The Issue Does Petitioner, Department of Financial Services (DFS), have authority to determine if Respondent, Alberto Luis Sotero (Mr. Sotero) and Respondent, FalconTrust Group, Inc. (FalconTrust), wrongfully took or witheld premium funds owed an insurance company while a civil action between the insurance company and Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust pends in Circuit Court presenting the same issues? Should the insurance agent license of Mr. Sotero be disciplined for alleged violations of Sections 626.561(1), 626.611(7), 626.611(10), 626.611(13), and 626.621(4), Florida Statutes (2007)?1. Should the insurance agency license of FalconTrust be disciplined for alleged violations of Section 626.561(1), 626.6215(5)(a), 626.6215(5)(d). 626.6215(5)(f), and 626.6215(5)(k), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Sotero is licensed by DFS as an insurance agent in Florida and has been at all times material to this matter. He holds license number A249545. FalconTrust is licensed by DFS as an insurance agency in this state and has been at all times material to this matter. It holds license number L014424. Mr. Sotero is an officer and director of FalconTrust and held these positions at all times material to this proceeding. Mr. Sotero also controlled and directed all actions of FalconTrust described in these Findings of Fact. Zurich American Insurance Company is a commercial property and casualty insurance company. FalconTrust Commercial Risk Specialists, Inc., and Zurich-American Insurance Group entered into an "Agency-Company Agreement" (Agency Agreement) that was effective January 1, 1999. The Agency Agreement bound the following Zurich entities, referred to collectively as Zurich: Zurich Insurance Company, U.S. Branch; Zurich American Insurance Company of Illinois; American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company; American Zurich Insurance Company; and Steadfast Insurance Company. The Agreement specified that FalconTrust was an "independent Agent and not an employee of the Company [Zurich.]". . .. The Agency Agreement also stated: All premiums collected by you [Falcontrust] are our [Zurich's] property and are held by you as trust funds. You have no interest in such premiums and shall make no deduction therefrom before paying same to us [Zurich] except for the commission if any authorized by us in writing to be deducted by you and you shall not under any circumstances make personal use of such funds either in paying expense or otherwise. If the laws or regulations of the above state listed in your address require you to handle premiums in a fiduciary capacity or as trust funds you agree that all premiums of any kind received by or paid to you shall be segregated held apart by you in a premium trust fund account opened by you with a bank insured at all times by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and chargeable to you in a fiduciary capacity as trustee for our benefit and on our behalf and you shall pay such premiums as provided in this agreement. (emphasis supplied. The Agency Agreement commits Zurich to pay FalconTrust commissions "on terms to be negotiated . . . ." It requires FalconTrust to pay "any sub agent or sub producer fees or commissions required." The Agency Agreement also provides: Suspension or termination of this Agreement does not relieve you of the duty to account for and pay us all premiums for which you are responsible in accordance with Section 2 and return commissions for which you are responsible in accordance with Section 3 [the Commission section.] The Agency Agreement was for Mr. Sotero and Falcontrust to submit insurance applications for the Zurich companies to underwrite property and casualty insurance, primarily for long- haul trucking. The Agency Agreement and all the parties contemplated that Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust would deduct agreed-upon commissions from premiums and remit the remaining funds to Zurich. On September 14, 2000, Zurich and Mr. Sotero amended the Agency Agreement to change the due date for premium payments and to replace FalconTrust Group, Inc. (FalconTrust) for FalconTrust Commercial Risk Specialists, Inc., and to replace Zurich-American Insurance Group and Zurich Insurance Company, U.S. Branch, with Zurich U.S. Mr. Sotero and Zurich's authorized agent, Account Executive Sue Marcello, negotiated the terms of the commission agreement as contemplated in the Agency Agreement. Mr. Sotero confirmed the terms in a July 20, 1999, letter to Ms. Marcello. The parties agreed on a two-part commission. One part was to be paid from the premiums upon collection of the premiums. The second part, contingent upon the program continuing for five years, was to be paid by Zurich to Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust. The total commission was 20 percent. FalconTrust and Mr. Sotero were authorized to deduct 13 percent of the commission from premiums before forwarding them to Zurich. The remaining seven percent Zurich was to pay to Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust at the end of the program or after the fifth year anniversary date. The letter spelled out clearly that Zurich would hold the money constituting the seven percent and was entitled to all investment income earned on the money. The passage describing the arrangement reads as follows: Our total commission is 20 percent however Zurich will hold and retain the first 7 percent commission where they are entitle [sic] to earn investment income. I understand that FalconTrust will not benefit from this compounded investment income. However you mentioned you would increase our initial commission that is set at 13 percent currently from time to time depending on FalconTrust reaching their goals, but it will never exceed a total commission of 20 percent. It is to our understanding that the difference will be paid at the end of the program or after the fifth year anniversary date being 12/31/2005, but not earlier than five years. I do understand that if Zurich and/or FalconTrust cancels the program on or before the fourth year being 12/31/2004 that we are not entitle [sic] to our remaining commission that you will be holding. If the program is cancelled after 12/31/2004 by FalconTrust and/or Zurich it is understood that all commission being held will be considered earned. (emphasis added.) Until the program ended, the parties conducted themselves under the Agency Agreement as described in the letter. At some point the parties agreed to decrease the percentage retained by Zurich to five percent and increase the percentage initially paid to and kept by FalconTrust to 15 percent. During the course of the relationship FalconTrust produced approximately $146,000,000 in premiums for Zurich. At all times relevant to this matter, all premium payments, except for the portion deducted by sub-agents and producers before forwarding the payments to Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust were deposited into a trust account. The various sub-agents of FalconTrust collected premiums and forwarded them to FalconTrust, after deducting their commissions, which were a subpart of the FalconTrust 13 percent commission. FalconTrust in turn forwarded the remaining premium funds after deducting the portion of its 13 percent left after the sub-agent deduction. This was consistent with the Agency Agreement and accepted as proper by Zurich at all times. All parties realized that the held-back seven percent, later five percent, was money that Zurich would owe and pay if the conditions for payment were met. The parties conducted themselves in keeping with that understanding. Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust described the practice this way in their Third Amended Complaint in a court proceeding about this dispute: "In accordance with the Commission Agreement, Zurich held the contingency/holdback commission and received investment income thereon." (Emphasis supplied.) In 2006 Zurich decided to end the program. In a letter dated December 8, 2006, Tim Anders, Vice President of Zurich, notified Mr. Sotero that Zurich was terminating the Agency-Company Agreement of January 1, 1999. The letter was specific. It said Zurich was providing "notification of termination of that certain Agency-Company Agreement between Zurich American Insurance Company, Zurich American Insurance Co. of Illinois, American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co., American Zurich Insurance Company, Steadfast Insurance Company . . . and FalconTrust Grup, Inc. . . ., dated January 1, 1999, . . .." Mr. Sotero wrote asking Zurich to reconsider or at least extend the termination date past the March 15, 2007, date provided in the letter. Zurich agreed to extend the termination date to April 30, 2007. At the time of termination FalconTrust had fulfilled all of the requirements under the Agency-Agreement for receipt of the held-back portion of the commissions. Mr. Sotero asked Zurich to pay the held-back commission amounts. He calculated the amount to exceed $7,000,000. Zurich did not pay the held- back commission amounts. As the program was winding down and the termination date approached, FalconTrust continued to receive premiums. As the Agency Agreement and negotiated commission structure provided, FalconTrust deducted its initial commission from the premium payments. But, reacting to Zurich's failure to begin paying the held back commission amounts, Mr. Sotero engaged in "self help." He deducted at least $6,000,000 from the premium payments from customers, received and deposited in the trust account. He took the money as payment from Zurich of earned and held back commissions.3 Nothing in the Agency Agreement or negotiated commission agreement authorized this action. In March of 2007, Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust also brought suit against Zurich in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida. The issues in that proceeding include whether Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust wrongfully took premiums and how much Zurich owes them for commissions. As of the final hearing, that cause (Case Number 07-6199-CA-01) remained pending before the court and set for jury trial in August 2010. There is no evidence of a final disposition. But the court has entered a partial Summary Judgment determining that FalconTrust wrongfully took premium funds for the commissions that it maintained Zurich owed. The court's Order concludes that the issue is not whether Zurich owed money to FalconTrust, but whether FalconTrust was entitled to take the funds when it did. Like the undersigned, the court determines that it was not. Between December 8, 2006, the date of the cancelation letter, and April 30, 2007, the program termination date, Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust did not remit to Zurich any of the approximately $6,000,000 in premium payments received. Despite not receiving premiums, Zurich did not cancel or refuse to issue the policies for which the premiums taken by Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust were payment. The policies remained in effect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services suspend the license of Adalberto L. Sotero for nine months and suspend the license of FalconTrust Group, Inc. for nine months. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the respondent Jules Maxwell Hanken was licensed as an ordinary life, including disability, agent in Florida, and was the President of Gulf Health/Life, Inc. in St. Petersburg, Florida. Though some administrative and supervisory duties were delegated to other individuals, respondent was the ultimate supervisor of insurance agents and employees at Gulf Health/Life. Respondent assumed the primary and major responsibility for training, directing and instructing employees to work as insurance salesmen within the agency. COUNTS I and VI The American Benevolent Society, Inc. was formed by the respondent and others in mid-1978, and was incorporated on November 22, 1978. The organization was described as "a society devoted to the welfare and benefit of independent Americans." Among its stated purposes was the provision of information and referral services dealing with medical, legal, benevolent, financial and recreational matters. The ABS also provided a newsletter and discounts to its members from numerous area businesses and dining establishments, as well as travel discounts and information. The membership fee was $15.00 for an individual and $25.00 for a family. New members were advised that one of the functions of the ABS was to solve the problem of high medical costs, and that members having difficulties with insurance claims could receive aid from the ABS. The offices of the ABS were located in the same building as Gulf Health/Life, Inc., but a separate telephone number and listing was maintained for the ABS. Employees of Gulf Health/Life, Inc. who answered the ABS telephone were instructed to not let callers know that the ABS office was in the Gulf Health office and to inform ABS callers that their insurance agent was not located at that office. In the sale of accident and health insurance, which was a major portion of the insurance sold at Gulf Health/Life, Inc., efforts were made by the respondent to offer insurance which would provide a discount in premium to members of the ABS. Apparently, respondent attempted to have the ABS endorse various insurance companies in return for members of the ABS receiving a "group" or "association" premium which would be less than the premium for an individual purchasing the same insurance. CNA did provide such a plan on one of its policies for individual members of the ABS, as well as for other associations, whereby the premiums for ABS members were slightly lower (approximately $10.00 per individual) than for members of the general public purchasing the same insurance. Neither Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Co. nor Founders Life Assurance Co. offered any group rate or reduction in insurance premiums to members of the ABS. Insurance salesmen employed at Gulf Health/Life, Inc. were instructed and directed by the respondent to also sell membership in the ABS. They received a commission for each membership sold and most sales were made at the same time as sales of insurance policies were made. It is estimated that approximately ninety-five percent (95 percent) of the ABS members also had insurance with a company represented by Gulf Health/Life, Inc. Respondent's insurance salesmen were directed in writing to always explain to the customer the difference between the ABS and the insurance company, to always collect separate checks and give separate receipts for the ABS membership fee and the insurance premium, and to require new ABS members to sign a form whenever they purchased insurance expressly acknowledging that the ABS was not the insurance company and that the endorsement and recommendation of insurance by the ABS did not imply or guarantee any discount in insurance premium. The respondent's agents were also required to place their signature on this form. In addition, the printed application form for membership in the ABS stated, in relevant part, as follows: I . . . am not joining as a prerequisite to obtaining insurance . . . and I realize that the A.B.A. insurance endorsement in no way implies or guarantees any discount or deviation from the ordinary premium established for the policies included. It is understood that the Society is not the insurance company." Respondent's salesmen were directed to obtain from each new ABS member the names of other persons who might be interested in ABS membership, and the amount of the salesman's commission for each ABS sale was dependent upon the number of referrals contained in each application. For example, an individual application for ABS membership with no referrals earned the salesperson a commission of $4.50, while an application with three referrals merited a commission of $7.50. Membership agents for the ABS, who were also licensed insurance agents, were required to sign a document acknowledging their understanding that monies collected for ABS were to be maintained separately from insurance premiums, that no preferential recommendations were to be made for insurance plans endorsed by the ABS over other plans which the agent was licensed to represent and "that solicitation of ABS members is in no way connected to or reliant upon insurance plans, programs, or policies, as no person's ability to obtain any insurance is helped or hindered by ABS membership; however, membership must be established prior to insurance solicita- tion through the American Benevolent Society. In contrast to the above-discussed specific written instructions and disclaimer forms requiring the signatures of agents and new customers, several agents employed by the respondent were of the opinion that those written forms and instructions were not consistent with what agents were verbally directed by respondent to use as a sales presentation. These agents believed that respondent, during the training sessions, was instructing them to blur together the presentations for sales of insurance and ABS membership so that the customer would believe that they could obtain better insurance (either in terms of coverage or lower premiums) through membership in the ABS. The agents were instructed in a sales technique which would begin with an explanation to the customer as to how difficult it is, because of the customer's age and/or physical condition, to obtain proper insurance coverage and then to explain that the ABS was formed for the purpose of solving those problems, could help its members in obtaining better and lower cost insurance, and could ultimately help them in their claims with the various companies. These agents admitted that they were instructed to avoid the term "group insurance," but stated that they were to use other terminology to suggest an association or group. Several former agents and employees testified that they received a "negative commission," or a reduction in their usual insurance commission, if they sold insurance to a customer without simultaneously selling that customer a membership in the ABS. No documentary evidence was offered to substantiate this testimony. Some of the respondent's insurance agents did tell customers that they had to be a member of the ABS before they could obtain certain insurance. These agents did, however, sell insurance without ABS membership and did sell ABS membership without insurance. They also sold ABS memberships simultaneously with the sale of insurance policies with companies which offered no benefits for ABS members. As noted above, CNA did offer a slight discount in premium on one of its policies to members of the ABS. The only three customers called as witnesses by the petitioner in this proceeding did join the ABS in order to acquire what they believed to a be a cheaper, group rate for their CNA policies, and to obtain discounts on other products. These customers did receive the discount provided to ABS members on at least one of the CNA policies purchased through respondent's agents. The agent did not explain the exact amount of the discount to them as compared with the ABS membership fee, nor did the agent compare the premiums with individual, as opposed to group, premiums. No other members of the ABS (which at one time had a membership of 700 or 800 persons) or the general public were called by the petitioner to testify in this proceeding. 1/ The only other member of the ABS who testified was called by the respondent, and he testified that he purchased a membership in the ABS after he bought insurance from one of the respondent's agents. He was told membership in the ABS would bring him certain services, benefits and discounts, but was not told he would receive a discount or reduction in his insurance premium. This witness was named in the Administrative Complaint as being one of the victims of the deceptive sales practices directed or authorized by the respondent. Insurance agents at Gulf Health/Life used various titles on their business cards and in reference to themselves. Some utilized the word "counselor," while others were referred to as "Regional Group Director." The purpose of utilizing the term "counselor" was not to disguise the fact that an agent was an insurance salesman, but rather to avoid the often poor public image associated with an insurance salesman. Upon inquiry to the State Insurance Commissioner's Office, the respondent's office was informed by letter dated January 21, 1980, that there was no statutory prohibition against use of the term "counselor" by insurance agents. An Insurance Department rule was referenced which prohibits the representation by an agent that he is a "counselor, advisor or similar designation" for any group or association of medicare eligible individuals, which representation does not reflect the true role of the agent in the solicitation of insurance. Salesmen were encouraged by respondent to avoid discussions with customers regarding the commission they may make on a potential sale. This was emphasized in training sessions for the purpose of illustrating what the proper attitude of an insurance salesman should be; to wit: to sell customers what they need and not what the salesman desires in terms of a commission. Respondent's employees and agents were not instructed to inform customers that they were not insurance salesmen or that they did not receive remuneration by way of commission. COUNT II Some thirty years ago, Earl Jacobs, a professional photographer prior to joining respondent's insurance company, constructed what he calls a "safe light." This is a wooden box which has a lightbulb in it and a glass filter across the face. The light can be openly used in a darkroom while working with light-sensitive photography paper. For some period of time, this device was kept on the premises of Gulf Health/Life, Inc. because the agency was putting together a brochure with each agent's picture. The restroom area was considered to be an ideal darkroom facility for the processing of prints. The "safe light" is referred to as a "light box" in the Administrative Complaint. Former employees and agents observed this device either in the closet of the woman's restroom or under the desk of Lynda C. Rushing, Vice President of Gulf Health/Life, Inc. Five witnesses observed the device in use by Lynda Rushing while either kneeling on the floor near her desk or while in another room. While it appeared to these witnesses that Ms. Rushing was using the device to trace customers' signatures onto insurance documents, no such documents were produced, no insured's name was given, nor did any customer or member of the general public present testimony as to a signature which was not genuine. 2/ Respondent ordered the device removed immediately after he was informed by a secretary that an irate customer had been in the office complaining that a signature on an insurance policy was not his signature. Applications and other insurance documents were frequently returned to respondent's agents for the purpose of obtaining an omitted signature. There was no testimony or other evidence in this proceeding to indicate that respondent Hanken ever used the device known as a "light box," or that he directed other employees to use this device to trace signatures. COUNT III Many, if not most, of the individuals employed by the respondent as insurance agents had no prior insurance experience. Sales techniques and practices were taught them by the respondent through extensive training sessions and the use of a sales manual called Psaleschology, which was primarily authored by the respondent. Agents were instructed to learn and were tested on the concepts expressed in the sales manual. The training sessions involved role- playing between the respondent and an agent, utilizing the concepts expressed in the manual. During the early stages of an agent's training, he was required to complete a form when he did not effectuate a sale, listing which steps in the manual were not followed by the salesman. While some salesmen believed that they were expected to follow the manual "verbatim" in their sales presentation, others, including the respondent, felt that the manual and the concepts expressed therein were simply guidelines or reminders of the principles of the psychology of salesmanship. Respondent considered the manual's purpose to be one of introducing to the salesman a formal attitude about selling and a demonstrative learning instrument. The sales manual under which the respondent's agents were trained does utilize the concepts of "MID/TIA" (Make It Difficult/Take It Away"); fear and greed, and fabrication. As explained by the respondent, these concepts of reverse psychology, motivation by relating to strong human emotion and demonstrations of risk are common techniques in salesmanship. They can as readily be described as concepts concerning the theory of supply and demand, the recognition of people's concerns and desires as motivating factors and the personalization of real events by fabrication of the characters. During a training session, the respondent related to his salesmen that he had once used the technique of telling an insurance customer who was reluctant to speak with him that he had come there to give the customer a Maas Brothers gift certificate. This was cited as an example of a method to persuade the unreceptive customer to open the door. There was no testimony that any of the respondent's salesmen ever actually used that technique or that respondent ever actually directed his employees to use such a technique. Maas Brothers gift certificates were in fact given to customers by Gulf Life/Health employees for a period of time when the customer gave an agent referrals for other sales. The respondent's manual does contain suggested techniques of reinstating lapsed policies by providing option or adjustment alternatives. One agent, who testified that he followed the respondent's manual literally during his early months with the company, stated that he would tell customers whose policies were about to lapse that they had a specific refund or monetary adjustment due them. This technique was utilized to gain entrance to the customer's home and to resell them insurance. This agent's technique was reported to the respondent by another agent, and respondent directed him to cease using the "refund" approach to reinstate lapsed policies. There was no testimony from any purchaser of insurance, potential insurance customer or other member of the general public that the techniques set forth in the respondent's sales manual or emphasized in his training sessions were actually practiced to the extent that the customer was frightened, coerced or deceived into purchasing insurance from the respondent's agency. 3/ COUNT IV Prior to becoming licensed to sell policies for Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Company, agent Edmund Shoman solicited and obtained applications for insurance with that company. Vice President Lynda Rushing, who was licensed with that company, signed these applications for him. At the time, Mr. Shoman was licensed to sell insurance with another company. There was no evidence to suggest that respondent had any knowledge that Ms. Rushing signed applications brought into the office by Mr. Shoman, or that Mr. Shoman received any commissions on these sales Bradley Wasserman had never sold insurance prior to being employed by the respondent. After one week of training, and prior to receiving his license, according to Bradley Wasserman, he was given leads, made contacts and sold two insurance policies by himself. He signed his brother Phillip's name to the applications and, according to him, received a commission on the two sales. Bradley's brother, Phillip, was employed as a licensed insurance agent by the respondent, was one of the respondent's top producers, and was also in law school at the time. Phillip recalled that respondent gave his approval to this practice, but could not recall whether he knew in advance that Bradley would be signing his name to the applications. During his first two weeks of employment with the respondent, Bradley Wasserman entered into and signed a "Training Agreement," acknowledging that during his training program he would be given a training allowance for his presence with a licensed instructor during a sale. The specific oral agreement was that Wasserman was to receive $25.00 for each presentation of two or more hours which he observed. Between February 20 and March 6, 1981, three checks were made payable to Bradley Wasserman in the amounts of $150.00, $150.00, and $100.00. Each check bore the words "training remuneration" or "training allowance." These amounts do not correspondent with the amounts claimed by Bradley Wasserman as his commission on the two sales of insurance. COUNT V Howard Cunix, at a time when he was not a licensed life agent, referred a life insurance customer, Mr. Miller, to Phillip Wasserman. Phillip Wasserman, who was licensed to sell life insurance, made the sale, but received only one-half of the commission for that sale. What happened to the remainder of the commission was not known by Mr. Wasserman and was not otherwise established. At that time, Mr. Cunix was a salaried employee and received the same amount of remuneration each week. He did receive one-half a production or referral credit on a board maintained at Gulf Health/Life to illustrate the production level of the various agents.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Amended Administrative Complaint dated April 29, 1982, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 8th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to the allegations of the First Amended Administrative Complaint, respondent Dennis Victor Daniels was licensed as an Ordinary Life including Disability Agent in Florida and was employed by Gulf Health/Life, Inc. in St. Petersburg, Florida. On or about January 14, 1980, Julie Stratton (then Julie Marzec) contacted respondent at the offices of Gulf Health/Life, Inc. for the purpose of purchasing health insurance. She and respondent discussed different insurance policies, and respondent informed her that if she joined the American Benevolent Society (ABS) she could obtain a lower rate for her policy and obtain the best policy for her money. Mrs. Stratton could not remember if respondent informed her of the exact amount of money she would save on her insurance if she joined the ABS. She was informed that other benefits and discounts from area businesses would be available to her as a member of the ABS. Mrs. Stratton joined the ABS in order to obtain less expensive insurance. She wrote two checks -- one in the amount of $15.00 payable to the ABS and the other in the amount of $54.26 payable to CNA Insurance Company. She obtained two insurance policies. The form numbers on these policies were 51831 and 52176. Based upon a referral from an agent with Allstate Insurance Company, John Valentine and his wife went to the offices of Gulf Health/Life in order to obtain hospitalization and surgical insurance coverage. Before moving to Florida, Mr. Valentine was covered by a group policy through his place of employment. Respondent informed Mr. Valentine that members of the ABS could obtain a policy at group rates which entailed a lesser premium than individual rates. Mr. Valentine wrote two checks -- one in the amount of $178.73 payable to CNA Insurance Company and the other in the amount of $25.00 payable to the ASS. Mr. Valentine received two policies from CNA -- one bearing form number 51831 and the other bearing form number 52176. He also received a brochure listing the places of business from which he could receive discounts as a member of the ABS. Gulf Health/Life, Inc. was a general agent for CNA. During the relevant time periods involved in this proceeding, CNA had different policies for health insurance. Policies with a form number of 51831 required the policyholder to be a member of an organization endorsing CNA in order to purchase that policy. Form 51831 policyholders paid a lesser premium for their policies. The difference in premiums between the group or organization policy and an individual policy with the same coverage is approximately $10.00. To obtain the policy bearing form number 52176, there is no requirement that the policyholder be a member of a group or an organization. Ms. Watkins, a secretary employed with Gulf Health/Life, Inc. between December of 1978 and June of 1979 observed a device known as a "light box" on the premises of Gulf Health/Life. This was a square-shaped plywood box with a slanted glass top and a high-intensity lightbulb within the box. On from a half-dozen to a dozen occasions on Fridays between January and April, 1979, Ms. Watkins observed respondent bent over the light box with a pen in his hand tracing a signature onto an insurance application. She could not produce any documents or recall any names of any insurance applicant whose signature was traced or copied by the respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the First Amended Administrative Complaint filed against the respondent on April 29, 1982, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis A. Billingsley, Esquire Franz Dorn, Esquire 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William A. Patterson, Esquire Masterson, Rogers, Patterson and Masterson, P. A. 447 Third Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of various violations of the Insurance Code and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Respondent has been licensed as a Life & Variable Annuity Agent (2-14), Life, Health and Variable Annuity Agent (2-15), Life Agent (2-16), Life and Health Agent (2-18), General Lines, Property and Casualty Agent (2-20), and Health Agent (2-40). Respondent holds license number A164221. Petitioner has disciplined Respondent on two prior occasions. By Consent Order filed November 28, 2000, Petitioner imposed an administrative fine of $7500 against Respondent and placed her licenses on probation for two years. The Consent Order arose out of allegations that Respondent failed to place insurance coverage and failed to supervise adequately her employees. By Consent Order filed April 30, 2002, Petitioner imposed an administrative fine of $2000 against Respondent. The Consent Order does not describe the underlying allegations. At all relevant times, Respondent has been a director, officer, and sole owner of AIA. She has owned the corporation since 1993. At all relevant times, Respondent was the only signatory on the AIA bank accounts. Customarily, Respondent markets the insurance and then sends customers to one of the AIA customer service representatives. A high-volume agency with over 15,000 active clients, AIA, which employs 10 persons, has issued about 50,000 policies since November 2001. For most, if not all, of the relevant period, AIA employed Tony Decambre as the primary agent, and customer service representatives performed much of the work in processing insurance applications. Petitioner attempted to prove that Respondent was the primary agent. Rather than produce copies of forms by which Respondent may have designated herself as the primary agent, Petitioner offered only copies of prints of screens of data maintained by Petitioner. The Administrative Law Judge excluded from evidence these data compilations. Respondent testified that Mr. Decambre was the primary agent. Petitioner's investigator testified that Respondent was the primary agent, at least the last time that he had checked. The investigator's testimony failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was the primary agent. On December 28, 2001, Fernando Gomez visited AIA to pay for a workers' compensation insurance policy to be issued by Florida United Businesses Association/Workers Compensation (FUBA). Respondent met with Mr. Gomez, who required the presence of another employee to translate into and from Spanish. As the producer, Respondent signed the application. FUBA bound the coverage on December 31, 2001. Among the three persons present on December 28, only Respondent testified. The application bears the date "December 28, 2001," although this handwriting is lighter than the remainder of the handwriting on the application and could have been written at a date subsequent to the date on which the application was taken. Petitioner contends that Respondent took the application on November 6, 2001, or somehow tried to bind FUBA as of November 6, 2001. The sole evidentiary basis for this contention is Petitioner Exhibit 9, which purports to be a certificate of liability insurance, bearing a date of December 28, 2001, but showing effective dates for general liability and workers' compensation coverage for Mr. Gomez of November 6, 2001. The certificate holder is stated to be Universal Drywall & Plastering, and the producer is stated to be AIA. The workers' compensation insurer is stated to be FUBA. Petitioner Exhibit 9 was admitted solely to prove what Universal Drywall & Plastering sent to FUBA to confirm the existence of Mr. Gomez's workers' compensation coverage. The certificate is false because it confirms workers' compensation insurance as of a date that neither FUBA nor AIA contends is correct. However, the failure to obtain testimony from Mr. Gomez, the AIA employee who translated, or an employee of Universal Drywall & Plastering who could explain how he or she obtained a copy of the certificate precludes a determination that Respondent is in any way responsible for the production or transmission of this false certificate. The certificate suggests that the person responsible for its preparation may not have had Respondent's presumed level of familiarity with FUBA. The person preparing the false certificate used a policy number that is not of a type used by FUBA to identify the workers' compensation policies that it issues. The false certificate bears an expiration date of November 6, 2002. In fact, the actual coverage issued by FUBA ended on April 1, 2002, because all of its workers' compensation policies expire each year on April 1. It appears that Universal Drywall & Plastering presented the false certificate to FUBA on January 2, 2002, so, as of that date, Mr. Gomez had workers' compensation coverage from FUBA. The record also fails to disclose why Mr. Gomez might have desired an earlier effective date. The information might have facilitated a determination of who was responsible for the fraudulent preparation of the certificate. Petitioner has failed to prove the material allegations of Count I. On October 25, 2002, AIA issued an Evidence of Property Insurance to Meryl Levin, showing an effective date of October 25, 2002 for homeowners and flood insurance in the amount of $114,000. The document states that "United" would provide the homeowners insurance at $910 per year and flood insurance at $247 per year. On October 30, 2002, AIA received a check in the amount of $910 from Stephen J. Allocco, P.A., and AIA deposited that check into its noninterest-bearing bank account at Wachovia Bank. On November 8, 2002, United Property & Casualty Insurance Company (United) sent Mr. Levin a notice that he owed $810 for his insurance policy, which bore an effective date of November 8, 2002. The due date is "upon receipt." On January 14, 2003, United canceled the insurance because it never had received the $810. United received a check for $810 on February 26, 2003, but the accompanying package failed to contain a "no loss" statement, which would have assured United that the insured had not suffered a loss between the purported coverage date and the date of receipt of the premium check. Absent such an assurance, United routinely declines to provide coverage because it will not cover losses retroactively. United thus returned the check. Mr. Levin did not testify as to this transaction, nor did anyone from AIA except Respondent, who disclaimed any direct involvement with the matter. There is no evidence of any loss suffered by Mr. Levin, nor is there any evidence of any intentional wrongdoing by Respondent. The determination as to whether Respondent negligently failed to satisfy all applicable duties imposed on her is frustrated by Petitioner's failure to call an expert witness who could have explained office practices in insurance agencies and proved what is reasonable and unreasonable to expect of Respondent. The record does not establish that United sent a copy of its November 8 statement to AIA. Count II portrays a single case in which AIA failed to pay a premium to an insurer for over three months--nothing more. The determination of whether Respondent has demonstrated unfitness for this omission is impossible absent a basis for determining an appropriate minimum standard of agency office practice. Petitioner has failed to prove the material allegations of Count II. On October 9, 2002, Respondent sent a letter to Gerald Kirby bearing the letterhead of AIA stating that "we" have reviewed your homeowner needs and "determined the best possible rate for you." Showing homeowners coverage of $518,000, as well as associated coverages, the letter quotes a total policy premium of $3278. The letter warns that "this quotation is an estimate and is not legally binding." At the bottom of the letter is: "Thanks!!!Joanne." The record reveals no other persons employed at AIA named "Joanne" besides Respondent. On the same date, AIA produced an evidence of property insurance, which shows homeowners and flood insurance with the same effective date of October 11, 2002, in the respective amounts of $518,000 and $250,000, and bearing respective premiums of $3278 and $411 annually. On October 11, 2002, AIA received a check in the amount of $3278 from Capital Abstract & Title and deposited that check into its noninterest-bearing bank account at Wachovia. AIA was to use these funds to purchase homeowners insurance from United, with coverage of $518,000 and an effective date of November 11, 2002 (according to the parties' stipulation, which misstates the year as "2001"). However, the premium for $518,000 of coverage from United was $1890 at the time. The proper amount of premium due for $518,000 of coverage was mooted by the fact that AIA, like all of United's agents at the time, lacked authority to bind United to more than $300,000 coverage without specific approval from a United representative. Such approval required, among other things, documentation of the value of the insured property. AIA sent United a check for $1777, which United received on November 12, 2002. This check was the proper premium for $300,000 of coverage. At the same time, AIA sent paperwork for the issuance of coverage to $587,000, but failed to send the documentation that United required. Thus, United issued only $300,000 of coverage, and Mr. Kirby was due a refund of $1501, which is the difference between the premium that he paid and the cost of the insurance that he received. AIA paid Mr. Kirby $1501 on February 24, 2003. After AIA or a United marketing representative submitted the required documentation, United approved on February 19, 2003, the increase of coverage to $518,000. It is unclear who paid the additional premium--AIA or Mr. Kirby. For the same reasons discussed in Count II, Petitioner has failed to prove the material allegations of Count III. Although AIA's handling of the Kirby transaction was flawed, again, the acts and omissions are not so stark as to eliminate the necessity of expert testimony to establish the minimum standard, against which to measure Respondent's performance of her duties. Mr. Kirby appears to have suffered no loss, and there is no evidence of intentional wrongdoing. Even though, as to this transaction, Respondent clearly had some personal involvement, it is impossible to determine her degree of responsibility for the uneven handling of the insurance transaction and short delay in sending the refund to Mr. Kirby or even whether these two aspects of the transaction demonstrate unfitness to transact insurance business. The remaining counts involve refunds from Pro Premium Finance Company (Pro Premium) to AIA and refunds from AIA to its customers. Pro Premium provides financing to persons purchasing insurance. Several customers of AIA borrowed money from Pro Premium to pay for insurance they were buying through AIA. For various reasons--typically, the cancelation of coverage--Pro Premium refunded portions of the premium to AIA, which subsequently refunded the unearned portion of the commission to the customer. Every two weeks, Pro Premium sends AIA refunds and statements, which clearly identify the insured, date of cancelation, amount of refund, and amount due the insured. The time that elapsed from when AIA received the refunds from Pro Premium to when AIA sent the customers their share of the refunds ranged from two to twelve months. AIA received the refunds from Pro Premium between April 15, 2003, and February 15, 2004, and AIA sent its customers their shares of the refunds between April 5, 2004, and May 12, 2004. The customer refunds are concentrated in a relatively short period of time because AIA discovered all of the unrefunded monies during a self-audit that it conducted during this six-week period. AIA performed the self-audit due to an audit underway at Pro Premium. Except as noted below, Respondent was not personally involved in any of these refund transactions. At the time of all of the Pro Premium transactions described in this recommended order, the policy of AIA was for the customer service representative to write the client within one week of receiving the refund from Pro Premium and ask for directions whether to apply the refund to new or existing insurance or to pay it to the customer. The customer service representatives were supervised by the agency manager, not Respondent. It is unclear what AIA's policy was if the customer did not respond. When AIA paid refunds, its policy at the time was for the agency manager to prepare the refund check, which Respondent would sign. In May 2004, AIA changed its handling of refunds by directing all Pro Premium refunds directly to the bookkeeper, who expedites the preparation of the refund checks, which can now be signed by Respondent or one of two other employees. As to Count IV, on April 15, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1361.03, which AIA deposited on May 7, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$117.21--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Erikna Guzman. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Guzman of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Ms. Guzman did not respond. On May 10, 2004, AIA sent Ms. Guzman a check for $117.21. Twelve months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. Guzman the money due her. As to Count V, on May 31, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1538.36, which AIA deposited on June 10, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$43.83--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Shannon Campbell. By letter sent after obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Campbell of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Ms. Campbell did not respond. On April 17, 2004, AIA sent Ms. Campbell a check for $43.83. Ten and one-half months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. Campbell the money due her. As to Count VII, on an unspecified date, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $720.38, which AIA deposited on July 8, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$347.35--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Marie Philippe. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Philippe of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Ms. Philippe did not respond. On April 5, 2004, AIA sent Ms. Philippe a check for $347.35. At least nine months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. Philippe the money due her. As to Count VIII, on June 30, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1729.80, which AIA deposited on July 8, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$380.40--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Fernando Garcia. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Mr. Garcia of the refund and asked him to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. The first letter was returned by the postal service as undeliverable. Mr. Garcia had sold his house and moved. However, on April 7, 2004, AIA sent Mr. Garcia a check for $380.40. Nine months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Mr. Garcia the money due him. As to Count IX, on August 31, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1552.84, which AIA deposited on September 9, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$102.07--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Girline Reid. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Reid of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Respondent testified that Ms. Reid instructed AIA to apply the refund to insurance issued to her husband, which AIA did. However, Respondent did not testify when AIA applied the refund to the account of Ms. Reid's husband. On May 7, 2004, AIA sent Ms. Reid a check for $102.07. Eight months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. Reid the money due her. As to Count X, on August 31, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1552.84, which AIA deposited on September 9, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$169.06--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Guillermo Diaz, who is a significant customer of AIA. Respondent spoke with him shortly after AIA received the refund, and he instructed her to apply the refund to other insurance issued to him. Again, Respondent did not testify when Mr. Diaz instructed her to apply the refund to other insurance, but, given his importance as a repeat customer, he probably spoke with her shortly after AIA received the refund. However, on April 17, 2004, AIA sent Mr. Diaz a check for $169.06, to which he may not have been entitled. Eight and one-half months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Mr. Diaz the refund check. As to Count XI, on November 30, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $4994.25, which AIA deposited on December 9, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$143.18--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Bernardo Archibald. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Mr. Archibald of the refund and asked him to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Respondent testified that Mr. Archibald directed AIA to keep the money to apply to insurance for which he owed additional premium because he had not yet obtained a four-point inspection (heating, wiring, roofing, and plumbing) of an older home, so as to be entitled to a reduced premium. However, Respondent did not testify when AIA received this direction from Mr. Archibald, although only five months elapsed from AIA's receipt of the refund from Pro Premium to its issuance, on May 7, 2004, of a check to Mr. Archibald for $143.18. As to Count XII, on an unspecified date, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $3881.67, which AIA deposited on January 13, 2004, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$488.83--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Danette Piscopo. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Piscopo of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Respondent testified that AIA sent a refund check, but Ms. Piscopo never cashed it. However, Respondent did not testify when it sent the earlier check, although only about three months elapsed from AIA's receipt of the refund from Pro Premium to its issuance on April 15, 2004, of a check to Ms. Piscopo for $488.83. As to Count XIII, on December 31, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1988.58, which AIA deposited on January 13, 2004, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$294.60--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Allam Masief. Respondent testified that AIA mistakenly issued two policies to Mr. Masief for the same coverage from two insurers and mistakenly paid Pro Premium twice, even though Mr. Masief paid only one premium. Both policies were canceled. Mr. Masief asked AIA to reinstate one policy, but it was unable to do so. Respondent did not testify when these discussions with Mr. Masief took place, but only four and one-half months elapsed from AIA's receipt of the refund from Pro Premium and to its issuance, on May 12, 2004, of a check to Mr. Masief for $294.60. As to Count XIV, on January 31, 2004, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $3260.03, which AIA deposited on February 10, 2004, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$886.74--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Geraldine DeStefanis. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. DeStefanis of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Respondent testified that Ms. DeStefanis "probably" asked AIA to try to reinstate the canceled policy, but AIA was unable to do so. On May 7, 2004, AIA sent Ms. DeStefanis a check for $886.74. Three months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. DeStefanis the money due her. As to Count XV, on an unspecified date, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $4750.53, which AIA deposited on March 9, 2004, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$343.38--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Leslie Ramrattan. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Ramrattan of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Respondent testified that Ms. Ramrattan asked AIA to try to reinstate the policy, but AIA was unable to do so. On May 7, 2004, AIA sent Ms. Ramrattan a check for $343.38. About two months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. Ramrattan the money due her. Petitioner has failed to prove the material allegations of Counts IV-V and VII-XV, with one exception each as to Counts VI, V, and VII. In general, there is no evidence of any intentional wrongdoing by anyone at AIA, nor is there evidence that Respondent should have known of the failure of her staff to promptly refund the monies due their insureds. In several of these transactions in which AIA held the customers' refunds for relatively long periods of time, the record demonstrates that this was in accordance with the customers' directions or otherwise justified. For the shorter periods-- five months or less--the record provides no basis for determining that Respondent should have known of this failure within this relatively short period of time. In several counts, AIA failed to meet its obligation, under Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-196.010(2)(b), which is cited below, to refund or apply the unearned commissions within 15 days of receipt of the refund and statement from Pro Premium. These are Counts IV, V, VII, XIV, and XV. It is impossible to determine if AIA violated this rule in Count VIII, where the insured had moved; Counts IX-XI, where the insureds told AIA to apply the refunds to new or other insurance and presumably AIA did so, perhaps within the required 15 days; and Count XIII, where AIA appears to have paid for one policy out of its own funds and the insured may have received a windfall. As to Counts IV, V, VII, XIV, and XV, the question is whether Respondent is professionally responsible for the violations by AIA. These counts fall into two groups. In Counts IV, V, and VII, AIA wrongfully retained the refunds for long periods--12 months, 10 and one-half months, and at least nine months, respectively. In Counts XIV and XV, AIA wrongfully retained the refunds much shorter periods--less than three months and less than two months, respectively. Perhaps expert testimony could have established that Respondent should have detected, within a period of less than 90 days, the wrongfully retained funds, but, absent such testimony, an inference to this effect is impossible, especially when the standard is clear and convincing evidence. However, expert testimony is unnecessary to establish Respondent's professional responsibility for failing to detect this situation for 9-12 months. Given the long durations of time, the clarity of the Pro Premium's refund statements, the relatively small number of employees, Respondent's integral involvement in the daily operations of AIA as the only person authorized to sign checks, and the importance of restoring funds of customers to customers promptly, it is a reasonable inference that Respondent should have known that AIA staff had wrongfully failed to send these refunds to its customers for 9-12 months. Any suggestion by Respondent that the absence of a response from these customers justified retaining these moneys fails to account for the fact that AIA later sent the refund checks to the customers, even though they had still not contacted AIA, according to the record. Thus, for Counts IV, V, and VII, Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent has demonstrated her unfitness to transact insurance business.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Counts I-III and VIII-XV of the Administrative Complaint; finding Respondent guilty of three violations (Counts IV, V, and VII) of demonstrating unfitness to engage in the insurance business, in violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes; and suspending her insurance licenses for 30 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Sevices The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Robert Alan Fox Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Thompkins W. White White & Chang, P.A. 1650 Summit Lake Drive, Suite 1013 Tallahassee, Florida 32317
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Ralph Edward Carter, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a life and health insurance agent and general lines agent - property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was licensed as a property and casualty insurance agent for Bankers Insurance Company (BIC) and Underwriters Guarantee Insurance Company (UGIC). In March 1987 respondent purchased an insurance franchise and began operating an insurance firm under the corporate name of Mr. Auto of South St. Petersburg, Inc. Records on file with the Department of State reflect that effective June 25, 1988 the name of the corporation was changed to Reliable Insurance of South St. Petersburg, Inc. Since February 1989 the business has been located at 3135 18th Avenue, South, No. C- 3, St. Petersburg, Florida. The corporation was primarily engaged in doing business as a general lines insurance agency. Respondent has been licensed as an agent since 1968, and during his tenure as an agent, has worked in sales with several large insurance companies. In January 1988 Betty Andrews purchased from respondent liability and property damage coverage on her two automobiles, a 979 Ford station wagon and a 1980 Chrysler. The insurance was written through UGIC and was effective for the year beginning January 8, 1988. Shortly after May 16, 1988 Andrews received a notice from UGIC reflecting that she owed an additional $38.90 on her policy. For some undisclosed reason, Andrews did not pay the additional premium owed. On July 6, 1988 Andrews visited respondent's office for the purpose of adding comprehensive and collision coverage on her two automobiles. After respondent quoted a rate, she agreed to purchase the additional coverage, filled out an application, and gave respondent two checks totaling $166. These monies were deposited into respondent's business account. The balance was to be paid in three monthly payments of approximately $55 each month through a finance company. Respondent gave Andrews a document entitled "Receipt and Binder Certificate" reflecting she had comprehensive and collision coverage with "Bankers" effective from July 6, 1988 to January 6, 1989. "Bankers" was in fact Bankers Insurance Company. When Andrews did not receive a policy from BIC, she attempted to contact respondent on several occasions to ascertain its whereabouts. Andrews could not recall when or how many times she telephoned respondent's office but indicated she was never able to reach him. This was probably because respondent operated a one-man office with no clerical help and was frequently absent from his office. In late August 1988 Andrews received a notice from UGIC advising that UGIC intended to cancel her policy effective September 7, 1988 because she failed to pay the $38.90 premium still due. At about this same time Andrews' husband sold the station wagon and purchased a truck. Accordingly, Andrews needed to transfer her insurance to the new vehicle. She went to respondent's office in early September 1988 and asked him why she had never received the new policy. She also asked him to find out why her existing policy was being cancel led and requested him to transfer coverage from the station wagon to the new truck. In Andrews' presence, respondent made a telephone call to UGIC and learned that Andrews' husband had failed to disclose on the insurance application that he had received a traffic ticket. This in turn caused a $38.90 increase in the annual premium, and because that amount had not been paid, the policy was being cancelled. Respondent attempted to persuade UGIC to reinstate the policy but was unsuccessful. Dissatisfied, Andrews told respondent she intended to file a complaint with the Department of Insurance. Respondent then wrote her a check for $166 which represented a full refund of her monies. There is no evidence to establish that respondent intended to defraud Andrews or to evade the requirements of the insurance code. Despite the fact that Andrews did not receive a policy, she was covered until September 1988 by her original policy and respondent's errors and omissions policy. Through testimony by an underwriting manager for BIC, David R. Wardlow, it was established that respondent had entered into a correspondent agreement with an agent of BIC. Wardlow's review of BIC's records reflected that BIC had never received Andrews' application and premium nor was a policy written on her behalf. However, there was no evidence to establish how promptly respondent was required to remit a new application and premium to BIC or whether respondent violated BIC policy by retaining the application and monies for some sixty days until he learned that the existing policy had been cancel led. Respondent readily conceded that he never forwarded the application and premium monies to BIC. He explained his actions by pointing out that after Andrews left his office he decided to secure the coverage from UGIC rather than BIC in order to have the entire coverage with one company at a cheaper rate. When he later learned that UGIC intended to cancel Andrews' policy for nonpayment of premium, he thought he might be able to persuade UGIC to reinstate the policy but was unsuccessful. He offered no excuse except inadvertence as to why he had not promptly followed up on Andrews' application. Petitioner also presented the testimony of Johnnie Ruth Bell who purchased automobile insurance from respondent in October 1988. Although Bell's testimony was often vague and confusing, the following facts were established. On or about October 1, 1988 Bell went to respondent's office to purchase full insurance coverage on her 1987 Toyota Corolla. After discussing various options with respondent, Bell agreed to purchase a policy issued through Redmond-Adams, a Sarasota underwriter for UGIC. Bell gave respondent a check in the amount of $227 as a down payment and agreed to finance the balance through a finance company at a rate of $78 per month for eight months. These monies were deposited into respondent's bank account. Respondent issued a "Receipt and Binder Certificate" reflecting coverage with "Underwriter - Redmond Adams". Because Bell had financed the car with a local bank, it was necessary for respondent to furnish the bank with evidence of insurance. Through inadvertence, but not intentionally or willfully, respondent misplaced the application and never forwarded the application and premium to the insurance company nor did he notify the bank of Bell's insurance coverage. However, Bell was covered during this period of time by respondent's errors and omissions policy. After Bell did not receive a copy of her policy from Redmond-Adams, but received a number of telephone calls and notices from her bank, she met with respondent around December 2, 1988. Respondent accepted an additional $156 in cash from Bell and issued her a new binder effective that date which was identical to the first binder except for the date. It is unknown why the additional money was collected. He then tore up the first binder. When Bell had still not received her policy by April 1989, she filed a complaint with petitioner. After respondent learned that Bell had filed a complaint, he contacted her in May 1989 and refunded all of her monies. There was no evidence to establish how promptly respondent was required to submit applications and premiums to UGIC or how that company construed the term "in the regular course of business" in the context of agents remitting applications and premiums. Respondent blamed his problems on the fact that he is the sole employee of his office and, according to his estimate, services some 500 active clients per year and more than 1,500 accounts. He desires to continue in the insurance profession and points to the fact that, of the many insurance transactions handled by him over the last twenty-two years, the Andrews and Bell transactions are the only two that have spawned any significant problems. Moreover, he has never been disciplined by petitioner during his tenure as an agent. Respondent asks that any penalty be limited to a period of probation during which time he can have the opportunity to improve his management and bookkeeping skills. There was no evidence to establish whether respondent's conduct demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the insurance profession. As to respondent's knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transactions authorized by his licenses, he conceded he lacks training in bookkeeping and management skills, both needed for a general lines agent, but denied that he lacks the necessary skills in the sales part of the business. This was not contradicted. Finally, respondent has taken curative steps to insure that applications are not misplaced and the customer receives the requested insurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating sections 626.611(8) and 626.734 and that his general lines license be suspended for thirty days. All other charges should be dismissed with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 13 day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13 day of March, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner: 1-4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. 5-7. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. 8-11. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a finding has been partially adopted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, cumulative, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. Respondent: A Partially adopted in findings of fact 5 and 6. Rejected as being irrelevant. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. Rejected since respondent did not move his office until February 1989. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. I. Partially adopted in findings of fact 3 and 8. Partially adopted in findings of' fact 7 and 8. Partially adopted in findings of fact 6 and 7. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Partially adopted in finding of fact l. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. Note - Where a finding has been partially used, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, cumulative, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the evidence or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Insurance Commissioner Plaza Level, The Capital Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Willis F. Melvin, Jr., Esquire 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Richard J. DaFonte, Esquire O. Box 41750 St. Petersburg, FL 33743-1750 Donald A. Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether proposed rule 4-141.020 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background These cases arose after respondent, Department of Insurance (DOI), published in the Florida Administrative Weekly its notice of intent to adopt new rules 4-141.020 and 4-141-021, Florida Administrative Code. The first rule prescribes procedures for the withdrawal and surrender of a certificate of authority, or the discontinuance of writing insurance in the state. The second rule specifies procedures for implementing the moratorium phaseout process in Section 627.7013, Florida Statutes. By agreement by the parties, rule 4-141.021 is no longer in dispute. Contending that rule 4-141.020 is invalid for numerous reasons, petitioners, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF&G) and Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company (FGIC), filed their petition to determine invalidity of proposed rules on February 25, 1994. Generally, the petition alleges that the rule as a whole conflicts with other statutory and constitutional provisions, as well as the authorizing statute. It further alleges that subsections (3), (5), (8), and (9)(b) of the rule conflict with the authorizing statutes, and that paragraph (9)(b) is also arbitrary, capricious and vague. Petitioner, Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Salem (Holyoke), filed its petition to determine invalidity of proposed rules on February 25, 1994. The petition generally alleges that the rule as a whole conflicts with the law being implemented and is arbitrary and capricious. More specifically, the petition alleges that subsections (2)(b), (5), (6)(e)4., (7)(a), (7)(b), (8), (9), (9)(a), and (9)(b) contravene statutory provisions, and that the rule as a whole violates the due process, equal protection, commerce, and impairment of contract clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Parties Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the laws of the state governing insurance companies. Petitioners USF&G and FGIC are foreign insurers authorized to transact insurance in the State of Florida, including personal lines and residential insurance. USF&G and FGIC filed a notice to withdraw from homeowners multi-peril lines of insurance on July 7, 1993, in accordance with Subsection 624.430(1), Florida Statutes. Under that law, petitioners were required to give ninety days notice to the DOI before discontinuing those lines of insurance. The ninety-day notice period would have expired on October 5, 1993. Due to various emergency rules adopted by DOI and newly enacted legislation, the notice to withdraw never became effective. Because the proposed rule would affect their right to discontinue writing certain lines of insurance, petitioners are substantially affected by rule 4-141.020. Petitioner Holyoke is a mutual insurance company that writes business in all the New England states, New York and Florida. As of December 31, 1994, Holyoke had 4,027 homeowner policies and 1,541 dwelling fire policies outstanding in the State of Florida. Some of these property and insurance contracts were entered into prior to the enactment of Section 627.7013, Florida Statutes, which provides for a phaseout of a moratorium imposed by the legislature on the cancellation or nonrenewal of certain policies. On March 11, 1993, Holyoke filed a notice of withdrawal from all lines and kinds of insurance in the State and of the surrender of its certificate of authority pursuant to Section 624.430, Florida Statutes. Its plan was to withdraw over six months, giving all policyholders six months notice before nonrenewing policies over a twelve month period. Due to various emergency rules and statutes, Holyoke has been unable to cease doing business in the state. Since rule 4-141.020 would regulate Holyoke with regard to withdrawing from the homeowners multi-peril insurance market, it is substantially affected by the proposed rule. Events Leading to the Adoption of the Rule Following Hurricane Andrew's landfall in South Florida on August 24, 1992, the insurance industry suffered catastrophic casualty losses which totaled around $15 billion. Many insurance companies announced they were either withdrawing from the state altogether, were withdrawing from the homeowners' line of business, or were cancelling or nonrenewing substantial blocks of policyholders. Beginning on August 31, 1992, the DOI began to issue a string of emergency rules designed to limit cancellations and nonrenewals of insurance policies. None of these rules, however, purported to regulate the withdrawal of insurers from the state or from particular lines of insurance. During this same time period, the DOI adopted two emergency rules establishing procedures for insurers wishing to withdraw from any property lines in Florida. These emergency rules pertaining to insurer withdrawals expired on May 12, 1993, and no authority to restrict withdrawals retroactively has been authorized by the legislature. On May 18, 1993, the DOI imposed emergency rule ER 93-18 which represented its response to market stabilization in homeowners insurance lines. The rule imposed a moratorium on the nonrenewal and cancellation of homeowners insurance policies. The rule did not purport to regulate insurer withdrawals under Section 624.430, Florida Statutes, which governs the surrender of certificates of authority or discontinuance of writing certain lines of insurance in the state. Effective June 8, 1993, the legislature enacted Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida, which essentially codified a DOI emergency rule and imposed a moratorium on cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies from May 19, 1993, until November 14, 1993. The law was specifically confined to imposing a time-limited moratorium on only the "cancellation and nonrenewal of residential property coverages." Just prior to the expiration of the moratorium, the legislature enacted Section 627.7013, Florida Statutes, which provided for a "phaseout" of the moratorium imposed in Chapter 93-401. The statute provides for the extension of the moratorium on nonrenewal or cancellation of personal lines property insurance imposed by Chapter 93-401, limits unrestricted nonrenewals to five percent per year, and is to remain in effect until November 14, 1996. The statute makes no reference to withdrawals by insurers. Indeed, its purposes, as stated in subsection (1) of the statute, "are to provide for a phaseout of the moratorium (on cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies) and to require advance planning and approval for programs of exposure reduction." It is especially noteworthy that during the same legislative special session in which section 627.7013 was enacted, the legislature considered and rejected legislation that would have created a new section 624.431 granting DOI the authority to condition and prevent withdrawals by insurers. Thus, the legislature rejected a statute which would have provided the DOI with the same authority included in the proposed rule. There is no clear expression in section 627.7013 that the legislature intended the law to operate in a retroactive manner. Because the statute imposes new obligations on insurers, it must be presumed that the legislature intended it to operate prospectively. In contrast, and in response to Hurricane Andrew, when the legislature adopted Chapter 92-345, Laws of Florida, in its December 1992 special session, subsection (2) of section 1 of that law contained specific language that "this section shall take effect upon becoming a law and shall apply retroactively to August 24, 1992." On February 4, 1994, the DOI published notice of its intent to adopt new rules 4-141.020 and 4-141.021. However, the latter rule is no longer in issue. Rule 4-141.020, which is sometimes referred to as the "withdrawal rule," generally sets forth the procedures for withdrawal, surrender of certificate of authority, or discontinuance of writing insurance in the state under section 624.430. More specifically, it provides definitions of various terms [paragraph 2)], provides a DOI interpretation of section 624.430 (paragraphs (3) and (5)], prescribes procedures for withdrawals and reduction of insurance (paragraphs (6)-(8)], and sets out DOI policy regarding the relationship of reduction in business to the moratorium phaseout in section 627.7013 [paragraph (9)]. Sections 624.308(1) and 624.6012, Florida Statutes, are cited as the specific authority for adopting the rule while Sections 624.430, 624.6011, 624.6012 and 627.7013, Florida Statutes, are identified as the law implemented. Prior to Hurricane Andrew, if an insurer wished to (a) discontinue the writing of any one or more multiple kinds of insurance, (b) withdraw from the state, or (c) surrender its certificate of authority, it would simply provide to the DOI notice of its intent to do so as required by section 624.430. As long as the notice complied with the statutory requirements, the withdrawal was self- executing, and DOI did not require specific approval or impose further conditions on the insurer. Thus, before this controversy arose, DOI took the position that the only duty or power granted to it under the section was a ministerial one of altering the certificate of authority to reflect the insurer's withdrawal from certain lines of insurance or, in the case of complete withdrawal from the state, to cancel the insurer's certificate of authority. It has never adopted any permanent rule construing the statute in any other fashion. Although section 624.430 has not been amended by the legislature since it was enacted in 1963, under the proposed rule, section 627.7013 is interpreted as restricting the right of an insurer to withdraw from the state entirely or from a line of insurance. Indeed, the rule provides that section 627.7013 takes precedence over section 624.430, and unless an insurer had filed its notice of withdrawal prior to August 24, 1992, insurers are severely limited in their ability to discontinue lines of business or withdraw from the state through at least November 14, 1996. The Petitions, Stipulation and Proposed Final Orders Because the initial petitions, prehearing stipulation, and proposed final orders sometimes speak to different issues, and some of the allegations are either unclear or not precisely pled, it is necessary to comment on these matters before making findings as to the validity of the rule. Since the initial petitions frame the issues in these cases, and DOI counsel has objected to expanding the issues through stipulation or otherwise, the undersigned has limited the issues to those raised in the initial petitions and deemed all others to be untimely raised. Further, where a party has framed an allegation in its complaint, but failed to argue that issue in its proposed order, that allegation has been deemed to be abandoned. Finally, where allegations are nonspecific and speak to the rule as a whole, and the undersigned is unable to determine the language in the rule being challenged, those allegations have been disregarded. In their initial petition, USF&G and FGIC first contend that the rule as a whole is invalid because it conflicts with, extends or modifies sections 624.430, 627.7013 and "other existing (but unnamed) statutory authority," and it violates the Florida and U. S. Constitutions by interpreting section 627.7013 as taking precedence over section 624.430. In actuality, only subsection (9), and not the entire rule, speaks to this issue and thus the broad allegation has been narrowed in this respect. They have also alleged that the rule in its entirety is invalid because it conflicts with, extends or modifies the "authorizing statute" in that it purports to require filings and information not authorized by statute. Because these alleged illegal filing requirements are found in paragraph (6)(e), the undersigned has considered only that provision as subject to attack. USF&G and FGIC also allege that subsections (3), (5), (8) and (9)(b) are invalid because they conflict with, extend or modify the "authorizing statute." Finally, they allege that paragraph (9)(b) is invalid on the additional grounds that the language is arbitrary, capricious, and vague. Since the reference to paragraph (9)(b) appears to have been in error, and petitioners actually intended to challenge paragraph (9)(a), the undersigned will address the latter provision. In summary, then, and notwithstanding the broad allegations in the petition, only parts, and not the whole, of the rule have been placed in question by these petitioners. Because the proposed final order of USF&G and FGIC fails to address subsections (5) and (6)(e), the undersigned has deemed those allegations to be abandoned. Finally, the proposed order raises for the first time a contention that subsection (4) is invalid. This contention has been disregarded as being untimely raised. In its initial petition, Holyoke first contends that the rule in its entirety is invalid "because it would enlarge, contravene, and modify the specific provisions of law that it purportedly implements and because it would be arbitrary and capricious." It then goes on to plead that subsections (2)(b), (5), (6)(e)4., (7)(a), (7)(b), (8), (9), (9)(a), and (9)(b) are invalid on the ground they conflict with, extend, or modify other statutory provisions. Since no specific factual allegations have been made regarding the arbitrary and capricious nature of the rule, and there are no statutory allegations regarding the remaining parts of the rule, the undersigned will treat the petition as challenging only these paragraphs for the single ground stated. Finally, Holyoke alleges that the rule in its entirety violates the due process, equal protection, commerce, and impairment of contract clauses in the State and U. S. Constitutions. In its proposed order, Holyoke has further contended that the above paragraphs are also invalid on the grounds they are arbitrary and capricous, vague, fail to establish adequate standards and vest unbridled discretion in the agency. Because the latter three grounds were never raised in the initial petition and, as noted above, there are no specific allegations regarding the arbitrary and capricous nature of the cited paragraphs, these grounds have been disregarded as being untimely raised. Is the Rule Invalid? a. Rule 4-141.020(9) Petitioners' chief concern is the DOI's interpretation, as expressed in subsection (9) of the rule, that section 627.7013 takes precedence over section 624.430 "as to all attempted or desired reductions" affecting personal lines residential policies. Because "reductions" are broadly defined in paragraph (2)(b) of the rule as including the discontinuance of one or mulitiple lines of business, the withdrawal from the state, and the surrender of a certificate authority, subsection (9) effectively prevents an insurer from exercising its rights under section 624.430 until November 14, 1996, when the phaseout statute expires. Since the vitality of much of the rule turns on the validity of subsection (9), the multiple allegations concerning this provision will be addressed first. The exact language in subsection (9) is as follows: (9) Relationship of Reduction to Moratorium Phaseout. The department interprets Section 627.7013(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes, relating to certain applications for reduction filed prior to August 24, 1992, as indicating a legislative intent that as to all attempted or desired reductions affecting "Florida per- sonal lines residential policies" (hereinafter "residential policies"), other than those in which such reduction notice was filed prior to August 24, 1992, Section 627.7013 applies and takes precedence over Section 624.430, and prohibits or limits such reductions affecting residential policies, where there is any relation- ship between the reduction sought, and the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. Subparagraph (2)(a)4. of section 627.7013 provides the principal statutory support for the rule and reads as follows: 4. Notwithstanding any provisions of this section to the contrary, this section does not apply to any insurer that, prior to August 24, 1992, filed notice of its intent to dis- continue its writings in this state under s. 624.430, and for which a finding has been made by the department, the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Management Services, or a court that such notice satisfied all re- quirements of s. 624.430. As explained at hearing by the author of the rule, "by implication" or "negative inference" the DOI construed the above statutory language as manifesting an intent on the part of the legislature to make all types of withdrawals, and not just the cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property policies, subject to the moratorium phaseout statute. In other words, DOI posits that the legislative exemption from the moratorium phaseout statute of an insurer who filed, prior to August 24, 1992, a notice of its intent to discontinue writings, supports the broad negative inference that section 627.7013 prohibits an insurer not only from "discontinuing its writing" of one or more lines of business after August 24, 1992, but also from withdrawing from the state and surrendering its certificate of authority. In making this interpretation of section 627.7013 in its rule, the DOI ignored the distinctions between "discontinuance of lines of insurance" versus "withdrawal from the state" versus "surrendering a certificate of authority." Section 627.7013 refers only to "discontinue," as opposed to a total withdrawal coupled with a surrender of a certificate. Whatever negative inference might be drawn from subparagraph (2)(a)4. regarding the discontinuance of a line of insurance before August 24, 1992, as opposed to after that date, it cannot be extended to prohibit an insurer's total withdrawal from Florida and the surrender of its certificate of authority. Such an interpretation is not only contrary to the plain language in sections 624.430 and 627.7013, but also subsection 624.416(1), which recognizes an insurer's right to surrender its certificate of authority. To this extent, then, the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Assuming that the statute is a proper source of authority for imposing restrictions on discontinuing lines of insurance by virtue of the words "discontinue its writings" in subparagraph (2)(a)4., petitioners argue further that DOI has used the rule to interpret the statute so as to have it apply in a retroactive manner to insurance contracts in existence prior to the enactment of the statute. It is undisputed that all petitioners had insurance contracts in existence as of the date of the enactment of the law, and that the rule operates in a retroactive manner by applying to all notices of withdrawal filed prior to the enactment of section 627.7013 but after August 24, 1992. In resolving this issue, the undersigned cannot find, and respondent has not credibly reported, any clear expression in the statute that the legislature intended to apply the statute retroactively. At the same time, the statute affects petitioners' substantive rights by imposing new obligations or duties in connection with their right to withdraw under section 624.430, and thus it is deemed to be substantive in nature. Because the rule has the effect of imposing retroactive obligations and duties on petitioners in contravention of section 627.7013, subsection (9) is found to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. b. Rule 4-141.020(2)(b) Proposed rule 4-141.020(2)(b) defines the terms "reduce presence in Florida," "reduce," and "reduction" as follows: (b) "Reduce presence in Florida," "Reduce," and "Reduction," as used in this rule are inclusive terms meant to collectively refer to any and all of the following actions as may be desired or taken by an insurer: to surrender its Florida certificate of authority; to withdraw from Florida; or to discontinue the writing of any one or multiple lines or kinds of insurance in Florida. Holyoke contends that the foregoing language is invalid because the term "reduction" is defined as including a total withdrawal from all lines of insurance in Florida and the surrender of a certificate of authority, and thus it contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415, 624.416 and 627.7013. 34. Sections 624.430, 624.6011, 624.6012 and 627.7013 are cited by DOI as the source of authority for the definition. There is nothing in section 624.6011, which classifies insurance into seven "kinds of insurance," nor section 624.6012, which defines the term "lines of insurance," authorizing the broad and sweeping definition of the word "reduction." Similarly, section 627.7013(2)(b) authorizes the DOI to "adopt rules to implement this subsection," but subsection (2) deals only with "the cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies that were in force on November 14, 1993, and were subject to the moratorium." Section 624.430 does speak in general terms to "(a)ny insurer desiring to surrender its certificate of authority, withdraw from this state, or discontinue the writing of any one or multiple kinds of insurance in this state," but in the context of this rule, which seeks to prevent all types of withdrawals under the authority of section 627.7013, the rule clearly contravenes the law being implemented. Therefore, paragraph (2)(b) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. c. Rule 4-141.020(3) Proposed rule 4-141.020(3) reads as follows: (3) Actions Having the Substantial Effect of a Withdrawal or Discontinuance of Writing Insurance in this State. Reductions subject to Section 624.430, Florida Statutes, include any action or actions the reasonably forseeable substantial effect of which is, or will be when the action is completed, to have discon- tinued the writing of a kind or line of insurance or to have withdrawn from Florida. "Substantial effect" means that, for example, the continuance of a token amount of writing in Florida will not prevent a conclusion that a reduction subject to Section 624.430 has or will occur. Furthermore, it is not determinative of the existence of a reduction requiring notice under Section 624.430, that the action is taken in a single step, or by a series of steps over time, if the reasonably forseeable effect of the action or actions is or will to be to (sic) have substantially effected a reduction. The application of Section 624.430 does not depend upon the insurer's subjective statement of desire or intent as to the effect of its actions. In their petition, USF&G and FGIC contended this part of the rule impermissibly "conflicts with, modifies or extends the authorizing statutes in that the rule adopts a 'reasonably forseeable substantial effect' test for determining whether a proposed action is subject to Section 624.430, Florida Statutes." While petitioners have addressed other somewhat similar provisions in paragraph (9)(a), no argument has been made in their proposed order as to subsection (3), and the undersigned has accordingly assumed the issue to be abandoned. d. Rule 4-141.020(5) Proposed rule 4-141.020(5) prescribes the following time limitations in which an insurer can take no action after filing a notice of reduction with DOI: (5) Notice to Precede Action to Reduce Presence in Florida. An insurer shall take no action in furtherance of a reduction, prior to the expir- ation of 90 days after the receipt by the depart- ment of the notice required by Section 624.430. Prohibited actions include sending any notice of cancellation or termination, or notice of intent to cancel or terminate, to any policyholder, agent, managing general agent, reinsurer, or other person or entity. In their petition, USF&G and FGIC have alleged that the proposed rule conflicts with, modifies or extends "the authorizing statute in that it prohibits an insurer from taking action in furtherance of the proposed reduction prior to the expiration of the 90-day period under section 624.430, Florida Statutes." Holyoke makes the same allegation and contends the rule contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415 and 624.416. The record is not clear on the exact manner in which section 624.430 operates. It may be reasonably inferred, however, that once a notice of withdrawal is filed, the insurer may then begin notifying customers and other interested persons that it will withdraw at the end of the ninety-day statutory time period. By restricting insurers from taking this action in contravention of the terms of section 624.430, and there being no other valid source of authority, subsection (5) is found to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. e. Rule 4-141.020(6)(e)4. Paragraph (6)(e) describes the content of the notice to be given to DOI when providing a notice of reduction. Subparagraph 4. therein requires the following information to be provided in the notice of reduction: 4. Insurers shall also provide the department with the following information in the notice: A listing of all lines of insurance the insurer than has in force in Florida which will be affected by the reduction, and for each line, a statement of the approximate number of policies and dollars of premium then in force in Florida and which will be affected by the desired reduction. A description of what notice and treatment will be given by the insurer to its affected Florida policyholders concerning the reduction; and what steps will be taken by the insurer regarding processing of any outstanding covered claims of such policyholders while and after the insurer accomplishes its reduction. A description of projected impact of the reduction upon the insurer's Florida agent and agency force, if any. In addition to any other information related to the impact on agents, the insurer shall state the number of affected agents and give a brief description of what they are being told. Holyoke claims that this portion of the rule is invalid because it requires an insurer "to provide excessive information" in contravention of sections 624.430, 624.415 and 624.416. Since the proposed rule is based upon the premise that the DOI has the authority under section 627.7013 to restrict the ability of insurers to withdraw in any fashion, and such statutory authority has been found to be lacking in the laws being implemented, the rule is deemed to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground it modifies or extends sections 624.430 and 627.7013. f. Rule 4-141.020(7)(a) and (b) These paragraphs describe the DOI's responsibilities once an insurer files a notice of reduction. They read as follows: (7) Department Action Upon Receipt of Notice. Subsequent to receiving the initial filing the department will request the insurer to provide further information, or will conduct such other investigation as is necessary to determine whether the initial information provided is accurate and whether the proposed action will have the effects projected by the insurer. Reduction Tolled During Certain Investi- gations. The department shall inform the insurer by (sic) that the proposed reduction would be in violation of, or cause a violation of, any provision of the Insurance Code or rule of the department, and thereafter the insurer shall not effect the reduction and shall terminate any action then under way towards accomplishment of the reduction, until such time as the department's allegation is determined under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and such appeals as may be taken by either party are concluded. Like so many other parts of the rule, Holyoke contends here that the foregoing language is invalid because it contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415, and 624.416. Since the proposed rule purports to place new restrictions on insurers seeking to withdraw, and it has no source of statutory authority, the above language is found to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground it extends or modifies sections 624.430 and 624.7013. g. Rule 4-141.020(8) This provision provides that no surrender of a certificate is effective until approved by DOI. The specific language in the subsection reads as follows: (8) Certificate of Authority Surrender Effected by Department Order. No surrender or attempted surrender of a certificate of authority is effective until accepted by order of the department. USF&G and FGIC contend the rule conflicts with, modifies or extends section 624.430 since that statute requires an insurer to provide notice that it intends to surrend a certificate of authority, but does not require it to obtain DOI approval to do so. In its petition, Holyoke has alleged that the foregoing language contravenes not only section 624.430, but also sections 624.415 and 624.416. As noted in finding of fact 17, until the enactment of section 627.7013, DOI has always taken the position that a notice of withdrawal did not require specific agency approval. Rather, DOI has said that the only power or duty granted it under section 624.430 was a ministerial one of altering the certificate of authority to reflect the insurer's withdrawal from certain lines of insurance or, in the case of complete withdrawal from the state, to cancel the insurer's certificate of authority. Since section 624.430 has not been amended, and section 627.7013 does not enlarge DOI's rights with regard to a notice of withdrawal filed by an insurer, the paragraph is found to in conflict with both sections 624.430 and 627.7013. Therefore, it is deemed to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. h. Rule 4-141.020(9)(a) This paragraph generally provides that any reductions in residential policies proposed by an insurer must be unrelated, directly or indirectly, to a reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The rather lengthy rule reads as follows: Reduction Must be Unrelated to Risk of Loss From Hurricane Exposure. Pursuant to Section 627.7013, where the reduction affects residential policies, the proposed reduction must be unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The department notes that Section 627.7013 does not in any way qualify or limit the requirement that the reduction be unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The department interprets the word "unrelated," as used in Section 627.7013, in the context of the exigent circumstances motivating the enactment of the statute, and the remedial nature of the statute, as requiring a liberal, wide-reaching definition, so that the reduction must be completely unrelated, directly and indirectly, to reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure. As stated in subsection (3), above, the department is not bound by the reason facially asserted for the reduction. If the reduction is related in part to reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure, the reduction is prohibited unless authorized as type one, two, or three relief, under Rule 4-141.021, notwith- standing that some other reason is in good faith also part of the reason for seeking the reduction. The objective effect of the propose (sic) reduction in reducing hurricane exposure is given more weight than the insurer's subjective motivations, in determining whether the reduction is unrelated to risk of hurricane exposure. Subjective motivation is relevant primarily only where the objective effect is equivocal. Factors which will be given great weight in evaluating whether a desired reduction is related to risk of hurricane loss are: Would the reduction in Florida be accompanied by reduction action by the insurer in other states? If so, would a disproportionate amount of the impact be in areas of the country especially subject to risk of loss from hurricane? How much of the reduction in Florida would be in residential policy exposures as compared to exposures in other lines of insurance in Florida? If the insurer is discontinuing writing only some lines of insurance are the lines being discontinued especially subject to risk of loss from hurricane, as compared to the lines not being discontinued? Does the insurer have a significant con- centration of residential policies and exposure to risk of loss from hurricane exposure under residential policies in Florida? Would the desired reduction significantly reduce the insurer's exposure to risk of loss from hurricane exposure under residential policies in Florida? Holyoke argues that the paragraph contravenes sections 624.430, 624.416 and 627.7013 by stating that any "reduction" must be "unrelated to risk of loss from hurricane exposure" and that "unrelated" means "completely unrelated, directly and indirectly, to reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure." At the same time, USF&G and FGIC contend the rule is invalid since it "improperly" defines the term "unrelated" to permit the DOI to apply a subjective "effects" test "using illegal, arbitrary, capricious, and vague factors which fail to establish adequate standards for agency action and which exceed the agency's delegated authority." Although several statutes are cited as being the law implemented, section 627.7013 is the principal source of authority for the rule. Subparagraph (2)(a)1. of the statute provides in relevant part that (t)his subparagraph does not prohibit any cancellations or nonrenewals of such policies for any other lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The statutory language unequivocally reserves to insurers the right to cancel or nonrenew policies "for any other lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure." To the extent the rule authorizes DOI to prohibit nonrenewals or cancellations if they are related in part to reduction of hurricane exposure, even if other reasons are in good faith and are part of the reason for seeking the cancellations or nonrenewals, the language contravenes the statute. The rule further provides that if the effect of a reduction in exposure is to avoid hurricane exposure, the nonrenewal or cancellation can be denied even if the insurer has given a lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. Since it can be reasonably inferred that the ultimate effect of every withdrawal is to reduce to zero the insurer's risk of loss from hurricane exposure, the "effects" test strips the statute of its clear mandate that insurers maintain the right to cancel or nonrenew policies "for any other lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure." For this additional reason, the rule contravenes the statute. Next, while there is some evidential support as to DOI's theory in adopting the rule as a whole, there is no factual basis in the record to support the rationale for the language in paragraph (9)(a). As such, it is deemed to be arbitrary and capricious. Finally, in applying the six factors that would be given "great weight" in evaluating whether a desired reduction is related to risk of hurricane loss, the DOI acknowledges that there are no criteria or guidelines to follow in weighing these objective effects. Indeed, the DOI author admitted he had insufficient experience to fashion more specific guidelines. Even so, the language is not so vague as to confuse a person of reasonable knowledge, nor can it be said that the rule fails to establish adequate standards for agency action which exceed the agency's delegated authority. i. Rule 4-141.020(9)(b) The final provision under challenge is found in paragraph (9)(b) which reads as follows: (b) If the department determines that any proposed reduction violates Section 627.7013, the insurer shall not proceed with the reduction as it affects residential policies, and shall file an application under Rule 4-141.021 which implements Section 627.7013. The reduction in residential policies shall be limited to the extent of relief granted the insurer by the department under Section 627.7013 and Rule 4-141.021. Holyoke contends that this language is invalid because it contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415 and 624.416. Although the allegation is imprecise, it is assumed that petitioner contends the rule impermissibly broadens the definition of the word "reduction" to include an insurer's withdrawal from the state or the surrender of a certificate of authority. Because the undersigned has previously found that the DOI clearly lacks statutory authority under section 627.7013 to limit withdrawals from the state or the surrender of a certificate of authority, and the broad definition of "reduction" in paragraph (2)(b) has been deemed to be invalid, it is found that the language in the rule conflicts with sections 624.430 and 627.7013 and is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. D. Constitutional Claims Even if the rule is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority, Holyoke nonetheless contends the rule is invalid because it violates the Florida and United States Constitutions in several respects. USF&G and FGIC join in this claim. Due process and takings clause Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . ." USF&G, FGIC and Holyoke contend the proposed rule violates this provision and its federal counterpart, the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Holyoke's presence in the state may be characterized as small. Therefore, the absence of economies of scale assures continuing operating losses for the company. Indeed, in 1993 and 1994, Holyoke suffered operational losses in the state of $822,071 and $736,000, respectively, without the landfall of a hurricane. The rule bars Holyoke from withdrawing totally from Florida and surrendering its certificate of authority as it wishes to do. In Holyoke's case, every dollar of risk required to be underwritten in Florida requires that it forego writing business in another state, or increase its surplus-to-writings ratio, thereby increasing the financial risk assumed. The prospect of continuing losses in Florida impacts Holyoke in two ways. First, it suffers a drain on its surplus to the extent of the forced losses. Second, given the relationship between surplus and writing capacity, the loss of surplus caused by the operating losses results in its inability to write business in another state upon the lost surplus. USF&G is now in the process of downsizing its firm. In 1991, it was on the verge of insolvency having suffered losses of $600 million in that year alone. Based on marketing studies performed after 1991, the company has reshaped its corporate strategy and has subsequently withdrawn entirely from two states (Texas and Louisiana), and has withdrawn all personal lines from nine states. In addition, USF&G has made selected withdrawals for particular lines in many other states, and has pared its total employees from 12,500 to 6,000. The proposed rule prevents it from meeting its corporate objective of filing with DOI a notice of withdrawal for personal homeowners multiperil insurance. Equal protection clause Section 2 of Article I of the Florida Constitution provides in part that "(a)ll natural persons are equal before the law." Under the proposed rule, Holyoke must continue to do business in the personal lines market of the state indefinitely, or at least until November 1996. Holyoke contends this is to the detriment of residents of other states in which it writes business, and that the rule favors Florida residents over residents of other states for an illegitimate purpose. Commerce clause The federal commerce clause limits the power of the states to interfere with interstate commerce. Holyoke contends that the interstate allocation of capital and surplus constitutes interstate commerce, and because the proposed rule seeks to regulate its decision as to how to allocate capital and surplus, it violates the commerce clause. Impairment of contracts Article I, section 10 of the Florida Constitution provides that "(n)o . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." All three petitioners contend that section 627.7013, as interpreted by the proposed rule, violates the impairment of contract clauses of both the Florida and United States Constitutions. All petitioners had insurance contracts in existence at the time section 627.7013 was enacted and the rule proposed. Prior to that time, petitioners' rights with respect to those contracts were set forth in section 624.430. The DOI's interpretation of section 627.7013, as expressed in its rule, prohibits the insurers from exercising these pre-existing contractual rights, including the right to withdraw. To this extent, an impairment has occurred. By prohibiting an insurer from withdrawing from the state, DOI's impairment of those rights can be deemed to be substantial. Petitioners operate in a heavily regulated industry. At the same time, according to the findings and purposes of section 627.7013, that legislation was prompted by Hurricane Andrew's "enormous monetary impact to insurers," proposals by insurers to make "substantial cancellation or nonrenewal of their homeowner's insurance policyholders," and the legislature's "compelling state interest in maintaining an orderly market for personal lines residential property insurance."
