The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the permit for sign installation previously issued by the Department of Transportation is still valid to authorize Petitioner’s sign located on State Road 60 in Pinellas County.
Findings Of Fact The parties entered into two stipulations of fact which are accepted and incorporated herein. Stipulation of Fact #1 reads: The off-premise outdoor advertising billboard structure located at 2815-2817 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida, owned by Allan J. Stowell was lawfully erected under the applicable provisions of the City’s ordinances in the fall of 1981. The City issued building permit number 6361D, dated September 3, 1981, to Stowell to erect the billboard in issue. On August 25, 1985, the City of Clearwater adopted sign regulations which required, among other things, uniformity among signs. City Code Section 44.55(3)(b), required that all billboards on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, east of Highland Avenue, be brought into conformance with the Code provisions by January 19, 1996. On January 19, 1989, the City adopted Ordinance No. 4753-88, regulating signs on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard. Pursuant to that ordinance, the billboard in issue became non-conforming due to its size. Mr. Stowell was allowed a seven-year amortization period which expired on January 19, 1996. By letter dated August 30, 1994, the City advised Mr. Stowell that the billboard in issue would have to be brought into compliance with the provisions of the City’s sign ordinance by January 19, 1996. As a result of the sign regulations adopted by the City in 1985, the billboard in issue was classified thereafter as a legal non-conforming sign, and it was such on November 25, 1995. Stipulation of Fact #2 reads: State Road 60 means that segment of roadway, also known as Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, which is located within the City of Clearwater and is east of Highway 19. The effective date of the national highway system was November 28, 1995, and all references in stipulated exhibits, stipulations, transcripts of depositions, correspondence or other documents which erroneously refer to November 25, 1995, shall be amended to read November 28, 1995, for the purposes of this administrative proceeding. Any reference in this administrative proceeding to the “subject sign,” “billboard,” “off-premise outdoor advertising structure,” “sign,” or other similar designations shall mean the off-premise outdoor advertising billboard structure owned by the Petitioner and located at 2815-2817 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard (State Road 60). On May 22, 1974, State Road 60 was designated a Federal- Aid Primary. On July 1, 1976, State Road 60 was re-designated from a Federal-Aid Primary to a Federal-Aid Urban. Allan J. Stowell was licensed by the Florida Department of Transportation as an outdoor advertiser pursuant to license number 19848, dated October 2, 1981. On or about October 1, 1981, Allan J. Stowell was issued state sign permit numbers AF307-10 and AF308-10, by the Florida Department of Transportation, for the construction, maintenance and operation of the two sign facings on the subject billboard structure. At this point, State Road 60 was not part of the Federal-Aid Primary Highway System within Florida. After 1988, the Department discontinued billing Mr. Stowell because State Road 60 was not a Federal-Aid Primary, Interstate, or a part of the State Highway System outside a municipality. State Road 60 became a part of the national highway system on November 25, 1995. Petitioner, Allan J. Stowell, purchased the property on which the sign in issue is located in 1972. At that time, a sign owned by Foster and Kleiser (F&K), an outdoor advertising firm, was situated on the property. After Petitioner purchased the property, he entered an amended lease agreement with F&K for the use of his property. At that time, the existing sign was permitted by the state. Subsequent to the execution of the amended lease, because he wanted to develop the land and put up his own sign, Mr. Stowell requested that F&K remove their sign from his property, and an agreement to do that was received on August 3, 1981. During his research in preparation for the request for removal, Mr. Stowell spoke with Mr. Andre DeVetter of the Brandon office of the Department of Transportation (DOT). Mr. DeVetter advised him the sign was located adjacent to a Federal Aid Primary Highway, that the property on which the sign was to be located was properly zoned for that purpose, that after removal of the existing sign, Stowell could apply for and receive a permit for a new sign, and that under the terms of the Federal Highway Beautification Act (the Act), Mr. Stowell could not be required to take the sign down without compensation therefor. Based on these assurances, Petitioner borrowed $35,000, placing his home as collateral for the loan, which he used for the construction of the new sign. Before starting construction, however, Mr. Stowell went to the City of Clearwater for both a permit for the construction and a variance to exceed the normal size limitations because his proposed sign was to be bigger than the code calls for by more than 100 square feet. He requested and obtained a permit to construct a 10 by 40-foot sign. The variance was initially denied by the city’s sign approval board, but a subsequent action by the Board of Adjustment granted the variance. Though the minutes of the pertinent meeting of the Board of Adjustment cannot now be found, Mr. Stowell has a letter dated August 21, 1997, from DOT in which the Department agrees that a variance was granted. He also obtained an occupational license to conduct the outdoor sign business. Mr. Stowell constructed the new sign which was permitted by the Department as promised in 1982. He thereafter obtained renewals of the permits for the sign from DOT for calendar years 1983 and 1984 - one for each face. Over the succeeding years, Mr. Stowell did not receive annual renewal notices for the years 1985, 1986, or 1987, and the fees for those years were not initially paid. However, he received a letter in 1988 indicating he was delinquent in certain costs and fees for the permits. When he received that letter, Mr. Stowell sent in a check for the delinquent costs and fees in the amount of $308.00, which covered all delinquent permit fees and a 10 percent delinquency penalty, and believed his delinquencies had been brought current. The Department issued permits to Mr. Stowell for the sign in 1981 and 1982. After the delinquencies were brought current in 1988, Mr. Stowell did not hear anything further from the Department, other than the previously mentioned letter, which noted the sign was now on the Federal Highway System and he needed to obtain permits for it. Since he had previously been issued permits for the sign in 1981 and 1982, and since he had never received any notice that those permits had been revoked, he mistakenly believed his status was acceptable. When Mr. Stowell received the variance from the city for the 14 by 48-foot sign prior to its installation, he advised Mr. DeVetter at the Department’s Brandon office of its granting and was told his status was acceptable. After the City later sent him a letter indicating that the sign had to come down due to a change in the City ordinance, instead of planning to amortize the cost of the sign over the succeeding seven years, he started research into what he needed to do to obtain compensation for the taking as is required by the FHBA. In response, he received a copy of a certificate of sign removal from Reginald N. Millian, the Department’s Outdoor and Property Advertising Inspector, indicating that the sign had been removed by the owner, and that this determination was made based on a personal visit to the site. This was patently in error. The sign had not been removed and, in fact, had been operated and maintained, structurally unchanged, continuously since its construction in 1981. After the Department advised Mr. Stowell of his delinquency in permit fees in September 1988, even after the fees were paid up, due to the change in jurisdiction status, the Department inactivated his permits for this sign, dropped his permit numbers from its permit billing inventory, and did not issue and further billings to him for the previously issued permits. However, the Department did not issue a notice of intent to revoke the two permits, AF307-10 and AF308-10, nor did it in any way advise Mr. Stowell that his permits were no longer valid. Mr. Stowell mistakenly assumed that his sign was validly permitted, even after the City notified him of its status in 1994. After the Department reassumed jurisdiction, by letter dated June 21, 1996, the Department’s District Administrator, Property Management/ODA, Susan L. Rosetti, advised Mr. Stowell that his sign was not permitted and that the sign’s two faces required permits. At this point Mr. Stowell was provided with application forms for the permits and a set of instructions. After receipt of the June 21, 1996, letter, Mr. Stowell contacted Kenneth M. Towcimak, the Director of the Department’s Office of Right-of-Way, to request assistance in obtaining the required permits. In response, Mr. Towcimak advised Mr. Stowell that the permits had been inactivated by the Department, and that because State Road 60, on which the sign was located, was now under the Department’s jurisdiction, he had to obtain a new state permit by January 1, 1997. Towcimak contacted the City to determine the appropriate status of the sign, and as a result of this inquiry, advised Stowell in writing on November 6, 1996, that the Department was precluded by Florida Statute from approving any application for a permit which was not accompanied by a statement from the appropriate local government that the sign complies with all local government requirements, and that the local government will issue a permit upon approval of the application by the Department. Thereafter, On December 31, 1996, Mr. Stowell filed an application with the Department by certified mail. The document reflects it was date stamped in the Department on January 1, 1997, at 4:31 p.m., and again on January 3, 1997, at 1:07 p.m. Since the application Mr. Stowell filed was to reinstate the previously issued permits and not for new permits, he failed to complete a number of the information blocks on the form. On January 21, 1997, the Department issued a Notice of Denied Application for the permits to Mr. Stowell. The denial form reflected the reason for denial was that Mr. Stowell had failed to provide proof of ownership of the billboard, and had provided incorrect information on the application form. The evidence of record indicates that Mr. Stowell did provide the requested proof of ownership of both the billboard and the property on which it is located in his application. One of the City’s previously existing sign ordinances was declared unconstitutional by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on March 23, 1993. Since that time, the City has not enacted a comprehensive sign ordinance, but in 1989 it enacted an ordinance, No. 4753-88, which relates to signs located on SR 60 and which requires those signs on that road which are non- conforming to be brought into conformance or removed within seven years. This provides affected sign owners an opportunity to either bring the sign into conformity with the requirements or amortize the cost of the sign over seven years. Mr. Towcimak, Director of the Department’s Office of Right-of-Way, indicated that when the national highway system under ISTEA came into effect in November 1995, the Department had no inventory of existing signs. As a result, it did not provide notice to the owners of effected signs, and instructed its district offices to accept applications for sign permits through January 1, 1997. The operations of the Department of Transportation are decentralized with policy being set at the headquarters, but the day-to-day operations being determined at each of the eight districts. As to outdoor advertising enforcement, however, while each district handles enforcement, accounting is handled in the central office. In doing so, the Department follows the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which specifies that all permits expire on January 15 of each year. In practice, the advertiser is billed by October 1 of each year and is furnished a list of all permits shown by the Department records to be held by that permittee, along with a bill for all fees owed. If the Department records do not reflect an active permit for a particular sign, no billing will go out for that sign. Petitioner’s instant application for permit reflects it was timely received in the pertinent Department office. It is general practice within the Department for the District Outdoor Advertising Administrator to review the application and decide whether to grant or deny the permit. Thereafter, the application is forwarded to the central office for final check prior to issuance of the metal tag. It is Department practice to issue or deny the permit within 30 days of receipt of the application, as mandated by statute. When an application for a permit for an outdoor sign is received by the Department it is agency practice to review it for completeness. If the application is complete, a decision is made whether to approve or disapprove the application. If the application is incomplete, it is returned to the applicant without decision. However, if an application is incomplete, but it is apparent that, even if complete, the application would not be approved, that application will be returned “denied” rather than “incomplete.” There are several requirements which must be satisfied before an application may be approved. One of these is that the applicant submit a statement from the local government that the proposed sign would comply with local sign regulations, as required by Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes. If an application is received by the Department without this element being present, the Department may either return the application as incomplete or, if it appears the sign does not comply with local sign regulations, deny the application. The “Harmony of Regulations” provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, prohibits the state from issuing a permit where local government does not approve the sign, and prohibits local governments from issuing a sign permit where the Department does not approve. Consistent with that direction, when Petitioner contacted Mr. Towcimak to request guidance in the permitting process, and outlined his problem regarding the City’s position, Mr. Towcimak contacted the City to find out where that entity stood. On two separate occasions, the City advised the Department in writing that Petitioner’s existing sign was illegal and it would not grant permission for the Department to issue a sign permit. When that information was received by the Department, Petitioner was advised of the City’s position and that the permit would not be issued as a result.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying Petitioner permits for the maintenance of the signs in issue, and denying compensation for their removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Livingston & Associates, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Diedre Grubbs 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner's applications to erect a steel monopole which would support a two- sided outdoor advertising sign to be located west of Interstate Highway 95 (I-95), 2,244 feet north of I-95's intersection with Indrio Road, St. Lucie County, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Preliminary matters Petitioner POZ Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (POZ), is a corporation engaged in the business of erecting and maintaining outdoor advertising signs. The principals of POZ are Richard Pozniak and his wife, Barbara. Respondent, Department of Transportation (Department) is a state agency charged with, inter alia, the responsibility to regulate outdoor advertising, under the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-10, Florida Administrative Code. On February 17, 1997, POZ applied with the Department for permits to erect a monopole sign which would support a two- sided billboard to be located west of I-95, and 2,244 feet north of the intersection of I-95 and Indrio Road, St. Lucie County, Florida. The Department reviewed the applications, and on February 20, 1997, gave notice to POZ that the applications were denied because the "[s]ite is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade (S. #14-10.006(1)(b)5, FAC)." POZ filed a timely request for a formal hearing to challenge the Department's decision, and these proceedings duly followed. Matters at issue POZ did not contend, and indeed offered no proof at hearing to demonstrate, that the proposed site was not, as found by the Department, within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade, as proscribed by Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code.2 Rather, as noted in the preliminary statement, POZ contends the Department should be precluded from applying the Rule's spacing provisions as a basis for denial of the requested permits based on a theory of estoppel or a theory of inconsistent application of the Rule's spacing requirements. POZ's estoppel theory To accept POZ's estoppel theory, one must accept, as offered, Mr. Pozniak's version of events which he avers transpired in 1990, when he conducted his outdoor advertising business through AdCon Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (AdCon).3 According to Mr. Pozniak, in 1990 he met with Vana Kinchen, then a sign inspector with the Department, to establish the proper location of a billboard that AdCon proposed to permit. Again, according to Mr. Pozniak, Ms. Kinchen helped him measure the site, and identified the same location at issue in this proceeding (2244 feet north of the intersection of I-95 and Indrio Road) as an appropriate placement for a billboard. Following Ms. Kinchen's advice as to location, Mr. Pozniak avers that he applied for permits on behalf of AdCon to erect a monopole sign which would support a two-sided billboard to be located at the exact same site that is at issue in this proceeding. Those applications, according to Mr. Pozniak, were approved and Department tags issued; however, the sign was not erected within 270 days after the permit issued, as required by Section 479.05(3)(5)(b), Florida Statutes, and the permits became void. Having carefully considered the proof in this case, it must be concluded that Mr. Pozniak's version of the events surrounding AdCon's permitting activities in 1990 is less than credible. Rather, the persuasive proof demonstrates that AdCon's application for permits to erect a billboard at the site at issue in this proceeding were denied and it is most unlikely that Ms. Kinchen ever advised Mr. Pozniak that such site was a proper location for a billboard. Regarding AdCon's permitting activities in 1990, the proof demonstrates that on April 6, 1990, AdCon filed applications (inexplicably dated May 6, 1990) with the Department to erect a monopole sign which would support a two-sided billboard to be located west of I-95, and 3050 feet north of the intersection of I-95 and Indrio Road. Consistent with the requirement of Section 479.04(3)(b), Florida Statutes, the applications included a separate statement from the local government that the proposed signs complied with local government requirements. Those applications were approved and, on May 3, 1990, the Department's tag numbers BB-457-35 (for the north facing sign) and BB-458-35 (for the south facing sign) were issued. Subsequently, on November 9, 1990, AdCo filed applications dated November 7, 1990, with the Department to erect a monopole sign which would support a two-sided billboard to be located west of I-95, and 2,244 feet north of the intersection of I-95 and Indrio Road (the location at issue in this case). Those applications were rejected by the Department on November 15, 1990, because they violated the spacing requirements of Section 479.07(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes, which prohibits the issuance of a permit unless the sign is located at least 1,500 feet from any other sign on the same side of an interstate highway. Notably, as the Department observed at that time, those applications conflicted with the previously approved applications of AdCon for the site located at 3,050 feet north of the intersection of I-95 and Indrio Road, and the permittee still had until January 28, 1991, to erect those signs. The applications were also rejected by the Department because they failed to include a statement from local government as required by Section 479.04(3)(b), Florida Statutes, that the proposed signs complied with local government requirements. Rather, what AdCon submitted was a copy of the local government approval it had secured for the location permitted by the Department on May 3, 1990. That documentation did not, as AdCon knew or should have known, meet the requirements for the new location. Clearly, the Department did not previously permit the site at issue in this case, and it is most unlikely that Ms. Kinchen ever affirmatively advised Mr. Pozniak as to the suitability of the site. In so concluding, Mr. Pozniak's testimony, as well as Petitioner's Exhibit 3 (what purports to be copies of applications, dated November 7, 1990, by AdCon for the site at issue in this proceeding, and purportedly approved by the Department) have been carefully considered. However, when compared with the other proof of record it must be concluded that Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is a fabrication,4 and that Mr. Pozniak's testimony on the subject is not credible or worthy of belief. POZ's theory of inconsistency Mr. Pozniak offered testimony at hearing concerning two outdoor advertising signs at the intersection of I-95 and State Road 60 which he opined did not conform with the Department's spacing requirements and, therefore, represent inconsistent application of the District's rule. The persuasive proof is, however, to the contrary. The first sign, located within 500 feet of the interchange, was in existence when the Department's "ramp rule" regarding spacing requirements became effective and, accordingly, its presence was grandfathered. However, at some time following the enactment of the ramp rule, the owner replaced the sign. At that time, the sign became nonconforming and the Department, as soon as it became aware of the nonconformity, commenced an action to secure the sign's removal. The other sign alluded to by Mr. Pozniak, and identified in Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1, is owned by Division Street, Inc., and, contrary to Mr. Pozniak's testimony, that sign complies with the Department's spacing requirements and was properly permitted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the subject applications for outdoor advertising sign permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1997.
The Issue Whether the sign of Petitioner should be removed for violation of Section 479.11(7) and Rule 14-10.07(2)(e), maintaining a sign in an unsafe, insecure or unsightly condition and without face or topic for over twelve months.
Findings Of Fact A notice of violation and notice to show cause alleging violation of the statutes and rules under Chapter 479, Outdoor Advertising, was sent to Petitioner February 16, 1978, citing a structure located .24 miles east of State Road 44 w/s on Interstate 4 with "blank" copy. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. There was no dispute as to the location of the subject sign or that subject sign had carried no copy for a period of time beginning before October, 1975 and continuing until sometime immediately prior to March 13, 1978, at which time the sign structure was cleaned and an outdoor advertising copy placed thereon. The sign structure carries permit tag number 4836-10, 1974. The proper fee has been paid to keep the tag current. Petitioner contends: that the statute, Section 479.11 (7), is unconstitutional because it is vague; that Rule 14-10.07(2)(e), is a "prospective rule"; and, that Petitioner's sign is not in violation of the rule inasmuch as the effective date of the rule was December 10, 1977, that the sign currently is in violation of no law. Respondent contends: That the sign has stood along the side of the highway in a rusted and unsightly condition, without copy for a period in excess of three years and that the rule is applicable; that the Petitioner's sign has lost its "grandfather status", which allows a sign that does not conform to current laws to stand until compensation for such sign has been paid to the owner.
Recommendation Dismiss the complaint against the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire 217 North Eola Drive Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Philip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Based upon the Stipulation and the evidence received, the issue to be determined is whether Bill Salter has the written permission of the land owner to erect the proposed advertising signs.
Findings Of Fact Bill Salter filed an application for the erection of outdoor advertising signs, Exhibit 1, with the Department of Transportation. This application included a lease agreement and diagram of the proposed signs. Subsequently, the Department of Transportation received a copy of the letter addressed to Ronald Lashley of Bill Salter Advertising from W. L. Whisenhant and Luverne Whisenhant, the owners of the property upon which the proposed signs were to be located, cancelling the lease for the erection of the signs. Based upon this information, the Department of Transportation denied the application of Bill Salter. At the hearing a letter dated October 12, 1979, was introduced, which is a grant of permission to Bill Salter Advertising to erect an outdoor advertising sign at the location specified in the original application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the application be granted. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of November, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Bill Salter Bill Salter Advertising Company Post Office Box 422 Milton, Florida 32570
The Issue At issue is whether the permits Respondent holds to maintain two outdoor advertising signs should be cancelled, and whether the signs Respondent repaired and reerected following the destruction of the original signs by an Act of God (a hurricane) should be removed, as alleged in the Notices of Violation.
Findings Of Fact The parties Petitioner, Department of Transportation (Department), is a state agency charged with, inter alia, the duty and responsibility to regulate outdoor advertising signs under the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-10, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent, National Advertising Company, is a corporation engaged in the business of erecting and maintaining outdoor advertising signs. Pertinent to this case, Respondent is the owner and operator of two nonconforming outdoor advertising sign structures located adjacent to the Florida Turnpike (SR 91) in Palm Beach County, Florida. The first structure is a double-faced sign permitted by the Department under Permit Numbers AZ 363 and AE 401 and located .83 miles south of mile post 85, on the west side of the turnpike. The second structure is a single-faced sign permitted by the Department under Permit Number BT 386 and located .7 miles south of mile post 85, on the west side of the turnpike. In October 1999, both the single-faced and double-faced signs were damaged by Hurricane Irene. That damage included the severance of all upright supports (wood poles) for the sign structure, as well as other damage discussed infra. Respondent repaired and reerected the signs. Here, the Department contends the nonconforming signs were "destroyed," as that term is defined by Rule 14- 10.007(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, and may not be replaced. Respondent disagrees that the signs were "destroyed" and is, therefore, of the opinion that they were properly reestablished. The rule regarding maintenance and repair of nonconforming signs With regard to the maintenance and repair of nonconforming signs, Rule 14-10.007, Florida Administrative Code, provides: The following shall apply to nonconforming signs: A nonconforming sign must remain substantially the same as it was as of the date it became nonconforming. Reasonable repair and maintenance, including change of advertising message, is permitted and is not a change which would terminate nonconforming rights . . . . * * * A nonconforming sign which is destroyed may not be reerected. "Destroyed" is defined as when more than 50% of the upright supports of a sign structure are physically damaged such that normal repair practices of the industry would call for, in the case of wooden sign structures, replacement of the broken supports and, in the case of a metal sign structure, replacement of at least 25% of the length above ground of each broken, bent or twisted support. However, in the event that such damage occurs, a sign will not be considered destroyed if the sign owner shows that the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign would not exceed 50% of the value of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction. The following shall be applicable in determining whether the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign exceed 50% of the value of the structural materials in the sign: Structural materials shall not include the sign face, any skirt, any electrical service, electric lighting or other non- structural items. Structural materials shall include any support brackets for the face, any catwalk, and any supporting braces or members of the sign structure. The value of the structural materials in the sign immediately prior to destruction shall be based on the cost of all structural materials contained in the sign as it was configured just prior to damage, and the cost of such materials shall be based on normal market cost as if purchased new on or about the date of destruction, without regard to any labor costs or special market conditions. The materials to be included in the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign shall be all materials that would be used to return the sign to its configuration immediately prior to destruction and shall not include any material that is repaired on-site, but shall include any material obtained from a source other than the sign itself, whether used, recycled, or repaired. The repairs to the sign shall be with like materials and shall be those reasonably necessary to permanently repair the sign in a manner normally accomplished by the industry in that area. The cost of such materials shall be as described in paragraph (1)(d)2 . . . . Here, with regard to the signs at issue, the proof is uncontroverted that all the upright supports of both sign structures were so severely damaged as to require replacement. Consequently, it has been shown that the signs were "destroyed" unless Respondent can establish "that the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign . . . [did] not exceed 50% of the value of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction." The replacement materials costs to reerect the double-faced sign The value of the "instructional materials" in the double-faced sign immediately prior to destruction, based on all structural materials contained in the sign as it was configured just prior to damage, consisted of 10 wooden poles (upright supports) at $156.98 each; 28 wooden stringers (14 stringers per face) at $8.97 each; 2 galvanized steel catwalks (one on each side of the sign) at $1,400.00 each; and various angle steel supports for the catwalks, the value of which was not established of record. So configured, the value of the structural materials in the double-faced sign prior to destruction, excluding the value of the angle steel supports, totaled $4,620.96. The materials cost to reerect the sign (by returning the sign to its configuration immediately prior to destruction) consisted of 10 wooden poles at $156.98 each and 28 wooden stringers at $8.97 each, a total cost of $1,820.96. Excluded from the materials cost to reerect the sign was the value of the catwalks and angle steel supports which were recycled from the sign itself and, as necessary, repaired on-site. Comparing the value of the structural materials of the double-faced sign immediately prior to destruction (at least $4,620.96), with the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign, but excluding materials recycled on-site ($1,820.96), demonstrates that the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign did not exceed 50 percent of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction. Consequently, under the provisions of Rule 14-10.007(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the double-faced sign is not considered destroyed, and was properly reerected. The replacement materials costs to reerect the single-faced sign The value of the "structural materials" in the single- faced sign immediately prior to destruction, based on all structural materials contained in the sign as it was configured just prior to damage, consisted of 10 wooden poles at $156.98 each; 14 wooden stringers at $8.97 each; 1 galvanized steel catwalk at a minimum value of $700.00; 5/ and various angle steel supports for the catwalk, the value of which was not established of record. So configured, the value of the structural materials in the single-faced sign prior to destruction, excluding the value of the angle steel supports and valuing the catwalk at $700.00, was $2,395.38. The materials costs to reerect the sign (by returning the sign to its configuration immediately prior to destruction) consisted of 10 wooden poles at $156.98 each, 14 wooden stringers at $8.97 each; and 1 galvanized catwalk at a minimum value of $700.00, a total cost of $2,395.38 (provided the value of the catwalk, as offered by Respondent, is accepted). Excluded from the materials costs to reerect the sign was the value of the angle steel supports which were recycled on-site. Comparing the value of the structural materials of the single-faced sign immediately prior to destruction ($2,395.38), with the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign, but excluding materials recycled on-site ($2,395.38), demonstrates that the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign exceeded 50 percent of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction. Consequently, under the provisions of Rule 14-10.007(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the single-faced sign was destroyed, and was could not properly be reerected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered which adopts the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; which dismisses the notices of violation with regard to the double- faced sign (DOT Case Nos. 99-0263 and 99-0293, DOAH Case Nos. 99-4905T and 00-0134T); and which sustains the notices of violation with regard to the single-faced sign (DOT Case Nos. 99-0264 and 00-0026, DOAH Case Nos. 99-4906T and 00-0826T), cancels the single-faced sign permit, and orders the removal of the reerected single-faced sign. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The despot Building 1230 Appalachia Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNOCO 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2000.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Department of Transportation properly issued a Notice of Violation for an illegally erected sign to Lamar of Tallahassee and whether the Petitioner's applications for a sign maintained at the corner of SR366/West Pensacola Street and Ocala Road, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, should be granted as a non-conforming sign or because the Department did not act on either the 2005 or 2007 application for the same sign in a timely manner.
Findings Of Fact Under Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, the Department is the state agency responsible for regulating outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of the state highway system, interstate, or federal-aid primary system. Lamar owns and operates outdoor advertising signs in the State of Florida. On March 15, 2005, Lamar applied for a permit from the Department to erect the subject sign. The permit was denied because it was within 1,000 feet of another permitted sign owned by Lamar that is located on SR366/West Pensacola Street. The review process for Lamar’s application for a sign permit involved a two-step process. Initially, Mr. Strickland, the State Outdoor Advertising Administrator, reviewed Lamar’s application. He determined that the sign was within 1,000 feet of another permitted structure. On April 12, 2007, he preliminarily denied Petitioner’s application, prepared the Notice of Denied Application reflecting a denial issuance date of April 12, 2005, and entered his preliminary decision on the Department’s internal database. On the same date, Mr. Strickland forwarded the permit file along with his preliminary decision and letter to his superior, Juanice Hagan. The preliminary decision was made within 30 days of receipt of Lamar’s application. Ms. Hagan did not testify at the hearing. However, at some point, Ms. Hagan approved Mr. Strickland’s preliminary decision and entered the official action of the Department on the Department’s public database. That database reflects the final decision to deny the application was made on April 20, 2005, outside of the 30 days of receipt of Lamar’s application. On the other hand, Ms. Hagan signed the Notice of Denied Application with an issuance date of April 12, 2005. Her signature indicates that her final approval, whenever it may have occurred, related back to April 12, 2005, and was within 30 days of receipt of Lamar’s application. Lamar received the Department’s letter denying its application, along with the return of its application and application fee. The letter contained a clear point of entry advising Lamar of its hearing rights under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. However, Lamar did not request a hearing concerning the denied application as required in Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0042(3). Nor did Lamar inform the Department’s clerk in writing that it intended to rely on the deemer provision set forth in Section 120.60, Florida Statutes. Absent a Chapter 120 challenge to the Department’s action, the Department’s denial became final under Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0042(3). After the denial, Lamar performed a Height Above Ground Level (HAGL) test on the proposed sign’s site. The test is used to determine whether the sign face can be seen from a particular viewing location. Lamar determined that the South face could not be seen from SR366/West Pensacola Street due to some large trees located along the West side of Ocala Road and behind the gas station in front of the sign. Pictures of the area surrounding the sign’s proposed location, filed with the 2005 permit application, show a number of trees that are considerably taller than the roof of the adjacent gas station and utility poles. These trees appear to be capable of blocking the view of the sign face from SR366/West Pensacola Street and support the results from Lamar’s HAGL test. Since the sign could not be seen from a federal aid highway, it did not require a permit. Therefore, around August or October 2005, Lamar built the subject sign on the west side of Ocala Road and 222 feet north of SR 366/West Pensacola Street in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. As constructed, the sign sits on a large monopole with two faces, approximately 10 1/2 feet in height and 36 feet wide. The sign’s height above ground level is 28 feet extending upwards to 40 feet. The north face of the sign does not require a permit since it can only be seen from Ocala Road. Likewise, at the time of construction and for some time thereafter, the south face of the sign did not require a permit since it was not visible from a federal aid highway. Following construction of the subject sign, some of the large trees were removed. The removal caused the south face of the sign to be clearly visible from the main traveled way of SR366/West Pensacola Street. On March 21, 2007, the sign was issued a Notice of Violation for an illegally erected sign because it did not have a permit. The Notice of Violation stated: YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the advertising sign noted below is in violation of section 479.01, Florida Statutes. An outdoor advertising permit is required but has not been issued for this sign. The Notice cited the wrong statute and, on June 12, 2008, an amended Notice of Violation for an illegally erected sign was issued by the Department. The Amended Notice changed the statutory citation from Section 479.01 to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes. Both the original Notice and Amended Notice stated the correct basis for the violation as: "An outdoor advertising permit is required but has not been issued for this sign." On December 18, 2007, Lamar submitted a second application for an Outdoor Advertising permit for an existing sign. The application was denied on January 8, 2008, due to spacing conflicts with permitted signs BX250 and BX251. The denial cited incorrect tag numbers for the sign causing the spacing conflict. The incorrect tag numbers were brought to the attention of Mr. Strickland. The Department conducted a field inspection of the sign’s area sometime between December 20, 2007 and January 20, 2008. The inspection confirmed that the spacing conflict was caused by signs BZ685 and BZ686. The signs were within 839 feet of the subject sign and owned by Lamar. An Amended Notice of Denied Application was issued by the Department on January 24, 2008. However, the evidence was clear that the Department made the decision to deny the application based on spacing conflicts on January 8, 2008. The fact that paperwork had to be made to conform to and catch up with that decision does not change the date the Department initially acted upon Lamar’s application. Therefore, the 2007 application was acted upon within 30 days. The Department’s employee responsible for issuing violation notices is Lynn Holschuh. She confirmed that if the south sign face was completely blocked from view from the main traveled way of SR366/West Pensacola Street when it was originally constructed, a sign permit would not be required from the Department. Ms. Holschuh further testified that if a change in circumstances occurred resulting in the subject sign becoming visible from the main traveled way of Pensacola Street, the sign might be permitted by the Department as a non-conforming sign, if it met the criteria for such. In this case, the south face of the sign was once legal and did not require a permit because several large trees blocked the sign’s visibility from a federal aid highway. The removal of the trees that blocked the sign caused the sign to become visible from a federal aid highway. In short, the south sign face no longer conformed to the Florida Statutes and Rules governing such signs and now is required to have a sign permit. However, the sign has not been in continuous existence for seven years and has received a Notice of Violation since its construction in 2005. The evidence was clear that the sign does not meet the requirements to qualify as a nonconforming sign and cannot be permitted as such. Therefore, Petitioner’s application for a sign permit should be denied and the sign removed pursuant to the Notice of Violation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Petitioner a permit for the sign located on the west side of Ocala Road, 222 feet North of SR366/West Pensacola Street and enforcing the Notice of Violation for said sign and requiring removal of the south sign face pursuant thereto. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson Bell & Dunbar, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kimberly Clark Menchion, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Alexis M. Yarbrough, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Stephanie Kopelousos, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue With respect to DOAH Case No. 99-3345T, whether the Respondent must remove the double-faced outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to I-95, on the west side of the highway, 1.25 miles south of North Lake Boulevard, in Palm Beach County, Florida, for the reasons set forth in the Notice of Violation - Illegally Erected Sign, dated March 31, 1999. With respect to DOAH Case No. 99-3346T, whether the Respondent's permits for a double-faced outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to I-95, on the west side of the highway, 1.25 miles south of North Lake Boulevard, in Palm Beach County, Florida, and bearing permit numbers AZ346-35 and AZ347-35, should be revoked for the reasons set forth in the Notice of Violation - Maintenance of Nonconforming Signs dated March 31, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for, among other things, issuing permits and regulating outdoor advertising structures and signs along the state highway system, the interstate system, and the federal-aid primary system. Section 479.02, Florida Statutes (1999). National Advertising 2/ is the owner of a double- faced outdoor advertising sign located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The sign is located on the west side of Interstate 95, 1.25 miles south of North Lake Boulevard. At the time the structure was erected, the sign faces were visible to both southbound and northbound traffic of Interstate 95. At the times material to this proceeding, the sign at issue was a non- conforming sign. At the times material to this proceeding, the sign structure consisted of seven wooden poles placed in the ground and secured by concrete. Two metal heads, the sign faces themselves, were attached to the poles, one facing north and one facing south. The structure also included a metal catwalk providing access to the sign faces, as well as miscellaneous trim and equipment. At some time prior to the incidents giving rise to these proceedings, a sound wall was erected by the Department along Interstate 95, which blocked visibility of the National Advertising sign face by northbound traffic. In March 1999, National Advertising determined that the existing wooden poles supporting the sign heads were deteriorating and needed to be replaced. In addition, National Advertising decided to raise the height-above-ground-level ("HAGL") of the sign to maintain the same visibility of the sign face by the northbound traffic as that which existed before the sound wall was erected. Consequently, National Advertising contracted with a company to relocate the poles and transfer the existing sign faces and attached equipment to the new poles. Holes were dug approximately five feet from the original wooden poles, and new wooden poles were set in these holes. A crane lifted the sign faces and the attached trim and equipment and supported them while the old wooden poles were cut down slightly above ground level. The crane then moved the sign faces and the attached trim and equipment to the new poles, and the assemblage was bolted to the new wooden poles. The original wooden poles supporting the sign heads were approximately 12-to-13 inches in diameter, and the HAGL of the original sign faces was approximately 24 feet. The new wooden poles were approximately 20-to-22 inches in diameter, and the HAGL of the sign faces was raised to approximately 50 feet. The structure of the sign was not altered, and the materials used in the sign faces were not altered. The poles supporting the sign faces can be changed as part of the routine maintenance of an outdoor advertising sign, as long as the new posts are of the same material and configuration; the replacement of deteriorating poles is standard industry practice and is required to maintain the safety of the sign. The sign must, however, stay in the same relative location on the ground as the old sign. It is standard industry practice to place new supporting poles a few feet away from the exact location of the old supporting poles in order to provide a firm foundation for the new poles. The Department uses the term "remove" in its notices of violation as a "general term" meaning "[t]o move [a sign] away from the site, to move it any distance away from where it was installed previously." 3/ Nonetheless, the charges in the Notices of Violation issued in these cases were based on the Department's mistaken conclusion that National Advertising "cut down the entire sign, discarded it and built an entire new sign in its place." 4/ The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that the permitted outdoor advertising sign was removed from its original location and re-erected. Because it has not established with the requisite degree of certainty that the sign was re-erected, the Department cannot sustain its charge that the outdoor advertising sign at issue herein was erected without a permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the Notice of Violation - Illegally Erected Sign in DOAH Case No. 99-3345T and dismissing the Notice of Violation - Maintenance of Nonconforming Signs in DOAH Case No. 99-3346T. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2000.
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a permit for an outdoor advertising sign should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Poz Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Poz), filed an application dated June 19, 1996, with the Department of Transportation (Department) for an outdoor advertising sign permit. The application stated that the sign was to be located at I-95 approximately 2500 feet north of Midway Road in St. Lucie County, Florida. Additionally the application provided that the sign would not be located within city limits. The Department issued a Notice of Denied Application to Poz on July 16, 1996, stating the application was not approved because the “site is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade," citing Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code. The Department uniformly interprets Rule 14- 10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code. In the mid-80’s, the Department's central office sent out a diagram and instruction memo to all district staff explaining the measurement and distance requirements in Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5. Based on the methodology used by the Department for measuring compliance with Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, the site of the sign proposed by Poz is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. The area where I-95 crosses or intersects with Midway Road is called an interchange. Petitioner claims that the Department has approved other signs which are within 500 feet of a restricted interchange, namely, signs with permit numbers BM 097 and BM 096, located at the east side of I-95 and State Road 514; signs with permit numbers BM 819 and BM 820 located at the west side of I-95 and State Road 516; and signs with permit numbers BM 825 and BM 826 located at the west side of I-95 and State Road 514. The signs with permit numbers BM 096 and BM 097 are located within the city limits of Palm Bay according to the approved applications for those signs. According to the information contained in the Department’s computerized outdoor advertising location information, the signs with permit numbers BM 825 AND BM 826 are located within city limits. According to the information contained in the Department’s computerized outdoor advertising location information, the signs with permit numbers BM 819 and BM 820, are located within city limits. Petitioner also claims that the sign located at the interchange of I-95 and State Road 60 was within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. This sign is located in an unincorporated area of Indian River County. A sign was erected in this location in 1973 and was replaced with another sign at the same location in 1991. The county building permit for the restructured sign was issued conditioned upon the applicant receiving approval from the “State of Florida Right of Way Administration.” No evidence was presented to show that such approval was sought from or given by the Department. No evidence was presented to establish that the Department was aware that the sign had been restructured. Richard Pozniak, the husband of one of the owners of Poz, testified that a former sign inspector for the Department, Vanna Kinchen, had showed him how to measure for proposed sign sites. Ms. Kinchen rode out with Mr. Pozniak to a location about five miles from the interchange at issue and taught Mr. Pozniak how to measure from the interchange. Ms. Kinchen was not involved with the site at issue and was no longer a sign inspector at the time that Poz made the application for a permit of the site at issue. All interchanges are not constructed alike. Richard Pozniak and his wife, Barbara, measured the site which is at issue. Mr. Pozniak computed the distance from the interchange to the site by measuring 500 feet from the safety zone or gore area on I-95. The gore area is located on the inside of an entrance or exit ramp rather than along the outside of the widening of the pavement. In determining whether the site is within 500 feet of the interchange, the Department measures 500 feet beyond the widening of the entrance ramp onto I-95. The site proposed by Poz was located in the area before the widening of the ramp ends. A sign cannot be placed in the area. The logo program is a federally funded program. The requirements for the issuance of an outdoor advertising permit is different from the requirements for a business to display its logo in the logo program. In the logo program, the business is limited to displaying its logo on a Department sign structure located on the interstate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner, Poz Outdoor Advertising, Inc.’s application for a permit for an outdoor sign at I-95 and Midway Road in St. Lucie County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of May, 1997. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Pennington, Culpepper, Moore, Wilkinson Dunbar & Dunlap, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 34399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Attn: Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact In May and June of 1983 the Department received in its district office in Chipley, Florida, applications for four permits for outdoor advertising signs to be located adjacent to I-10, approximately one mile west of S.R. 285, in Walton County, Florida. Two of these applications requested permits to erect a two-faced, back-to-back structure on I-10, 4,262 feet west of S.R. 285, and two of these applications sought permits to erect a two-faced, back-to-back structure on I-10, 5,262 feet west of S.R. 285. These permit applications stated that the locations requested were in a commercial or industrial area within 800 feet of a business. The Department's outdoor advertising inspector approved these permit applications in June of 1983. When he visited the sites he found a small building, approximately eight to ten feet by approximately ten to twelve feet in dimension, situated at a point 300 feet from one of the sign sites and 700 feet from the other site. There was a pile of steel lying on the ground adjacent to this building. He was told by the Respondent's president that the Respondent's plan was to put an office on the site, and a building on which to work on signs and to store material. On the basis of his inspection of the site, coupled with these representations of the Respondent's president, the inspector approved the four applications for sign permits. Subsequently, in 1984 after the permits had been issued, the small building had been removed and was replaced by a shed and another small building. However, in 1983 at the time the applications for permits were submitted, the site where the business activity was planned did not have telephone service, nor did this location have any mailing address, and there were no employees of the Respondent on the site until 1984. The Respondent obtained this location for the purpose and with the intent of locating its sign business thereon, but when the permit applications were submitted the site had not yet become a commercial location. Much of the evidence presented by both sides at the hearing concerned activities conducted at the location between the two sign sites subsequent to the time when the permit applications were submitted. However, this is irrelevant. The salient facts are that the president of the Respondent knew that a business activity within 800 feet of the sign site was required in order to obtain lawful permits; he intended to establish his own sign business at a location between the two sign sites which would comply with the permitting requirements; but in June of 1983 when the permit applications were submitted, there was not then in existence any business activity within 800 feet of the proposed sign sites. Thus, the statement of the Respondent on its applications that the proposed sign sites were in an unzoned commercial area within 800 feet of a business was false, and the Respondent's president knew this when he submitted the applications.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that permits numbered AJ511-12, AJ510-12, AJ509-12 and AJ508- 12, held by Reese Outdoor Displays, Inc., be revoked, and the signs which were erected pursuant to these permits be removed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 20th day of May, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 George Ralph Miller, Esquire P.O. Box 687 DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32433 Hon. Paul A. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent's outdoor sign permit should be revoked because the original sign has been destroyed by an Act of God, as alleged by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this controversy, Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), seeks to revoke a permit (No. BP844) for an off-premise outdoor advertising sign owned by Respondent, National Advertising Company (Respondent), an entity now known as "Infinity Outdoor," on the grounds that the original sign was destroyed by a hurricane in October 1999, the sign has lost its nonconforming status, and Respondent cannot lawfully rebuild the structure. In response to these charges, Respondent contends that after the sign was damaged, unknown persons stole the damaged structural pieces that were going to be used in part to rebuild the sign. Under a theory first disclosed at hearing, Respondent went on to contend that if those materials were still available, it could qualify for a seldom, if ever, used exception found in Rule 14-10.007(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, which would otherwise allow it to reconstruct the sign. That rule provides in part that a sign will not be considered destroyed if the owner can demonstrate that "the replacement material costs to reerect the sign would not exceed [fifty percent] of the value of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction." Using that provision, Respondent argues that much of the sign's structure could have been rebuilt with the now- stolen materials, and the remaining "replacement material costs" would not exceed the threshold in the rule. The sign was erected in 1968 before spacing requirements for signs were first adopted in 1972; therefore, unless it is destroyed, the sign can continue to qualify for nonconforming status as long as it remains substantially the same as it was as of the date it became nonconforming. Because the sign is situated on U.S. Highway 1 in Brevard County, a federal-aid primary highway, and another permitted sign lies approximately 200 feet away, under current spacing requirements, a sign cannot be rebuilt on the same site. This is because current spacing requirements prohibit two signs from being closer than 1,000 feet apart on a federal-aid primary roadway. The sign in question is located adjacent to U.S. Highway 1, 0.341 miles north of Florida Memorial Gardens in Brevard County, Florida. In October 1999, Hurricane Irene tracked northward along the eastern coast of Florida causing extensive wind damage, including substantial damage to Respondent's sign. Photographs received in evidence as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3 show the condition of the sign on October 26, 1999, or shortly after it was damaged by the hurricane. Among other things, two of the five support poles (which were buried to a depth of eight feet) were "splintered" approximately two to three feet above ground level, while the other three were "knocked over" and "broken" at ground level. The wooden facing of the sign "had been knocked up against a pine tree" and the wooden plywood "panels [on which the sign message is printed] were split." The "stringers," whose numbers were variously described in the record as nine and sixteen, and which measure 2 x 4 x 20 feet and support the backside of the structure between the poles, were also damaged. The condition of the sign is corroborated by similar photographs taken on October 18 and 22, 1999, by a code enforcement officer of Brevard County. In the judgment of the DOT inspector who visited the site shortly after the hurricane, none of the damaged structural materials (poles and stringers) could be reused due to the amount of damage caused by the hurricane's winds. However, the inspector was unable to assign a replacement cost for any of those structural materials, or the replacement value of the sign immediately prior to its destruction. On an unknown date, but after the photographs were taken by DOT on October 26, 1999, Respondent's operations manager, Billy Nichols (Nichols), instructed a subcontracting crew to inspect each of the company's signs and to drop off at each sign location "what they thought we may have needed" to repair the signs. After inspecting the sign in question, the crew deposited five brand new poles at the site. Respondent takes the position that it always intended to use a combination of old and new materials, rather than all new materials, to repair the damaged sign. The date on which this decision was made by Respondent is not apparent in the record. In addition, despite a lack of clarity in the record, in its post-hearing filing, Respondent represents that the new poles were deposited at the site before the damaged materials were removed. However, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that based on the subcontractor's actions, Respondent originally intended to replace virtually the entire structure since five new poles were dropped off at the site of the sign; after a Citation was issued, Respondent apparently decided to reerect the sign under the theory proposed at hearing. Sometime after November 8, 1999, when DOT issued its Citation, Respondent maintains that much of the debris from the site, including the damaged poles and stringers, was unlawfully removed by unknown persons, resulting in Respondent being forced to rebuild the sign with all new materials. The new poles, however, were not removed and remained at the site. Because of the Citation, no work has occurred pending the outcome of this proceeding. In applying the terms of the rule relied upon by Respondent, DOT ascertains the cost of the sign and the replacement materials by utilizing cost data from retail stores, such as Home Depot or Lowe's, on a date as close to the date of destruction as is possible. In this case, that date would fall in September or October 1999. In addition, even if a sign owner decides to repair his sign with used or recycled materials, those materials would still be valued as if they were new. Further, only items such as supporting braces (stringers) or members of the sign structure (support poles) qualify as structural materials. This means that the sign facing would not be considered a structural component within the meaning of the rule. Finally, any old materials from the original sign that were reused would not be a part of the overall cost. Apart from the cost issue, in reconstructing the sign, the owner must return the sign to substantially the same configuration as before the damage. Thus, any change in the height or width of the sign facing, the number of feet that the sign sits above the ground, the structural safety of the sign, or the size of the replacement materials, might constitute a substantial change and prohibit reerection. In the case at bar, the testimony establishes that if Respondent proposes to change the height of the sign, the type of structural materials used, or the number of support poles, this would constitute a substantial change in the sign and disqualify Respondent from utilizing the exception in the rule. Although the rule does not specifically require such information, to prove that materials were stolen by unknown persons, historically DOT has required that the owner submit a police report confirming that materials were stolen. In this case, no police report was ever filed by Respondent, nor did it file a claim with its insurance company for the value of the materials allegedly stolen. Respondent submitted cost data from three local "supplier[s]" confirming that the value of the structural components of the sign just prior to its being damaged was not greater than $1202.00. This figure was derived by taking the cost of five new poles at $202.00 per pole, or $1010.00, and sixteen new stringers at a cost of $12.00 per stringer, or $192.00. Respondent's suggestion that the cost of plywood for the new sign facing ($636.00) should also be counted as a structural material has been rejected since that component does not qualify as such a material under the rule. Respondent's operation supervisor (Nichols) offered two alternatives for repairing the sign. First, he suggested that by lowering the structure below its previous height, he could reerect the sign using only two new poles. This alternative, however, would substantially change the sign's configuration and violate the terms of the rule. Second, in order to keep the sign at its original height, Nichols stated that he would purchase three new poles and "stub" two of the damaged poles by adding two more stringers. The second option would cost only $630.00, but under this alternative, the value of the replacement materials would exceed fifty percent of the cost of the structure ($1202.00) just prior to the sign being damaged. Then, too, the record shows that by making this type of repair, the sign facing would be weaker, making it less safe; its wind load would be changed; and the sign height would be lower. Thus, these modifications would constitute a substantial change.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order confirming that the outdoor advertising sign maintained by National Advertising Company under Permit No. BP844 has been destroyed, is nonconforming, and cannot be reerected. The permit should also be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 12th of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Attn: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Jodi B. Jennings, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
