emergency medical conditions. The Utilization Review Committee (URC) or medical provider will determine if the medical condition warrants emergency medical services and, if so, the projected duration of the emergency medical condition. The projected duration of the emergency medical condition will be the eligibility period provided that all other criteria are continuously satisfied. Emergency services are limited to 30 consecutive days without prior approval. For continued coverage beginning with the 31st day prior authorization must be obtained from the Agency for Health Care Administration (Medicaid Program Office). [Emphasis added]. The eligibility period for alien recipients is also described in rule 65A-1.702, which states: (2) Date of Eligibility. The date eligibility for Medicaid begins. This was formerly called the date of entitlement. The date of eligibility includes the three months immediately preceding the month of application (called the retroactive period). Eligibility for Medicaid begins the first day of a month if an individual was eligible any time during the month, with the following exceptions: * * * (c) Coverage for individuals eligible for the Emergency Medicaid for Aliens program begins the first day of a covered emergency and ends the day following the last day of the emergency medical situation. [Emphasis added]. DCF is performing an administrative function, solely to determine if the alien is eligible to receive medical assistance. DCF does not determine the duration of the emergency medical condition. DCF does not make a clinical medical determination regarding any patient because it does not have medical professionals to verify the information received. DCF has the dates of eligibility, but AHCA determines which bills are paid. AHCA relies on licensed medical physicians to determine the duration of the emergency medical services. Undocumented aliens do not qualify to receive full Medicaid benefits. As detailed in Agency handbooks, the aid is limited to the treatment of an emergency medical condition up to the point that condition has been alleviated. According to section 409.902(2), Medicaid eligibility is restricted to U.S. citizens and lawfully admitted noncitizens who meet the criteria provided in section 414.095(3), Florida Statute.4/ The criteria mean that undocumented or illegal aliens are generally not eligible for Medicaid assistance. All of the claims in dispute in this case involve payments on behalf of undocumented noncitizens who will be referred to herein as "aliens." As an exception to the general rule, episodic eligibility is available to an alien who is either pregnant or seeking "services [which] are necessary to treat an emergency medical condition." § 409.902(2)(b), Fla. Stat. "The eligibility of . . . a recipient [who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services] is limited to the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations." § 409.904(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). An alien is eligible for medical assistance only if he has an "emergency medical condition" requiring "emergency medical services"--and then only for those services "necessary to treat [the] emergency medical condition" that are provided during the "period of the emergency," the conclusion of which terminates the alien's eligibility. The term "emergency medical condition" (EMC) is defined in section 409.901(10)(a) as: A medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, which may include severe pain or other acute symptoms, such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in any of the following: Serious jeopardy to the health of a patient, including a pregnant woman or a fetus. Serious impairment to bodily functions. Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. Section 409.901(11) provides the following definition of “emergency services and care”: [M]edical screening, examination, and evaluation by a physician, or, to the extent permitted by applicable laws, by other appropriate personnel under the supervision of a physician, to determine whether an emergency medical condition exists and, if it does, the care, treatment, or surgery for a covered service by a physician which is necessary to relieve or eliminate the emergency medical condition, within the service capability of a hospital. Section 409.904(4) provides: A low-income person who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services. The eligibility of such a recipient is limited to the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations. Section 409.905(5) has, since 2005, consistently provided that AHCA shall pay for “all covered services provided for the medical care and treatment of a recipient” admitted as an inpatient by a licensed physician to a licensed hospital. However, covered payments can be determined by the patients’ physical condition. AHCA is authorized to “conduct or cause to be conducted . . . reviews, investigation, analyses, audits, or any combination thereof, to determine possible fraud, abuse, overpayment, . . . in the Medicaid program and shall report the findings of any overpayments in audit reports as appropriate . . . . Medical necessity determination requires that service be consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of illness or injury under treatment and not in excess of the patient’s needs.” § 409.913(2), Fla. Stat. Section 409.913(1)(e) defines “overpayment” to mean “any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake.” As found in section 409.913(1)(a)1, “abuse” means “[p]rovider practices that are inconsistent with generally accepted business or medical practices and that result in an unnecessary cost to the Medicaid program or in reimbursement for goods or services that are not medically necessary or that fail to meet professionally recognized standards of health care.” Further, under section 409.913(5), a Medicaid provider “is subject to having goods and services that are paid for by the Medicaid program reviewed by an appropriate peer-review organization designated by the agency. The written findings of the applicable peer-review organization are admissible in any court or administrative proceeding as evidence of medical necessity or the lack thereof.” AHCA has authority to “adopt any rules necessary to comply with or administer ss. 409.901-409.920 and all rules necessary to comply with federal requirements.” § 409.919, Fla. Stat. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160 provides that all enrolled hospital providers must comply with the provisions of the Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. As found on page 2 through 7 of this handbook: The Medicaid Hospital Services Program reimburses for emergency services provided to aliens who meet all Medicaid eligibility requirements except for citizenship or alien status. Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. Dialysis is considered an emergency service. [Emphasis added]. Rule 59G-5.020 provided for the use of the Florida Medicaid Provider Handbook. On page 3 through 22 under the heading, “Emergency: Medicaid for Aliens,” it provides: Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. All claims must be accompanied by documentation of the emergency nature of the service. Exceptions are labor, delivery, and dialysis services. These are considered emergencies and are payable without documentation when the emergency indicator is entered on the claim form. [Emphasis added]. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS In 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), conducted a “Review of Florida’s Medicaid Payments for Emergency Services to Undocumented Aliens” (review). The review was directed to AHCA for the purpose of determining “whether AHCA’s billing for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens in the State of Florida complies with applicable Federal statutes and CMS’ regulations.” One of the review’s findings was that “AHCA is claiming FFP for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens provided beyond what Federal statutes and regulations define to be an emergency.” CMS recommended that “AHCA should review all emergency services for undocumented alien amounts claimed for FFP during Federal Fiscal Years 2005, 2006, and 2007 and re-determine allowability of these claims utilizing the required Federal criteria” and that AHCA “promptly implement the necessary system edits so that services provided as emergent care [could] be differentiated from services provided after the point the patients are stable, and then bill to the proper Federal programs.” In September 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, published its “Review of Medicaid Funding for Emergency Services Provided to Nonqualified Aliens” (report). The report described existing internal controls at AHCA that needed to be improved in order to assure that “all claims for services provided to undocumented aliens are for conditions that the State agency defines as emergency services.” RN Ryder explained that AHCA’s internal controls, mainly the computer program, prevented the reviewers from adjusting a claim’s length of stay to the point where the emergency condition had been alleviated. Rather, the computer would only allow for the approval or denial of a claim. AHCA’s response to the report provided: The Agency’s contracted quality improvement organization began reviewing all requests for Medicaid reimbursement of inpatient emergency services for undocumented aliens on July 1, 2010. These reviews determine the point at which the emergency no longer exists, consistent with federal regulations and deny Medicaid reimbursement for the remainder of the inpatient stay. The Agency is also undertaking a retrospective review of all inpatient alien claims from July 2005 through June 30, 2010, to determine point of stabilization. Any payments made in error will be recouped, and the federal share will be adjusted on the Form CMS-64. The retrospective reviews will begin October 1, 2010. In August 2012, health care providers, including Lee Memorial, filed a Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy. This rule challenge, known as Bayfront I, ended with the December 12, 2012, Final Order that AHCA’s use of “the ‘point of stabilization’ standard was an interpretation or an implementation of the existing statutes and rules and not merely a restatement of them.” As such, AHCA discontinued reliance on the “stabilization standard.” In October 2014, health care providers, including Lee Memorial, filed a second Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy or In the Alternative for Determination of the Invalidity of a Rule. This rule challenge, known as Bayfront II, ended with the April 20, 2015, Final Order5/ that AHCA, having provided notice that it was going to start enforcing it statutes and rules, did not change “an interpretation or way of applying a statute or its rules. It is just starting to enforce them, as they are written, after years of neglecting to enforce them.” See Bayfront Med. Ctr., et al. v. AHCA, Case No. 14-4758, FO at 69 (Fla. DOAH Apr. 20, 2015). PROCESS One method the Agency uses to discover Medicaid overpayments is by auditing billing and payment records of Medicaid providers. Such audits are performed by staff in the Agency's MPI. MPI is responsible for reviewing providers to assure that paid claims for services rendered were in accordance with the applicable rules, regulations and handbook(s). MPI looks to ensure that the provider is enrolled, the recipient is eligible, the service billed is covered, and the service is billed appropriately. As an example: An alien is in need of medical care, emergent or otherwise. The alien applies through DCF to become eligible for medical services, and is deemed eligible. An EMC arises, and the alien immediately presents to a duly enrolled Medicaid Provider, a health care facility of some type.6/ The alien is admitted as an inpatient on day one, and emergency health care services are provided. The EMC is alleviated as of day three, yet the alien remains in the health care facility for ten more days, receiving medical services, but not of the emergent type. The alien is discharged from the facility on day The facility bills the Medicaid program for 13 days of service. It is not uncommon for the alien’s eligibility to be determined after the hospitalization has ended, and the provider is seeking to cover its costs. PEER REVIEW When a claim was presented for peer review, the peer reviewers were directed to base the review on the standards governing emergency Medicaid for Aliens under state and federal laws, rules, and regulations. The peer reviewers had three issues to determine: whether an EMC existed, the length or duration of the emergency services (when the EMC was alleviated), and whether there were sufficient medical documentation/records to perform a medical review of the rendered services. The peer reviewers were all Florida-licensed physicians, either allopathic or osteopathic, who were matched by specialty or subspecialty to the claims they were reviewing. Each physician testified as to his or her medical or osteopathic education, background and training. Petitioner offered each physician as an expert, and each was accepted as such. The physicians were trained by their peer review organization on the statutes and rules regarding emergency Medicaid for aliens. The physicians then applied the standards contained in the statutes and rules with their education, training and experience to determine whether an EMC existed, the date on which the EMC was alleviated, and whether there were sufficient medical records upon which to make those determinations. SPECIFIC CLAIMS TO DOAH CASE NO. 14-4171 Adam Berko, D.O, a Board-certified family practitioner (a/k/a general practitioner), credibly testified regarding the following claim: Claim (Patient) 3, an 18-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on December 5, 2006, complaining of shortness of breath, chest pain, body aches and abdominal pain. He was diagnosed with acute renal failure and leukocytosis with bandermia. Patient 3 was discharged from the hospital on December 14, 2006. Dr. Berko credibly testified that Patient 3’s EMC had been alleviated as of December 9, 2006. Mark Kanarek, M.D., a Board-certified pediatric physician credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 4, an 11-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on December 6, 2006, with abdominal pain and emesis (vomiting). It was medically necessary to admit Patient 4. An x-ray was taken which showed a subacute intestinal obstruction secondary to adhesions. A follow-up x-ray on December 7, showed there was a resolution of the small bowel distention. By December 8, Patient 4 was having regular bowel movements, which signified no further obstruction. She remained in the hospital until December 10, 2016; however, when Patient 4’s bowel obstruction was alleviated on the 8th, the EMC was alleviated. Claim (Patient) 21, a four-year-old male with Down’s syndrome presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 18, 2006, with a fever following a diagnosis of leukemia. It was an emergent condition for which hospitalization was necessary. Patient 21 continued to have fever spikes through July 23, 2006, which placed the child at a continued risk for life-threatening sepsis. The blood cultures returned as negative and the child was fever-free. Patient 21 remained in the hospital until July 26, 2006, however when the patient’s fever broke, on the 23rd, and the blood cultures returned as negative, the EMC was alleviated. Michael Phillips, M.D., a Board-certified internist credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 5, an 86-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 11, 2006, with nausea, vomiting and dehydration. Given Patient 5’s age and condition, it was medically necessary to admit her. Patient 5 received IV fluids, which were stopped on April 12, 2006. As such, on April 12, Patient 5’s EMC was alleviated, and she was discharged on April 13, 2006. Claim (Patient) 8, a 31-year-old male presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on October 6, 2006, complaining of weakness and dizziness since that morning. Patient 8 was found to have new onset diabetes, after having lost approximately 47 pounds in the preceding four or five months. The admitting diagnosis was “syncope and collapse,” but without mention of a loss of consciousness. There was discussion regarding the signs of the significant weight loss. Patient 8 was discharged on October 12, following his receipt of insulin,7/ oral hypoglycemics8/ and education for his diabetic condition. Patient 8 had “a chronic medical condition that required treatment, but again, it wasn’t something that required immediate emergency care.” There was no EMC. Claim (Patient) 11, a 26-year-old male with a history of testicular cancer, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 29, 2006, for his fifth cycle of chemotherapy. Patient 11 was admitted to a regular nursing floor for his scheduled chemotherapy treatment. Patient 11 was discharged on September 4, 2006. Patient 11 did not have an EMC nor did he receive any emergency services; rather, he had a scheduled medical treatment. Claim (Patient) 27, a 43-year-old female presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 9, 2006, with complaints of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea and chills. She had a two-month history of abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, and was diagnosed as having colitis. Patient 27 was admitted to Lee Memorial, had an abdominal scan and was treated with IV infusions. She did not require immediate surgery or any emergency services during the admission. Patient 27 did not receive any emergency services. She was discharged on September 4, 2006. Steve Beiser, M.D., a Board-certified internist credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 13, a 28-year-old male was admitted to Lee Memorial on October 9, 2006, for an elective surgery. Patient 13 underwent an anterior mediastinal germ cell tumor resection and was discharged on October 14, 2006. Patient 13 did not receive any emergency services. Bruce Shephard, M.D., a Board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist, credibly testified regarding the following claim: Claim (Patient) 18, a 23–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on March 3, 2006, with complaints of being unable to void or have a bowel movement, abdominal pain, and pelvic pain. She was admitted on March 3, and her EMC presented on March 8, when she underwent surgery. Patient 13 was discharged on March 9. The EMC was alleviated on March 8, 2006. SPECIFIC CLAIMS TO DOAH CASE NO. 15-3271 Dr. Berko credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 7, a 52-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on November 30, 2007, with complaints of epigastric pain, anemia and alcohol abuse. During his December 1, 2015, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 21), Dr. Berko testified there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties agreed that Respondent was able to provide the medical records. Dr. Berko was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 23, 2016, Case Detail Report (CDR). Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 66, the CDR which contained Dr. Berko’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 7, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 7. Dr. Kanarek credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 4, an eight-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial with bone pain, fever and a refusal to walk on December 26, 2007. During his January 11, 2016, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 19), Dr. Kanarek testified that there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties agreed that Respondent was able to provide the medical records and Dr. Kanarek was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 21, 2016, CDR. Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 65, the CDR which contained Dr. Kanarek’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 4, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 4. Claim (Patient) 12, a 17-year-old male, was admitted to Lee Memorial on January 17, 2007, for a mediport placement, bone marrow biopsy on January 18, and the initiation of chemotherapy. (Patient 12 had been diagnosed with undifferentiated sarcoma with metastasis to the lungs.) There was no EMC for Patient 12, but rather a planned hospitalization for his cancer treatment. Following his chemotherapy, Patient 12 was discharged on January 22, 2007. Claim (Patient) 24, a six-year-old Down’s syndrome male with leukemia, was admitted to Lee Memorial on October 11, 2007, with fever and pancytopenia. He was discharged on October 15, 2007, after he had been fever-free for 48 hours on October 14. Dr. Kanarek determined that Patient 24’s EMC was alleviated on October 14. Claim (Patient) 27, a two-year-old male, was presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 5, 2007, following a near drowning event which required cardiopulmonary resuscitation. During his January 11, 2016, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 19), Dr. Kanarek testified that there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Respondent was able to provide the medical records. Dr. Kanarek was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 21, 2016, CDR. Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 67, the CDR which contained Dr. Kanarek’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 27, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 27. Claim (Patient) 40, a seven-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on November 26, 2007, with a one- week history of left-sided facial swelling, following a tooth extraction. Although the child had been given oral antibiotics following the tooth extraction, that course of treatment failed, and his facial swelling and pain increased. When hospitalized, Patient 40 was started on IV antibiotics, and by November 28, 2007, his blood culture was negative, he remained afebrile, and his facial swelling had subsided. The EMC was alleviated on November 28, 2007. Patient 40 was discharged on December 10, 2007. Claim (Patient) 44, a 13-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 13, 2007, with a two and one-half month history of weight loss, increased thirst and urination, and a blood glucose of 534. He was admitted to the hospital, given IV normal saline bolus, started on insulin, and received diabetic instruction. Patient 44 did not present with an EMC; he presented with new onset diabetes. Dr. Kanarek credibly testified that Patient 44 never exhibited any signs of diabetic ketoacidosis, an imminently life-threatening condition, and he never required intensive or emergent care. Patient 44 was discharged on August 17, 2007. Thomas Wells, M.D., a Board-certified surgeon and family practitioner, who engages in emergency medicine, family practice and surgery, credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 6, a 26-year-old female, was admitted to Lee Memorial on May 14, 2007, for a scheduled gastric cancer surgery. This patient had a medical condition, but there was no evidence that she presented with an EMC. Patient 6 was discharged on May 21, 2007. Claim (Patient) 46, a 20-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on June 10, 2007, following a motor vehicle crash. Patient 46 was admitted to the hospital with a traumatic brain injury, bilateral chest trauma, blunt abdominal trauma with liver injury, and multiple bone fractures complicated by cocaine use. His hospital stay was complicated by the surgically repaired wounds opening, and he required additional surgeries. By July 2, 2007, Patient 46’s cardiology workup was completed, his arrhythmia was resolved, his abdominal wound was improving, and he was tolerating food by mouth. Dr. Wells determined that his EMC was alleviated by July 2. Patient 46 was discharged from the hospital on July 7, 2007. Claim (Patient) 50, a 33-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 13, 2007, with upper quadrant abdominal pain radiating to his back. Patient 50 was admitted and underwent testing protocol. By July 20, 2007, Patient 50’s white blood count had improved, his temperature was improved and his condition was no longer emergent. Dr. Wells determined that the EMC was alleviated on July 20, 2007. Patient 50 was discharged from the hospital on July 21, 2007. Dr. Beiser credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 9, a 54-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room and was admitted on September 4, 2007. Prior to the admission, Patient 9 had been non-compliant with his health care provider’s instructions, and he was told to “go to the ER.” Although he came in through the emergency department, there was no EMC to address, or to be alleviated. Rather, Patient 9 was a non-compliant patient who needed to comply with his physician’s directions. Patient 54 was discharged on September 8, 2007. Claim (Patient) 11, a 33-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 6, 2007, with a recurrent deep vein thrombosis of her left lower extremity. Her condition was an EMC, and she was admitted. Her physician promptly administered anticoagulation medication and her condition improved, so much so that she was walking well and without chest pain or shortness of breath the following day, April 7. She was discharged on April 9, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined her EMC was alleviated on April 8, 2007. Claim (Patient) 15, a 35–year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 7, 2007, following a motor vehicle accident involving alcohol intoxication. Patient 15 had a left ankle contusion and a closed head injury, which on imaging identified a large brain mass. The mass was determined to be a cyst and no emergent intervention was indicated. The following day, April 8, Patient 15 was alert and oriented with no apparent alcohol withdrawal symptoms. Dr. Beiser determined that his EMC was alleviated on April 8, 2007. Claims 17 and 18 involve the same patient over two different hospitalizations. Patient 17/18, a 51–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on September 5, 2007, with complaint of abdominal pain after gastric bypass surgery. She was admitted to the hospital and noted to have ascites, jaundice and diabetes. Patient 17/18 was found to have liver failure and bacterial peritonitis. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated by September 11, when Patient 17/18’s abdominal pain had resolved and there was significant improvement in her overall condition. On October 13, Patient 17/18 again presented to Lee Memorial with complaints of abdominal pain for four days’ duration. She was known to have severe liver disease. Her abdominal pain was suspected to be bacterial peritonitis and this EMC was treated. By October 15, Patient 17/18 was found to be afebrile with no abdominal tenderness. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on October 15, and the patient was discharged on October 21, 2007. Claim (Patient) 31, a 25-year-old male with a history of meningitis, neurosyphilis and underlying human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on June 14, 2007, with an acute febrile illness and neck mass. He was admitted to the hospital and started on IV antibiotics, and a neck biopsy was performed. Patient 31 had a complicated hospital stay as he had persistent fevers, headaches, episodes of hypotension, and sepsis. Through treatment, his condition improved and he was discharged on July 3, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on June 27, 2007. Claims 33 and 34 involve the same patient over two different hospitalizations. Patient 33/34 is a 67-year-old female who presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on May 21, 2007, with an active gastrointestinal bleed and blood loss anemia. She underwent blood transfusions and the anemia was alleviated by May 22. Patient 33/34 was discharged on May 23, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on May 22, 2007. Patient 33/34 presented to Lee Memorial on July 5, 2007, with an active gastrointestinal bleed and blood loss anemia. Patient 33/34 underwent blood transfusions and the anemia was alleviated on July 6. Patient 33/34 refused any further medical procedures, and she was discharged on July 8, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on July 6, 2007. Claim (Patient) 37, a 27–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on October 12, 2007, with complaints of severe abdominal pain. On October 14, her condition was “improved,” and she denied any abdominal pain, nausea or vomiting. Dr. Beiser determined her EMC was alleviated on October 14. Patient 37 was discharged on October 15, 2007. Claim (Patient) 38, a 32-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on September 28, 2007, with complaints of excessive thirst and urination, with some slight weight loss and weakness. He was admitted to the hospital for uncontrolled diabetes. Although Dr. Beiser determined that uncontrolled diabetes is not an EMC, Patient 38’s records demonstrated that he had diabetic ketoacidosis, which is an EMC. With insulin, Patient 38’s EMC was alleviated on September 29, 2007. He was discharged on October 1, 2007. Claim (Patient) 49, a 33-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 30, 2007, with complaints of right mid-lower quadrant abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting and diarrhea for two days prior to presentation. Patient 49 was admitted to rule out appendicitis. Patient 49 was taken to surgery on May 2, 2007, where an appendectomy was successfully performed. He had an uneventful recovery, and Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on May 2, 2007. Patient 49 was discharged on May 4, 2007. Dr. Shephard credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 36, an 18-year–old female, presented to, and was admitted to Lee Memorial on July 14, 2007, at 31 weeks gestation with a heart condition and mild pre-eclampsia. Her medical condition became emergent on July 26, when she experienced congestive heart failure and decreased oxygen levels. She was transferred to the intensive care unit, and she delivered by emergency C-section on July 28, 2007. Patient 36 was extubated on July 29, and her cardiopulmonary status continued to improve. She was discharged on August 3, 2007. Dr. Shephard determined that Patient 36’s EMC started on July 26 and was alleviated on August 2, 2007. RECOUPMENT OF MEDICAID OVERPAYMENTS Based upon the foregoing findings, and the persuasive weight of the evidence presented by the parties, it is determined: As to Patient 3, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to December 9, 2006; As to Patient 4, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to December 8, 2006; As to Patient 21, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to July 25, 2006; As to Patient 5, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to April 12, 2006; As to Patient 8, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 11, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 27, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 13, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 18, although admitted on March 3, 2006, the EMC presented on March 8, and Patient 13 was discharged on March 9, 2006; (The following patients were seen in 2007.) As to Patient 7, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 4, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 12, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 24, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 14, 2007; As to Patient 27, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 40, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to November 28, 2007; As to Patient 44, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 6, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 46, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 2, 2007; As to Patient 50, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 20, 2007; As to Patient 11, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to April 8, 2007; As to Patient 15, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to April 9, 2007; As to Patient 17, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to September 11, 2007; As to Patient 18, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 15, 2007; As to Patient 33, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to May 22, 2007; As to Patient 34, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 6, 2007; As to Patient 37, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 14, 2007; AA. As to Patient 38, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to September 29, 2007; BB. As to Patient 49, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to May 2, 2007; CC. As to Patient 36, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to August 2, 2007. With respect to both DOAH case numbers, Respondent offered no testimony or evidence to dispute or rebut the testimony on any of the claims presented above. Each expert credibly testified as to when each EMC presented and the date on which each EMC was alleviated. The experts provided the requisite support to both the AFAR and FAR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order sustaining the Medicaid overpayment in DOAH Case No. 14-4171 as $57,337.71, plus sanctions of $2,500, and costs of $2,062.04. With respect to DOAH Case No. 15-3271, the amount due should be recalculated based on only those claims that were found to be overpayments,9/ and costs of $3,528.41. Based on the oral stipulation announced at the hearing (found on Transcript, page 106), AHCA “remove[d] the claim for sanctions as to the 2007 case[s].” DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2016
The Issue Is the practice of Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), limiting Medicaid reimbursement for services provided to undocumented aliens determined by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) to be eligible for Medicaid services for the duration of a medical emergency an "agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency"1/ that section 120.54, Florida Statutes (2014),2/ requires the Agency to adopt as a rule? Are Agency rules 59G-4.160(2) and 59G-5.020 invalid because they exceed the Agency's delegated authority and contravene the statute which the rule implements?3/ & 4/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Title XIX of the Social Security Act establishes Medicaid as a collaborative federal-state program in which the state receives federal financial participation (FFP) from the federal government for services provided to Medicaid-eligible recipients in accordance with federal law. The state also provides funding for the Medicaid program. Section 409.902(1) designates the Agency to administer Florida's Medicaid program. The program provides medical care for indigent people in Florida. Federal and state laws, federal regulations, and state rules, including Medicaid handbooks incorporated by reference into the rules, govern eligibility for, participation in, and payment by the program. The Hospitals are acute care hospitals enrolled as providers in the Florida Medicaid program that provide emergency medical services. They have obtained, and intend to seek in the future, Medicaid compensation for emergency services provided to undocumented aliens. To participate in the Medicaid program, the Hospitals have agreed to a Medicaid Provider Agreement with the Agency. The agreement governs the terms under which the Medicaid program will compensate hospitals for services provided to individuals. Those terms include multiple state and federal statutes and rules discussed below. The Agency makes payments to Hospitals subject to its right to later audit the claims for payment and recoup payments if the Agency determines that they were not authorized. The Medicaid Program and Undocumented Aliens Until 2010 Federal law prohibits compensating a state through federal financial participation under the Medicaid program "for medical assistance furnished to an alien who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law [undocumented aliens]." 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(1). It permits federal financial participation for services provided to otherwise eligible undocumented aliens that "are necessary to treat an emergency medical condition as defined in paragraphs (b)(1) and (c)," if the individual otherwise meets the conditions for participation in the Medicaid program. 42 C.F.R. § 40.255(a). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2). For purposes of eligibility of undocumented aliens, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3) defines "emergency medical condition" as: medical condition (including emergency labor and delivery) manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in-- (A) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy, (B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (C) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. Florida statutes and rules, with minor variations, incorporate the federal standards limiting the eligibility of undocumented aliens to treatment for emergency medical conditions. Federal laws and regulations do not impose a defined endpoint or quantitative limit on the duration of the eligibility due to the emergency medical condition. Sections 409.902 and 409.904 address Medicaid services for undocumented aliens. Section 409.904(4) establishes the criteria for the limited Medicaid eligibility of undocumented aliens. Section 409.902(1) designates the Agency "as the single state agency authorized to make payments for [Medicaid services]." Section 409.902(1) makes [DCF] "responsible for Medicaid eligibility determinations." Section 409.902(2) restricts Medicaid eligibility to United States citizens and lawfully admitted noncitizens who meet the Medicaid eligibility criteria for "qualified noncitizens" for temporary cash assistance.5/ Section 409.902(2)(b) limits use of state funds to provide medical services to individuals who do not meet the requirements of the subsection. It permits an exception for use of state funds to provide medical services that are necessary "to treat an emergency medical condition." The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, June 2011 (Hospital Handbook), incorporated by reference into the Agency's rule 59G-4.160(2), states on page 2-7 the limits on reimbursement for services provided undocumented aliens as follows: The Medicaid Hospital Services Program reimburses for emergency services provided to aliens who meet all Medicaid eligibility requirements except for citizenship or alien status. Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. The Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook, 2012 (Provider Handbook), incorporated by rule 59G-5.020, repeats this limitation. Earlier versions of the Handbooks have essentially the same requirements and limitations. Section 409.904(4) authorizes DCF to find an undocumented alien eligible for Medicaid, but limits the duration of the eligibility for undocumented aliens. It states: A low-income person who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services. The eligibility of such a recipient is limited to the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations. From 2005 to 2012, the definitions of section 409.901 for "emergency medical condition" and "emergency services and care" have remained unchanged, although the subsection numbering for them has changed. "Emergency medical condition" is defined as: A medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, which may include severe pain or other acute symptoms, such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in any of the following: Serious jeopardy to the health of a patient, including a pregnant woman or a fetus. Serious impairment to bodily functions. Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. With respect to a pregnant woman: That there is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery. That a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus. That there is evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions or rupture of the membranes. "Emergency services and care" are defined as: [M]edical screening, examination, and evaluation by a physician, or, to the extent permitted by applicable laws, by other appropriate personnel under the supervision of a physician, to determine whether an emergency medical condition exists and, if it does, the care, treatment, or surgery for a covered service by a physician which is necessary to relieve or eliminate the emergency medical condition, within the service capability of a hospital. DCF's Emergency Medical Services for Aliens, rule 65A-1.715, provides: Aliens who would be eligible for Medicaid but for their immigration status are eligible only for emergency medical services. Section 409.901(10), F.S., defines emergency medical conditions. The Utilization Review Committee (URC) or medical provider will determine if the medical condition warrants emergency medical services and, if so, the projected duration of the emergency medical condition. The projected duration of the emergency medical condition will be the eligibility period provided that all other criteria are continuously satisfied. Emergency services are limited to 30 consecutive days without prior approval. For continued coverage beginning with the 31st day prior authorization must be obtained from the Agency for Health Care Administration (Medicaid Program Office). DCF's rule 65A-1.702(2)(c), implementing Title XIX, in its provisions for establishing a patient's date of eligibility, states: "Coverage for individuals eligible for the Emergency Medicaid for Aliens program begins the first day of a covered emergency and ends the day following the last day of the emergency medical situation." Until July 1, 2010, neither DCF nor the Agency had a system, procedure, or practice for determining when the duration of an undocumented alien's emergency ended or when the emergency was alleviated, other than the initial determination of eligibility. DCF's consistent practice was to make its eligibility determination based upon a review of the information provided by healthcare providers on DCF Form 2039 after discharge of the patient. The providers usually provided additional information and documents, including information about the diagnosis and treatment and the projected or actual duration of the emergency. DCF's practice, since 2002, has been to routinely accept the information and documents submitted by the provider and base the eligibility determination on them. DCF's consistent practice was to not allow providers to submit any documentation until after the patient was discharged. Consequently, the information upon which DCF based its eligibility determination for undocumented aliens was actual, not projected. DCF notifies providers of the eligibility decision by sending a completed DCF Form 2039 or making the information available online. The information contains the specific period of eligibility for the undocumented alien, including the beginning and ending date of the eligibility period. This is the duration of the emergency medical condition. Until July 1, 2010, under previous administrations, the Agency did not make any consistent or meaningful effort to determine if the services for which a hospital billed Medicaid were for the emergency medical conditions that were the predicate for DCF's determination of emergency eligibility. The Agency's automatic process for reviewing Medicaid claims kicked out claims for services to undocumented aliens eligible because of an emergency medical condition. These claims were manually reviewed by just two nurses. The system allowed two choices, "approve" or "deny." Sometimes the nurses reviewed requests for Medicaid reimbursement from providers solely to determine if the services provided were medically necessary. This is the same standard used to determine if Medicaid will pay for services provided to citizens and documented aliens. The process and the number of claims overwhelmed the two nurses conducting the review. A huge claims backlog developed. This resulted in the review becoming more minimal and intermittent. Hospitals complained about the resulting payment delay. The Agency worried about it, too. On September 9, 2009, Dyke Snipes, deputy director of Medicaid, released all the backlogged claims for payment without review. Later, he sent the hospitals a memorandum stating the claims would be paid without further review subject to later audit and claims for recoupment. However, from July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2010, the Agency did not audit any of the claims for payment for hospital services provided to undocumented aliens. In 2002, as required by statute, the Agency began a prior authorization program for Medicaid inpatient hospital services. The purpose was to determine, before payment, if services were medically necessary. The Agency contracted with KePRO to perform the prior authorization reviews for medical necessity. In the case of services to undocumented aliens, the prior authorization review and medical necessity determination was not made, despite the name, until the patient was discharged. The Agency's Bureau of Medicaid Services performed a separate review of claims for payment of services to undocumented aliens to determine if the services were for the treatment of an emergency medical condition. The Bureau conducted this review after the Department had determined that the patients were eligible for Medicaid and after KePRO had authorized the services. Nurses employed by the Agency reviewed the claims and accompanying records to determine if the services were for treatment of an emergency medical condition. The review did not include judgments about the number of days appropriate for treatment, the relationship between services provided, and the emergency or the duration of the emergency. Before July 1, 2010, the Agency, to the extent that it did anything, implemented and applied the rule, statute, and regulation provisions permitting payment for emergency medical services to eligible undocumented aliens by paying claims for the period of eligibility determined by the Department for services that KePRO determined were medically necessary and that the Bureau had determined to be necessary for treatment of an emergency medical condition. The Agency did not conduct a targeted review to determine when the emergency ended or when the emergency was alleviated. Altogether, the Agency was just not enforcing the statutory and rule limitations upon payment for emergency medical services to persons that DCF determined eligible. Federal Audit Eventually, Florida's failure to enforce the limitations came to the attention of the federal government. On August 25, 2009, the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) presented the Agency with the report of its Financial Management Review of Florida's Medicaid Payments for Emergency Services to Undocumented Aliens. The transmittal letter asked Florida "to retroactively review claims for emergency medical services provided to undocumented aliens for proper eligibility determinations. We will defer these claims until the State has reviewed the claims." The federal government said that payment of the FFP to Florida for emergency medical services for undocumented aliens was in question, but it would delay deciding while Florida conducted the requested review. In plainer words, the federal government said it would hold up on recouping FFP paid for services to undocumented aliens. CMS "determined that the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) claimed Federal Financial Participation (FFP) for emergency services to beneficiaries that did not meet the Federal Definition of undocumented alien. In addition, AHCA claimed FFP for additional medical services that did not qualify as emergency care after the patient was stabilized." Finding number 2 of the report stated: "AHCA is claiming FFP for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens provided beyond what Federal statutes and regulations define to be an emergency." Recommendation number five stated: AHCA should review all emergency services for undocumented alien amounts claimed for FFP during Federal Fiscal Years 2005, 2006 and 2007 and re-determine allowability of these claims utilizing the required Federal criteria. Based on this review and re-determination, AHCA should revise previous FFP amounts claimed on the Form CMS-64 quarterly statement of expenditures report to reflect only emergency services to undocumented aliens (supported by SAVE and IVES research) up to the point of stabilization. Upon completion, please report the results of your review to CMS. Recommendation number 6 stated that: "AHCA [should] promptly implement the necessary system edits so that services provided as emergent care can be differentiated from services provided after the point the patients are stable, and then bill to the proper Federal programs."6/ The audit identified the Agency's electronic claims system's lack of system edits needed to account and separate claims for costs incurred "during emergent care and costs past stabilization" as a contributing factor. CMS concluded that it believed Florida's claims for payment for emergency medical services were "significantly overstated." The report stated: "During our review, we found that AHCA is claiming costs for emergency services for undocumented aliens, during the patients' entire hospital stay, and beyond the emergency or stabilization point as defined by Federal statutes and regulations." It asked Florida to conduct "re-reviews of claims for emergency medical services provided undocumented aliens." CMS did not recommend that Florida change its statutes or rules governing Medicaid eligibility of undocumented aliens. It only recommended that Florida enforce existing law. In September 2010, the Office of Inspector General for the United States Department of Health and Human Services released its "Review of Medicaid Funding for Emergency Services Provided to Nonqualified Aliens [by Florida]." This review observed that the Agency "relied upon two medical staff to review approximately 4,000 such claims per month, and this limited review was not sufficient to prevent some unallowable claims from being paid." The review also noted the problem with the system edits that the Agency was using. The system just identified claims for services to undocumented aliens and kicked them out for review by the two nurses who were not capable of properly reviewing the claims because of the overwhelming volume. The review observed that the system had an edit which could classify claims under five options: emergency, urgent, elective, newborn, and information not available. The review stated: "If active, this edit may have ensured that the State Agency properly claimed Federal reimbursements." The audit and the review, as well as the testimony of Johnnie Shepherd, the Agency administrator, convincingly establish that up to 2010, the Agency was not applying or enforcing federal or Florida statutory and rule requirements limiting medical services to undocumented aliens for emergency conditions. The Agency Reacts to the Audit and Review The Agency began working to implement the recommendations. KePRO presented a proposal to expand the scope of its services that it described in this fashion: It is our understanding that the Agency for Health Care Administration used internal resources to conduct such [emergency care for undocumented aliens] reviews. Previously, cases were authorized for payment using medical necessity criteria verses [sic] "point of stabilization." Approximately 12,000 cases dating back to 2006 fall into this category. This presents the Agency with an opportunity to recoup payments for hospital days that exceeded the "point of stabilization." The Agency amended its contract with KePRO to include review of claims for emergency services to undocumented aliens to determine if the services continued beyond the duration of the emergency. The Agency and KePRO began the review process. The requirements are included in the Agency's contracts with KePRO's successor, eqHealth Solutions. The Agency began advising providers of the coming changes in review and authorization of Medicaid services for undocumented aliens. The Agency's campaign incorporated use of "stabilization" from the CMS reviews. "Stabilization" did not appear in any pertinent Florida statutes or rules. A July 1, 2010, letter to all Medicaid providers from the chief of the Bureau of Medicaid Services advised of upcoming changes to the Agency's procedure and practice for reviewing claims for undocumented aliens. It is representative of the Agency's approach. The letter stated: Beginning July 1, 2010, the Keystone Peer Review Organization (KePRO), Medicaid's contractor for utilization management of inpatient services, will implement revised review processes for inpatient admissions for undocumented aliens. KePRO will review these requests to determine whether conditions requiring hospitalization are an emergency, defined in 42 CFR 440.255 as follows: The sudden onset of a medical condition (including emergency labor and delivery) manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in: Placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy; Serious impairment to bodily functions; or Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic care after the emergency has subsided and the patient is stabilized. The letter also stated: Professional services provided to an inpatient alien on or after the date that the patient has been stabilized will not be reimbursed by Medicaid. From the point of patient stabilization, the patient may continue to require medically necessary treatment; however, Medicaid cannot reimburse medically necessary treatment for aliens, only emergency treatment. Hospitals, including many of the challengers here, brought an action claiming the Agency was using a new "stabilization" standard that amounted to a rule that had not been adopted. They prevailed. That action was Bayfront I. The Final Order in Bayfront I found that "the 'point of stabilization' standard was an interpretation or an implementation of the existing statutes and rules and not merely a restatement of them." Bayfront I, DOAH Case No. 12-2757RU, at ¶ 54. It concluded that the "Agency's 'stabilization' standard for determining which services to un-documented aliens Medicaid will pay for is a statement of general applicability meeting the definition of a rule that has not been adopted pursuant to section 120.54(1)(a)." Bayfront I, DOAH Case No. 12-2757RU, at ¶ 74. The Final Order required the Agency to "immediately discontinue all reliance upon the 'stabilization' standard or any substantially similar statement as a basis for agency action." Since Bayfront I The Agency complied with the Final Order by discontinuing all reliance on a "stabilization standard" (or any other unadopted standard) as a basis for agency action. It did not abandon its efforts to review past, present, and future hospital claims for Medicaid payment for emergency services provided to undocumented aliens. The Agency developed new instructions for peer reviewers evaluating claims and amended affected contracts. It provided reviewers the language of the governing rules and statutes to use in evaluations. The material included the provisions of the Florida Medicaid Handbooks that have been incorporated by reference into the Agency's rules. The Agency emphasized, as Shevaun Harris, bureau chief, Bureau of Medicaid Services, testified: [Peer reviewers should] no longer use stabilize, to use--to use that terminology anymore, and that they should follow the policy. The policy--the handbook provides instruction to readers in terms of which words they need to go back to the glossary. And then words that are not defined are its plain--should be used--should be applied using its plain meaning. (Pet. Ex. 130, pp. 29 & 30). The Agency expected the reviewers to apply their education, clinical expertise, and experience to determine if services provided were "emergency services or treatment," as defined in section 409.901(11) for an "emergency medical condition," as defined in section 409.901(10). A January 28, 2013, memorandum to peer reviewers from Johnnie Shepherd, AHCA Administrator, Medicaid Program Integrity, is a representative example of the Agency's instructions to peer reviewers. It told the reader of the result of Bayfront I and stated that the Agency "will cease to rely upon the 'stabilization' standard or any substantially similar statement as a basis for determining the duration of the emergency." The Agency attached applicable excerpts from statutes and rules. It also advised the importance of reports "of sufficient detail and complexity to clearly support any claims payment adjustments based upon the medical determination and the application of Medicaid rules." (P. Ex. 130, AHCA Bates No. 463). Similarly, the Agency advised other "vendor[s] to make sure that they were using terminology as found in the rules that are promulgated and that their determinations are consistent with the rules as they are promulgated." (Pet. Ex. 130, p. 15). The vendors advised their employees and agents accordingly. Exhibit 2 to the desposition7/ of Carol Roberts, program manager for the Fee for Service Rules Unit, is a representative example of these instructions. The Power Point slides for a presentation reproduced the statutory definition for "emergency medical condition" and "emergency services and care." A March 7, 2013, internal eqHealth e-mail from Naveen Gande to Mary McPhee demonstrates that the vendors followed the instructions. It states that the "stabilization" standard should not be used and that reviewers should refer to the Agency handbooks. Likewise an e-mail exchange between Mr. Shepherd and Eileen Bechkes of Vendor Health Integrity demonstrates the Agency's reliance upon statutes and rules. Ms. Bechkes relayed a question from Winter Haven Hospital asked during an audit entrance conference. It asked to "explain the difference between the standard of 'stabilization of the emergency condition' and the standard of 'emergency condition is relieved or eliminated.'" (Pet. Ex. 119[B], p. 3).8/ Mr. Shepherd's response states the Agency position frankly. Thanks for this question. Our positon is to direct the provider to the Medicaid Provider's general Handbook and the other references mentioned in the audit letters. Since this question has been brought up prior to the other letters conveying the references to the provider, we should simply tell them to read the Medicaid policy reference for the limited coverage category that pertains to Medicaid for Aliens as found in the Medicaid Provider General Handbook. Also, the General Handbook includes definitions for Emergency Services and Care and Emergency Medical Condition. Finally, we are asking the peer reviewers to apply their education, experience and judgment in reviewing the respective medical records to determine if an emergency medical condition existed, and if it did at what point was the emergency medical condition alleviated or eliminated per the definitions found in the Medicaid references. The instructions to Agency or vendor employees reviewing the claims for payment for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens consistently emphasized that all participants were to apply only the applicable statutes and rules and that "stabilization" was not a criterion. The Hospitals rely heavily upon the wording of the post-Bayfront I amendment to the eqHealth contract (P. Ex. 89) and Ms. Harris's testimony about it. (P. Ex. 130, p. 117, ll. 19-22). These things, the hospitals argue, prove that the Agency is still attempting to determine the length of the period of eligibility and that this is a new interpretation of the rules and statutes. The existing language provided that the vendor would review the cases to time the point at which the emergency no longer existed and the patient's condition was stable. The amendment said: "The Vendor shall review these cases to determine the point at which the emergency no longer exists, in accordance with state and federal statutes." Ms. Harris's testimony on page 119 of Petitioner's Exhibit 30 clarifies that the amendment was referring to "the Agency's obligation to pay for services for undocumented aliens or individual who met all other requirements for Medicaid, except citizenship." The weight of the evidence, including training materials and written communications, proves that despite poor wording in the amendment, the parties to the contract stayed focused on determining whether the Agency was being asked to pay for services that state and federal law permitted it to, not determining the length of the emergency medical condition. The Agency was resolute in its commitment to only apply the standards and definitions of statutes and rules in the evaluation of claims for payment for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens. The Agency's resolve was tested in meetings with provider representatives, inquiries from vendors, and internal questions. Agency representatives repeatedly said that the rules and statutes determine the standards and people should apply the plain meaning of their words. Agency documents did the same. The Agency did not succumb to the temptation, as it did with "stabilization," to explain in different words the words of statute and rule. The weight of the evidence convincingly established that after entry of the Final Order in Bayfront I, the Agency's statements of general applicability implementing the law governing Medicaid reimbursement for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens were only quotes from or references to governing statutes and rules.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, as well as the factual stipulations entered into by the parties, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed practical nurse in the State of Florida holding license number PN 0626161. At all times material hereto, Dr. Vladimir Rosenthal owned three clinics in Dade and Broward Counties at which he performed abortions. The clinics were located in Coral Gables (hereinafter referred to as the "Coral Gables clinic"), North Miami (hereinafter referred to as the "North Miami clinic") and Plantation (hereinafter referred to as the "Broward clinic"). All three clinics were licensed under Chapter 390, Florida Statutes. In September and October, 1989, Respondent was employed by Rosenthal and worked full-time as a licensed practical nurse in the North Miami clinic. During this period of time, she had no responsibilities with regard to the other two clinics owned by Rosenthal. Among Respondent's duties at the North Miami clinic during this time period was to prepare, under Rosenthal's direct supervision, packages of medications that Rosenthal gave to his patients, free of charge, to take home with them upon their discharge, a practice that Rosenthal has since discontinued. 6/ On September 30, 1989, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) conducted an on-site inspection at the Coral Gables clinic. Respondent was not present at the clinic during the inspection. Nor were there any patients at the clinic at the time. Approximately 50 small manilla envelopes containing multiple doses of medications were found in a drawer of a desk in the clinic. The envelopes were labeled to the extent that they indicated the name of the drugs they contained, but they did not provide any information regarding the lot number, expiration date or the name of the manufacturer of the drugs. Carmen Penaloza, one of the clinic workers who was present during the inspection, was asked to demonstrate how these packages were prepared. Penaloza proceeded to take an empty manilla envelope like the ones that had been found in the desk drawer and fill it with medication that came from a large container. In performing this demonstration, she did not use gloves and her bare hands came in contact with the medication. Carlos Arias, a licensed pharmacist and one of the HRS employees who participated in the inspection, advised Penaloza that the technique she had employed was unsanitary and recommended that in the future she use a tray and spatula like pharmacists do to perform such a task. The HRS inspection also revealed that medical devices were being stored in a refrigerator that also contained food items. On October 26, 1989, HRS conducted an on-site inspection of the North Miami clinic. Arias was among the various HRS employees who were on the inspection team. Diane Robie, a medical quality assurance investigator with the Department, accompanied the team members on their inspection. Approximately 30 envelopes containing medications were found during the inspection. They were similar to the packages that had been discovered the month before at the Coral Gables clinic. Respondent was at the clinic when the inspection was conducted. Penaloza was also there. No patients were present, however. Respondent was asked to demonstrate how the packages were prepared. Penaloza was nearby at the time the request was made. She saw Respondent nervously looking around and concluded that Respondent was unable to locate any sterile gloves to use. She therefore told Respondent where such gloves could be found. Respondent then donned the gloves, laid a clean piece of paper on top of the desk where she was situated, placed tablets from a large container onto the paper and pushed each tablet with a tongue blade into a small manilla envelope. 7/ The technique that Respondent used during her demonstration, while it may have been unconventional from the perspective of a pharmacist like Arias, nonetheless was antiseptic and therefore acceptable. Sometime during the inspection Respondent made a statement that led Robie to erroneously believe that Respondent was responsible for packaging medications, not just at the North Miami clinic, but at the Coral Gables clinic as well. A finding of probable cause was initially made in this case on May 14, 1990. An Administrative Complaint was thereafter issued and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Department received the following letter, dated September 4, 1990, from counsel for Respondent concerning settlement of the case: This will confirm our understanding that you will file a notice of dismissal with DOAH of the case now pending against my client and, providing the dismissal is confirmed as a final dismissal and closing order entered by the probable cause panel, that Ms. Echlov will agree not to seek fees against your agency under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. In the event the panel does not approve a final dismissal and instructs you to refile the case, neither party will be prejudiced by the present agreement and each party will retain all rights otherwise available to them, including my client's rights to seek fees should the case be refiled. If this does not reflect our understanding, please notify me at once. Otherwise, please fax me a copy of your notice of dismissal so that I can take the final hearing off my calendar. Thank you for your efforts to resolve this matter amicably. Counsel for Respondent sent to the Department, and the Department received, the following follow-up letter, dated November 6, 1990: You may recall that we reached an agreement in the above-referenced case providing for a voluntary dismissal on your part and promise on mine that my client would not seek attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. You had to take the case back before the Probable Cause Panel and ask them to close it. In order that I can close my file and know that this matter is, in fact, concluded, please let me know whether you have taken the case back before the Probable Cause Panel and, if so, the outcome. If there are documents reflecting same, please, please send me a copy. If the case has not been taken back before the Panel, please let me know when this will be done. Thanks. I'll be looking forward to hearing from you. Counsel for Respondent sent to the Department, and the Department received, a third letter, dated January 14, 1991, the body of which read, as follows: It has now been over four months since we reached our "understanding" that DPR would dismiss the case pending before DOAH (which you did) and that my client would forego her right to seek fees under the EAJA, providing (to quote from my September 4, 1990 letter to you) "that the dismissal is confirmed as a final dismissal and a closing order [is] entered by the probable cause panel." The final part of the bargain has never been performed so far as I know (and, if it was performed, the action was illegal since I requested notification of the date when the matter would be presented to the panel so that I might attend or send a court reporter but never received any). I have not, of course, received any final order of dismissal from the probable cause panel. If, within ten days of the date of this letter, I have not received either: an order of closure from the probable cause panel, or the time, date and place when our agreement will be presented to the panel, I will consider that DPR is in breach of the agreement and pursue all remedies available to my client, including attorneys' fees. I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience. The probable cause panel met a second time, at which it determined not to reconsider its initial finding of probable cause. 8/ Neither Respondent nor her attorney were notified of this second meeting of the probable cause panel. Following this meeting, an Amended Administrative Complaint was filed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order (1) finding the evidence insufficient to establish that Respondent engaged in "unprofessional conduct," within the meaning of Section 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, and (2) dismissing said complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 10th day of January, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 1992.
