The Issue Whether Respondent, Tony Williams Drywall and Plastering, Inc., failed to comply with the coverage requirements of the Workers' Compensation Law, chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by not obtaining workers' compensation insurance for its employees and, if so, what penalty should be assessed against Respondent pursuant to section 440.107.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of the workers' compensation law that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for their employees and corporate officers. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. Tony Williams Drywall and Plastering, Inc., (Respondent or Williams Drywall) is a corporation based in Tallahassee, Florida, first incorporated on August 18, 1999. Williams Drywall is engaged in the construction industry, operating as a drywall installation and repair business with a principal office located at 8513 Raquel Lane in Tallahassee. Tony Williams is the sole owner, registered agent and president of Williams Drywall. On or about October 30, 2014, Williams Drywall was hired by Bill Davis, a general contractor, to make drywall repairs at 2069 North Monroe Street in Tallahassee (the job site). Williams Drywall hired Viper Enterprises, LLC, (Viper) for the job. Viper is a company owned and operated by Joseph Johnson, whom Mr. Williams described as a friend. Mr. Williams deemed the job as simple and expected to pay Viper about $200. On October 30, 2014, Department Investigator Betty Fuentes arrived at the job site and encountered Mr. Johnson. Ms. Fuentes inquired regarding Mr. Johnson’s workers’ compensation compliance.1/ Although Mr. Johnson, as corporate officer of Viper, had been exempt from the requirement to obtain workers’ compensation insurance, pursuant to section 440.05(3), Florida Statutes, the exemption expired after September 10, 2014. As of October 30, 2014, Mr. Johnson had not effectively renewed his exemption. Mr. Johnson called Mr. Williams from the job site on October 30, 2014, to inform Mr. Williams of the events that transpired at the job site. Through this telephone call, Mr. Williams learned that Ms. Fuentes had issued a stop-work order at the job site. Mr. Williams also spoke with Ms. Fuentes by phone from the job site on October 30, 2014, and Ms. Fuentes asked Mr. Williams for his corporate records as part of her investigation. Mr. Williams met directly with Ms. Fuentes in the late afternoon of October 30, 2014. During the meeting, Ms. Fuentes hand-delivered to Mr. Williams a Stop Work Order for Specific Worksite Only (Stop Work Order). The Stop Work Order required Williams Drywall to cease all business operations at the job site for failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees. The Stop Work Order included an Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of two times the amount Williams Drywall would have paid in premium when applying the approval manual wage rates to Williams Drywall’s employee payroll during periods for which it failed to secure payment of workers’ compensation insurance within the preceding two-year period. During the meeting, Mr. Williams provided to Ms. Fuentes corporate records and workers’ compensation information for Williams Drywall. Ms. Fuentes also requested from Mr. Williams payroll records for the preceding two-year period. Mr. Williams disputed that his payroll records for the preceding two-year period were relevant. Mr. Williams testified that he offered to provide his payroll records for the two-week time period during which Mr. Johnson’s exemption had lapsed. Mr. Williams insisted that the October 30, 2014, drywall job was the only job for which he hired Mr. Johnson between September 11, 2014, and October 30, 2014. Mr. Williams did not provide any payroll records for Williams Drywall to Ms. Fuentes or any other representative of the Department. Andrew Moskowitz was assigned to calculate the appropriate penalty to be assessed against Williams Drywall by the Department. Penalties for workers’ compensation insurance violations are based on doubling the amount of evaded insurance premiums for periods during which the employer failed to secure workers’ compensation coverage within the two-year period preceding the Stop Work Order. § 440.107(7)(d), Fla. Stat. The applicable period of noncompliance for Williams Drywall was September 11, 2014, the date Mr. Johnson’s exemption lapsed, through October 30, 2014, the date the Stop Work Order was issued. Section 440.107(7)(e) provides that where an employer fails to provide business records sufficient to enable the Department to determine the employer’s actual payroll for the penalty period, the Department will impute the weekly payroll at the statewide average weekly wage as defined in section 440.12(2), multiplied by two.2/ In the penalty assessment calculation, Mr. Moskowitz consulted the classification codes and definitions set forth in the SCOPES of Basic Manual Classifications (Scopes Manual) published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI). The Scopes Manual has been adopted by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021. Classification codes are four-digit codes assigned to occupations by the NCCI to assist in the calculation of workers’ compensation insurance premiums. Rule 69L-6.028(3)(d) provides that “[t]he imputed weekly payroll for each employee . . . shall be assigned to the highest rated workers’ compensation classification code for an employee based upon records or the investigator’s physical observation of that employee’s activities.” Mr. Moskowitz applied NCCI Class Code 5480, titled “Plastering NOC [Not Otherwise Classified] and Drivers,” which applies to specialty contractors engaged in interior plastering. Mr. Moskowitz used the approved manual rates corresponding to Class Code 5840 for the period of non-compliance to calculate the penalty. On December 14, 2014, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $2,105.50, based upon an imputation of wages to Mr. Johnson, the only employee of Williams Drywall known to the Department for the period of noncompliance. The evidence produced at the hearing established that Mr. Moskowitz utilized the correct class codes, average weekly wages, and manual rates in his calculation of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The Department has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Williams Drywall was in violation of the workers' compensation coverage requirements of chapter 440. Joseph Johnson was an employee of Williams Drywall performing services in the construction industry without valid workers’ compensation insurance coverage. The Department has also demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the penalty was correctly calculated by Mr. Moskowitz, through the use of the approved manual rates and the penalty calculation worksheet adopted by the Department in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.027.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, assessing a penalty of $2,105.50 against Tony Williams Drywall and Plastering, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2015.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent should be fined $750 for allegedly violating various agency rules.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, John A. Green, Sr., d/b/a Sunshine Haven (Sunshine Haven, respondent or Green), operates a licensed adult congregate living facility at 920 66th Street East, Bradenton, Florida. The facility is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). As such, Sunshine Haven is required to adhere to various HRS rules codified in Chapter 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code. On May 30, 1990, an HRS human services surveyor specialist, Alice Adler, conducted a routine survey of respondent's facility. Both Green and his wife, who was also a facility employee, were present during all or parts of the inspection. During the course of the survey, Adler noted the following deficiencies which constituted a violation of applicable portions of Chapter 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code: respondent failed to maintain written accounting procedures and a recognized system of accounting to reflect details of business (10A-5.021(1) and 10A-5.024, F.A.C.); respondent was serving as a resident payee for residents without maintaining a surety bond (10A-5.014(5)(b)2. and (7)(a), F.A.C.); and several bed pillows were worn thin and covered with heavily soiled pillow cases (10A- 5.022(1)(e), F.A.C.). For purposes of this order, the three violations will be referred to hereinafter as items (2)(a), (2)(b) and (2)(c). The deficiencies were later noted in a classification of deficiencies report received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. A copy of the report was eventually mailed to the facility's owner on July 25, 1991. At the completion of the May 30 survey, Adler held an exit interview with Green's wife and explained the reason why each deficiency was cited and the steps required to correct the same. More specifically, Adler explained that (a) the "written accounting procedures" are needed to support the facility's profit and loss statements and to explain how the facility maintains its fiscal records, (b) evidence of a surety bond is required whenever a facility receives funds from a third party on behalf of a resident, and (c) pillow cases must be kept "clean" and not in a soiled or stained condition while pillows must be "attractively maintained" within the meaning of rule 10A-5.022(1)(e). In addition, Adler advised Green's wife that all deficiencies had to be corrected by a certain date and that she would return for an unannounced follow-up visit to verify whether such deficiencies had been corrected. An "exit letter" confirming this process was then furnished to Green's wife and she signed and acknowledged receiving the letter. According to the classification of deficiencies report, items (2)(a), (2)(b) and (2)(c) were to be corrected no later than June 30, 1990. Adler stated that respondent orally agreed to this date since the facility foresaw no reason why the violations could not be corrected within that timeframe. This was not credibly contradicted. On September 7, 1990, Adler returned to the facility for an unannounced follow-up visit. The purpose of the visit was to ascertain whether the deficiencies noted on May 30 had been corrected. During this visit, respondent was still unable to produce "written accounting procedures" and a "surety bond", and Adler observed a pillow case with red stains and another pillow case encasing only the fiber fill from an older pillow. Thus, she concluded that none of the deficiencies had been corrected. On a third visit made on November 19, 1990, Adler found the facility to be in compliance with all HRS regulations. Even so, HRS initiated this action because the violations observed on May 30 had not been corrected by the specified due date and initial follow-up visit. Respondent offered a number of reasons why the deficiencies were not timely corrected. While they serve to mitigate the severity of any penalty, they do not excuse or justify the violations. In general, respondent claimed he was the victim of harrassment and had been subjected to a highly technical and strict interpretation of the agency rules. As to item (2)(a), respondent contended that he misunderstood the nature of the "written accounting procedures" required by HRS, particularly since no such records were required by an HRS employee who surveyed the facility in 1987. However, it was explained that the requirement for "written accounting procedures" was imposed and codified by rule after the 1987 inspection had been concluded. He also complained that he could not get Adler to explain exactly what was needed. Even if this was true, Green did not request an extension of time in which to prepare the necessary information. Respondent further indicated that he was unaware that such information was due no later than June 30, 1990. However, this assertion is not deemed to be credible. The appropriate documentation was finally supplied to HRS in October 1990. As to item (2)(b), Green acknowledged he had two private pay clients for whom he acted as a representative payee. Although Green had a surety bond until May 1990, it expired through inadvertence. In attempting to obtain a new surety bond, respondent experienced considerable difficulty and was not able to obtain one by June 30. By letter dated July 23, 1990, Green requested a further unspecified amount of time to satisfy the deficiency. However, the request for extension of time was denied on the ground the request was not made until after the June 30 corrective date. Green eventually obtained a bond from a Miami insurance firm effective November 1, 1990. As to item (3)(a), Green was cited for having dirty pillow cases (yellow stains) and worn out or "wafer thin" pillows on the May 30 survey. On the September 7 follow up visit, Adler observed one pillow case with red stains and another pillow case that was encasing only the fiber fill from an older pillow. According to the Greens, the red stained pillow case was a "favorite" of a patient who kept taking it from another room while the fiber filled pillow case was an older pillow whose outside lining had been removed. Respondent also questioned whether agency rules require a facility to provide a patient with a pillow. Finally, the Greens acknowledged some pillow cases had permanent yellow stains but pointed out that the pillow cases were regularly washed and cleaned. Even so, rule 10-5.022(1)(e) requires that all furnishings, such as pillows and pillow cases, be kept "clean" and "reasonably attractive". There is no record of respondent's facility having been disciplined on any prior occasion. Also, there is no evidence to indicate that the violations threatened the residents with physical or emotional harm or that respondent realized a financial benefit from the continuing violations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent be found guilty of the three violations discussed above and that he pay a $300 administrative fine within thirty days after a final order is rendered in this case. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: During times material hereto, Respondent was a certified residential contractor having been issued license number CR C018874 since 1981. Respondent, during late 1986, was approached by a Mr. Marlar, owner of Pinellas Builders, who requested that Respondent affiliate with Pinellas Builders using his licensure to qualify Pinellas. Respondent tentatively agreed to a business arrangement with Marlar, however, prior to the time that Respondent formally qualified Pinellas, the negotiations broke down and Respondent never formally qualified Pinellas. During January, 1987, Pinellas entered into a contract with a customer, John Kane of Clearwater, Florida, to build an addition to Mr. Kane's residence for a sum of $33,000. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) Pinellas was required to obtain a permit to construct the addition to Kane's residence. Pinellas obtained the permit and utilized Respondent's license to do so. Kane encountered difficulty with Pinellas as the subcontractors were not paid and liens and/or notices of intent to file liens were placed on his home. Mr. Kane ultimately had to rehire the subcontractors and pay them directly resulting in an additional expenditure by Kane of approximately $10,000 over and above the amount that Pinellas agreed to complete the addition to his home. During June of 1987, Kane filed a complaint with Petitioner and in connection therewith, Petitioner's investigator, H. Dennis Force, spoke to Respondent via telephone respecting the fact that permits were being pulled under his name. Respondent was unaware that Pinellas was utilizing his name as a qualifier to obtain permits nor was Respondent aware that Pinellas had obtained contracts to perform work utilizing his name as the licensing authority. As a result of Investigator Force's conversations with Respondent, Respondent revoked the letter of authorization given to Marlar during April, 1987. Respondent distributed copies of the revocation of authorization given to Marlar to the various local cities in the surrounding area. Respondent acknowledges his liability as a qualifier and accepts that responsibility. Respondent is not presently affiliated with any corporate entity in that he prefers to work as an individual such that he can insure the quality which he strives for comes to reality. Mr. Kane acknowledges that he never saw Respondent on the jobsite and had never met him during any of the negotiations with Marlar (Pinellas). Respondent received no monies from Kane or any other persons who had entered dealings with Pinellas.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order imposing a civil penalty of $500 payable to Petitioner within thirty (30) days and issuing a written letter of reprimand to Respondent based on his authorization of an unlicensed person to use his name to obtain permits. 1/ DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1989.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment action against Petitioner by discriminating against her based on her disability in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2005).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 120-bed skilled nursing home. Respondent is licensed by the State of Florida and certified by Medicare and Medicaid. Petitioner is and has been a Certified Nurse Assistant (CNA) since 1975. In January 2005, Petitioner worked for Elder Care, sitting with one of Respondent's resident's from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. Toward the end of the month, she began looking for another job because her hours as a sitter were being cut back. Petitioner learned that Respondent had an opening for a floor technician (floor tech). Petitioner had experience cleaning floors, so she applied for the job on January 31, 2005. Petitioner gave her application to Respondent's receptionist. Respondent then sent the application, to Teresa Engram, Respondent's Assistant Director of Housekeeping. The application included a health checklist/assessment. Petitioner indicated on the form that she suffered from high blood pressure, back pain, and asthma. Ms. Engram reviewed Petitioner's application, and, during an interview, inquired whether Petitioner would be able to perform the necessary work. Ms. Engram explained that the person hired for the job would have to work a flexible schedule because the facility's floors could only be stripped and waxed at night when the patients were asleep. Petitioner assured Ms. Engram that she would be able to do the job. Petitioner did not reveal that she suffered from depression. Petitioner did not tell Ms. Engram that her health problems, such as asthma, would prevent her from working around the strong chemicals used in stripping floors. Petitioner told Ms. Engram she would be able to work at nights with advance notice so that she could arrange a babysitter for her grandchild. Petitioner passed the required medical test and background check. She began working on or about February 1, 2005. Her regular hours were from noon to 8:00 p.m., Sunday through Thursday, with the understanding that she would have to work scheduled night shifts. Petitioner initially trained with another floor tech, Johnnie Betsy. After a few days, Petitioner worked on one side of the facility and Mr. Betsy worked on the other. Her duties included sweeping, mopping, and buffing the floors, as well as taking out the trash. At least once a year, Respondent's floor techs strip and wax the floors in the facility. The project takes about a month from start to finish. The work is performed at night. The waxing and stripping project was already underway for 2005 when Petitioner began working for Respondent. Ms. Engram made several attempts to schedule a night shift for Petitioner so that she could train with Mr. Betsy and help him strip and wax floors. Petitioner let Ms. Engram know that she did not want to work the night shift. Additionally, Petitioner was unhappy with her salary and complained that she should be making more money. Ms. Engram discussed Petitioner's complaints with Rhonda Cheney, Respondent's Director of Laundry and Housekeeping. Eventually, Petitioner learned that Respondent had an opening for a CNA position. Petitioner told Ms. Engram and Ms. Cheney that Petitioner was going to apply for the CNA position because it involved fewer hours, two days on and four days off. At some point in time, Petitioner received Social Security disability benefits. There is no competent evidence to show what disability Petitioner had that entitled her to disability benefits. Apparently, Petitioner lost her disability benefits before she started working for Respondent because she made too much money at a prior job. Petitioner wanted the new CNA position even though she would make less money than a full-time floor tech. Petitioner believed she could reestablish her disability benefits if she earned less money. Sometime during the first week of March 2005, Ms. Engram advised Petitioner that she would have to work the night shift beginning 9:00 p.m. on March 6, 2005, till 5:00 a.m. on March 7, 2005. Petitioner agreed to work as scheduled, with the understanding that she and Mr. Betsy would strip and wax hall floors. Petitioner testified that she told Ms. Engram that she should have an ambulance present on the night of March 6, 2005, in case Petitioner had an asthma attack from the strong chemicals used to strip the floors. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not persuasive. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner never verbally discussed her mental or physical health problems with Ms. Engram. On March 3, 2005, Petitioner learned from Mr. Betsy that there was not enough wax to complete the job planned for the evening of March 6, 2005. Even without the wax, Petitioner and Mr. Betsy had plenty of work to do stripping floors. The floors did not have to be waxed the same night they were stripped. Petitioner decided to work her regular hours on March 6, 2005, from noon to 8:00 p.m. Petitioner made this decision without Ms. Engram's knowledge or approval. Mr. Betsy worked alone on the March 6, 2005, night shift. He spent the evening stripping floors, using the wax that was available to polish a small area, and performing other routine tasks. On March 7, 8, and 9, 2005, Petitioner worked her regular hours. Ms. Engram did not discover that Petitioner had not worked her scheduled shift on March 6, 2005, until Ms. Engram made a routine check of the time cards on or about March 9, 2005. Petitioner was still hoping to get the new CNA position on March 9, 2005. That evening, Petitioner was working as a floor tech when she noticed that Sid Roberts, Respondent's interim administrator, was working late. Petitioner approached Mr. Roberts to tell him about her application for the CNA position and why she needed the new job. During that conversation, Petitioner told Mr. Roberts that she suffered from depression and that she had previously received disability benefits for that condition. On or before March 10, 2005, Ms. Engram consulted with Ms. Cheney about Petitioner's decision not to work her scheduled shift on March 6, 2005. Ms. Engram and Ms. Cheney did not discuss Petitioner's alleged disability or health problems. Ms. Engram was not aware that Petitioner had any health problems that needed to be accommodated. Ms. Cheney was not aware that Petitioner had any health problems at all. After consulting with Ms. Cheney, Ms. Engram made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. Ms. Engram took this action because Petitioner did not work from 9:00 p.m. on March 6, 2005, to 5:00 a.m. on March 7, 2005, as agreed, but unilaterally and without Ms. Engram's knowledge, decided to work her regular hours on March 6, 2005. Subsequently, Mr. Roberts attended a meeting with Ms. Cheney. Inquiring about Petitioner's employment status, Mr. Roberts learned that Ms. Engram already had terminated Petitioner. Mr. Roberts did not have any part in the decision to hire or fire Petitioner. Mr. Roberts did not tell Ms. Cheney or Ms. Engram about his conversation with Petitioner on the evening of March 9, 2005, until after Ms. Engram terminated Petitioner's employment. Mr. Roberts' knowledge that Petitioner suffered from depression did not contribute to the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barbara Martin 635 West Hubbard Avenue Deland, Florida 32720 Kelly V. Parsons Cobb and Cole Post Office Box 2491 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115-2491
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's age or perceived disability in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Subsections 760.02(6) and (10). Petitioner is a 51-year-old white male who had cancer in one kidney at the time of an alleged unlawful employment practice. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Subsection 760.02(7). Respondent is a construction company engaged in the business of building bridges and other highway structures in Florida. For the reasons set forth hereinafter, a preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's age or perceived disability. Respondent employed Petitioner as a crane operator on February 22, 2008, at a pay rate of $18.00 per hour. Petitioner listed his residence as Naples, Florida. Petitioner was unaware that he had any disability and did not disclose any disability at the time of his initial employment. Petitioner solicited employment from Respondent and was not recruited by Respondent. Petitioner relocated from Wyoming to Florida to be with his family. Respondent assigned Petitioner to a construction job that was under the supervision of Mr. Scot Savage, the job superintendent. Mr. Brandon Leware was also a superintendent on the same job. Mr. William (Bill) Whitfield was the job foreman and Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Sometime in October 2008, medical tests revealed that cancer may be present in one of Petitioner's kidneys. The treating physician referred Petitioner to a specialist, David Wilkinson, M.D., sometime in October 2008. Medical personnel verbally confirmed the diagnosis of cancer to Petitioner by telephone on October 30, 2008. On the same day, Petitioner voluntarily resigned from his employment during a verbal dispute with his supervisors. Petitioner did not disclose his medical condition until after he voluntarily resigned from his employment. The verbal dispute involved Petitioner and several of his supervisors. On October 30, 2008, Mr. Whitfield, the foreman, assigned work to several employees, including Petitioner. Mr. Whitfield proceeded to complete some paperwork and, when he returned to the job site, discovered the work assigned to Petitioner had not been performed. When confronted by Mr. Whitfield, Petitioner refused to carry out Mr. Whitfield’s directions. Mr. Whitfield requested the assistance of Mr Savage. Mr. Savage directed Petitioner to return to work or quit. Petitioner quit and walked off the job. As Petitioner was walking off the job, Petitioner turned around and stated that he had cancer. Petitioner then left the job site. Petitioner's statement that he had cancer was the first disclosure by Petitioner and first notice to Respondent that Petitioner had cancer. The medical condition did not prevent Petitioner from performing a major life activity. Respondent did not perceive Petitioner to be impaired before Petitioner voluntarily ended his employment. None of the employees of Respondent who testified at the hearing regarded Petitioner as impaired or handicapped or disabled or knew that Petitioner had cancer prior to Petitioner's statement following his abandonment of his job on October 30, 2008.2 Within a week after Petitioner voluntarily left his position, Petitioner returned, approached Vice-President Mr. Scott Leware, and asked for his job back. Mr. Leware advised him that he would not get his job back. At the time, Mr. Leware was unaware that Petitioner had cancer. Mr. Leware was the ultimate decision-maker, and Mr. Leware was unaware that Petitioner had cancer when Mr. Leware made that decision approximately a week after Petitioner voluntarily left his employment. The terms of employment did not entitle Petitioner to a per diem payment while employed with Respondent. Petitioner's residence in Naples was within 75 miles of the job site where Petitioner worked. Respondent did pay for the hotel room that Petitioner used at the Spinnaker Inn while on the job, but not other per diem expenses, including meals. The cost of the hotel ranged between $50 and $60 a night. Mr. Brandon Leware followed Petitioner to a gas station and paid for gasoline for Petitioner’s vehicle. Mr. Leware and Petitioner then went to the Spinnaker Inn where Petitioner resided in a room paid for by Respondent. Mr. Leware advised the manager of the Spinnaker Inn that Respondent would pay for Petitioner’s lodging for that night, but not after that night. The rate of compensation that Respondent paid Petitioner was within the normal range of compensation paid to crane operators employed by Respondent. Crane operator compensation ranges from $16.00 to $20.00 an hour. Respondent paid Petitioner $18.00 an hour. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent ever offered to pay Petitioner $22.00 an hour. The allegation of age discrimination is not a disputed issue of fact. Petitioner admitted during his testimony that he never thought Respondent discriminated against him due to his age. Respondent employed another crane operator with cancer at the same time that Respondent employed Petitioner. The other crane operator is identified in record as Mr. Roddy Rowlett. Mr. Rowlett’s date of birth was October 14, 1949. Mr. Rowlett notified Respondent that he had cancer, and Respondent did not terminate the employment of Mr. Rowlett. Mr. Rowlett continued to work as a crane operator until a few weeks before his death. A preponderance of evidence does not show that age, cancer, or perceived impairment were factors in how Respondent treated Petitioner during his employment with Respondent. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent hired anyone to replace Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations against Respondent and dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2010.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent Solutia, Inc., discriminated against the Petitioner Darlene Fitzgerald, by allegedly denying her employment because of her hearing impairment. Embodied within that general issue is the question of whether, under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and other relevant law, the Respondent is an "employer"; whether the Petitioner is handicapped or disabled; whether the Petitioner is qualified for the position for which she applied; whether the Petitioner requested a reasonable accommodation from the alleged employer; whether the Petitioner suffered an adverse employment decision because of a disability; and whether the Petitioner has damages, their extent, and whether the Petitioner properly mitigated any damages.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Darlene Fitzgerald, is a 34-year-old woman who alleges that she applied for a "carpet walker" position with either the Respondent or "AmStaff" in March 1998. The Respondent, Solutia, Inc. (Solutia), is a company which owned and operates a manufacturing plant that manufactures fibers and carpet in Escambia County, Florida. A number of independent contractors operate at the Solutia plant, performing certain phases of the manufacture and related services and operations there, including "AmStaff" and "Landrum." AmStaff is a contractor which operates a tire yarn plant and a Kraft plant at the Solutia facility. AmStaff hires its own employees to work in its operations at the Solutia plant. It is solely responsible for all hiring, counseling, disciplinary and termination decisions concerning its employees. AmStaff has its own payroll, does the Social Security withholdings for its employees, pays workers' compensation premiums on its employees and provides retirement benefits to its employees. Landrum is a staff leasing company which is responsible for certain jobs at the Solutia plant, including carpet walkers. Landrum is solely responsible for all of its hiring, counseling, disciplinary and termination decisions concerning its employees. Landrum has its own payroll, does its own Social Security withholdings for its employees and pays workers' compensation premiums on its employees. A carpet walker is a person who tests carpet for wear and tear. A carpet walker is required to work 40 hours per week and to walk approximately 18 miles a day testing carpet. Neither Solutia nor AmStaff employs carpet walkers. The Petitioner has never been to Solutia's facility or offices and has never gone out to the Solutia plant to apply for a job. She has had no contact with anyone representing or employed by Solutia concerning a job. All of the Petitioner's contacts concerning employment in March 1998, were with either AmStaff or Landrum. The Petitioner testified that she saw a newspaper ad that AmStaff was taking job applications, but never produced a copy of that ad. The Petitioner went to AmStaff to fill out an employment application. AmStaff's office is not at the Respondent Solutia's plant. The Petitioner gave conflicting testimony as to the date she allegedly applied with AmStaff for a carpet walker position. First, she testified that she applied for the position on March 15, 1998, which was a Sunday. After that was established by the Respondent, as well as the fact that AmStaff was closed on Sundays, the Petitioner then maintained that she applied for the carpet walker position on March 19, 1998. This date is incorrect, however, as evidenced by Respondent's Exhibit two in evidence, which is AmStaff's "notification of testing." According to the Petitioner the company name printed on the employment application she filled out was AmStaff. The Petitioner was then scheduled for testing by AmStaff on March 12, 1998, at Job Service of Florida (Job Service). The notification of testing clearly indicates that the Petitioner applied for a job with AmStaff. While at the Job Service, the Petitioner spoke with an individual named Martha Wyse. The Petitioner and Robin Steed (an interpreter who accompanied the Petitioner to the job service site), met Martha Wyse, who never identified her employer. Subsequent testimony established that Martha Wyse was AmStaff's recruiting coordinator. Martha Wyse has never been employed at Solutia nor did she ever identify herself as being employed by Solutia. All applicants with AmStaff must be able to meet certain physical requirements, including, but not limited to pushing and pulling buggies weighing 240 to 1,080 pounds; lifting 50 to 75 pound fiber bags, lifting 60 pound boxes, stacking and pouring 55 pound bags and working indoors in temperatures of up to 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The Petitioner admitted that she could not push or pull buggies weighing 240 pounds; could not lift 50 to 75 pound fiber bags, could not lift 60 pound boxes nor stack and pour 55 pound bags or work indoors in temperatures in the range of 100 degrees. Additionally, the Petitioner admitted that her obstetrician and gynecologist had restricted her, in March 1998, to no lifting or pushing. On September 24, 1998, the Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident. Her doctors restricted her to lifting no more than 25 to 30 pounds as a result of the injuries sustained in the automobile accident. Because of the injuries sustained in the automobile accident, the Petitioner was unable to work and applied for Social Security disability. Apparently she was granted Social Security disability with attendant benefits. AmStaff employees must work around very loud machinery. There is noise from the machines themselves, combined with that of the air conditioning equipment. Horns blow signaling that forklift trucks are moving through the employment area. The machinery also emits a series of beeps that are codes to let employees know to do different things at different times regarding the machinery. Although the Petitioner stated that she had no restrictions concerning her hearing and could hear everything with the help of her hearing aid, she also stated that she could not stand loud noises generated by machines. In addition to the physical requirements, AmStaff employees were required to work rotating shifts. The employees had to rotate between a 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., shift and a 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., shift. The Petitioner did not want to work from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Additionally, AmStaff's employees were required to work 36-hour weeks followed by 42-hour weeks on alternating week schedules. The Petitioner did not want to work more than 20-hours per week in 1998, and in particular the months of April through September 1998. She did not want to work more than 20-hours per week, as she did not want to endanger her Social Security income benefits or have them reduced. Landrum did not have an opening for a carpet walker position at the time the Petitioner allegedly applied for that position. The Petitioner did not ask AmStaff or Landrum for any disability accommodations. If an employee is not entirely aware of the sounds and signals emanating from a plant and the machinery within the plant, that employee cannot respond immediately or accurately to situations that may cause problems with the machinery and ultimately could cause injury to the employee or to other employees. If a bobbin is not seated properly on a machine, for example, the machine will begin to produce a clanking noise. If the noise is not heard by the operating employee and the bobbin is not re-seated properly it can become detached from the machine and be thrown by the force of the machine potentially striking either the operator or anyone who happens to be moving through the machine aisle nearby at the time. Further, there are over 300 alarm boxes throughout the plant. These alarms are used in emergency situations. The alarms indicate the type of emergency, the location of the emergency and its severity. There are different types of warnings for vapor clouds and evacuations. All warnings come through that alarm system. An employee must listen for the type of sound or blast, the number of sounds or blasts and the sequence of the sounds or blasts in order to determine the type of emergency and to know how to react to it. The Petitioner was unemployed from September 24, 1998 until April 2000, when she became employed at Walmart. She left her employment at Walmart in July of 2000. After leaving Walmart the Petitioner has not been employed and has not looked for work. She apparently worked at Popeye's Fried Chicken for an undetermined period of time after March 1998. From April to September of 1998, she voluntarily restricted her work to no more than 20-hours per week in order to keep from reducing her Social Security disability benefits.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, as well as the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us. Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Danny L. Kepner, Esquire Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge, P.A. 226 South Palafox Street, Ninth Floor Pensacola, Florida 32501 Erick M. Drlicka, Esquire Emmanuel, Sheppard & Condon 30 South Spring Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations should grant the Petition for Relief alleging that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of his marital status, in violation of Section 760.10, Fla. Stat. (1995).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Shaker Lakes Apartments Company d/b/a Seasons of Tampa, Limited, is a property management company whose principal place of business is in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. The Respondent owns real property or conducts business in Florida and has 15 or more employees. The Petitioner, Jerry Dolinger, was hired by the Respondent on or about August 14, 1989, as a maintenance supervisor at a starting pay of $12,000 a year. On or about May 1, 1991, the Petitioner was promoted to district manager at an annual salary of $20,541.57 ($395.03 per week), plus hospitalization benefits and the use of a company car. By the end of 1992, the Petitioner was demoted to maintenance supervisor, but his salary and benefits remained the same. The Petitioner's wife, Karen Dolinger, also was employed by the Respondent, as property manager for Seasons of Tampa, Limited. On or about April 1, 1993, the Petitioner's wife resigned due to disputes with and conduct of the Respondent's vice-president of operations, Jacqueline McCullough. Upon her resignation, she distributed a letter to all residents of the apartment complex giving the residents information concerning the change in property management and the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the Respondent's management personnel in Ohio. The Respondent did not wish to have the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the Respondent's management personnel in Ohio given to the tenants at Seasons of Tampa. The Respondent wished to have those individuals remain unknown to the tenants so all tenant complaints and similar issues would have to be resolved locally through the property manager and district manager. On or about April 2, 1993, Jacquelyn McCullough telephoned the Petitioner and asked whether he had any knowledge of his wife's letter to the tenants. The Petitioner denied any knowledge and in fact had no such knowledge. She asked if the Petitioner also intended to resign, and the Petitioner answered that he did not. Later on April 2, 1993, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner's employment. One of the reasons given for the termination--an alleged temporary staff reduction--was a pretext. (Within days of the Petitioner's termination, the Respondent hired someone to take the Petitioner's place as maintenance supervisor.) The other reason--alleged insubordination and disloyalty--was based on the Respondent's belief that the Petitioner knew about and participated in the letter to the tenants. But the only basis for this belief was the Petitioner's marital status. Since there was no evidence to support the Respondent's belief, the basis of the Petitioner's termination was his marital status. The Petitioner was unable to find reemployment until approximately June 11, 1993. However, his new employment was at a salary of only $17,000 a year, a reduction of $68.11 a week. The Petitioner suffered this reduction in salary until November 5, 1993, when he obtain employment at a salary higher than what he earned with the Respondent, together with hospitalization benefits and the use of a company car, for a total of salary loss during this period of $1,430.31. The Petitioner's loss of use of the Respondent's company car from April 2 through November 5, 1993, cost him monetary damages of $295 a month for replacement transportation, or approximately $2,100. (The Affidavit of Petitioner's damages incorrectly multiplies the monthly expense by 31 weeks, resulting in an incorrect alleged total loss of $9,145.) In order to redeem the second mortgage on the Petitioner's home, which went into default as a result of the loss of the Petitioner's salary, the Petitioner and his wife had to refinance, at a cost of $2,033.02. The Petitioner also claims damages due to the loss of life and health and hospitalization insurance from April 2 through November 5, 1993. But the Petitioner's testimony was that he could not afford to replace those insurance coverages, and there was not evidence that he suffered any out-of-pocket uninsured expenses that would have been covered by them. The Petitioner also claims damages for the loss of $3,775 worth of personal items sold to pay necessary living expenses for the period from April 2 through November 5, 1993. But those sums already are accounted for in loss of salary and would result in a double recovery if added to the loss of salary. Based on the Affidavit of Plaintiff's Attorney's Fees, a reasonable attorney fee in this case is $6,492.50. Based on the Certificate of Costs, reasonable costs to be taxed to the Respondent in this case is $178.42.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order: finding the Respondent guilty of illegal discrimination on the basis of the Petitioner's marital status; and (2) requiring that the Respondent pay the Petitioner a total of $9,692.03, together with legal interest from November 5, 1993, plus $6,492.50 as a reasonable attorney fee, together with legal interest from May 1, 1996, as affirmative relief from the effects of the illegal practice. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5381 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Conclusion of law. 2.-5. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not conclusion of law, subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Annual salary rejected as inconsistent with the Affidavit of Petitioner's Damages; otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 9.-10. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 11.-15. Accepted and incorporated. 16. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 17.-23. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Amount of loss rejected as not proven by the evidence; "mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries" rejected as not relevant in this proceeding; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Davis, Esquire 620 E. Twiggs Street, Suite 305 Tampa, Florida 33602-3929 Jacqueline McCullough Vice President Shaker Lakes Apartments Company 1422 Euclid Avenue, Suite 1146 Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1951 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner based upon mental disability.
Findings Of Fact The final disputed-fact hearing began on time. Petitioner was present, as was the attorney for Respondent. Petitioner appeared pro se and responded clearly and affirmatively to the undersigned's questions, stating that she knew that she could be represented by an attorney but for reasons of her own she chose to represent herself. After explaining the duty to go forward, the burden of proof, and the order of proof, the undersigned inquired of both parties whether any further explanation was necessary; whether they had any questions; and whether the undersigned could do anything to make the process easier on either of them. At that point, Petitioner gestured to a piece of paper and requested to meet with Respondent's counsel for purposes of negotiating a settlement. A brief recess was granted for that purpose, and the undersigned left the hearing room. Upon returning to the hearing room, the undersigned inquired whether a settlement had been reached and was informed that one had not been reached. Petitioner then announced that, "Since they won't settle, I have no more to say." The undersigned inquired at length to be certain Petitioner understood that: she could call witnesses; she could testify on her own behalf; and she could present documents, either through her own testimony or that of others. Petitioner stated that she understood but did not want to call witnesses or testify. She gestured at what appeared to be her proposed settlement document, but which could have been something else, stating that she only had a document. The undersigned explained that very few documents could be called "self-authenticating" and gave a brief explanation of what type of testimony is necessary to lay a predicate to put any document into evidence. Petitioner said she did not wish to testify. She did not offer her piece of paper. The undersigned explained that if Petitioner did not testify and did not offer her single document, she could not prevail, and that based upon the allegation in her Petition that she has a "mental disability/handicap," the undersigned needed to be assured that Petitioner understood that unless she testified to something, called witnesses to testify, or offered some exhibits, the undersigned would have no choice but to enter a recommended order of dismissal. Petitioner assured the undersigned that she understood and refused to proceed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michele B. Brown, pro se 2634 North Point Circle, Apt. B Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda S. Bennett, Esquire Brooks, LeBoeuf, Bennett Foster & Gwartney, P.A. 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
