Findings Of Fact For Petitioner: Robert C. Byerts, Esquire Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 For Respondent: Michael S. Moreland, Esquire Post Office Box 1992 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES Whether the Respondent committed the alleged multiple violations of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Virginia Louise Williamson be found guilty of nine violations of Section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes, and nine violations of Section 626.21, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. That Respondent's licenses as General Lines Insurance Agent, Life Insurance Agent, and Health Insurance Agent and eligibility for licensure be suspended for a period of one year. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA D. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4553 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See HO #3 and #18. Accepted. See HO #12 and #13. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #14. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #7 Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #10. Rejected. Improper Summary. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #3. Rejected. See HO #3. (Respondent's answer and prehearing statement.) Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #4. 8.-10. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #5. Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Contrary to existing law. See White v. Allstate Insurance Company, 530 So.2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). 13.-16. Accepted. 17.-28. Accepted. See HO #6. 29.-34. Accepted. See HO #7. 35.-36. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #7. 37. - 43. Accepted. See HO #8. 44. Rejected. See HO #8. 45-50. Accepted. See HO #9. 51.-52. Accepted. 53.-64. Accepted. See HO #10 and #11. 65.-76. Accepted. See HO #12 and #13. 77.-83. Accepted. See HO #14. 84.-91. Accepted. See HO #15. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert C. Byerts, Esquire Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Michael S. Moreland, Esquire Post Office Box 1992 Fort Myers, Florida 33992 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses described in the administrative complaint? If so, what punishment should he receive?
Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Respondent is now, and has been for approximately the past 20 years, licensed by Petitioner as a general lines insurance agent. On July 3, 1986, Petitioner received a complaint concerning Respondent from Elsa Garcia. Garcia reported that she had purchased automobile insurance through Dixie Insurance Brokers and had been given a temporary insurance binder bearing the signature of a "Paul J. Lovelace" reflecting that her coverage was to be effective March 11, 1985. According to Garcia, however, she had subsequently discovered, after having been involved in an automobile accident on March 23, 1985, that her insurance coverage had not taken effect until after the accident. Garcia's complaint was assigned to one of Petitioner's employees, Burton Powell, to review and investigate. As part of his investigation, Powell contacted Alan D. Kruger, Garcia's attorney. Kruger supplied Powell with Garcia's affidavit and other pertinent documents, including a copy of Garcia's automobile insurance application and the temporary insurance binder she had been given by Dixie Insurance Brokers. The application reflects that Garcia was seeking coverage for the period from April 2, 1985, to October 2, 1985. The binder, on the other hand, indicates that it was to be effective for one month commencing, not April 2, 1985, but March 11, 1985. Someone other than Respondent signed his name to both the application and the binder. 1/ On various occasions prior to December 18, 1987, Respondent was the general lines insurance agent of record for Dixie Insurance Brokers. 2/ On these occasions he never personally signed any insurance applications, nor did he otherwise play any role in the operation and control of the agency. By his own admission, he simply allowed the agency to use his license, without any restrictions imposed by him, in exchange for monetary consideration. In so doing, he willfully engaged in a scheme designed to circumvent the licensing requirements of the Florida Insurance Code.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order (1) dismissing Count I of the administrative complaint; (2) finding Respondent guilty of Count II of the administrative complaint; and (3) revoking Respondent's general lines insurance agent license for his having engaged in the conduct specified in Count II of the administrative complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of November, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1989.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against her and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Licensure Respondent has held a Florida 2-20 general lines (property and casualty) insurance agent license since July 24, 1998, and a Florida 2-15 life (including variable annuity and health) insurance agent license since August 17, 2005. Facts Common to Counts I through V and VIII At all times material to Counts I through V and VIII of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed by O. J. Insurance (O. J.), a Miami insurance agency she had previously owned for approximately 15 years before having sold it in January 2003. Respondent went to work for O. J.'s new owners in or around June 2003. She remained an employee of the agency for approximately two years. During this two-year period, Respondent was the only licensed insurance agent at the agency. The agency's two other employees (one of whom was Respondent's sister, Sonia Pupo) held Florida 4-40 customer representative licenses. Respondent and the agency's two customer representatives were all salaried employees. None of them received a commission. The agency itself, however, received commissions from the insurance companies whose policies it sold. Respondent's performance as an employee of the agency was evaluated on an annual basis. Among the factors considered in the evaluation process was Respondent's productivity (that is, the number of insurance policies she sold). After her first year as an employee of the agency, Respondent received a salary increase based upon the annual evaluation she had received. Facts Relating to Count I On or about December 30, 2003, Blanca Duron went to O. J., where she purchased automobile insurance from United Automobile Insurance Company (United) through Respondent. Respondent filled out the insurance application for Ms. Duron. On the application, Respondent put down that Ms. Duron's address was 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida, knowing that this was not Ms. Duron's correct address. Ms. Duron actually resided on Southwest 7th Street in Miami. At no time did she ever tell Respondent that she lived at 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida. 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida, was in a "territory" having lower insurance rates than the "territory" in which Ms. Duron actually lived. Respondent's purpose in falsifying Ms. Duron's address on the application was to enable Ms. Duron to pay a lower premium than United would have charged had her correct address been entered on the application. Facts Relating to Count II On or about December 6, 2004, Brisaida Castillo went to O. J., where she purchased automobile insurance from United through Respondent. Respondent filled out the insurance application for Ms. Castillo. Respondent put down on the application that Ms. Castillo's address was 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida, knowing that this was not Ms. Castillo's correct address. Ms. Castillo actually resided on Northwest 22nd Court in Miami. At no time did she ever tell Respondent that she lived at 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida. 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida, was in a "territory" having lower insurance rates than the "territory" in which Ms. Castillo actually lived. Respondent's purpose in falsifying Ms. Castillo's address on the application was to enable Ms. Castillo to pay a lower premium than United would have charged had her correct address been entered on the application. Facts Relating to Count III On or about December 10, 2004, Ricardo Fernandez went to O. J., where he purchased automobile insurance from United through Respondent. Respondent filled out the insurance application for Mr. Fernandez. Respondent put down on the application that Mr. Fernandez's address was 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida, knowing that this was not Mr. Fernandez's correct address. Mr. Fernandez actually resided on Essex Avenue in Hialeah, Florida. At no time did he ever tell Respondent that he lived at 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida. 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida, was in a "territory" having lower insurance rates than the "territory" in which Mr. Fernandez actually lived. Respondent's purpose in falsifying Mr. Fernandez's address on the application was to enable Mr. Fernandez to pay a lower premium than United would have charged had his correct address been entered on the application. Facts Relating to Count IV On or about February 1, 2005, Pedro Cruz, Sr., went to O. J., where he purchased automobile insurance from United. It is unclear from the record whether it was Respondent or her sister, Ms. Pupo, who filled out Mr. Cruz, Sr.'s insurance application.4 The application indicated that Mr. Cruz, Sr.'s address was 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida. This was not his correct address. He actually resided on Northwest 18th Street in Miami. At no time did he ever tell Respondent that he lived at 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida. 5205 Southwest 140th Place, Miami, Florida, was in a "territory" having lower insurance rates than the "territory" in which Mr. Cruz, Sr., actually lived. Consequently, Mr. Cruz, Sr., paid a lower premium than United would have charged had his correct address been entered on the application. Facts Relating to Count V On or about December 6, 2004, Pedro Cruz, Jr., went to O. J., where he purchased automobile insurance from United through Respondent. Respondent filled out the insurance application for Mr. Cruz, Jr. Respondent put down on the application that Mr. Cruz, Jr.'s address was 5521 Southwest 163rd Court, Miami, Florida.5 Mr. Cruz, Jr., actually resided on Northwest 18th Street in Miami. At no time did he ever tell Respondent that he lived at 5521 Southwest 163rd Court, Miami, Florida.6 Facts Relating to Count VIII On or about February 3, 2005, Eulogio Martinez went to O. J., where he purchased automobile insurance from United through Respondent. Respondent filled out the insurance application for Mr. Martinez. Respondent put down on the application that Mr. Martinez's address was 5205 Southwest 142nd Place, Miami, Florida. Mr. Martinez actually resided on Northwest 5th Street in Miami. At no time did he ever tell Respondent that he lived at 5205 Southwest 142nd Place, Miami, Florida.7 Facts Relating to Count XI Since September 2005, O.D.C. Insurance Services, Inc. (O.D.C.) has operated an insurance agency (selling Allstate insurance products) at 13860 Southwest 56th Street in Miami, Florida, for which it has not obtained a license. During this period of time, Respondent has been owner, sole officer (president), and registered agent of O.D.C. and responsible for the day-to-day operations of O.D.C.'s Allstate insurance agency. At all times material to Count XI of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was unaware of the requirement that insurance agencies, such as O.D.C.'s, be licensed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I through III of the Administrative Complaint, revoking her licenses for having committed these violations, and dismissing the remaining counts of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2008.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed insurance agent licensed in the State of Florida as a general lines agent. He was the primary agent of Emerald Coast Insurance Agencies, Inc. (Agency) for Pensacola, Florida. The agency at all times pertinent to the events and times treated in the Amended Administrative Complaint was a general lines insurance agency incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating and licensing the entry of insurance agents into the profession of insurance and regulating the practice of agents and other insurance professionals already licensed by the State of Florida, including the imposition of disciplinary measures. The Respondent had been an insurance agent, as of the time of the hearing, for approximately four years. During that time, he has typically written 50-60 applications for automobile insurance and related coverage per week. The owner of the Agency would not allow the Respondent to issue checks from the Respondent's own office. All processing of insurance application files was completed at the Tallahassee, Florida office. The files with client information for insurance applicants, whose business was initiated by the Respondent, was sent by UPS to the Tallahassee, Florida office on the morning following the taking of the applications. The forms, which the Respondent was required to have completed and asked customers to sign, were pre-printed and issued from the Tallahassee, Florida office. The Respondent had no part in the creation of these forms as to content, format, and the disclosures depicted on their face. The Respondent inquired of the Department's local office as to whether the forms comported with pertinent statutes and regulations, and the Department expressed no objection to them. Indeed, the forms in question do make disclosures of the coverage or products which the customer is purchasing and contain an acknowledgment, which the customer is required to sign, indicating that the coverage has been explained to the customer. In particular, the motor club product is depicted on the relevant form as being an optional product and that it has been explained to the customer, with a blank after that pertinent statement for the customer to sign an acknowledgment of that fact. The issue in this case does not involve whether the customer paid for such a product without executing any consent but, rather, whether the customer was misled or whether the products sold were actually, in fact, explained fully to them; whether they were misled in making a decision to buy such coverage in the belief that it was required in order to obtain the insurance they knew they needed. THE TRANSACTIONS AT ISSUE No evidence was submitted as to Count I, concerning Cheryl Ginsterblum nor Count VIII, concerning Joseph Shelton. Therefore, no findings of fact can be made and these counts should be dismissed. Pam Shivers of Gulf Breeze, Florida, required insurance coverage for her 1988 Dodge Caravan. Because the van was still financed with a lender, "full coverage" was required, that is, she needed personal injury protection (PIP), property damage (PD) coverage, comprehensive risk coverage, and collision damage coverage. On March 8, 1993, she went to the Respondent's Agency, and the Respondent handled the requested insurance transaction. She requested "full coverage", and the transaction was handled while she was standing at the counter, in just a few minutes. PIP and PD insurance was placed with Security Insurance Company of Hartford (Security). Comprehensive and collision coverage was placed with Florida International Indemnity Company (FIIC). The premium for Security was $350.00, and the premium for FIIC was $399.00. The purchase of this coverage was financed so that Ms. Shivers would not have to pay the entire $749.00 premium for all of the coverage at one time. In return for the premium financing arrangement, a $187.00 down payment was required for the insurance coverage. During the transaction, Ms. Shivers was quickly presented with approximately six documents to sign. Included in those documents was a document containing a disclosure that the motor club product which she purchased was optional, that is, not required by law; that she had been offered to purchase automobile insurance by the Agency without an optional motor club and chose to purchase that optional coverage of her own free will at an additional cost of $150.00; that she examined the benefits being offered, and that it was her decision to request enrollment as a member of the motor club association. It is true that Ms. Shivers signed these acknowledgments and disclosures, which on their face, would indicate that she had been informed about the nature of the motor club product or coverage and its cost, including the fact that it was not required by law and was optional. In fact, however, her apparent consent was not an actual, knowing and informed consent. She was presented with the six documents to sign hurriedly, with the places to sign simply marked for her to make quick signatures. She did not, in the course of the transaction, have significant time to read the documents or reflect on what she was signing, what her signatures obligated her for, and what specific products she was purchasing. She was not, in actual fact, informed that she was purchasing a motor club membership. She did not request that product, and the Respondent did not give her any actual explanation about it. She was not informed that she had any choice in whether or not to take that product. She later discovered that the product was optional and that it was, therefore, not an integral, unseverable part of the insurance coverage she did want to purchase. Moreover, Ms. Shivers was confused about the $749.00 premium quote and the amount she was actually required to pay. Her confusion involved the $749.00 premium for insurance quoted to her because of the fact that she was actually required to pay an $899.00 purported "premium". The receipt issued at the end of the purchase transaction indicated a total "premium" of $899.00. In fact, however, the actual cost of the insurance was $749.00. The additional $150.00 was for a motor club membership which was hidden in the receipt amount and what was represented on the receipt as a "total premium". The down payment of $337.00 quoted to her was also deceptive because actually, only $187.00 of that was the down payment on the actual insurance coverage premium. This is shown by the premium finance agreement in evidence. The Respondent had concealed the cost of the motor club membership within what was purported to be the total insurance premium amount reflected on the receipt and included the entire $150.00 charge for that membership within the down payment, simply and misleadingly calling the down payment of $337.00 as the down payment on insurance coverage. Thereafter, on March 21, 1993, Ms. Shivers went back to the Agency to cancel her insurance, related to the fact that her vehicle had been involved in an accident. Upon doing that, she left thinking that her insurance had been effectively cancelled. Later, she received notices from the premium finance company but was told by the Respondent to ignore them. On May 7, 1993, however, the Respondent informed her that she had to come back to the Agency and fill out a cancellation request. Thus, 47 days after she had attempted to cancel her coverage, her request was finally processed by the Agency. In the meantime, she was apparently being charged for premiums on the coverage she thought she had cancelled. Thus, from January 21, 1994, the premium finance company turned an amount it claimed was due of $43.26 over to its attorney for collection purposes, which impinged on Ms. Shivers' credit standing. She had already paid the Respondent $190.00 in premiums under the premium financing agreement, with her down payment, but did not receive any returned unearned premium representing the period after she thought she had cancelled her policy but, instead, was billed the additional $43.26 directly due to the Respondent's 47-day delay in processing her cancellation request. Count III In June, 1993, Laura O'Donohue of Pensacola, Florida, purchased her first vehicle, a 1993 Chevrolet Cavalier. The automobile dealership, where she purchased the vehicle, gave her a card for the Respondent's insurance agency. Therefore, never having established a relationship with an insurance agency, she went to that Agency to purchase insurance. Her mother, Lynn O'Donohue, accompanied her to the Agency. Before coming to the Agency while at the automobile dealership, she had received a quote for the insurance she wanted from the Agency. When she arrived at the Agency, she informed Donald Grubb, an employee of the Agency and the Respondent, that she just wanted "basic coverage". This was the first time she had purchased insurance, and she relied entirely for her decisions regarding that upon the representations of the Respondent and his colleague. Therefore, in a transaction, which took approximately 20 minutes, the Respondent and/or Mr. Grubb assisted her in filling out the paperwork required to place the insurance coverage she requested. During the course of the brief insurance purchase transaction, Ms. O'Donohue learned that she would be required to pay a higher premium amount than the quote she had received from the Agency while she was at the automobile dealership earlier that day. This is consistent with the Agency's custom and practice, established by former agent, James Self's, testimony to the effect that motor club coverage was typically added to the normal insurance coverage requested by customers, which resulted in higher purported "premium" quotes and charges than had initially been quoted to the customer, typically by telephone, before a customer came to the Agency office. When Ms. O'Donohue and her mother arrived at the Agency after having received the lower quote earlier, they were thus not prepared to pay the higher amount of the so-called premium. Ms. O'Donohue did not need a motor club because, through her mother, she was covered by AAA Motor Club for towing and other benefits. She had no knowledge that she had purchased a motor club product from the Respondent. All of the documents were presented to her, in response to her request for just basic insurance coverage, in the context that this was what the law required her to have and what she needed. She totally relied, as did her mother, upon the representations of the Respondent and his agent or employee, Mr. Grubb, concerning what the law required and what she needed in the way of insurance coverage. The testimony of Ms. O'Donohue's mother, Lynn O'Donohue, confirms the fact that they had no intent to purchase towing coverage or "auto club" because they already had a membership with AAA and wanted to pay nothing extra other than the basic insurance coverage. The Respondent or his agent or employee, Mr. Grubb, indicated, as shown on page 91 of the transcript, that "towing was all part of it", that is, they meant that the basic insurance package sought by Ms. O'Donohue included towing as part of its coverage. In fact, that was not the case, and the motor club product was clearly optional, at extra cost, and not legally required. Ms. O'Donohue purchased it unknowingly, based upon the representations and business practice used by the Respondent in connection with her transaction, in spite of the presence of her signatures on the disclosure portion of the application documents for the reasons referenced with regard to the Shivers transaction. The insurance requested was placed with two insurance companies. The PIP and PD were issued by Security at a premium of $223.00. The comprehensive and collision coverage was placed with General Insurance Company (General) at a premium of $411.00. Thus, the premiums for actual insurance coverage, which is all Ms. O'Donohue wanted, totaled $634.00. That was financed by the ETI Premium Finance Company (ETI) on periodic installment payments, with a required down payment of $127.00. The Respondent, however, required Ms. O'Donohue to make a down payment of $277.00 on a purported total premium due of $784.00. This amount, unbeknownst to Ms. O'Donohue, happened to include a motor club purchase (Atlantic Travel Association), which cost $150.00, thus, the difference between the $634.00 actual insurance premium and the $784.00 purported premium due. The $150.00 fee for motor club benefits was concealed in the "total premium" amount falsely represented to the customer by the Respondent. The deceptive and misleading nature of this transaction is further pointed out by the form of the receipt issued to Ms. O'Donohue upon consummating the transaction. That receipt indicates that the "total premium" is $784.00. Actually, the cost of the insurance was only $634.00, as referenced above, and the additional $150.00 of that purported total premium amount was the motor club fee. Likewise, the down payment quoted to her of $277.00 was deceptive because only $127.00 of that was applied to the actual insurance coverage. The remaining amount was the motor club fee which the agent collected in its entirety at the beginning of the transaction, as part of the down payment, while the insurance premiums, in excess of the $127.00 actual down payment for insurance, were financed through ETI. The Respondent did this because, by collecting all of the motor club fee in a lump sum at the outset of the transaction, he could get his entire commission immediately. His motor club sales commission was at a considerably higher rate than the commission he earned on the sale of insurance itself. In fact, his commission was 90 percent of the $150.00 motor club fee. Since Ms. O'Donohue did not have the entire $277.00 at the time of the transaction, because she had been relying on the lower quote for the insurance given to her over the telephone, she only paid $200.00 down payment at the time of the transaction, with a balance owed of $79.00, as reflected on her receipt. Her mother had reservations concerning the purchase of this insurance from the Respondent and told her daughter that she thought that because the insurance she purchased involved financing the premium, she could save money by going to GEICO insurance company. Therefore, the following day, she went to GEICO and secured new coverage at a lower premium rate and then called the Respondent's Agency to confirm that she could cancel her policy, with no penalty. They replied that she could cancel her policy just so long as she brought them proof that she had secured new insurance, since the law presently does not allow them to cancel the coverage until they are shown proof that the insured has obtained other coverage. Ms. O'Donohue, therefore, went to GEICO, purchased new insurance for her vehicle, and then brought proof to the Agency and requested that the Respondent cancel her insurance. This request was made on June 19, 1993. At that time, she requested a refund of the $200.00 down payment which she had made two days before and was assured that she would receive it within 60 days. In fact, she never received a refund and continued to receive past-due and delinquency notices from ETI, the premium finance company. She notified the Agency of this problem on numerous occasions to no satisfaction. Due to ETI's belief that her coverage was still in force and that they were still owed the premium payments, her credit was endangered. This was all directly related to the Respondent's failure to properly and timely process her cancellation request. On June 20, 1993, Terre Thompson of Pensacola, Florida, also went to the Respondent's Agency to purchase insurance for her 1993 GEO Metro automobile. The Respondent met her at the automobile dealership, where she purchased the vehicle. He had already prepared documents for the purchase of insurance to be underwritten by Security and General, along with a premium financing agreement and other documents. He had marked X's where Ms. Thompson was supposed to sign all contracts and disclosure forms. The Respondent filled out all of the information on the documents and merely told her, in effect, to "sign here, here and here". The transaction was conducted very quickly and with little or no explanation of coverage or benefits. Although Ms. Thompson needed full coverage for her vehicle, because it was financed, she did not want towing and rental benefits. The Respondent, however, gave her to understand that it was required in the coverage package she purchased. Accordingly, on June 20, 1993, she made a down payment of $100.00, with an additional amount due of $51.00 by June 27, 1993. Although the receipt was dated June 20, 1993, Ms. Thompson did not actually receive it until June 27, 1993, when she returned to the Respondent's Agency to pay the $51.00 owed. The receipt falsely depicts that the "total premium" was $834.00. Actually, the cost of the insurance was only $754.00. The additional $80.00 was for a motor club product, although the $80.00 was buried in and represented to be part of the total insurance premium for the transaction. The down payment of $231.00 quoted, likewise, was deceptive because only $151.00 of that was actually applied to insurance coverage, which was all of the coverage that Ms. Thompson had requested. The Respondent collected the $100.00 on June 20, 1993 and entered into a financing arrangement with the customer, Ms. Thompson, for the $51.00 to be paid on June 27, 1993. In fact, this was only enough to cover the down payment for the actual insurance coverage because the Respondent forgot to include the fee for the motor club coverage on the "front end" or in the down payment, as was his normal practice. This is why Ms. Thompson became upset when she learned she owed an additional $71.00 when she returned on June 27, 1993, when she thought she had only owed approximately $60.00. In any event, the receipt finally received by her reflected payments of $100.00, $60.00, and $71.00, which totals $231.00. This amount includes the $151.00 down payment for actual insurance coverage and the remaining $80.00 for motor club membership, which Ms. Thompson did not know she had purchased at the time and did not desire to purchase. Indeed, Ms. Thompson, and the other customers referenced in the Amended Administrative Complaint, who testified, signed the disclosure in the standard package of documents presented to them by the Respondent. It indicated that they acknowledged that the motor club benefit or the "nations safe driver" medical benefit was an optional coverage, not required by law and that, after explanation of it, they had elected to purchase it. In fact, they signed those documents, albeit imprudently, without actual knowledge that they were obtaining that coverage and without explanation that it was not legally required. No disclosure was made to them that the purported "total premium" amount actually included payment for the motor club benefit, which was not actually part of the insurance premium and which, at least in the case of those customers with AAA memberships, was totally unnecessary. Timothy Malden of Jacksonville, Florida, purchased a vehicle on or about August 31, 1993. He needed full coverage because the vehicle was financed, that is, he needed PIP, PD, comprehensive coverage, and collision coverage. He went to the Respondent's Agency on that date to purchase coverage on his 1986 Pontiac Fiero. During the course of the transaction, handled by the Respondent, Mr. Malden was asked if he had motor club coverage or benefits and he told the Respondent that he had AAA membership and showed the Respondent his AAA card. The Respondent and Mr. Malden entered into a transaction to sell Mr. Malden insurance. The transaction involved approximately seven different documents and took a total of about 15 to 20 minutes. Mr. Malden merely signed the documents. The Respondent told him that he just needed his signature on the documents and the Respondent did not explain the coverage. The procedure seemed rushed or hurried to Mr. Malden. Although Mr. Malden signed the disclosure (inadvertently, because apparently he did not read it) stating, in effect, that the motor club coverage was optional, not required and that after having it explained to him, he had decided to purchase it, he, in fact, did not know at the time that he had purchased the motor club coverage and it had not been explained to him. Moreover, as stated above, he had explained to the Respondent that he did not need it because he already had AAA motor club coverage. Nevertheless, the Respondent, knowing that Mr. Malden had AAA, still sold him the motor club coverage with the Atlantic Travel Association for an additional fee of $150.00. Mr. Malden made no informed consent to purchase that benefit. The PIP and PD coverage was placed with Security at a premium of $395.00. The comprehensive and collision coverage was placed with Continental American Insurance Company (Continental) for a premium of $525.00. The total premium for "insurance" was $920.00, with a $230.00 down payment. The premiums were financed by ETI. Mr. Malden, however, was required to pay a "down payment" of $380.00. The receipt issued to him reveals a "total premium" of $1,070.00. The actual cost of insurance was only $920.00. The additional $150.00 was for motor club coverage, and the charge for that was hidden in what was represented on the receipt as "total premium". Likewise, the down payment of $380.00 was deceptive in nature because only $230.00 of it was actually a down payment for insurance coverage. The remainder of it, as explained above with regard to the other customers, was actually full payment for the unnecessary, unwanted motor club benefit. On March 8, 1994, Karen Sigler of Pensacola, Florida, went to the Agency to purchase automobile insurance for a 1990 Plymough Voyager. She stated to the Respondent that she only wanted the minimum automobile insurance required by Florida law. She told the Respondent that she needed new insurance because her previous insurance company had gone out of business. The Respondent handled the transaction for her and she specified that she wanted only that coverage which the State of Florida required. Ms. Sigler had been originally quoted a $324.00 premium amount. When she actually entered into the insurance transaction, however, an additional $65.00 was added on to that amount because the Respondent sold her an additional "Nations Safe Drivers, Inc." enrollment. This is not an insurance product but, rather, is a form of supplemental medical benefit. Ms. Sigler had not requested this and did not understand the nature of it, believing that it was unnecessary because she was already qualified as a "safe driver" based upon her driver's record. She was given no explanation as to what that enrollment form, and benefit was nor that there was an extra charge for it. Even as reflected on the enrollment form, Ms. Sigler merely thought that the Nations Safe Drivers membership was a part of the required insurance purchase package. This is not true, in fact, since only PIP and PD coverages are required by law. Ms. Sigler was thus sold a product she did not request, which was not required by law and which was not explained to her. The entire transaction took approximately one- half hour. The receipt issued to Ms. Sigler shows that the "total premium" was $324.00. In fact, however, the actual cost of insurance was a $259.00 premium. The additional $65.00 of the $324.00 amount was the fee for the Nations Safe Drivers membership, which was hidden in what was represented as a "total premium". Moreover, the down payment she paid of $98.00 was deceptive because only a part of it was applied to automobile insurance coverage and the remainder was the fee for the Nations Safe Drivers membership. The Respondent's business practice in this regard resultingly misled Ms. Sigler into believing that Nations Safe Drivers, Inc. was required by State law and that it was an insurance product, which it was not. Here, again, in spite of the disclosure she signed and the documents that she was hurriedly urged to execute by the Respondent, the clear and convincing evidence shows that she did not actually, knowingly consent to purchase the extra non-insurance product referenced above. The Respondent's business practice, the way he represented the nature of her insurance coverage and in the manner in which he conducted the transaction did not involve an actual explanation of the non-insurance product he misled her into purchasing. Thus, there was no informed consent to purchase that product. Rosa Johnson went to the Respondent's Agency on March 21, 1994. She wanted to purchase the "minimum" automobile insurance required by State law for her 1971 Plymouth. She dealt with the Respondent and another gentleman who worked under the Respondent's direction and control. She told them she only wanted the basic, legally-required coverage. PIP and PD coverage was issued through Security. Ms. Johnson was also sold the Nations Safe Drivers product. This product was not actually explained to her, in spite of the fact that she may have signed a written disclosure that it had been, including the fact that it was an optional benefit and not part of the legally-required insurance coverage. She did not request this product nor was it explained to her so that its meaning and coverage was understood by her. Upon conclusion of the transaction, Ms. Johnson had purchased PIP and PD coverage from Security for a premium of $248.00, plus an unrequested enrollment in Nations Safe Drivers, Inc. for a fee of $35.00. All of this amount was financed by ETI. Here, again, as with the other customers, the receipt furnished to Ms. Johnson indicates a total "premium" of $283.00. The actual cost of insurance or true premium was $248.00. The additional $35.00 of the $283.00 amount was the cost of the Nations Safe Drivers, Inc. product, which was hidden in what was represented to her on the receipt as the "total premium". Likewise, the purported down payment of $85.00 was deceptive in the manner in which it was presented and required of Ms. Johnson, because only part of it was applied to insurance coverage, the remainder being the $35.00 fee for the added non- insurance product referenced above. The Respondent's authority to bind coverage with Security Insurance Company had been terminated on March 14, 1994 due to excessive late submissions of insurance applications to the carrier. The problem was later alleviated and his authority to bind insurance for Security was restored by that company. However, during the period of time his binding authority had been terminated, the Respondent kept taking applications and binding policies. This caused the insureds to believe that they had coverage when, in fact, they did not, because the carrier, Security, through its managing agent, U.S. Underwriters, did not, for a period of time, allow the Respondent to obligate that company for coverage. Accordingly, in due course, Ms. Johnson was notified by U.S. Underwriters, on behalf of Security, that she had no coverage. She became upset and filed a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner because she had understood that as soon as the transaction with the Respondent was completed, her coverage had been bound and timely filed and processed with the underwriting insurance carrier. Charles Meadows of Gulf Breeze, Florida, required insurance on his 1986 Chrysler LeBaron. He wanted to purchase the minimum amount of legally- required coverage and went to the Respondent's Agency for that purpose on May 17, 1994. He needed the minimum amount of legally-required insurance so that he could obtain a tag for his automobile from the county tag office. He was in a hurry because he had taken leave from work and needed to get his insurance transaction consummated, as well as to obtain his automobile tag before 4:30 p.m. He conferred with a lady who was employed by the Respondent at the Agency who handled his transaction. She completed all of the documents, spread them across the counter, and marked and told him the places to sign to effect the binder of the coverage that day. The transaction occurred quickly, lasting only approximately 15 minutes. He received no effective explanation of any of the coverages. Rather, he relied on her representations that he was getting what he had asked for, that is, the minimum legally-required Florida insurance coverage. The coverage he obtained was placed with Security as to the PIP and PD coverage. The premium for that coverage was $321.00. The total premium quoted to him was $421.00, which included a $100.00 membership in the Gulf Coast Travel Association, a motor or travel club. Mr. Meadows was not aware that he had this extra amount of coverage or membership until he conferred with Mr. Spencer of the Department at a later time, who informed him of such. If he had known that the agreements he was signing during the hurried, unexplained transaction with the Respondent's employee included the motor club coverage, he would have declined it because his wife already had coverage with AAA for towing and related benefits. Mr. Meadows made a down payment of $190.00 on May 17, 1994. The receipt issued to him revealed a "total premium" of $421.00. The actual cost of insurance was $321.00, with the additional $100.00 being for the motor club, although the total amount was represented as "total premium". Additionally, the down payment of $190.00, which he paid, was deceptive in that only $90.00 was actually applied to insurance coverage and the remaining $100.00 was the total up-front fee for the motor club coverage, although it was represented to Mr. Meadows as being the $190.00 down payment on the insurance premium itself. Later, Mr. Meadows learned that he had the motor club benefits which he did not want or need and so he demanded a refund of his money from the Respondent. He spoke to the Respondent personally about this but did not receive immediate satisfaction. There was a substantial delay in receiving his refund after the Respondent told him that he would receive one. The Respondent justified this by stating to him that it had to come from "another office" and that it would not come from his Agency itself. Dorothy Weber of Pensacola, Florida, required automobile insurance for her 1986 Chevrolet Blazer and a 1978 Chevrolet Caprice. She went to the Respondent's Agency on June 15, 1994 and indicated to one of his employees that she was interested in the cheapest coverage available. She wanted nothing extra, except that required by law. She received very little explanation of the coverages and benefits, other than in response to questions she asked. The transaction of insurance was conducted in a similar manner to those referenced earlier in these Findings of Fact. The PIP and PD coverage was placed with the Florida Joint Underwriting Association. It carried a premium of $787.00. Despite Ms. Weber's request for only the minimum, legally-required insurance, she was also sold a motor club (Gulf Coast Travel Association) unbeknownst to her at the time at an additional fee of $150.00. In spite of the fact that Ms. Weber signed the disclosure concerning the optional nature of the motor club and related fee and so forth, as described in further detail in the above Findings of Fact, in actual fact, it was not explained to her. The fact that the fee for it was separate from the insurance premium for the insurance coverage was not explained to her and she effectively was not informed that she was purchasing that product. During the transaction, she was informed that if her vehicle broke down, she could obtain wrecker service. Nothing was mentioned to her, however, about Gulf Coast Travel Association or that the $150.00 was an extra fee. She merely had all of the forms presented to her in rapid fashion and was asked to sign them. The explanation simply was that the "total policy" cost $937.00, and there was a down payment of $318.00 supposedly for premium only. The entire transaction took approximately one-half hour. Later, Ms. Weber discovered that she had been misinformed and complained to the Department and the Respondent's Agency, specifically indicating that she had not been informed that the $150.00 for the motor club was separate nor that she had purchased motor club coverage. The receipt furnished to Ms. Weber concerning the amounts she paid to secure her coverage is misleading. It indicates a total premium of $937.00, when the actual cost of the insurance was $787.00. The additional $150.00 was for the undisclosed motor club coverage hidden in what was represented on the receipt as a "total premium". The down payment of $308.00 was deceptive or misleading in that only $158.00 of it was actually a down payment on insurance coverage. Barry and Deeana Walker of Pensacola, Florida, needed automobile insurance for a 1990 Plymouth Laser. They wanted the cheapest coverage legally required and available to them. The Respondent dealt with the Walkers and was their agent of record. Mr. Walker remembers nothing being mentioned about a motor club, but Mrs. Walker remembers that the agent mentioned "Nations Safe Drivers, Inc."; however, she specifically informed him that she did not want it. In fact, Nations Safe Drivers is a non-insurance membership plan which includes a medical supplement coverage benefit. It is not a motor club. The PIP and PD and bodily injury coverages were placed with Underwriters Guaranty Insurance Company (UGIC) for a premium of $641.00. The premium was originally financed by Underwriters Financial. Also executed on May 4, 1994 was another premium finance agreement with ETI. It provided for an insurance premium of $441.00 for a policy issued by UGIC and the financing of a Nations Safe Drivers enrollment for $100.00. This document was not signed by the Walkers. On May 4, 1994, the Walkers paid $150.00 by check and were required to pay an additional $143.00 by May 20, 1994. The $143.00 was paid; and subsequently, the Walkers received a notice of additional premium of $190.00 due and they paid an additional down payment of $76.00. The Walkers made payments on the ETI premium financing agreement up until October, 1994, even though it had never actually been signed. They made down payments of $369.00 and monthly payments totaling $333.63, for a total of $702.63. Sometime in October of 1994, they received a letter from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Drivers Licenses in Tallahassee, Florida, stating that Mr. Walker's driver's license was suspended because his insurance had been cancelled, effective July 16, 1994. The Walkers had received a notice from the insurance company of cancellation (because apparently that company would not insure co-owned vehicles) and had gone to the Respondent to see what to do about that problem. The Respondent told them to fill out a form which he gave them and that everything would be taken care of. They filled out the form at his behest so as to indicate that Mr. Walker's father, the co-owner, would not be a driver of the vehicle. Accepting the Respondent's representation, they believed that that would take care of the cancellation of coverage problem, and they continued to make their monthly payments on their premium financing agreement until October of 1994 based upon what the Respondent told them. In fact, the coverage was cancelled effective July 16, 1994; and soon thereafter, Mr. Walker's driver's license was suspended due to failure to carry valid insurance on his automobile. If the Respondent had acted with promptness in correcting the underwriting error, upon being apprised of the situation by the Walkers, the lapse in coverage and suspension of the driver's license need not have occurred and the payments on the original coverage need not have been made until October 11, 1994, when new coverage was finally obtained by the Respondent at the Walkers' behest. Although, on November 11, 1994, ETI credited the Respondent and the Walkers for $169.41 of unearned premium, the damage had already been done by that point in terms of the lapse of coverage and the suspension of Mr. Walker's driver's license, with attendant financial risk and inconvenience to Mr. Walker. Moreover, the receipt issued to the Walkers in the original insurance transaction indicates a total premium of $741.00. As in the other situations, the actual insurance cost was $641.00, and the additional $100.00 was for the Nations Safe Drivers non-insurance medical payment product, wrapped up in what was represented as "total premium". The down payment of $293.00 was similarly misleading because only $193.00 of that applied to actual insurance coverage. The Respondent received his fee of $100.00 for the added-on product mentioned above entirely out of the up-front, down payment amount. Thus, the Respondent received the entire fee for the Nations Safe Drivers product within a purported "premium receipt" amount described to the customer as an insurance down payment. On January 26, 1995, Ms. Betty Cook of Walnut Hill, Florida, needed to purchase insurance for her 1994 Thunderbird and her 1993 Chevrolet C1500 pickup truck. She went to the Respondent's Agency to accomplish her insurance renewal transaction. A lady by the name of Sonya handled the transaction for her that day. The Cooks' insurance was placed with UGIC for a premium of $1,123.00. The premium was financed through Underwriters Financial of Florida, Inc. The transaction was initiated on January 26, 1995 but ultimately concluded on January 28, 1995, after Mrs. Cook had received and signed all of the paperwork. Mrs. Cook made a premium down payment of $339.00 and mailed her first payment when it was due. She thereupon was sent a notice stating that no policy existed. She called the Agency to see what was wrong and someone at the Agency indicated to her that it would taken care of immediately. A lienholder on the pickup truck sent a notice to her that they had not been notified that the insurance had been renewed. Mrs. Cook became very concerned and the Respondent offered to refund her premium; however, three months had evidently elapsed since she first renewed her insurance or thought she had. Thus, Mrs. Cook, without knowing at the time, was driving her automobiles without insurance coverage for approximately a three-month period. Mrs. Cook contacted the Department and got her insurance reinstated and placed with another servicing agent. The policy was issued by UGIC, without requiring the payment of a premium down payment by the Respondent. The Respondent had still not forwarded the $339.00 down payment originally received from Mrs. Cook as of April 19, 1995. This lapse or failure to forward the insurance down payment obviously resulted in the coverage never being bound with the company. Therefore, the company had not issued and had no record of coverage for Mrs. Cook's vehicles. The agent for this company was required to account for and promptly forward insurance premium down payments, such as this, to the insurer he represented and on behalf of the insured he also represented in the transaction. Christopher Camus of Pensacola, Florida, went to the Respondent's Agency to purchase insurance for a 1983 Oldsmobile Cutlass. He went to the agency on August 25, 1993, and the Respondent placed his coverage with Security. The total premium was quoted as $274.00. Mr. Camus signed an application on that date and paid the full amount to the Respondent. The Respondent failed to forward the application and premium to the insurance carrier, and the policy of insurance was not actually issued until November 30, 1993. Mr. Camus was thus left without coverage for approximately two months. He made repeated telephone calls to the Agency to no avail. Agency personnel maintained that the problem was occurring with the insurance company itself and was not the fault of the Respondent's Agency. The Respondent deposited Mr. Camus' check in August of 1993, but the application for his insurance was never received by Security until December 23, 1993. The Respondent thus did not promptly and appropriately handle the insurance premium funds in question and forward the application so as to promptly bind the coverage for the customer. Indeed, it is noteworthy that this company revoked the Respondent's authority to bind coverage for customers on March 14, 1994 due to an excessive amount of such late submissions of insurance applications and premiums. In 1993, of the 1,299 applications taken by the Respondent and his Agency, only 58 percent reached the insurer's office within the required time period. In summary, the evidence presented in this case indicates that the Respondent engaged in the general business practice of selling ancillary products to insureds without truly obtaining "informed consent" of those insureds. The pattern running through the testimony of the above-described witnesses, none of whom were shown to have any motive to falsify their testimony, was that, although they signed the various disclosures on the insurance underwriting or binding documents, indicating that they understood that the ancillary products were optional, were not insurance, and were not required to be purchased. They did not receive any significant explanation of the optional nature of those products concerning the advisability of their purchase (particularly as to those customers who had AAA coverage), nor the extra cost attributable to those products. Each insured witness consistently maintained that he or she had not read the numerous documents presented to them. Certainly, they should have, in an abundance of caution, read the documents and attempted to understand them. Their failure to do so, however, does not absolve the Respondent of his duty to specifically explain to each customer the exact nature of the coverage being offered, whether or not it was legally optional, particularly, as to those customers who stated definitely that they only wanted the bare minimum coverage required by law, and the fact that it was optional at an extra cost, and was not included in the basic insurance coverage being sold. It is clear from these witnesses' testimony that none had requested motor club benefits or any other ancillary product and yet, in effect, these were automatically added to the policies involved in this proceeding in each transaction and were clearly not explained to the customers. The general business practice of the Respondent involved in the sale of the motor club and ancillary products belies the existence of "informed consent" on the part of the customers. Mr. James Self is a former agent for the Respondent, who testified regarding the Respondent's business practices. He was trained by the Respondent and worked for the Agency from August, 1993 to June, 1994. The Agency had a policy of giving telephone quotes for insurance premiums, without including the amount represented by motor club or other add-on optional products. The Agency would then add such products to the insurance package when the customer came in to purchase insurance. According to Mr. Self, any sort of explanation or disclosure of these add-on products to the customer would be merely to the effect that the insurance "quote" included towing or rental. There was little else explained about it. In many of the situations with witnesses in this case, the insureds only requested the minimum coverage and, therefore, no optional or ancillary products were justified without full explanation to the customer. Mr. Self described how the Respondent specifically trained him in "clubbing", which meant adding motor club coverage to the insurance coverage requested by customers. The Respondent's own testimony shows the economic necessity for the pervasive sale of such motor club benefits to as many customers as possible, when he stated: It's really the only way to exist . . . Q: So you're telling me that the only way for you to exist is to sell motor clubs? A: Financially, it's -- really for most businesses in this market it's the only way to be able to survive. Transcript, page 175. The Respondent further acknowledged the pecuniary interest he had in selling travel or motor clubs since he described his average commission as being 90 percent of the fee for writing that coverage, which is higher than the commission on insurance products. Moreover, he recovered all of that money from the down payment the customers were making, supposedly for their insurance coverages. Therefore, his incentive was multiplied because he was getting the high commission percentage rate, plus he was getting all of it in cash on the initial portion of the transaction, the down payment. Mr. Self also explained that salesmen would never tell the insured exactly how much the motor club cost. On occasions, when Mr. Self would try to partially disclose the motor club, the Respondent would tell him to "hurry up", that he was taking too much time in effecting the transaction. It was Mr. Self's experience that approximately 99 percent of the customers coming into the Agency for insurance left having purchased motor club benefits. Eventually, Mr. Self was terminated because he did not sell enough motor club products. The overall gravamen of his testimony shows that he attempted to make some disclosure or explanation of the motor club and other ancillary products but was discouraged from doing so by the Respondent, with the implication being that this ultimately resulted in his termination from employment with the Respondent's Agency. The evidence thus establishes that, for the most part, the insureds in question did not really know what "minimum coverage" or "full coverage" really consisted of when they came in to purchase such insurance. In making this lay description of the coverage they desired, they then relied on the agent, the Respondent or his employees, to sell them coverage which comported with their wishes and needs, since they were not schooled in the insurance business and related laws themselves. Since they were not so schooled, they almost totally relied on any explanation given to them by the Respondent or his agents or employees. In spite of the signing of the disclosure documents referenced in the above Findings of Fact, the reality of the situation, as a continuing, consistent pattern throughout the testimony adduced from these insureds, and from Mr. Self, reveals that no regular business practice of obtaining an informed consent from customers, such as these, was carried out by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Daniel Lee Alison, be found guilty of the violations set forth and discussed above, that his license as an insurance agent in the State of Florida be revoked for a period of two years and that he be ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $9,000.00, within a time to be set by the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-2690 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-35. Accepted, except to the extent that they do not comport with the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on these subject matters to which they are subordinate. Rejected, as being subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as being subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter and because of the editorial comment. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter and rejected, as to the editorial comment. 39-40. Rejected, as being subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 41-44. Accepted, in part, but rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-13. Accepted, but not as materially dispositive of the issues presented for resolution. Accepted, in part, but rejected, as subordinate and somewhat contrary to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive to the issues presented for resolution in this case. 16-17. Accepted. 18. Rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 19-25. Accepted, but not themselves materially dispositive to the resolution of the issues presented to the Administrative Law Judge. 26. Accepted. 27-29. Rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 30-32. Accepted. 33-36. Accepted, in part, but rejected, as to the overall material import and as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 37-43. Rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter and to some extent, as immaterial. 44. Accepted, as technically correct, but witness Self, a former employee and a witness who purchased insurance, did establish in his testimony that purchase of an ancillary product was a pre-condition to premium financing by Agency policy. 45-47. Accepted, in part, but otherwise rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 48. Accepted. 49-52. Accepted, but not in and of themselves dispositive of the material issues presented concerning this witness' transaction(s). Rejected, as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael K. McCormick, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley & Associates, P.A. 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Bill Nelson Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of violating any of the below-cited provisions of the Florida Insurance Code and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed as follows: life agent, life and health agent, general lines agent, and health agent (Licenses). Respondent's license identification number is A192740. At all material times, Respondent has owned Florida Best Insurance Agency, Inc. (Best). Best sells insurance. Rose Duverseau has previously purchased insurance from Best and Respondent. Respondent has previously sold her insurance even though Ms. Duverseau lacked the cash necessary to pay the premium, although the record does not reveal the specifics of their arrangements in such transactions. On September 9, 2003, Ms. Duverseau telephoned Respondent at Best's office to discuss the purchase of automobile insurance. Satisfied with the premium cited by Respondent, Ms. Duverseau told Respondent to prepare the paperwork, and she would come to the office to sign the papers and obtain the insurance. When she arrived at Best's office later that day or the following day, Ms. Duverseau revealed to Respondent that she lacked the funds to pay the entire premium of $530. Respondent accepted from her a payment of part of the premium--$100. In return, Respondent issued to her insurance identification cards, showing that, effective September 9, 2003, she had coverage with American Vehicle Insurance Company (American) for personal injury protection benefits, property damage liability, and bodily injury liability. Ms. Duverseau told Respondent that she would bring him the rest of the money later. On September 23, 2003, Ms. Duverseau returned to Best's office and gave Respondent an additional $200 toward the premium. On September 25, 2003, Ms. Duverseau sent a friend with the remaining $230 to complete payment of the premium. Ms. Duverseau sent a friend because, earlier on September 25, Ms. Duverseau was involved in an automobile accident while in the covered vehicle. As a result of the accident, Ms. Duverseau incurred over $11,000 of medical expenses, which, after negotiations, was later reduced to $6243.25. She paid this amount with the proceeds of a settlement with another party involved in the accident. Ms. Duverseau later demanded that Respondent pay her this sum and the $530 that she had paid him for the policy, but Respondent gave her only $200 and a used computer that broke shortly after he gave it to her. Respondent never submitted the insurance application or premium payments to American. He is not an authorized agent of American. As he had in other insurance transactions, Respondent had intended to submit the application and premium to Fed USA Insurance and Financial Services, which is an agent of American, but Respondent intended to do so only after Ms. Duverseau had completed paying the full amount. However, Respondent is not an employee or agent of Fed USA.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order suspending Respondent's Licenses for five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Robert Alan Fox Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Francois Noel 13285 Northeast Sixth Avenue, Apt. N104 North Miami, Florida 33161
The Issue Whether petitioner should take action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent Kenneth E. Schneider has been a general lines agent and so licensed by respondent, at all pertinent times. He has been doing business in Pensacola, Florida, as Friendly Auto Insurance of Pensacola, Inc. (Friendly). Mr. Schneider was "agent for Friendly," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 16, and he and his wife ran the office (T. 124) with the help of a clerical assistant. Respondent was the licensed agent who "waited on customers." (T. 125) At the time of the final hearing, he was licensed to represent Protective Casualty Insurance Company, and Allied Fidelity Insurance Company. Petitioner's Exhibit 20. Additionally, and "only during 1982," petitioner was licensed to represent Dixie Insurance Company, Kenilworth Insurance Company, Colonial Insurance Company of California, and Fortune Insurance Company. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 19. When Mr. Schneider wrote policies for insurance companies other than those he was licensed to represent, he did so by agreement with "a managing general agency." (T. 141). Not all of these agreements he had with managing general agencies were in writing and the Department of Insurance was apprised of none of them. (T. 142, 143). Respondent "broker[ed] . . . business through a general agency in the State of Florida . . . [or] in Atlanta." (T. 141). Time Premium Company (TPC) of Hollywood, Florida, finances insurance premiums. TPC supplies Friendly (and other insurance agencies) with form contracts and blank drafts. Customers of Friendly wanting to borrow money to pay part of their insurance premiums sign a form contract filled in by a Friendly employee obligating the customer to repay TPC the portion of the premium it finances, on an installment basis. Among other things, the form contract provides: That in consideration of the payment by TIME to the respective insurance companies, or their agents, of the balance of the premiums upon the policies of insurance hereinbefore described, the assured agrees with TIME as follows: The assured hereby assigns to TIME as security for the total amount payable hereunder, any and all unearned return premiums and dividends which may become payable under the policies listed in the schedule and loss payments under said policies which reduce the unearned premiums. . . . 4. The assured hereby appoints TIME his attorney in fact to cancel and give notice of cancellation of said policies for non-payment of any amounts due hereunder, and said insurance companies are hereby authorized and directed, upon the demand or request of TIME, to cancel said policies and to pay TIME the unearned return premiums pursuant to the assignment contained in paragraph 1 about thereon without proof of default hereunder or breach thereof or of the amount owning hereunder. In the event that the unearned return premiums are not sufficient to pay the total amount due hereunder, the assured shall pay the deficiency with interest at the highest allowable rate. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. A Friendly employee consummates the loan by drawing on TPC and forwarding the draft to the insurance company (or agency) for whom Friendly is writing the insurance. In the event that a company fails to repay TPC, TPC causes the insurance coverage to be cancelled and applies return premiums against the outstanding indebtedness, including, when received, unearned commissions in Friendly's hands at the time of cancellation. TPC notifies Friendly of any shortfall, once it has received return premiums from the insurance companies (or agencies), and Friendly forwards all or part of its unearned commission to TPC, as appropriate. By print-out mailed four times monthly, TPC notifies Friendly of unearned commissions Friendly owes TPC. If return premiums, including unearned commissions, do not satisfy the debt, TPC duns the customer. Friendly is under an obligation to return to the customer any part of an unearned commission it does not owe to TPC or some other premium finance company. BARAHONA On November 29, 1982, Victor Barahona bought insurance from Friendly. Friendly wrote policy No. FAP508054 on Horizon Insurance Company (Horizon) on behalf of Guaranteed Insurance Underwriters (Guaranteed) for liability coverage; and, for comprehensive and collision coverage, policy No. SPP0401130 on Southern Insurance Company (Southern), on behalf of Florida General Agency. Mr. Barahona made a downpayment of $159.00 and Friendly effected a loan to him from TPC in the amount of $386.00 for the remainder of the combined premiums. Together with the finance charge and documentary stamps, Mr. Barahona's obligation to TPC aggregated $437.60, which he was to repay in eight monthly installments of $54.70 each, the first being due on December 30, 1982. On January 6, 1983, TPC notified Mr. Barahona that it had not received an installment payment, and that the policies would be cancelled if the payment was not received within ten days. On January 17, 1983, TPC requested cancellation of both policies. Later TPC notified Mr. Barahona that the policies were cancelled effective February 25, 1983. As a result of the cancellation of the Barahona policies, TPC received a total of $311.63 in return premiums, $127.95 from Florida General Agency and $183.68 from Horizon or Guaranteed. As of September 2, 1983, Barahona still owed TPC $114.78, and TPC had not received any part of the unearned commission on Barahona's policies from Friendly, but it was not until August that TPC had received the last insurance company return premium. Some time thereafter it billed Friendly on the entire unearned commission. In July of 1984, Friendly paid TPC the money it owed TPC on account of the cancellation of the Barahona policies. TAYLOR December 6, 1982, Friendly wrote policy No. SPP0401329 on Southern on behalf of Florida General Agency and policy No. 389868 on Protective Casualty Insurance Company (Protective) on behalf of Specialty Insurance Underwriters (Specialty) for James M. Taylor. Mr. Taylor made a down payment of $97.00, and Friendly effected a loan to him from TPC in the amount of $226.00 for the remainder of the combined premiums. Together with the finance charge and documentary stamps, Mr. Taylor's obligation to TPC aggregated $264.43, which he was to repay in eight equal monthly installments of $33.06, the first being due January 7, 1983. On January 12, 1983, TPC notified Mr. Taylor that it had not received an installment payment, and that the policies would be cancelled if the payment was not received within ten days. At TPC's behest, both policies were cancelled effective February 28, 1983, leaving an outstanding balance of $274.48. As a result of the cancellation of the Taylor policies, TPC received a total of $185.62 in return premiums, $88.02 from Florida General Agency and $97.60 from Protective in March of 1983. A notice of cancellation was sent to Friendly as well as to Protective and Southern, but Friendly did not pay the unearned commission it owed TPC until July of 1984. (T. 19). BIVINS On November 29, 1982, Friendly wrote policy No. 0401124 on Southern on behalf of Florida General Agency for Walter L. Bivins. Of the $159.00 total premium, Delores T. Bivins paid $99.00 as a cash downpayment, and Friendly effected a loan to her from TPC in the amount of $60.00 for the remainder of the premium. Together with the finance charge and documentary stamps, Mr. Bivins' obligation to TPC aggregated $81.93, which he was to repay in three equal installments of $27.31, the first of which was due December 30, 1982. Delores T. Bivins mailed TPC a check for $30.31 ($27.31 plus a $3.00 late charge) dated December 31, 1982. TPC deposited this check, but it was returned unpaid. As a result TPC assessed a $10.00 delinquency charge, and an additional $10 charge, because the check was returned, and caused the cancellation of Mr. Bivins' policy, effective March 2, 1983, claiming a balance due of $104.93. TPC received a return premium from Southern or Florida General Agency later the same month. TPC received the $12.80 unearned commission Friendly owed it in July of 1984. GORECKI On January 6, 1983, Friendly wrote policy No. SPP0403316 on Southern on behalf of Florida General Agency and policy No. 031555 on Allied Fidelity Insurance Company on behalf of Specialty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. for James T. Gorecki. The combined premiums amounted to $481.00. Mr. Gorecki made a down payment of $144.00 and financed the remaining $337.00 through TPC. Friendly effected the loan from TPC. Together with the finance charge and documentary stamps, Mr. Gorecki's total obligation to TPC aggregated $384.56, which he was to repay in eight equal monthly installments of $48.07, the first being due February 6, 1983. Mr. Gorecki sold his car and requested cancellation of both insurance policies in February of 1983. He executed documents at Friendly's office to effect the cancellation. Mr. Gorecki made no payment to TPC and TPC requested cancellation of both policies as a result, although at least one of them had already been cancelled. The Southern policy, No. SPP0403316, was cancelled March 3, 1983, and on March 17, 1983, a check for Southern's return premium, in the amount of $145.33, was sent to TPC, and TPC received it shortly thereafter. The return premium check for Allied Fidelity's policy No. 031555 reached TPC no later than May of 1983. (T. 26). On June 21, 1983, Mr. Gorecki's mother filled out an "insurance consumer service request" complaining that "[t]hey have been telling us since February they would send us a check for the unearned premium." After applying both return premium checks against Mr. Gorecki's indebtedness, a balance of $45.16 remained. TPC notified Friendly by written statement mailed June 23, 1983, that unearned commissions up to $45.16 should be forwarded to TPC. Unearned commissions in excess of $45.16, if any, should have been returned to Mr. Gorecki. (T. 41). BOURGEOIS On January 5, 1983, Friendly wrote policy No. SPP0403324 on Southern on behalf of Florida General Agency and policy No. 031572 on Allied Fidelity Insurance Company on behalf of American Underwriters, Inc. for Edward Bourgeois. The combined premiums amounted to $397.00. Mr. Bourgeois made a down payment of $119.00 and financed the remaining $278.00. Friendly effected the loan from TPC. Together with the finance charge and documentary stamps, Mr. Bourgeois' total obligation to TPC aggregated $320.64, which he was to repay An eight equal monthly installments of $40.08, the first being due February 8, 1983. Mr. Bourgeois made no payments to TPC and TPC caused the cancellation of both policies, effective March 29, 1983, as a result. Notice of cancellation went to both insurance companies and Friendly. On April 27, 1983, TPC received an insurance company return premium of $135.29 and the other insurance company return premium arrived in May of 1983. (T. 27). Friendly paid TPC the unearned commission in July of 1984. A YEAR BEHIND TPC deals with some four or five hundred insurance agencies in Florida. TPC normally receives unearned commissions from agencies within 45 to 60 days after billing, although a TPC employee testified that 90 days was "acceptable." (T. 30). TPC bills the agencies with a computer printout, representing an accumulation of accounts. Possibly one other agency has taken longer than a year to repay moneys owed under similar circumstances. (T. 29). When respondent Schneider fell behind in forwarding unearned commissions, TPC telephoned to discuss the problem. He began sending money to reduce his indebtedness and continues to do so. TPC "would like him to do better, but . . . [is] working with him on this." (T. 31-32). Respondent Schneider sent TPC checks for $800.00 on April 26, 1983, for $500.00 on July 21, 1983, for $400.00 on May 25, 1983, for $400.00 on June 15, 1983, and for $500.00 on July 21, 1983. At the time of the hearing, he was paying $3,000.00 a month "[a]gainst old accounts that . . . [TPC needs] money on on the unearned commissions," (T. 42) but TPC has "asked him to raise it to four or five." (T. 38). TPC applies money it gets from respondent to the oldest accounts first, and Mr. Schneider was aware of this. (T. 38). The money TPC received in 1983 was applied to "possibly `81 or `82 files." (T. 32). A TPC employee testified without contradiction that unearned commissions insurance agencies like Friendly owed it would be TPC's money in the hands of the agent. LE On September 9, 1982, Hang Thi Le purchased Allied Fidelity Insurance Company's policy No. 09-104802 from Friendly for automobile liability, property damage and personal injury protection coverage. She paid Friendly $123.00 on September 9, 1982. Friendly forwarded $104.55 to Allied Fidelity and retained the balance as its commission. On January 26, 1983, Ms. Le made a written request that coverage be cancelled, by executing a form which stated, "I have sold my car." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12. Allied Fidelity Insurance Company cancelled the policy and, on April 22, 1985, mailed Friendly a check "in the amount of $532.10 with a notation on the bottom of the check indicating that this involved return premium[s] . . . for two policyholders, one being Hang Thi Le . . . indicating the amount of return [for Ms. Le] to be $50.15." (T. 51). Ms. Le was due a total return premium of $59.00, of which $8.85 was unearned commission still in respondent's hands. After she had telephoned Friendly three times and been told at least once that Mr. Schneider was not in, Ms. Le received a refund check in the amount of $50.15 dated July 21, 1983. The check bore the notation "returned premium" and was signed by respondent Schneider, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12, but did not include the $8.85 respondent owed Ms. Le. In a separate transaction with Friendly, Ms. Le bought insurance and financed the premium. She "put a down payment and . . . ma[d]e a[nother] payment," (T. 69) before deciding to cancel her insurance and stop payment on a check. LOGOS On March 29, 1982, Edward T. Logos went to Friendly's office because he had seen an advertisement on the back of the Pensacola News-Journal's "TV Tab", to wit: [Graphic image of Petitioner's Exhibit 16, as displayed on page 16 of the original Recommended Order, has been omitted. To view this portion of this document, please contact the Clerk's Office.] Mr. Logos "told the lady [in Friendly's office that he] wanted to buy PIP and that's all. [He] assumed they were honorable enough that they would sell [him] what [he] asked for." (T. 91). He was quoted $52.00 and complained about the price. He had waited an hour and a half or two for his turn to buy insurance and signed multiple documents where a woman in respondent's employ had marked them with "x"s. Among the papers he signed was an application for membership in Nation Motor Club, Inc., even though he never asked to join and would have declined an offer to purchase a membership. He also signed the following document: [Graphic image of Petitioner's Exhibit 15, as displayed on pages 17-18 of the original Recommended Order, has been omitted. To view this portion of this document, please contact the Clerk's Office.] The premium for the PIP policy with its $8,000 deductible, was $17.00. The $35.00 difference between the PIP premium and what Mr. Logos paid was apparently the cost of the motor club membership. More than a month later Mr. Logos received his policy in the mail, along with papers indicating he was a member of the Nation Motor Club. Mr. Logos never asked to join Nation Motor Club and would not knowingly have paid to do so. He made inquiries, then complained to the Insurance Commissioner. Respondent refunded the entire $52.00 by check dated August 27, 1982.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the following sections of the Florida Statutes: 626.041(2), 626.561(1), 626.592(1), 626.611(4), (5), (7)-(10), (13), 626.21(2), (6), (12), 626.9521, 626.9541(1)(a)1, (b), (e)1., (k)1., (o)1., (z)3, 627.739(2), and 627.843. If so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Joanne Marie Shepherd (Shepherd), is currently and was at all times pertinent to this proceedings licensed in Florida as an authorized joint underwriter, association representative, life agent, life and health agent, general lines-property casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines agent, health insurance agent, independent adjuster, and dental health care service contract salesman. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Shepherd was the president, secretary, and treasurer of Coral Springs Auto Tag and Insurance Agency, Inc. (Coral Springs Agency). Coral Springs Agency is an insurance agency incorporated and existing pursuant to the laws of the state of Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding Shepherd would be present at the Coral Springs Agency office during approximately 90 percent of the operating hours of the business. In early 1992, Shepherd organized an automobile club, Quality Motoring Association (QMA). At all times relevant to this proceeding, Shepherd was the vice president, secretary, treasurer, director, and resident agent of QMA. QMA provides one or more of the following services: coverage for automobile towing and road service, rental reimbursement, emergency travel expense, and theft reward. Shepherd's employees were paid a commission for each QMA contract which they sold. Contracts for QMA services were on a printed form and contained the following language: THIS CONTRACT IS NOT AN INSURANCE POLICY AND DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE FINANCIAL RESPONSI- BILITY OR NO-FAULT LAWS OF ANY STATE OR TERRITORY. Jo Ann Jones and Kelly Conley were employed by Coral Springs Agency beginning in 1987 and 1991, respectively. They worked under the direct control and supervision of Shepherd. On February 26, 1993, Ms. Jones received a limited customer representative license for automobile insurance. She received her 220 license in December, 1994. During 1993, Ms. Conley spent approximately 60 to 70 percent of her work time performing tag and title work for Coral Springs Agency. In addition, her other duties included filing, answering the telephone, assisting in preparing correspondence concerning late payments and intentions to cancel, and selling QMA services. Her duties did include giving quotes for renewals and specific coverage requests, taking applications and receiving premium payments; however the evidence did not establish that Ms. Conley spent more than ten percent of her time performing these duties. She received her 220 license in October, 1994. On October 26, 1994, Shepherd originally filed the name of the primary agent for Coral Springs Agency as Kelly Gorton. This filing was amended on December 15, 1994, to change the name of the primary agent to Jo Connors. The records of the Department do not show that Shepherd filed the name of the primary agent for Coral Springs Agency for 1990 through 1993. Shepherd did not file the name of the primary agency for Coral Springs Agency for 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993. In 1992, Andrew Coombs came to Coral Springs Agency to procure an automobile insurance policy. Shepherd explained the coverages to him. Mr. Coombs was issued a policy for PIP and property damage. Based on Respondent's Exhibit No. 8, Mr. Coombs was also issued comprehensive and collision coverage with Executive Insurance Company for a policy period of July 5, 1992 through July 5, 1993. The declaration sheet for the Executive Insurance Company policy showed that Mr. Coombs had a conviction for DUI/DWI on 6-11-90. In 1992, Mr. Coombs signed a contract with QMA for towing and rental services. However, Mr. Coombs was under the impression that the rental and towing services were included as part of his insurance policy. The contract which he signed did not indicate the fee amount for the contract. In June, 1993, Mr. Coombs called and discussed with Jo Ann Jones his need for a policy renewal and received a written quote from her on June 17, 1993, which stated: As per your request, please see the following renewal quote. 25,000 property damage, basic PIP w/a 2000 ded. Comp and coll. w/a 500 ded each. Your annual premium is 1278. w/a down payment of 302.62 and 6 months payments of 170.56. If you have any questions please call me. Thank you. The following Saturday, Mr. Coombs went to the Coral Springs Agency and gave Ms. Jones $200 in cash and a check for $1,078. He received a receipt from Ms. Jones for that amount showing that it was for "ins. paid in full." Mr. Coombs was in a hurry on that day and he executed a power of attorney appointing Coral Springs Auto Tag and Insurance Agency as his attorney-in-fact and authorizing the Coral Springs Agency to sign and execute applications for automobile insurance. The power of attorney did not authorize Coral Springs Agency to execute a contract with QMA for Mr. Coombs. Jo Ann Jones witnessed the execution of the power of attorney and dated it 7-3-93. The power of attorney was used on July 3, 1993 to execute a contract with QMA for towing and rental services. The charge for these automobile club services was $100 and was so indicated on the contract. Mr. Coombs did not know that the power of attorney would be used to purchase towing and rental services with QMA. The power of attorney was used also to execute Mr. Coombs' application for an insurance policy with Progressive. The application showed that the total premium with Progressive was $1,178. The policy with Progressive was for property damage, PIP, comprehensive and collision. In completing the application, it was the understanding of the Coral Springs Agency that the latest conviction that Mr. Coombs had was the DUI in June, 1990. However, Mr. Coombs had confused the date of the occurrence of the violation with the date of conviction and had not revealed that in October, 1990, his license had been revoked because of the DUI violation. When Progressive learned of the revocation, it notified Mr. Coombs that an additional $98 premium would be due. As a result of the notification from Progressive, Mr. Coombs learned that Progressive had received $1,178 instead of the $1,278 which he had given Coral Springs Agency and that he had been charged $100 for QMA's towing and rental services. Surprised and upset by this revelation, Mr. Coombs contacted the Department of Insurance and made a complaint. On July 24, 1993, Wayne LeBlanc went to the Coral Springs Agency to purchase automobile insurance. His current policy was with Allstate and he told Ms. Conley that he wanted similar coverage. The Allstate policy included towing and rental coverage for approximately eight dollars. Ms. Conley gave Mr. LeBlanc a quote. Ms. Conley filled out Mr. LeBlanc's application for insurance with Progressive and a contract with QMA for rental and towing services. She placed "X's" on the documents indicating where Mr. LeBlanc should sign and he signed the documents. Mr. LeBlanc did not know that he was purchasing towing and rental services from an automobile club. Ms. Conley did not explain the QMA contract to Mr. LeBlanc. The Progressive application showed that the total premium for the insurance was $512. The QMA contract showed the amount of the fee for QMA services as $100. Mr. LeBlanc gave Ms. Conley a check for $228. Ms. Conley applied $128 for payment of the insurance coverage and $100 for the QMA coverage. A short time later, Mr. LeBlanc received a statement from Progressive indicating that his insurance premium had increased from $512 to $702 because he had failed to show proof of insurance for the six months prior to the purchase of the Progressive policy. Mr. LeBlanc cancelled his policy with Progressive. He received a check from QMA dated January 19, 1994 for $100 as a refund on his QMA coverage. In August, 1993, Eric Henry called Coral Springs Agency for a quote for automobile insurance for his 1984 Nissan. He wanted the minimum coverage which was legally required. Mr. Henry was given a quote of between $480 and $490. He, along with his father, went to Coral Springs Agency to purchase the insurance. Mr. Henry signed a Progressive insurance application. The Progressive application showed a total premium of $410 in two different locations on the contract as well as a breakdown of the premium by coverage. Additionally the application showed a $103 down payment with the remainder of the premium to be paid in installments. Mr. Henry signed a contract with QMA. The contract showed a fee of $80 as well as the benefits he was receiving under the contract. Ms. Jones did not explain the QMA contract to Mr. Henry. He did not know that he was purchasing towing and rental services from an automobile club. He did not ask for the automobile club services and did not want them. He had never had towing and rental coverage before. Mr. Henry gave Ms. Jones $183, of which $103 was applied to the insurance premium and $80 to QMA for towing and rental services. Mr. Henry was given a receipt by Ms. Jones that described the money as "DP on ins." Mr. Henry learned that he had purchased QMA coverage from a representative from the Department. He contacted the Coral Springs Agency and requested a refund for the QMA coverage because he did not want and had not asked for the QMA services. QMA refunded his money. Mr. Henry has continued to do business with Coral Springs Agency. On Saturday, August 21, 1993, JoAnne Strader called Coral Springs Agency for a quote for insurance on her automobile. Shepherd gave her a quote by telephone for coverage by Fortune Insurance Company. Ms. Strader wanted the minimum coverage required by law and nothing else. Coral Springs closed at one that afternoon so Ms. Strader hurried to the agency to purchase the insurance. When she arrived at the agency, Ms. Conley pulled up the quote from the computer. Ms. Strader signed the application for the Fortune Insurance, a contract with QMA for towing and rental services, and an agreement for financing the insurance premiums. The application stated that the total insurance premium was $207. The QMA contract showed that the fee for the QMA services was $55 for six months. Ms. Jones did not explain the QMA contract. The financing agreement showed that the total premium was $207 with $102 being applied as the down payment. Ms. Strader gave Ms. Conley a check for $157 of which $102 was applied as a down payment for the insurance coverage and $55 for QMA services. The finance agreement provided that Ms. Strader would make three payments of $42.95 beginning on September 21, 1993. Ms. Strader was given a copy of the finance agreement on August 21, 1993. Ms. Strader later called Coral Springs Agency and advised Ms. Conley that she had misplaced her insurance documents. Ms. Conley sent Ms. Strader a duplicate set, including a copy of the finance agreement, in October, 1993. Ms. Strader was unaware at the time she purchased the insurance that she had also purchased automobile club services from QMA. She learned for the first time that she had purchased such services when a representative from the Department contacted her in January, 1994 and told her. In February, 1994, Ms. Strader made a claim to QMA for reimbursement of towing expenses. She received a check dated February 18, 1994 from QMA. On November 9, 1993, Daniel Link went to the Coral Springs Agency to purchase minimum automobile insurance coverage for his two vehicles. He was given a written quote by Jo Ann Jones. Mr. Link asked Ms. Jones to prepare the application and stated that he would come back later in the day to sign the application. When he returned to the agency the application was prepared and he signed it. The application showed that the total insurance premium was $1023 with a breakdown by vehicle of the costs for the coverages. Mr. Link gave Coral Springs Agency a check for $356, which he thought would be applied to the insurance premium; however only $256 was applied toward the insurance premium. Mr. Link signed an agreement to finance the outstanding premium balance. The finance agreement showed that the total premium was $1023 with a down payment of $256 with the remainder to be paid in eight payments. His testimony was not clear whether he received a copy of the finance agreement on the day that he signed the agreement. Mr. Link did not want to purchase towing and rental coverage. When he came into the agency to sign the application, he also signed a contract with QMA for automobile club services which showed a fee of $100. The blanks in the contract had been filled out by someone at Coral Springs Agency, and he signed where an "X" was placed. Ms. Jones did not explain the QMA contract to Mr. Link. He did not know that he had purchased such services. Of the amount which Mr. Link paid the Coral Springs Agency, $100 went to pay for QMA coverage. In November, 1993, Andrew Prisco and his father went to the Coral Springs Agency to purchase insurance for a 1985 Nissan. Mr. Prisco's father had transferred the title to the car to Mr. Prisco. The vehicle has previously been insured through the Coral Springs Agency. Mr. Prisco's father handled the transaction for Mr. Prisco and discussed the coverage with Ms. Jones. Mr. Prisco signed an application for Progressive Insurance. Jo Ann Jones had filled out a portion of the application. The application showed that the total premium was $410. Mr. Prisco gave the Coral Springs Agency a check for $490, thinking it was for insurance premiums. Mr. Prisco did not want towing and rental services, but he signed a contract with QMA. Ms. Jones filled out the QMA agreement and put an "X" where Mr. Prisco was supposed to sign. Mr. Prisco signed where Ms. Jones indicated; however he was unaware that he was purchasing automobile club services. Ms. Jones did not explain the QMA contract to Mr. Prisco. The QMA contract showed that the fee for the services was $80. Of the $490 which he paid Coral Springs Agency, $80 was for QMA. Mr. Prisco learned from a Department representative that he had purchased QMA services. Mr. Prisco and his father requested a refund from QMA. QMA refunded the fee paid by Mr. Prisco. Mr. Prisco has continued to do business with Coral Springs Agency. Shepherd has been a licensed insurance agent in Florida since 1982. Other than the instant proceeding, Shepherd has never had a disciplinary action taken against her insurance agent license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Counts III, VI, and VII of the Administrative Complaint; finding that Joanne Shepherd violated Section 626.592(1), Florida Statutes; finding that Shepherd violated Sections 626.9541(1)(x)3., 626.611(5), (7), and (9), Sections 626.621(2)(6), and 626.9521, Florida Statutes, as set forth in Counts II, IV, V, VIII and IX of the Administrative Complaint; and suspending Joanne Shepherd's license for two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4167 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 6-7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance that Ms. Jones was employed as an employee of Coral Springs Agency during the time period relevant to this proceeding. Paragraph 10: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Ms. Jones was a limited customer representative. Paragraphs 11-19: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance that Progressive asked for an additional $98 but denied that the reason for the additional premium was because Shepherd failed to send Progressive $1,278. The reason of the increase was because Coomb's license had been either suspended or revoked in 1990. Paragraph 21: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 22: The first sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that Ms. Conley took an application from Mr. Leblanc but not that she solicited or procured the application. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraph 23: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is rejected as to soliciting. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 25-32: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 33: The first sentence is accepted in substance that Ms. Conley took an application from Ms. Strader for automobile insurance with Fortune but rejected that she solicited or procured the application. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: The first sentence is accepted in substance except as to soliciting. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraphs 37-39: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 40: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 41-42: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 43: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraphs 44-49: Accepted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance except as to Mr. Coombs. He did not sign the application. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 5-6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 8: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraph 9: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 10: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 11-12: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 13-17: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 18: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen R. Moayad, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson and Cowdery 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner on October 6, 1997, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Insurance is the state agency responsible for regulating the business of insurance in the State of Florida. Section 624.307, Florida Statutes. This power extends to the licensing and discipline of insurance agents. Sections 626.291, .611, and .621, Florida Statutes. Howard Irvin Vogel ("Respondent") is, and was at all times material to this action, licensed as a general lines agent (2-20) and a health insurance agent (2-40); Respondent is also currently licensed as a Florida Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association representative (0-17). Respondent is, and was at the times material to this action, the president of Federal Auto Ins., Inc., 1/ ("Federal Insurance"), an incorporated general lines insurance agency located in Lake Worth, Florida. He is, and was at the times material to this action, the only officer of the corporation who is a licensed insurance agent. In 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, Respondent was a director of the corporation and its designated primary agent. Respondent is, and was at the times material to this action, also the only licensed insurance agent who has the authority to sign checks drawn on the Federal Insurance trust account. At the times material to this action, Federal Insurance employed at least two licensed insurance agents in addition to the Respondent. The Respondent regularly worked full-time in the Federal Insurance office during 1993, 1994, and 1995, and he was aware of the way in which the agents he employed sold insurance. All monies received by the agents were turned over to the agency, and the Respondent approved all refunds and signed all refund checks. The Respondent ran the day-to-day operations of the insurance agency and supervised the agents who worked there. At the times material to this action, it was the practice at Federal Insurance to impose a service charge for the preparation of certificates of insurance 2/ if a customer indicated he or she would need certificates prepared throughout the year. It was also the practice not to charge customers for the preparation of the first three certificates, but the agents employed there had the option, depending on the person and on the amount of the premium, of charging $5 for each certificate prepared in excess of the three free ones or of charging a flat fee of $100 per year. The charge was imposed to cover the costs of preparing the certificates. The agents employed by Federal Insurance were expected to explain the charge to the customer and to make it clear that the $100 was an additional charge and not part of the insurance premium. The fees received for the preparation of certificates of insurance were deposited in Federal Insurance's trust account. Some insurance agencies do not charge for the preparation of certificates of insurance on behalf of their customers. At the times material to this action, Federal Insurance sold automobile towing coverage provided by L.N.V., Inc., a Florida corporation whose directors since its incorporation in 1987 have been Howard and Alicia Vogel. L.N.V., Inc., reimburses its members for the expense of towing an insured vehicle if an accident occurs during the period the customer's automobile insurance policy is in effect. Federal Insurance had, at the times material to this action, a separate application for the towing coverage, which applicants for the coverage were required to sign. The agents employed by Federal Insurance were expected to explain the nature of the coverage and to make it clear to the customer that the charge for the towing coverage was separate from the premium charged for the underlying automobile insurance policy. The membership fees received for the towing coverage were deposited into a separate account for L.N.V., Inc. The Respondent is the only licensed insurance agent authorized to sign checks on this account. Michael Clark On December 19, 1993, Michael J. Clark went to the office of Federal Insurance to purchase a commercial general liability insurance policy and to renew his commercial automobile insurance policy. He met with Lee Vogel, who was a licensed general lines agent employed by Federal Insurance. Lee Vogel quoted Mr. Clark an annual premium of $776 for the renewal of his commercial automobile insurance policy for a vehicle used in his business, Eastern Electric. Mr. Clark applied for the policy, which was written by the Granada Insurance Company ("Granada"); $776 was the correct premium for the coverage Mr. Clark requested. Mr. Clark paid Federal Insurance a down payment of $330 and signed a Premium Finance Agreement and Disclosure Statement in order to obtain financing for the balance of the premium. When Mr. Clark signed the premium finance agreement, the portion identified as the Federal Truth-in-Lending Disclosure Statement had not been completed by Lee Vogel, so the form did not reflect the amount of the down payment. Mr. Clark and Lee Vogel used a worksheet when they were discussing the coverage and the cost of the policy. The worksheet Lee Vogel prepared during these discussions shows that he added $100 to the $776 premium for the commercial automobile insurance policy and stated a total of $876 on the worksheet. Mr. Clark signed the worksheet on which the $100 charge is shown, and he apparently did not question at that time the purpose of the additional $100 charge. Several weeks after he purchased the commercial automobile insurance policy, Mr. Clark received the documents and payment book from the premium finance company. These documents reflected that he had been credited with a down payment of only $230 rather than the $330 down payment Mr. Clark thought he had made on the policy. At the same time he purchased the commercial automobile insurance policy, Mr. Clark purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy. Lee Vogel quoted Mr. Clark a premium of $281 for a policy which would be written by the American Surety and Casualty Insurance Company ("American Surety"). Mr. Clark applied for this policy and paid Federal Insurance $381 as payment in full for the general liability policy. The worksheet prepared by Lee Vogel shows a $100 charge added to the $281 premium quoted to Mr. Clark. Although Mr. Clark claims that Lee Vogel did not explain the $100 charge to him, Mr. Clark did not question Lee Vogel about the additional $100 charge. He signed the worksheet and paid Federal Insurance $381 for the general liability coverage even though he was quoted $281 as the premium for the coverage. Lee Vogel added the $100 charge to the $776 and $281 premiums for the automobile and general liability policies as a service charge to cover the costs of preparing any certificates of insurance Mr. Clark might request during the policy year. According to Lee Vogel, customers are not charged for the preparation of certificates for commercial automobile insurance policies because certificates of insurance are not usually prepared for such policies. If they are, it is in conjunction with certificates of insurance prepared to confirm commercial general liability coverage. At the time he purchased the policy, Mr. Clark requested that four certificates of insurance be prepared, and, on December 20, 1993, Howard Vogel signed four certificates of insurance verifying that Eastern Electric had general liability coverage with American Surety. During the 1993-94 policy year, Federal Insurance prepared a total of seventeen certificates of insurance on behalf of Eastern Electric, which certified that Eastern Electric had general liability coverage with American Surety. Five of the seventeen certificates of insurance confirmed both that Eastern Electric had general liability coverage with American Surety and that Eastern Electric had automobile insurance coverage with Granada Insurance Company. No separate certificates of insurance were prepared by Federal Insurance for the commercial automobile insurance policy written by Granada Insurance Company. Mr. Clark testified that he was not informed of the $100 service charge added to the premiums for the commercial automobile insurance policy and the commercial general liability insurance policy. He was in a hurry when he purchased these policies, and, when Lee Vogel gave him two or three papers to sign, he signed the papers without really reading them. Except for his signature appearing on several of the certificates of insurance prepared by Federal Insurance for Eastern Electric, the Respondent's only direct involvement with Mr. Clark's case was a letter the Respondent wrote to the Department, dated June 20, 1994, in which he complained about the way in which the investigation of Mr. Clark's complaint was being handled. Cheryl Lee Andrews On February 23, 1994, Cheryl Andrews purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy for her husband's lawn care business, Tropic Green Lawn Care, through Federal Insurance. After having spoken with him on the telephone, Ms. Andrews met with Bryan Sanders, a licensed general lines insurance agent employed by Federal Insurance, who quoted Ms. Andrews a premium of $673 for a policy written by American Surety. The wholesale broker in this transaction, with whom Federal Insurance had a contract, was Amelia Underwriters, Inc. Ms. Andrews made a down payment of $271 on the policy, and she was given a receipt which indicated that she had paid a $271 payment on a "GL" policy with "Amelia." When she paid the down payment on the policy, Ms. Andrews also signed a Premium Finance Agreement to finance the remainder of the premium through Del Rio Discount Corp. When Ms. Andrews signed the premium finance agreement, the portion identified as the Federal Truth-in-Lending Disclosure Statement had not been completed by Mr. Sanders; the premium finance agreement contained only the number of payments, the amount of each payment, and the date the first payment was due. Soon after, Ms. Andrews spoke with the Respondent on the telephone and requested a copy of the premium finance agreement with a completed disclosure statement. The Respondent sent her a copy of the agreement by facsimile transmittal, but it was not legible. Ms. Andrews telephoned the Respondent again and requested that he send her a copy by mail. When she did not receive another copy from Federal Insurance, she contacted American Surety, which contacted Amelia Underwriters, and the underwriters provided a completed copy of the Premium Finance Agreement. The down payment identified in the agreement was $171. On the day she purchased the insurance policy, Mr. Sanders asked if she wanted any certificates of insurance. At that time, Ms. Andrews did not know what this was, and Mr. Sanders told her it was proof of insurance. She asked that he prepare one certificate of insurance for Tropic Green Lawn Care on February 23, 1994. A second certificate of insurance was prepared by Federal Insurance for Tropic Green Lawn Care on March 28, 1994. Mr. Sanders did not discuss with Ms. Andrews at any time a charge for preparation of certificates of insurance. When she questioned the Respondent during a telephone conversation about the additional $100 she had paid Federal Insurance, he told her that it was a charge for certificates of insurance and other service charges and that, if she wanted any information, she should ask in writing. She then wrote a letter to the Respondent, dated June 10, 1994, requesting a breakdown of these charges, but she did not receive a response. In a letter dated July 26, 1996, written to the Department, Mr. Sanders confirmed that Federal Insurance charged $100 Ms. Andrews for preparation of certificates of insurance. Tropic Green was reimbursed $100 by Federal Insurance by a check drawn on the Federal Insurance trust account and dated January 8, 1996. Virginia Davidson On August 17, 1994, Virginia Davidson applied for personal automobile insurance through Federal Insurance. She dealt with a woman whose name she does not remember and who has not been identified in these proceedings. The policy was to cover a 1985 Chrysler, and she told the woman that she wanted insurance only for a short time because she intended to sell the car in the near future. At the time of this transaction, Ms. Davidson was in her late sixties. Ms. Davidson was told she needed to buy a one-year policy, and she recalled being quoted a price of $386 for an automobile insurance policy written by Armor Insurance Company ("Armor"). She paid the $386 by check dated August 17, 1994, and made payable to Federal Insurance; she was given a receipt that indicated that she had paid in full the premium on the Armor automobile insurance policy for one year. In fact, the premium for this policy was initially computed as $281 on the Brokerage Auto Application form. Although Ms. Davidson signed the application form on which this quote appeared, her signature appeared only on the reverse of the application form, while the quote appeared on the front. Ms. Davidson does not recall that anyone on August 17, 1994, explained that the $386 quoted to her included a separate $100 charge for towing coverage to be provided by L.N.V., Inc. At the time she purchased the insurance policy, Ms. Davidson was a member of AAA and would not have knowingly purchased towing coverage. Ms. Davidson's signature appears on a separate application form which clearly displayed the terms "Towing Coverage" and "LNV Corp." The "membership fee" for this coverage was shown on the form as $100. Ms. Davidson was asked to sign a number of documents when she applied for the automobile insurance policy, and she does not recall signing the application form for towing coverage. In a notice from Armor dated September 16, 1994, Ms. Davidson was notified that she owed an additional premium of $116 on her automobile insurance policy. The additional premium was due as a result of Armor's investigation of Ms. Davidson's driving history. In a letter to Armor dated October 11, 1994, Ms. Davidson requested that the policy be cancelled and that she receive a refund of unearned premium. Armor sent Federal Insurance a check dated October 31, 1994, in the amount of $163.70, representing the unearned premium on Ms. Davidson's automobile insurance policy. Mr. Vogel signed a check to Ms. Davidson on the Federal Insurance trust account, dated November 11, 1994, for $163.70. Ms. Davidson did not receive this check, and a replacement check was prepared, dated December 5, 1994. Ms. Davidson does not recall receiving this check, and neither of these checks has cleared Federal Insurance's account. The Respondent refused to issue another replacement check unless Ms. Davidson waited six months for the checks to clear the bank or paid Federal Insurance the $25.00 fee charged by the bank to stop payment on the replacement check. During December 1994, the Respondent recalculated the amount of the refund owing Ms. Davidson, including for the first time the agency's unearned commission and a pro rata refund of the $100 fee for the towing coverage. The Respondent issued a check to Ms. Davidson, drawn on the Federal Insurance trust account and dated December 26, 1994, in the amount of $117.20. The check specified that it was for "cancellation in full" of Ms. Davidson's automobile insurance policy. Ms. Davidson did not cash this check because she disputed that it was the full amount of the refund owed to her. Armor subsequently issued a check to Ms. Davidson in the amount of $184.80, which included the $163.70 and an additional amount of unearned premium which Armor had neglected to include in its calculations. Ms. Davidson does not recall receiving this check. All of the checks were sent to Ms. Davidson at her correct address in West Palm Beach, Florida. The Respondent was involved in the transaction involving Ms. Davidson only after she cancelled her automobile insurance policy. The Respondent signed the refund checks issued in her name, and, after Ms. Davidson filed a complaint with the Department, he responded to the Department's inquiry regarding the refund due to her. After having reviewed the files of Mr. Clark, Ms. Andrews, and Ms. Davidson, the Respondent was satisfied with the way the agents employed by Federal Insurance transacted business with these individuals. Summary The evidence is uncontroverted that the employees of Federal Insurance are supervised on a daily basis by and are under the direct control of the Respondent. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Michael Clark was unaware that he was charged $100 in addition to the premiums quoted on the commercial automobile insurance policy and commercial general liability insurance policy he purchased through Federal Insurance. Although he may not have been told the purpose of the extra charge, Mr. Clark was quoted premiums of $776 and $281, respectively, for the insurance policies. The worksheet he signed clearly shows that $100 was added to each of these premiums; in fact, Mr. Clark paid $381 as payment in full for the commercial general liability insurance policy when he knew that the premium for the policy was $281. On the other hand, the evidence presented is sufficient to establish that Lee Vogel deducted a $100 service charge for certificates of insurance from Mr. Clark's down payment of $330 on the commercial automobile insurance policy even though this charge was not imposed on commercial automobile insurance policies because separate certificates of insurance are not prepared for such coverage. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that Bryan Sanders did not inform Cheryl Andrews of the $100 service charge added to the premium for the general liability insurance policy she purchased for Tropic Green Lawn Care and to establish that Ms. Andrews could reasonably believe that the entire down payment of $271 would be applied to the insurance premium. However, the evidence is uncontroverted that, when she spoke to the Respondent by telephone, he told her that the charge was for preparation of certificates of insurance and other services. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that, even though she signed an application form for towing coverage to be provided by L.N.V. Corp., Ms. Davidson was not told of the purpose of the application, the nature of the coverage, or the $100 fee for the coverage. In fact, the receipt for $386 that she received from Federal Insurance did not make any reference at all to the towing coverage or to L.N.V. Corp. The evidence presented by the Department is, however, not sufficient to establish that the Respondent refused to refund the monies owing to Ms. Davidson; under the circumstances presented, it was not unreasonable for Federal Insurance to refuse to issue a second replacement check. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that the Respondent instituted the practice of charging a $100 service fee for the preparation of certificates of insurance for commercial general liability insurance purchased through Federal Insurance. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Federal Insurance was prohibited by agreement or contract from imposing a service charge for the preparation of certificates of insurance. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that the Respondent instituted a policy at Federal Insurance requiring customers to purchase towing coverage from L.N.V., Inc., as a condition of purchasing an automobile insurance policy or that the Respondent developed a sales scheme whereby the application for and explanation of the towing coverage was hidden. The evidence is sufficient to establish only one instance in which an unidentified person employed at Federal Insurance failed to disclose the particulars of the towing coverage. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish a pattern at Federal Insurance of agents failing to disclose the $100 service charge for preparing certificates of insurance, of agents imposing the service charge to policies for which no certificates of insurance are prepared in the normal course of business, or of failing to inform customers of the nature of and charge for ancillary coverage such as towing coverage. Finally, the evidence presented by the Department does not establish that the Respondent or the agents involved in the transactions at issue in this proceeding failed to remit any portion of the premiums owing to the insurance companies for the policies sold to Mr. Clark, Ms. Andrews, or Ms. Davidson. In the case of Mr. Clark and Ms. Andrews, the premiums quoted to them were correct and the premiums set forth on the premium finance agreements were correct; it is irrelevant in this respect that Mr. Clark and Ms. Andrews may have believed that their $330 and $271 down payments were to be applied solely to the premiums owed on the policies. Likewise, the full amount of the premium initially calculated for Ms. Davidson's automobile insurance policy was paid to the insurance company by Federal Insurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order dismissing all three counts of the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Howard Irvin Vogel. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1998.
