The Issue Whether the Motions for Rule Challenge Proceedings (referred to as Petition(s)) filed in each of the above-cited cases meet the requirements both in form and substance, pursuant to Subsection 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating skilled nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the underlying case, the Petitioner operated or controlled three licensed skilled nursing facilities: Harborside Healthcare-Pinewood, Harborside Healthcare-Sarasota, and Harborside Healthcare-Naples. In October of 2001, the Agency filed Administrative Complaints against the Petitioner's three facilities. As to each complaint the Agency relied upon its interpretation of Section 400.121(3)(d), Florida Statutes. The Agency's interpretation of the statute went beyond the plain and unambiguous language of the law. Moreover, such interpretation had not been promulgated by rule. If the interpretation was intended to be the policy of the Agency, the implementation of the policy was not authorized by the statute. The Petitioner pursued three legal strategies: it filed an injunction proceeding in circuit court, a petition to challenge the unpromulgated rule, and vigorously defended the administrative actions filed against its facilities. In so doing, the Petitioner incurred legal expenses and costs necessitated by the Agency's implementation of a policy that had not been established through rule-making procedures. Petitioner's rule challenge alleged that the Agency had failed to follow any rule-making procedures; had enlarged, modified, and contravened the specific provisions of the law; and had implemented a policy that was arbitrary and capricious. Due to the severity of the penalties the Agency sought to impose against the Petitioner, the damage to its reputation in the communities it served, and the resident fear and uncertainty at the facilities, the Petitioner sought and was granted an expedited hearing on the rule challenge. The "Wherefore" clause of the Petitioner's rule challenge clearly stated that Petitioner sought an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes. Petitioner had retained outside counsel to pursue each of its legal strategies. On October 31, 2001, a Final Order was entered in the underlying case that directed the Agency to cease and immediately discontinue all reliance on the policy that had not been promulgated through rule-making procedures. That Final Order has not been appealed. The Final Order did not retain jurisdiction for purposes of addressing the Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees and costs. The instant case was opened when the Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs subsequent to the entry of the Final Order in DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU. The matter was assigned a new case number as is the practice of the Division of Administrative Hearings in ancillary proceedings. Accordingly, the instant case, DOAH Case No. 01-4283F, was designated a "fee" case (hence the F at the end of the case number). The initial order entered through the DOAH clerk's office erroneously designated that the fees were sought pursuant to Section 59.11, Florida Statutes. Nevertheless, after the time for appeal of the Final Order (DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU) had elapsed, the matter was scheduled for final hearing. Carole Banks is an attorney employed by the Petitioner as an in-house counsel and director of risk management for the three facilities identified in this record. Ms. Banks is also a registered nurse and has been a member of the Florida Bar since April of 1998. Ms. Banks receives a salary from the Petitioner and is required to perform duties typically associated with her full-time job. Due to the filing of the Administrative Complaints against the facilities, Ms. Banks was required to expend additional time to assist outside counsel to defend the facilities. A portion of that time was attributable to the rule challenge case (DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU). Based upon the testimony of this witness and the exhibits received into evidence it is determined Ms. Banks expended 19.8 hours assisting in the prosecution of the rule challenge case. An appropriate rate of compensation for Ms. Banks would be $150.00 per hour. There is no evidence, however, that the Petitioner was actually required to pay Ms. Banks overtime or an appropriate rate of compensation for her additional work. K. Scott Griggs is an attorney employed by the Petitioner. Mr. Griggs serves as vice president and General Counsel for the Petitioner and is located in Massachusetts. Mr. Griggs did not testify, was not available to explain his time-keeping records, and none of the exhibits in this cause indicate how Mr. Griggs is compensated for his services or what his specific duties entail. While it is certain Mr. Griggs assisted counsel in the prosecution of the underlying case, without relying on hearsay, no determination as to the amount of time spent and the hourly rate that should be applied to such time can be reached. In order to fully protect the Petitioner's interests and those of its residents, the Petitioner retained outside counsel in the underlying case. The law firm of Broad & Cassel was hired to defend the administrative actions, seek injunctive relief, file the underlying case, and pursue other administrative remedies to assist the client. By agreement, Petitioner was to pay the following hourly rates: partners were to be compensated at the rate of $245.00 per hour, associates were to receive $175.00 per hour, and paralegals were entitled to $90.00 per hour. In this case, four partner-level attorneys from Broad and Cassel expended time in furtherance of the client's causes. After reviewing the time records and testimony of the witnesses, it is determined that the partners expended at least 172.6 hours associated with the underlying rule challenge. Additionally, an associate with the Broad & Cassel firm expended not fewer than 12.1 hours that can be directly attributed to the rule challenge case. Additional hours expended contributed to the success of the rule challenge. The Petitioner also incurred costs and expenses associated with the rule challenge. A paralegal expended 4.6 hours (with a $90.00 per hour rate) making copies of the documents used at the hearing. Other costs included court reporter fees, transcripts, telecopy charges, and expert witness fees. It is determined that the Petitioner has incurred $5819.15 in recoverable costs associated with this case and the underlying rule challenge. The hourly rates sought by the Petitioner are reasonable. The time and labor expended by the Petitioner to vigorously protect its legal interests was reasonable given the severity of the penalty sought by the Agency and the circumstances faced by the client. The Petitioner benefited from the efforts of counsel. Due to the time constraints and immediate ramifications faced by the Petitioner, special time and requests were made of the attorneys performing the work for the underlying case. In some instances, the attorneys were required to devote an extensive amount of time to address the client's interests to the exclusion of other work. This was the first time the Broad & Cassel firm had been retained to represent the client. As a result, the attorneys did not have the benefit of a long-term understanding of the facilities and the client's needs. The Broad & Cassel firm and the attorneys assigned to this matter have considerable experience and demonstrated considerable skill, expertise, and efficiency in providing services to the client. Had the Petitioner not prevailed, its ability to honor its hourly agreement with counsel may have been jeopardized. The Agency's expert recognized the difficulties presented by the case and opined that a proper fee would be $42,908. Such amount did not include attorney time spent in preparing for, conducting the fee hearing, or post-hearing activities. Such amount did not cover the amounts depicted in the billing statement from the Broad & Cassel firm. The Petitioner was required to retain expert witnesses to address the fees sought. The calculation of attorney's fees in this cause is complicated by the fact that none of the fees sought would have been incurred by the Petitioner had the Agency not implemented an unlawful policy. That is, had the non-rule policy not been utilized to support Administrative Complaints against the three facilities, none of the fees sought would have been incurred. The Petitioner presented a "shot-gun" approach pursuing every avenue available (including the underlying rule challenge) to dissuade the Agency from pursuing its action against the facilities. Only the rule challenge proved successful. Had the rule challenge not proved successful, residents would have been relocated from their homes. The Petitioner would have incurred extensive financial loss. William E. Williams and Carlos Alvarez testified as experts on behalf of the Petitioner. Their testimony has been considered and their opinions regarding the reasonableness of the fees sought by Petitioner has been deemed persuasive. Based upon the totality of the evidence presented, it is determined that the Petitioner prevailed in the rule challenge. The Agency has not demonstrated that the non-rule statement was required by the Federal Government to implement or retain a delegated or approved program or to meet a condition governing the receipt of federal funds. The formal hearing for fees in this cause lasted 4.75 hours. Petitioner's counsel expended time in preparation for the hearing and in post hearing activities. A reasonable fee associated with that time would not be less than $15,000.00.
The Issue Whether this cause is barred by a release of all claims.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Petitioner, Jessica Miles', Petition for Relief from employment discrimination for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Invarrary Retirement Center, Inc. (IRC), is licensed by petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), to operate an adult congregate living facility (ACLF). The facility operates under the name of Inverrary Retirement Center at 5811 Northwest 28th Street, Lauderhill, Florida. On or about April 4, 1984, two HRS inspectors performed a routine relicensure survey of IRC. The purpose of the survey was to determine whether IRC was complying with all HRS requirements relating to record keeping, sanitation, fire and safety. During the course of the survey, the inspectors noted the following violations of HRS rules: There was no staff member within the facility at all times who was certified in an approved first aid course (Rule 10A- 5.19(5)(f), F.A.C.); The facility failed to keep "current" records of self administered medication (Rule 10A-5.18(6)(f), F.A.C.); Menus were not planned and posted where they could be easily viewed by the residents (Rule 10A-5.20(1)(j), F.A.C.); The kitchen was not equipped with an approved exhaust hood over the stove (Rule 10A-5.23(15)(a), F.A.C.); An electrical extension cord was used to service the coffee maker (Rule 10A- 5.23(15)(a), F.A.C.); One of the buildings had an insufficient means of egress for the residents (Rule 10A- 5.23(15)(a), F.A.C.); There were no manually operated fire alarms capable of being heard throughout the facility (Rule 10A-5.23(15)(a), F.A.C.); Respondent failed to provide documenta- tion reflecting the smoke detectors were tested on a weekly basis (Rule 10A- 5.23(15)(a), F.A.C.); and (j) There was a sliding bolt on an exit door on one of the buildings (Rule 10A- 5.23(15)(a), F.A.C.). All of the foregoing constituted a separated violation of HRS rules. 1/ When the survey was completed, the inspectors reviewed all violations with IRC's manager and advised her that a resurvey would be taken in about thirty days, and that all violations must either be corrected by that time, or some action instituted which reflected an intent on the part of the facility to correct the same. This was in accordance with HRS policy governing ACLFs, and approximated the time given other facilities to make similar corrections. On April 10, 1984, a Corrective Action Plan was issued by HRS and sent to IRC. This document set out in detail the various violations found in the April 4 inspection and set a compliance date of May 4, 1984 for all corrections to be made. A resurvey of IRC's facility was made by the same two HRS inspectors on May 18, 1984. With the exception of item (3)(h), which required documentation verifying that smoke detectors be tested weekly, the inspectors noted that no corrections had been made. However, respondent presented evidence that items (3)(b) and (3)(c) had indeed been corrected by that date and such evidence is deemed to be more persuasive than contrary evidence offered by HRS representatives. Further, the violation in item (3)(f), and turns on whether an HRS publication or the City of Lauderdale fire code was controlling when the inspection was made. Because no evidence was presented to establish which standard was in effect, the allegation that an HRS publication was violated must fail. Accordingly, it is found that IRC failed to timely correct items (3)(a), (3)(d), (3)(e), (3)(h), (3)(i), and (3)(j) as required by the Corrective Action Plan. Respondent eventually made all corrections, although not within the HRS imposed deadline. One of the deficiencies [item (3)(d) required extensive renovations, including bids and a city permit, which took considerable time to accomplish. However, IRC's manager neglected to provide HRS inspectors with any evidence on the May 18 visit showing that bids were being solicited, or that there was any "movement" on the project. The same is true for item (3)(g) which required competitive bids from suppliers. IRC also failed to advise HRS that it could not immediately enroll an employee in the Broward County First Aid Course [item (3)(a)] because of the large number of participants in the class. IRC failed to do so even though its manager had been told that an extension on the May 4 deadline could be obtained where IRC gave some evidence to the inspectors that action was being instituted to correct the deficiency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating agency rules as set forth in items (3)(a), (3)(d), (3)(e), (3)(h), (3)(i) and (3)(j) of the administrative complaint, and that a $900 administrative fine be imposed, to be paid within thirty days after the data of the final order rendered in this proceeding. All other charges should be DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1985.
Findings Of Fact The special condition in invitation to bid No. 69-360-240-F that petitioner challenges here provides: PUBLIC ENTITY CRIMES Any person responding with an offer to this invitation must execute the enclosed Form PUR 7068, SWORN STATEMENT UNDER SECTION 287.133(3) (a), FLORIDA STATUTES, ON PUBLIC ENTITY CRIMES and enclose it with your bid. If you are submitting a bid on behalf of dealers or suppliers who will ship and receive payment from the resulting contract, it is your responsibility to see that copy(s) of the form are executed by them and are included with your bid. Failure to comply with this condition shall result in rejection of your bid. Joint Exhibit No. 1. Under the heading "Bid Conditions," Rule 13A-1.008(2), Florida Administrative Code, incorporates form PUR 7068 by reference, and requires that invitations to bid on term contracts include the form. Challenge Untimely The parties stipulated in their prehearing stipulation as follows: "1. Respondent's Division of Purchasing advertised for competitive bidding for [a term contract for] carpet installed, bid number 69-360-240-F. "2. On or about April 19, 1990, the Division of Purchasing sent to prospective bidders a revised invitation to bid. [Like the original invitation to bid, the revised invitation to bid contained the following language: INTERPRETATIONS/DISPUTES: Any questions concerning conditions and specifications shall be directed in writing to this office for receipt no later than ten (10) days prior to the bid opening inquiries must reference the date of bid opening and bid number. No interpretation shall be considered binding unless provided in writing by the State of Florida in response to requests in full compliance with this provision. Any actual or prospective bidder who disputes the reasonableness, necessity or competitiveness of the terms and conditions of the invitation to Bid, bid selection or contract award recommendation, shall file such protest in form of a petition in compliance with Rule 13A-1.006, Florida Administrative Code. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5.] "3. The petitioner did not protest any of the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid within 72 hours of its receipt of the invitation to bid. "4. The petitioner timely submitted its bid pursuant to the above- referenced bid solicitation. "5. The bids were opened on May 16, 1990 and on July 23, 1990 the Division of Purchasing posted the official bid tabulation document. "6. The Division of Purchasing determined that the petitioner's bid was non-responsive. "8. On July 25, 1990, the petitioner timely filed its Notice of Intent of Protest with the respondent. "9. On August 3, 1990, the petitioner timely filed its Notice of Formal Written Protest and Petition for Formal Hearing. "10. On August 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Petition for Administrative Determination of the Validity of Unpromulgated Rule challenging the special condition entitled `Public Entity Crimes' on page four of the invitation to bid." No Future Effect Already superseded in subsequent invitations by a revised version (T.142, 171), any special condition like the one petitioner challenges will soon undergo further change. Effective October 1, 1990, Section 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes will be amended to read: * Prior to entering into a contract a person shall file a sworn statement with the contracting officer . . . <<for the calendar year. The department shall adopt by rule a standard sworn statement . . .. The form shall include>> [[on a form to be promulgated by the department by rule, including the following information:]] The name of the person. The business address . . . * Note: In the above quotation, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Chapter 90-33, Sections 1 and 3, Laws of Florida (1990) (language added or deleted by Chapter 90-33). "Only if the responding bidder does not have the [sworn statement on public entity crimes] . . . on file with [respondent's] . Division of Purchasing on or after October 1 this year" (T. 135) must a sworn statement accompany a bid. The amended statute "effective on October 1 allows . . . submission of the public entity crime form document on a calendar year basis. So, it does not have to be submitted with each and every bid." (T. 135.) Petitioner does not anticipate bidding in response to any other of respondent's invitations to bid any time before October 1, 1990. When asked, "Is it Jones' Floor Covering's intention after October 1st, to submit only one sworn statement a year to the Division of Purchasing," (T. 95) Rocky Wayne Jones, a vice- president in petitioner's employ, answered, "Whatever we need to do, that's what we will do to be able to bid on State work. If that's what the law is, then we will do what the law says to do." T. 95.
The Issue The issues are whether, in violation of sections 120.54(1)(a) and 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, Respondent has made an agency statement that is an unadopted rule in implementing a 2017 statutory amendment broadening the category of first-time test-takers to be counted when calculating the passing rate of the graduates of Petitioner’s prelicensure professional nursing education program (Program) and whether, pursuant to section 57.111, Petitioner may recover attorneys’ fees and costs from Respondent. At Petitioner’s request, the parties presented evidence concerning constitutional challenges that Petitioner intends to present to a district court of appeal.
Findings Of Fact The Program is a prelicensure professional nursing education program that terminates with an associate degree. Respondent approved the Program in 2013, thus authorizing Petitioner to admit degree-seeking students into the Program, as provided in section 464.019. As provided by section 464.019(5)(a)1., the passing rate of the Program’s graduates taking the NCLEX for the first time must meet or exceed the minimum passing rate, which is ten points less than the average passage rate of graduates taking the NCLEX nationally for the first time. Until June 23, 2017, the passing rate of a Florida program was based only on first-time test-takers who had taken the exam within six months of graduating (New Graduates). Chapter 2017-134, sections 4 and 8, Laws of Florida, which took effect when signed into law on June 23, 2017 (Statutory Amendment), removes the six-month restriction, so that the passing rate of a Florida program is now based on all first-time test-takers, regardless of when they graduated (Graduates). The statutory language does not otherwise address the implementation of the Statutory Amendment. For 2015 and 2016, respectively, the minimum passing rates in Florida were 72% and 71.68%, and the Program’s New Graduates passed the NCLEX at the rates of 44% and 15.79%. As required by section 464.019(5), Respondent issued the Probationary Order. The Probationary Order recites the provisions of section 464.019(5)(a) specifying the applicable passing rate, directing Respondent to place a program on probation if its graduates fail to pass at the minimum specified passing rates for two consecutive years, and mandating that the program remain on probation until its passing rate achieves the minimum specified rate. The Probationary Order details the 2015 and 2016 passing rates of Petitioner’s relevant graduates and the minimum passing rates for these years. The Probationary Order makes no attempt to describe the condition of probation, which might have included a reference to New Graduates, other than to refer to section 464.019(5)(a)2., which, unchanged by the Statutory Amendment, specifies only that a program must remain on probation until and unless its graduates achieve a passing rate at least equal to the minimum passing rate for the year in question. For 2017, the minimum passing rate for a Florida program was 74.24%. If, as Respondent contends, the new law applies to all of 2017, six of the fifteen of the Program’s Graduates failed the NCLEX, so the Program’s passing rate was inadequate at 60%. If, as Petitioner contends, the old law applies to all of 2017, twelve of the Program’s test-takers were New Graduates, and only three of them failed, so the Program’s passing rate was adequate at 75%. Respondent clearly applied the Statutory Amendment retroactively to January 1, 2017, in the Order Extending Probation because the order states that that the passing rate of the Program’s Graduates for 2017 was only 60% and therefore extends Petitioner’s probationary status for 2018. The Order Extending Probation provides Petitioner with a clear point of entry to request an administrative hearing. Each party applies the Statutory Amendment without regard to the effective date of June 23, 2017, but Respondent reaches the correct conclusion: the passing rate of the Program’s graduates for 2017 was inadequate. The NCLEX is administered throughout the year, and the dates of graduation are available for Petitioner’s Graduates taking the NCLEX in 2017, so it is possible to calculate a combined passing rate, using only New Graduates under the old law for testing dates through June 22 and all Graduates under the new law for testing dates after June 22. From January 1 through June 22, 2017, five of the Program’s test-takers were New Graduates and they all passed. From June 23 through December 31, 2017, four of the eight Graduates taking the NCLEX passed the test. Combining these results for all of 2017, the Program’s passing rate was nine divided by thirteen, or 69%, which was inadequate for 2017.
The Issue Whether the Motions for Rule Challenge Proceedings (referred to as Petition(s)) filed in each of the above-cited cases meet the requirements both in form and substance, pursuant to Subsection 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2004); Whether Respondent, Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR), has inherent authority to reconsider a Final Order it has issued; and Whether FCHR should adopt a rule which would permit the granting of a motion to reconsider a Final Order.
Findings Of Fact The policy being challenged provides that: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. This provision is routinely and customarily embodied in the notices issued by Respondent to parties before it in matters arising under Florida Statutes 447.307 and 447.503. The Respondent acknowledges that it did not adopt and promulgate the policy pursuant to Florida Statutes 120.54 or any other relevant provision of Chapter 120. On 12 July 1979 Petitioner filed a petition with Respondent in which Petitioner sought to represent certain employees employed by the Collier County Board of County Commissioners. This petition was accepted by Respondent and on 30 July 1979 Respondent issued a Notice of Representation Hearing and a Prehearing Order. This Prehearing Order directed the parties to that proceeding to file with Respondent at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the hearing, and serve upon each other, a prehearing statement, identifying: Those fact disputes to be presented for resolution. Any and all legal questions to be presented for resolution. The legal authority to be relied upon by each party in presenting its arguments. Those witnesses to be called at the hearing, except rebuttal witnesses. The approximate time necessary to present the party's case. Any outstanding motions or procedural questions to be resolved. This Pre-Hearing Order then provided: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. Petitioner did not file its prehearing statement within the prescribed 7-day period and on 21 August 1979 Petitioner was notified that the hearing scheduled to commence 23 August had been cancelled. On 22 August Petitioner was advised that a written order cancelling the 23 August hearing had been entered by the Commission. Thereafter Petitioner filed the petition here under consideration contending that the policy of Respondent to enter the cancellation-of-hearing notice in prehearing orders is a rule and invalid by reason of not being promulgated pursuant to Chapter 120. Respondent takes the position that the provision in the prehearing order is not a rule, but even if it could otherwise be considered to be a statement of general applicability, it is exempt from being so found by 447.207(6), Florida Statutes.
