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GLORIA FRANCIS vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 05-002958 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gardner, Florida Aug. 18, 2005 Number: 05-002958 Latest Update: Feb. 15, 2007

The Issue Whether Respondent Employer has committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner by discrimination against her on the basis of race, sex, handicap, or retaliation, in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Negro female. As of March 12, 2003, she was rated by the Veterans’ Administration (VA) as having a 30 percent disability, due to a knee injury which occurred while she was on active military duty. (Petitioner’s unrefuted testimony and Exhibit P-37.) Petitioner specifically has alleged “sexual harassment,” “hostile work environment,” racial discrimination, retaliation, disparate treatment, and that she was denied a reasonable accommodation for her alleged knee “handicap.” Her “disparate treatment” allegation was presented in two respects: (1) that employees outside Petitioner’s protected racial class were not disciplined as harshly as Petitioner; and (2) that because Petitioner had worked for Respondent Employer for more than twelve months’ total, the State of Florida career service rules do not support her being terminated as a “probationary employee” from the position to which she was promoted and in which she had worked for less than twelve months at the time of her termination. Petitioner was first employed by Respondent Employer on November 15, 2002, at St. Lucie Regional Juvenile Detention Center in the position of Juvenile Detention Officer (JDO). After completing her twelve months’ probation in that position, Petitioner attained permanent State of Florida career service status. This meant that Petitioner was considered a permanent State of Florida employee, but it did not mean, as she has asserted, that she did not have to undergo a twelve months’ probationary period in each career service promotional position, if and when she attained one, or that she could never be terminated for cause. (See Conclusions of Law.) On September 10, 2003, at Petitioner's request, she was transferred from St. Lucie Regional Juvenile Detention Center to a vacant JDO position at Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention Center (ARJDC or “the facility”). This transfer permitted her to pursue a higher education at Santa Fe Community College (SFCC) in Gainesville, via her VA benefits, while being employed fulltime. When she transferred, Petitioner prepared a memo to all her supervisors at ARJDC stating that she needed to work the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift so she could attend college classes in the mornings. However, at no time did the Employer guarantee that Petitioner would always be assigned to that shift. (P-35) At all times material, Petitioner was a single parent, working full time, and taking college classes. As a single parent, she was the sole support of her child. Because she was going to college pursuant to VA guidelines, she had to attend her classes and successfully complete them in order to continue to receive VA tuition and assistance. At all times material, Jill Bessette (Caucasian female) was employed in the position of ARJDC’s superintendent. As such, she was responsible for the overall functioning and operations at ARJDC, and for ensuring the safety and security of that facility’s juveniles and staff. Bessette relied on the facility's two assistant superintendents, Patricia Newman (Caucasian female) and Charles Parkins (Caucasian male), to assist her. Newman and Parkins oversaw daily operations, attended to personnel matters, and provided direct supervision of staff. In so doing, they regularly made written and oral reports to Bessette. On February 13, 2004, as a result of good reports about Petitioner's performance as a JDO at the facility, Bessette promoted Petitioner to the position of Senior Juvenile Detention Officer (SJDO). (P-17). On or about February 23, 2004, Petitioner complained to her superiors about Douglas Singleton (male) evaluating her, because she felt he had not observed her often enough. She was also rated by a female officer, Cohen, and wanted Cohen’s rating retained. This may have been a departmental career service or a union grievance, but it appears to have had no discrimination overtones. (See Findings of Fact 31 and 34.) Assistant Superintendent Parkins, who was Petitioner’s direct line senior supervisor, denied Petitioner’s grievance about her rating as untimely, but Petitioner did not demonstrate any specific negative personnel action resulting directly from Singleton’s evaluation. There is no evidence that this rating reflected that Petitioner was ever tardy or had unexcused absences. (P- 24, 25). After her termination in September 2004, Petitioner wrote the Governor stating that she had complained to Parkins in March 2004, about his attempt to switch her to a shift which would have interfered with her college classes and that Parkins was hostile about her going to college (P-36), but at hearing she presented no credible evidence that such an attempt by Parkins had ever occurred or that she had ever complained to anyone about such an attempt prior to her termination. Additionally, Petitioner was consistently assigned to the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift she had requested until September 2004. (See Findings of Fact 31-35, 55, and 75, and Conclusion of Law 81.) In late February 2004, Petitioner complained because Newman, the assistant superintendent most concerned with timesheets, had inquired of a middle-level supervisor why Petitioner had been absent on a specific day. The testimony about this incident is so sparse, disjointed, and inconclusive that the undersigned cannot determine whether Petitioner also filed any type of grievance about Newman’s inquiry, but again, Petitioner’s complaint does not seem to have had anything to do with discrimination. (See Findings of Fact 31, 34.) In any case, Newman was apparently satisfied when informed by Cohen that Petitioner had been on pre-approved leave, and Petitioner did not suffer any detrimental personnel action specifically as a result of Newman’s inquiry. (Cf. Findings of Fact 74-75.) During the first week of April 2004, Petitioner tendered a letter of resignation to Bessette, which Bessette reluctantly accepted. Bessette testified that the only reasons Petitioner gave for this resignation were personal ones unrelated to discrimination. Petitioner did not testify otherwise. A short time later, Petitioner reconsidered her decision, and Bessette accepted Petitioner’s rescission of her resignation in such a way that Petitioner suffered no lapse in her career service. (R-5). From April 13, through July 25, 2004, Bessette took extended medical leave. During Bessette's absence, Assistant Superintendent Charles Parkins assumed the role of “Acting Superintendent.” At all times material, Shirley Edmond (Negro female) and Bruce Perry (Negro male) were employed by ARJDC as middle level supervisors. They supervised the JDOs and SJDOs assigned to their shift(s). At ARJDC, there are three shifts around the clock. SJDOs and JDOs at the facility are assigned to work shifts. In order to maintain an appropriate minimum correctional officer- to-juvenile detainee ratio, and in order to ensure the safety and security of staff, juveniles, and the community, SJDOs and JDOs are subject to having their shift assignment rotated or changed. Also in order to prevent the facility from operating below minimum staffing levels, JDOs and SJDOs may be required to “holdover” or continue working into the next shift when asked to do so as a result of on-coming staff members’ tardiness or absence. As a result of minimum staffing level requirements, ARJDC's operating procedures address the issue of tardiness and identify three instances of tardiness in any rolling 90-day period as “excessive.” (R-17). ARJDC’s operating procedures also address absenteeism. The required procedure for “calling in sick” requires employees seeking approved leave to contact the on-duty officer or acting supervisor at least two hours in advance of the employee’s report time, and further requires that thereafter, the employee also speak to the shift supervisor and discuss the employee's return-to-work date. Medical verification may be required by the Employer for absences in excess of three consecutive days. (R-17). Upon her hire, and again in June 2004, Petitioner was made aware of, and was provided with, a copy of the Employer’s policies and procedures with regard to absenteeism and tardiness. (R-3, 19). From May through June or early July 2004, Petitioner, Perry, and Edmond all worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. During these months, both Perry and Edmond observed that Petitioner frequently arrived late for her shift, that is: more than one minute after 11:00 p.m., which is the grace period allowed by the facility’s policies and procedures. (R-17). On one occasion, Perry spoke to Petitioner about her tardiness. Petitioner attributed her tardiness to problems with her babysitter. At all times material, Petitioner was aware of the Employer’s policy against, and procedures for reporting, discrimination or sexual harassment. These procedures are given in numbered paragraphs, but are not referred to as “steps.” They permit Petitioner to involve the internal EEOC officer and the Employer’s hierarchy outside the facility. (R-4). On June 25, 2004, while he was her shift supervisor, Bruce Perry wrote Petitioner a counseling memo concerning her tardiness on June 1 and 25. She received the memo on July 13, 2004. (P-15). Shirley Edmond testified that July 22, 2004, Petitioner threatened her as set out in greater detail in Findings of Fact 68-72 infra, concerning Bruce Perry’s counseling memo. On or about July 16, 2004, Petitioner filed what was described as a “departmental grievance” against Perry’s counseling memo(s).2/ This grievance could have been brought pursuant to a union collective bargaining agreement or pursuant to Section 110.227(4), Florida Statutes. However, that statute provides a "two-step" grievance procedure only for career service employees who are no longer on probation in their current position, and it excludes consideration of both "discrimination" and "sexual harassment" issues, which are supposed to proceed through superiors and the EEOC officer. Due to her probationary status as SJDO, Petitioner would have been ineligible to pursue the statutory grievance. In any case, her grievance did not raise issues of sexual discrimination or sexual harassment (P-38), nor was it directed to an internal EEOC officer. On or about July 17, 2004, Petitioner sent an e-mail letter outside the facility to the Assistant Superintendent for Detention Services, Perry Turner. Respondent's discrimination and sexual harassment procedures permitted this. However, in the e-mail Petitioner complained in general terms that she was experiencing problems getting facility personnel, particularly Charles Parkins, to follow all the "steps," in appropriate sequence, of established grievance procedures. (P-39). Turner, who oversees all detention facilities and services statewide, and whose office is in Tallahassee, delegated responsibility for investigating Petitioner's complaint to Operations Manager Richard Bedson, who supervises all of the detention branches’ support services. Mr. Bedson had recommended Petitioner for her promotion to SJDO and for a raise in connection therewith, but they did not know each other. (P-17). He was not housed in her facility. He was entirely independent from ARJDC staff. On July 19, 2004, Perry rescinded his counseling memo to Petitioner (P-12), because it had been shown to Parkins that Perry was not on the same shift with Petitioner on June 25, 2004 (P-13), and/or that on June 25, 2004, or the other date cited in Perry’s memo (June 1, 2004), Petitioner had prior permission from a different supervisor to “back down” her hours so as to legitimately arrive late for her shift (P-39). Perry’s testimony herein confirmed that for one of the days cited in his counseling memo, he had relied on someone else’s observation of Petitioner’s tardiness, and that he, himself, had not seen that particular tardy arrival. In any case, a counseling memo is not considered a disciplinary memo, and Perry’s memo stated that fact. (P-15). A counseling memo does not begin the three-tier progressive discipline that could lead to termination of a permanent employee for cause, and Perry’s counseling memo was rescinded, anyway. Petitioner acknowledged that the offending memo was rescinded after she complained about it. Despite the happy outcome for Petitioner of her grievance about Perry’s counseling memo, Petitioner claimed at hearing that everything that happened to her after February 2004, was the result of Parkins’ retaliation against her for filing the first evaluation grievance which Parkins had ruled was untimely (see P-12, 14, and Finding of Fact 10) and/or because Parkins and Perry were retaliating against her for grieving Perry’s alleged sexual harassment of her. At hearing, Petitioner testified that from late May 2004 to June or July 2004, Bruce Perry made suggestive remarks to her about her lips and buttocks; made comments designed to make others infer that Petitioner and Perry were sexually involved; put his hands on her shoulders; and rubbed his privates in her presence. She claimed that she rejected Perry and reported these unsavory and harassing activities to superiors Parkins (male), Singleton (male), Smith (female), and Cohen (female), and that thereafter, Perry created a hostile and retaliatory workplace for her. She also related that Freda Smith, a middle level supervisor, had promised to report Petitioner’s complaint of sexual harassment by Perry to Parkins. None of the foregoing supervisors Petitioner named corroborated that Petitioner had reported any sexual incident with Perry to them. Of the supervisors Petitioner named, only Parkins actually testified, and he denied that either Petitioner or Freda Smith, on Petitioner’s behalf, had made any such report to him. (R-20). Bruce Perry denied in writing, when the issue was first raised after Petitioner’s termination, and in his testimony herein that he had committed any of the acts of which Petitioner accused him. (R-7). Interestingly enough, although Parkins and Perry both denied any knowledge of Petitioner reporting Perry to Parkins, Petitioner personally testified that when she had reported Perry to Parkins, Parkins removed her from the area physically near Perry and later removed Perry from her shift altogether, so as to separate them. Perry confirmed that he only worked with Petitioner "a couple months" until he was removed from her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. When, precisely, Perry was removed from that shift is not clear on this record. Petitioner testified that she needed larger pants for her correctional officer’s uniform, to accommodate the knee brace she sometimes needed to wear for her prior military injury, and that Perry had remarked that her pants were all right, in connection with his comments about her buttocks. Perry denied making any suggestive remarks. No other witness noticed a problem with Petitioner’s uniform pants or that Petitioner was in any manner unable to do her job, due to her knee or for any other reason, until she had a shoulder injury on August 4, 2004, as described infra. However, Petitioner testified that Parkins told her to get a doctor’s note stating that she needed the knee brace. Petitioner had admitted in evidence such a note from her doctor dated July 21, 2004, on which she had printed a note to Parkins requesting larger uniform pants and stating she had spoken to Parkins about the larger pants a month before July 21, 2004. This note said nothing about Perry or his alleged sexual comments. (P-11). Petitioner's testimony is not entirely clear as to whether she believed that Parkins refused her request for larger uniform pants, or just ignored it, but since she admitted that she slipped the note under Parkins’ office door when she was told by another supervisor that Parkins would not be in, her delivery system may have failed to get her doctor’s note to Parkins. Parkins testified that he recalled no requests, either oral or written, for bigger uniform pants, but if he had received such a request he would merely have passed it on to the person who was in charge of ordering/issuing property on a regular basis. It is probable the property officer only worked a standard day shift, while Petitioner worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. On July 25, 2004, Bessette returned and resumed her duties as superintendent of ARJDC. Bessette testified that she knew nothing of any sexual harassment allegations until after Petitioner was terminated in September 2004, and the evidence as a whole shows that Petitioner first approached internal and external EEOC officers about sexual harassment only after she was terminated. (R-7, P-26,36) Moreover, in late July, Petitioner had every opportunity to speak to the Employer’s non-facility personnel to resolve any alleged “sexual harassment,” “hostile work environment,” racial discrimination, retaliation, disparate treatment, or problems concerning being denied a reasonable accommodation for her alleged knee “handicap,” but she did not do so. In late July, Operations Manager Richard Bedson telephoned Petitioner at the facility and asked if he could speak to her about the concerns she had expressed in her letter to Assistant Superintendent for Detention Services, Perry Turner. (See Finding of Fact 26.) Petitioner refused to speak to Bedson over the phone about her e-mail to Turner or her concerns, stating she did not know who Bedson was and she was not going to speak to him unless someone else on the phone vouched for him. Bedson then arranged to meet with Petitioner, personally. (P-39). Discrimination investigations, particularly those involving sexual matters, are best begun by a discreet meeting between the investigator and the complainant alone, but Petitioner had not told Mr. Bedson what her problems were, and her memos had referred to “step” grievance procedures which are a union device. The use of the word "step" could also have referenced the Section 110.227(4) procedure which, by its nature, could not deal with "discrimination" or "sexual harassment." (See Finding of Fact 25.) Petitioner also had declined, via e-mail, to come to Bedson's office in another city unless she received per diem travel pay, and had stated that she preferred to meet at ARJDC. (P-39). Therefore, Bedson held a meeting on July 30, 2004, with Petitioner, Bessett, Parkins, and Petitioner's union representative, Mr. Reeves, who is a teacher from outside the facility. Bedson chaired the meeting and asked Petitioner to relate her concerns regarding her treatment at ARJDC. At no time during the July 30, 2004, meeting did Petitioner indicate she was being, or had been, sexually harassed; that she or anyone else was the subject of any type of disparate or preferential treatment; or that she had a knee injury that was not being accommodated. She did not state that she was entitled to preferential treatment by virtue of being a veteran. She did orally accuse Parkins of practicing undefined retaliation against her. However, she refused to discuss anything more and stated she would put her concerns in writing. Bedson informed Petitioner that he would request that an investigator meet with her as quickly as possible so that an investigation could occur. He then concluded the meeting. After this meeting, Bedson telephoned Operations Management Consultant II James Darbin Graham, who is assigned to Respondent Department’s North Region Office. He directed Graham to meet with ARJDC staff and Petitioner to determine what Petitioner’s concerns were and to conduct an investigation as necessary. Bedson recounted to Graham his earlier meeting with Petitioner, her prior e-mail, her general allegation of "retaliation" by Parkins, and her refusal to provide any further explanation. On August 4, 2004, while working the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, Petitioner injured her shoulder opening a door. She left the facility for the hospital. After treatment at the hospital, she returned to the facility at approximately 5:00 a.m. with hospital paperwork for facility administrators so that she could obtain workers' compensation benefits, including medical care, disability pay, and leave. On this same morning, Graham arrived, unannounced, at the facility at approximately 6:00 a.m. to meet with Petitioner. He was advised that she had left for the hospital, but then he spotted her in the ARJDC lobby. Petitioner was wearing a hospital gown, and her arm was in a sling. Graham introduced himself to Petitioner and advised that he needed to speak to her. Petitioner refused to speak to him, stating she was on medication and that he would have to make an appointment so that she could have her union representative at the meeting when she was not feeling the effects of the medication. In order to be able to arrange such a meeting, Graham advised Parkins that he needed to speak with Petitioner upon her return to work from medical leave. From August 4, 2004 onward, Parkins did not arrange such a meeting or notify Graham when such a meeting could occur. Graham concluded this was because of Petitioner’s extended absence and subsequent termination, effective September 8, 2004. As a result of her on-the-job shoulder injury, Petitioner was immediately placed on workers’ compensation leave. The parties agree that Petitioner was entitled to all workers’ compensation benefits, including medical care, leave, and pay, from August 4, through August 10, 2004. It is the two periods of August 10, to August 19, 2004, and August 20, to September 8, 2004, that drive this case. Assistant Superintendent Newman maintains and processes paperwork related to workers' compensation for the facility. On August 10, 2004, Petitioner’s medical physician released Petitioner to return to work with the following restrictions and medications: Employee is to avoid all use of affected arm. . . . Avoid lifting, reaching, grasping with right arm only. Physical therapy ordered. Stop percocet and discontinue sling. The following medication(s) has (have) been prescribed: Naproxen . . . Effects include . . . dizziness Metaxalone . . . May cause drowsiness Cyclobenzaprine . . . common side effects include drowsiness, decreased judgment, . . . blurred vision . . . caution should be exercised when driving or operating dangerous equipment Tramadol . . . May cause sedation . . . Use caution when driving or operating dangerous machinery. (Emphasis supplied) (R-2). Petitioner received a copy of the foregoing document, as quoted supra. It is probable that the Employer’s independent workers’ compensation contract carrier, “Covel”, also received a copy, but there is no evidence this detailed document was presented to anyone at ARJDC. However, ARJDC was made aware of its medical restrictions on use of Petitioner’s arm. “Master Control” is the only light duty available at ARJDC. It has always been used for situations such as Petitioner’s, and is the only “accommodation” Respondent has available. Master Control is a desk assignment away from juvenile detainees, which requires only monitoring cameras, answering telephones, and pushing buttons, but which has no potential for strenuous restraint of, or harm from, detainees. Petitioner was advised on August 10, 2004, that the facility could accommodate her doctor's restrictions of modified duty by assigning her to Master Control. However, Petitioner did not report to work for nine more days, or until August 19, 2004.3/ Petitioner also did not obtain authorization for her absence August 10-19, 2004, using the methods required by the Employer’s policies and procedures. (See Findings of Fact 16- 18.) Instead, Petitioner reached Parkins by telephone on August 10, 2005, and told him that her medications were making her too drowsy and dizzy to drive. Parkins took what Petitioner told him at face value. He was concerned about Petitioner’s safety and the Employer’s liability. He told her not to come to work until she could drive or could see her doctor. Petitioner followed up on their conversation by faxing Parkins, that same day, a written explanation that she was on four medications and that three out of the four medications, which she did not name, were causing her symptoms. (P-34). Petitioner’s next doctor’s appointment was not until August 19, 2004, so she did not report to work until after that appointment. Although her physical restrictions diminished over time, from August 4, 2004, until October 20, 2004, Petitioner’s workers’ compensation physician continued to prescribe one or more medications for Petitioner which could have rendered her dizzy or drowsy. (P-10, 32). However, there is no evidence this information was sent to ARJDC, even though it probably was sent to the independent workers’ compensation contract carrier, Covel. Petitioner did not work the full 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift in Master Control on August 20, 2004. Upon her placement in Master Control early, at about 10:30 p.m., on August 19, Petitioner immediately complained of pain in her shoulder and drowsiness from her medications. After she was observed with her head on the table, she was sent home by her supervisor. She had been present on the jobsite about an hour. Petitioner called in on August 21, 2004, at midnight (an hour after she was due to report for her shift), to say she had just awakened, was in a lot of pain, and would not be reporting to work. Petitioner did not follow proper procedures in reporting this absence. (See Findings of Fact 16-18.) Petitioner's regular days off work fell on August 22, and 23, 2004. On August 24, 2004, Petitioner still did not report to work and did not call the facility, as required by Respondent’s policies and procedures. On August 24, 2004, Assistant Superintendent Newman received a call from Julie Bumgardner of Covel, who wanted to be sure that the facility was accommodating Petitioner’s workers’ compensation shoulder injury with an appropriately restricted work assignment. When Newman indicated that Petitioner continued to be absent due to drowsiness associated with her medication, Bumgardner advised Newman that the medications Petitioner was currently prescribed for her workers' compensation injury did not contain narcotics to make her drowsy and Petitioner should have returned to work on August 10, 2004, with the accommodation for her arm as previously stated. Bumgardner faxed Newman either an incomplete copy of the August 10, 2004, physician's order, which did not mention the four drugs which could have been making Petitioner dizzy or drowsy between August 10-19, 2004, but which did say to discontinue percoset, and/or a separate document showing that the narcotic percocet had been discontinued by the physician on August 10, 2004, and which listed the other four drugs, but not their side effects. (R-8). As a result of this incomplete and therefore misleading information, Newman and Bumgardner concurred that any of Petitioner’s absences after August 10, 2004, should be charged against Petitioner’s accrued sick and annual leave and should not be categorized as workers’ compensation leave. Petitioner was credited with working eight hours on August 25 and eight hours on August 26, 2004. On August 26, 2004, Newman wrote a memo to Petitioner advising her that effective Friday, September 10, 2004, Petitioner was being temporarily reassigned to the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift in Master Control. The memo explained to Petitioner that Newman's purpose in this reassignment was to further accommodate Petitioner by assigning her to Master Control during the day shift when another employee, also assigned to this same station, could assist Petitioner if Petitioner needed assistance. By writing the memo on August 26, and not making the assignment change effective until September 10, Newman intended to give the customary two weeks’ notice so that Petitioner could arrange her personal life to fit the change of shift. When she wrote this memo, Newman should have, but did not, realize that Petitioner was taking morning classes. When she received this memo on August 26, 2004, Petitioner believed that she was entitled to never be reassigned to a shift that did not accommodate her college classes. She refused to sign, acknowledging receipt of the memo. Petitioner wrote the following on the bottom of Newman’s memo: I am confused about this letter because of the last letter I received from D.S. Bessette. I cannot sign this at this time. You must have me confused with SJDO L. Green. She’s the one with the shift ch[ange].(R-10) In her routine review of employee timesheets, Newman had noted that Petitioner had not signed her timesheet covering August 13, 2004, through August 26, 2004, and that Petitioner had claimed “leave without pay: code 60”, signifying that she expected to receive workers’ compensation disability pay and not be docked any sick or annual leave for that period of time. On August 27, 2004, Newman issued a memo to Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Wilcox, requesting that Wilcox address with Petitioner the incorrect coding Petitioner had written into her timesheet covering the dates of August 13, through August 26, 2004. (P-33). Ms. Newman also wrote across Petitioner’s first timesheet (see Finding of Fact 57), in red ink, advising Petitioner: Ms. Francis you need to recode your leave to 52-sick and resubmit w/ signature. According to your doctor’s note you should have assumed work duties on the 10th of August. (R-12) Workers’ compensation pay does not begin until a specified time after the compensable accident. Many employers, including this one, have an elaborate system in place to pay an employee full salary and adjust leave categories of accrued sick and annual leave to make up the difference between the workers’ compensation rate and the regular pay rate, instead of paying the employee just the lesser amount permitted by the workers’ compensation statute. However, neither of those considerations was afoot here. Here, despite Newman’s testimony as to “the first 40 hours of workers’ compensation coverage,” the exhibits clearly reveal that Newman was attempting to get Petitioner to use her accrued sick leave to cover any time she had been absent from work after August 10, 2004. Because of her conversation with, and the incomplete materials supplied by, Bumgardner, Newman believed this was the correct way to code Petitioner’s timesheet. (See Findings of Fact 49-53.) When she received Newman’s August 27, 2004, memo to Wilcox, that same day, Petitioner responded to it by writing a note on the bottom in which she stated that she was not going to use sick leave; that she had permission from Parkins for her August 10-19, absence; that she was on four different “meds”; that her arm became swollen when she did come in on August 19; and again that she would not use sick time for an on-the-job injury that Newman refused to accommodate. Petitioner then finished with I am so sick and tired of the inconsistency and lack of communication among the management team. . . . You all need to stop this please. (P-33) Petitioner’s adamant and belligerent attitude did not sit well with Newman who, based on the information provided by Bumgardner, believed she was just doing her duty. On September 2, 2004, Newman came in at 6:00 a.m. to talk to Petitioner before Petitioner went off her shift at 7:00 a.m. Petitioner insisted on being confrontational with Newman in front of staff, instead of coming to Newman’s office as Newman requested. Petitioner adamantly refused to change the first timesheet or to sign it. (R-14). She stated to Newman that she had relied on Parkins’ oral authorization to be on workers’ compensation leave from August 10, to August 19, 2004. She later submitted a new, typed timesheet, still claiming “Code 60-workers’ comp. disability” for each of her scheduled work days between August 13, and 24. This version she signed. (R- 13). Newman caught up to Petitioner as Petitioner was checking out at the time clock on September 2, 2004; handed her a copy of the August 26, 2004, memo (see Finding of Fact 55); and inquired if Petitioner would be reporting as previously ordered to the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift on September 10, 2004. Petitioner stated she could not make the change due to her babysitter and previous registration for college classes. She continued to rely on Parkins’ oral authorization for August 10-19, and apparently expected workers’ compensation considerations for her absences after August 19, 2004, as well. (R-14). Newman never received corrected timesheets from Petitioner, despite explaining the situation to someone from Petitioner’s union who telephoned Newman and offered to act as an informal intermediary. Finally, in order to get Petitioner paid on time, either Newman or Parkins filled out a timesheet covering August 13 through August 26, 2004, and signed for her. Petitioner ultimately was charged sick leave from August 10-20, 2004, and was declared absent without authorization for August 21 and 24, when she had not followed the prescribed procedures for an authorized absence. (See Findings of Fact 49 and 51.) This meant that Parkins had retroactively withdrawn his oral authorization for Petitioner to take workers’ compensation leave for August 10 through August 19/20, and that Respondent viewed Petitioner’s absences on August 21 and 24 as unexcused. From the way this case was presented, it is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint when Petitioner did, and did not, report for duty after August 26, 2004. For instance, Petitioner insisted that she was not scheduled for duty on September 3, 2004, because that was the date of Hurricane Frances. She also claimed she could not work on September 3, 2004, because that was a day on which lack of accommodation the night before had caused her arm to swell. (See Finding of Fact 68.) Parkins confirmed that he did not schedule any “light duty” officers, of which Petitioner was one, for duty during Hurricane Frances, but he did not know the date of Hurricane Frances. Another witness thought Hurricane Frances had occurred in August 2004. If Hurricane Frances occurred on August 3, 2004, instead of September 3, 2004, then all such testimony is irrelevant because Petitioner's arm was not injured until August 4, 2004. There is documentation and testimony from Newman and Petitioner that Petitioner worked September 2, rolling into September 3, 2004. (See Finding of Fact 68.) Other dates Petitioner worked are equally confused or obscure, but Petitioner claims she worked August 25-28; was off on August 29-30; and contradicts herself that she was, or was not, scheduled to work on August 31, 2004; and was, or was not, scheduled to work on September 3, 2004. (See, infra.) However, both Petitioner and Edmond agree that on September 2, 2004, Edmond assigned Petitioner to a regular duty post. Edmond claims the assignment was a pure mistake on her part. Petitioner complained, via a 6:05 a.m. September 3, 2004, e-mail to Bessette, Newman, and Parkins, that her arm was swollen because of Edmond’s mis-assignment. (R-18). Petitioner’s e-mail also asserted that the Employer was not accommodating her work restrictions from her workers’ compensation doctor and that she was unable to come in to work that night due to her swollen arm. On September 3, 2004, at 11:35 a.m., about five-and-a- half hours after Petitioner’s complaint about Edmond’s assignment of her to regular duty on the 11:00 p.m September 2, to 7:00 a.m., September 3, 2004, shift, Edmond provided Bessette with a written statement, via e-mail, relating that on July 22, 2004, Petitioner threatened to "take her [Edmond] down." Edmond testified that shortly after receiving Perry’s June 25, 2004, counseling memo, Petitioner had called Edmond into a courtyard area at the facility to discuss her tardiness and her belief that management was tracking her tardiness. Respondent had always tracked its employees’ tardiness but had recently added a new method of keeping track. Petitioner referred to management’s tracking of her tardiness as "foolishness." Petitioner told Edmond not to engage in such behavior or Petitioner would “take her down" with the rest of management. Edmond claims to have acknowledged the incident to her immediate supervisor, Wilcox, on the same night it occurred. Wilcox was not called to corroborate Edmond’s testimony, and Edmond did not memorialize the event in writing until September 3, 2004, when she felt her job was being threatened by Petitioner’s September 2, 2004, memo of complaint. (See Finding of Fact 68.) Edmond testified that she also notified Bessette on September 3, 2004, about the July 22, incident because she believed that Petitioner was using codeine on the job. There is insufficient credible evidence to substantiate Edmond's testimony about codeine. It is more likely that Edmond related the story about July 22, 2004, to Bessette in retaliation for Petitioner's complaining that her workers’ compensation injury was not being accommodated by Edmond. The fact that Edmond also kept the July 22, 2004, incident to herself for six weeks renders the truth of her whole testimony suspect. However, that does not mean that Edmond's superiors had reason to disbelieve her September 3, 2004, accusation. Since August 24, 2004, Parkins and Newman, in reliance on Bumgardner, believed that Petitioner was using a narcotic drug (percocet) which her doctor had told her to discontinue on August 10, 2004. They were unaware that some of the other drugs legitimately prescribed by Petitioner’s authorized workers’ compensation physician might have caused the drowsiness and dizziness that had kept Petitioner from reporting for work between August 10 and August 19, 2004, and sporadically thereafter. (See Finding of Fact 53.) After Julie Bumgardner’s mis-information had been received on August 24, 2004, and continuing onward, Superintendent Bessette received reports from Newman, Parkins, and Edmond about Petitioner’s tardiness problems. It is not clear what instances of tardiness besides those occurring after August 10, 2004, were actually reported to Bessette. It is probable that both Newman and Parkins had an overall impression that Petitioner had frequently been tardy over the whole period of her employment at ARJDC, and it is possible, but not proven, that the rescinded Perry counseling memo (see Findings of Fact 23-27) was remembered or utilized. However, tardiness was only part of Bessette’s considerations. Bessette was also apprised of Petitioner's incorrectly coded timesheets and adamant attitude that she would not use sick leave to cover time off. Petitioner’s belligerency toward Newman and her attitude that everyone was “out to get her” aggravated the situation. Bessette considered Petitioner's refusal of Newman’s direct order to correct her timesheets to be insubordination. Parkins and Newman believed, however erroneously, that Petitioner was taking the narcotic percocet, contrary to her doctor’s instructions. Parkins may also have believed and resented that his oral authorization to Petitioner for leave August 10-19, had been obtained by fraud. The report to Bessette of a threat against Edmond was the last straw. Upon the mounting objections to Petitioner’s job performance, and based on a consensus of Newman, Parkins, and herself, Bessette determined that discipline was appropriate and requested authorization from her superiors to terminate Petitioner, which they granted. Petitioner was terminated by a September 8, 2004, letter, effective that date, stating that her termination was because of . . . your failure to satisfactorily complete your probationary period . . . . (P-9) Petitioner proved that ARJDC SJDO Genevieve Hazelip (Caucasian female), Respondent’s employee since 2000, was disciplined in the position of SJDO on one occasion in January 2005, after Petitioner was terminated. This was an oral reprimand for “a conversation with racial undertones, regardless of intention". (R-15). The oral reprimand of Hazelip was only stage one of the Employer’s three-stage progressive disciplinary system, which could lead to termination of a permanent employee at the third step. If Hazelip was on probation in her SJDO position, the Employer did not have to go through the three steps to terminate her, but it was not proven that Hazelip was on probation when she received the oral reprimand. Petitioner also proved that Hazelip was disciplined on two other occasions but was unable to establish whether these disciplinary actions occurred while Hazelip was a JDO or an SJDO or what level of discipline was imposed either time. At hearing, Petitioner claimed that Caucasian officers at ARJDC regularly got weekends and other coveted days off and Negro officers did not. She submitted nothing to substantiate this allegation, but admitted that there were more Negro officers than Caucasian officers and that she had never complained about the shift assignments because she was not dissatisfied with her own days off. It also may be reasonably inferred that Petitioner was not privy to any requests by other officers, Caucasian or Negro, for what shifts or days they wanted to work.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2006.

Florida Laws (6) 110.213110.2135110.227120.57760.10760.11
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MARY A. CLINE vs USBI COMPANY, 94-005634 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Oct. 07, 1994 Number: 94-005634 Latest Update: Mar. 28, 1997

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mary Anna Cline (Ms. Cline), is a fifty-two year old female who was employed by USBI Company (USBI) from 1985 until November 15, 1994. USBI refurbishes the solid rocket boosters for the space shuttle program at the Kennedy Space Center, Brevard County, Florida. It employs substantially more than fifteen full-time employees. Ms. Cline was hired for the position of technical illustrator, which position is responsible for drawing mechanical components, doing illustration and charts, and preparing manuals and documents that apply to the day-to-day work of the company. She was a good employee and had excellent technical skills, as reflected in her performance evaluations and numerous commendations. At the time that she left the company, she was in a position titled "senior technical illustrator." In early 1992 the company had some internal reorganization, and Ms. Cline and a group of employees were transferred from Management Services to Documentation Support. The job duties remained substantially the same, but the new group also had responsibility for the Routing of Documents (RODS) program, which involved the tracing of detailed technical drawings, to be used on a computer mainframe by the "techs" (engineers). Documentation Support generated technical documentation for the rockets, all technical manuals, standard procedures, testing, fliers and presentations - generally all of the paperwork used by the company, including verbiage and graphics. The supervisor of Documentation Support, then and now, is a woman, Monica Teran. Approximately seventy-five percent of Ms. Cline's work group were women. In June 1992, Richard Bowen was hired by USBI as a technical illustrator and was assigned to Documentation Support. He became a coworker of Ms. Cline and their assigned work stations were side-by-side without a partition. Richard Bowen's two main hobbies are photography and computers. He was generally accepted as the computer expert in the work group; when there were problems with the computers, Richard Bowen could often work them out. Bowen's interest in photography is also more than a casual avocation. He attended photography school in Chicago when he was younger and worked with a modeling agency. He holds an occupational license to conduct a photography business and performs commercial photography services that do not conflict with his 9-5 job: weddings, portraits, some modeling photographs and some work with a theme park in Orlando. He is a member of the Audubon Society and takes wildlife photographs and does computer work for the organization. The Photograph Incident Staff in the work group were interested in Bowen's photographs. He brought samples of his pictures to work to show off. He usually left the pictures on his desk, face up, so that people could come to his work area and look at them. Some time in the latter months of 1992, Bowen purchased an expensive special soft-focus lens that gives the subject a soft, romantic, mystical look and deletes the wrinkles or blemishes. He discussed the lens with a fellow photographer at work and brought in a sample of photographs he had taken with the lens. Most of the pictures among the twelve to fifteen which he brought on this occasion were wildlife; there also were a few photographs of a model. She was bare-breasted, but was not exposed from the waist down. While there is no clear description of her pose in the record, she was described by some as nude and others as partially nude. None described the photographs as sexually suggestive or pornographic. In the early morning before work started, some female staff members were shuffling through the photographs. Ms. Cline was part of the group looking on. Bowen said something semi-jokingly like, "You might not want to look at these; there's a bare-breasted model." One of the women replied that it was nothing that she had not seen before, and continued shuffling through the photographs. Ms. Cline saw the model's photograph, remarked that the girl had pretty eyes, and returned to her own work station. Several months later, after a workshop that management had initiated to deal with problems in the workplace, Ms. Cline reported the photographs to Carol DuBray, Director of Human Resources and Darryl LeCanne, the immediate supervisor of Monica Teran. Ms. Cline was embarrassed by the photographs. Management's Response As soon as Ms. Cline left Darryl LaCanne's office, he called Monica Teran, and the two supervisors met with Richard Bowen. They informed him that USBI had a policy of not tolerating nude photography or pin-up calendars in the workplace and that his bringing the photographs to work was unacceptable behavior. Darryl LaCanne told Richard Bowen that the next time severe disciplinary action would be taken. Richard Bowen was also called in to speak with USBI's director of security, Barry Wysocki. Mr. Wysocki informed him that nude pictures were prohibited by USBI's regulations. Mr. Bowen received the message in clear terms that the matter was very serious. Bowen never again brought nude or semi-nude photographs to work and Ms. Cline never again saw such photographs at work. Offensive Shop Talk Work stations in the Documentation Support unit were divided into cubicles, some separated by dividers, some (Richard Bowen's and Ms. Cline's) were side by side, facing a partition with two other workers on the opposite side. Workers interacted within a small space and moved about to use different computer equipment, printers, files, and similar work tools. Among some of the workers there was occasional bawdy banter and comment about boyfriends, weekends and vacations, and the like. It was sexually oriented in a sophomoric, adolescent schoolyard manner. It included terms like "shit" and "fuck" and included conversation about "blow jobs" or "hard-ons," and other slang words involving male genitalia. With one exception, the language was not directed to Ms. Cline. That exception was one occasion when Richard Bowen responded to her criticism of some work with the expletive "fuck." Both male and female workers engaged in the banter, which was overheard by Ms. Cline and others. Ms. Cline was particularly offended by banter between Bowen and a female worker, Anna Silvestri, who occupied a workstation on the other side of the partition in front of Ms. Cline and Mr. Bowen. Ms. Silvestri sometimes initiated this banter. In May or June of 1993 Ms. Cline reported to her supervisor, Monica Teran, that Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri used the word "fuck" and engaged in sexually explicit conversations. Ms. Teran went to her supervisor to see what to do about the complaint and Carol DuBray requested that Barry Wysocki conduct an investigation. Barry Wysocki interviewed and took statements from employees in the Document Support Unit, including Ms. Cline. She complained that Richard Bowen created a hostile environment; that she heard him say "fuck" on one occasion in the past two months and that she heard Anna Silvestri say the word on two occasions. Ms. Cline said that Bowen and Silvestri discussed Ms. Silvestri's sex life and that on one occasion Ms. Silvestri tried to discuss her sex life with Ms. Cline, but she cut her off with a comment that it was improper. Ms. Cline reported hearing Monica Teran and Beth Seaman use the word "fuck" in the work area. Bowen and Silvestri did not deny mild profanity and mildly sexual conversations. Other employees reported hearing some profanity, primarily "shit," "damn" and "bullshit." Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri were seriously reprimanded by Barry Wysocki, by Barry Smoyer, by Darryl LaCanne and by Monica Teran. Each supervisor impressed on the two employees that the use of foul language was not tolerated and was against company policy. Barry Smoyer gave the two employees a letter "for the record," documenting the counselling session and reprimand. Monica Teran moved Ms. Cline to Anna Silvestri's workstation on the other side of the partition from Richard Bowen. She moved Anna Silvestri two cubicles away, with several partitions between her and Mr. Bowen. And George Roberts was placed next to Richard Bowen in Ms. Cline's former workstation. The intent by the supervisor was to accommodate Ms. Cline's concerns and to separate the two prime offenders. In the two years that he worked for USBI, including the time that he worked next to Richard Bowen, George Roberts heard nothing more than "hell" or "damn" from Bowen. Nevertheless, around August 1994, during her performance review, Ms. Cline informed Monica Teran that the sexual conversations were continuing. Ms. Teran informed her supervisors and another investigation commenced, this time by USBI's new security director, Al Eastlack. Mr. Eastlack conducted an interview with Ms. Cline, among others, and took her formal statement in September 1994. Barry Smoyer reviewed a draft report of Mr. Eastlack's investigation and although he understood the results were "inconclusive," Mr. Smoyer renewed his admonishments to Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri in separate memoranda to the two, reminding them of USBI's intolerance of sexual harassment in any form and warning them that inappropriate language would result in disciplinary action. Alleged Threats After the photograph incident, but before she complained, Richard Bowen and Mary Anna Cline had a conflict over the use of some computer graphics software. Bowen was advocating one type of software that Ms. Cline opposed. Monica Teran had to intervene and instructed Ms. Cline to install the program and learn how to use it. After she complained about the photographs, Ms. Cline became convinced that Richard Bowen was going to retaliate. She complained to Monica Teran that she was afraid of Bowen but her complaints were non-specific. She began to complain of stress and sleep problems. Ms. Teran recommended that she go to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counsellor or to see her own counsellor or doctor. This was around the same time that Ms. Cline complained about the offensive language and conversations, and Ms. Cline took the recommendation to mean that Ms. Teran did not believe her, or that Ms. Teran felt Ms. Cline was at fault. Ms. Teran also commented to Ms. Cline that she should simply tell Bowen to stop talking like that. Another employee, Dorothy Stokey, who was offended by Bowen's use of "fuck" had told him to stop. Ms. Cline was too intimidated by him to confront him directly. Some time in the latter months of 1993, Monica Teran found Ms. Cline in the ladies' room crying and upset to the point of incoherence. Ms. Cline had overheard a conversation between Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri involving a gun and made a connection between that and incidents of violence in the workplace and coworkers being shot. With the help of Barry Smoyer, Ms. Teran was able to get Ms. Cline out of the ladies' room and calmed down. Then, at Mr. Smoyer's direction, Ms. Teran called Ms. Silvestri and Mr. Bowen into her office to find out what had happened. Mr. Bowen did not have a gun at work and he had been discussing a gun show early that morning. Ms. Teran was satisfied that the discussion had been innocuous and reported her findings to Barry Smoyer. No other employee reported that Bowen had a gun or saw him with a gun. None, including Ms. Cline, ever complained that Bowen had threatened them with a gun. Alleged Retaliation Ms. Cline contends that USBI retaliated against her for reporting sexual harassment. Specifically she claims that her job duties were shifted from work on RODS, which she liked, to word processing, which she disliked and with which she had difficulty, due to some dyslexia. It is undisputed that Ms. Cline was a very competent graphics illustrator. She and Mr. Bowen and a couple of other employees in the unit were considered the core of the illustration function, and other employees in the unit preferred and were more skilled in the word processing and language component of the unit's responsibilities. However, the work assignments were not so clearly divided between "illustration" and "word processing." The production and modification of company manuals required both types of work. Monica Teran was interested in cross-training her staff to do a variety of tasks. There was a time, after mid-1993, when Ms. Cline's assignments involved word processing. She also continued to do a substantial amount of RODS work, as evidenced by handwritten logs maintained by the employees. Monica Teran never instructed the staffperson responsible for making assignments to remove Ms. Cline from RODS or other graphics work. RODS was not considered high profile or creative work since it primarily involved tracing technical components repetitively. There was a period when RODS work was put on hold. There was another period when temporary employees, such as George Roberts, were taken in to work exclusively on RODS. At no time during her employment with USBI was Ms. Cline demoted in job title or pay. In 1993 and 1994 her employment evaluations reflected a need to improve communications and attendance, but she was still rated "excellent," "good" and "acceptable" in all categories, and overall "excellent" and "good." There is no evidence to indicate that anyone tampered with Ms. Cline's computer or sabotaged her computer, as she claimed. On occasion it was necessary for Monica Teran or other staff to work at Ms. Cline's and other stations, to see if programs were loaded or the machine was set up properly. Although certain equipment, such as a printer, was located at an individual workstation, other staff needed access to that equipment. Job-Related Stress Ms. Cline's attendance did suffer and she did experience job-related stress. She went to an EAP counsellor and to a psychiatrist. She was on medication and there were problems with adjusting the type and amount of medication. Ms. Cline experienced sleep disorders; she reported falling asleep at the wheel of her car and had a minor accident. She also experienced other physical phenomena such as pains in her chest and arms, or numbness. Her psychiatrist diagnosed her medical condition as "adjustment reaction of adult life with mixed emotions, basically depression and anxiety." (T-415) Accommodation and Resignation Monica Teran's staff was located in two buildings: the modular unit occupied by Ms. Cline, Mr. Bowen, Ms. Silvestri and others; and another separate building which also included other USBI employees. Ms. Teran's staff was moved around routinely, as new employees were added or other work space needs arose. In Fall 1993 USBI offered to move Ms. Cline to the other building, allowing her to retain her same position and duties; she declined, and the company did not insist that she move. Later, Ms. Cline was offered a lateral position at the same pay and position level. Carol DuBray met with Ms. Cline to discuss this attempt to accommodate her. Ms. Cline also rejected that offer. She explained at hearing that she was afraid she would have been in line for a layoff, if she transferred. However, there is no competent evidence to support that fear. Ms. DuBray explained to Ms. Cline in their meeting that she would retain all benefits, including seniority. In fact, USBI has no departmental seniority policy. Seniority is based on the date an individual is hired by the company, rather than time within a department in the company. On November 15, 1994, Ms. Cline voluntarily resigned, citing "continuing stress brought on by sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation and the flagrant disregard by USBI and its management in the handling of this problem. . . ." (Petitioner's exhibit no. 31) The Formal Complaints At the time she resigned Ms. Cline had already filed her complaint of discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). That charge is dated December 6, 1993. The charge of discrimination alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, by sexual harassment and retaliation. It does not cite the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to a worksharing agreement between EEOC and FCHR, the charge was sent to the Florida agency for initial investigation. That workshare agreement, which refers to the FCHR as the "FEPA," provides, in pertinent part: FILING OF CHARGES OF DISCRIMINATION In order to facilitate the filing of charges of employment discrimination, the EEOC and the FEPA each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges. The FEPA shall take all charges alleging a violation of Title VII, ADEA, EPA, or the ADA where the parties have mutual juris- diction and refer them to the EEOC for dual filing, so long as the allegations meet the minimum requirements of those Acts. Each Agency will inform individuals of their rights to file charges with the other Agency and to assist any person alleging employment discrimination to draft a charge in a manner which will satisfy the require- ments of both agencies to the extent of their common jurisdiction. As part of the intake duties, investigators are to verify with the charging parties if they have filed a charge of discrimination with other agencies prior to filing the charge. For charges that are to be dual-filed, each Agency will use EEOC Charge Form 5 (or alternatively, an employment discrim- ination charge form which within statutory limitations, is acceptable in form and content to EEOC and the FEPA) to draft charges. When a charge is taken based on disability, the nature of the disability shall not be disclosed on the face of the charge. * * * H. The delegation of authority to receive charges contained in Paragraph II. a. does not include the right of one Agency to determine the jurisdiction of the other Agency over a charge. * * * DIVISION OF INITIAL CHARGE-PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITIES * * * D. EEOC will not defer or refer any charge for the FEPA to process that is not jurisdictional on its face with both Agencies. If it is apparent that one Agency might have jurisdiction when another does not, then the Charging Party will be referred to the appropriate Agency. * * * (Petitioner's exhibit no. 41) (emphasis added) A notice dated December 20, 1993, on EEOC form 212, states that the FCHR has received the charge and will initially investigate the charge. The FCHR did investigate the charge and the FCHR investigator's report is dated July 13, 1994. A document styled "Determination: No Cause" is dated August 25, 1994 and has the apparent signature of FCHR's Executive Director. An accompanying document, with the same date, is styled "Notice of Determination: No Cause" and informs Ms. Cline as complainant of her right to file her petition for relief within 35 days. The petition for relief dated September 27, 1994, was filed with FCHR, and cites the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as well as Title VII. The petition alleges sexual harassment and retaliation. FCHR transmitted the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 6, 1994. The amended petition for relief, filed on April 10, 1995, and referenced in the order and notice of hearing dated May 16, 1995 deletes any reference to Title VII and recites instead that the claims for relief are based on Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. The amended petition does not claim constructive discharge nor does it mention that Ms. Cline left the company approximately five months earlier. Sexual Harassment Policy and Summary of Findings USBI has, and during the relevant period had a sexual harassment policy which provides: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's amended "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex" include a section prohibiting sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of sexual nature when: submission to such conduct is either an explicit or implicit term or condition of employment, or submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for an employment decision affecting the person rejecting or submitting the conduct, or such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an affected person's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Sexual harassment is unacceptable behavior by any USBI employee or outside vendor. Any form of harassment, like any conduct contrary to common decency or morality, cannot and will not be tolerated. The company will take whatever corrective action necessary to prevent or deal with acts of sexual harassment in the work place. (Respondent's exhibit no. 61) The policy provides names and phone numbers for persons to report sexual harassment and states that reports at that point will be confidential. Employees are informed of the policy through annual letters from the company head, through posters on the facility walls and through mandatory workshops for managers and their staff. USBI responded appropriately to Ms. Cline's complaints. Its response as to the photographs was effective; the sexually-themed banter, however, continued. The banter did not constitute sexual harassment of Ms. Cline, nor did it create a sexually hostile work environment. No one at USBI ever made a sexual advance towards Ms. Cline; no one suggested or requested sex from her or asked her for a date. No one touched her inappropriately. The sexual banter was never directed to or about her. The banter overheard by Ms. Cline, and the use of the "f word," were occasional, not daily or even weekly. The banter was not directed solely to, or about women; it was engaged in, and was overheard, by men and women, alike. The work quarters were close; the unit which included Ms. Cline was in a small "modular" building with work stations divided by movable partitions. By necessity, workers moved around the office to use various equipment. Coworkers of Ms. Cline did not find the environment sexually hostile, offensive or intimidating. No one else of the primarily female group complained about a sexually hostile or intimidating work environment. According to both a friend and her psychiatrist, Ms. Cline was more sensitive than most to profanity and off-color language. Without question, Ms. Cline suffered from stress at work. The stress was manifest in the myriad physical symptoms which caused absenteeism and loss of performance. USBI appropriately offered to Ms. Cline accommodations which would have allowed her to continue working at the same job level and salary but outside of the environment she found intolerable. She rejected the offers and voluntarily resigned. The resignation was not urged, directly or indirectly, by the company.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Ms. Cline's complaint and petitions for relief in this cause. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5634 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in part in paragraph 33; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 60. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted by implication in paragraph 60. Adopted in substance in paragraph 48. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 50. Adopted in paragraph 52. Adopted in paragraph 53. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Subparagraphs are addressed as follows: Adopted in substance: a (but not the date), b, c, h, i, m, n. Rejected as unnecessary, immaterial or misleading: d, e, f, g, j, k, l. Rejected, as to the "escalation," as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence; adopted generally in summary in paragraph 17; but some of the specifics alleged were not established (for example, the "sucking" statement). Rejected as a mischaracterization of the incident, although use of the word, "fuck," was proven. 19.-22. Rejected as not credible. 23.-24. Adopted in substance in paragraph 17. 25.-28. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in part in paragraphs 39-41, but it was not proven that the stress was the result of a "hostile work environment," within the scope of gender-based discrimination. Rejected as unnecessary. 31.-32. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 33.-34. Accepted that she complained, but the dates and frequency were not established with competent evidence 35. Conclusion that the steps were "inadequate" is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 36.-41. Rejected as unnecessary, immaterial, or misleading. 42. Rejected (as to characterization of "retaliation") as contrary to the weight of evidence and the law. 43.-46. Rejected as unnecessary, given the recommended disposition. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-4. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 48 and 49. 5.-6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 54. 7. Adopted in paragraph 1. 8. Adopted in paragraph 55. 9. Adopted in paragraph 3. 10. Adopted in paragraph 4. 11. Adopted in paragraph 5. 12.-13. Adopted in paragraph 4. 14.-15. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 34. Adopted in paragraph 6. 18.-21. Adopted in paragraphs 7 and 8. 22. Adopted in paragraph 9. 23. Adopted in substance in paragraph 59. 24. Adopted in paragraph 61. 25. Adopted in paragraph 10. 26. Adopted in paragraph 12. 27.-28. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 11 and 12. 29. Adopted in paragraph 13. 30. Adopted in paragraph 27. 31. Rejected as unnecessary. 32.-35. Adopted in paragraphs 14 and 15. 36.-38. Adopted in paragraph 19. 39.-43. Adopted in paragraphs 20 and 21. 44. Adopted in paragraph 22. 45. Rejected as unnecessary. 46. Adopted in paragraph 23. 47.-48. Rejected as unnecessary. 49. Adopted in substance in paragraph 25. 50. Adopted in paragraph 24. 51. Adopted in paragraph 26. 52. Adopted in paragraph 28. 53. Adopted in paragraph 29. 54. Adopted in paragraph 31. 55. Adopted in paragraph 30. 56. Rejected as unnecessary. 57.-62. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 43 through 46. 63.-64. Adopted in part in paragraph 47; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 65.-72. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 32 through 38. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia E. Lowrey, Esquire Mark B. Roberts, Esquire STEEL HECTOR and DAVIS 1900 Phillips Point West 777 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Wayne L. Allen, Esquire 700 North Wickham Road, Suite 107 Melbourne, Florida 32935 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (5) 120.57760.02760.06760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (2) 60Y-5.00160Y-5.008
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MARLANA M. HULTS vs SUPERIOR BEDROOMS, INC., 04-002710 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Aug. 04, 2004 Number: 04-002710 Latest Update: Mar. 10, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an act of discrimination or sexual harassment against Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a payroll, accounts-payable clerk for Respondent's furniture store from May 23, 2001 until May 20, 2002. Respondent operates a furniture store located at 6886 North 9th Avenue, Pensacola, Florida 32504-7358. Five months after commencing her employment with Respondent, Petitioner began to look for a new job. Petitioner believes that Mr. Alan Reese, Respondent's office manager and Petitioner's direct supervisor, began to follow her home in August 2001. Petitioner believes that, after ceasing to follow her when she confronted him about it, Mr. Reese began to follow her home again two months later. Petitioner accused Mr. Reese of following her home on numerous occasions, peeking into her windows, and sitting in his car and watching her while she tended to her garden. Petitioner was permitted to come to work late during October 2001, on occasion, when she was looking for a new place to live. Petitioner did not get along with Serita Coefield, her fellow accounting clerk at the furniture store. They often had disputes over the handling of invoices. In May of 2002, Petitioner met with Barbara Hoard, the Escambia County/Pensacola Human Resource Coordinator, to discuss the alleged harassment by Mr. Reese. Ms. Hoard told her to inform her employer in writing of her concerns and explained the availability of filing a complaint with the FCHR or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On May 15, 2002, Petitioner delivered a memo to Mr. Reese in which she accused him of following her home, touching her improperly in the workplace, and asking her questions about her personal life. She also sent, by certified mail, a copy of the memo to Elmer Githens, Respondent's president. After receiving the memo, Mr. Githens conferred with Mr. Reese, then issued a memo to Petitioner on May 17, 2002, in which he set forth her work schedule for the dates of April 29 through May 16, 2002. Petitioner's regular work hours were supposed to be 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with an hour for lunch. The May 17 memo, which was based upon Petitioner's actual time cards, showed that her start time at work ranged from 8:18 a.m. to 11:38 a.m. and her end time ranged from 4:01 p.m. to 6:12 p.m. Petitioner clocked in for a full eight- hour workday on only four of fourteen days during the time period reflected in the memo. Later in the day on May 17, 2002, Mr. Githens issued a second memo to Petitioner in which he noted that Petitioner had yelled at him when he gave her the first memo, and accused Serita Coefield of "being out to get her." The memo further stated that Petitioner "has alienated every one [she] works with due to [her] attitude." The memo continued with a discussion of Petitioner's work hours which were to be 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. with at least a 30-minute lunch break every day. Petitioner was informed that this was her final warning about her tardiness and her inability to get along with her co-workers. The memo concluded with the words "[t]he next time you will be dismissed." On Monday, May 20, 2002, Petitioner's next workday, Petitioner clocked in at 10:37 a.m. She was given a memo that day dismissing her for "willful misconduct after receiving ample warnings that termination of your employment was imminent if you continued present behavior of coming to work late, not putting lunch on your time card, clocking out after 5pm without permission and causing disturbances with fellow employees for no reason." Petitioner claims that, on the day she was fired, she arrived at Respondent's parking lot at 8:00 a.m., but sat in her car because she was having a "panic attack" due to her belief that Mr. Reese was continuing to stalk her. Both Petitioner and Mr. Reese live east of Respondent and travel, at least part of the way, in the same direction and on the same roads to go home after work. Mr. Reese denies knowing the location of Petitioner's home. Mr. Reese has never been to Petitioner's home. Mr. Reese admits he drove home in the same direction as Petitioner on numerous occasions since she drove along one of the routes he routinely took home. No one witnessed the alleged stalking of Petitioner by Mr. Reese. Petitioner claims to have contacted the police by telephone, but never filed a police report concerning the alleged stalking by Mr. Reese.

Recommendation is, Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2005.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57509.092760.01760.02760.10760.11
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ELLEN EDITH HANSON vs ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION, 03-002306 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jun. 24, 2003 Number: 03-002306 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner failed to timely file her Petition for Relief following the Florida Commission on Human Relations' No Cause Determination? Whether Petitioner failed to timely file a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations with respect to her claim of harassment? Whether Respondent promptly and thoroughly investigated Petitioner's claim of sexual harassment? Whether Respondent took measures reasonably calculated to end and prevent any alleged sexual harassment? Whether Petitioner suffered from a disability, and, if so, what was the nature of her disability. Whether Respondent provided Petitioner with a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability? Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her sex and/or disability? Whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner for complaining of sexual harassment?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed her Charge of Discrimination against Respondent on August 29, 2002. FCHR issued a No Cause Determination and Notice of Determination: No Cause on May 12, 2003. Petitioner filed her Petition for Relief on June 20, 2003. This was 39 days after the No Cause Determination was issued. Petitioner failed to show good cause for the delay in filing. Petitioner worked as an apprentice operator at Respondent's Stanton Energy Center ("Energy Center"), during the relevant time period, under the supervision of Wade Gillingham ("Gillingham"), manager of Operations for the Energy Center. Respondent is an employer under the FCRA. On or about July 5, 2001, Petitioner expressed some concern to Gillingham about a co-worker, Tim Westerman ("Westerman"), potentially hurting himself or others. More specifically, Petitioner told Gillingham that she was concerned Westerman was going to hurt himself or her. Upon learning of Petitioner's concerns, Gillingham notified Respondent's Human Resources Department, and he scheduled a follow-up meeting with Petitioner on Monday, July 9, 2001. Lou Calatayud ("Calatayud") from Human Resources also attended this interview. During these initial meetings, Petitioner did not complain of any inappropriate touching or sexual contact between herself and Westerman. Following her meeting with Calatayud and Gillingham, German Romero, director of Human Resources, held a second interview with Petitioner to discuss her concerns about Westerman. Thereafter, Respondent conducted a thorough investigation into Petitioner's allegations. During the course of the investigation, Petitioner was interviewed twice and Westerman was interviewed twice. Both Westerman and Petitioner admitted to voluntarily participating in several telephone calls with each other, with some lasting as long as two hours. Petitioner did not appear upset or concerned after these calls. Human Resources also interviewed Terry Cox and Tom Dzoba, both watch engineers to whom Petitioner claimed she reported complaints regarding Westerman. Neither Cox nor Dzoba was Petitioner's direct supervisor. Petitioner told Cox that she had issues with another employee. However, she refused to provide Cox with the other employee's name and insisted on handling the matter on her own, despite Cox's asking her for the name of the person. Dzoba has no knowledge of Petitioner ever complaining about any problems with another employee in the workplace. The first person to whom Petitioner reported Westerman's name was her supervisor, Gillingham, who immediately reported Petitioner's complaints to Human Resources. Westerman was not Hanson's supervisor. Westerman never expressed any romantic interest in Petitioner; however, Petitioner had expressed interest in meeting Westerman outside the workplace for dinner. Additionally, Petitioner used to write Westerman "cheer-up notes" while at work. In fact, the only touching that Petitioner later referred to were hand or arm rubbing during voluntary personal conversations with, and counseling or consoling of, Westerman. Similarly, the only touching Westerman recalls was possibly rubbing up against Petitioner in the workplace or maybe putting his hand on her shoulder when they were talking. Westerman never kissed or attempted to kiss Petitioner. In addition to the above, no other employees were able to identify any inappropriate contact between Petitioner and Westerman. After completing its investigation in early August 2001, Respondent determined that sexual harassment had not occurred but instructed Westerman, verbally and in writing, not to have any further contact with Petitioner. Prior to Respondent's instruction, sometime between May and July 2001, Petitioner personally asked Westerman to stop calling her, a request he complied with generally. At the same time, Respondent instructed Petitioner to discontinue counseling employees to protect against any future incidents or allegations of sexual harassment. It is the policy and practice of Respondent to treat all employees equally regardless of their gender and/or disability. Respondent developed and distributed to its employees, via an Employee Handbook, an Equal Opportunity Policy and Policy Against Harassment. Following the conclusion of Respondent's investigation into Petitioner's complaints of sexual harassment, on or about August 6, 2001, Petitioner requested a medically-supported leave of absence for 30 days. This leave was granted by Respondent. However, Petitioner later requested to return to work nearly ten days ahead of schedule, on August 27, 2001, submitting a release from her doctor. Because Petitioner was seeking to return to work so far ahead of schedule, Petitioner was evaluated by Respondent's occupational medical director, Jock M. Sneddon, M.D., before she was released to return to work. Petitioner returned to work in the same position and rate of pay as before her leave. Additionally, Petitioner received disability benefit payments covering the entire duration of her leave. More than seven months later, Petitioner called in sick on April 6 through 8, 2002, after sustaining a house fire at her personal residence. Following the use of 16 hours or more of sick time, employees are required to return to work with a doctor's note authorizing their absence. Here, it was determined that Petitioner was not sick during this time, nor was she even evaluated by a physician. Based on similar previous problems, for which she was twice verbally reminded of Respondent's policy regarding sick leave, Petitioner received a disciplinary write-up. In addition to Petitioner's two verbal reminders, on or about January 7, 2002, Gillingham issued a memorandum to all operations employees, including Petitioner, detailing Respondent's sick leave policy. On or about June 7, 2002, Petitioner and a male co-worker, Tom Moran, were written up by Gillingham for neglect of their job duties as the result of an incident that occurred at the Energy Center on May 14, 2002. More specifically, both Petitioner and Moran were deemed responsible for failing to make sufficient rounds to discover a mechanical failure, which led to severe flooding of a sump basement in the coal yard, causing more than $12,000 in damages. Gillingham estimated it would have taken between six to eight hours to fill the 60-foot by 20-foot sump basement with the seven feet of water that was found the following morning. Although Moran was an auxiliary operator, both "operators," including Petitioner, an apprentice operator, have the same responsibilities and were responsible for making the necessary rounds to ensure that a mechanical failure of this nature is promptly discovered and repaired. In accordance with Respondent's policy, employees with active discipline in their files are not eligible for promotions or transfer. The written discipline Petitioner and Moran received for the May 14, 2002, sump incident remained active in their employee files for nine months. During her employment at the Energy Center, Petitioner's performance evaluations remained relatively unchanged, receiving a "meets" or "good" rating on each evaluation. Additionally, Petitioner received all regularly scheduled wage increases, until she topped out at the salary for her position. Petitioner received the same wage increases as similarly-situated male employees. Further, on or about April 2, 2003, Gillingham notified Human Resources that the discipline in her file had expired, and Petitioner was promoted to auxiliary operator, with the commensurate increase in pay. Petitioner started at the same rate of pay as three of the four other male employees placed in the apprentice operator position at that time. The fourth male employee, David Ziegler, started at a higher rate of pay based on his five years of previous experience working for a contractor at the Energy Center. Further, because of the credit Ziegler was given for his previous work experience, he was promoted to auxiliary operator ahead of Petitioner and all of the other apprentice operators who started at the same time. Vasquez was promoted to auxiliary operator on the standard two-year schedule on or about August 12, 2002; however, Petitioner was not eligible for promotion at that time because of the active discipline in her file. Petitioner failed to prove that she suffered from a recognized disability or that Respondent failed to make a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of her sex. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent retaliated against her for complaining of the alleged sexual harassment which occurred in the Summer of 2001.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief in DOAH Case No. 03-2306, FCHR Case No. 22-02718. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ellen Edith Hanson 5355 Rambling Road St. Cloud, Florida 34771 David C. Netzley, Esquire Ford & Harrison, LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 1210242 U.S.C 2000e CFR (1) 29 CFR 1604.11(d)(2002) Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.01760.10760.11
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FRANCES G. DANELLI vs FRITO-LAY, INC., 17-006311 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Nov. 17, 2017 Number: 17-006311 Latest Update: Sep. 14, 2018

The Issue The issues in this case are whether, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Respondent terminated Petitioner on the basis of her sex or age, or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity; and whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment based on her sex or age.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Frito-Lay, Inc. ("Frito-Lay"), makes and sells snack foods, including many familiar brands of chips. Petitioner Frances G. Danelli ("Danelli") is a former employee of Frito-Lay. Frito-Lay initially hired Danelli in or around 1998 as a packer for its West Valley, Utah, plant. When Danelli's husband was transferred to Florida, she took a job for Frito-Lay in Pompano Beach, Florida, and later moved to the company's West Palm Beach Distribution Center as a route sales representative ("RSR"). Danelli worked in Florida as a Frito-Lay RSR for more than 15 years, and her routes eventually included such large stores as Publix, Walmart, Winn-Dixie, and Target.1/ RSRs sell and deliver Frito-Lay products to retail stores, and these stores, in turn, sell the products to consumers. RSRs are responsible, as well, for presenting the company's products to shoppers in the best way possible to increase sales. So, RSRs not only sell and deliver products to stores, but they also unload the products, stock the shelves, set up displays, and remove unsold items whose sell-by dates have expired. RSRs are paid an hourly wage plus commissions. RSRs are required to compete for sales against other companies' vendors, who (like Frito-Lay's personnel) are trying to place as many of their products as possible onto the shelves of the snack food aisle. Shelf space is essential for growing sales, and competition for product placement can be fierce. There is no dispute that Danelli's performance as an RSR was fine, perhaps even exemplary. Frito-Lay considered her to be a good employee. Danelli went to work early each morning, usually arriving at the warehouse by 4:00 a.m. so that she could get to her first store by 5:00 a.m., which would give her a head start on other vendors. When Danelli got to the warehouse, she would clock in on her handheld computer, which she also used to track the goods she delivered to each store. Upon returning to the warehouse, she had paperwork to complete and print from the handheld computer. In 2013, Frito-Lay started requiring drivers of delivery trucks over a certain size, including RSRs such as Danelli, to comply with U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulations. As relevant, these regulations require an RSR to take at least a ten-hour break before driving a commercial vehicle, and they prohibit an RSR from driving a commercial vehicle after 14 consecutive hours on duty. Frito-Lay programmed its employees' handheld computers so that an employee subject to the DOT regulations would receive a conspicuous warning if he or she attempted to clock in to work less than ten hours after last going off duty. As Danelli testified at hearing, if the computer told her to wait, she would go to the warehouse, pick up some product, fix her truck, and then sign in when the handheld said she could go. Evidently, however, to get the warning, an employee needed to log on as a "regulated" employee; if, by mistake, a "regulated" employee logged on as "non-regulated," she would not get the warning. Danelli found it difficult to comply with the DOT regulations, which led to Frito-Lay's imposing discipline against her in accordance with the company's Corrective Action Process set forth in its Sales National RSR Handbook, which governed Petitioner's employment. The handbook prescribes a process of progressive discipline that begins with "coaching," which is a form of pre- discipline. As the name suggests, a "coaching" is, essentially, a nondisciplinary intervention whose purpose is to correct an issue before the employee's conduct warrants stronger measures. If coaching is ineffective, the Corrective Action Process calls for increasingly severe steps of discipline. The steps of discipline consist of a Step 1 Written Reminder, a Step 2 Written Warning, a Step 3 Final Written Warning, and a Step 4 Termination. The particular discipline to be imposed depends upon the severity of the infraction and the step of discipline, if any, the employee happens to be on when the infraction is committed. Steps of discipline remain "active" for six to nine months, depending on the step. If the employee does not commit any further disciplinary infractions during the active period, the step "falls off." If the employee commits another disciplinary infraction within the "active" period, however, he or she moves to the next disciplinary step in the Corrective Action Process. On June 5, 2014, after having previously been coached to maintain compliance with the DOT regulations, Danelli received a Step 1 Written Reminder for four violations of the 10-hour rule. She did not appeal this discipline. On July 25, 2014, Danelli received a Step 2 Written Warning for a new violation of the 10-hour rule. Once again, Danelli did not appeal the discipline. On October 7, 2014, Danelli was given another coaching, during which she was informed that (i) an investigation into her DOT hours was in process, and (ii) the company was concerned that she might be getting assistance on her route from her husband in violation of the RSR Performance Standards. On January 27, 2015, Danelli received a Step 3 Final Written Warning for violating the 14-hour rule. She did not appeal this discipline. Under the Corrective Action Process, a Step 3 Final Written Warning remains "active" for nine months and is the final step prior to a Step 4 Termination. On May 2, 2015, Danelli committed another DOT violation. Because she was already on a Step 3 Final Written Warning, she was suspended pending further investigation. Danelli maintains that this violation, and others, resulted from her making a simple mistake with the handheld computer, namely failing to log on as a "regulated" employee, which cost her the electronic warning she otherwise would have received. She points out, too, that in this instance, the violation was minor, merely clocking in ten minutes early. These arguments are not wholly without merit, and if Frito-Lay had fired Danelli for a single, ten-minute violation of the DOT regulations, the undersigned would question the company's motivation. But that is not what happened. Danelli did not just violate the ten-hour rule once or twice, but many times, after multiple warnings, and in the face of increasingly serious disciplinary steps. Further, Frito-Lay did not terminate Danelli's employment over this latest violation of the ten-hour rule, even though it would have been justified in doing so within the parameters of the Corrective Action Process. Instead, the company placed Danelli on a Last Chance Agreement. Last Chance Agreements are not specifically provided for in the Corrective Action Process but are used, at the company's discretion, as a safety valve to avoid the occasional unfortunate termination that might result from strict adherence to rigid rules. In this regard, the agreement given to Danelli, dated May 15, 2015, stated as follows: We strongly considered [terminating your employment]. However, due to the unique facts and circumstances involved here, as well as your 15 years of service with the Company, the Company is willing to issue this Last Chance Warning. This step is over and above our normal progressive disciplinary process, and is being issued on a one-time, non-precedent setting basis. . . . [A]ny subsequent violations by you may result in discipline up to and including immediate termination. More specifically, any future violations [of the DOT regulations] will result in your immediate termination. As Danelli put it, the Last Change Agreement was a "sign of grace" from Frito-Lay. By its terms, it was intended to be "active and in effect for a period of 12 months." The undersigned pauses here to let the Last Chance Agreement sink in, because the fact that Frito-Lay did not fire Danelli in May 2015 when——for objective, easy-to-prove reasons, after a by-the-book application of progressive discipline——it clearly could have, is compelling evidence that the company was not harboring discriminatory animus against Danelli. After all, if Frito-Lay had wanted Danelli gone because of her age or her gender, why in the world would the company not have jumped at this golden opportunity, which Danelli had given it, to fire her with practically no exposure to liability for unlawful discrimination? The irony is that by showing mercy, Frito-Lay set in motion the chain of events that led to this proceeding. In or around November of 2015, Danelli underwent surgery, which required her to take some time off of work. For several years before this leave, Danelli's route had consisted of a Super Walmart and two Publix stores. When she returned, the Super Walmart had been assigned to another RSR, and to make up for its loss, Danelli's supervisor, Stanley Gamble, put a third Publix grocery on Danelli's route, i.e., Publix #1049 located in Tequesta, Florida. Danelli was acquainted with one of the managers at the Tequesta Publix, a Mr. Morgan. On her first day back, Danelli and Mr. Gamble went to that store, where Mr. Morgan told Mr. Gamble that he was "glad Frances is here." Mr. Morgan had complained to Mr. Gamble about the previous RSR, who left the store "all messed up," according to Mr. Gamble. Danelli also met Sarah Oblaczynski, the store's "backdoor receiver," which is the Publix employee who checks in merchandise. On her new route, Danelli usually went to the Tequesta store first, early in the morning. She soon ran into a vendor named Tony who worked for Snyder's of Hanover ("Snyder's"), a snack food company that competes with Frito-Lay. From the start, Tony was nasty to Danelli and aggressive, telling her that "there is no space" for two vendors. Tony was possessive about shelf space within the store, as well as the parking space close to the store's loading dock. Danelli thought, because of Tony's behavior, that he might be using drugs. On Tuesday, April 6, 2016, Petitioner had an argument with Tony over the shelf space that the store manager previously had awarded to her for the display of Frito-Lay products. Tony asserted that he had been promised the same space and said to Danelli, "You're going to take that stuff out of the shelf." Danelli told him, "No, Morgan said that's still my space." At this, Tony began cursing and pushed Danelli's cart into her, yelling, "That fucking Morgan!" Danelli later spoke to Mr. Morgan, who assured Danelli that the shelf space in question was hers and said he would leave a note to that effect for Ms. Oblaczynski. There is a dispute as to when Danelli reported the forgoing incident to Frito-Lay. She claims that, before the end of the day on April 6, she told Mr. Gamble, her supervisor, all about the matter, in detail, and requested that someone be assigned to accompany her on her route the next day because Tony planned on taking her shelf space. According to Danelli, Mr. Gamble just laughed and said he did not have anybody to help her. Mr. Gamble testified, to the contrary, that Danelli had neither reported the April 6, 2016, incident to him nor asked for any assistance. (Danelli admits that she did not report the incident to Mr. Canizares, sales zone director, or to Human Resources ("HR")). Without written documentation regarding this alleged discussion, it is hard to say what, if anything, Danelli reported on April 6, 2016. It is likely that Danelli did complain to Mr. Gamble about Tony on some occasion(s), and might well have done so on April 6. What is unlikely, however, is that Danelli notified Mr. Gamble that she felt she was being sexually harassed by Tony. Tony's boorish and bullying behavior, to the extent directed at Danelli, seems to have been directed to her qua competitor, not as a woman. At the very least, the incident is ambiguous in this regard, and one could reasonably conclude, upon hearing about it, that Tony was simply a jerk who resorted to juvenile antics in attempting to gain the upper hand against a rival vendor. The undersigned finds that if Danelli did speak to Mr. Gamble about Tony on April 6, he—— not unreasonably——did not view the incident as one involving sexual harassment. As far as Mr. Gamble's declining to provide Danelli with an escort, assuming she requested one, his response is reasonable if (as found) Mr. Gamble was not clearly on notice that Danelli believed she was being sexually harassed. Danelli, after all, was by this time an experienced and successful RSR who undoubtedly had encountered other difficult vendors during her career. Indeed, as things stood on April 6, a person could reasonably conclude that Danelli in fact had the situation under control, inasmuch as Mr. Morgan had clearly taken Danelli's side and intervened on her behalf. What could a Frito-Lay "bodyguard" reasonably be expected to accomplish, which would justify the risk of escalating the tension between Tony and Danelli into a hostile confrontation? During the evening of April 6, 2016, Danelli talked to her husband about the problem at Publix #1049, and they decided that he would accompany her to the store the next morning before reporting to his own work, to assist if Tony caused a scene. On April 7, 2016, Danelli's husband drove to Publix #1049 in his own vehicle. Although no longer an employee of the company, Danelli's husband entered the store wearing a Frito-Lay hat, and he stayed in the snack aisle while Danelli went to the back to bring the order in. Ms. Oblaczynski, the receiver, presented Tony with a note from Mr. Morgan stating that Danelli's products and sales items were assigned to aisle one. In response, Tony started swearing about Mr. Morgan and the denial of shelf space, made a hand gesture indicative of a man pleasing himself, and told Ms. Oblaczynski that "they can take a fly[ing] F'n leap." Tony had made this particular hand gesture about Mr. Morgan on a number of previous occasions, in front of both men and women. Mr. Danelli left to go to work once Danelli's product was placed, and she left to go to the next store on her route. When Danelli returned to the warehouse, she went to Mr. Gamble's office and told him about the April 7, 2016, incident. According to Danelli, Mr. Gamble laughed in response. Danelli asked Mr. Gamble if the company would conduct an investigation, and he said yes. She recalls that every day thereafter, she asked Mr. Gamble if he had heard anything because she thought "we [Frito-Lay] were investigating" and that HR was on top of it. Danelli admits, however, that she "intentionally" did not tell Mr. Gamble that her husband had accompanied her to Publix #1049 to assist her in the store that morning. She did not report this detail because she knew it was "bad." In conflict with Danelli's account, Mr. Gamble testified that Danelli did not report that Tony made a sexual gesture in front of her or used coarse or profane language in her presence on April 7, 2016. The undersigned finds that Mr. Gamble most likely did not laugh at Danelli or otherwise treat her dismissively upon hearing her report of the incident. If Mr. Gamble had believed the matter were so trivial or amusing, he would not likely have agreed to investigate. The undersigned finds, further, that however Danelli described the incident, she did not make it clear to Mr. Gamble that she perceived Tony's behavior as a form of sexual harassment. Danelli did not make a formal written complaint to that effect at the time, and the situation at Publix #1049 was, at the very least, ambiguous. More likely than not, Mr. Gamble viewed the troublesome vendor from Snyder's as an unwelcome business problem to be dealt with, not as a perpetrator of unlawful, gender-based discrimination. To elaborate, putting Tony's "sexual gesture" to one side momentarily, the rest of his conduct, even the cursing, while certainly objectionable, is not suggestive of sexual harassment; it is just bad behavior. Tony's temper tantrums and outbursts no doubt upset Danelli and others, but that does not turn them into gender discrimination. Further, Danelli seems to have handled the situation well until she resorted to self-help on April 7, 2016. The responsible Publix employees were already aware of the problem, and in due course, they complained to Snyder's, which unsurprisingly removed Tony from that store. Meantime, had Danelli felt physically threatened or afraid as a result of Tony's more aggressive antics, she (or Publix) could have called the police; this, indeed, would have been a safer and more reasonable alternative to bringing along her husband or another civilian for protection, which as mentioned above posed the risk of provoking a fight, given Tony's volatility. Ultimately, it is Tony's "sexual gesture" that provides a colorable basis for Danelli's sexual harassment complaint. But even this gives little grounds for a claim of discrimination, without more context than is present here. To be sure, the "jerk off gesture" or "air jerk" is obscene, and one would not expect to see it in polite company or in the workplace. Yet, although it clearly mimics a sexual practice, the air jerk is generally not understood as being a literal reference to masturbation. That is, the gesture is not typically used to convey a present intention to engage in masturbation or as an invitation to perform the act on the gesturer. Rather, the jerk off gesture usually signifies annoyance, disgust, disinterest, or disbelief. As with its cousin, the "finger" (or bird) gesture, the sexual connotations of the air jerk are (usually) subliminal. Here, there is no allegation or evidence that Tony's jerk off gesture was undertaken in pursuit of sexual gratification or was intended or perceived as a sexual advance on Danelli (or someone else)——or even as being overtly sexual in nature. (Obviously, if the evidence showed that, under the circumstances, Tony was, e.g., inviting Danelli to participate in sexual activity, this would be a different case. The undersigned is not suggesting, just to be clear, that the air jerk gesture is inconsistent with or could never amount to sexual harassment, but only that it is not unequivocally a sign of such harassment, given its commonly understood meanings.) To the contrary, it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that Tony made the gesture to indicate that he regarded Mr. Morgan's note as pointless and annoying. It was roughly the equivalent of giving them the bird, albeit arguably less contemptuous than that. For these reasons, the undersigned finds it unlikely that, assuming Danelli described the gesture (which is in dispute), Mr. Gamble thought Danelli was complaining about sexual harassment, as opposed to a very difficult vendor. On April 13, 2016, Mr. Gamble visited Publix #1049 and spoke to Ms. Oblaczynski about the situation. During this conversation, Ms. Oblaczynski stated that the "Frito-Lay people" did nothing wrong. She further specified that "the person [Danelli] had with her did nothing wrong." After speaking with Ms. Oblaczynski, Mr. Gamble met with Danelli while she was servicing her second account. Right off the bat, Mr. Gamble asked Danelli who was with her at Publix #1049 on April 7, 2016. She eventually admitted that her husband was with her in the store that day. Aware of the seriousness of her offense and the active Last Chance Agreement, Danelli asked Mr. Gamble, several times, if she would be fired. That same day, Mr. Gamble called Carlos Canizares to tell him what he had learned. Mr. Canizares instructed Mr. Gamble to stay with Danelli while she finished servicing her accounts and then to obtain a written statement from her about the incident. Later on April 13, 2016, Danelli provided a written statement in which she confirmed that her husband had been working with her at Publix #1049 the previous week. Danelli has since described this statement as a "full written account of the harassment [and] rude sexual gestures." Danelli knew, of course, that HR would review her statement, and yet she said nothing therein about having complained to Mr. Gamble or any supervisor about harassment generally or Tony in particular; about Tony's use of course or improper language; or about having requested an escort to help keep Tony in line. On the instructions of the company's HR department, Mr. Gamble conducted an investigation into the "rude sexual gesture" about which Danelli had complained. Specifically, he called Mr. Morgan, the Publix manager, and asked him about the incident. Mr. Gamble also requested that he be allowed to review any videotapes and documents concerning the incident. Mr. Morgan informed Mr. Gamble that Publix was investigating the matter. Mr. Gamble's request to allow Frito-Lay access to Publix videotapes and documents was, however, turned down. Tony's boorish behavior aside, the fact remained that Danelli, without prior approval, had allowed a non-employee to perform work or services for Frito-Lay at one of the stores on her route, which the RSR Performance Standards specifically prohibit without express authorization. RSRs who are found to have permitted non-employees to accompany them on their routes are either discharged or issued multiple steps of discipline, as Danelli knew. Because Danelli violated this rule while on an active Last Chance Agreement, Frito-Lay decided to terminate her employment. On April 26, 2016, Mr. Canizares met with Danelli to inform her that she was fired. Danelli timely appealed her termination pursuant to the company's Complaint and Appeal Procedure, electing to have her appeal decided by a neutral, third-party arbitrator. The arbitration hearing took place in January 2017. Three months later, the arbitrator ruled that Danelli's termination had been proper and carried out in accordance with Frito-Lay's employment policies. Danelli does not presently deny that she violated the DOT regulations and the company policy forbidding the use of non-employees as helpers while on duty, nor does she dispute that Frito-Lay had sufficient grounds for imposing the disciplinary steps leading to the Last Chance Agreement. Indeed, she does not contend that it would have been wrongful for Frito-Lay to have fired her in May 2015 instead of offering the Last Chance Agreement. Her position boils down to the argument that because Frito-Lay could have exercised leniency and not fired her for bringing her husband to work at Publix #1049 (which is probably true2/), its failure to do so can only be attributable to gender or age discrimination. Put another way, Danelli claims that but for her being a woman in her 50s, Frito-Lay would have given her another "last chance." This is a heavy lift. As circumstantial evidence of discrimination, Danelli points to the company's treatment of another RSR, a younger man named Ryan McCreath. Like Danelli, Mr. McCreath was caught with a non-employee assisting him on his route. Unlike Danelli, however, Mr. McCreath was not on any active steps of discipline at the time of the incident, much less a Last Chance Agreement. Although Mr. McCreath's disciplinary record was not unblemished, Frito-Lay did not terminate his employment for this violation of the RSR Performance Standards. Instead, he received three steps of discipline and was issued a Final Written Warning. Mr. McCreath's situation is distinguishable because he was not under a Last Chance Agreement at the time of the violation. Moreover, it is not as though Mr. McCreath got off scot-free. He received a serious punishment. Danelli could not have received a comparable punishment for the same offense because she was already beyond Step 3; her record, unlike his, did not have room for the imposition of three steps of discipline at once. The McCreath incident does not give rise to a reasonable inference that Frito-Lay unlawfully discriminated against Danelli when it terminated her employment for committing a "three-step violation" while on an active Last Chance Agreement. There is simply no reason to suppose that if Danelli, like Mr. McCreath, had not had any active steps of discipline when she violated the rule against having non- employees provide on-the-job assistance, Frito-Lay would have terminated her employment for the April 7, 2016, infraction; or that if Mr. McCreath, like Danelli, had been on a Last Chance Agreement when he violated the rule, Frito-Lay would have issued him a Final Written Warning in lieu of termination. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that any of Frito- Lay's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Danelli, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by age- or gender-based discriminatory animus. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful age or gender discrimination could be made. There is no persuasive evidence that Frito-Lay took any retaliatory action against Danelli for having opposed or sought redress for an unlawful employment practice. There is no persuasive evidence that Frito-Lay committed or permitted sexual harassment of Danelli or otherwise exposed her to a hostile work environment. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Frito-Lay did not discriminate unlawfully against Danelli on any basis.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Frito-Lay not liable for gender or age discrimination, retaliation, or creating a hostile work environment. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2018.

USC (1) 29 U.S.C 623 Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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SUSAN KIRBY vs APPLIANCE DIRECT, INC., 07-003807 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Aug. 24, 2007 Number: 07-003807 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 2008

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white female. Petitioner worked as a salesperson at Respondent’s Melbourne store from April 2006 to September 2006. Petitioner’s primary job duty was selling appliances to retail customers. She also performed ancillary duties, such as tagging merchandise, cleaning and organizing the showroom floor, scheduling deliveries, and making follow-up calls to customers. Petitioner was not paid a salary. Her income was solely commission-based. She earned a total of $11,826.14 while working for Respondent, which equates to an average weekly gross pay of $537.55. Petitioner had several managers during the term of her employment. She did not have a problem with any of her managers, except for Jeffrey Rock. Mr. Rock is a black male, and by all accounts, he was a difficult manager to work for. He was “strict”; he often yelled at the salespersons to “get in the box”2 and “answer the phones”; and, unlike several of the prior managers at the Melbourne store, Mr. Rock held the salespersons accountable for doing their job. Petitioner testified that Mr. Rock "constantly" made sexual comments in the store, including comments about the size of his penis and his sexual prowess; comments about sex acts that he wanted to perform on a female employee in Respondent’s accounting office, Ms. Miho; “stallion” noises directed at Ms. Miho; and a question to Petitioner about the type of underwear that she was wearing. Petitioner’s testimony regarding the sexual comments and noises made by Mr. Rock was corroborated by Neina Blizzard, who worked with Petitioner as a salesperson for Respondent and who has also filed a sexual harassment claim against Respondent. Mr. Rock denied making any sexually inappropriate comments or noises in the store. His testimony was corroborated by Guy Ruscillo and Carissa Howard, who worked as salespersons with Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard and who are still employed by Respondent. Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard testified that Mr. Rock gave favorable treatment to Ms. Howard and two other female salespersons with whom he had sexual relationships and/or who found his sexual comments funny. Mr. Rock denied giving favorable treatment to any salesperson, except for one time when he gave a “house ticket”3 to Ms. Howard because she took herself off the sales floor for six hours one day to help him get organized during his first week as manager at the Melbourne store. Ms. Howard is white. The record does not reflect the race of the other two female salespersons -- Rebecca and Shanna -- who Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard testified received favorable treatment by Mr. Rock, and the anecdotal evidence of the favorable treatment that they allegedly received was not persuasive. Petitioner did not have any complaints regarding her schedule. Indeed, she testified that Mr. Rock changed her schedule at one point during her employment to give her more favorable hours. Petitioner’s testimony about other salespersons having sexual relationships with Mr. Rock and/or receiving favorable treatment from Mr. Rock was based solely upon speculation and rumor. Indeed, Rebecca, one of the salespersons with whom Mr. Rock allegedly had a sexual relationship, was “let go” by Mr. Rock because of the problems with her job performance observed by Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard. Petitioner’s last day of work was Saturday, September 30, 2006. On that day, Petitioner came into the store with Ms. Blizzard at approximately 8:00 a.m. because, according to Petitioner, another manager had changed her schedule for that day from the closing shift to the opening shift. Mr. Rock confronted Petitioner when she arrived, asking her why she came in at 8:00 a.m. since he had put her on the schedule for the closing shift. An argument ensued and Petitioner went into the warehouse in the back of the store to compose herself. When Petitioner returned to the showroom several minutes later, Mr. Rock was engaged in an argument with Ms. Blizzard. During the argument, Ms. Blizzard demanded a transfer to another store, which Mr. Rock agreed to give her. Then, as a “parting shot,” Ms. Blizzard told Mr. Rock that he was a “racist” who was “prejudiced against white women.” Ms. Blizzard testified that Mr. Rock told her that she was fired immediately after she called him a racist. Petitioner testified that after Mr. Rock fired Ms. Blizzard, he asked her whether she wanted to be fired too. Petitioner testified that even though she did not respond, Mr. Rock told her that “you are fired too.” Then, according to Ms. Blizzard and Petitioner, Mr. Rock escorted them both out of the store. Mr. Rock denies telling Ms. Blizzard or Petitioner that they were fired. He testified that they both walked out of the store on their own accord after the argument. Mr. Rock’s version of the events was corroborated by Mr. Ruscillo, who witnessed the argument. Mr. Ruscillo testified that he heard a lot of yelling, but that he did not hear Mr. Rock tell Ms. Blizzard or Petitioner at any point that they were fired. Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard met with an attorney the Monday after the incident. The following day, Petitioner gave Ms. Blizzard a letter to deliver on her behalf to Respondent’s human resources (HR) Department. The letter, which Petitioner testified that she wrote on the day that she was fired by Mr. Rock, stated that Petitioner “was sexually harassed and discriminated against based on being a white female by my manager, Jeff Rock”; that Petitioner “previously reported numerous incidents of this discrimination and sexual harassment to upper management”; and that she was fired “as a result of this discrimination and the refusal to put up with Mr. Rock’s sexual advancement.” This letter was the first notice that Respondent had of Petitioner’s claims of sexual harassment or discrimination by Mr. Rock. Petitioner considers herself to be a very good salesperson, but Mr. Rock described her as an “average” salesperson. Mr. Rock’s characterization of Petitioner’s job performance is corroborated by Petitioner’s acknowledgement that her sales figures were lower than those of at least Mr. Ruscillo, Ms. Blizzard, and Ms. Howard. Petitioner complained to another manager, Al Sierra, about Mr. Rock’s management style at some point in mid-September 2006. She did not complain to Mr. Sierra or anyone else in Respondent’s upper management about the sexual comments allegedly made by Mr. Rock. Indeed, as noted above, the first time that Petitioner complained about the sexual comments allegedly made by Mr. Rock was in a letter that she provided to Respondent’s HR Department several days after she was fired and after she met with a lawyer. Petitioner testified that she did not complain about the sexual harassment by Mr. Rock because he threatened to fire any salesperson who complained to upper management about the way that he ran the store and because she did not know who to complain to because she never received an employee handbook. There is no evidence that Mr. Rock fired any salesperson for complaining about how he ran the store, and he denied making any such threats. He did, however, acknowledge that he told the salespersons that they were all replaceable. Mr. Rock’s testimony was corroborated by Mr. Ruscillo and Ms. Howard, who were at the sales meetings where Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard claim that the threats were made. The training that Petitioner received when she started with Respondent was supposed to include a discussion of Respondent’s policies and procedures, including its policy against sexual harassment. The trainer, Kit Royal, testified that he remembered Petitioner attending the week-long training program and that the program did include a discussion of the sexual harassment policy and other policies and procedures. Petitioner, however, testified that no policies and procedures were discussed during the training program. Petitioner was supposed to have received and signed for an employee handbook during the training program. No signed acknowledgement form could be located for Petitioner, which is consistent with her testimony that she never received the handbook. The fact that Petitioner did not receive the employee handbook does not mean that the training program did not include discussion of Respondent’s sexual harassment policies. Indeed, Petitioner’s testimony that the training program did not include any discussion regarding salary and benefit policies (as Mr. Royal testified that it did) and that she was never told what she would be paid by Respondent despite having given up another job to take the job with Respondent calls into question her testimony that the sexual harassment policy was not discussed at the training program. Petitioner was aware that Respondent had an HR Department because she met with a woman in the HR Department named Helen on several occasions regarding an issue that she had with her health insurance. She did not complain to Helen about the alleged sexual harassment by Mr. Rock, but she did tell Helen at some point that Mr. Rock “was being an ass” and “riding her,” which she testified were references to Mr. Rock’s management style not the alleged sexual harassment. Petitioner collected employment compensation of $272 per week after she left employment with Respondent. Petitioner testified that she looked for jobs in furniture sales and car sales while she was collecting unemployment, but that she was unable to find another job for approximately three months because of the slow economy at the time. She provided no documentation of those job-search efforts at the final hearing. Petitioner is currently employed by Art’s Shuttle. She has held that job for approximately nine months. Petitioner drives a van that takes cruise ship passengers to and from the airport. The record does not reflect how many hours per week Petitioner works at Art’s Shuttle, but she testified that she works seven days a week and earns approximately $500 per week. No written documentation of Petitioner’s current income was provided at the final hearing. Respondent has a “zero tolerance” policy against sexual harassment according to its president, Sam Pak. He credibly testified that had he been aware of the allegations of sexual harassment by Mr. Rock that he would have conducted an investigation and, if warranted, done something to fix the problem. The policy, which is contained in the employee handbook, states that Respondent “will not, under any circumstances, condone or tolerate conduct that may constitute sexual harassment on the part of its management, supervisors, or non-management personnel.” The policy defines sexual harassment to include “[c]reating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment or atmosphere by . . . [v]erbal actions, including . . . using vulgar, kidding, or demeaning language . . . .” Mr. Pak agreed that the allegations against Mr. Rock, if true, would violate Respondent’s sexual harassment policy. The employee handbook includes a “grievance procedure” for reporting problems, including claims of sexual harassment. The first step is to bring the problem to the attention of the store manager, but the handbook states that the employee is “encouraged and invited to discuss the problem in confidence directly with Human Resources” if the problem involves the manager. Additionally, the handbook states in bold, underlined type that “[a]nyone who feels that he or she . . . is the victim of sexual or other harassment, must immediately report . . . . all incidents of harassment in writing to your manager or the store manager, or if either person is the subject of the complaint, to the president.” Mr. Pak had an office at the Melbourne store. He testified that he had an “open door policy” whereby employees could bring complaints directly to him. The only complaint that Mr. Pak ever received about Mr. Rock was from another salesperson, Rod Sherman, who complained that Mr. Rock was a “tough manager.” Mr. Pak did nothing in response to the complaint and simply told Mr. Sherman that different managers have different management styles.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2007.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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NORA E. BARTOLONE vs BEST WESTERN HOTELS, 07-000496 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bartow, Florida Jan. 29, 2007 Number: 07-000496 Latest Update: Aug. 27, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Respondent operates the Best Western Admiral’s Inn and Conference Center in Winter Haven. Petitioner worked as a waitress in the hotel’s first floor restaurant from March 8, 2005, through March 18, 2006. Petitioner testified that she was sexually harassed “for months” by Marcus Owens, a cook who worked with her in the restaurant. According to Petitioner, Mr. Owens made vulgar and sexually-explicit comments to her on a number of occasions while they were working together. Petitioner could not recall precisely when the harassment started, but she estimated that it started approximately two weeks after Mr. Owens started working at the restaurant. Mr. Owens started working in the restaurant on July 28, 2005, which means that the harassment would have started in mid- August 2005. Petitioner did not complain about the harassment until November 9, 2005, when she reported it to her supervisor, Cory Meeks. This was the first notice that Respondent had about the alleged harassment. Petitioner’s testimony that she complained to the hotel’s general manager, Jeffrey Vandiver, about the harassment several weeks prior to her complaint to Mr. Meeks was not persuasive. Petitioner and Mr. Meeks met with the hotel’s human resources manager, Lin Whitaker, on the same day that the complaint was made, November 9, 2005. Ms. Whitaker told Petitioner that she needed to put her complaint in writing for the hotel to take formal action. Petitioner refused to do so because she was scared of retribution by Mr. Owens, even though Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whittaker assured her that she would be protected from Mr. Owens. Petitioner asked Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker to address the situation with Mr. Owens without using her name, which they did. Mr. Owens denied sexually harassing anyone when confronted by Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker. On December 2, 2005, Petitioner again complained to Mr. Meeks about Mr. Owens. She told Mr. Meeks that the harassment had not stopped and that it had gotten worse through even more vulgar comments. Petitioner again did not want a formal investigation into the allegations, but Ms. Whitaker told her that an investigation was required by company policy since this was the second complaint. Mr. Owens was immediately suspended without pay pending the completion of the investigation. The investigation was conducted by Mr. Vandiver, Mr. Meeks, and Ms. Whitaker on December 7, 2005. They first met with Petitioner to get her side of the story. Then, they met separately with Mr. Owens to get his side of the story. Finally, they interviewed all of the employees who worked with Petitioner and Mr. Owens. This was the first time that Petitioner went into detail about what Mr. Owens had said and done. She stated that, among other things, Mr. Owens asked her whether she had “ever had a black man” and whether her boyfriend “is able to get it up or does he require Viagra.” She also stated that there were no witnesses to the harassment because Mr. Owens was "discreet" about making the comments to her when no one else was around. Mr. Owens again denied sexually harassing anyone. He acknowledged asking Petitioner whether she had ever dated a black man, but he stated that the question was in response to Petitioner asking him whether he had ever dated a white woman. (Mr. Owens is black, and Petitioner is white.) The other employees who were interviewed as part of the investigation stated that they had not witnessed any sexual harassment or overheard any sexually explicit conversations in the restaurant. Mr. Vandiver, Mr. Meeks, and Ms. Owens concluded based upon their investigation that “there is not enough evidence of sexual harassment to terminate Marcus Owens.” They decided to let Mr. Owens continue working at the hotel, provided that he agreed to be moved to the hotel’s second floor restaurant and that he agreed to attend a sexual harassment training program. On December 8, 2005, Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker conveyed the results of their investigation and their proposed solution to Petitioner. She was “fine” with the decision to move Mr. Owens to the second floor restaurant where she would not have contact with him. On that same day, Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker conveyed their proposed solution to Mr. Owens. He too was “fine” with the decision, and he agreed that he would not go near Petitioner. Mr. Owens came back to work the following day, on December 9, 2005. On December 14, 2005, Mr. Owens was involved in an altercation with Stephen Zulinski, a dishwasher at the hotel and a close friend of Petitioner’s. The altercation occurred at the hotel during working hours. Mr. Zulinski testified that the incident started when Mr. Owens made vulgar and sexually explicit comments and gestures about Mr. Zulinski’s relationship with Petitioner. Mr. Zulinski was offended and angered by the comments, and he cursed and yelled at Mr. Owens. Mr. Zulinski denied pushing Mr. Owens (as reflected on Mr. Zulinski’s Notice of Termination), but he admitted to putting his finger on Mr. Owens’ shoulder during the altercation. Mr. Owens and Mr. Zulinski were immediately fired as a result of the altercation. Petitioner continued to work as a waitress at the hotel’s first floor restaurant after Mr. Owens was fired. Petitioner received awards from Respondent for having the most positive customer comment cards for the months of October and November 2005, even though according to her testimony she was being sexually harassed by Mr. Owens during those months. She testified that her problems with Mr. Owens affected her job performance only to a “very small degree.” Petitioner had no major problems with her job performance prior to December 2005, notwithstanding the sexual harassment by Mr. Owens that had been occurring “for months” according to Petitioner’s testimony. Petitioner was “written up” on a number of occasions between December 2005 and February 2006 because of problems with her job performance. The problems included Petitioner being rude to the on-duty manager in front of hotel guests; taking too many breaks and not having the restaurant ready for service when her shift started; failing to check the messages left for room service orders; and generating a guest complaint to the hotel’s corporate headquarters. Petitioner was fired after an incident on March 11, 2006, when she left the restaurant unattended on several occasions and the manager-on-duty received complaints from several hotel guests about the quality of service that they received from Petitioner that night. Petitioner ended up being sent home from work that night because, according to her supervisor, “she was in a crying state,” unable to work, and running off the restaurant’s business. Petitioner’s employment with Respondent was formally terminated on March 18, 2006. The stated reason for the termination was “unsatisfactory work performance” and “too many customer complaints.” None of the supervisors who wrote up Petitioner were aware of her sexual harassment complaints against Mr. Owens. Petitioner claimed that the allegations of customer complaints and poor job performance detailed in the write-ups were “ludicrous,” “insane,” “almost a complete fabrication,” and “a joke.” The evidence does not support Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner admitted to having “severe” bi-polar disorder, and she acknowledged at the hearing and to her supervisor that she was having trouble with her medications over the period that she was having problems with her job performance. For example, the comment written by Petitioner on the January 27, 2006, write-up stated that she was “at a loss” to explain her job performance and that she “hope[d] to have [her] mental stability restored to what everyone else but [her] seems normalcy.” Petitioner worked 25 to 30 hours per week while employed by Respondent. She was paid $5.15 per hour, plus tips, and she testified that her biweekly take-home pay was between $200 and $250. Petitioner applied for unemployment compensation after she was fired. Respondent did not dispute the claim, and Petitioner was awarded unemployment compensation of $106 per week, which she received for a period of six months ending in September 2006. Petitioner has not worked since she was fired by Respondent in March 2006. She has not even attempted to find another job since that time. Petitioner does not believe that she is capable of working because of her bi-polar disorder. She applied for Social Security disability benefits based upon that condition, but her application was denied. Petitioner’s appeal of the denial is pending. Petitioner testified that one of the reasons that she has not looked for another job is her concern that doing so would undermine her efforts to obtain Social Security disability benefits. Respondent has a general “non-harassment” policy, which prohibits “harassment of one employee by another employee . . . for any reason.” Respondent also has a specific sexual harassment policy, which states that “sexual harassment of any kind will not be tolerated.” The policy defines sexual harassment to include verbal sexual conduct that “has the purpose or effect of interfering with the individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” The general non-harassment policy and the specific sexual harassment policy require the employee to immediately report the harassment to his or her supervisor or a member of the management staff. The Standards of Conduct and the Work Rules adopted by Respondent authorize immediate dismissal of an employee who is disrespectful or discourteous to guests of the hotel. The Standards of Conduct also authorize discipline ranging from a written reprimand to dismissal for an employee’s “[f]ailure to perform work or job assignments satisfactorily and efficiently.”

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald T. Ryce, Esquire 908 Coquina Lane Vero Beach, Florida 32963 Nora E. Bartolone 119 Alachua Drive Southeast Winter Haven, Florida 33884

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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TAMMY M. FORD vs MOLD-EX RUBBER COMPANY, 00-002309 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida May 31, 2000 Number: 00-002309 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 2001

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes, by allowing Petitioner to be sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sections 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes, Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended. Respondent manufactures rubber parts for housewares, aircraft, and the automotive industry. Respondent typically employs an untrained workforce then provides its employees with on-the-job training. Respondent experiences a high turnover in entry level jobs. Petitioner began working for Respondent on or about November 15, 1995. Her immediate supervisor was Walter Tate. Part of Mr. Tate's job was to train Petitioner how to operate a rubber injection machine. There is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Tate ever touched Petitioner or spoke to her in a sexually inappropriate manner. On December 6, 1995, Petitioner's hand was injured at work. This injury occurred when another employee drove a forklift into the platform where Petitioner was working. Mr. Tate did not blame Petitioner for the accident. He did not use the accident as a means to sexually discriminate against Petitioner. On or about February 16, 1996, Petitioner's machine caused a shut down in production. The machine broke down when someone placed a metal bar in the feed hole. The metal bar broke off between the machine's feed hole and its extruder, preventing the rubber from passing through. The machine was a silicon extruder; this type of machine is usually turned off when the designated operator takes a break. Based on a good faith belief that Petitioner was responsible for damage to her machine, Mr. Tate gave Petitioner a verbal warning for using the metal bar instead of a plastic one. Mr. Tate advised Petitioner that the next time she would be given a written warning. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Tate had any hidden agenda when he reprimanded Petitioner. Petitioner became visibly upset about the verbal reprimand and cursed Mr. Tate. Subsequently, Petitioner signed an employee warning report, indicating that she disagreed with the verbal warning but gave no reasons for her disagreement. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner met with Respondent's plant manager, Steve Wieczorek, and second-shift plant superintendent, Robbie Misenheimer. Petitioner complained that she did not like Mr. Tate telling her what to do because she already knew her job. Petitioner also complained that she did not like Mr. Tate's use of profanity. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner never complained to Respondent about any form of sexual harassment or discrimination by Mr. Tate during this or any other meeting. During the meeting, Mr. Wieczorek took handwritten notes of Petitioner's complaints. According to Petitioner, she signed these notes before she left the meeting. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Wieczorek typed the notes in accordance with his customary procedure. Mr. Wieczorek and Mr. Misenheimer signed the typed notes before placing them in Petitioner's personnel file. Petitioner did not sign the typed notes. The location of the handwritten notes was not established during the hearing. After the meeting, Mr. Wieczorek directed Mr. Misenheimer to investigate Petitioner's complaints. In accordance with that directive, Mr. Misenheimer talked to Mr. Tate and several of Petitioner's co-workers. Mr. Misenheimer concluded that there was no merit to Petitioner's complaints that Mr. Tate was treating her unfairly. Nevertheless, Mr. Misenheimer continued to check with Petitioner personally and to observe Mr. Tate for several days to ensure that Petitioner was not being mistreated. On February 27, 1996, Petitioner walked out of the plant, voluntarily leaving her workstation in the middle of her shift. Petitioner did not advise Mr. Tate or any other supervisor of her reason for leaving the work site. There is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Tate threatened Petitioner for turning him in before she abandoned her workstation. After leaving the plant, Petitioner did not call Respondent for three days to explain why she had not returned to work. Respondent did not attempt to contact Petitioner during this time. In accordance with the company's personnel policies, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment on March 1, 1996. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent's policy was that sexual harassment was not to be tolerated. This policy was communicated to employees in group meetings. Petitioner admits that she received instruction on the procedure for complaining about sexual discrimination when she began working for Respondent. However, she could not remember whether she received the information in a training session or in a printed form. Respondent posted information in the employee break room about state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Committe, Esquire 17 South Palafox Place, Suite 322 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Heather Fischer Lindsay, Esquire Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs 1400 South Trust Tower Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (3) 120.569760.10760.11
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HOLLY MATHIS vs O'REILLY AUTO PARTS, 16-001072 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Feb. 24, 2016 Number: 16-001072 Latest Update: Feb. 10, 2017

The Issue Whether Petitioner (“Holly Mathis” or “Ms. Mathis”), in contravention of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01 through 760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes (2014),1/ experienced sexual harassment and/or disparate treatment during her employment at Respondent, O’Reilly Auto Parts (“O’Reilly”).

Findings Of Fact O’Reilly is a retail distributor of automobile parts headquartered in Springfield, Missouri. On approximately August 11, 2014, Ms. Mathis began working at an O’Reilly’s store in Panama City Beach, Florida (“store no. 4564”). Her duties included pulling automobile parts from the store’s inventory and using an O’Reilly’s-owned vehicle to deliver automobile parts to mechanics in the surrounding area. Ms. Mathis was the only female employee at store no. 4564. Upon beginning her employment with O’Reilly, Ms. Mathis received a copy of the O’Reilly Auto Parts Team Member Handbook (“the Handbook”) detailing policies, benefits, and the responsibilities of O’Reilly’s employees. One portion of the Handbook specifies that O’Reilly’s employees “are not discriminated against on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, pregnancy, age, military obligation, disability, or other protected class as defined by federal, state or local laws.” Another portion of the Handbook addressed harassment and stated that “[a]buse of other team members through ethnic, racist, or sexist slurs or other derogatory or objectionable conduct is unacceptable behavior and will be subject to progressive discipline.” This portion of the Handbook continued by describing sexual harassment as follows: Sexual harassment is a specific form of harassment that undermines the integrity of the employment relationship – it will not be tolerated. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when: Submission to such conduct is made, either explicitly or implicitly, a term or condition of an individual’s employment. Submission to or rejection of the conduct is the basis for an employment decision affecting the harassed team member. The harassment substantially interferes with a team member’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. This portion of the Handbook also instructed employees how to report harassment: If you feel you have been discriminated against or have observed another team member being discriminated against due to race, color, religion, national origin, disability, sex, age or veteran status, you should immediately report such incidents to your supervisor/manager, local Human Resources representative, the corporate Human Resources Department, or anonymously via the company’s T.I.P.S. Hotline at 1-800-473-8470 without fear of reprisal. A prompt, thorough investigation will be made as confidentially as possible. Appropriate action, up to and including termination, will be taken to ensure that neither discrimination nor harassment persists . . . . The Handbook instructs an O’Reilly’s employee with work-related concerns to bring them to the attention of his or her supervisor. If the work-related concern involves that employee’s supervisor, then the Handbook instructs the employee to “speak directly with the next level of supervision.” Store no. 4564 had a poster notifying employees that sexual harassment is illegal. The poster stated that: If you experience or witness sexual harassment, report it immediately to your supervisor or the Human Resources Department without fear of retaliation. The company will promptly investigate all complaints as confidentially as possible. If the company concludes that sexual harassment did occur, disciplinary action will be taken with the offender(s) up to and including termination. The poster listed two “hotline” phone numbers that O’Reilly’s employees could utilize to report sexual harassment. Also, the Handbook states that “[s]moking, eating, and drinking are not allowed in company vehicles, and team members are not permitted to possess food or beverages, including water, within the cab of a store delivery vehicle.” As noted above, Ms. Mathis began working for O’Reilly on approximately August 11, 2014. She typically worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays. Ms. Mathis’ hiring by O’Reilly was probably facilitated by the fact that she had previously worked with the store’s general manager (Paul Stephenson) at an Advance Auto Parts store. Ms. Mathis considered Mr. Stephenson to be a “big brother.” However, in September of 2014, Mr. Stephenson began directing sexual comments toward Ms. Mathis, and inappropriate conduct by Mr. Stephenson continued through April of 2015.2/ During Ms. Mathis’ employment with O’Reilly, Mr. Stephenson was the highest-ranking employee at the Panama City Beach store. Therefore, Mr. Stephenson had supervisory authority over Ms. Mathis. On April 4, 2015, Ms. Mathis and Mr. Stephenson were working at store no. 4564. When Ms. Mathis asked to leave early so that she could spend time with her newborn, Mr. Stephenson repeatedly asked her to expose her breasts to him. Ms. Mathis refused Mr. Stephenson’s requests but was eventually allowed to leave work early. However, Ms. Mathis had been under the impression that she would not be allowed to leave early unless she complied with Mr. Stephenson’s request. On approximately April 13, 2015, Ms. Mathis applied for a position at an Autozone store approximately five minutes from store no. 4564. By April 14, 2015, Ms. Mathis had secured a new position at that Autozone store and submitted a letter of resignation to O’Reilly on April 14, 2015. Mr. Stephenson’s inappropriate conduct did not stop after Ms. Mathis submitted her letter of resignation. As discussed in her Petition for Relief, Mr. Stephenson attempted to touch her in an inappropriate manner many times on April 15, 2015, and succeeded in doing so on April 16, 2015. Ms. Mathis reaffirmed that statement during her testimony at the final hearing. The undersigned finds Ms. Mathis’ testimony regarding Mr. Stephenson’s conduct in April of 2015 to be credible. April 16, 2015, was Ms. Mathis’ last day of work at store no. 4564, and she began working for Autozone on April 17, 2015. In addition to Mr. Stephenson’s inappropriate conduct, Ms. Mathis asserts that she was subjected to disparate treatment by her direct supervisor, William Yohe. Specifically, Ms. Mathis testified that Mr. Yohe would belittle her by calling her “stupid” in front of co-workers and customers. Male employees did not experience such verbal abuse. In addition, Mr. Yohe allegedly allowed male drivers to decline deliveries without giving Ms. Mathis the same option. When a male driver declined a particular delivery, then Ms. Mathis was required to handle it. Also, Mr. Yohe allegedly allowed male drivers to have food and beverages in the O’Reilly-owned delivery vehicles. However, Mr. Yohe sent Ms. Mathis home early on April 10, 2015, for having a Gatorade in a delivery vehicle. With the exception of family and friends, Ms. Mathis told no one (including no one with authority over Mr. Stephenson and Mr. Yohe in O’Reilly’s chain-of-command) of the sexual harassment and disparate treatment she experienced at store no. 4564. Ms. Mathis did not report the sexual harassment and disparate treatment to anyone associated with O’Reilly because she was worried that Mr. Stephenson or Mr. Yohe would learn of her complaints and fire her. As a single mother of a newborn, she could ill afford to be out of work. As for the anonymous T.I.P.S. Hotline in the Handbook, Ms. Mathis was concerned that her anonymity could not be maintained because she was the only female employee at store no. 4564. The undersigned finds that Ms. Mathis proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Stephenson sexually harassed her in April of 2015 as described above. There was no reliable evidence to rebut Ms. Mathis’ allegations regarding Mr. Stephenson. For example, another driver at store no. 4564 testified that he never observed any behavior towards Ms. Mathis that amounted to a violation of O’Reilly’s policies. However, that testimony and his written statement were of little use because the other driver worked Mondays and Tuesdays while Ms. Mathis usually worked Wednesday through Friday. Mr. Stephenson did not testify during the final hearing. He did give a written statement to O’Reilly in which he denied any inappropriate conduct of the nature described by Ms. Mathis. However, and as explained in the Conclusions of Law below, Mr. Stephenson’s written statement was hearsay, and it did not supplement or corroborate any non-hearsay evidence. In addition, several other O’Reilly’s employees submitted written statements explaining that they had never seen any discrimination at their workplace and/or that they were unaware of any discrimination occurring at their workplace. However, those employees did not testify, and their written statements did not supplement or corroborate any non-hearsay evidence. Mr. Yohe gave a written statement in which he noted that no one had complained to him about being sexually harassed. However, and as noted above, Ms. Mathis told no one other than friends and family about her experiences at store no. 4564. While Ms. Mathis proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she was sexually harassed by Mr. Stephenson during her employment at O’Reilly, she did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was subjected to other types of disparate treatment. Mr. Yohe denied verbally abusing Ms. Mathis, and O’Reilly’s witnesses persuasively testified that male and female drivers were treated equally with regard to having prohibited items in O’Reilly-owned delivery vehicles. As for Ms. Mathis’ assertion that she was forced to make deliveries that male drivers declined, Mr. Yohe rebutted that assertion by testifying that Ms. Mathis was unable to successfully work the front counter at store no. 4564 because she had yet to accumulate sufficient knowledge of automobile parts. Therefore, if the front counter was short-staffed at certain times, then a male driver would be asked to work the front counter and Ms. Mathis would have to handle all of the deliveries during that time period. The undersigned also finds O’Reilly had reasonable measures in place to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior. It is also found that Ms. Mathis failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities offered by O’Reilly.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Holly Mathis’ claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 2016.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.68509.092760.01760.11934.03934.04934.06934.09 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.217
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LESA BURKAVAGE vs PARRISH MEDICAL CENTER, 09-006221 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Nov. 13, 2009 Number: 09-006221 Latest Update: Sep. 22, 2010

The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment and/or retaliation while employed with Respondent in violation of Subsections 760.10(1)(a) and/or (7), Florida Statutes (2008).1

Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the definition found in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was hired as an employee of Respondent in July 1993, as an X-ray technologist ("tech") in the Radiology Department. She is an adult female and, as such, is a member of a protected class. During her employee orientation, Petitioner received and read a copy of Respondent's Employee Handbook. Among other things, Respondent's Employee Handbook addresses the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. Respondent's policy strictly prohibits sexual harassment and states that Respondent "will not tolerate such action by employees." Respondent's policy also encourages any employee who feels that he/she is being subject to sexual harassment to discuss and/or make a complaint with the Human Resources Department. Any such complaint is handled according to Respondent's Policy No. 9510-17, in order to ensure appropriate investigation and action. Respondent's employees also receive computer-based training regarding sexual harassment and Respondent's policy prohibiting the same, every year. Petitioner received this computer-based training regarding sexual harassment. In October 2006, Petitioner started training to be a magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") tech. Petitioner was chosen to be cross-trained from an X-ray tech to a MRI tech by Greg Phillips, who was then the manager of Diagnostic Imaging. Phillips became her unofficial "mentor" at Respondent's facility. Petitioner received on-the-job training for an MRI tech from Chris Depelteau, Amy Brantly, and Lucinda Swales, all of whom were MRI techs at the time. In December 2006, Petitioner received a secondary job code which allowed her to work independently as an MRI tech part-time. Essentially this meant that she could "take call." That same month, Paul Licker was hired by Respondent as lead MRI tech. Depelteau had also applied for this job, but had not been chosen. Upon being hired by Respondent, Licker was also made aware of its policy regarding sexual harassment. As lead MRI tech, Licker was responsible for scheduling the MRI techs, ordering supplies, working on protocols, ensuring that patients were being properly scanned and treated, and following up with the MRI techs as they cared for patients. Therefore, Licker became Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Like all the other MRI techs, Licker also trained Petitioner in MRI. In training Petitioner, Licker often taught her different techniques or ways of doing things than the way she had been taught by the other MRI techs. Licker, on several occasions, sought to teach Petitioner his way of doing things on the computer, which was different from the others. In doing so, Licker invaded Petitioner's workspace and engaged in inappropriate touching, particularly by covering her hand with his while manipulating the mouse, to the point that she became uncomfortable. Licker also started implementing changes and different ways of doing things throughout the MRI department. As lead MRI tech, Licker had the authority to implement such changes. Also, during this same period, if Licker added patients or made other changes to her schedule, Petitioner would argue with or complain to him. In fact, Petitioner did not like Licker and also told Depelteau and other employees that Licker was a "bad supervisor." Licker himself recognized that Petitioner did not like the way he was supervising the department. A few weeks after Licker started working for Respondent, Petitioner approached Phillips complaining that Licker was calling her, other female employees, and patients, "Babe." For instance, Licker would say, "Babe, I need you to do this for me," when asking Petitioner to complete a task. Petitioner indicated that she thought that the use of this term was inappropriate and demeaning and that it made her uncomfortable. In fact, other employees who were friendly with Petitioner understood that Licker was using the term "Babe" the way another person might use the terms "Sweetie," or "Honey," i.e., in a non-sexual or non-derogatory way. However, understanding that Licker was a new supervisor who may not have understood that the term suggested something sexual in using the term "Babe," Phillips suggested to Petitioner that she speak directly with Licker to resolve this issue. Phillips also spoke to Licker directly regarding his use of the term "Babe." Specifically, Phillips advised Licker that he "needed to carefully choose his words around patients and employees." Phillips also advised Licker that some people did not like being addressed by "Sweetie or Hun or Babe," and that he should refrain from using these terms in the workplace. Licker understood Phillips' suggestion and tried to refrain from calling Petitioner, or anybody else, "Babe" or any word similar to the term. Petitioner did not complain about any other alleged inappropriate conduct by Licker to Phillips, or any other manager, until February 1, 2007. However, shortly after he started working for Respondent, Licker made an inappropriate comment in the cafeteria to Petitioner. Licker stated to other employees that he could not sit next to Petitioner because they were sleeping together. Licker made a similar inappropriate comment to Dana Keach when he first started employment at Parrish. He suggested that there was a lesbian relationship between Keach and another woman. This conduct was not reported until much later. Prior to February 1, 2007, it became readily apparent that the MRI department was suffering serious setbacks because the department employees were not working cooperatively together. The biggest problem in the MRI department appeared to be a lack of teamwork resulting from the staff's inability to communicate effectively with one another. Licker advised Gallacher that he was struggling in his "daily interactions" with Depelteau and Petitioner and that he simply "could not make the group happy, whether it was scheduling or time off or just getting through the day." MRI's problems grew to the point that Phillips and Gallacher both stepped in to try to improve communications and teamwork among Licker, Petitioner, Depelteau, and Shelly Hugoboom, the MRI CT assistant. The entire MRI department engaged in team-building meetings and even worked with the medical center's chaplain in an attempt to learn to work together. These department meetings were intense and discussion often became heated among the MRI staff members. In addition to these team-building meetings, Gallacher met with staff members individually to discuss their concerns. Gallacher also addressed the interpersonal skills issues between Petitioner and Hugoboom. Specifically, Gallacher met with the two employees together "to see if they could put [their issues] to rest and move on." In the midst of these efforts to improve the department, Petitioner came to Phillips on February 1, 2007, complaining that Licker was continuing to call her "Babe," and that he had also offered her some concert tickets. Phillips observed that Petitioner was extremely upset and immediately contacted Human Resources Manager Roberta Chaildin to start an investigation in regard to Licker's alleged behavior. Phillips and Chaildin spoke with Petitioner and Licker, individually, regarding Petitioner's claims. When questioned regarding the concert ticket, Licker explained that he had been looking to sell an extra ticket that he had. Licker advised Phillips and Chaildin that Petitioner had taken his offer to sell her the extra ticket "out of context," when she assumed that he was asking her to the concert on a date. Licker specified that he had asked Petitioner if she wanted to buy his extra ticket and "tag along" with him and his friends to the concert. Licker also offered his extra ticket to other people besides Petitioner. After speaking with Petitioner and Licker, Phillips and Chaildin determined that they were dealing with a "he-said- she-said situation and a misunderstanding." "He said, I was trying to sell the ticket or give it away. She said, he had asked me out on a date to a concert." Phillips and Chaildin determined that this was not a case of "sexual harassment" by Licker. They did, however, warn Licker that as a supervisor, he had to be "extremely careful" in how he spoke to his subordinate employees. Phillips and Chaildin advised Petitioner that they had investigated her claim and concluded that there was no evidence of sexual harassment. They encouraged her, however, to file a report if she continued to have issues with Licker. Over five months passed without a complaint or incident. Then on July 11, 2007, Licker verbally counseled Petitioner regarding her having accumulated nine tardy appearances ("tardies") at work since January 1, 2007. In speaking with Petitioner, Licker wanted to ensure that Petitioner understood that she needed to be on time in the future, as she had exceeded the number of tardies deemed acceptable by Respondent. To ensure that nothing said during the verbal counseling session was misconstrued by Petitioner, Licker had another supervisor, Boyd Wallace, serve as a witness. The tardies cited in Licker's verbal counseling to Petitioner were unrelated to instances when he would excuse her from work due to slower volume in the MRI department. On August 21, 2007, Licker observed Petitioner on the telephone being advised by security that she had parked in a "no parking" zone. During the conversation, Petitioner became agitated. Licker documented and filed the incident. Phillips personally addressed this incident with Petitioner. On October 10, 2007, the MRI department was working an already full schedule when Licker had to add a patient to the schedule due to an emergency situation. Petitioner objected to Licker adding another patient to the day and became withdrawn and resentful. Licker instructed Petitioner that she needed to change her attitude and become more cooperative. The evidence is not persuasive that Licker assigned Petitioner "menial tasks" after she complained about his having offered her the concert tickets in February 2007. In October 2007, Gallacher, Phillips and Chaildin met Petitioner and issued her a Decision Day disciplinary letter. A "Decision Day" meeting and letter is a management tool in which the employee is given a paid day off to contemplate whether they wish to remain an employee of Respondent. This resulted from Respondent's concerns regarding her "interpersonal skills." This was an issue that had been continuously addressed by Licker and other supervisors or managers at Respondent. The incident which prompted the progressive disciplinary action involved Debbie York, a relatively new employee who resigned from the MRI department, claiming that Petitioner and her interactions with other employees and with Licker was the reason for her leaving. During the Decision Day meeting, Petitioner stated that she was the "victim" and brought up the previous incidents of allegedly being sexually harassed. Petitioner was reminded that she had not complained of any other instances of alleged sexual harassment since she complained of Licker's offering her concert tickets in February 2007 and that the matter was investigated and resolved. From the point of view of management, the Decision Day meeting was intended to address Petitioner's on-going issues with her co-workers and her supervisor. However, Petitioner did not bring up any new incidents of alleged sexual harassment by Licker during the Decision Day meeting. Following the meeting, Petitioner took her Decision Day letter and returned to work. The Decision Day letter called for the creation of an Action Plan, which Respondent uses to help a struggling employee "become invested with the organization and with [his or her] team." Thereafter, Petitioner met with Gallacher to discuss what should be included in her Action Plan. On November 7, 2007, an Action Plan was drafted and signed. It included a number of initiatives designed to assist Petitioner in being "re[-]engaged" with the MRI department. Despite being placed on an Action Plan, Petitioner continued to have issues with Licker being her supervisor. On November 20, 2007, Licker verbally counseled Petitioner for her failure to discuss changes in her weekly schedule with him. Licker specifically identified Petitioner's "communication skills" as a continuing issue. On December 19, 2007, Petitioner was suspended without pay for two days for stating that Licker was being an "asshole," or something to that effect, in front of a co-worker. Petitioner accepted responsibility for her comment. Along with her suspension, Petitioner was also issued a written warning stated in pertinent part, "Upon your return [from suspension], you will be expected to demonstrate a high level of interpersonal skills towards your co-workers, management and this organization and work on completion of your Action Plan items. Any reports of less than acceptable behavior or performance or deviation from a Diagnostic Imaging or PMC policy or procedure will result in immediate termination." As a result of the written warning, Petitioner also lost 50 percent of her annual merit increase. In January 2008, management considered that the MRI department was still very "dysfunctional." Scott Hazelbaker, the new executive director of Diagnostics/Cardiovascular, met with all of the MRI employees as a group to discuss his "expectations of working together as a team." Hazelbaker also discerned that Licker lacked leadership skills to be an effective supervisor. In fact, none of the MRI employees had much respect for Licker's management style. On April 10, 2008, Hazelbaker, Gallacher, and Chaildin met with Petitioner to discuss her progress under the Action Plan. During the meeting, Hazelbaker reviewed Petitioner's history toward Respondent, explaining that her negative attitude could not be tolerated. Specifically, her negativity, failure to be a team player, and refusal to embrace or become engaged in Respondent's culture were detrimentally affecting the work of MRI as a whole. Hazelbaker continued by advising Respondent that as a result of her "track record," she could either resign from her employment or be terminated. Petitioner was advised that if she resigned, Respondent would pay her for two weeks in lieu of having her work through her notice period, pay her the balance of her personal leave bank, extend her health benefits for two weeks so that she could fill her prescriptions, and even designate her eligible for rehire in its system. At the end of the meeting, Petitioner tendered her resignation notice to Respondent. At no time during the meeting did Petitioner ask to leave the room or make a call in order to seek advice or legal counsel. Further, at no time during the meeting did Petitioner raise her past issues regarding Licker and the alleged sexual harassment she suffered. The evidence is persuasive that Licker did not influence the decision to terminate Petitioner. He had not asked for her to be terminated. In August 2009, more than one year after Petitioner resigned, Respondent received a complaint regarding Licker from then-X-Ray Tech Dana Keach, who claimed that Licker made sexually suggestive comments to her. Following an investigation, Licker was terminated, effective September 24, 2009, for "communication unsuitability between care partners." It does not appear that Licker was terminated for engaging in sexual harassment. The evidence is not persuasive that during the time he was employed by Respondent that Licker had inappropriate discussions in the workplace on numerous occasions in front of both male and female employees; nor that Licker would also discuss pornography in the workplace.

Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Lesa Burkavage's, claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation against Respondent, Parrish Medical Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2010.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569760.02760.10760.11
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