Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified building contractor holding license number CB C032007. In May, 1985, he contracted to build a residence for Daniel Drigger for a price of $98,400. This is the first residence constructed by the Respondent under his license. The Driggers moved into the house in February, 1986. As a part of the contract to build the residence, the Respondent was responsible for the construction of a "greenhouse" window along the wall of the kitchen. The window is depicted in P. Ex. 3 on the left side of the house. The top portion of the window that slants on a 45 degree angle from the wall of the house began to leak in heavy rain storms shortly after the Driggers moved in. Water would pour in from the top seams of the window, damaging the drywall and wallpaper, and resulting in large pools of water on the floor. Mark Nasrallah was qualified as an expert in proper methods of construction and responsibilities of a contractor in Florida. Based upon the opinion of Mr. Nasrallah, it is concluded that the window had been improperly constructed by Mr. Allison. Mr. Allison's method, reliance upon caulking to seal the top glass, was defective because the glass would change size in heat and cold, thus loosening the seal, causing leaks. The proper method to prevent leaks was to rabbet the frame, laying the glass on a bead of caulk within the rabbet, and to construct a system of double flashing as indicated in the sketch which is Petitioner's Ex. 7. Mr. Allison agreed in his testimony that the method he chose to construct the window was not correct. He relied upon the carpenters he had hired to properly construct the window. The carpenters he hired had told him that they had constructed windows of this type many times before. Mr. Allison relied upon their representations, but did not know himself how the window should properly be constructed. At the hearing, Mr. Allison accepted full responsibility for the incorrect window, and was willing to spend the money needed to repair the window to the standards set forth by Mr. Nasrallah. The cost of correction of the window will be approximately $300. When Mr. Driggers first discovered that the window leaked, he called Mr. Allison and asked him to fix it. Mr. Allison told Mr. Driggers that he had lost a lot of money under the contract, and that he (Mr. Allison) believed that Mr. Driggers still owed him money. Mr. Allison told Mr. Driggers that he would fix the window if Mr. Driggers paid him the money that was owed, but that otherwise Mr. Driggers would have to have the window repaired using the money Mr. Driggers owed Mr. Allison. Since Mr. Driggers refused to pay the money claimed by Mr. Allison, Mr. Allison refused to correct the window. Mr. Driggers tried several methods to correct the leaky window, including caulk and after-the-fact flashing (without reconstruction), to no avail. The window still leaked. At the end of the job, there were still a number of corrections to be made. In order to release liens and to allow the bank to release funds, the parties agreed to allow the retention of $1500 by the Driggers, to be paid to Mr. Allison upon completion of the corrections on the "punch" list. P. Exs. 5A and 5B are the letters exchanged between the parties that established the agreement regarding the punch list and the retained $1500. The Driggers agreed that if all the items on the punch list were not completed by February 16, 1986, then the Driggers would have the option to hire someone to take care of the uncompleted items. Implicitly, payment was to be made from the retained $1500. R. Ex. 5B. Mr. Driggers testified that the following items on the punch list were not completed by Mr. Allison: rehang door to guest bathroom to open to outside; remove stain from living room ceiling; replace cabinet drawers upstairs; remove smudge on wallpaper in upstairs bathroom; center cabinet doors, master bathroom; and deliver all guarantees and warranties. This testimony is not credible, and is rejected. On May 6, Mrs. Driggers wrote to Mr. Allison. P. Ex. 6. The letter is clearly intended to itemize all remaining deficiencies under the contract. It states that $1,273.30 of the retained $1,500 is enclosed as "final payment," and itemizes $226.70 in matters claimed as offsets by the Driggers. None of the items listed are matters that Mr. Driggers at the formal hearing testified were uncompleted items on the punch list. The letter concluded that "this concludes our contract." Based on the letter of May 6, 1987, Mr. Allison reasonably and justifiable thought that the retained amount of $226.70 was used by the Driggers to satisfy all remaining claims by the Driggers under the contract. At the conclusion of the contract, Mr. Allison had a claim against the Driggers for the following, which Mr. Allison asserts was never paid to him: $75 for the utility deposit; $362 for landscaping; and $101.07 for appliances in excess of contract allowance. None of these amounts were denied by Mr. Driggers. The effect of this claim, however, cannot be determined on this record due to the findings of fact which follow. Mr. Allison originally presented Mr. and Mrs. Driggers with an estimate of $112,000 to construct the house. The bank would loan only $98,400. Thus, the parties agreed that the contract would be for the lower amount, but that Mr. Driggers would bring the cost down by supplying labor and materials for certain jobs. This agreement was not reduced to writing, and there is insufficient evidence in the record to conclude that either Mr. Allison or Mr. and Mrs. Driggers breached any of these oral agreements, resulting in money owed to either party. This is Particularly true in light of the letter of May 6, 1987, P. Ex. 6. As a consequence, it is impossible on this record to conclude that after consideration of all claims and counter claims, that the Driggers owed Mr. Allison anything further, or that Mr. Allison breached any duty to the Driggers other than in the construction of the leaky window. On June 25, 1986, the Driggers sent a letter to Mr. Allison. The letter lists a number of grievances. It ends by saying that formal complaints were being filed against Mr. Allison. On the last page, the Driggers state that "we, personally, have taken the appropriate steps to have the leaks fixed." After receipt of the June 25, 1986, letter, Mr. Allison did not offer to fix the leaky window because he believed it had already been fixed based upon the Driggers' letter. He was not contacted again by the Driggers. The window had not been fixed as of the date of the formal hearing. Mr. Allison offered to fix the window, as discussed above.
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, enter its final order dismissing the administrative complaint against Frank D. Allison. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 18th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2959 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have either been rejected or which have been adopted by reference. The numbers used are the numbers used by the parties. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: The proposed finding that the "punch list items were not complete" has been ejected for the reasons set forth in finding of fact 15. The second sentence is true and adopted by reference, but is subordinate. This proposed finding is true and adopted by reference, but is subordinate. This proposed finding is true and adopted by reference, but is subordinate. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: The last sentence of the first paragraph is rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 18 and 19. The second paragraph is rejected. Although the proof was inadequate during the formal hearing that Mr. Allison failed to complete punch list items, this does not, in itself, prove that Mr. Driggers "deceived the contractor" about the punch list items. Mrs. Driggers explicitly listed the items for which money was withheld in the May 6, 1986, letter. Mr. Allison thus knew exactly why the money was withheld. Whether or not Mr. and Mrs. Driggers were correct in the withholding of the money has not been determined on this record. The last sentence of paragraph 3 is true and adopted by reference. It is not sufficient, however, the change the conclusion that the construction of the window was improper. Mr. Allison agreed during the hearing that the Nasrallah method was the proper method. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Swanson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Frank D. Allison 1004 East South Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Willian O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact On May 23, 2005, Petitioner was hired by Respondent as a ready-mix concrete truck driver at Respondent’s Gainesville plant. Petitioner was a good employee. He had a clean driving record, and he did not have any disciplinary problems while working for Respondent. On or about July 27, 2007, Petitioner had a “mild” heart attack and was placed on medical leave by Respondent. In September 2007, Petitioner was released by his personal physician to return to work. Thereafter, Petitioner returned to work for a couple of days and began the process of being recertified for his driving duties. He reviewed safety materials and videos and did “ride- alongs” with other drivers. Before Petitioner could return to his driving duties, he was required by federal Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations to pass a physical and be certified as “physically qualified.” Recertification is required every 24 months and after an injury that impairs the driver’s ability to perform his/her normal duties, such as the heart attack suffered by Petitioner. Petitioner understood that he could not return to his job as a ready-mix concrete truck driver until he passed a physical and received his DOT certification. On September 12, 2007, Respondent sent Petitioner to a DOT-approved physician in Ocala for his physical. Petitioner did not pass the physical. The DOT-approved physician expressed concerns about Petitioner’s cardiac surgery, possible sleep apnea (based upon a questionnaire filled out by Petitioner), and blood pressure issues. There is no credible evidence that Respondent influenced the DOT-approved physician’s decision in any way. Petitioner’s suspicion that Respondent had something to do with the decision is unfounded. Petitioner’s personal physician disagreed with the concerns expressed by the DOT-approved physician, and after Petitioner underwent a series of tests, it was determined that he did not have sleep apnea. On November 9, 2007, Respondent laid Petitioner off based upon his “failure to meet job qualifications.” Petitioner was 48 years old at the time of the lay- off. There is no credible evidence that Petitioner’s age or medical condition played any role in Respondent’s decision to lay Petitioner off. Rather, the decision was based solely upon Petitioner’s failure to have the DOT certification that was required for him to drive a ready-mix concrete truck. Respondent gave Petitioner ample time to obtain his DOT certification before it laid him off. Approximately two months passed between the time that Petitioner was cleared to return to work by his personal physician and the time that he was laid off for not having his DOT certification. Petitioner did not obtain his DOT certification until some point in January 2008. Petitioner was treated no differently by Respondent than other drivers -- both older and younger than Petitioner -- who lost their DOT certification. Like Petitioner, those drivers were fired because they did not meet the applicable job qualifications. Petitioner testified that he was told that he would be rehired when he got his DOT certification. This testimony is corroborated by the comment on the Employee Separation Notice for Petitioner, which stated “Jesse has been unable to get his DOT card/when he does he will be rehired.” By the time Petitioner obtained his DOT certification in January 2008, Respondent’s business had declined due to the slow-down in the economy and the building industry, and it did not have any work for Petitioner. Respondent laid off three drivers at its Gainesville plant in December 2007, and it laid off an additional five drivers at the plant in February 2008 because of the decline in its business. Six of the eight drivers who were laid-off were younger than Petitioner. After these lay-offs, there were still three drivers employed at Respondent’s Gainesville plant who had less seniority than Petitioner, but in order to rehire Petitioner, Respondent would have had to fire one of those drivers. There were also a number of drivers still employed at Respondent’s Gainesville plant who were older and had more seniority than Petitioner. Respondent’s decision not to fire one of the other drivers in order to re-hire Petitioner was reasonable under the circumstances. And, more importantly, there is no credible evidence that this decision was motivated in any way by Petitioner’s age or a perceived disability based upon his heart attack. Respondent has not hired any drivers at its Gainesville plant since the lay-offs described above. Petitioner has not worked since he was laid off by Respondent. He testified that he has tried to find another truck-driving job, but that like Respondent, most companies are not hiring drivers because of the slow-down in the economy and the building industry. Petitioner would likely still be employed by Respondent if he had obtained his DOT certification before Respondent started laying off drivers because Petitioner was a good employee with more seniority than all but one of the drivers who were laid off in December 2007 and February 2008. Petitioner believes that Respondent could have put him to work in the warehouse or on the yard until he obtained his DOT certification and could return to driving duties. However, the record does not reflect whether any positions were available in the warehouse or on the yard or whether Petitioner was qualified for those positions. Petitioner testified that he was told by other employees that they overheard Respondent’s managers stating that they did not intend to return Petitioner to his driving duties because his heart attack made him a “high risk driver.” No evidence was presented to corroborate this hearsay-based testimony. Petitioner also testified that a supervisor made a critical comment to him regarding his use of a cane immediately after he returned to work. The supervisor denied making the comment, and even if the comment was made, there is no credible evidence that it was anything more than an isolated comment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2009.
The Issue Whether there is probable cause for petitioner to bring an action against respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact Some time after February 19, 1983, and before March 23, 1983, Wayne W. Hickey opened for business as an auto mechanic under the name Auto Tech at 2350 Fernwood Drive in Pensacola, Florida. He was employed by, but had no ownership interest in the auto repair business known as Motor Exchange that occupied the premises before him. After he had opened his own business, he undertook employment for Lloyd Linville, a principal of Motor Exchange, who asked him to repair a car that belonged to David H. Weinstein which Motor Exchange had been unable to repair. Mr. Hickey could not fix the engine knock, either, and was never paid for his work. While the car was in Mr. Hickey's custody, vandals did $700 damage to it. Mr. Hickey refused to repair this damage or pay Mr. Weinstein money to have it done elsewhere. On February of 1983, while still employed by Motor Exchange, Mr. Hickey signed a warranty on behalf of Motor Exchange covering an engine rebuilt for Jose L. Rodriguez. A week later Mr. Rodriguez discovered that the cam and the lifters were bad, and brought this to Mr. Hickey's attention. Mr. Hickey referred Mr. Rodriguez to Motor Exchange at their new location. The last time that Mr. Rodriguez and Mr. Hickey spoke before the hearing in this cause, Mr. Rodriguez told Mr. Hickey that all was well. At hearing for the first time, Mr. Hickey learned that other problems had developed with the engine since. After she got her income tax refund, Anita Diane Frye took her 1974 Chevrolet to Auto Tech on February 28, 1983. She considers the car hers even though it is registered in her boyfriend's name. He signed the work order authorizing respondent to rebuild the engine. Auto Tech worked on the engine and gave a "1 year or 15,000 mile warranty on engine against defective parts & workmanship accessories excluded." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. When Mr. Hickey returned the car after working on the engine, he told Ms. Frye, "You better buy a new set of back tires," because it would go so fast, he claimed. In fact, the car smoked from the time they got it back from Mr. Hickey and he was unable to correct the problem when they took it back for lifters to be installed or when they took it back the second time. The third time they took it back they found the shop closed and no indication of how to get in touch with Mr. Hickey. At the time of the hearing, the car had been driven less than 3,000 miles since the engine had been rebuilt, but the engine spat and sputtered and the car could not be driven faster than 20 or 30 miles per hour: "You sit in a cloud of smoke whenever you stop." After James Clyde Odom heard respondent's radio advertisement, he brought his 1974 Dodge truck to Auto Tech on May 3, 1983, to have the engine rebuilt. Mr. Hickey told him he would rebuild the engine "from the ground up" and guarantee his work. As agreed, Mr. Odom returned for the truck on May 7, 1983, paid Mr. Hickey $644.09 and received a written "1 year or 15,000 mile warranty on engine against defective parts & workmanship. Accessories excluded." Mr. Odom had driven the truck approximately three miles when his wife, who was following in another car, honked her horn. Steam was rising from the engine. They turned around and went back to the garage where Mr. Hickey supplied a bolt that had been left out of the water pump housing. The Odoms set out again and made it all the way to Mrs. Odom's father's house, where they noticed oil leaking. They determined that a quart and a half had been lost. They took the truck back to the Auto Tech shop again and left a note describing the problem. A week later Mr. Odom picked his truck up from Auto Tech a third time and drove it about two and a half miles to a friend's house, where oil leaked from the truck again and formed a puddle in the friend's driveway. This time when Mr. Odom returned, Mr. Hickey said he could not work on it right away, that Mr. Odom would have to bring it back at Mr. Hickey's convenience, and he refused Mr. Odom's proposal that another mechanic he asked to repair the engine with the bill being sent to Mr. Hickey. The compression in the truck's engine ranged from 107 or 114 pounds in one cylinder to 160 pounds in another. Mr. Hickey also undertook to repair the brakes on the Odom truck, and was paid for this job. He did not turn the drums or replace the brake cylinders although he did install new brake shoes. The brakes did not hold after the work was done. On May 27, 1983, Ishmael White took a 1974 Dodge engine to Hickey for rebuilding. The job was to include "rings, mains, rod bearings, timing gear, timing chain, lifters, push rods, oil pumps, all new gaskets, complete valve job and" cam bearings. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. On June 1, 1983, Mr. White paid Mr. Hickey $624.75 for this work and he picked the engine up the next day. The head bolt had not been replaced. On June 10, 1983, the engine was reinstalled in Mr. White's pick-up truck. It made the whole truck vibrate. When Mr. White took it to be tuned, the mechanic said he could not tune it because the valves were not closing. When Mr. White reported this to Mr. Hickey, Mr. Hickey said he would not be able to work on the engine until June 15, 1983. On June 15, 1983, Mr. White left the truck with Mr. Hickey and returned to pick it up on June 21, 1983, as they had agreed. The truck was not ready then, so Mr. White inquired again on June 23, 1983. At that time Mr. Hickey told him that the water pump leaked and would cost $70 to replace, but Mr. White refused to buy a water pump from Mr. Hickey since a new one had been installed less than three months before he took the engine to Auto Tech. On July 12, 1983, Mr. Hickey told Mr. White that everything had been fixed except the water pump and that if he towed the truck away without buying another water pump the warranty was "no good." The warranty Mr. Hickey had earlier given Mr. White was a "1 year or 15,000 mile warranty on engine against defective parts & workmanship. Accessories excluded." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Mr. White took the truck nevertheless. Bolts were loose. A brand new air filter was wet. Four of the eight cylinders had little or no compression and the engine ran so rough the hood shook, but the water pump was not leaking. Mr. White took the truck elsewhere to be repaired at his expense. On April 2, 1983, James Fisher took his Ford pick-up to Mr. Hickey and Auto Tech and asked that a rebuilt 400 cubic inch engine be substituted for the 351 cubic inch engine it had at the time and that its C-4 transmission be replaced with a C-6. The Fishers retrieved their truck on April 14, 1983, and drove it home. The next day they set out on a camping trip. They had driven 20 miles when the engine "blew up." Smoke came back into the cab and billowed out from under the hood. Employees of Mr. Hickey came for the truck. On April 25, 1983, the Fishers left Auto Tech in the Ford truck a second time. The engine ran rough, the transmission "growled," and they spotted a stream of transmission fluid, so they turned around before they had gone a mile and drove the truck back to Auto Tech. On April 29, 1983, Mr. Hickey said everything was fine and the Fishers set out again. The transmission was better, but the engine was worse, and the car broke down near their son's place of business, a block or so from Auto Tech. The truck was taken back to the Auto Tech garage. Again on May 6, 1983, the Fishers set out in the truck and got all the way to Pace, Florida, this time, notwithstanding problems with the transmission. A mechanic in Pace discovered worn valve guides, worn rings and worn bearings; and that only one bolt attached the engine to the frame; and that the drive shaft had been jammed in without being properly fitted. The Fishers were unable to find Mr. Hickey after he closed down his Auto Tech shop. Without objection, the following affidavit was received in evidence at hearing: I Took The Engine To Wayne Hickey at Auto TECH to be Rebuilt. He was To Rebuild The Engine For $395.00 Plus Taxes, I Paind Him by check $414.75 I took The Engine Home and Installed it in The Car.The engine was Smokeing Real bad. I went back to Wayne Hickey with The Car and he informed me That The Engine Should be Ran For up To 500 miles If IT didn't stop smokeing & useing oil To bring it back. The Engine Froze up. I Towed The car back to AUTO TECH. Wayne Hickey said he would Need to Keep The Car for 3-4 days. My daughter called after 7 days and they haden't Touched The car. They Said to Call back ON The 16 July 83. My daughter Called back on The 16 July 83 and could get no anser, I called back on The 19th & the Recording Said The Phone was Temperoley out of order, I came over here to Auto TECH and talked to Wayne Hickey, 7-28-83. He had not done anything to the Engine, I ask him To give me my Money back and I would get The Engine Fixed Myself. He stated For me to Take The car Home, Take the Engin back out and bring the Engine back To him and He would Fix IT, he didn't say anything about Removeing The Engine when He Told me To bring The car back to Him, A Mr. Watha L. Clayton wrote out the foregoing statement on a form furnished by petitioner's office. The form affidavit was notarized July 28, 1983.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner find probable cause to initiate judicial proceedings against respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 2d day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2d day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr., Esquire Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Wayne Hickey Motor Exchange 5672 Avondale Road Pensacola, Florida 32506 Curtis A. Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue Whether Respondent, Superior Optical Shop (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Sections 760.01– and 509.092, Florida Statutes, by subjecting Petitioner, Janice Jennings (Petitioner), to discrimination in employment and by discharging Petitioner in retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s discriminatory employment practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent is a corporation with its corporate headquarters located in Ocean Springs, Mississippi. Respondent operates an optical shop in a Veteran’s Administration (V.A.) Hospital located in Lake City, Florida. At its Lake City location, Respondent fills prescriptions written by eye physicians at the V.A. Hospital, assists patients with choosing frames, and fits patients with their prescription eye glasses. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is fast-paced, with a constant stream of patients, averaging 50-to-60 patients a day. If the optical shop is running behind schedule, it is problematic because often physicians at the V.A. Hospital are waiting to see the patients served by the optical shop. In 2009, Petitioner interviewed for a position at Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City, Florida. During her interview, Petitioner advised Respondent that she had competent computer skills and significant experience working in an office environment and with eye doctors. On May 27, 2009, Respondent hired Petitioner as a part- time clerk at the optical shop. Petitioner was terminated prior to working 90 days for Respondent. When Petitioner was hired, two full-time employees worked at the optical shop: office supervisor, Jean Hartup, and optician, Kathleen Denton. Ms. Hartup has been employed with Respondent for approximately five years. Ms. Denton has been with the optical shop for approximately two and a-half years. As office supervisor, Ms. Hartup can be distant with employees and “hard” at times. She can also be “direct” when speaking to employees. Ms. Hartup demonstrates these traits with all of the employees at the optical shop. Ms. Hartup has written up Ms. Denton in the past and the two have had personality conflicts. Both Ms. Hartup and Ms. Denton assisted with training Petitioner. Evidence indicated that Petitioner received adequate training to perform the tasks she was assigned to perform as a clerk. She often had to be re-trained on the same tasks. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is a very small room, approximately ten-feet by ten-feet square inside the V.A. Hospital. There are two small desks in the shop and it is very crowded. Petitioner was aware of the small working environment at the time she accepted employment with Respondent as a part- time clerk. Past and present employees at the optical shop have had to share desk space. Sometimes work has to be performed in the hallway because of the small office space. All new hires for Respondent are subjected to a 90-day probationary period. As explained in Respondent’s “Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits,” of which Petitioner was aware: There will be a 90-day probationary period during which time the employer may terminate the employee at any time for any reason or for no reason regardless of any other provision of these policies. Sick leave and personal days are accrued but cannot be used during this period. Respondent’s Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits also provides: [Respondent] does not and will not tolerate any employee discriminating against their work peers for any reason i.e., race, color, religion, sex, national origin or handicap. Any known verifiable discrimination will be grounds for immediate termination. Once on the job, Petitioner was not proficient on the computer and, despite repeated training, failed to show any improvement and was slow in performing her job duties. Because of this, service to patients at the optical shop slowed down and the optical shop was frequently behind, resulting in physicians having to wait for patients being served by the optical shop. Ms. Hartup became frustrated with Petitioner’s unsatisfactory job performance and the resulting delays. In addition, Petitioner began to show a lack of interest in her job and even stated that she “didn’t really need a job; she just wanted to be out of the house.” Despite repeated training and opportunities to improve her work performance, Petitioner failed to improve. Petitioner was given a notebook with information from the American Board of Opticians for review but she failed to read it or return it to Respondent. Prior to the end of her employment with Respondent, Petitioner called Respondent’s corporate headquarters in Mississippi and spoke to Mary Walker. Petitioner complained to Ms. Walker that Ms. Hartup was being too hard, was impatient, and was expecting too much of her. Petitioner did not raise concerns with Ms. Walker that she was being discriminated against based on her race, or that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment because of her race. In fact, there is no evidence that Petitioner ever complained of race discrimination or a hostile work environment based on race discrimination while she was still employed by Respondent. During that first telephone conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Walker suggested to Petitioner that she should talk to Ms. Hartup about the problems. Petitioner assured Ms. Walker that she would. Two days later, Ms. Walker called Ms. Hartup and inquired whether Petitioner had discussed her concerns with Ms. Hartup. Petitioner, however, had not spoken to Ms. Hartup about her complaint. Ms. Walker gave Ms. Hartup the authority to run the optical shop at Lake City, including making hiring and firing decisions. Ms. Walker did not discipline Ms. Hartup because of Petitioner’s complaints. Rather, Ms. Walker told Ms. Hartup to handle the situation regarding Petitioner’s complaints. Ms. Hartup then met with Petitioner and they spoke about Petitioner’s concerns that Ms. Hartup was being too harsh and about Petitioner’s poor work performance. As a result of that meeting, Ms. Hartup felt the situation had been resolved. Petitioner subsequently advised both Ms. Denton, as well as Ms. Walker at Respondent’s headquarters, that the conversation with Ms. Hartup had gone well and that their issues had been resolved. Petitioner’s work performance, however, did not improve. Prior to the end of her 90-day probationary period of employment, Respondent terminated Petitioner from employment for poor work performance, for failing to reach her capabilities as an employee, and because her poor work performance was a detriment to Respondent’s Lake City optical shop. Petitioner testified that, from her point of view, she truly felt as though she had been discriminated against because of her race. That testimony, however, was without further support and was unpersuasive, especially in view of the fact that there is no evidence that Petitioner ever mentioned to anyone during her employment with Respondent that she believed she was being discriminated against. There was otherwise no evidence presented at the final hearing that would support a finding that Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was in retaliation for Petitioner’s complaint against Ms. Hartup. Further, the evidence produced at final hearing does not support a finding that either the manner in which Petitioner was treated during her employment with Respondent, or her termination from that employment, was based on Petitioner’s race. Respondent filled the position of part-time clerk left vacant after Petitioner’s termination by hiring a Native- American male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert Maccelli, is a certified general contractor in inactive status for the period 1981 through 1983, holding License #CG C011040. He was in inactive status as of June 1, 1981. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) Respondent was employed as a building inspector for Broward County, Florida. He was required to be a certified contractor to fill this position. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 3.) On June 1, 1982, Respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of violating Section 838.015, Florida Statutes, by taking a bribe in relation to the performance of his duties as a building inspector for Broward County. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 2.)
Recommendation Having found the Respondent, Robert Maccelli, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Construction Industry Licensing Board revoke the certificate of Respondent as a general contractor. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Mr. Robert Maccelli Post Office Box 8243 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33310 J. K. Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by Respondent because of his race.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, Tredit Tire & Wheel Co., Inc., operated a specialty tire and wheel assembly facility in Plant City, Florida. Petitioner was employed by Tredit at that facility. On October 10, 1995, Ronald Pike, Tredit’s vice- president for operations, paid a routine visit to Tredit’s Plant City facility. Somewhat concerned over the apparent inadequate level of production and higher costs being experienced there, Mr. Pike called a meeting of the entire 15-member staff. During the course of the meeting, in an attempt to determine, if possible, the reason for the deficiency, Mr. Pike asked questions of each member of the staff. Mr. Lee, who recalls he had nothing to say at the time, claims Pike’s insistence on his participation in the discussion constituted "picking on him." Mr. Pike denies picking on Petitioner. He contends he was trying to get some input from the hourly employees, and insists he questioned all of them even-handedly. He asked each for input, indicating their jobs would not be jeopardized by their answers. During the meeting Pike advised the associates that both their attitudes and their production must improve. Though Petitioner denies it, Mr. Pike indicated that Petitioner claimed at that time there was not enough work to give him a 40-hour week, and he was stretching out his jobs in order to make them take long enough to ensure he could work a 40-hour work week. Mr. Bauer, also a Tredit executive, is of the opinion this manipulation is neither necessary nor possible, considering the facility’s work practices. Tredit creates wheel assemblies for specialty vehicles, utilizing tires and wheels manufactured by others. Though its Florida business is high volume, due to the nature of the product and the intense competition, the profit margin is low, and the company has to react to order cycles which require immediate response. However, Mr. Bauer opined there was always enough to do to make sure the hourly employees were always productively employed. No independent evidence was presented in support of the position taken by either party on this point, however. Once the meeting was completed, Mr. Pike and Mr. Bauer left. The facility was being managed at the time by Carol Suggs. At the end of the day after Mr. Pike held his meeting with the staff, Ms. Suggs called for Petitioner to meet with her. The request was communicated through Mr. Longo. According to Ms. Suggs, Petitioner was admonished about his working habits and warned regarding his attitude on the job. She claims he then became disrespectful and quit. A short while later, a payroll accounting document was prepared reflecting Petitioner had been discharged on the day of the conference with Ms. Suggs. Petitioner categorically denies having quit the job as Ms. Suggs indicates in her sworn affidavit of August 22, 1996. He claims to have taken pride in his work and to have been so upset by his termination that he actually cried as a result. Ms. Suggs, on the other hand, contends that Petitioner did not put forth appropriate effort on the job. She claims that not only were the hourly employees getting a full 40-hour week, but also performing overtime, and yet the required amount of material was not being produced. Petitioner rebuts this contention, claiming adequate inventory was prepared. Nonetheless, as a result of what she perceived as Petitioner’s attitude and performance shortcomings, on October 11, 1995, at her meeting with Petitioner the day after Mr. Pike’s visit, Ms. Suggs gave him a written employee warning notice. Petitioner admits to having signed this notice as indication he received it, but denies he agreed with its contents. No other notice of dismissal action was executed by Ms. Suggs except the payroll change notice reflecting Petitioner’s dismissal on October 13, 1995, two days following the meeting she had with Petitioner. Because this earlier action, the warning, does not reflect Petitioner was terminated, but within two days thereof he was taken off the payroll, and because Ms. Suggs’ testimony was credible, it is found that Petitioner’s reaction to the warning was as described by her and was the basis for his dismissal. Tredit had 15 employees at the Plant City facility when Petitioner was employed there. Of this number, four were female and eleven were male. Two of the males were black. After Petitioner was terminated, the employee census was the same except for one fewer black employee. At the time of the hearing, Tredit employed four individuals in the Plant City facility’s office, all of whom were white; and nine warehouse employees, of whom four were white, one black, and two Hispanic. No evidence was presented to establish that Petitioner’s termination from employment with Respondent was the result of his race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Raymond T. Lee’s Petition for Relief filed against Tredit Tire & Wheel Co., Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ramon T. Lee, pro se 832 Augusta Street Lakeland, Florida 33805 Antonio Faga, Esquire 375 Twelfth Avenue South Naples, Florida 34102 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
