Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on November 18, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. 3. In the Petition Rules "33-3.002, 33-19.006, 33-19 et. seq., 33-19.012, 33-23 et. seq." were challenged. Most of the Challenged Rules are lengthy and deal with a number of subjects. The common thread of the Challenged Rules concern medical care of inmates. The Petition is, to say the least, confusing. This confusion is caused by the Petitioner's frequent use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 17, State of the Case and Facts, provides the following: 17. That the (Petitioner) has learned that the (Respondent) act [sic] pursuant to an invalid delegation as 33-3.002 33-19 et. seq., 233-23 et. seq. that fail to establish adequate standards for agency decision making, and vests unbridled discretion in the agency or employees that's inconsistant [sic] to the statutory requirements of 120.54 and 944.09. This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition. Although it contains some "legalese", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of employees of the Respondent in allegedly releasing confidential medical information to "security staff and psychologist or and other staff or employees with criminal intent" and other medical practices of the employees of the Respondent. The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rules. The statements concerning constitutional issues consist of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rules are unconstitutional. Again, most of the Petitioner's arguments apparently concern violation of constitutional rights by the acts of employees of the Respondent as opposed to the violations of constitutional rights in the Challenged Rules. Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the Challenged Rules are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. On December 10, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend was entered. The Petitioner was informed that his Petition was being dismissed and the Petitioner was given an opportunity to file an amended petition. No amended petition has been filed by the Petitioner. On January 14, 1992, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered dismissing the Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether a statement made by a representative of Respondent Department of Community Affairs in a letter to legal counsel for Petitioners, and statements made in a Final Order of Dismissal entered by Respondent, constitute unpromulgated rules in violation of applicable Florida law.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Alachua Leadership Alliance-Citizens Helping Us All, Inc. (ALA-CHUA), is a corporation created to represent the interests of certain citizens within the community, to "share information with the community," and to be "a citizen's watchdog group overlooking the expenditures" of funds. ALA-CHUA holds regular meetings, attends public meetings, and initiates litigation. ALA-CHUA president Tamara Kay Robbins and ALA-CHUA member Eileen McCoy testified at the hearing. Petitioners Robert A. Perez, Thalia Gentzel, and Madalene Rhyland, did not testify at the hearing. Respondent is the state agency charged with administration of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act ("Act"), Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. As stated at Subsection 163.3161(2), Florida Statutes (2004), the purpose of the Act is to "utilize and strengthen the existing role, processes, and powers of local governments in the establishment and implementation of comprehensive planning programs to guide and control future development." The Act requires local governments to adopt comprehensive plans that address numerous areas of responsibility. As set forth at Subsection 163.3191(1), Florida Statutes (2004), each local government is required to adopt an evaluation and appraisal report ("EAR") to assess "the progress in implementing the local government's comprehensive plan" and identifying portions of the plan that require updating. Subsection 163.3191(9), Florida Statutes (2004), requires that Respondent establish a schedule for adoption of EARs that provides "each local government at least 7 years from plan adoption or last established adoption date for a report. " After the EAR is completed, it is submitted to Respondent for a "sufficiency determination" as required at Subsection 163.3191(6), Florida Statutes (2004). Once Respondent determines an EAR to be sufficient, the local government is required to adopt within 18 months from the sufficiency determination, EAR-related comprehensive plan amendments. Subsection 163.3191(10), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that the 18-month deadline may be extended for six months by Respondent for "good and sufficient cause" and may again be extended if the additional extension would "result in greater coordination between transportation and land use, for the purposes of improving Florida's transportation system." Subsection 163.3191(11), Florida Statutes (2004), provides as follows: The Administration Commission may impose the sanctions provided by s. 163.3184(11) against any local government that fails to adopt and submit a report, or that fails to implement its report through timely and sufficient amendments to its local plan, except for reasons of excusable delay or valid planning reasons agreed to by the state land planning agency or found present by the Administration Commission. Sanctions for untimely or insufficient plan amendments shall be prospective only and shall begin after a final order has been issued by the Administration Commission and a reasonable period of time has been allowed for the local government to comply with an adverse determination by the Administration Commission through adoption of plan amendments that are in compliance. The state land planning agency may initiate, and an affected person may intervene in, such a proceeding by filing a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings, which shall appoint an administrative law judge and conduct a hearing pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57(1) and shall submit a recommended order to the Administration Commission. The affected local government shall be a party to any such proceeding. The commission may implement this subsection by rule. Section 14.202, Florida Statutes (2004), identifies that the Administration Commission is the Governor and the Cabinet. The sanctions available to the Administration Commission include various restrictions on the eligibility for and provision of certain state funds to non-complying local governments. The City of Alachua (City) is a local government with responsibility for adoption of a comprehensive plan. According to the Respondent's letter to City Mayor James A. Lewis dated December 29, 1998, the City's EAR was determined to be sufficient by the Respondent. The 18-month deadline for the City to adopt EAR- related comprehensive plan amendments expired at the end of June 2000. There were no deadline extensions granted by Respondent to the City. The City failed to meet the 18-month deadline for the adoption of EAR-related comprehensive plan amendments. By letter dated June 30, 2004, to Thaddeus Cohen, Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs, David Jon Russ (counsel for Petitioners) asked Respondent to initiate proceedings against the City of Alachua under the provisions of Subsection 163.3191(11), Florida Statutes (2004), by no later than July 8, 2004. By letter dated July 20, 2004, David L. Jordan, Deputy General Counsel for Respondent, advised Mr. Russ that Respondent "respectfully declines your request to seek sanctions against the City." The letter further states as follows: The City transmitted proposed EAR-based amendments on May 12, 2004, and the Department issued its Objections, Recommendations, and Comments ("ORC") report on July 16, 2004. Although the ORC report raises some objections to the proposed EAR- based amendments, the Department believes that the City can revise the amendments to resolve those objections. Therefore, the City is on course to adopt sufficient plan amendments to implement the EAR. The Department will not commence litigation to force the City to perform a duty that the City is already performing. Subsection 163.3184(7), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that a local government has 120 days from the date of the ORC report to adopt (or adopt with changes) the EAR-based amendments. Accordingly, the deadline for the City to adopt the amendments was November 15, 2004. The City adopted the EAR- based amendments on September 13, 2004. In response to the Jordan letter dated July 20, 2004, on August 16, 2004, Petitioners filed with Respondent a Petition for Hearing on Decision Affecting Substantial Interests and for Rulemaking, stating that Petitioners "demand a hearing before DOAH, a recommended order finding the action illegal, a final order adopting it, and rule-making by the Department." The Petition indicates that Petitioners desire a hearing on Respondent's decision not to initiate administrative proceedings against the City and to require Respondent to initiate rulemaking related to Subsection 163.3191(11), Florida Statutes (2004). On August 31, 2004, Respondent entered a Final Order Dismissing Petition, in which Petitioners' requests were dismissed with prejudice. The Final Order was not appealed. As grounds for the dismissal of the request for hearing, the Final Order of Dismissal stated that Petitioners failed to "identify any interest protected by pertinent substantive law that will suffer injury by virtue of the Department's decision not to seek sanctions against the City" and that Petitioners failed to identify any substantive right protected under Section 163.3191, Florida Statutes (2004). As grounds for dismissal of the request for rulemaking, the Final Order noted that Subsection 163.3191(11), Florida Statutes (2004), vests authority for adoption of rules related to implementation of the subsection in the Administration Commission, and that Respondent had no authority to initiate rulemaking. The evidence presented at the hearing established that Respondent's general policy is to encourage and negotiate with non-complying local governments, and that various types of technical and financial assistance is available to local governments, depending on the circumstances, to enable such compliance. The evidence further established that Respondent would initiate Subsection 163.3191(11) proceedings against a non- complying local government if the local government failed to proceed into compliance after receiving appropriate technical and financial assistance from Respondent. As of the date of the hearing, Respondent has not initiated Subsection 163.3191(11) proceedings against a local government for failing to timely adopt EAR-based comprehensive plan amendments. There is no evidence that any local government has failed to come into compliance with applicable comprehensive plan requirements after receiving assistance from Respondent. There is no evidence that Respondent has made any statement indicating that it would never initiate proceedings against any local government under the provisions of Subsection 163.3191(11), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on November 8, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. 3. In the Petition Rules "33-3.001, 33-3.006, 33-3.0025, 33-22.004(3)(A), 33-22.0012 Code 3, s. 3-12, 33-29 and 33-4.001, 33-4.002" and Internal Operating Procedure Number AG-91.51 were challenged. Most of the Challenged Rules are lengthy and deal with a number of subjects. The common thread of the Challenged Rules and IOP concerns the possession of contraband and punishment therefor. The Petition is, to say the least, confusing. This confusion is caused by the Petitioners frequent use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 2, State of the Case and Facts, provides the following: 2. That the (Respondents) Rules as 33-29 et. seq. 33- 3.006, 33-3.0025, 33-22.0012 Code 3, s 3-12 is [sic] invalid, arbitrary, capricious, vague, delegation to exceed, modify, contravenes, the specific provisions of laws [sic] implemented, citation required by 120.54(7), Florida Statutes and 944.09(1)(A). This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition. Although it contains some "legalese", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of employees of the Respondent in punishing the Petitioner for having contraband in his possession. The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rules and the IOP. The statements concerning constitutional issues consist of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rules or the IOP are unconstitutional. Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the Challenged Rules and the IOP are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. On December 4, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered. On December 23, 1991, an Amended Petition was filed by the Petitioner. The Amended Petition consolidated the Petitioner's challenges in this case and case number 90-7190R. The Amended Petition is very similar to the Petition and suffers from the same deficiencies. Additionally, the Petitioner includes the Department of Legal Affairs, and the State Attorney of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, the Respondents in case number 91-7190R as Respondents and addresses his challenge to other rules, internal operating procedures and directives of the other named Respondents challenged in case number 91-7190R. The Amended Petition is devoid of a sufficient statement of the alleged facts pertinent to the issues raised in the Petition or the Amended Petition which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rules, the IOP or the other matters challenged in the Amended Petition are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On January 14, 1992, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered dismissing the Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a contractor engaged in highway construction and holds a certificate of qualification with Respondent. Action pending in DOAH Case No. 84-2538 could result in the suspension of Petitioner's certificate if an alleged contract delinquency is proven. Section 337.16, F.S., delegates to Respondent the authority to revoke or suspend a certificate when contract delinquency is demonstrated. This statute provides: No contractor shall be qualified to bid when an investigation by the highway engineer discloses that such contractor is delinquent on a previously awarded contract, and in such case his certificate of qualification shall be suspended or revoked. The department may suspend, for a specified period of time, or revoke for good cause any certificate of qualification. The purpose of the above statute is to enforce timely completion of construction work and to prevent a contractor from taking on new work which might require diversion of resources from the delinquent job, thus lessening the contractor's ability to catch up. Rule 14-23.01, F.A.C. was promulgated by Respondent to implement its authority to suspend or revoke contractor certificates for job delinquency. Because contractors charged with delinquency frequently catch-up or cure the delinquency during the pendency of administrative proceedings, 1/ Respondent's statutory authority to enforce construction schedules was easily thwarted. To "put teeth" in its ability to deter job delays, Respondent amended its delinquency rule in 1982 to provide after- the-fact certificate suspension where a contractor was proven to have been delinquent in its progress on a construction project. This provision, which is challenged here, states as follows: (b) REINSTATEMENT. Any contractor disqualified under the above provisions shall be disqualified from further bidding and shall be disapproved as a contractor until the delinquency is cured. Where a contractor cures the alleged delinquency during the course of administrative proceedings, the Department may suspend the qualification to bid and disapprove as a subcontractor for the number of days the contractor is administratively determined to be delinquent. Specifically, Petitioner challenges the last sentence which it contends amounts to unauthorized punishment since the deficiency sought to be corrected by the statute no longer exists. However, the provision would arguably have some deterrent force since contractors would recognize that suspension could not be avoided merely by requesting formal proceedings 2/ and counting on administrative delay to render the delinquency issue moot.
The Issue Whether the petitioner is entitled to an award under section 57.111, Florida Statutes, of attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the appellate matter Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 631 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), and, if so, the amount of such award.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is the state agency responsible for issuing occupational licenses to veterinarians with access to the backside of a racetrack and for regulating such licensees. Sections 550.10(1)(b) and .105(2)(d)2, Florida Statutes. Dr. Witmer has been licensed to practice veterinary medicine in Florida since January 1, 1993, and, as of October 19, 1993, he was authorized to practice veterinary medicine at Florida racetracks by virtue of a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license (“license”) issued by the Department. He has been domiciled in Florida at all times material to this matter. On October 19, 1993, Dr. Witmer was a partner in a professional practice in veterinary medicine with its principal office at 1450 Southwest Third Street, Pompano Park, Broward County, Florida. His professional practice had three full-time employees and a net worth, including both personal and business investments, of less than $2 million. In the Administrative Complaint and Emergency Order of Suspension dated October 19, 1993, the Department took two actions with respect to Dr. Witmer’s license.1 First, in the administrative complaint, it put Dr. Witmer on notice that the Department had initiated a disciplinary action against him, charging him with violations of a statute and a rule governing his license which, if proven, would justify the imposition of penalties, including revocation or suspension of his license. Secondly, in the emergency order of suspension, it summarily suspended Dr. Witmer’s license. Dr. Witmer requested a formal administrative hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to challenge the truth of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint. The request was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case Number 93-6638. That action was pending at the time Dr. Witmer filed the application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue in this proceeding. Underlying proceeding On the basis of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint and its determination that Dr. Witmer’s interest in his license was “far outweighed by the immediate danger to the public health and safety and to the integrity of harness racing in the State of Florida,” the Department suspended Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as of October 19, 1993, ordered him to cease and desist from all activities authorized by the license, and barred him from entering any pari-mutuel establishment as a patron for the duration of the emergency suspension. Dr. Witmer chose to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to sections 120.60(8) and 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1993). It is this appellate proceeding which is the proceeding underlying Dr. Witmer’s application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue herein. State agencies are authorized by section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes (1995) to immediately suspend a license under the following circumstances and subject to the following conditions: If the agency finds that immediate serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency suspension, restriction, or limitation of a license, it shall show compliance in its order with the requirements imposed by s. 120.54(9) on agencies making emergency rules. Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a formal suspension or revocation proceeding under this section shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon. Section 120.54(9)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: If an agency finds that an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action, the agency may adopt any rule necessitated by the immediate danger by any procedure which is fair under the circumstances and necessary to protect the public interest, provided that: * * * 3. The agency publishes in writing at the time of, or prior to, its action the specific facts and reasons for finding an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for concluding that the procedure used is fair under the circumstances. . . . The agency’s findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness shall be judicially reviewable. On February 2, 1994, the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of Florida issued its opinion in Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Case Number 93-3232, reported at 631 So. 2d 338. The court quashed the Emergency Order of Suspension, concluding that the order was “facially inadequate,” and ruling that “the Department’s findings of immediate danger to the public welfare are not supported by specific facts and reasons as required by 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes.” Id. at 340, 343. The district court in Witmer observed that its review was limited to a determination of whether the order complied with the requirements of section 120.54(9)(a)3 and based its analysis upon the following rules of law: If the facts alleged in the complaint and [emergency] order are sufficient to demonstrate immediacy, necessity and fairness, no hearing is required prior to the emergency suspension. . . . The factual allegations contained in the emergency order must sufficiently identify particularized facts which demonstrate an immediate danger to the public. (Citation omitted.) Where, as here, no hearing was held prior to the entry of the emergency order, every element necessary to its validity must appear on the face of the order. (Citation omitted.) The order must be “factually explicit and persuasive concerning the existence of a genuine emergency.” (Citation omitted.) Witmer, 631 So. 2d at 341. In reaching its conclusion that the emergency order was facially inadequate, the court in Witmer held that the Department failed to allege facts in the complaint and order to establish the essential elements of the violations upon which the emergency suspension was based. Firstly, the court found that the charge in the emergency order that Dr. Witmer had failed to report gratuities was not supported by any allegations of fact in the complaint and order. Id. at 341. Secondly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer’s actions related to horse racing or to race horses, an essential element of a violation of section 550.235(2), Florida Statutes, and of rule 61D-1.002(10), Florida Administrative Code. Id. at 342. Thirdly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer reached an agreement with a second person to commit the violation, an essential element of any conspiracy, including one to violate section 550.235(2) and rule 61D-1.002(10). Id. Finally, the court concluded that the public harm alleged by the Department in the order was too attenuated to support the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Id. at 343. The district court issued its mandate to the Department on February 18, 1994, directing it to act in accordance with the opinion quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension. The Department did not seek review of the decision of the district court in the Florida Supreme Court. Consequently, the decision of the district court had the effect of nullifying the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Summary Dr. Witmer was a small business party, as that term is defined for purposes of section 57.111, at the time the Department entered the emergency order.2 The evidence is sufficient to establish that the Department initiated an action against Dr. Witmer when it entered an Emergency Order of Suspension. This order was issued under the authority granted state agencies in section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes. The order had the effect of immediately and summarily suspending Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. Dr. Witmer had the right to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to section 120.54(9)(a)3. The appellate court quashed the emergency order because it was legally insufficient to support the suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license under the standards of section 120.54(9)(a)3. The Department did not appeal or seek further review of the appellate court’s decision. Dr. Witmer, therefore, prevailed in the administrative proceeding initiated by the Department. The Department presented no evidence to establish that its action in ordering the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license had a reasonable basis in law and fact or that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of attorney’s fees and costs in this case unjust.3 The monetary value of the attorney’s fees rendered in connection with the appellate proceeding culminating in the decision quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension is $9,715.00, and the costs incurred total $250. These fees and costs are reasonable and were necessary to prosecute the appellate proceeding.4
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at the Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. In accordance with plea arrangements, Petitioner was convicted of numerous charges of robbery, burglary, sexual battery, and false imprisonment in Circuit Courts in Dade and Broward Counties, Florida. He received numerous and various prison sentences, all of which were to run concurrently with a 99- year sentence. Assuming that Petitioner is eligible for statutory gain time for good behavior, his sentence would expire sometime prior to the year 2080. During July, 1981, Petitioner was interviewed by an examiner of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of establishing a presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Under Parole and Probation Commission rules then in effect, the examiner was to consider the severity of the offense committed by the Petitioner, calculate a "salient factor score" and apply various aggravating or mitigating circumstances in determining a recommended PPRD. The examiner classified the offense as "greatest (most serious III);" determined a salient factor score of nine based upon prior convictions, total time served, the existence of burglary as a present offense of conviction, the number of prior incarcerations, and the Petitioner's age of first commitment; and applied numerous aggravating circumstances based upon the nature of various of the charges that had been lodged against Petitioner. The examiner recommended a PPRD of March 4, 2092. On August 26, 1981, the Parole and Probation Commission considered the examiner's recommendation and affirmed it. Petitioner is now pursuing a review of the PPRD before the Commission. In promulgating the rules which were in effect when Petitioner'S PPRD was determined, the Parole and Probation Commission sought to isolate factors that would predict the probability of a successful parole outcome. There is no perfect predictive device on a case-by-case basis. An inmate's past behavior and statistical relationships that can be isolated provide the best predictive devices. The Commission's C utilization of a system which first classifies the offense characteristics, then applies a salient factor score and aggravating or mitigating circumstances is designed to set a presumptive parole release date based on an inmate's past behavior and based upon the statistical relationships that have been found to exist. The evidence does not establish that the guidelines adopted by the Commission in its rules which were applied to the Petitioner are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The Parole and Probation Commission has amended the rules which were followed in the setting of the Petitioner's PPRD. The Petitioner continues to be affected, however, by the rules as they existed prior to the amendments because those rules provide the basis for his PPRD.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice because of Petitioner's national origin.
Findings Of Fact It is not disputed that Mr. Arugu is a Nigerian resident in the United States, that he held the position of Treatment Counselor with the BSO, that he was discharged subsequent to being charged criminally of certain violent acts, or that BSO refused to rehire him after he was found not guilty of those charges. The BSO is an employer as that term is used in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Mr. Arugu was hired as a substance abuse treatment counselor by Broward County, Florida, for its drug court program, in November 1989. He worked as a mental health specialist for the Broward County Drug Court. The position, with Mr. Arugu as the incumbent, was transferred to the BSO on October 1, 1999. A mental health specialist provides guidance to individuals or groups of persons who abuse legal and illegal substances and provides, among other things, anger management advice. Mr. Arugu's supervisor was Kristina Gulick. Her title was Director of the Department of Community Control. She assumed this position in 2001. Her immediate supervisor is Colonel Wimberly and his immediate supervisor is Sheriff Ken Jenne. Mr. Arugu began working for Ms. Gulick in 2002. Teddy Meisel is the assistant director of the Department of Community Control and reports to Ms. Gulick. He has known Mr. Arugu since 1997. He learned that Mr. Arugu had been arrested sometime after June 20, 2003. Subsequent to October 24, 2003, he reviewed an investigation into the activities of Mr. Arugu and as a result, decided he should be terminated. Although Mr. Meisel was aware that Mr. Arugu was a Nigerian, that fact did not enter into his decision to recommend that he be terminated. He discussed his recommendation with Ms. Gulick, who agreed, and forwarded a recommendation of dismissal to Colonel Wimberly. Ultimately, Sheriff Jenne signed off on the dismissal. The investigation reviewed by Mr. Meisel, Ms. Gulick, and Colonel Wimberly was prepared by Sergeant Wilfred Medina of the BSO's Office of Professional Compliance. He opened the investigation on June 21, 2003, and completed it on October 24, 2003. Sergeant Medina interviewed Mr. Arugu on September 21, 2003, in connection with his arrest by the Plantation Police Department (PPD) on June 20, 2003. The PPD had charged him with two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting arrest with violence and resisting arrest without violence. A review of the probable cause affidavit prepared by the arresting officers revealed that two PPD officers responded to a domestic disturbance complaint made by Lauretta Arugu, the estranged wife of Mr. Arugu. When the officers arrived at Ms. Arugu's residence, Mr. Arugu struck them repeatedly. The officers used pepper spray to gain control of him and thereafter arrested him. Based on this information, Mr. Arugu was suspended from his employment without pay. He was ordered to report to the Office of Professional Compliance on June 23, 2003, so that he could meet with Lieutenant Arndt of that office, and with Sergeant Medina. During that meeting Mr. Arugu provided the officers with a hand-written letter that was completely different from the version of events provided by the arresting officers. Mr. Arugu asserted that the arresting officers brutalized him. On June 25, 2003, Sergeant Medina learned that Mr. Arugu had been arrested by the Sunrise Police Department (SPD) on September 14, 1997. A report prepared by SPD indicated that on that date two SPD officers observed Mr. Arugu selling shoes from the trunk of his automobile at the Sawgrass Mall. He was arrested for operating a business without a license. After being placed in a patrol car, he exited the vehicle and attacked two SPD officers. Although it is a violation of the Broward County Code of Ethics Manual to fail to report an arrest to one's supervisor, a policy about which Mr. Arugu was aware, he did not inform Mr. Meisel of his arrest by SPD. During the interview, Mr. Arugu did not inform Sergeant Medina of his arrest in 1997 by SPD for the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer. He stated that he had no criminal record and denied ever having been arrested prior to the June 20, 2003, arrest. Sergeant Medina concluded that Mr. Arugu was not a truthful person. During Sergeant Medina's interview, Mr. Arugu made no claim that he was the victim of prejudice based on his national origin or any other status. On July 11, 2003, pursuant to Ms. Arugu's petition, a permanent restraining order was served on Mr. Arugu. The restraining order forbade him from being in the presence of Ms. Arugu or contacting her. Mr. Arugu nevertheless called Ms. Arugu's home and left messages on her answering machine. This was reported to the judge, who issued the order. On October 14, 2003, the judge, who issued the order, found that Mr. Arugu had indeed violated the order and admonished him, but did not incarcerate him. In Mr. Arugu's Employment Complaint of Discrimination, Mr. Arugu specifically alleged that Roy Vrchota, Assistant Inspector General told him, while his criminal case was pending, that he would be reinstated if he was found not guilty at the end of the criminal case addressing the June 30, 2003, incident. Mr. Vrchota testified under oath that he never told Mr. Arugu that he would be reinstated. Upon consideration of all of the facts and circumstances of this case, it is found as a fact that Mr. Vrchota did not tell him that. Mr. Vrchota was the person who discovered the previous arrest by SPD. Mr. Vrchota does not believe that Mr. Arugu is a truthful person. Mr. Arugu never made any allegations to him with regard to being a victim of prejudice. He did not learn that Mr. Arugu was a Nigerian until he was deposed in this case. On September 12, 2003, Mr. Arugu was found not guilty of charges addressing the June 30, 2003, incident. On September 29, 2003, Mr. Arugu sent the BSO a letter asking to be reinstated. In a letter dated December 23, 2003, Mr. Arugu was informed that he was not going to be reinstated. The fact that Mr. Arugu was a Nigerian was not taken into consideration by those in the decision-making process. Mr. Arugu's conduct was contrary to BSO standards and that is why he was discharged.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Odiator Arugu, Esquire The Florida Law Firm, PLC 1990 West Fairbanks Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Harry O. Boreth, Esquire Glasser, Boreth & Kleppin 8751 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 105 Plantation, Florida 33324 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether, in violation of sections 120.54(1)(a) and 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, Respondent has made an agency statement that is an unadopted rule in implementing a 2017 statutory amendment broadening the category of first-time test-takers to be counted when calculating the passing rate of the graduates of Petitioner’s prelicensure professional nursing education program (Program) and whether, pursuant to section 57.111, Petitioner may recover attorneys’ fees and costs from Respondent. At Petitioner’s request, the parties presented evidence concerning constitutional challenges that Petitioner intends to present to a district court of appeal.
Findings Of Fact The Program is a prelicensure professional nursing education program that terminates with an associate degree. Respondent approved the Program in 2013, thus authorizing Petitioner to admit degree-seeking students into the Program, as provided in section 464.019. As provided by section 464.019(5)(a)1., the passing rate of the Program’s graduates taking the NCLEX for the first time must meet or exceed the minimum passing rate, which is ten points less than the average passage rate of graduates taking the NCLEX nationally for the first time. Until June 23, 2017, the passing rate of a Florida program was based only on first-time test-takers who had taken the exam within six months of graduating (New Graduates). Chapter 2017-134, sections 4 and 8, Laws of Florida, which took effect when signed into law on June 23, 2017 (Statutory Amendment), removes the six-month restriction, so that the passing rate of a Florida program is now based on all first-time test-takers, regardless of when they graduated (Graduates). The statutory language does not otherwise address the implementation of the Statutory Amendment. For 2015 and 2016, respectively, the minimum passing rates in Florida were 72% and 71.68%, and the Program’s New Graduates passed the NCLEX at the rates of 44% and 15.79%. As required by section 464.019(5), Respondent issued the Probationary Order. The Probationary Order recites the provisions of section 464.019(5)(a) specifying the applicable passing rate, directing Respondent to place a program on probation if its graduates fail to pass at the minimum specified passing rates for two consecutive years, and mandating that the program remain on probation until its passing rate achieves the minimum specified rate. The Probationary Order details the 2015 and 2016 passing rates of Petitioner’s relevant graduates and the minimum passing rates for these years. The Probationary Order makes no attempt to describe the condition of probation, which might have included a reference to New Graduates, other than to refer to section 464.019(5)(a)2., which, unchanged by the Statutory Amendment, specifies only that a program must remain on probation until and unless its graduates achieve a passing rate at least equal to the minimum passing rate for the year in question. For 2017, the minimum passing rate for a Florida program was 74.24%. If, as Respondent contends, the new law applies to all of 2017, six of the fifteen of the Program’s Graduates failed the NCLEX, so the Program’s passing rate was inadequate at 60%. If, as Petitioner contends, the old law applies to all of 2017, twelve of the Program’s test-takers were New Graduates, and only three of them failed, so the Program’s passing rate was adequate at 75%. Respondent clearly applied the Statutory Amendment retroactively to January 1, 2017, in the Order Extending Probation because the order states that that the passing rate of the Program’s Graduates for 2017 was only 60% and therefore extends Petitioner’s probationary status for 2018. The Order Extending Probation provides Petitioner with a clear point of entry to request an administrative hearing. Each party applies the Statutory Amendment without regard to the effective date of June 23, 2017, but Respondent reaches the correct conclusion: the passing rate of the Program’s graduates for 2017 was inadequate. The NCLEX is administered throughout the year, and the dates of graduation are available for Petitioner’s Graduates taking the NCLEX in 2017, so it is possible to calculate a combined passing rate, using only New Graduates under the old law for testing dates through June 22 and all Graduates under the new law for testing dates after June 22. From January 1 through June 22, 2017, five of the Program’s test-takers were New Graduates and they all passed. From June 23 through December 31, 2017, four of the eight Graduates taking the NCLEX passed the test. Combining these results for all of 2017, the Program’s passing rate was nine divided by thirteen, or 69%, which was inadequate for 2017.
