Findings Of Fact By Petition To Determine The Invalidity Of A Proposed Rule, filed July 3, 1996, Petitioner sought to challenge Respondent's adoption of Proposed Rule 33-20.008, relating to establishment of certification standards of "Batterer's Intervention Programs" in the area of domestic violence. Petitioner's alleged affectuation of substantial interests, on which standing to bring this proceeding is premised, is set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Petition and read as follows: Petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the proposed rule because, by statute, it provides legal representation for many indigents subject to the legal requirements established by the proposed rules. Petitioner has an interest in assuring that the guidelines adopted here are available, reflect participation, are clear and are fair to its clients. As proposed, the guide- lines are not available. The attempt to adopt the guidelines by reference only deprives petitioner of written notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly, to which it subscribes, of the proposed guidelines and of any changes to the proposed guidelines as they are proposed and adopted. It also make the proposed guidelines unavailable as adopted rules, because they will not be available in the Florida Administrative Code. As proposed, the guidelines will not reflect participation, because the only issue in the rulemaking proceeding is whether or not the guidelines should be incorporated as rules of the department. The substance of the guidelines has already been established. The guidelines are not clear, especially in the area of assessment. Greater clarity is needed to prevent difficulties from arising on a case by case basis that petitioner will have to resolve by expending scarce resources. The guidelines are not fair to petitioner's clients, in the area of cost to indigents and in other areas. As counsel to those subject to the guidelines, petitioner's substantial interests will be affected by the proposed rule because it will be hampered in executing its responsibilities to its clients by the failings in the proposed rule just identified. Unless it takes this opportunity to resolve problems with the proposed rule here and now, petitioner will have to spend scarce resources during its representation of clients subject to the rule, case by case, to assure that each client's rights are fully protected. Petitioner also seeks to represent interests of its indigent clients in these proceedings. As indigents, its clients do not have the resources to protect themselves from the flaws in the proposed rule as that rule is applied to them. As counsel to a steady stream of indigents who face legal problems subject to the proposed rule, petitioner is uniquely suited to become familiar with, and to advance, its clients objections to the proposed rule. Just as associations have been given standing to seek relief on behalf of their members in rule challenge proceedings, petitioner should be permitted to seek relief on behalf of its statutorily defined client base.
The Issue Whether just cause exists to terminate Respondent from her employment with the Lee County School Board.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is responsible for hiring, terminating, and overseeing all employees in the school district. Respondent has been employed by Petitioner since December 13, 2010. She is currently assigned as a school bus attendant in Petitioner’s transportation department. Respondent’s employment is governed by the collective bargaining agreement between the Support Personnel Association of Lee County (SPALC) and the School Board. The Petition for Termination alleges that on July 6, 2015, Petitioner’s Department of Professional Standards and Equity was notified that Respondent was arrested on June 26, 2015, and charged with four felony counts of public aid fraud in excess of $200.00. Andrew Brown testified that he received a “hit” notification from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement informing the District that Respondent had been arrested. Respondent obtained public assistance of $200 or more through false statements, misrepresentation, impersonation or other fraudulent means. The offenses were committed from: December 1, 2011, to May 31, 2012; October 1, 2012, to May 31, 2013; October 1, 2013, to September 30, 2014; and August 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013. All of the foregoing offenses occurred during Respondent’s period of employment with Petitioner. Respondent was arrested for the foregoing offenses on June 26, 2015. On November 24, 2015, Respondent pled guilty to four counts of engaging in public aid fraud, all felonies, and was sentenced to 36 months of probation and ordered to pay $8,483.29 in restitution to the Florida Department of Children and Families. The evidence demonstrates that Respondent, on November 24, 2015, knowingly pled guilty to public aid fraud. School Board policy 5.04 permits Petitioner to terminate the employment of an employee who commits a crime during their employment, if the crime would otherwise disqualify the employee from initial employment with the School Board. Public aid fraud is such a crime. Paragraph (7)(a) and (b) of policy 5.04 provides that the School Board will not hire an individual who has committed welfare and/or unemployment fraud within 10 years of the offense. Policy 5.04 also provides that an individual who is on probation may also be ineligible for employment. School Board policies 5.02, 5.03, and 5.29 all include language that mandate compliance with applicable laws, and require that employees maintain high ethical standards and good moral character. Respondent has failed those mandates. The credible evidence establishes that Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent’s employment with the School Board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Lee County School Board enter a final order terminating Respondent’s employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 2016.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Hispanic male. Respondent is an 860-unit apartment complex in Ocala. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a full-time maintenance technician from 2001 through September 28, 2007. His job responsibilities included performing repairs and general maintenance work on the insides of the apartments. Petitioner’s starting wage in 2001 was $9.00 per hour. He received annual raises from 2001 to 2004, at which point his wage was $11.75 per hour. Petitioner did not receive any raises from 2004 through 2007. He was still earning $11.75 per hour when he was fired on September 28, 2007. Starting in 2004, Respondent did not give raises to any maintenance technicians who were not HVAC-certified. This policy applied equally to all maintenance technicians, including non-Hispanics, and was intended to encourage them to get HVAC- certified. HVAC certification was important to Respondent because the air conditioning systems at the apartment complex were getting older and were requiring more frequent repairs. Respondent provided the necessary study materials for the HVAC certification exam and paid for the exam. Petitioner is not HVAC-certified. He took the certification exam once, but he did not pass. He did not take the exam again, even though Respondent would have paid for him to do so as it did for other maintenance technicians. HVAC certification is not required to perform all types of work on air conditioners, and Petitioner continued to do some work on the air conditioners at the apartment complex after 2004 even though he was not HVAC-certified. Petitioner was characterized as a “fair” employee who did “okay” work. His supervisor, a Hispanic male, testified that there were some jobs that he did not assign to Petitioner, that Petitioner frequently got help from other employees, and that he received a couple of complaints from other maintenance technicians about Petitioner’s work. Respondent does not have an employee handbook, and the only written policy that Respondent has is a policy prohibiting sexual and other harassment. Respondent’s executive director, Laura Smith, testified that she expected employees to use “common sense” regarding what they can and cannot do at work. Respondent utilizes a system of progressive discipline, which starts with warnings (oral, then written) and culminates in dismissal. However, the nature of the misconduct determines the severity of the discipline imposed, and a serious first offense may result in dismissal. On October 5, 2006, Petitioner was given an oral warning for “improper conduct” for visiting with a housekeeper multiple times a day for as long as 20 minutes at a time. The housekeeper also received an oral warning for this conduct. On May 15, 2007, Petitioner was given a written warning for the same “improper conduct,” i.e., wasting time by going into an apartment to visit with a housekeeper. Petitioner acknowledged receiving these warnings, but he denied engaging in the conduct upon which they were based. His denials were contradicted by the more credible testimony of his supervisor and Ms. Smith. Petitioner was fired on September 28, 2007, after a third incident of “improper conduct.” On that day, Petitioner left the apartment complex around 10 a.m. to get gas in his truck. He did not “clock out” or get permission from his supervisor before leaving the apartment complex. Petitioner was away from the apartment complex for at least 15 minutes, but likely no more than 30 minutes. Even though Respondent does not have written policies and procedures, Petitioner understood, and common sense dictates that he was supposed to get his supervisor’s approval and “clock out” before he left the complex on a personal errand. Petitioner also understood the procedure to be followed to get the 14 gallons of gas per week that Respondent provided for maintenance technicians. The procedure required the employee to get the company credit card from the bookkeeper, get the gas from a specific gas station, and then return the credit card and a signed receipt for the gas to the bookkeeper. Petitioner did not follow any aspect of this procedure on the day that he was fired. He had already gotten the 14 gallons of gas paid for by Respondent earlier in the week. Petitioner’s supervisor, a Hispanic male, compared Petitioner’s actions to “stealing from the company” because he was getting paid for time that he was not at the apartment complex working. He also expressed concern that Respondent could have been held liable if Petitioner had gotten in an accident on his way to or from getting gas because he was still “on the clock” at the time. Petitioner testified that he and other maintenance technicians routinely left the apartment complex to fill up their cars with gas without “clocking out” or getting permission from their supervisor. This testimony was corroborated only as to the 14 gallons of gas paid for each week by Respondent. There is no credible evidence that other employees routinely left the apartment complex to do personal errands without “clocking out,” and if they did, there is no credible evidence that Respondent’s managers were aware of it. There is no credible evidence whatsoever that Petitioner’s firing was motivated by his national origin. His supervisor is Hispanic, and he and Ms. Smith credibly testified that the fact that Petitioner was Hispanic played no role in her decision to fire Petitioner. Petitioner claimed that he was “harassed” by Ms. Smith and that she accused him of having sex with a housekeeper in the vacant apartments. No persuasive evidence was presented to support Petitioner’s “harassment” claim, which was credibly denied by Ms. Smith. Petitioner also claimed that he was disciplined differently than similar non-Hispanic employees, namely James Stroupe, Jason Head, and Willie Hutchinson. Mr. Stroupe is a white male. He worked on the grounds crew, not as a maintenance technician. In May 2007, Mr. Stroupe was given a written warning based upon allegations that he was making explosive devices at work, and in September 2007, he was given an oral warning for “wasting time” by hanging out in the woods with Mr. Head. Mr. Head is a white male. He worked on the grounds crew, not as a maintenance technician. In September 2007, he received a written warning for “wasting time” by hanging out in the woods with Mr. Stroupe. Mr. Hutchinson is a white male, and like Petitioner, he worked as a maintenance technician. In September 2007, he was arrested for DUI. Mr. Hutchinson was not disciplined by Respondent for this incident because it did not happen during working hours and it did not affect his ability to perform his job duties as maintenance technician. The grounds department (in which Mr. Stroupe and Mr. Head worked) was responsible for maintaining the landscaping around the apartment complex, whereas the maintenance department (in which Petitioner and Mr. Hutchinson worked) was responsible for maintaining the insides of the apartments. The departments had different supervisors. Petitioner was initially denied unemployment compensation by Respondent after he was fired, but he successfully appealed the denial to an Appeals Referee. Petitioner received unemployment compensation through April 2008. On April 11, 2008, Petitioner started working for Holiday Inn as a maintenance technician. He is employed full time and his wage is $11.50 per hour. Respondent placed an advertisement in the local newspaper after Petitioner was fired in order to fill his position in the maintenance department. The advertisement stated that Respondent was looking for an applicant who was HVAC-certified. Respondent hired Javier Herrera to fill the position. Mr. Herrera, like Petitioner, is a Hispanic male.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 2008.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner reimbursed Respondent beyond the amount of Petitioner's salary overpayment and is, therefore, due a refund.
Findings Of Fact The Department made a claim that Mr. Serrano had received a salary overpayment and had not repaid the overpayment. Mr. Serrano claimed that he had repaid the overpayment. Furthermore, he claimed that he had paid too much on the overpayment and was due a refund of monies. No dispute now exists that Mr. Serrano had repaid the overpayment to the Department. However, the Department denies that Mr. Serrano had repaid too much and was due a refund. Mr. Serrano is the Petitioner in this matter. He failed to appear at the final hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order dismissing the claim for a refund by David Serrano. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: David Serrano 107-D Weybridge Circle Royal Palm Beach, Florida 33411 Mary Linville Atkins, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Anthony Schembri, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
The Issue The issues posed for decision herein are whether or not the Respondent discriminatorily discharged the Petitioner, at least in part, based on race or other unlawful considerations, and whether or not the Respondent's employment policies, as practiced against the Petitioner herein, have an adverse impact upon blacks and/or other minorities. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, the proposed memoranda and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found:
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from March 12, 1979 to May 29, 1979. Petitioner was notified of his termination by Respondent's agent, Captain James McRaven, on May 29, 1979. Petitioner's efforts to be employed by Respondent commenced with his completing an application during 1978. In this regard, Industrial Relations' Manager, Earle Patrick, sought out Petitioner for employment with Wackenhut as part of his duties of recruiting qualified minority employees for positions. Patrick's effort included personal contacts, advertising, and other recruiting methods, including the use of service organizations in Brevard and the immediate surrounding counties. Industrial Relations' Manager Patrick advised Petitioner that a background investigation is conducted on each employee hired by Wackenhut. Petitioner's knowledge of Respondent's background investigations is further verified by a review of the application, completed by Petitioner, which provides in pertinent part: I . . . agree that if, in the judgment of the company . . . the results of such investigation are not satisfactory, any offer of employment made by the company may be withdrawn, or my employment with the company may be terminated immediately without any obligation or liability to me . . . Respondent has a policy of not extending offers of employment to applicants with convictions involving penalties in excess of a $25.00 fine, except minor traffic violations. Petitioner indicated on the first page of his application for employment that he had never been convicted of a violation of any law. Additionally, this fact was again admitted by the Petitioner during the subject hearing herein. Further, on two separate occasions prior to the Petitioner's commencement of employment with Respondent, Industrial Relations' Manager Patrick inquired of Petitioner whether or not his back ground investigation would reveal anything, aside from convictions, that he (Patrick) should be made aware of. On both occasions Petitioner replied "I am clean." Background investigations of the Petitioner indicated that Petitioner had been placed on one(1)year probation on April 10, 1978, for unemployment compensation fraud. That background investigation revealed further that other counts of unemployment compensation fraud had been withdrawn, and a further charge of issuing worthless checks in Kentucky had been dismissed. Petitioner pled guilty to the first count of unemployment compensation fraud and was placed on supervised probation for one (1) year. The court withheld adjudication of guilt. While a probationer, Petitioner was not allowed to carry a gun. Further, the Petitioner did not apply for any modification of the terms of his probation which would allow him to carry a firearm. Respondent maintains a rigid requirement for employee conduct and integrity for its security guard employees. (Respondent's Exhibit 15, Section 4.6.2.3 and Respondent's Exhibits 6 and 16.) The decision to discharge Petitioner was based on the results of the Respondent's background investigation of Petitioner and following consultation with its labor counsel, its Industrial Relations Manager, and the Chief of Security. Although the Petitioner contends that the Respondent was aware of his criminal background prior to employment, the documentary and other evidence introduced herein fails to support his claim in that regard. Further, the evidence reveals that the Petitioner does not employ, or even consider for employment, applicants who have pled guilty to a felony charge. This policy consideration is based on the Respondent's concern for high standards of integrity among its security guards due to the sensitive nature and other security considerations involved in its contract with NASA. In addition to the unlawful discharge allegation, Petitioner also alleged that he was unlawfully discriminated against in his employment with Respondent based on his failure to be selected for the SWAT Team; the fact that he as discriminatorily assigned to a remote and difficult security job assignment; the failure of Respondent to award him overtime work assignments, and finally, a claim that he was "grilled" by Captain McRaven. As to his non-selection to be a member of the SWAT Team, the Respondent bases its selection to the SWAT Team on employees who demonstrate a high proficiency in weapons, prior SWAT Team experience, and other factors, including length of employment. As to Petitioner's claim that he was discriminatorily assigned to a remote and difficult security job assignment, evidence reveals that Respondent attempts to assign employees to all of the possible job locations in an effort to acquaint them as much as possible so that they can be assigned to any and all post assignments as needed. Respondent selects employees for overtime assignments based on job seniority as set forth in its contract with the employee's job representative. Finally, no evidence was introduced herein to substantiate Petitioner's claim that he was "grilled" by Captain McRaven as charged. Petitioner acknowledged that there was a problem with his carrying a firearm while he was a probationer; however, he failed to mention his concern to any of Respondent's agents. Industrial Relations' Manager Patrick related that had the results of Petitioner's background investigation only revealed the disorderly conduct charge in Kentucky, Petitioner would still have been in Respondent's employ. The decision to terminate Petitioner was promoted by his guilty plea to a felony charge. Industrial Relations' Manager Patrick made a conscious effort to increase the number of minority employees with the Respondent. As example, during the month of April, 1978, Respondent's minority employees amounted to less than 1 percent of its total complement of employees, and during the course of the hearing, the complement of minority employees approximates 12 percent of the Respondent's total work force. Further, the number of minority employees shows a steady increase since the Respondent was awarded the subject contract with NASA in 1978. Richard G. Fritz, an associate professor who has earned a doctorate degree in economics, was received as an expert in statistics in this proceeding. 2/ Following a review of the "cause determination" introduced herein by the Intervenor, Dr. Fritz rendered his expert opinion that that determination was informational but not relevant herein, inasmuch as the reference groups were too small to be statistically accurate. Dr. Fritz reviewed several samples to determine a 50 percent accuracy rate and statistically determined that a sample size would need to number at least 102.18 in order to be valid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an Order dismissing the PETITION FOR RELIEF filed herein. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1983.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Latasha Moore (Petitioner) received excess salary payments from the Department of Juvenile Justice (Respondent) for which repayment is required.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent, although by the time of the hearing, the Petitioner was no longer so employed. By letter dated January 30, 2006, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that two salary overpayments totaling $723.62 had occurred, for which repayment was sought. The Respondent's letter stated that for the bi-weekly pay period ending May 19, 2005, an overpayment of $400.73 had occurred. The letter stated that for the bi-weekly pay period ending June 2, 2005, an overpayment of $322.89 had occurred. The letter advised that repayment by cashier's check or money order was due within 15 days of receipt of the letter. The letter further advised that the Petitioner had the right to an administrative hearing to challenge the calculation. A second letter, essentially identical to the letter dated January 30, was issued on March 28, 2006. The evidence presented at the hearing failed to establish that the calculation of the alleged overpayment was correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order vacating the demand for repayment of salary overpayment and finding that no salary repayment is due from Latasha Moore. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Linville Atkins, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Latasha Moore 5506 Metro West Boulevard, Apartment 303 Orlando, Florida 32811 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Anthony Schembri, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Children and Family Services (the "Department"), was overpaid in the amount of $826.82 and should be required to repay that amount to the Department.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: On June 5, 1995, Petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with Respondent to resolve certain disciplinary matters not directly relevant to this case. For purposes of this proceeding, the key element of the settlement agreement was that Petitioner would accept a voluntary demotion. The terms of the settlement agreement provided that Petitioner would retain his current salary status for a period not to exceed five years, though it would exceed the maximum for his new pay grade. On June 7, 1995, the Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC") entered a final order approving the settlement agreement in disposition of Petitioner's complaint. Petitioner did not appeal the final order. Rule 60K-2.004(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that a demoted state employee's base rate of pay may exceed the maximum of the salary range to which the employee has been demoted for a maximum of five years. Petitioner's base rate of pay was allowed to exceed the maximum of his new pay grade for the full five years. During this period, Petitioner benefited from pay grade increases, received a reclassification of his position, and was not promoted. The five-year period ended in June 2000. Respondent's main office in Tallahassee twice per year issues a computer-generated list of employees receiving pay over the maximum of their pay grades. Human resources employees in Respondent's branch offices then examine the list to determine whether these employees' base rate of pay should continue to exceed the maximum. Respondent issued an "Employees Over Maximum" list in September 2000. Rex Duley of the District 8 human resources office examined the approximately 15 listed names of persons working in District 8. Mr. Duley determined that the applicable five-year period for Petitioner's receipt of pay above his grade had expired in June 2000. Mr. Duley prepared a letter, dated September 11, 2000, notifying Petitioner of the overpayments. The letter stated that Petitioner had received $1,316.11 in gross overpayments since June 2000. Respondent subsequently completed the full computation through the Bureau of State Payroll's automated system, and determined that the net overpayment to Petitioner was $826.82. At the hearing, Petitioner did not dispute the amount of the net overpayment. Petitioner testified that he would be able to repay the money at a rate of $25 to $50 per pay period. Instead, Petitioner sought to introduce evidence calling into question the validity of the 1995 settlement agreement. This evidence was deemed irrelevant and was not admitted. The evidence established that Petitioner voluntarily entered the settlement agreement, did not appeal from the PERC final order adopting the settlement agreement, and accepted the benefits of the settlement agreement for a period of five years. The time for contesting that agreement has long passed. Petitioner also questioned Respondent's diligence in discovering the overpayments. Petitioner was well aware of the five-year limitation on the salary arrangement established by the settlement agreement, and was in at least as good a position as Respondent to know that he was being overpaid between June and September 2000. Petitioner accepted the overpayments without questioning them or calling Respondent's attention to them. Petitioner's contention that he is being penalized for Respondent's lax bookkeeping is thus without merit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent repay $50 per pay period to the Department of Children and Family Services beginning with the pay period immediately following entry of a final order in this case and continuing each pay period thereafter until the overpayment is repaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Eugenie Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906-0085 Robert J. Richmond 5411 Loyloa Lane Southwest Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to Petitioner's race in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner on October 13, 1997, as a maintenance operator. Six months later he was promoted to the position of Maintenance Technician I. During his employment, Petitioner was one of six technicians. He was the only black technician. Petitioner was initially paid at a rate of $6.00 per hour. He received no pay increase with his first promotion. His yearly evaluation was delayed, but finally received by him on December 7, 1998. His evaluation for 1999 was received by December 23, 1999. His wages had climbed by this time to $8.40 per hour. His evaluations were satisfactory or above. Although Petitioner had been told he would be provided training on the job, he was relegated to the night shift, working by himself. As a consequence, he educated himself on maintenance of Respondent’s facility. In 1999, all technicians were to receive formal training. Another technician, who was white and lower in seniority than Petitioner, was selected for training before Petitioner. When Petitioner brought this to the attention of a supervisor, Petitioner was sent to other training provided by Siemen’s Corporation in Atlanta, Georgia. Petitioner stated he was treated unfairly because he was required to absorb the cost of lodging for the first night in Atlanta, prior to commencement of training. The five other technicians employed by Respondent were being paid a minimum of $11.00 per hour when Petitioner, on or about May 5, 2000, requested an increase from his current $8.40 per hour rate to $10.00 per hour. His supervisor responded that he could not grant the increase. An argument ensued and Petitioner left the office and returned to work. Later that day, Respondent’s human resource officer contacted Petitioner. He informed Petitioner that Petitioner’s employment was terminated due to “insubordination.” On Respondent’s termination form, the reason listed for Petitioner’s termination was insubordination and using “slanders to his senior manager.” The form also listed Petitioner’s absence from work on Saturday, April 29, 2000, as a reason for employment termination. In rebuttal, Petitioner produced a copy of an annual leave slip at final hearing requesting approval of his absence on the date in question. Petitioner had accumulated ample leave to cover the requested time. Respondent’s approving authority failed to approve Petitioner’s absence, but no notification was given to Petitioner. Respondent’s claim of unauthorized absence is effectively rebutted. According to a copy of a letter dated June 19, 2003, and received by DOAH on June 24, 2003, bearing the purported signature of David Anderson, registered agent for Respondent on June 20, 2002, Respondent was reputed to have ceased operation. According to statements contained in the letter, the Bank of America sold Respondent on March 10, 2002, in the “form of rights in collateral.” The letter additionally stated “unliquidated assets” in the bankruptcy were “sold in a Section 363 auction” on May 23, 2002. No direct evidence was presented on behalf of Respondent corroborating the contents of the letter and consequently the letter is not credited. Petitioner produced documentation at the final hearing, specifically a corporation reinstatement form issued by the Florida Department of State, documenting Respondent’s continued existence as of April 22, 2002.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered directing that Respondent to cease the discriminatory employment practice evidenced in this case and awarding Petitioner back pay at the rate of $10.00 per hour for each normal 40-hour work week between May 5, 2000, and the present. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael F. Coppins, Esquire Coppins & Monroe Post Office Box 14447 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4447 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dwight E. Mazion 1713 Calgary Drive Desoto, Texas 75115 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black female. At all times material, Petitioner was employed by Respondent corporation in one of its general retail merchandise stores in Ocala, Florida. Petitioner was hired by Respondent's white male store manager, Mr. John Sasse, on October 20, 1992, as a stock clerk in the shoe department. Petitioner was terminated on January 10, 1993, within the ninety day probationary period published in Respondent's employee handbook. In making the foregoing finding of fact, it is recognized that Petitioner attempted to show that the probationary period for new employees was only sixty days. However, she only showed that the sixty day period was applicable in a different time frame than is material here. On October 31, 1992, while working in a stock room, Petitioner's back and neck were injured when a box fell on her. Supervisors called an ambulance, and Petitioner was transported to the emergency room of a local hospital. She was treated but not hospitalized. Respondent duly filed the "Notice of Injury" as mandated by Chapter 440 F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Act," and began to pay Petitioner's medical expenses. Prior to her injury, Mr. Sasse considered Petitioner to be only a marginal employee. Petitioner was released by hospital doctors for return to work as of November 6, 1992. At that time, she had no work restrictions imposed by a doctor, so Mr. Sasse reassigned Petitioner to her usual duties. Petitioner worked at the tasks she felt she could do until November 11, 1992, when she returned to the hospital. She was examined and medicated. Later that same day, as is standard procedure with workers' compensation injuries wherein the employer pays for an injured worker's medical care and as a result has the legal right to specify which doctors attend the employee, Mr. Sasse ordered Petitioner to go to "Care One," a "walk-in" medical facility specializing in occupational medicine. Petitioner went to Care One, where she was again examined and medicated. Petitioner was released for work the same day with written work restrictions from the Care One doctor. Petitioner's resentment against Respondent that she had been injured in the first place apparently was a motivating force in her actions after she returned to work the second time. Petitioner's candor and demeanor while testifying, as well as her persistence in returning her testimony to the circumstances surrounding the box falling upon her in the storeroom, made it very clear that she considered it discriminatory, or at least unfair, that Respondent had "forced" her or anyone to work under the cluttered stock room conditions that had resulted in her initial accident or injury. In Petitioner's mind, at least, the fact that an accident or injury had occurred in the first place was sufficient to establish "dangerous working conditions" and "an unlawful employment practice." After November 11, 1992, she persisted with these complaints to the employer. However, no competent evidence established a nexus between Petitioner's race and her pre-injury job assignments, and no evidence demonstrated that after her accident, the Respondent-employer handled her workers' compensation medical care any differently because she was black. On November 11, 1992, Care One's written restrictions provided: Restricted Employee should avoid movements of the upper body and neck that would place undue stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and working above the shoulders. Employee should avoid lifting > 20 pounds, avoid frequent bending and twisting of the back, and avoid strenuous pushing and pulling. Mr. Sasse and his subordinate supervisors assigned Petitioner tasks consistent with Mr. Sasse's interpretation of Petitioner's written restrictions, as modified over time by subsequent information. On November 11, 1992, a position was created for Petitioner in the soft goods department. At this time, Petitioner became the only black clerk in the soft goods department. Initially, Mr. Sasse told her she was not to reach above her shoulders or bend to pick up anything below her knees. Petitioner complained that these tasks constituted too much physical exertion for her due to her physical condition. Petitioner continued to complain about the accident and her pain. The employer and insurance carrier continued to refer her back to Care One. There was a short delay with regard to some medical services requested by Petitioner or by referring and consulting doctors under the workers' compensation medical care delivery system, but the employer/insurance carrier in due course authorized physical therapy, a consultation with an orthopedic specialist, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for further diagnosis. Derrick Proctor, a black male employee and Petitioner's friend, presented as a credible witness, even though he claimed to have been fired by Mr. Sasse under what Mr. Proctor termed "suspicious circumstances" and at the time of formal hearing had some type of action pending against this employer. Mr. Proctor described Petitioner as "embittered" against the employer because of the employer's refusal or delay in dealing with Petitioner's medical concerns and stress. However, it appears that Petitioner's problems, if any, were common disputes and communication delays inherent in the workers' compensation medical care delivery system. For instance, when asked, the doctors reported directly to the employer, insurance carrier, and store manager concerning the Petitioner- employee's medical condition, consultant treatment, and recovery progress. On December 10, 1992, Mr. Sasse told Petitioner that he had received an oral report on her December 9, 1992 MRI results and that they were negative. This conversation occurred before any of the doctors had reported the MRI results to the Petitioner, and Petitioner inferred therefrom that information was being withheld from her. Later, on December 22, 1992, Petitioner learned, during a reprimand and counselling session for insubordination and failure to work up to her capacities, that the employer had been informed much earlier that she could return to work with no restrictions. (See Findings of Fact 32-36) Although Mr. Sassy and others had told her this before December 22, 1992, the events of December 22, 1992 triggered a belief in Petitioner that the employer was "out to get" her. Notwithstanding the extreme light duty assigned her, Petitioner complained about the work assigned and was uncooperative about helping supervisors find a job description she felt she could perform. Although Petitioner may not have known about it until November 25, 1992, on November 20, 1992 Care One deleted the prior restrictions on lifting items over 20 pounds, bending, and strenuous pushing and pulling, and narrowed her restrictions to the following: Restricted. Employee should avoid movements of the upper body and neck that would place undue stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and work above the shoulders. In December 1992, Mr. Proctor was required to close his department, hardware, every night, and Petitioner closed the soft goods department some nights. Petitioner considered being required to close some nights to be discrimination against her since she was the only black employee in the soft goods department at that time and the white female employee in soft goods had been switched to the day shift in Petitioner's place. The greater weight of the evidence shows that the whole store's evening hours increased from midnight to 1:00 a.m. due to the Christmas season, and on December 6, 1992, Petitioner was assigned to work nights so that she could go to daytime medical and physical therapy appointments. The employer's accommodation of Petitioner's situation in this respect was comparable to the accommodation given a white female employee in soft goods. Beginning November 23, 1992, that white female employee, Ms. Audrey, had been assigned to a daylight shift so that her husband, who had bad night vision, could drive her to and from work. Race was not a factor in the accommodation rendered Ms. Audrey or Petitioner. Who closed the store during December 1992 depended upon who worked the evening shift, not race. It is not entirely clear on the record whether, on December 3, 1992, Petitioner withdrew from physical therapy because she could not do the weight training assigned her or was rejected by the physical therapist as a client because she would not cooperate in weight training. Petitioner testified that she returned to physical therapy thereafter for ultrasound treatment. It is clear that Petitioner believed she was rejected by the therapist because she could not lift the heavy weights assigned her by the therapist as part of Petitioner's planned recovery. It is also clear that the decision to end the weight phase of Petitioner's treatment did not have employer input. By December 5, 1992, Petitioner's personally professed physical limitations and complaints about Mr. Sasse's treatment of her had resulted in Mr. Sasse accommodating her by creating a "make-work" job description. Under it, she was asked to push a cart that other employees had hung clothes on; she was not required to load the car with clothes. She was required only to pick up single articles of clothing that were left in the women's dressing rooms and return them to the racks. She was told only to bend if an occasional article of clothing was found on the floor. She was also told to open dressing room doors for customers and, if requested, fetch more clothes for them to try on while they remained in the dressing room. Petitioner was permitted to wear her softly padded neckbrace at all times, even though she presented no written doctor's instructions to do so. Petitioner described it as an "agony" imposed on her by the employer when, on December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse ordered her not to sit continuously on the sales floor in a chair she had removed from the women's dressing room. Petitioner had previously complained because she had been required to sit for long hours on a very hard chair Mr. Sasse had provided for her, and this time she had gotten a different chair herself. On December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse told her she must leave the dressing room chair in the dressing room for the customers, that she was not permitted to sit all the time on the sales floor where customers could see her, and she must not just sit without doing any work, until all her work was done. He told her to do a variety of the tasks of which she was capable, including but not limited to sitting while pricing goods. Petitioner considered these orders to be contrary to her doctor's limitations and to constitute "physical abuse." Petitioner repeatedly requested time off with pay so that she could recover completely through bed rest. Mr. Sasse would not allow her time off for medical reasons without a doctor's written approval. Petitioner considered this condition imposed by management to be "abusive." Petitioner described Mr. Sasse as being rude to her on December 6, 1992, when he refused to discuss her accusations of "physical abuse" and her request for time off in the presence of other employees and customers in the public buffet area of the store, and walked off, leaving her there. Petitioner referred to this incident as at least part of her "opposition to unlawful employment practices" which she believed resulted in her termination. Petitioner presented no evidence that a doctor had ever recommended that she stay at home and do nothing so that she could heal. From all the evidence, it is inferred that as a probationary employee, Petitioner had no accrued sick leave to expend for this purpose. Ms. Gardner was a long-time white female employee who had her doctor's approval for knee surgery and who required a month of bed rest at home afterwards. The employer allowed Ms. Gardner to use earned compensatory time as sick leave for that purpose during the month of December 1992. By mid-December, 1992, Mr. Sasse was frustrated because Petitioner refused to do every job he devised, even the "make work" ones, and he believed that she only pretended to be busy when he was watching her. Mr. Sasse had told Petitioner that she could do normal work again and she would not accept this from him without hearing it also from her doctor. Mr. Sasse decided to discipline Petitioner for not working up to her limitations as he understood them and for insubordination. He directed the soft goods manager trainee, Ms. Lynn Tyler, a white female, to "write up" Petitioner. Ms. Tyler and the assistant store manager, Ray Harding, a white male, met with Petitioner on December 22, 1992 to discuss the contents of the prepared memo. One of the supervisors' concerns at the time Petitioner was "written up" was that they could not get Petitioner to do anything at all without an argument, even after pointing out various light work job duties on a walk around the whole store. They were also concerned that without Petitioner doing some tasks, the employer had to pay other employees overtime to accomplish what Petitioner was not accomplishing in her regular shift hours. It was stipulated that Petitioner was never asked to work overtime. Petitioner refused to sign the December 22, 1992 memorandum of reprimand because she did not agree with it and because Tyler and Harding were, in her opinion, "grudgeful." Petitioner was informed later on December 22, 1992 by her Care One doctor that he had, indeed, released her for normal work activities effective December 16, 1992. His December 16, 1992 report which had been previously received by the employer read: Please note employee's current duty status is as follows: Regular May return to normal work activities full time. After her accident, Petitioner was observed by Derrick Proctor doing some of the same types of physical exertion the employer had required that she do before the accident, including reaching above her head to put clothes on and take them off clothes racks and picking clothes up from the floor, but he never knew her medical restrictions other than what she told him. He also observed her in agitated conversations with Ms. Tyler and Mr. Sasse while she was wearing a neck brace. On January 7, 1993, he saw Ms. Tyler "very out of sorts" when talking to the Petitioner. At first, he stated that he did not consider Petitioner to be rude or insubordinate on these occasions because the topic was working conditions, but later he admitted that he could not overhear what was actually said on all these occasions. Mr. Proctor also observed that, "Mr. Sasse rode everybody pretty hard," including white workers. It was "his way of getting things done." Mr. Proctor once observed Petitioner hiding in another department, behind racks, to avoid management. Petitioner acknowledged and described her "hiding out" at that time to Mr. Proctor as due to her "feeling mistreated" and "avoiding management." In her formal hearing testimony, Petitioner described it as "opposing unlawful work practices and abusive treatment." After learning on December 22, 1992 of her release from all medical restrictions, Petitioner continued to be uncooperative with management. Petitioner's testimony conceded that she had understood that all doctors had released her with no restrictions as of December 28, 1992 and that she had still refused to reach and bend in the stock room when ordered to do so by Mr. Sasse and Ms. Tyler on January 7, 1993. After evaluating Petitioner's continued failure or refusal to perform even the lightest of duties, Mr. Sasse decided to terminate Petitioner before her ninety days' probationary period ended. Mr. Sasse, who was terminated by Respondent-employer sometime later in 1993 and who, at the time of formal hearing, was litigating an unemployment compensation claim against Respondent, had no reason to fabricate information or testify favorably for the Respondent-employer. He was credible to the effect that the decision to terminate Petitioner in January 1993 was his unilateral decision and that he made his decision without reference to, or motivation by, Petitioner's race. Specifically, it was Mr. Sasse's foundational assessment that Petitioner could physically do the light work he assigned her after reasonable accommodation for a temporary disability but that she would not do the work assigned by him that caused him to terminate her. Petitioner testified that she was replaced by a white female. In fact, a white female was hired approximately one or two weeks prior to Petitioner's January 10, 1993 termination, with a due date to report to work on January 11, 1993, which subsequently turned out to be the day immediately following Petitioner's termination. The employer did not hire this white female with the intent of replacing Petitioner, but she was ultimately placed into the soft goods department. Mr. Proctor testified that other blacks worked in soft goods after Petitioner's termination. Within four weeks of Petitioner's termination, three new employees were hired. None of these were assigned to the soft goods department. Mr. Standley Gillings, a black male, was originally employed in another of Respondent's Ocala stores. In October 1993, Mr. Gillings was demoted with a loss of pay and transferred to the store from which Petitioner had been fired ten months earlier. His new immediate supervisor in that store was also black. Respondent continued to employ Mr. Gillings under the black supervisor until Mr. Gillings found another job and quit.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1994.
