The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a very well-credentialed, internationally-recognized cancer researcher who is black and a native of Cameroon. He has been granted lawful permanent residence status in the United States (with an EB-1 classification, signifying that he is an alien with "extraordinary ability"). Petitioner received his Doctor of Medicine degree in 1999 from the University of Yaounde I in Cameroon. He spent the next five years as a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Rochester Medical Center in Rochester, New York.3 He worked in the Department of Orthopaedics (under the supervision of Randy N. Rosier, M.D., Ph.D.) for the first two of these five years and the James P. Wilmont Cancer Center (under the supervision of Dr. Rosier and Joseph D. Rosenblatt, M.D.) for the remaining three years. Petitioner enjoyed a considerable amount of independence, and was "very productive," during his time at the University of Rochester Medical Center. In June 2005, Petitioner began working as a post- doctoral associate assigned to the Viral Oncology (VO) program at UM's Sylvester Comprehensive Cancer Center (Sylvester) in Miami, Florida. He remained in this position until his termination (which he claims was discriminatorily motivated) in September 2006. Sylvester "serves as the hub for cancer-related research, diagnosis, and treatment at [UM's] Miller School of Medicine" (Miller). The VO program is administratively housed in the Division of Hematology/Oncology of Miller's Department of Medicine. Dr. Rosenblatt, Petitioner's former supervisor at the University of Rochester Medical Center, is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, the Chief of the Division of Hematology/Oncology. According to the Sylvester website, the goals of the VO program include: Investigating the mechanisms of oncogenesis and innate immune subversion in viral associated cancers including those that arise in immunocompromised patients. Devising novel and targeted therapeutic and preventive strategies for viral associated malignancies. Implementing basic and clinical international collaborative studies in developing nations that have a high incidence of these tumors. William Harrington, Jr., M.D., is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, "in charge" of the VO program. Dr. Harrington, who is white, is a 1984 Miller graduate. He has been working for UM since his graduation 24 years ago. For the past 17 or 18 of these years, he has held positions having supervisory authority over other UM employees. As the head of the VO program, Dr. Harrington runs a "small" laboratory (Dr. Harrington's lab) staffed by a post- doctoral associate, lab technicians, and a research nurse (all of whom he directly supervises). Dr. Harrington's lab is a "hundred percent funded by [competitive] peer review grants": four from the National Institutes of Health (NIH); one from the Leukemia Society; and one from the State of Florida. It is "one of the best-funded labs" at UM. In addition to running his lab, Dr. Harrington also sees and treats patients at UM's Jackson Memorial Medical Center (Jackson Memorial). Approximately 95% of his patients are indigent, with a large number of them being of African descent (black). Dr. Harrington "specializes" in viral lymphomas, with a strong emphasis on diseases that occur predominantly in persons of African descent (certain AIDS-related lymphomas, HTLV-related lymphomas, and Burkitt lymphoma). Over the years, Dr. Harrington has had occasion to do work outside the United States, in areas where these diseases are prevalent, including the Afro-Brazilian state of Bahia, where, approximately 12 years ago, he met his wife Tanya, who is of African descent. Dr. Harrington has also "worked with colleagues in Zambia . . . on AIDS-related lymphomas and pediatric Burkitt lymphomas." Approximately seven or eight years ago, Dr. Harrington "sponsored post-doc[toral] trainees from Zambia in his lab." Dr. Harrington was introduced to Petitioner by Dr. Rosenthal. After reviewing Petitioner's "bio-sketch," Dr Harrington interviewed Petitioner and was sufficiently impressed to offer Petitioner an unadvertised post-doctoral position in his lab. Dr. Harrington hired Petitioner because Petitioner had the "skillset" Dr. Harrington was looking for. Dr. Harrington was particularly influenced by Petitioner's background, including publications, in NF-kappaB signaling, which was an "area[] of [Dr. Harrington's] interest." Moreover, Dr. Harrington thought Petitioner was a "smart capable man." At the time he hired Petitioner, Dr. Harrington was aware Petitioner was black and from Cameroon. Neither Petitioner's race, nor his national origin, played any role in Dr. Harrington's hiring decision. As a post-doctoral associate, Petitioner was the "senior lab person" working under Dr. Harrington's supervision. He was expected to assume a "higher level [of responsibility] than other staff personnel in [the] lab . . . in terms of doing a given set of experiments or [other] work." Dr. Harrington and Petitioner initially enjoyed a cordial working relationship. They had "excellent rapport" and even socialized after work hours. At Dr. Harrington's invitation, Petitioner came over to Dr. Harrington's house approximately "every other Friday" and for the Thanksgiving holiday. Although Dr. Harrington did not hire Petitioner specifically to "build[] international research programs," once Petitioner was hired, Dr. Harrington did discuss the matter with Petitioner, and he authorized Petitioner to initiate contact with cancer investigators in Cameroon to explore the possibility of their collaborating with Dr. Harrington on a project involving NF-kappaB signaling and Burkitt lymphoma. After having received Dr. Harrington's authorization, Petitioner "made contact with some of [his] mentors back in Cameroon, all [of whom were] involved in [Cameroon's] national cancer control program." On July 13, 2005, Dr. Harrington himself sent an e- mail to these Cameroonian investigators, which read as follows: Thank you Dr. Mouelsone for your response. I was considering putting together a project on Burkitt lymphomas that would principally be a study on the biology of the tumor in endemic and HIV associated cases. We would collaborate with investigators in Brazil and Africa. The study would be focused on targets that could be exploited in novel therapies as well the role of ebv [Epstein Barr virus] in different types of tumors. We already have IRB approval for collection of residual lymphoma specimens as well as protocols for the processing that would be required. A challenge in any grant is keeping the project focused and attractive scientifically for the reviewers. The participating center would have to have the capability to identify and consent patients as well as processing and storage . . . . Therefore one would need reagents, a research nurse (maybe 50%) salary and liquid nitrogen dewar as well as some support for a PI. Maybe I could send everyone the aims of a recently submitted grant to see if it would be possible. I could send our informed consent document since it broadly covers all viral associated tumors. I am attaching a recent article and I sincerely appreciate your help. I also am a fan of the Cameroon's football team the "indomitable lions." Dr. Harrington ultimately determined to collaborate exclusively with the Brazilian investigators, with whom he had a longstanding professional relationship, and not with the Cameroonian investigators, on this particular project. During the first several months of Petitioner's employment, he engaged in research involving NF-kappaB signaling. He also helped write an article (entitled, "Zidovudine: A Potential Targeted Therapy for Endemic Burkitt Lymphoma") that was published in the East African Medical Journal. When presented with the draft of the article that Petitioner had prepared, Dr. Harrington commented to Petitioner (by e-mail dated July 28, 2005), "[T]his is better than the one I wrote." Petitioner also contributed to the preparation of a successful NIH grant application submitted on September 1, 2005, by Dr. Harrington (as Principal Investigator/Program Director) seeking funding for his lab, as well as for collaborators in Brazil and at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, to "investigate in primary BLs [Burkitt lymphomas] the form of EBV [Epstein Barr virus] latency and its relationship to NF- k[appa]B"; to "determine the susceptibility of primary tumor cell lines to antiviral apoptosis"; and to "investigate commonly available, inexpensive agents that are known to induce the EBV lytic cycle and potentiate phosphorylation of AZT [azidothymidine, also known as Zidovudine]." The grant application was "based on . . . work that had been done [prior] to [Petitioner's coming to work in Dr. Harrington's lab]." The following individuals were listed as the "key personnel" on the grant application: Dr. Harrington; Iguaracyra Araujo, M.D., of Brazil; Jose Barreto, M.D., of Brazil; Carlos Brites, M.D., Ph.D., of Brazil; Dirk Dittmer, Ph.D., of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and Isildinha Reis, Ph.D., of UM. The following statements were made on the grant application concerning Dr. Reis' and Petitioner's anticipated roles in the proposed project: Isidinha Reis, Ph.D. (Biostatistician) will be in charge of the statistical component of this project including periodic analysis of data pertaining to this grant. She will participate in phone conferences with Ms. Shank and Luz. She will be particularly important for the conduct of this study since she is Brazilian by birth and fluent in Portuguese. 7.5% support is requested. Valentine Andela (Post Doctoral Fellow) will be in charge of all the day-to-day laboratory aspects of Dr. Harrington's component of the project. This includes receipt of isolates shipped from Brazil and then forwarding them to Dr. Dittmer, cell culture, DNA and RNA preparation and hybridization, EMSA and immunoblot analysis, cryopreservation of samples, etc. 50% support is requested. In the fall of 2005, Dr. Harrington discussed with Petitioner an article published in a "science magazine" that reported on Epstein-Barr virus (EBV) microRNAs, which, at the time, was a relatively unexplored area of research and one in which Dr. Harrington "definitely [did] not" have any "expertise." During the discussion, Petitioner expressed an interest in studying EBV microRNAs. Dr. Harrington "agreed [this] would be an interesting project to pursue," and he "thought [Petitioner] could do a good job" on it. With Dr. Harrington's approval, Petitioner thereafter started his research of EBV microRNAs, a project that consumed most of his work time during the remainder of his employment with UM. The project included helping draft a manuscript detailing the findings of the research. The experiments that Petitioner did as part of the project were on tumor samples that had been "collect[ed]" and "intial[ly] analy[zed]" by Brazilian investigators with whom Dr. Harrington had collaborated with in the past. In November 2005, Petitioner advised Dr. Harrington that he was considering participating in a clinical residency program, and Dr. Harrington "agreed to help [Petitioner] out" in any efforts he might make to seek a residency position. At Petitioner's request, Dr. Harrington wrote a letter of reference (dated November 16, 2005), "highly recommending" Petitioner for such a position. Dr. Harrington indicated in his letter, among other things, that in the "relatively brief time" that Petitioner had worked for him, Petitioner had "exceeded [Dr. Harrington's] expectations and made novel findings in the area of lymphoma and Epstein Barr virus." In addition to writing this letter of reference, Dr. Harrington, on Petitioner's behalf, contacted Stephen Symes, M.D., who at the time was the "head of the [Jackson Memorial medical] house staff program." Dr. Symes told Dr. Harrington that the "logical thing for [Petitioner] to [first] do [was] . . . a clinical rotation" at a teaching hospital, such as Jackson Memorial (during which he would act as either an observer or as an actual member of a medical team). Petitioner had planned to participate in a two-week clinical rotation at Jackson Memorial in December 2005, but had to change his plans because, when December came, he was still immersed in the EBV microRNA research project he had undertaken and had no time to do the rotation. Dr. Harrington was pleased with the quality of the work that Petitioner was doing on the project. In an e-mail he sent Petitioner on March 6, 2006, Dr. Harrington stated that he was "really excited about [Petitioner's] work," which he described as "novel and probably the best thing to come out of [his] little lab." On or about March 20, 2006, Dr. Harrington provided Petitioner with his written annual performance evaluation. He gave Petitioner an overall rating of "exceeds standards," with Petitioner receiving an "exceeds" rating in the categories of "Job Knowledge," "Supervision Required," "Quality of Work," "Adaptability," "Customer Service," and "Safety," and a "meets" rating in the category of "Time Management." Dr. Harrington made the following handwritten comment on the evaluation with respect to the latter category: I would like him to maintain more regular hours but his work is outstanding. Dr. Harrington felt compelled to make this comment because, although he "liked the work [Petitioner] was doing," "there were issues [regarding Petitioner's] disappearing for long periods of time [from Dr. Harrington's lab without telling Dr. Harrington where he was] and [Dr. Harrington] thought that this was becoming problematic." These "unexplained absences" from the lab were becoming more frequent and Dr. Harrington felt like Petitioner was "pushing the envelope." The improvements that Dr. Harrington had hoped to see in Petitioner's attendance did not materialize, and the relationship between the two deteriorated precipitously. On March 29, 2006, following a confrontation he had with Dr. Harrington, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Dr. Harrington, in which he advised: I did not mean to be rude this afternoon and you are absolutely right in pointing out that I am tense and consequently reactive. All things considered, I am putting undue pressure on myself. I am pretty much accepted in the Master of Arts in International Administration (MAIA) program at the UM. It is a professional degree program that puts a lot of weight on a practicum of the degree candidate[']s choice. I had proposed to implement the strategy articulated in the attached manuscript, which was previously funded in 2003 by an NCI-UICC grant for international cancer research and technology transfer. I am going to commit[] to the MAIA program, get it done in a year, and then reassess. I can go on to work in international developmental aid or go on to do a residency. If I was pushing for a tenure track faculty position, it is in part because I wanted to pursue the first option, but do it gradually over 3 years under your wing. Of course, I was counting on that plan being in line with your grand scheme, i.e. developing international programs. Dr. Harrington responded that same day by sending Petitioner the following e-mail: Ok I can help you with letters etc. I understand and that sounds like a good program. I want to expand these studies to Africa and hopefully in the future we can work together. I need your help on this paper. I think you have done very nice work. Things are pretty tough in the academic arena these days. A few days later, on April 1, 2006, Dr. Harrington, upset with what he felt was Petitioner's continuing lack of respect for his supervisory authority over the operation of the lab, sent Petitioner an e-mail, in which he stated the following: I have given this some thought and I don't think that this is working out with you. I am tired to see that you have simply disappeared without even a word to me and although you do very nice work it isn't worth it to me at this point. I also did not like the way you simply dismissed the fact that I had to do the work as outlined in the grant. I have tried very hard to go out of my way to accommodate you but at this point I feel that I have no authority at all. I want you to sit down on Monday and give me all the data for this paper, raw and otherwise. I also received all the pictures from Iguarcyra and the tumors are on the way. If you don't want to finish this then I will send everything to [D]irk. It is too bad because there is a lot we could have accomplished. Later that month, on April 28, 2006, reacting to another instance of Petitioner's being away from the lab when he was expecting Petitioner to be there, Dr. Harrington sent the following e-mail to Petitioner: I have been waiting around here to look at the figures. If you don't come in you should call, or if you leave for the majority of the day, you should call. I have spoken to you about this to no avail. You are a smart guy but am sick of this. Finish your paper and find another job. You will have to leave the computer here too. I will not ask for a raise for you nor a faculty position. Dr. Harrington sent Petitioner a follow-up e-mail the next day, which read as follows: I really am disgusted. You have thrown away everything this year, both for you and me. Your unstable behavior makes me question everything you have done also and so I will have to cancel submitting this paper until Lan[4] or JC can repeat some of the work. You are throwing away your tuition benefits also and have adversely affected everyone, most of all yourself. I have contacted the appropriate ones about this. I strongly urge you to do all I have outlined below.[5] I will not consider anything else. In an April 30, 2006, e-mail to Dr. Harrington, Petitioner responded: I will let the facts speak for themselves. Prior to joining your lab, I spent over five years working in a highly interactive and competitive environment. My record is infallible. You have in fact benefited tremendously from my intellect, my experience and especially my poise. I trust you would assemble an ethics committee to probe my work. I expect a letter of termination in due form and I would transfer all of the research material accordingly. This e-mail generated the following response from Dr. Harrington, which was communicated to Petitioner later that day by e-mail: Poise, what a joke. If you walk off with the data and th[]e computer I will call security. The morning of May 2, 2006, Petitioner sent the following e-mail to Dr. Harrington: Dear Dr. Harrington: Per your request, I will transfer everything to Lan no later than next week, Monday the 8th. This was all a set up anyway, to bog me down in the lab. So I would not make a fuss about any of this. I will put this all behind me. Nonetheless, I have backed up every relevant document that exonerates me from any denigration. In a way, I should thank you for throwing me out to the world and bringing me to face my fears. So thank you. Valentine Dr. Harrington replied a little more than a hour later, stating in an e-mail to Petitioner: I have always t[h]ought that you were the smartest person that has worked for me. Your work is really beautiful and I certainly could not have done it. I am very disturbed over this and I don't see why you could not level with me. Your behavior at times was just too much, not your demeanor but the fact that you simply went on mental walkabouts and disappeared. You have to get a grip on your ego and not wear it on your sleeve. I had really thought we could have basically kicked ass in this area but I don't think that you realize the precarious nature of this business and that you have to be careful about straying into something or somebody that will leave you []no[] grant money. Valentine you can ask Joe. I spent most of my time bragging about your work to everyone. If you are smart, which you obviously are, then you don't have to go around telling that to people, they know. The most important thing is that you get along with people and when you would just not show up without even calling it really pissed me off. It was telling me that I am not even worth a phone call. I can be a real asshole, again ask Joe, and I have done myself harm from being so. But like it or not I am a lot older and more senior than you. You will far surpass me in research if you get a grip on your ego. If not there will be an ever shrinking number of people that care. I would like for you to call me on my beeper or cell. Petitioner defended himself in the following manner in an e-mail he sent to Harrington later that morning: You cannot say that I [am] an egomaniac. I give of myself and I give very generously. That is the record I left in Rochester and that is the record I have left in your lab. To say people there will be an ever shrinking number of people who care is again not true. You should know that whenever I call[ed] on a favor from Rochester, for example getting into the . . . MA in Intl Admin [program], the response was immediate and overwhelmingly positive. I never thought I was smart and never said it. This much I know, I work very hard and I have a generous heart and I will not l[]ose my way. Those are all the values I ever had and I will stick to it. God promised the path would be rough, but the landing would be safe. Again, thank you. Valentine. The final e-mail of the morning was sent by Dr. Harrington to Petitioner. In it, Dr. Harrington informed Petitioner: I am trying to get in contact with the [B]razilians and check on the id of the sa[m]ples one final time and I will try to submit the paper this week. The "paper" to which Dr. Harrington was referring in his e-mail was the manuscript (written by both Petitioner and Dr. Harrington) of the EBV microRNA research project Petitioner was spearheading (EBV microRNA Manuscript). On or about May 12, 2006, following an instance of Petitioner's not "com[ing] in [to the lab] nor call[ing] to advise [Dr. Harrington] of [his absence]," Dr. Harrington spoke with Petitioner about his "unexcused absences" and provided him with specific verbal instructions regarding his attendance and use of his work time. In a May 12, 2006, e-mail, Dr. Harrington informed Desiree Uptgrow of Sylvester's human resources office of the talk he had had with Petitioner and the directives he had given him. The e-mail read as follows: I spoke to Mr. Andela regarding his unexcused absences from work. I referred to the recent time on Friday, when he did not come in nor call to advise me of this. I also spoke to him about concentrating on work and not other activities while in the lab. I will not excuse this or any further incidents. He is expected to comply with the following: 1) arrival at work at a reasonable hour, by this I mean between the hours of 9 to 10 am and cessation of work at a reasonable hour by this I mean 5-6 pm. 2) Weekly goals will be outlined by me in terms of expected experiments to be performed (of course results may vary since the nature of research may not be predictable). 3) an attitude of collegiality in that if there is down time for whatever reason help would be offered by him to other lab personnel. 4) no unexplained long absences from the lab during the day. An expected lunch break of an hour is acceptable. Further deviations from the above will result in a second and third entry into his file whereupon he will be subject to dismissal. William Harrington MD As he put it in his testimony at the final hearing, Dr. Harrington "had no problem with [Petitioner's] going somewhere for an hour or going somewhere for a couple of hours and doing something, but [he] had problems with [Petitioner's] simply disappearing and not giving [him] . . . the courtesy of letting [him] know what was going on." On June 1, 2006, Dr. Harrington (as the corresponding author) submitted the EBV microRNA Manuscript (which was entitled, "Targeted Suppression of CXCL11/I-TAC by EBV encoded BHRF1-3 microRNA in EBV related B-Cell Lymphomas" and is hereinafter referred to as the "First Manuscript") to Blood, a medical journal published by the American Society of Hematology. Petitioner was listed as the first author in the manuscript. Among the other individuals given authorship credit were the Brazilian investigators. It was Dr. Harrington's decision to include them. He felt that "they clearly deserved to be co- authors" and that "it would have been unethical to not have included them." Petitioner disagreed with Dr. Harrington's assessment of the Brazilian investigators' entitlement to authorship credit. In a July 17, 2006, decision letter, Blood's associate editor advised Dr. Harrington that the First Manuscript had been evaluated and deemed "not acceptable for publication in Blood." On July 20, 2006, after what he considered to be further instances of insubordinate conduct on Petitioner's part, Dr. Harrington sent an e-mail to Ms. Uptgrow (as a follow-up to the May 12, 2006, e-mail he had previously sent her), in which he stated the following: There have been a couple of recent incidents which I want to submit in writing. Last week Mr. Andela called me and said that his flight from DC was cancelled or overbooked and he would be late. I replied that this was OK but he never called, emailed or showed up to work. Yesterday he came in past 11 am and also did not call. More concerning is that I had asked him to set up an experiment and later asked my lab tech to assist. When I spoke to my tech this morning he told me that Mr. Andela was not doing the experiment because he saw no reason to. I consider this to be insubordination. Later that same day (July 20, 2006), Ms. Uptgrow sent an e-mail to Nicole Lergier and Lynetta Jackson of Miller's human resources office advising of Dr. Harrington's desire for "assist[ance] in the termination of [Petitioner] based on [Petitioner's] continue[d] lack of following instructions " The afternoon of July 24, 2006, Dr. Harrington and Petitioner engaged in the following argumentative e-mail exchange, evidencing the further decline of their relationship: 1:51 p.m. e-mail from Dr. Harrington to Petitioner I asked you to do the bl-8 line and Peterson line. I don't care to hear that you chose not to do them. 2:05 p.m. e-mail from Petitioner to Dr. Harrington Sorry but I don't know what you are talking about - and it is very disconcerting. I told you we had done the BL8 line and you told Lan to send the Peterson line to Dittmer for profiling. That's where we left off on that - this was reiterated at the meeting you convened with Lisa, Lan, Julio and I. 2:10 p.m. e-mail from Dr. Harrington to Petitioner No that is not true. Lan said that you did not want to do another primary and I said repeatedly that I wanted it done. Your problem [V]alentine is that you think that you are in charge, ie I want a tenured position, I don't want to do old things etc. while I have to keep the grant money coming in. I respect your ability to do certain things and you are a s[m]art guy but clearly you would prefer to be autonomous. The question is how do you attain that. 2:44 p.m. e-mail from Petitioner to Dr. Harrington Dr. Harrington- that is hearsay - you and I had this conversation over the BL8 and the P[e]terson and I said the BL8 had been done and I would run the P[e]terson line in parallel with the dicer exp[erimen]t, once I had gotten the conditions right. I don't think I am in charge - and just how could I, when day in and day out you seek to undermine every "independent" effort I make, that's what[']s expected of a post-doctoral fellow... Every independent effort I have led has panned out - not because I am smart but because I put the time and effort to think it through. When I joined your lab, it was on a 1 year stint - and now I am starting on my second year because you[] wanted it that way. I joined your lab to work on NFkappB, which is what you are funded for and what I had some expertise in, but then you had me work on something totally novel - miRNAs - and the work is done. If I asked for a tenure track position - it is because I recognized (or I thought I did) that you needed someone permanent in the lab - furthermore I was investing too much time and effort on the miRNA work... despite my best efforts (which you do not acknowledge) this is not working out. So I am going right back to the drawing board by doing a residency - we had agreed on this back in May that I was taking a month off in August to do a rotation. I am taking off to Europe for a short vacation on the 6th of August to prepare for my 2 week clinical rotation. So to answer your question - I am giving up on any autonomy and I am going right back to doing a residency. 3:02 p.m. e-mail from Dr. Harrington to Petitioner You never told me about vacation time but ok... you said you would be out for aug (without pay) so am I to presume that aug 6th will be your last day? We don't seem to get along and that's that, no hard feelings. 3:09 p.m. e-mail from Petitioner to Dr. Harrington August 5th would be my last day. 3:17 p.m. e-mail from Dr. Harrington to Petitioner And I will try my best to make sure that happens[.] [Up] until the 5th I would appreciate it if you did run Peterson and bl-8 since they will be cleaner than the primaries. Although not obligated to do so, Dr. Harrington agreed to make sure that Petitioner was paid for the two weeks that, according to his July 24, 2006, 2:44 p.m. e-mail to Dr. Harrington, he was going to be spending doing his clinical rotation (after his trip to Europe). Petitioner left Miami on August 5, 2006, and went to Russia to participate in a two-week "short course" for which he received three credits towards his MAIA degree at UM. (He had enrolled in the MAIA degree program earlier that year.) On August 10, 2006, while he was still in Russia, Petitioner sent the following reply to an e-mail he had received from Dr. Harrington "regarding when [his] return date from the 2 week clinical rotation would be": Sorry I missed that - the 8th of September. Thanks. Petitioner returned to Miami from Russia on August 18 or 19, 2006, "exhausted" and "burned out." He stayed home to rest until returning to work on September 8, 2006. He never did the clinical rotation he told Dr. Harrington he was going to do, but he nonetheless was paid by UM (as Dr. Harrington said he would be) for the two weeks he represented he was going to be engaged in this activity. At no time during his absence from work did Petitioner tell Dr. Harrington he was, in fact, not doing a clinical rotation. He concealed this information because he "wanted to avoid a confrontation" with Dr. Harrington. Dr. Harrington, however, was not entirely in the dark about the matter. On August 22, 2006, through e-mail correspondence, he had checked with Dr. Symes to see if Petitioner had "ever showed up for a clinical rotation" at Jackson Memorial and had been told by Dr. Symes that he had "not heard from [Petitioner] at all." When Petitioner returned to work on September 8, 2006, Dr. Harrington asked him for documentation showing that he had done a clinical rotation at Jackson Memorial during the time he had been away. Petitioner told Dr. Harrington that he did not have any such documentation. Dr. Harrington understood Petitioner to "follow[] that up by saying he had done a clinical rotation in Rochester." Dr. Harrington then "asked [Petitioner] for documentation of that clinical rotation," which Petitioner was unable to produce. The conversation ended with Dr. Harrington telling Petitioner to leave the lab and go home, explaining that he would be bringing the matter to the attention of the human resources office. At this point, Dr. Harrington had decided that it was "just impossible to continue the working relationship" he had with Petitioner and that Petitioner had to be terminated. He was convinced that Petitioner had lied to him about doing a clinical rotation and that, by having been absent from work for the two weeks he was supposed to have been doing such a rotation, Petitioner had effectively abandoned his job. Moreover, Dr. Harrington felt that Petitioner had "exploited" him and was continuing to disregard his supervisory authority. Later in the morning on September 8, 2006, Petitioner sent Dr. Harrington the following e-mail: Hi Dr. Harrington This is just written confirmation that you asked me not to resume work today and to stay away until you had convened a meeting with human resources. Thanks Valentine Petitioner never returned to Dr. Harrington's lab. September 8, 2006, was his last day in the "work environment" of the lab. As he had promised he would, Dr. Harrington made contact (by e-mail) with the human resources office. He concluded the e-mail by stating: At this point, under no circumstances will I allow Mr. Andela back into my lab and he is dismissed. Lynetta Jackson of the human resources office responded to Dr. Harrington by sending him, on September 11, 2006, the following e-mail: Dr. Harrington, We're required to follow a process when terminating employees. As we discussed a few weeks ago, all terminations must be approved by Paul Hudgins.[6] I'm still out of the office for medical reasons. This matter is being referred to Nicole Lergier/Karen Stimmel for follow-up. Nicole Lergier was the human resources employee who handled the matter. Ms. Lergier met with just Petitioner on September 14, 2006. At the outset of the meeting, she informed Petitioner that there was a "request for [his] termination" made by Dr. Harrington. She explained that Dr. Harrington "was concerned that [Petitioner] had taken several weeks off to complete a clinical rotation for which [Petitioner] had been paid but [for] which [he] had never registered," and that Dr. Harrington considered Petitioner's conduct to be "job abandonment and . . . grounds for immediate termination." She then went on to tell Petitioner that the purpose of the meeting was to give Petitioner the opportunity, without Dr. Harrington's being present, to give his side of the story and "to bring forward any issues." Petitioner took advantage of this opportunity. He defended himself against the charges Dr. Harrington had made against him and countercharged that Dr. Harrington had been abusive, "manipulative[,] and unprofessional." At no time did Petitioner complain to Ms. Lergier that Dr. Harrington was "prejudiced against [him] because [he was] black or because [he was] from Cameroon." Petitioner indicated to Ms. Lergier that he "had no interest in going back to Dr. Harrington's lab," but that, among other things, he wanted the EBV microRNA Manuscript to be published. On the same day that the meeting took place, Petitioner sent the following e-mail to Ms. Lergier: This is in response to Dr. William J. Harrington's complaint that I abandoned my job functions. The attached e-mails dated Monday 7/24/2006 indicate that I was gone on leave, without pay. What[']s more, there [is] evidence of professional misconduct, manipulation and negative inputs on Dr. Harrington's part. This is not the first instance. The e-mails dated Tuesday 5/2/2006 to 4/28/2006 document another one of many such instances. The time I took off in August was not nearly enough to recover from a tremendously negative work environment where I nonetheless made many positive contributions, in ideas, manuscripts and grants. The facts speak for themselves. At this point, I do not intend to return to work with Dr. Harrington and I trust Human Resources would find a constructive solution to this problem. Approximately an hour later, Petitioner received an e- mail from Dr. Harrington, which read as follows: Your paper will be submitted with you as first author. I have 9 tumor blocks corresponding to the patients in [B]razil and a couple of new ones here that we will assay for eber, cxcl-11 (we got a new ab.) and LMP-1. Lan has repeated the rpa's on the lines (BL-5, R) and several new primaries and they look very good, cleaner than the previous ones. Once I get this done I will send you a draft prior to submission. Dr. Harrington subsequently submitted a revised version of the First Manuscript (Revised Manuscript) to Blood. The Revised Manuscript was "shorter," but not "substantially different from the [First] [M]anuscript." Petitioner was still listed as the first author, which Dr. Harrington "thought was [only] fair since . . . [Petitioner] had done most of the lab work on that article." Dr. Harrington did not believe that, in submitting an "abbreviated" manuscript with Petitioner's name on it as first author, he was doing anything that was contrary to Petitioner's interests or desires. Notwithstanding Dr. Harrington's best efforts, the Revised Manuscript, like the First Manuscript, was rejected for publication in Blood. Although listed as the first author, Petitioner had not "sign[ed] off" on, or even seen, the Revised Manuscript before its submission to Blood. He ultimately received an e- mailed copy from Dr. Harrington. The next day, upon running into Dr. Harrington on the UM campus, Petitioner told him: [Y]ou cannot put my name on a paper that I didn't write. You can't have me as a first author on a manuscript that I didn't sign off on. Take my name off that paper. I have moved on. Dr. Harrington complied with Petitioner's request. Petitioner's name was not on the version of the EBV microRNA Manuscript Dr. Harrington submitted to another medical journal, Cancer Research, "sometime in late 2007," which was accepted for publication and published in March 2008. On or about September 20, 2006, Petitioner was contacted by Ms. Uptgrow and given the option of resigning his position or being terminated. Petitioner told Ms. Uptgrow that he "wasn't going to resign." On September 25, 2006, Dr. Harrington sent Petitioner the following letter, advising Petitioner that his employment was being terminated "effective immediately": As you know, you have been counseled many times regarding your unsatisfactory performance and attendance issues. Unfortunately, these problems persist despite our counseling efforts. There have been several emails and conversations that have taken place, which you were advised that any further incidents would result in additional disciplinary action. Specifically, we had agreed you would take the weeks of August 5, 2006 - August 18, 2006- off for vacation and this would [be] followed by a 2 week clinical rotation[.] [Y]ou notified your supervisor that you would return on September 8, 2006, 3 weeks after completing your vacation. Despite all of the previous warning and effort to work with you on the problems that concerned your supervisor, it has continued. Due to your failure to adhere to University policies and procedures and ongoing problems, you have left us no alternative but to terminate you effective immediately. Any accrued vacation will be paid to you in your final paycheck. You are to return all University property issued to you upon employment to Desiree Uptgrow to expedite the processing of your final check. Please contact Benefit Administration, (305)284-6837, regarding continuation of benefits you may be entitled to. You should receive information regarding COBRA benefits from the Office of Benefits Administration in a separate letter. If you do not receive this letter, please contact the Office of Benefits Administration at (305)243-6835. Dr. Harrington's termination of Petitioner's employment was based solely on what Dr. Harrington perceived to be Petitioner's deficiencies as an employee. Neither Petitioner's race, nor his national origin, played any role in this or any other action Dr. Harrington took affecting Petitioner. On September 29, 2006, four days after his termination, Petitioner sent the following e-mail to Dr. Harrington: Hi Dr. Harrington: Dr. Symes urged me to do a 2 week clinical rotation/observership with Hem/Onc as the department of internal medicine no longer offers this. Would it be possible to do it with you, starting next week, Wednesday the 3rd of October. Thanks for your consideration. On the advice of UM legal counsel, Dr. Harrington did not respond to this e-mail. Instead of seeking other employment following his termination, Petitioner "focused" on completing the requirements to obtain his MAIA degree at UM. In accordance with UM policy, he continued to receive tuition remission benefits for the 2006 fall semester (the semester in which he was terminated), but after that semester, the benefits ceased. Petitioner believes that he has completed the requirements for his MAIA degree and is entitled to receive his diploma and final transcript, which UM has withheld. UM's records, however, reflect otherwise. They reveal that he has not yet received any credit for the Practicum in International Administration (INS 517) course that he needs to obtain his degree. This course involved Petitioner's writing and defending a thesis. In the spring of 2007, while Petitioner was working on his thesis, his car, which was parked on the UM campus, was ticketed by the City of Coral Gables police and subsequently towed by Downtown Towing Company for "safekeeping." After unsuccessfully attempting to retrieve his vehicle, he demanded that UM compensate him for his loss. UM (acting through its Assistant General Counsel, Judd Goldberg, Esquire) and Petitioner engaged in settlement negotiations. At least as early as August 8, 2007, UM insisted, as a condition of its agreement to any settlement, that Petitioner sign a full and general release reading, in pertinent part, as follows: In exchange for the promises which the University makes in this Agreement, Andela agrees to waive voluntarily and knowingly certain rights and claims against the University. . . . . The rights and claims which Andela waives and releases in this Agreement include, to every extent allowed by law, those arising under . . . the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871, and 1964, . . . the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 . . . and any amendments to said laws. This is not a complete list, and Andela waives and releases all similar rights and claims under all other federal, state and local discrimination provisions and all other statutory and common law causes of action relating in any way to: (a) Andela's employment or separation from employment with the University which accrued or may have accrued up to the date of execution of this Agreement; and/or (b) Andela's status as a student at the University which accrued or may have accrued up to the date of execution of this Agreement. . . . On September 13, 2007, Petitioner filed his employment discrimination complaint with the FCHR (complaining, for the first time to anyone, that he had been a victim of race and national origin-based discrimination by UM, acting through Dr. Harrington). On September 22, 2007, Petitioner sent the following letter to Mr. Goldberg: I will not surrender my civil rights by signing the full and general release agreement, in order to receive a settlement for my above referenced car that was swindled. Compelling me to surrender my civil rights is an act of retaliation, based on your knowledge of an employment discrimination complaint filed against the University of Miami. As specified on page two-paragraph two- of the attached letter from the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR), "the law prohibits retaliation against any person making a complaint, testifying or participating in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing on an alleged unlawful employment practice." Unless you correct this unlawful act by the end of business day - Monday 24th of October - I will notify the FCHR. Mr. Goldberg responded by sending Petitioner the following letter, dated September 24, 2007: This letter acknowledges receipt of your correspondence of September 22, 2007 addressed to myself and President Shalala. The University does not believe that the settlement and general release agreement is retaliatory. Indeed, the settlement and general release agreement was provided to you before you filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. At this juncture, the University will respond to the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations when it is formally advised of the charge by the Commission.[7] If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please call my office directly as it is my office that handles all legal matters for the University. Thank you for your attention to this matter. This letter constitutes communication regarding settlement and cannot be used for any other purpose. At no time has Petitioner filed any employment discrimination complaint with the FCHR alleging that he was retaliated against for having engaged in activity protected by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (although he did make such allegations in the Petition for Relief he filed in the instant case).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding UM not guilty of the unlawful employment practices alleged by Petitioner and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2008.
The Issue Whether the Respondent engaged in employment practices in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Lakeyta Givens, is a black female, and was first employed by the Respondent on February 6, 2001. The Petitioner had no experience in the business of re- financing real property; however, the Petitioner was trained by the Respondent, and was given one promotion and a pay-raise. She became sufficiently knowledgeable and productive that she was tasked to train other employees. After she had been with the company for nearly two years, her supervisor wanted to step down for personal reasons. This opened up a position with greater responsibility and increased pay. The Respondent was a closely held corporation owned and operated by Anthony and Rachel Catanzeriti. Anthony Catanzeriti was the manager of the office and was there daily. His wife, Rachel, was the president of the corporation and was not there on a daily basis. She did, however, exercise primary control over the company. Anthony Catanzeriti asked the Petitioner if she would be interested in moving into the supervisor's position at a salary of $15.00 per hour, a raise of $5.00 per hour. The Petitioner indicated that she would be pleased to make the move. Mr. Catanzeriti indicated that his wife would have to approve the promotion, and that he would talk to her about the promotion. There was no action on the promotion for a long time. The Petitioner was concerned about the status of her promotion. The Petitioner heard during this time that Rachel Catanzeriti had stated that she "would not have a nasty nigger work in the company." The Petitioner asked to speak about her promotion with Mr. and Ms. Catanzeriti, but because of various mutual indispositions a meeting was delayed. On February 3, 2003, Rachel Catanzeriti came in to do some personnel work, and a meeting was arranged at which Mr. Catanzeriti was not present. From the content and progression of this meeting, it was clear that the Petitioner was concerned that she was not being promoted because of her race. The Petitioner immediately confronted Ms. Catanzeriti about the purported racial slur. Ms. Catanzeriti denied having made such a remark; however, she immediately became angry. The meeting never addressed the promotion because of Ms. Catanzeriti's anger. In an effort to de-escalate the situation, the Petitioner walked out of the office. Ms. Catanzeriti followed the Petitioner out of the office and between buildings continuing the heated exchange. The Petitioner asked her to discuss the racial epithet, and Ms. Catanzeriti, replied, "Let's talk about your big fat ass." Very shortly after this comment and within the same argument, Ms. Catanzeriti fired the Petitioner. Subsequently, the supervisor's position was filed by a white female, whom the Petitioner had previously trained. The Petitioner's work record was good, and her attendance was regular. She was unable to find employment until April 2004. After the Petitioner had been fired, U S Mortgage, Inc., was closed by the Office of the State's Attorney. The Petitioner reported that Mr. Catanzeriti was currently imprisoned out of state, and Ms. Catanzeriti was living in Texas.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter its final order directing that the Respondent desist from discriminatory employment practices and awarding the Petitioner $4,800.00 in damages for lost wages. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lakeyta Givens Post Office Box 293 Sanderson, Florida 32087 U S Mortgage, Inc. 28 West Macclenny Avenue, Suite 14 Macclenny, Florida 32063 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed with the Respondent from August 3, 1985 until May 10, 1986, as a waitress in the dining room of the Kings Inn Restaurant in Pensacola, Florida. In March, 1987, the Petitioner became pregnant. She then informed her employer, Mr. Judge of her pregnancy. He told her initially that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to. Shortly thereafter, he told her that she could not work after five months of pregnancy. On another occasion, his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, told her that she could not work after she "started showing." Once the Respondent, Mr. Judge, learned of the Petitioner's pregnancy, he began a regime of harassing treatment. For instance, Mr. Judge made her do the "side work," filling up all the salt and pepper shakers and sugar bowls for all of the waitresses and waitress stations. It had always been uniform policy that each waitress had the responsibility to do her own side work for her own station and tables. Mr. Judge also began yelling and cursing at her in front of her workers and customers, causing her great humiliation and embarrassment. He criticized her publicly about her posture and the way she serviced customers, although she had always had an excellent record as a competent waitress and had no complaints from customers or former employers, before announcing that she was pregnant. Mr. Judge also began a practice of constantly questioning other employees about the Petitioner's job performance, although he apparently learned of no substandard performance in both her duties and her attitude toward her customers. He also took her to task about her "charge tips" being less than other employees, apparently the measure he used to determine if a waitress was serving her customers appropriately and adequately. This situation, however, was caused by his discriminatory conduct toward her in giving her fewer tables to serve and thus, reducing her tip income. Mr. Judge additionally assigned her to clean up a portion of the kitchen area, particularly the "bread shelves" when normal policy had been for kitchen personnel to perform all kitchen clean-up duties, with any clean up of the bread shelf area being rotated amongst the dining room personnel. The Petitioner, however, was singled out for this duty exclusively after it became known that she was pregnant. The Petitioner was also required to stay late and perform certain closing duties at the end of business late at night, much more often than other waitresses. In addition to performing restaurant closing duties, she was frequently required to wait on cocktail tables as late as 2:00 in the morning on many of the "late duty" occasions, even though she was hired as, and until she became pregnant worked exclusively as, food waitress. Petitioner's testimony and Petitioner's exhibit 2, in evidence, establishes that, although Petitioner was only scheduled to stay late three times in March, three times in April and once in May that, in fact, she worked late, that is, after all other employees or waitresses had been released for the evening seven out of nine days that she worked in March; nine out of twelve days she worked in April; and six out of the seven days she worked in May. Indeed, on May 10, 1986, the last day she worked for the Respondent, Mr. Judge required her to stay late and to "bus" all the tables, that is clean all the tables, in the dining room, allowing the waitress who was scheduled to stay late that night to leave early. The Petitioner became quite upset at this turn of events and resigned her position, due to the repeated pattern of harassment as described herein. Although Mr. Judge initially told the Petitioner that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to during her pregnancy, in fact, on April 11, 1986, Mr. Judge hired the Petitioner's replacement. He hired Pamela Modes and had the Petitioner train her in her waitress duties. He stated to Ms. Modes privately when hiring her "that he needed a food waitress" because "he's got a girl that's pregnant." Additionally, he told the Petitioner that he objected to her working because of her pregnancy and claimed his insurance would not allow him to employ her after she was five months pregnant. These statements, coupled with the statement by his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, to the effect that she would not be employed there "once she started showing" reveal an intent by the employer to terminate the employee, the Petitioner, because of her pregnancy. Instead of terminating her outright, the Respondent chose to put sufficient pressure on the Petitioner through extra, unscheduled work duties and the other above-mentioned forms of harassment, so as to coerce her into leaving the Respondent's employ. The Petitioner thus made a prima facia showing that she was forced to terminate employment due to her sex and her pregnancy, and no countervailing evidence was adduced by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida Human Relations Commission finding that an unlawful employment practice has occurred through the Respondent's discrimination against the Petitioner because of her sex (pregnancy) and that she be accorded all relief allowed under the above- cited section, including backpay and related benefits in accordance with the requirements of Section 760.10(13), Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 21st of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra A. Larson, Pro Se 9742 Aileron Avenue, Apt. 606 Pensacola, Florida 32506 Dracut Corporation d/b/a Kings Inn Restaurant Lawrence F. Judge, Jr. Owner/General Manager 1309 Maldonado Pensacola Beach, Florida 32561-2323 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether Respondent, Superior Optical Shop (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Sections 760.01– and 509.092, Florida Statutes, by subjecting Petitioner, Janice Jennings (Petitioner), to discrimination in employment and by discharging Petitioner in retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s discriminatory employment practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent is a corporation with its corporate headquarters located in Ocean Springs, Mississippi. Respondent operates an optical shop in a Veteran’s Administration (V.A.) Hospital located in Lake City, Florida. At its Lake City location, Respondent fills prescriptions written by eye physicians at the V.A. Hospital, assists patients with choosing frames, and fits patients with their prescription eye glasses. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is fast-paced, with a constant stream of patients, averaging 50-to-60 patients a day. If the optical shop is running behind schedule, it is problematic because often physicians at the V.A. Hospital are waiting to see the patients served by the optical shop. In 2009, Petitioner interviewed for a position at Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City, Florida. During her interview, Petitioner advised Respondent that she had competent computer skills and significant experience working in an office environment and with eye doctors. On May 27, 2009, Respondent hired Petitioner as a part- time clerk at the optical shop. Petitioner was terminated prior to working 90 days for Respondent. When Petitioner was hired, two full-time employees worked at the optical shop: office supervisor, Jean Hartup, and optician, Kathleen Denton. Ms. Hartup has been employed with Respondent for approximately five years. Ms. Denton has been with the optical shop for approximately two and a-half years. As office supervisor, Ms. Hartup can be distant with employees and “hard” at times. She can also be “direct” when speaking to employees. Ms. Hartup demonstrates these traits with all of the employees at the optical shop. Ms. Hartup has written up Ms. Denton in the past and the two have had personality conflicts. Both Ms. Hartup and Ms. Denton assisted with training Petitioner. Evidence indicated that Petitioner received adequate training to perform the tasks she was assigned to perform as a clerk. She often had to be re-trained on the same tasks. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is a very small room, approximately ten-feet by ten-feet square inside the V.A. Hospital. There are two small desks in the shop and it is very crowded. Petitioner was aware of the small working environment at the time she accepted employment with Respondent as a part- time clerk. Past and present employees at the optical shop have had to share desk space. Sometimes work has to be performed in the hallway because of the small office space. All new hires for Respondent are subjected to a 90-day probationary period. As explained in Respondent’s “Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits,” of which Petitioner was aware: There will be a 90-day probationary period during which time the employer may terminate the employee at any time for any reason or for no reason regardless of any other provision of these policies. Sick leave and personal days are accrued but cannot be used during this period. Respondent’s Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits also provides: [Respondent] does not and will not tolerate any employee discriminating against their work peers for any reason i.e., race, color, religion, sex, national origin or handicap. Any known verifiable discrimination will be grounds for immediate termination. Once on the job, Petitioner was not proficient on the computer and, despite repeated training, failed to show any improvement and was slow in performing her job duties. Because of this, service to patients at the optical shop slowed down and the optical shop was frequently behind, resulting in physicians having to wait for patients being served by the optical shop. Ms. Hartup became frustrated with Petitioner’s unsatisfactory job performance and the resulting delays. In addition, Petitioner began to show a lack of interest in her job and even stated that she “didn’t really need a job; she just wanted to be out of the house.” Despite repeated training and opportunities to improve her work performance, Petitioner failed to improve. Petitioner was given a notebook with information from the American Board of Opticians for review but she failed to read it or return it to Respondent. Prior to the end of her employment with Respondent, Petitioner called Respondent’s corporate headquarters in Mississippi and spoke to Mary Walker. Petitioner complained to Ms. Walker that Ms. Hartup was being too hard, was impatient, and was expecting too much of her. Petitioner did not raise concerns with Ms. Walker that she was being discriminated against based on her race, or that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment because of her race. In fact, there is no evidence that Petitioner ever complained of race discrimination or a hostile work environment based on race discrimination while she was still employed by Respondent. During that first telephone conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Walker suggested to Petitioner that she should talk to Ms. Hartup about the problems. Petitioner assured Ms. Walker that she would. Two days later, Ms. Walker called Ms. Hartup and inquired whether Petitioner had discussed her concerns with Ms. Hartup. Petitioner, however, had not spoken to Ms. Hartup about her complaint. Ms. Walker gave Ms. Hartup the authority to run the optical shop at Lake City, including making hiring and firing decisions. Ms. Walker did not discipline Ms. Hartup because of Petitioner’s complaints. Rather, Ms. Walker told Ms. Hartup to handle the situation regarding Petitioner’s complaints. Ms. Hartup then met with Petitioner and they spoke about Petitioner’s concerns that Ms. Hartup was being too harsh and about Petitioner’s poor work performance. As a result of that meeting, Ms. Hartup felt the situation had been resolved. Petitioner subsequently advised both Ms. Denton, as well as Ms. Walker at Respondent’s headquarters, that the conversation with Ms. Hartup had gone well and that their issues had been resolved. Petitioner’s work performance, however, did not improve. Prior to the end of her 90-day probationary period of employment, Respondent terminated Petitioner from employment for poor work performance, for failing to reach her capabilities as an employee, and because her poor work performance was a detriment to Respondent’s Lake City optical shop. Petitioner testified that, from her point of view, she truly felt as though she had been discriminated against because of her race. That testimony, however, was without further support and was unpersuasive, especially in view of the fact that there is no evidence that Petitioner ever mentioned to anyone during her employment with Respondent that she believed she was being discriminated against. There was otherwise no evidence presented at the final hearing that would support a finding that Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was in retaliation for Petitioner’s complaint against Ms. Hartup. Further, the evidence produced at final hearing does not support a finding that either the manner in which Petitioner was treated during her employment with Respondent, or her termination from that employment, was based on Petitioner’s race. Respondent filled the position of part-time clerk left vacant after Petitioner’s termination by hiring a Native- American male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on sex, whether Respondent was sexually harassed, and whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner for making a complaint of sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Hunt was hired by Sears on January 9, 2006, as an appointment specialist, which is a telemarketer position. Sears provides home improvement products such as siding. The duties of an appointment specialist include calling potential Sears customers and scheduling appointments for the Sears salespersons and the customers. Each year, the chief executive officer of Sears sends the Sears associates a reaffirmation statement of affirmative action and equal employment opportunity. The letter, which is posted at each call center, states in part: Our fair employment policies are not new to Sears. These policies prohibit harassment or discrimination against any applicant, associate, vendor, contractor, or customer on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, gender identity, ancestry, national origin, age, disability, veteran status, pregnancy, citizenship, sexual orientation, marital status, ethnicity, or any other reason prohibited by law. These policies also prohibit all forms of retaliation against any individual who complains of being harassed or discriminated against. Each new hire, including Ms. Hunt, is provided with a copy of the Sears harassment policy on their first day of employment. The harassment policy is also posted at each call center. The harassment policy states that Sears prohibits sexual harassment and provides examples of actions that may constitute sexual harassment. Such examples include “[i]nappropriate comments, jokes, or remarks because of or based on a person’s status” and “[t]ouching someone in a sexual way, including hugs, kisses, pinches, etc.” The Sears harassment policy further requires an employee to take action if the employee: [F]eel[s] uncomfortable in a situation because of someone’s harassing, sexually aggressive, abusive, or discriminatory behavior. [F]eel[s] that another’s harassing, sexually aggressive, abusive or discriminatory comments or actions toward [the employee] or a fellow associate, vendor, customer, etc. are improper in a work environment. [B]elieve[s] that another’s harassing, sexually aggressive, abusive, or discriminatory behavior impairs the [employee’s] ability to do [his or her] job, or [W]ants the harassing, sexually aggressive, abusive, or discriminatory behavior to stop. If an employee believes that a violation of the harassment and discrimination policy has occurred, the Sears harassment policy tells the employee to take the following actions: Explain the situation to your immediate supervisor or manager. If you are not satisfied with your supervisor’s or manager’s response, or if you are uncomfortable speaking with him or her, immediately contact his or her manager or your human resources representative. If you still find that sufficient attention has not been given to your complaint, or if you are uncomfortable talking with someone in your unit, associates should contact the company’s the EthicsAssist Line at 1-800-BASSIST or Associates Services at 1-888-88sears. Sears has a progressive discipline policy and a progressive progress policy. Employees are given coaching discussions and verbal performance memos for the first step. The second step, third, and fourth steps are performance plans for improvements. The last step is a final warning. Sears has a dress code policy. On April 6, 2006, Ms. Hunt was sent home because she was in violation of the dress code policy. On April 13, 2006, a coaching discussion was held with Ms. Hunt concerning her productivity. Ms. Hunt was not meeting the daily requirements for making calls. The minimum standard was 165 calls out daily and 12 appointments. Ms. Hunt was averaging approximately 78 calls per day. On May 15, 2006, Ms. Hunt received a step-two performance plan for improvement for not adhering to the Sears attendance policies. The performance plan stated the performance issues as follows: Tonja’s attendance does not meet company expectations. Since the beginning of her employment Tonja has had multiple occurrences. On 01-30 scheduled court date, 02-10 out due to a family emergency, 02-21 out due to a court hearing for her daughter, 03-06 out due to daughter personal issues, 03-30 called running late, 04-14 late, 04-19 late, 04-24 thru 04-25 out due to oral surgery. Tonja does not have any time available to her an[d] any further occurrences will count as separate occurrences. On June 1, 2006, Ms. Hunt received a verbal performance memo for not meeting the company requirements for productivity. Her productivity for April was .05, which was below the company minimum of 1.3. In October 2006, Ms. Hunt received a step-three performance plan for improvement. The performance issues were described as follows: Tonja’s productivity for the month of September was that of 0.64 which is well below company minimums of 1.3 and a company goal of 1.8. Tonja’s attendance has yet to improve. Since 05-15-06 Ms. Hunt has had 12 additional occurrences. On November 7, 2006, Ms. Hunt received a step-four performance plan for improvement due to work performance and misconduct. The performance issues were described as follows: Work Performance: Below monthly minimum standard of 1.3; Tonja’s results--.60 has not met standards since hire date. Attendance: 10/27/06, instructions given to Tonja to call in by noon on Monday & speak to Luis. Previously warned of attendance on 10/9/06 & 5/15/06. Failed to follow directive Could not be reached until 11/1 Misconduct: 10/27/06, received multiple complaints regarding inappropriate comments of a sexual nature to other associates on the call floor. Upon investigation, behavior was in violation of company policy. 11/3/06, Tonja instructed by Management and HR not to discuss investigation with other associates. Complaints received regarding Tonja not following this directive and discussing the matters of the investigation with other associates. On November 13, 2006, Ms. Hunt was given a performance memo which served as a “final warning.” The memo stated the reasons for the final warning as follows: As stated in the PPI Written Step IV document issued on 10-03-06, there were to be no more attendance occurrences. According to the timekeeping system, you clocked in 40 minutes late on 11-09-06. This memo serves as your final warning. Another attendance occurrence will result in immediate separation. On January 17, 2007, Ms. Hunt received her annual performance evaluation, which rated her on nine areas of performance. Ms. Hunt received an overall performance evaluation of two, which meant that improvement was needed. She received a rating of one in the areas of productivity, availability, and adherence to policy. A rating of one signifies that the performance is unacceptable. Sears terminated Ms. Hunt’s employment effective January 23, 2007, for poor performance. When Ms. Hunt began her employment with Sears, she worked in a unit in which Mr. Royston Kenneth Khadaroo was the team leader. As team leader, Mr. Khadaroo would provide assistance to the other employees concerning the work assignments. He was not a supervisor and had no authority to fire, discipline, or otherwise affect the terms and conditions of employment of the other employees in the unit. Beginning in May 2006, Ms. Hunt claims that Mr. Khadaroo began to sexually harass her.1 According to Ms. Hunt, Mr. Khadaroo made the following statements to her: “I think you are pretty” and “I think you must be cold.” Ms. Hunt took the second statement to mean that he was referring to her nipples. Ms. Hunt claims that on one occasion, he made a measurement using his finger and thumb. She took the action to mean that he was referring to the length of her crotch. On another occasion, Ms. Hunt claims that while Mr. Khadaroo was giving her a ride to her car that he put his hands between her legs. Prior to August 2006, Ms. Hunt made no attempt to advise her supervisor or other management at Sears concerning Mr. Khadaroo’s actions. In August 2006, Mr. Khadaroo approached Darlene Lighthouse, who was one of Ms. Hunt’s supervisors and told Ms. Lighthouse that Ms. Hunt had been making accusations against him and that he wanted the issue to be addressed by upper management. Mr. Khadaroo also advised Luis Saez, who was another of Ms. Hunt’s supervisors, that he wanted an investigation because Ms. Hunt had been making complaints against him. After Mr. Khadaroo complained to Ms. Lighthouse, she sent him home and talked to Ms. Hunt. Ms. Hunt told Ms. Lighthouse that Mr. Khadaroo had been sexually harassing her. Ms. Lighthouse sent Ms. Hunt home and began an investigation into the allegations. Up until Ms. Hunt’s claims, there had been no complaints from any employee concerning Mr. Khadaroo. Ms. Lighthouse’s investigation did not reveal any witnesses to Ms. Hunt’s allegations. There was no evidence to support or refute Ms. Hunt’s claims of sexual harassment. It was a case of “he said, she said.” To alleviate the situation, management decided to move Ms. Hunt from the unit in which Mr. Khadaroo worked. Ms. Hunt’s workstation was moved so that she worked a few rows away from Mr. Khadaroo. After the investigation, Ms. Hunt did not experience any further unwelcome advances or comments from Mr. Khadaroo. On October 12, 2006, Ms. Hunt filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Commission, alleging that Sears had discriminated against her based on her sex.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entering dismissing Ms. Hunt’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2009.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to Petitioner's race, age, sex, or as retaliation in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner, a 56-year-old African- American female, as a Food Support Worker at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, at all times relevant to these proceedings. Petitioner was promoted to the position of Food Service Worker on May 10, 2002, with probationary status until May 10, 2003. On February 12, 2003, Petitioner was terminated from her employment for failure to satisfactorily complete her probationary period in the career service. In the course of her employment with Florida State Hospital, Petitioner was aware of the strict safety guidelines implemented by Respondent to protect employees from injury. Petitioner also knew that violation of the safety rules could result in dismissal of an erring employee. Violations of these policies had resulted in dismissal of both non-minority and minority employees in the past. On February 9, 2003, due to an unsafe act and violation of Respondent’s safety rules, Petitioner proceeded to cut the tip of her left thumb in the process of slicing cabbage. Petitioner was not using a cutting glove, a mandatory requirement of the safety rules. As a result of this rule violation, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment on February 12, 2003. At final hearing, Petitioner admitted the cutting injury to her finger, but contended that termination of employment had not been effected for other younger white employees for similar offenses in the past. These allegations of Petitioner were non-specific and uncorroborated; they are not credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Annette Carroll 10202 Northwest Third Street Bristol, Florida 32321 Kathi Lee Kilpatrick, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Jacqueline H. Smith, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Great Southern Café is a restaurant located in Seaside, Florida. The restaurant is owned by James Shirley. As owner, Mr. Shirley did not generally involve himself in personnel decisions at the Café. Such decisions and the day-to- day management of the restaurant were the responsibility of the general manager, who at the time period relevant to this case was William “Billy” McConnell. Petitioner Janet D. Mayes is female. Petitioner has ADD, ADHD, OCD, and general anxiety disorder. She has been diagnosed with these conditions for 20 years and they are all controlled through medication. More importantly, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner’s disorders interfered with her ability to work or significantly impacted any other major life activity. Indeed, Petitioner has worked in the restaurant business for about 30 years and has held a variety of different positions during that time, often working long hours. Since her disorders did not interfere with any of Petitioner’s major life activities, the evidence did not demonstrate that such disorders were disabilities or handicaps for purposes of employment discrimination. Sometime around March 2012, Petitioner interviewed for employment with Respondent. She was initially hired as a hostess for the restaurant by the then general manager, Jim Ruby. Shortly thereafter, Mr. McConnell, who was then assistant manager, replaced Mr. Ruby as general manager. At the time, Mr. McConnell had 35-40 years of experience as a restaurant manager in Alabama and Florida and had managed the predecessor restaurant to Great Southern Café known as “Shades.” Mr. McConnell’s management philosophy was to be patient with employees, to train them in the right way, and to ask employees to do their best. He would give employees the benefit of the doubt, and when disciplinary action was necessary, would sit down and talk with the employee to build confidence in them. Mr. McConnell’s disciplinary style was informal and it was not his general practice to issue formal written discipline to employees. Mr. McConnell liked Petitioner’s work ethic and thought she did a good job as hostess. Under Mr. McConnell’s management, Petitioner was promoted by Mr. McConnell to relief manager in May of 2012. In August 2012, she was again promoted by Mr. McConnell to full manager. Mr. McConnell did not know about, nor was he provided with any documentation regarding, Petitioner’s disorders. Indeed, the evidence showed that Petitioner’s disorders were not so obvious that anyone who encountered her necessarily would have known about those disorders. There was no evidence that Petitioner ever sought any kind of accommodation from Respondent for her disorders. Since Mr. McConnell worked only the day shift and Petitioner usually worked nights, their paths did not often cross at work. However, the evidence demonstrated that Mr. McConnell occasionally used the term “bitch” to refer to Petitioner. The evidence also demonstrated that he did so not in a malicious or discriminatory way, but in a joking manner because of Petitioner’s actions that he witnessed or that were described to him. Petitioner conceded that it was “like it was a joke” when Mr. McConnell referred to her as a “bitch.” There was no testimony that Mr. McConnell used this term on repeated occasions so that its use rose to the level of harassment or that he used it to belittle or demean Petitioner. Sometime in April 2013, the Café catered a very large event known as “JazzFest.” Petitioner assisted Mr. McConnell in the planning and execution of this event for the Café. Her husband, William, who had been unemployed, was hired to help in food preparation at the event. In general, JazzFest was stressful for all those who worked the event. Both Mr. McConnell and Petitioner worked many extra hours at the festival. During the course of JazzFest, Mr. McConnell, as manager, permitted the employees to get food from the banquet line since they had been working all day without breaks for nutrition. Petitioner and her husband loudly and inappropriately berated Mr. McConnell in public and in front of other employees about allowing employees to get food from the banquet line. Mr. Shirley witnessed the confrontation and considered the display to be an inappropriate method by Petitioner to communicate her disagreement regarding Mr. McConnell’s management decision. Mr. McConnell also observed that during JazzFest, Petitioner was “too pushy” and “too bossy” with the staff without having any good reason for such treatment of employees. Additionally, Mr. McConnell observed that Petitioner was “not herself” and “wound up a little too tight” during JazzFest. Further, Mr. McConnell was aware that Petitioner had some recent personal stressors, such as her husband having issues with unemployment and one of her sons being arrested and incarcerated. He believed Petitioner’s behavior was due to the pressures in her family life combined with the pressure from working Jazzfest. Therefore, Mr. McConnell decided to give Petitioner a week off, with pay, for rest and relaxation. He hoped that Petitioner would come back refreshed and ready for the busy beach season after her break. Mr. Shirley knew of and supported the time off for Petitioner and hoped that Petitioner’s time away from work would ease some of the undercurrent of negative feelings that had built up between Petitioner and some of the employees. After Petitioner returned from her week off, Mr. McConnell received reports from some of his employees that Petitioner was being unreasonable, raising her voice and losing her temper “numerous” times. He also received reports that Petitioner was “hard to work for,” and “a bully.” In addition, owner James Shirley received some complaints from employees that Petitioner was “going off on people.” Indeed, her treatment of the employees had gotten to the point that several employees no longer wished to work with her. These employees were considered good employees and were part of the restaurant team. The evidence showed that it is very important for restaurant staff to function as a team and that maintaining good working relationships among team members is one important component of a good functioning restaurant. Mr. McConnell spoke to Petitioner about the subject of the complaints and asked why she was pushing the staff so hard and creating a bad environment. Petitioner said she would try to do better. During this conversation, Mr. McConnell did not remember asking Petitioner whether her meds were “out of whack,” but he has stated this to other people as a figure of speech in the manner of “get your act together.” The evidence did not show that Mr. McConnell’s use of the phrase was discriminatory, harassing or demonstrative of any knowledge of Petitioner’s alleged disability or perception of the same. After his talk with Petitioner, things improved for a couple of days. However, Mr. McConnell received more and similar complaints about Petitioner from the same employees who previously complained about her, with some indicating they would quit if Petitioner continued to work at the restaurant. Mr. McConnell feared that if something was not done about Petitioner some of his good team employees would leave and he would not be able to run the restaurant. The better evidence demonstrated that Mr. McConnell met with Petitioner and offered her two weeks’ severance pay. He spoke with her about her inability to get along with the employees and function as a team member at the restaurant. The meeting lasted about 20-30 minutes. Ultimately, Petitioner refused the severance pay, handed over her keys, and left. There was no credible or substantial evidence that Petitioner’s termination was based on disability, perceived or otherwise. Similarly, there was no credible or substantial evidence that Petitioner’s termination was based on her sex. Although Petitioner asserted harassment from Mr. McConnell, no evidence to support this claim was adduced at the hearing. Respondent hired and promoted Petitioner to a manager position, allowed Petitioner to hire her husband and son (and at least one of her son’s friends), and gave her a paid week off after JazzFest to refresh and relax from a stressful event. The evidence showed that Mr. McConnell gave Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, as he did with all his employees, and only decided to terminate her after talking with Petitioner and determining that giving her time off did nothing to eliminate the negative energy Petitioner was bringing to the job. Based on these facts, Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent discriminated against her based on sex or disability when it terminated her from employment. As such, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Thirston, II, Esquire Thirston Law Firm Post Office Box 19617 Panama City Beach, Florida 32417 (eServed) Timothy Nathan Tack, Esquire Kunkel Miller and Hament 3550 Buschwood Park Drive, Suite 135 Tampa, Florida 33618 (eServed) Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by termination of the Petitioner for discriminatory reasons, based upon her national origin (Panamanian/Hispanic).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an Hispanic female of Panamanian origin. She began working for the Delta Health Group, the Respondent, as a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) on or about May 5, 2000. She was generally described by her supervisors as being a good worker. During times pertinent hereto, the Petitioner worked on an evening shift at the Respondent's nursing care facility. One of the residents assigned to her care was L.M., an elderly person. The Petitioner cared for Ms. M. for approximately one year. The Respondent is an employer with more than 15 employees. During times pertinent to this case it operated a nursing care facility located in the vicinity of Destin, Florida, at which the Petitioner was employed as a CNA. The Respondent, in its nursing facility operation, is closely regulated by the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration and, as to its licensed personnel (CNA's, RN's, LPN's, etc.) are subject to licensure and practice standards and regulations of the Department of Health, Board of Nursing, etc. The operative regulations include, as to AHCA, requirements to report any incident involving harm or injury to a nursing home resident, as well as departures from nursing home operational regulation standards and nursing practice standards. There are extensive charting and record- keeping requirements with regard to all care and incidents involving residents. On or about the evening of January 2, 2006, the Petitioner was caring for Ms. M., when Ms. M. told her she wanted to wear some earrings that her grandson had given her. She asked the Petitioner to help her place the earrings in her ears. The Petitioner asked Ms. M. if her ears had been pierced and Ms. M. apparently told her that they had been. The Petitioner put the earrings in Ms. M.'s ears as requested. One went in easily, but the left earring felt somewhat tight. Ms. M. wore the earrings to dinner that night. At bedtime, the Petitioner asked her if she wanted to remove the earrings, but Ms. M. wanted to keep them in. She did ask the Petitioner to remove the earring from her left ear and purportedly asked her to put a string through the hole. The Petitioner maintains that the pierced hole in Ms. M.'s left ear was not opened well enough, and was "clogged-up and dirty." The Petitioner concedes that she put a string through Ms. M.'s left ear by tying it to the left earring and passing the string through the hole, through use of the earring, as Ms. M. purportedly requested. The evidence is conflicting somewhat on this. The Respondent's version of events, it purports to have gleaned from Ms. M., was to the effect that the Petitioner used a needle which she sterilized with a cigarette lighter before passing it through Ms. M.'s ear with the string. The Respondent relies on the out-of-court statement purportedly made by Ms. M., the resident, to its investigating personnel concerning the facts surrounding the piercing (or not) of the ear in question, how the string was inserted, and for what purpose. A hearsay objection was raised about testimony which relied on this statement and the Respondent relies on the hearsay exception for elderly or disabled adults contained in Section 90.803(24), Florida Statutes.1/ Starla Lindaas, LPN, came on duty on January 3, 2006, and noticed the string in Ms. M.'s left earlobe. Ms. Lindaas stated that Ms. M. told her that the Petitioner had pierced her ears. When she examined Ms. M.'s ears, however, she did not notice any redness, irritation, discharge or other issues indicating that any medical problem was occurring. The Risk Manager, Connie Hamilton, knew of and investigated the so-called ear piercing incident, but did not report it to the Department of Children and Family Services, or the Agency for Health Care Administration, because the Petitioner caused no abuse, neglect, or harm to the resident, nor did she intend to do so. The Petitioner was interviewed during the investigation of the incident by the Respondent, on January 3, 2006. The Petitioner related the version of events concerning the ear issue as first described above. The resident, Ms. M., purportedly described them to the Respondent's supervisory personnel as involving the Petitioner "piercing" her ear or ears, by the use of a needle for piercing of her earlobe, inserting the string, or both. CNA's are allowed to place earrings in pierced earlobes for residents, if the ears are already pierced. They are not authorized, and it is beyond their scope of practice, to carry-out ear piercing, however. In any event, the Respondent elected to rely on the version of events related by the resident in her statement, which therefore amounted, in the view of the Respondent, to the Petitioner acting beyond the scope of her CNA practice. She was therefore terminated from her employment on January 3, 2006. The Petitioner's salary at the time of her termination was $31,825.14 annually. During the year of her termination, after her termination, she earned from part-time employment $5,513.28 and also received $6,999.00 in unemployment compensation benefits. The Petitioner adduced testimony concerning a number of instances of what she maintains were disparate treatment occurrences, which she claims amount to national origin discrimination against her status as a Panamanian. She, in essence, claims that the comparator employees, who were all white, or non-Hispanic, were treated disparately by being treated more favorably in purportedly similar instances of employee misconduct and discipline. This testimony applies to both one element of her prima facie case of discrimination based upon national origin, regarding disparate treatment as compared to other employees not of her protected classification, as well as to an attempt to establish an ongoing pattern or pervasiveness of discrimination against Hispanics, as it relates to her attempt to establish discriminatory intent or motivation underlying the employment action of which she complains. This evidence relates to her ultimate burden of persuasion and her burden to show that the employer's reasons were pretextual. In this connection, in May 2004, the Petitioner was reprimanded ("written-up") for cutting a resident's hair, some three months after the event. She maintained that the nurse supervising her asked her to cut the resident's hair. She was written-up for cutting the resident's hair, because it is against policy at the Respondent's facility and beyond the range of practice for a CNA. A beautician is used for all haircutting and similar cosmetic duties at the facility. The Petitioner maintains that one Megan Teibo, a white female, also cut a resident's hair. The Petitioner states that she reported Ms. Teibo to her supervisors, and to the facility's management, but that Ms. Teibo was not disciplined. The Petitioner also contends that it was common practice for employees to be tardy arriving at work for their shift because of the very heavy traffic between Ft. Walton and Destin, the location of the Respondent's facility. She testified that it was routine for employees to call ahead and inform the supervisors that they would be late for work. The Petitioner maintains that she had to do this a number of times and yet she was written-up for being tardy, while other employees who are white were not so reprimanded. Additionally, in February 2004 she was out sick for six days. She had a doctor's excuse justifying her missing work for illness. When she returned to work, however, she contends she was written-up by the administrator and that four or five non-Hispanic employees who where out sick for six or seven days were not written-up. Additionally, Sandy Port, a nurse, was out sick and had a doctor's excuse and was not purportedly written-up. The Respondent's witnesses maintain that all employees, regardless of race or national origin, etc., were treated the same. If they were tardy they were counseled or written-up depending on the situation and the same was true if they were absent from work. They were counseled or "written-up" depending on the circumstances such as repetitiveness and severity. In this connection, the Petitioner only testified to these matters based upon her own opinion and undocumented, uncorroborated conversations she maintained she had with her co- workers, thus purportedly learning that those others who were absent or tardy were not reprimanded or disciplined for it. She offered no evidence, as for instance, obtained through discovery of the Respondent's employee records, that any non-Hispanic, non-Panamanian employees were treated differently for similar conduct involving tardiness (magnitude or degree, etc) and were treated more favorably. The same is true with regard to the category of absences from work for sickness or other reasons. Thus the record testimony in favor of the Petitioner is only the Petitioner's own unsupported opinion concerning these matters. The testimony adduced by the Respondent demonstrates that the Petitioner could not have known directly of any circumstances or details regarding the other employees' disciplinary situations regarding their tardiness or absence records, because she had no access to their records. Thus her testimony is only based on her own subjective opinion and, at most, out-of-court hearsay declarations by non-present, non-appearing, declarants. In July 2004, according to the Petitioner, the Respondent's facility needed CNA's to work the morning shift, which was shorthanded. The Petitioner asked her administrator if she could move from the evening shift to the morning shift and he told her that there were no openings at that time. She contends that white, non-Hispanic employees were, however, allowed to move to those positions, while she was not. In June or July of 2005, Caroline Gatewood, a resident of the Respondent's facility, suffered a fall. Nurse Toni Acosta grabbed her or picked her up without doing an assessment. She started pushing the resident, apparently trying to get her back to her room according to the Petitioner. The incident was reported to the Director of Nursing, and Ms. Acosta was suspended for several days during an internal investigation conducted by the Director of Nursing. The results of that were reported to the Agency for Health Care Administration. Ultimately, however, the nurse was determined to have not been at fault, and was restored to duty and paid for the days she had been suspended without pay. Thus no discipline was actually imposed against her. The Petitioner maintained that about one month after that incident nurse Acosta was accused of verbally abusing the same resident, but no action was taken against her. Ms. Acosta is a white female. The Petitioner merely stated her opinion or her subjective, hearsay-based knowledge regarding the situation, and had no corroborative evidence to show that Ms. Acosta was actually determined to have been guilty of any misconduct about either the pushing incident or the alleged verbal abuse one month later. Thus, it was not persuasively established that Ms. Acosta was disparately and more favorably treated than the Petitioner. In fact, it was not shown that the employees, Acosta and the Petitioner, were similarly situated, by committing similar purported acts of misconduct, concerning which they were allegedly disparately disciplined, or not disciplined, for that matter. In March 2005, the Petitioner was verbally accosted by a cook at the facility by the name of Mark. He apparently became angry and yelled at the Petitioner, using obscenities directed at her. She reported the conduct to the Assistant Director of Nursing, the Director of Nursing, and the Administrator. She maintains that no action was taken against the cook. Here again she is testifying of her own subjective knowledge or belief. She did not establish that she was aware of all facts concerning whether counseling or other disciplinary action may have been taken against the cook. In any event, even if no action was taken, it was not established that the Respondent condoned such conduct or allowed it to recur, once the Respondent knew of it. Such an isolated incident does not constitute the condonation of discriminatory conduct by a co- employee, on the part of a supervisor. Finally, in October 2005 the Petitioner had to go to Panama for several weeks for the funeral of her father and her brother. When she returned to work she maintains that she was written-up for a tardy instance "for three minutes," which occurred approximately a month before that. She maintains that employees "Todd," "Shauna," "Art," and "Deena" had come to work late and were not written-up. Here again this is her unsupported, subjective opinion without reference to any documentation from the Respondent's employee records, for instance. In fact, witness Nicole Coffield, for the Respondent, rebutted this testimony by establishing that these employees, indeed, were disciplined for their tardiness. Moreover, it was not shown that their degree or repetitiveness of tardiness, or the other circumstances surrounding it, were the same or similar to the Petitioner's. It was thus not established that these purported comparator employees indeed were similarly situated to the Petitioner in the circumstances of their conduct and any discipline (or the degree thereof). Additionally, the Petitioner recounted an instance in which she was accused of stealing cash donations, and was suspended for several days. She was accused of taking a "donation bucket" from a nurses station, and the money it contained, for her personal use. The matter was investigated and the Respondent concluded it by accepting the Petitioner's explanation. She had taken the money, with her supervisor's approval, to buy flowers or a gift for a co-worker, who was absent and gravely ill. The Petitioner was exonerated by the Respondent, restored to duty, and paid for the days she was suspended. The suspension during the pendency of the investigation was a routine practice according to the Respondent's established, normal policy concerning disciplinary procedures. In summary, the Petitioner admitted putting the string through the resident's ear and that she did not ask her supervisor for permission. The Respondent investigated the report purportedly made by Ms. M., the resident. The investigation was conducted by the Director of Nursing, the Risk Manager, and the Director of Human Resources. The Petitioner was suspended pending the results of the investigation, according to the Respondent's regular stated policy. In its investigation the Respondent determined to accept the version of events attributed to the statement or statements of Ms. M., the resident, as corroborated by the testimony of Ms. Lindaas, the LPN. Whether or not the resident's statement was true and whether or not it is inadmissible hearsay, the Respondent established that it relied upon that report in deciding the outcome of its investigation. Since the Respondent relied on the statement after corroborating it by Ms. Lindaas's reporting of the events, it established that it had a reasonable basis at the time for believing that the relevant events involving the Petitioner occurred in that way. The Respondent thus determined that the Petitioner had departed from the proper practice and appropriate conduct of a CNA and that this was a "category one offense" under the Respondent's corporate polices and disciplinary procedures. A category one offense requires suspension pending an investigation, and then either termination, or restoration of employment, with payment for the suspended period of time, depending on whether the allegations are determined true or not. In this instance, based largely on Ms. M.'s statement, corroborated by the statements of other personnel, who had observed or conversed with Ms. M., the Respondent determined that the Petitioner had not merely placed the earrings in the resident's ear, but had actually pierced the resident's ear with a needle. This was an inappropriate departure from the standards of conduct and practice of a CNA, which the Respondent established was a category one violation in its disciplinary policy, for which she was therefore terminated.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Republic Parking System, Inc., operates paid parking lots and facilities at a variety of public and private locations. One of its locations is at the Northwest Florida Beaches International Airport in Panama City, Florida. As part of its operations, Republic maintains an equal- employment opportunity, anti-sexual harassment and non- discrimination policy. The policy also prohibits harassment at work by anyone, including supervisors, co-workers or customers. The evidence showed that the policy is disseminated to its employees in its Employee Handbook and is consistently enforced by the company. Under its Employee Handbook the company generally follows a progressive-disciplinary policy for violations of company policy, with increasing penalties ranging from reprimands to dismissal. However, certain violations of policy, such as use of abusive language or being discourteous to customers, supervisors or fellow employees, may result in immediate dismissal. In October of 2010, Petitioner, Joni Barkley, an African-American, was employed by Respondent as a parking booth cashier at the international airport in Panama City. Upon employment, Ms. Barkley received a copy of Republic Parking System, Inc.’s Employee Handbook and signed an acknowledgement of her receipt of that handbook. She was aware of the company’s policy regarding discrimination and harassment. During her tenure and prior to the end of December 2013 or early 2014, Ms. Barkley had no complaints of racial discrimination or harassment towards her. On the other hand, she had been verbally counseled about a remark she made that co- employees had interpreted as racially motivated. Respondent also had been disciplined for repeated tardiness. Additionally, during her employment, Ms. Barkley was known for misinterpreting statements of others and believing innocent statements or actions by others were directed at her. Towards the end of December 2013 or early January of 2014, one of Ms. Barkley’s co-workers, Eva Bishop, a Caucasian, showed her co-workers, including Ms. Barkley, several photographs and a video of her trip to Alaska. Among the photos she showed to everyone was a picture of a Ketchikan Native American clan house. The picture depicts a rustic blue wooden structure with several Alaskan Native American symbols painted on it to form a face with an open mouth for the front entry. Three large Native American totem poles dominate the front of the structure and are placed at the front corners and in the middle over the front entry way to the structure. When Ms. Barkley was informed that the photo was of a clan house, she mistakenly believed that the photo was related to the Ku Klux Klan and thought Ms. Bishop was referring to a “Klan” house. Unfortunately, Ms. Barkley maintained the correctness of her mistaken belief even though several co- workers who had seen the same picture tried to explain the picture to her. Through January of 2014, Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop had several arguments and animated discussions. Ms. Barkley insisted that Ms. Bishop was a member of the Ku Klux Klan and accused her of the same, with her rank in the Klan growing from member to president of the local chapter. She also insisted that the picture Ms. Bishop had shown Petitioner was related to the Ku Klux Klan. Due to her mistaken beliefs, Ms. Barkley became very anxious and fearful of Ms. Bishop. On February 5, 2014, Ms. Barkley first reluctantly complained about Ms. Bishop to Kim Hall, Republic’s Assistant Manager and Ms. Barkley’s immediate supervisor. She complained that Ms. Bishop had used racial slurs in talking with her and had discussed with her the Ku Klux Klan. Ms. Hall immediately took Ms. Barkley to Kelly Blum, Republic’s General Manager at the Panama City airport. Ms. Barkley made the same complaint, but indicated that she “loved” Ms. Bishop and did not want to see her fired. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Blum met with Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop together, and told them that they could not fight with each other at work. At the conclusion of the meeting, Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop hugged, apologized to each other, said they loved each other and told Ms. Blum they could work together. There was no evidence that demonstrated the manner in which Ms. Blum investigated or handled Ms. Barkley’s complaint was intimidating, harassing or discriminatory. Ms. Blum also stated that she would try to avoid scheduling Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop on the same shift. However, due to limitations in personnel, Ms. Blum could not ensure that the two employees would not be on the same shift. Unfortunately, sometime after this conversation, Ms. Barkley worked two hours with Ms. Bishop because Ms. Bishop’s replacement for the next shift was late or couldn’t make it in to work due to bad weather. The manager that day offered to stay with Ms. Barkley, but Ms. Barkley said it would be alright and that she could work with Ms. Bishop present. The evidence did not demonstrate that the one-time, unanticipated shift overlap was in retaliation for Ms. Barkley’s earlier complaint. Over the next several days and notwithstanding their mutual apologies, Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop continued to argue with each other, create a hostile work environment and use abusive, profane language. Eventually, Ms. Barkley called the F.B.I. and continued to accuse Ms. Bishop of being a racist and a member of the Ku Klux Klan. At some point, Ms. Barkley insisted on showing Ms. Bishop some books about the Ku Klux Klan, again accused Ms. Bishop of being a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and indicated that Ms. Bishop’s connection to the Klan scared her. Ms. Bishop told Ms. Barkley, in essence, that the KKK hung niggers, and asked why Ms. Barkley thought she would take a similar action. Ms. Barkley responded and, in essence, referred to Ms. Bishop as a white cracker bitch who would hang niggers from trees and that she better hang her with her pearls on. As a consequence, Ms. Blum looked into the continued behavior and reported her concerns about Ms. Barkley’s and Ms. Bishop’s behavior to her supervisor, Regional Manager Linda Kelleher. Ms. Kelleher requested that Republic’s human resources department investigate the matter. Again, there was no evidence that demonstrated this inquiry was intimidating, harassing or discriminatory towards Ms. Barkley. Jan Veal, Republic Parking System, Inc.’s Director of Human Resources, interviewed all witnesses, including Ms. Barkley, Ms. Bishop, Ms. Williams, Ms. Hall, Ms. Blum, and Ms. Kelleher. During the investigation, Ms. Bishop admitted using racial epithets towards Ms. Barkley. Based upon Ms. Bishop’s admission, Ms. Bishop was suspended, with pay, pending the conclusion of the investigation. Shortly thereafter, following Ms. Veal’s interview with Ms. Barkley and the other witnesses’ report of the racial remarks of Ms. Barkley, Ms. Barkley also was suspended with pay, pending the conclusion of the investigation. Such actions were reasonable since both Ms. Bishop and Petitioner were at fault in their behavior towards each other. On February 25, 2014, Republic Parking Systems, Inc., terminated Ms. Barkley’s employment, having concluded that she used offensive and threatening language of a racial nature including the use of profanities and creation of a hostile work environment in violation of company policies. Republic Parking System, Inc., terminated Ms. Bishop’s employment on the same day for the same reasons. As such, the evidence was clear that both employees engaged in similar behavior and were disciplined in the same manner. Both were terminated. Based on these facts, Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent discriminated against her based on race or retaliation when it terminated her from employment. As such, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of August, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Joni Marie Barkley 15221 Banks Drive Southport, Florida 32409 (eServed) Jan Veal Republic Parking System, Inc. Suite 2000 633 Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37450 James Scott McDearman, Esquire Grant Konvalinka and Harrison, P.C. 633 Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37450 (eServed) Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioners were denied access by Respondent to a public accommodation so as to render Respondent liable for any claims pursuant to Article VI of the Gainesville City Municipal Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Gloria Jean Mitchell and Arnold Mitchell are husband and wife. They are African-American. Sunil and Gira Patel are husband and wife. They are not African-American. There was no testimony as to their race. By observation, it appears that they are Caucasians originating in the Indian sub-continent. They own Respondent facility EZ Food Mart/Chevron, which qualifies as a "place of public accommodation." EZ Food Mart/Chevron is a combination gas station and convenience store, with a unisex restroom, which is open for business from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. each day. Mr. and Mrs. Sunil Patel employ one female clerk and one male clerk, Jay Patel.1/ Jay Patel’s race was not testified- to, but his race appears to be the same as Mr. and Mrs. Sunil Patel’s race. Jay Patel speaks English with some confusion, sometimes using "he" for "it", and does not understand everything that is said to him in English. However, having observed his candor and demeanor while testifying, it is found that Jay Patel has, to a degree, selective understanding, so that he comprehends more questions that permit generally exculpatory answers, than questions about particular events on the days at issue herein. Despite Jay Patel’s testimony that he had been employed at the store only since April 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Sunil Patel and Dale Warren place Jay Patel’s commencement of employment at the EZ Food Mart/Chevron approximately two years earlier, when Mrs. Patel ceased to go into the store as regularly as she had before. Their dating of Jay Patel’s arrival is supported by other parts of Jay Patel’s testimony and is accepted as more accurate than Jay Patel’s first stated date of April 2006. The majority of the residents of the neighborhood in which EZ Food Mart/Chevron is located are African-American. The majority of Respondent's clients are African-American. Mrs. Mitchell frequently purchases gas at EZ Food Mart/Chevron. On April 26, 2006, she filled her car's gas tank at the pump and entered the convenience store to pay for the gas. When she got to the cash register operated by Jay Patel, she asked to use the restroom. He told her, "No, you can't use it. It's out of order." Mrs. Mitchell had no trouble understanding Jay Patel and had observed on many trips to the EZ Food Mart/Chevron that he understood others speaking English. On her way out, she observed a blonde Caucasian man rush in and ask to use the restroom and further observed that the blonde Caucasian man was handed a key. Mrs. Mitchell's testimony did not specify which clerk handed the key to the blonde, Caucasian man. The blonde Caucasian man was not a customer. Mrs. Mitchell did not see the condition of the restroom that day and assumed there was one restroom for women and one restroom for men. There is no clear evidence as to what time of day this all occurred or which clerk handed the key to the blonde Caucasian man, but it was a very busy time of day with many customers standing in line at the cash registers. There is no evidence of the actual condition of the restroom on April 26, 2006. On April 28, 2006, Arnold Mitchell was accompanying his wife on errands. After their car gas tank was filled, Mr. Mitchell went into Respondent's convenience store to pay for the gas. Mr. Mitchell has a medical condition involving the need to urinate frequently and urgently. When he paid Jay Patel for the gas, Mr. Mitchell explained his medical condition and requested to use the restroom. Jay Patel refused to let him use the restroom, saying something to the effect that, "It's out of order. Because you live in the neighborhood, you can go home and use the restroom." There also was another clerk working in the store at that time. On April 28, 2006, Mr. Mitchell went out and told his wife what had happened. At that point, Mrs. Mitchell realized Respondent's facility only had one unisex restroom and assumed that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her African-American race on April 26, 2006, by receiving inferior treatment than had the Caucasian male who had been permitted to use the restroom after she had been denied. Mr. and Mrs. Mitchell did not see Respondent's unisex restroom on April 28, 2006. They had no idea what condition it was in at that time. There is no clear evidence of the condition of Respondent’s restroom on April 28, 2006. No one connected with Respondent on either April 26, 2006, or April 28, 2006, made any racial comment to either Petitioner. No racial or discriminatory comment was made in their presence at any time by anyone connected with Respondent. However, both Petitioners were hurt, humiliated, and embarrassed by what they perceived on April 28, 2006, to be discriminatory disparate treatment on April 26, and April 28, 2006. The Mitchells live two miles or five minutes' drive away from the EZ Food Mart/Chevron, but on April 28, 2006, they chose not to go home so that Mr. Mitchell could use the restroom. As a result, Mr. Mitchell suffered some bladder pain. They wanted to get to their dry cleaner before that business closed, and they got there in time. This evidence puts the incident at Respondent's establishment on April 28, 2006, at close to the end of the average business day, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. Mr. Mitchell urinated on himself. The evidence is not clear as to why he did not use the dry cleaner's restroom, but it may have been out of order. The next place Petitioners stopped also had a restroom that was out of order, so he could not use it. The third stop, a bus station, let Mr. Mitchell use its restroom. Mr. Mitchell suffered stress and embarrassment from this chain of events.2/ On May 2, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Mitchell returned to Respondent's store with a TV20 news crew and camera. First, Mr. Mitchell went into the store, bought something, and asked a female clerk if he could use the restroom. She told him he could not. He then asked the male clerk, Jay Patel, who also told Mr. Mitchell he could not use the restroom. There was no reference to race by anyone. There was a reference by Jay Patel to Mr. Mitchell living in the neighborhood, but exactly what was said about neighborhood residence is unclear. Mr. Mitchell returned to the parking lot and conferred with the TV20 people. Ten to 15 minutes later, TV20 sent a Caucasian female into the store. When she asked to use the restroom, she was given the key immediately by store personnel. The TV20 Caucasian female telecaster returned outside a little while later. Then the whole TV20 news crew and the Mitchells returned inside and confronted Jay Patel.3/ There is no clear evidence concerning the actual condition of the restroom on May 2, 2006. There is no credible evidence that the restroom was cleaned or was not cleaned during the 10-15 minutes that elapsed between the time Mr. Mitchell was denied access to the restroom on May 2, 2006, and the time the Caucasian telecaster was granted access. Photographs in evidence document that at some time the store's restroom was unsanitary. "Filthy" would not be too strong a descriptive adjective. The photographs were purportedly taken at least two days, and possibly a week, before May 2, 2007. This places the restroom’s documented filthy condition as being sometime between April 26 and April 30, 2006. However, Respondent provided no explanation as to why the photographs of the restroom had been taken before the first date of alleged discrimination ever presented any reason to make a photographic record. Dale Warren, an African-American male, is a uniformed Alachua County Deputy Sheriff. He lives next door to the EZ Food Mart/Chevron. He testified that on one occasion, apparently quite some time before April 26, 2006, he had asked to use the restroom and Jay Patel told him he could not. Mr. Warren asked why he could not use the restroom. Jay Patel told him to go look at it. There is no evidence that Mr. Warren had to unlock the restroom at that time. Mr. Warren has no trouble understanding Jay Patel, and apparently, Jay Patel is able to understand Mr. Warren’s English. Mr. Warren observed the restroom to "have a whole bunch of toilet tissue and like paper napkins and it was filthy and he [referring to Jay Patel] said he needed to clean it and get some work done.” At that time, Mr. Warren gently warned Jay Patel to get the restroom fixed or someone in that African-American neighborhood would file a discrimination suit. Jay Patel let Mr. Warren use the clean restroom on a later day. Mr. Warren further claimed that a young man comes each day, in the afternoons, between 4:30 and 7:30 p.m. and cleans the restroom on a routine basis for Jay Patel. Jay Patel did not mention in his testimony that anyone else had ever come in to clean the EZ Food Mart/Chevron restroom. Rather, Jay Patel’s testimony and that of Mr. and Mrs. Sunil Patel suggested that Jay Patel cleaned it himself. Jay Patel did testify that on May 2, 2006, he had locked the restroom door from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. and that at other times he had locked the restroom door and told people who wanted to use the restroom that they could not use it. The times Jay Patel claimed to have locked the restroom and prohibited everyone, regardless of race, from using it were when the restroom was clean but the store was very busy, like during “rush hour,” which he defined as between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., or when the restroom was already filthy.4/ When neither Mr. or Mrs. Sunil Patel was on the premises, they left the entire running of the store to Jay Patel. Shortly before April 26, 2006, Sunil Patel had a conversation with Jay Patel to the effect that the entire running of the store was in Jay Patel’s hands, including getting the messy restroom "under control." At all times material, Mr. and Mrs. Sunil Patel had no clear anti-discrimination policy in place and none was posted for the benefit of employees or patrons. The events of May 2, 2006, led to a demonstration with picketers marching in front of the EZ Food Mart/Chevron. Gira Patel arrived on the scene and inquired of Mr. Mitchell how she could make the picketers stop. He asked that she terminate Jay Patel's employment. She refused. At some unspecified time thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Patel did terminate Jay Patel as a result of this situation. However, based on observation at hearing, it is found that the three remain in contact and are on cordial terms. In his testimony, Jay Patel continued to refer to Sunil Patel as “my employer” in the present tense. The Patels stated they saw nothing wrong with Jay Patel’s actions. All three Patels denied any racial animus or aversion to persons of any race. Mrs. Mitchell conceded that in the past she had been waited-upon by Mrs. Patel in other stores with no hint of racial discrimination and that no one at the EZ Food Mart/Chevron had ever made any racial or derogatory statements or reference to her. Mr. Mitchell agreed that no overt racial comments or observations had ever been made to, or about, him at the EZ Food Mart/Chevron. Annie Pickens, an African-American female, who has lived in the neighborhood of the EZ Food Mart/Chevron for 30 years, testified that on one occasion in March 2006, she had requested to use the store’s restroom and was denied access by Mrs. Patel. Although Mrs. Patel denied that she was working in the EZ Food Mart/Chevron in March 2006, Jay Patel testified that when Mrs. Patel did work in the store, it was from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. It is also possible that Ms. Pickens confused Mrs. Patel with a female clerk. In any case, the female behind the counter told Ms. Pickens in March 2006, that the restroom was out of order. Ms. Pickens had no personal knowledge whether or not the restroom was soiled, out of order, or just fine on the date her request was denied. The time of day she made her request is not in evidence. Beverly Craig, an African-American female, who does not live in the neighborhood, testified that she has used Respondent's restroom numerous times. Ms. Craig has known Mr. and Mrs. Patel and has patronized the EZ Food Mart/Chevron for eight years. At hearing, all three Patels testified that neither race nor neighborhood residence governed whom they let use the store restroom. All three Patels testified they had no reason to deny Petitioners access to their restroom based on any prior problems with Petitioners. Jay Patel testified that he did not keep a list of persons who soiled the restroom so as to preclude them from using the restroom again.5/ At all times material, Mr. Mitchell has been totally disabled and unemployed. There is no evidence of Mrs. Mitchell being employed at any time material. There was no evidence of any actual damages incurred by either Petitioner. There was no evidence concerning lost wages, psychiatric or physical disability, medical bills, or any other resultant expenses, and no evidence of any inability to enjoy life that resulted from the April 26, April 28, or May 2, 2006, incidents. Respondent denied any liability, but the parties stipulated that a reasonable attorney's fee would be $250.00, per hour and that Petitioner's attorney had worked 32.9 hours up to the commencement of the three and a half-hour hearing, and that Respondent's attorney had worked 21 hours up to that point. The Transcript reveals that the hearing herein lasted three and a half hours. No evidence of costs incurred was offered in evidence by either party and no party requested that the record be left open for that type of evidence. There was considerable indecisiveness, speculation, lack of memory, and vacillation within the testimony of all the principals herein. Indeed, in some instances, witnesses contradicted themselves as well as other witnesses. This sort of immaterial “human error” occurs in every case, and is not necessarily indicative of untruthfulness. It is a common occurrence to be considered and weighed by the finder of fact, who is in the best position to reconcile testimony as much as possible and to assess the credibility of all witnesses. However, where there are major and material discrepancies among witnesses’ respective testimonies, the credibility issue is more important. In making the foregoing Findings of Fact 1-29, the undersigned has made every effort to reconcile testimony and exhibits so that each witness may be found to speak the truth. However, where major and material conflicts existed, the credibility issue has been resolved on the characteristics listed in the Florida Civil Jury Instructions. Generally, where the foregoing Findings of Fact diverge from the construction of events related by any particular witness(es), it is because that witness or those witnesses were not found entirely credible and no further discussion of those credibility factors beyond the discussion incorporated here and/or within those Findings of Fact is necessary. On the other hand, certain elements of the testimony/evidence are clearly incredible, unreliable, less reliable than other evidence, or otherwise undermine a party’s theory of the case, and those specific elements are discussed with regard to the shifting burden(s) of proof within the following Conclusions of Law.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the City of Gainesville Human Rights Board enter a final order that: Finds Respondent discriminated against Gloria Mitchell based on her race (African-American); Finds Respondent discriminated against Arnold Mitchell based on his race (African-American); Orders Respondent to post and display a printed anti- discrimination policy that accords with the language employed at Article IV, Section 8-67 of the City of Gainesville Ordinance and which provides an address and telephone number where the owners or their agent can be reached to report any alleged discrimination on their premises; Authorizes the Gainesville City Attorney to apply to a Circuit Court for an injunction that prohibits any further discrimination in accommodation by the Respondent; and Awards from Respondent to Petitioners' attorney $9,100.00, in fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2007.
