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SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT vs EDWARD TANNER, 96-004161 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bartow, Florida Sep. 03, 1996 Number: 96-004161 Latest Update: Mar. 10, 1997

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Department should impose administrative penalties in the form of fines, costs and points assessment because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint and Order entered herein.

Findings Of Fact At All times pertinent to the issued herein, the Petitioner, SWFWMD, was the governmental agency responsible for the licensing of well contractors and the permitting of well drilling and abandonment within its jurisdictional area. Respondent, Edward Tanner, was a licensed water well contractor, holding license Number 2276 issued on July 21, 1982. On January 16, 1996, SWFWMD issued Well Construction permit 575267.01 to Respondent for the abandonment of a four-inch diameter water well on property owned by Mr. McCrimmon located at Five Tera Lane in Winter Haven. The well, a domestic water well, had failed and Respondent applied for a permit to construct a new well at the site and abandon the failed well. Stipulation Number Four of the permit issued to the Respondent provided that the well must be examined for debris or obstructions from the land surface to the original depth of construction, and further required that any debris or obstruction discovered be removed from the well prior to the commencement of abandonment. In addition, the stipulation called for the well to be plugged from bottom to top by an approved method of grouting. According to the permit, if any other method of abandonment was to be used, it must be approved in advance by specifically denoted District personnel. Though Respondent did not utilize the approved method of abandonment in this project, he did not apply for a variance from the District. Had he done so, he would have been required to show some emergency or hardship which would have prevented him from properly filling the abandoned well with cement from top to bottom and justified an alternative method of abandonment. In this case, Respondent plugged the well in issue, which was 210 feet in depth, from the land surface down to fifty five feet, utilizing six bags of portland cement. Deviation from the 210 foot plug required a variance to be granted by the District. Respondent did not seek this variance. Well abandonment is a regulated practice because, inter alia, improper abandonment may result in contamination of the aquifer. The well in question here is located in an area susceptible to contamination by ethylene dibromide, (EDB), recognized as a human carcinogen, which is known to be present in the area. In addition to failing to properly abandon the well, Respondent also failed to file a well completion report within thirty days of completion of his abandonment effort. The required report was submitted on June 10, 1996, nearly four months after it was due. Respondent relates that in January 1996, after he had worked on a well “commonly known” to be the subject of litigation, he was asked to try to fix the well in issue. When he saw the problem, he contends he repeatedly advised the authorities that the well was leaking sand and could not be cleaned out to the bottom as the District required. Therefore, to preserve the integrity of the well, he plugged it at a point below the break in the well lining. At that time, he told Mr. McCrimmon what the situation was and advised him the well needed to be abandoned, but he, Tanner, did not do that type of work. Respondent contends, supported by his son, that on January 16, 1996, while he was at Mr. McCrimmon’s property, he was told by Mr. Wheelus and Mr. Lee, both District officials, that Mr. Calandra, also a District official had said he, Tanner, had to pull a well abandonment permit or Calandra would not sign off on the new well. At that point, Respondent claims, he went to the District’s Bartow office to argue with Mr. Calandra, and asked Mr. Calandra to show him the law which supported Calandra’s position. Calandra persisted in his position and even, according to Respondent, bet with another District employees that Respondent had to do what he was told. This other employee does not recall any such bet. Therefore, under protest and only so he could get paid for the work he had done on the new well, Respondent agreed to pull the abandonment permit. At that time, he claims, he asked the District personnel in charge how many bags of concrete would be required to abandon the well and was told, “six”. When the time came to do the actual work, Respondent called for the required observer to be present from the District office, but because no one was available at the time, he was granted permission to do it without observation. He did the job as he felt it had to be done, and thirty days to the day after that, was served with the notice of violation. Respondent contends either that the witnesses for the District are lying in their denials of the coercive statements he alleges, or the situation is a conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights. He does not believe a well contractor should be required to stay current regarding all the District rules regarding well construction and abandonment because the rules change so often. Respondent admits, however, that the rules in existence at the time in question required the filling of a well all the way down and that he did not do that nor did he seek a variance., He knew he was required to comply with the conditions of a permit. He also admits that a completion report was due within thirty days of work completion. In that regard, however, he contends that when the issue went into litigation, he felt the district would advise him of what he had to do. In this he was mistaken, but he was not misled into believing so by anything done or said by District personnel. Taken together, the evidence does not demonstrate that anyone from the District staff coerced Respondent into abandoning the well. He was issued a permit to drill the new well for Mr. McCrimmon with no conditions thereon. By the same token, the abandonment permit he obtained did require the complete clearing and total plugging of the abandoned well, and this was not done. The costs incurred by the District in the investigation and enforcement of this alleged violation totaled in excess of $500.00.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order finding Respondent, Edward Tanner, guilty of improperly abandoning the well in issue and failing to file the required report in a timely manner, and assessing enforcement costs in the amount of $500.00 in addition to an administrative fine of $250.00. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret M. Lytle, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899 Edward Tanner 1137 Saint Anne Shrine Road Lake Wales, Florida 33853 Peter G. Hubbell Executive Director Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (2) 40D-3.30140D-3.531
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FLORIDA AUDUBON SOCIETY, FLORIDA KEYS AUDUBON SOCIETY, AND UPPER KEYS CITIZENS ASSOCIATION vs WILLIAM R. CULLEN AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 89-003779 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Key Largo, Florida Jul. 14, 1989 Number: 89-003779 Latest Update: Aug. 22, 1990

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Department of Environmental Regulation (Department) should grant a dredge and fill permit which has been requested by the Respondent, William R. Cullen (Applicant). That proposed permit has been opposed by the Petitioners (who will be referred to collectively as Petitioners for convenience sake).

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency authorized to issue permits pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The Respondent, William R. Cullen, filed an application for a dredge and fill permit to construct a slip marina on June 4, 1985. The original request was subsequently amended to seek approval for a forty-two slip commercial marina. The project site for the Applicant's marina is located at Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida. The site is within Buttonwood Sound, Florida Bay. The property is owned by Mr. Cullen and his family. All of the proposed improvements will be constructed on submerged lands or uplands owned or controlled by the Cullen family. The project site is located within a commercial area of Key Largo and contains frontage on both the water, Buttonwood Sound, and the highway, U.S. Highway 1. The project site has a basin which was created by the excavation of materials used for road construction from the shoreline and the installation of an L-shaped rock jetty which runs roughly perpendicular and then parallel to the shoreline. This jetty was installed during the late 1960s. The water depths within the basin range from 3 feet to approximately 14 feet. The water within the basin is subject to the same tidal considerations as the waters within Buttonwood Sound. There is no interruption of the flow of water in and out of the basin from those waters of the Sound. The water within this basin is within an Outstanding Florida Water as defined in Rule 17-3.041, Florida Administrative Code. The Applicant's plan calls for the excavation of appproximately 30,170 square feet of upland area and the dredging of the existing basin for approximately 18,460 dredged square feet. During the construction phases, the Applicant proposes to install turbidity curtains to limit the adverse effects expected during that time. The improvements are intended to be a permanent alteration to the basin design and will permanently modify the marine life habitat within that basin. The Applicant proposes to remove portions of the existing jetty to allow additional water to flow through the basin unimpeded by the jetty walls. The removal of the jetty walls will expedite the dilution and flushing of potential pollutants from the basin on a tidal frequency. That flushing is purported to assure that the water quality within the basin will not be diminished. However, such pollutants will be flushed into Buttonwood Sound. Stormwater accumulating on the upland project is to flow toward a lower upland area and should not to be dumped into the basin. The proposed marina is to have fueling facilities and the Applicant has agreed to design that system to limit inadvertent spillage. Further, as a condition of the permit, the Applicant has agreed to abide by the Department of Natural Resources' spill contingency plan requirements. The proposed marina is designed to provide portable sewage pumpout facilities for each slip. A permanent pumpout facilities will also be available. The Applicant seeks to attract boats in the range of 30 to 50 feet in length at this facility. While there are a number of other marinas in other areas of Key Largo which might accomodate that size boat, the marinas in the immediate vicinity of this project site are designed for smaller craft. The area within the basin consists of unvegetated bottom, submerged rip-rap, sea grasses, and hardbottom/algae communities--the predominant classifications being the latter two. The deeper hardbottom areas are to be filled and portions of the sea grasses will be dredged in order to configure the proposed docks. Additionally, other sea grass areas will be shaded, and thereby disturbed, by the construction of the docks. There are no historical or archaeological features relevant to the proposed site. The area has not been designated as a critical manatee area, however, manatees do frequent the project vicinity and have been observed feeding immediately adjacent to the basin. The permit proposed for this project requires a water quality monitoring plan. In addition to sampling for coliform, diesel by-products, oils, greases, detergents, oxygen, copper, lead and zinc, the plan requires sampling for aluminum, cadmium, and chromium. The monitoring stations are to be located both within the basin (2 stations) and outside the basin (2 stations). Liveaboards or others continuously docked at the marina will create additional shading which will disrupt and adversely affect the sea grass system. In order to provide access to the marina, the Applicant intends to dredge a channel in an area containing sea grass which is undisputedly within the Outstanding Florida Waters. The Department deemed the subject application was complete on February 23, 1988. The Department did not apply the Keys Rule found in Rule 17-312.400, Florida Administrative Code, to this project. The Department also did not apply the Mitigation Rule found in Rule 17-312.300, Florida Administrative Code, to this project. Michael Dentzau has personally reviewed and processed 250-300 dredge and fill permits during his tenure with the Department. Of those projects he has reviewed, he has not recommended that dense sea grass beds of the type located within this project site be dredged in order to construct a commercial marina. Phillip Edwards was responsible for executing the Intent to Issue in this case. In determining that this project had provided reasonable assurances that water quality standards will not be violated, Mr. Edwards weighed the public interests criteria set forth in Section 403.918, Florida Statutes. Because he received letters purportedly from elected officials, Mr. Edwards presumed that the project was in the public interest. That assumption of fact has not been established by this record. According to Mr. Edwards, the adverse effects expected by this project could be adequately addressed by the permit conditions when weighed against the public interest in favor of the project. Since Mr. Edwards' assumptions as to the public interest in this project have not been established, his conclusion regarding the weight that interest should receive can be given little consideration. The project as proposed by the Applicant will not adversely affect navigation or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The project as proposed by the Applicant will adversely affect fishing or marine productivity within the basin since it will permanently alter the basin biologically by destroying sea grass. The increased boat traffic within the Sound will also detract from the present recreational uses enjoyed by area residents. According to Mr. Edwards, it is very unusual for the Department to issue a permit when sea grasses will be adversely affected. In the 17 years in which he has reviewed permits, only two occasions merited approval when the destruction of sea grasses to the extent in this case would result. Neither of those cases were factually similar to the case at issue. In those cases, however, elected officials advised Mr. Edwards, as he presumed they had here, that there was a public need for the permit. Increased boat traffic will result in increased manatee mortality due to collisions. In order to assure water quality will not be degraded within a marina, the project should have a short flushing time comparable to healthy natural embayments. In this case, the flushing proposed by the Applicant is dependent, in part, on winds which may be inconsistent or relatively minimal during the summer months.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a final order denying the permit requested by the Applicant. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO CASE NOS. 89-3779 et seq. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY PETITIONERS: The first three sentences of paragraph 1 are accepted; the remainder is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 2 is accepted. Paragraph 3 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 4, it is accepted that the Department deemed the application complete on February 23, 1988; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as argument. With regard to paragraph 5, it is accepted that the habitat within the basin is the same as the habitat throughout Florida Bay and that the basin is not "enclosed" hydrologically; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as argument or comment. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 are rejected as argument, conclusions of law, or comment. The paragraphs do not recite facts pertinent to this case. Paragraphs 13, 14, and the first two sentences of paragraph 15 are accepted. The remainder of paragraph IS is rejected as argument. The first two sentences of paragraph 16 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as comment or argument. Paragraph 17 is accepted. Paragraph 18 is rejected as argument. To the extent that paragraph 19 accurately describes Van de Kreeke's assessment of the report it is accepted; otherwise rejected as irrelevant, comment, argument, recitation of testimony or unsupported by the record. The report upon which comment is directed was not offered in this cause to prove its truth/accuracy. Paragraphs 20 through 22 are rejected as comment, argument, recitation of testimony or unsupported by the record-- see comment to paragraph 19 above. Paragraphs 23 through 26 are accepted. Paragraphs 27 and 28 are rejected as argument, comment, or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 29 and 30 are accepted. Paragraph 31 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 32 and 33 are accepted. Paragraph 34 is rejected as hearsay, irrelevant, or argument. Paragraph 35 is rejected as comment or argument. Paragraph 36 is accepted. Paragraphs 37 through 40 are rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 41 through 43 are accepted. Paragraph 44 is rejected as contrary to the record. Paragraph 45 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 46 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 47 is accepted but is comment. Paragraphs 48 and 49 are accepted. Paragraph 50 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraph 51 is rejected as argument or conclusions of law. The first three sentences of paragraph 52 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as argument. The first sentence and that portion of the second sentence of paragraph 53 that ends with the word "authenticity" is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as argument or conclusions of law. Paragraphs 54 and 55 are accepted. Paragraph 56 is rejected as irrelevant or hearsay. Paragraph 57 is rejected as hearsay. Paragraph 58 is rejected as argument, comment, or irrelevant. Paragraphs 59 through 66 are accepted. Paragraph 67 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 68 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 69 and 70 are accepted. Paragraph 71 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraph 72 is rejected as argument. The first sentence of paragraph 73 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 74 is accepted. Paragraphs 75 through 77 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 78 and 79 are accepted. Paragraph 80 is rejected as repetitive. With the inclusion of the words "and hardbottom and algae" paragraph 81 is accepted. Paragraph 82 is accepted. Paragraph 83 is accepted. Paragraph 84 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 5l. Paragraphs 85 through 89 are accepted. With the substitution of the word "not" for the word "ever" in the last sentence of paragraph 90, it is accepted. Paragraphs 91 through 94 are accepted. Paragraph 95 is rejected as not supported by the record or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 96 through 100 are accepted. Paragraph 101 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraphs 102 through 106 are rejected as argument, comment, or irrelevant. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraph 1 is accepted. Paragraph 2 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The waters within the basin are of the same origin as they were prior to the creation of the jetty; no artificial body of water was created. With regard to paragraph 3 it is accepted that the jetty was constructed in the late 1960s. Paragraph 4 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 5 it is accepted that that is the applicants proposal no conclusion as to the likelihood of that is reached. Paragraph 5 is accepted. Paragraph 6 is accepted. Inevitably, however, spills will occur and must be considered as an adverse affect of the project. Paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraph 8 is rejected as unsupported by competent evidence or contrary to the weight of the evidence presented. Paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraph 11 is accepted but is inadequate to offset the adverse affects to manatees. Paragraph 12 is accepted but is inadequate to limit the adverse affects to sea grass. Paragraph 13 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 14 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraph 16 is accepted. Paragraphs 17 and 18 are accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE APPLICANT: Paragraphs 1 through the first sentence of paragraph 6 are accepted. The second sentence of paragraph 6 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 7 through Il are accepted. Paragraph 12 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 13 through the first sentence of paragraph 17 are accepted. The remainder of paragraph 17 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraph 19 is rejected as unsupported by the record or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20 is accepted. Paragraphs 21 through 26 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 27 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or unsupported by competent evidence. The first sentence of paragraph 28 is accepted, the remainder rejected as speculative, comment, or unsupported by the record. The first sentence of paragraph 29 is accepted, the remainder rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraph 31 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 32 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 33 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 34 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 35 is accepted; however, sea grasses not disturbed by dredging will still suffer adverse affects from shading and silting. Paragraph 36 is accepted but see comment to paragraph 35 above. Paragraph 37 is accepted. Paragraph 38 is accepted. Paragraph 39 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 40 is accepted. Paragraph 41 is accepted. Paragraph 42 is accepted. Paragraph 43 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 44 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 45 is accepted but it should be noted that is not the extent of the proposal. Paragraph 46 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 47 is accepted. Paragraph 48 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 49 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Pamela Presnell Garvin Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Charles Lee Florida Audubon Society 1101 Audubon Way Maitland, Florida 32751 Robert Routa P.O. Box 6506 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6506 Linda McMullen McFARLAIN, STERNSTEIN, WILEY & CASSEDY, P.A. 600 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.68267.061
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SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT vs JESUS G. QUEVEDO, 98-003053 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jul. 15, 1998 Number: 98-003053 Latest Update: May 17, 1999

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's revocation of Respondent's modified permit, authorizing a cross- fence on Petitioner's fee owned right-of-way, should be approved.

Findings Of Fact The South Florida Water Management District (District) is a public corporation in the State of Florida, existing by virtue of Chapter 25270, Laws of Florida (1949), and operating pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Title 40E, Florida Administrative Code, as a multi-purpose water management district. The District's principal office is West Palm Beach, Florida. In executing its multi-purpose, the District, as local sponsor for the US Army Corps of Engineers' Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, acquired canal rights-of-way. The District's rights-of-way were acquired to enable the Corps of Engineers to construct the flood control project and to maintain the system after its construction. The District operates a proprietary-based right-of-way program to manage the various property interests of the canal rights-of-way. The purpose of the District's right-of-way program is, to the extent possible, to allow uses of the rights- of-way that do not conflict with the flood control project. The rights-of way are used by both public and private concerns, including adjacent property owners, governmental entities, and utility companies. Jesus G. Quevedo is a private individual. His address is 2615 North Federal Highway, Lake Worth, Florida. The property at this address was vacant when Mr. Quevedo purchased it, and he has owned the property for approximately ten (10) years. The District has fee simple title to a strip of land on the south side of the District's C-51 Canal, immediately west of the Federal Highway/Olive Avenue bridge (C-51 Right-of-Way). Mr. Quevedo's property is located at the side of and adjacent to the C-51 Right-of-Way. The C-51 Right-of-Way is also located within the boundaries of Spillway Park as established in the agreement between the District and the City of Lake Worth. Generally described, Spillway Park includes the District's fee simple owned right-of-way on the south side of the District's C-51 Canal, beginning at the west side of the Federal Highway/Olive Avenue bridge and continuing to the east side of the Dixie Highway bridge. Mr. Quevedo has no real property interest in the C-51 Right-of-Way. Prior to purchasing his property, Mr. Quevedo was aware that the District owned the C-51 Right-of-Way. Historically, portions of Spillway Park and the C-51 Right-of-Way, in particular, have been a unique and popular location for excellent snook fishing by the public. These areas continue to be considered as such. On February 11, 1993, Mr. Quevedo was issued SFWMD Permit No. 9801 (Permit), a right-of-way occupancy permit, by the District’s Governing Board. The Permit authorized him to make use of the District’s lands and works as follows: 20’ X 50’ BOAT DOCK WITH WALKWAY, BURIED WATER AND ELECTRICAL SERVICE, POP-UP SPRINKLERS, AND SODDING WITHIN THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY OF C-51 LOCATED IMMEDIATELY WEST OF THE OLIVE AVENUE/FEDERAL HIGHWAY BRIDGE. During the permit application process, but prior to the issuance of the Permit, Mr. Quevedo had discussed with the District's staff the erection of a cross-fence based on allegations of improper or criminal activities by members of the public. Subsequently, in November 1995, Mr. Quevedo again discussed with the District's staff erection of a cross-fence based on the same allegations but he also included a new allegation of public safety as to the C-51 seawall. Based on the concern for public safety, the District's staff recommended that Mr. Quevedo be granted a modification to the Permit for a cross-fence. On November 14, 1996, the District's Governing Board approved, as part of its consent agenda, and issued SFWMD Permit MOD No. 9801 (MOD Permit)3 authorizing the following: CHAIN LINK CROSS FENCE WITH 16’ VEHICULAR GATE ALONG THE WEST PROPERTY LINE WITHIN THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY OF C-51 LOCATED AT 2615 NORTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY. The MOD Permit, as did the Permit, provides in pertinent part on its face the following: The permittee, by acceptance of this permit, hereby agrees that he shall promptly comply with all orders of the District and shall alter, repair or remove his use solely at his expense in a timely fashion. . . . This permit is issued by the District as a license to use or occupy District works or lands. . . By acceptance of this permit, the permittee expressly acknowledges that the permittee bears all risk of loss as a result of revocation of this permit. The MOD Permit, as did the Permit, contained standard limiting conditions, as provided in Rule 40E-6.381, Florida Administrative Code, and special conditions. The limiting conditions provide in pertinent part as follows: Permittee agrees to abide by all of the terms and conditions of this permit, including any representations made on the permit application and related documents. . . . This permit does not create any vested rights, and except for governmental entities and public or private utilities, is revocable at will upon reasonable prior written notice. Permittee bears all risk of loss as to monies expended in furtherance of the permitted use. Upon revocation, the permittee shall promptly modify, relocate or remove the permitted use. In the event of failure to so comply within the specified time, the District may remove the permitted use and permittee shall be responsible for all removal costs. This permit does not convey any property rights nor any rights or privileges other than those specified herein. . . . Having been granted the MOD Permit, Mr. Quevedo erected the cross-fence within and onto the C-51 Right-of-Way. The C-51 Right-of-Way is located adjacent to Mr. Quevedo’s property, as indicated earlier, and continues westerly to the permitted cross-fence. The C-51 Right-of-Way is enclosed by the cross-fence, preventing access by the public, and is located easterly of the cross-fence. As the C-51 Right-of-Way is located within the boundaries of the Spillway Park, the cross- fence is also located within the boundaries of the Spillway Park. During the time that Mr. Quevedo has owned his home, including prior to and after erection of the cross-fence, he, his family members and/or guests have frequently fished from the C-51 seawall and used the C-51 Right-of-Way enclosed by the cross- fence. Prior to and after the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo and his family members have selectively controlled access by the public to the C-51 Right-of-Way at the C-51 seawall. Prior to the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo chased members of the public off the C-51 Right-of-Way. Mr. Quevedo and members of his family also called law enforcement officers to remove members of the public who were located on the C-51 Right-of-Way, even if the members of the public were fishing from the C-51 seawall. After the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo and his family members continued to engage in this conduct of selective access. Subsequent to the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo had a member of the public arrested for trespassing. The person allegedly jumped over or went around the cross-fence to fish from the C-51 seawall in the C-51 Right-of-Way. With the existence of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo has prevented the general public from using the C-51 Right-of-Way, including the C-51 seawall. As a result, he has acquired the exclusive, private use of the C-51 Right-of-Way at the C-51 seawall, which is publicly owned land, and has, almost doubled the size of his adjacent property without the obligations and expense of acquisition, assuming he could acquire the property through acquisition. The District's policy is that public land should be open to the public. Contrary to this policy, Mr. Quevedo's cross-fence precludes access to the District's right-of-way (C-51 Right-of-Way), including the seawall, for passive recreational use. Similar cross-fencing, although not within the boundaries of Spillway Park, have been erected behind residences on the northeast, northwest, and southeast sides of Federal Highway, along the District’s C-51 Canal bank. The cross-fencing prevents public use of the District’s C-51 Canal bank at these locations. The City of Lake Worth made improvements within the boundaries of Spillway Park; however, it made no improvements, and does not intend to make any improvements in the future, at the C-51 Right-of-Way where Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence is located or at the other private lots west of Mr. Quevedo's property. All of the improvements made at Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence at the C-51 Right-of-Way have been made by him even though the C-51 Right-of- Way is located within Spillway Park. The original public safety rationale for authorizing Mr. Quevedo to erect the cross-fence blocking public access was revisited by the District. Additional investigation by safety experts (Risk Management staff) revealed that no unreasonable danger existed by allowing public access to the C-51 seawall at the C-51 Right-of-Way. In the absence of the public safety basis for closure of the C-51 Right-of-Way, such closure was contrary to District policy. As a consequence, the District’s staff recommended to the District’s Governing Board that the MOD Permit, authorizing Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence, be revoked. After conducting two public meetings and receiving comments from Mr. Quevedo, members of the public, and the District’s staff as to the policy issue of pubic access to the C- 51 Right-of-Way, the District’s Governing Board determined that the C-51 Right-of-Way should be open to the public. Consequently, the Governing Board decided to revoke Mr. Quevedo's MOD Permit. Allegations of criminal activity within the general boundaries of Spillway Park and, specifically, in the C-51 Right- of-Way at the cross-fence area, were made by Mr. Quevedo as a basis to not revoke the MOD Permit and allow the cross-fence to remain. Such allegations have no bearing on the revocation of the MOD Permit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order revoking SFWMD Permit No. MOD 981 issued to Jesus G. Quevedo. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1999.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.569120.57373.016373.085373.086 Florida Administrative Code (3) 40E-6.01140E-6.34140E-6.381
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RANGER CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 81-001429 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001429 Latest Update: Mar. 03, 1982

Findings Of Fact Petitioner has a lease on a 160-acre tract of land along the northern boundary of Palm Beach County which has been zoned and used for several years to mine rock used in local road building operations. This tract of land is surrounded on the east, south and west by some 1,000 acres of land owned by Intervenor, Vanguard Farms. The Vanguard Farms property is used to grow citrus and sugarcane. The geology of the area in the vicinity of this application is such that some three feet of Everglades top soil overlies the limestone. The land surface is about fifteen (15) feet NGVD and the water level table fluctuates from twelve (12) to fourteen (14) feet NGVD for the dry and wet seasons. The Vanguard Farms property, which surrounds Petitioner's property in Palm Beach County, is a wet area bordered on the west by Lake Okeechobee and on the east by high ground water elevation. The area has an excess of rainfall over evapotranspiration and excess water will always be generated. In order to render Vanguard Farms arable it is necessary to drain the property and pump excess water from the land. The existing rock pit is some 6.7 acres in area. In order to economically mine rock from this pit it is necessary to remove stable overburden and expose the limerock to provide a stable platform on which the mining equipment can be operated. Since the water table is generally above the top of this limerock, it is necessary to remove water from the pit to expose the rock to be quarried. During earlier operations water from the pit dewatering was pumped into a canal which flowed onto intervenor's property. In the application now under consideration, no water from the dewatering operation will be pumped off the 160 acres controlled by Petitioner. A 25-acre holding pond has been constructed on this site as well as a 9-acre overflow pond. The holding pond was constructed by piling the overburden, and possibly some limerock, in a rectangular shape some ten feet above the surface (25 feet NGVD). This material with which this 10-foot high levee is formed was excavated with a dragline and shaped with a tractor. Condition 28, of the conditions proposed by Respondent for the grant of this application, requires all dikes, levees and berms behind which water is to be retained to be inspected for structural adequacy. A report of such inspection and steps necessary to correct the deficiencies noted shall be submitted, and the report is to be signed and sealed by a Florida registered professional engineer. Perimeter ditches on the north, south and east sides of Petitioner's lands will intercept seepage from the retention pond and surface waters flowing onto this property. These perimeter ditches are connected to the rock pit to which such waters will flow. Water moving westward across the property will be intercepted by the rock pit. Without the rock pit excess water generated in this area will flow onto Vanguard's adjacent land. This condition will exist when the pit is not in operation. However, when the pit is in operation, the water will be retained on Petitioner's property by those limiting conditions requiring the maintenance of water level elevation in the perimeter ditch to be kept either equal to or below the water level elevation of Vanguard Farms. Under this condition, all water will be routed between the pit and retention pond. Conditions of the permit which Respondent proposes to issue include that the water level in the retention pond not exceed 18.5 feet NGVD, that the holding pond be interconnected with the overflow pond, that the water level in the perimeter ditches be maintained by use of a flashboard riser at 10.8 feet NGVD, that dewatering operations cease upon notification by District staff of any adjacent property owners experiencing water-related problems, and that a direct connection between holding pond and rock pit be established for emergency discharge of water from the holding pond back into the rock pit.

Florida Laws (1) 373.044
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SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT vs DEBORAH SUGGS, 03-001128 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bushnell, Florida Mar. 28, 2003 Number: 03-001128 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 2024
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CIVIL CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY, INC. vs SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 02-000473 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Feb. 07, 2002 Number: 02-000473 Latest Update: Dec. 26, 2002

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's certification as a minority business enterprise should be revoked, as proposed by Petitioner in its letter dated December 20, 2001.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Respondent, Civil Construction Technologies, Inc. (CCT), is a corporation engaged in the business of providing earthwork, clearing, canal excavation, and erosion control services for prime contractors. The firm was incorporated on April 6, 2000, and until November 2001, it was located at 1132 Northeast 48th Street, Pompano Beach, Florida. The business was then relocated to 3100 Northwest Boca Raton Boulevard, Boca Raton, Florida. The sole owner and shareholder is Bonnie S. Cramer, a female who qualifies as a minority under the Supplier Diversity & Outreach Program (Program) codified in Part VI, Chapter 40E-7, Florida Administrative Code. That Program is administered by Petitioner, South Florida Water Management District (District). CCT's application for certification as a minority business enterprise (MBE) was filed with the District on December 12, 2000, and was approved on December 15, 2000, in the areas of earthwork, clearing, canal excavation, and erosion control. The certification expires on December 15, 2003. Although the District had "some concerns" regarding Ms. Cramer's knowledge of the business during its review of the application, it gave her "the benefit of the doubt on the application because she had worked in the industry." On August 22, 2001, the District held a "partnering" meeting for all contractors, including CCT, on a pump station project awarded to Beers Stanska, Inc. (the Beers project). CCT was represented at the meeting by Ronald J. Coddington (Ron Coddington), a non-minority professional engineer who had worked on other District projects in the past and owns an earthwork company. Coddington's attendance on behalf of a minority contractor raised suspicions on the part of a District contract administrator, Jessica Flathmann, who also attended the meeting. Ms. Flathmann, who is now on active duty with the military, prepared a short note the same date requesting that the District's compliance section "[p]lease check out [CCT's] information (minority status) with state on-line info." The "state on-line info" refers to the Department of State's web site for Florida corporations. A subsequent name search under the Department of State's corporation records revealed that since at least 1987 Ms. Cramer had been an officer and/or director in a number of other corporations, including Team Land Holdings, Inc. (vice- president, secretary, treasurer, and 50 percent owner), Team Environmental Resources, Inc. (owner, president, vice- president, and secretary-treasurer), Team Land Development, Inc. (treasurer), Team Offshore Services, Inc. (secretary- treasurer), Team Marine Services, Inc. (director and secretary-treasurer), and R.J. Coddington and Associates, P.A. (vice-president). Except for Team Environmental Resources, Inc., Ron Coddington was a principal in, and owner of, all of the other corporations. Because Ms. Cramer had failed to acknowledge a relationship with any other firms on her application, the District decided to conduct an investigation concerning CCT's eligibility for MBE status. Based on a site visit to Ms. Cramer's office, and an interview with her, the District determined that decertification proceedings were appropriate. By letter dated December 20, 2001, as later clarified during discovery, the District alleged that CCT made a material misrepresentation on its original application for certification in violation of Rule 40E-7.653(2), Florida Administrative Code; that CCT "shared resources with a non-minority person or business in the same or an associated field" in violation of Rule 40E- 7.653(6)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code; and that CCT's owner, Ms. Cramer, "does not possess the knowledge and technical expertise to manage the day-to-day activities of her firm." Respondent denies all allegations. It also suggests that the District's real purpose in revoking the certification is because of animosity between certain District personnel and Ron Coddington, with whom Ms. Cramer has had a personal relationship and is now engaged to marry. Material Mispresentation The District first alleges that Petitioner made a material mispresentation on its application for certification by answering Question 20 in the negative. That question reads as follows: ARE ANY OWNERS, PARTNERS OR PRINCIPALS OF YOUR COMPANY AFFILIATED WITH ANY OTHER FIRM(S) AS EMPLOYEES, SHAREHOLDERS, OR DIRECTORS? If Yes, please list below, attach a written explanation of the business relationship and provide a financial statement for the affiliate firm(s). Ms. Cramer answered Question 20 "No." At the end of the application, she executed a lengthy affidavit acknowledging that all of the statements contained in the application were "true, accurate and complete." When the question was answered, Ms. Cramer was a vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and part-owner of Team Land Holdings, Inc., a corporation which owned the building listed as the business address for CCT and two corporations in which Ron Coddington was a principal. As to Team Environmental Services, Inc. and Team Land Development, Inc., however, the parties disagree on Ms. Cramer's status in those corporations at the time the application was filed. The other corporations are not in issue since they are no longer active or Ms. Cramer has resigned as an officer, director, or employee. Ms. Cramer was president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer of Team Environmental Services, Inc. and filed the paperwork to incorporate the business. She indicated that the corporation "never did any business," had no income, closed its books in either April or August 2000, and filed its final tax return for calendar year 2000. Even so, Ms. Cramer continued to file annual reports with the Secretary of State for two more years after the corporation allegedly closed its books, and she did not file Articles of Dissolution for the corporation until April 2002, or just before her deposition in this case was taken. Given these circumstances, it is found that Ms. Cramer was still affiliated with an active corporation at the time she filed her application, and this information should have been disclosed. Beginning in 1987 and continuing until May 2000, Ms. Cramer was a director, officer, and employee of Team Land Development, Inc., a firm engaged in the earthwork business and owned by Ron Coddington. However, Ms. Cramer submitted into evidence a letter to Ron Coddington dated May 10, 2000, tendering her resignation as an officer and director. The authenticity of that letter was not challenged. She also testified that she resigned as an employee around March 2000. While the record shows that Ms. Cramer prepared and filed the annual report for the company in 2001, or after she had resigned as an employee, she explained that she was simply helping out by doing some "extra accounting" for the firm even though she was no longer on the payroll. In light of these circumstances, there is less than clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Cramer was affiliated with Team Land Development, Inc. at the time she submitted her application for certification, and thus she was not required to disclose her relationship with that entity. One of the purposes of Question 20 is to determine if an applicant has a parent company, affiliates, or subsidiaries. This information is then used by the District to determine whether the applicant has true management and control over the business or whether another entity has actual control over the applicant. The information is also used to determine whether the applicant meets the size standards for MBEs when combined with the affiliates. This is important because District regulations establish certain size thresholds (in terms of net assets and number of employees) which an applicant cannot exceed. It can be inferred from the evidence that for these reasons, the District considers the information in Question 20 to be material since the information is essential in order to properly review a MBE application. Ms. Cramer, who signed the application, suggested that Question 20 was ambiguous and unclear. However, Ms. Cramer never sought guidance from District personnel to clear up any confusion she might have, nor did she read the MBE rule itself. Rather, she interpreted the question as requiring an affirmative response only if she was affiliated with another firm involved "in [a] similar or same field" as CCT. Because the two corporations in which she was then affiliated did not provide the same or similar services as CCT, she responded in the negative. Question 20 is clear and unambiguous. It simply requires an applicant to identify any other corporation or entity in which the applicant is affiliated. The question does not mention, or even suggest, that an affirmative answer is required only if the other entity is in the same or similar field as the applicant's business. Respondent's contention that the question was ambiguous and susceptible to more than one interpretation has been rejected. The only remaining issue is whether the omitted information was "material" so as to constitute a ground for revocation of the certification. As noted above, the District considers the information derived from Question 20 to be material since that information is necessary to carry out its responsibility of determining an applicant's eligibility. Therefore, the failure by Ms. Cramer to disclose her relationship with two corporations was a material omission, as alleged in the letter of December 20, 2001. Did CCT share resources with a non-MBE? Petitioner next alleges that CCT shared resources with a non-minority person or business which is in the same field of operations in violation of Rule 40E-7.653(6)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code. Those provisions require that the minority owner demonstrate its independence and that the business does not share common ownership, directors, or facilities with a non-minority person or business in the same or related field of operations. Ron Coddington is the owner of Team Land Development, Inc. (TDI), an earthmoving company which performed contract work for the District until January 2002, and for whom CCT was a subcontractor on two District projects. TDI's business address was 1132 Northeast 48th Street, Pompano Beach, which is the same address used by CCT until November 2001. In addition, R.J. Coddington & Associates, Inc., an engineering firm owned by Ron Coddington, also listed that street address as its business address for the years 2000 and 2001. That firm provides engineering services through Mr. Coddington's professional engineering license. Thus, the three corporations shared the same address from April 2000 (when CCT was incorporated) until November 2001. A small office building is located at 1132 Northeast 48th Street and is owned by Team Land Holdings, Inc., a company in which Ron Coddington and Ms. Cramer each owns 50 percent of the stock. The exact configuration of the offices within the building is not clear although Ms. Cramer testified that the building once had three separate "suites," each with a separate entrance, and that CCT occupied an office in the back of the building with a conference table that was used for all CCT meetings. However, when District investigators visited the building for an interview with Ms. Cramer in October 2001, they entered a common entrance, met her in a "front" office area, and were not invited into a separate office in the back of the building. Likewise, when they interviewed Ron Coddington during the course of this proceeding, he also met them in the same front area and did not invite them into a separate office. Respondent contended that the three firms only shared a fax machine and a kitchen area used primarily for storage purposes. Even so, the more clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that three corporations, including at least one engaged in the same business as CCT, were sharing facilities, as prohibited by the rule. Therefore, it is found that from December 2000 when it was first certified, and until November 2001, CCT shared facilities (offices) with a non-MBE business (Team Land Development, Inc.) which was engaged in the same business (earthmoving) as CCT. Did Ms. Cramer possess the knowledge and experience to operate her business? Finally, the District alleges that Ms. Cramer "does not possess the knowledge and technical expertise to manage the day-to-day activities of her firm," as required by Rule 40E-7.653(5)(c)4., Florida Administrative Code. That rule requires that Ms. Cramer have "managerial and technical capability, knowledge, training, education and experience required to make decisions regarding that particular type of work." To support this allegation, the District relies upon a report prepared by the District's Inspector-General on December 6, 2001; the results of an interview with Ms. Cramer conducted in January 2002 by a professional engineer; and the deposition of Ms. Cramer taken during the spring of 2002 in preparation for the final hearing. Ms. Cramer's background is in accounting and bookkeeping. She is not an engineer. Indeed, on her personal income tax return for the year 2000, she listed her occupation as an accountant. She also admits that she is not an expert in earthmoving, nor does she have experience working at job sites overseeing that type of work. According to the resume attached to her application, and before CCT was incorporated, Ms. Cramer was employed in the following positions, some of which were apparently part- time: (1) bank teller and branch manager of a bank (1972- 1981); (2) bookkeeper for an upholstery firm (1981-1998); owner of a music store (1982-1985); accounting assistant for a general contractor (1985-1987); accounting assistant to a certified public accountant (1987-1998); and treasurer of Team Land Development, Inc. (1987-1999). The same resume represents that CCT's "typical work" includes canal excavation, erosion control and dewatering, and wetland construction. It also indicates that the firm provides "earthwork and construction solutions for prime contractors," as well as "skilled, knowledgeable personnel providing a variety of earthwork, erosion control and site environmental mitigation services." In issuing its proposed agency action, the District relied in part upon an investigation conducted by Mr. Sooker, a certified public accountant in its Inspector-General's Office. Mr. Sooker performed an on-site "audit" of CCT on October 30 and 31, 2001. The audit included an interview with Ms. Cramer and the examination of various documentation related to the business. In his report, Mr. Sooker concluded that CCT did not meet eligibility standards for a MBE for several reasons, including an opinion that Ms. Cramer "d[id] not possess the background, experience, and technical expertise to manage and control job site work activities." After the letter of December 20, 2001, was issued, Ms. Cramer requested a meeting with the District to demonstrate that she had the necessary experience to manage the day-to-day operations of an earthmoving company. The meeting was held in January 2002. At that time, a District professional engineer, Mr. Weldon, who has extensive experience in earthmoving, posed a series of questions to Ms. Cramer regarding her knowledge of that business. While Respondent contends that Mr. Weldon's interview was flawed in many respects, it is found that the interview was a reasonable and appropriate way in which to test Ms. Cramer's qualifications to operate an earthmoving business. In response to many of the questions, Ms. Cramer simply stated that she would rely on her foreman and project manager to resolve the issues raised by the engineer. As to the remaining inquiries, she failed to demonstrate any technical expertise in the area. Thus, the meeting reconfirmed the District's preliminary conclusion (found in Mr. Sooker's report) regarding Ms. Cramer's lack of technical expertise in the area for which CCT was certified. During a deposition taken prior to hearing, Ms. Cramer was also asked a series of questions pertaining to earthmoving to ascertain the degree of experience and competence that she possessed. Again, Ms. Cramer failed to demonstrate that she had the requisite experience necessary to manage her business. For example, Ms. Cramer was unfamiliar with the term "shrinkage," a term commonly used in the business; she could not describe a method for estimating canal excavation or factors necessary to make that estimate; she could not state what type of equipment would be used if the material being excavated had dense sand, weak limestone, or cemented shells; she was unaware that soil borings would indicate the presence of rock in the material being excavated; and she could not describe the process for excavating and constructing a berm "with haul that would affect equipment collection." An experienced person in the field of earthmoving would be expected to correctly answer most, if not all, of these inquiries. Thus, Ms. Cramer did not demonstrate any level of experience or firsthand knowledge in operating an earthwork company. While she was able to respond more accurately to some of these same questions at the final hearing, the undersigned assumed that she could do so only because the intervening time between the deposition and final hearing allowed her to consult with experts and prepare her answers. In addition, Ms. Cramer acknowledged that she has never been a project manager for any construction job, including those that CCT has contracted to perform; she has never operated any heavy equipment; she has never personally prepared job estimates involving plans and specifications by herself; she cannot read construction plans and specifications; she has not negotiated any contracts for CCT; and she has never attended any meetings that the District has held for the Beers project. On the Beers project, in which CCT is a subcontractor for the prime contractor, notices of safety violations by CCT employees are sent to Ron Coddington's attention, and the first subcontract agreement between Beers and CCT was also sent to his attention. In fact, in correspondence to CCT, the Beers office manager for the project assumed that Ron Coddington was president of the firm. At the same time, Ms. Cramer relies heavily on her foremen and Ron Coddington (who serves as a $1,600.00 per week consultant) to deal with all technical aspects of her business and to answer questions regarding the Beers project. She further acknowledged that she has delegated a number of tasks on the Beers project to Ron Coddington, such as providing estimates and bid takeoffs; providing on-site project management; preparing project schedules and monthly estimates; making on-site inspections; coordinating on-site surveys and quality control with CCT employees; assuming responsibility for owner and prime contractor conduct on the District pump station projects; and representing CCT at all job coordination meetings. Notwithstanding the above, Respondent contends that the Inspector-General's report dated December 6, 2001, is the primary underpinning for the District's case and that the report is flawed in numerous respects. For example, the Inspector-General's Office has an operations manual which spells out the manner in which investigations shall be conducted. Contrary to specific requirements in the operations manual, Mr. Sooker did not prepare, sign, and file a statement of independence, and he did not maintain and preserve working papers, outlines of questions, and interview notes in the investigative file. These deficiencies were confirmed through the testimony of Respondent's expert, Mr. Kirchenbaum, a certified public accountant, as well as the Inspector-General himself. While Mr. Sooker's investigation admittedly did not fully conform with the operations manual, his conclusions regarding Ms. Cramer's experience were independently verified and reconfirmed through the interview with Ms. Cramer in January 2002 and the answers given by her in the deposition taken in April 2002. Therefore, even if Mr. Sooker's report is ignored, there is other clear and convincing evidence to support the allegations in the letter of December 20, 2001. For the foregoing reasons, it is found that Ms. Cramer does not have managerial and technical capability, knowledge, training, education, and experience required to make decisions regarding the type of business in which she is certified, as alleged in the letter of December 20, 2001.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order revoking the MBE certification of Civil Construction Technologies, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry Dean, Executive Director South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680 Catherine A. Linton, Esquire South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680 Bradford J. Beilly, Esquire Bradford J. Beilly, P.A. 400 Southeast 18th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316-2820

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57120.595
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WILLIAM B. SWAIM vs FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 15-000091RU (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jan. 08, 2015 Number: 15-000091RU Latest Update: Jan. 27, 2015
Florida Laws (3) 120.52120.54120.68
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SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT vs AMBER SUGGS, 03-000788 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bushnell, Florida Mar. 05, 2003 Number: 03-000788 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 2024
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