Findings Of Fact On September 16, 1981, the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, In And For Duval County, Florida, upon a Petition For Modification of the Final Judgment of Paternity, entered a Consent Order For Support requiring the Petitioner in this cause to pay Fifteen and No/100 Dollars ($15.00) per week as and for child support and assigning said support payments to the Respondent in this cause until such time as the child involved in the paternity suit no longer received assistance from the State of Florida. At the time Respondent caused Petitioner's Federal Income Tax Refund to be intercepted, the Petitioner was in arrears in the sum of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety and 17/100 Dollars ($2,790.17) on child support payments assigned to the Respondent under the order referred to in paragraph 1 above. Petitioner's Federal Income Tax Refund in the amount of Eight Hundred Twenty Eight and No/100 Dollars ($828.00) has been intercepted and is in the possession of the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a Final Order providing for the Petitioner's income tax refund in the amount of Eight Hundred Twenty Eight and No/100 Dollars ($828.00) be applied against his debt to the State of Florida for past due child support. Respectfully submitted and entered this 22nd day of April, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory Alan Mitchell 439 Woodbine Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 R. Craig Hemphill, P.A. 331 East Union Street, Suite 1 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Frederick J. Simpson, Esquire Dept. of HRS Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues are (1) whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-48.002(95) and 67-60.010(3) are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority; and (2) whether certain statements in Request for Application 2016-113 (RFA-113) issued by Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation (Florida Housing or agency), are unlawful unadopted rules in violation of section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2016).
Findings Of Fact The Parties Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504. One of its responsibilities is to award low-income housing tax credits, which developers use to finance the construction of affordable housing. Tax credits are made available to states annually by the United States Treasury Department and are then awarded pursuant to a competitive cycle that starts with Florida Housing's issuance of an RFA. This proceeding concerns RFA-113. Petitioners ARD and Madison are developers of affordable housing units and submit applications for tax credits. Law and Wolf are principals of a developer of affordable housing units. Berkshire, Hawthorne, and Southwick are limited partnerships that have submitted applications for tax credits. All Petitioners intend to submit applications in response to RFA-113 and will be subject to rule chapters 67-48 and 67-60. Intervenors Heritage and HTG are developers of affordable housing who intend to file applications pursuant to RFA-113. Background On October 28, 2016, Florida Housing published on its website proposed solicitation RFA-113, a 121-page document inviting applications for the award of up to $14,669,052.00 in housing tax credits for the development of affordable, multifamily housing located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas Counties. After Petitioners gave notice of their intent to challenge RFA-113, Florida Housing attempted to resolve the dispute by modifying the solicitation on November 13, 2016. The modification did not resolve the dispute. On November 14, 2016, Petitioners timely filed with DOAH two Petitions, each challenging rules 67-48.002(95) and 67-60.010(3) and various statements in RFA-113. On the same date, they filed with Florida Housing two petitions challenging certain specifications in the solicitation. Although the Petitions include allegations that two existing rules are invalid, Petitioners' main concern appears to be directed at various provisions in RFA-113 that they assert limit their ability to be awarded tax credits. These contentions are addressed separately below. C. Rule 67-48.002(95) The federal Low-Income Housing Credit Program is governed by 26 U.S.C.S. § 42 (section 42). The program allocates annually federal income tax credits to states on a per capita basis to help facilitate private development of affordable low-income housing. As the housing credit agency for the State of Florida, Florida Housing has the authority to administer various federal and state affordable housing programs, including the Low-Income Housing Credit Program. See § 420.5099(1), Fla. Stat. Section 42(m)(l)(A)(i) requires each state that administers low-income housing credits to adopt a QAP, which identifies the selection criteria used for distributing the housing credits. To comply with this requirement, rule 67-48.002(95) adopts and incorporates by reference the 2016 QAP. The rule reads as follows: (95) "QAP" or "Qualified Allocation Plan" means, with respect to the HC [Housing Credit] program, the 2016 Qualified Allocation Plan which is adopted and incorporated herein by reference, effective upon the approval by the Governor of the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 42(m)(1)(B) of the IRC and sets forth the selection criteria and the preferences of the Corporation for Developments which will receive Housing Credits. The QAP is available on the Corporation's Website under the Multifamily Programs link or by contacting the Housing Credit Program at 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000, Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329, or from http://flrules.org/Gateway/reference/asp?No= Ref-07355. The 2016 QAP is a five-page document that replaces the 2015 QAP and generally describes the process for allocating 2017 housing credits. In summary, it identifies Florida Housing as the housing credit agency for the State, lists the federally- mandated preferences and selection criteria to be used when allocating housing credits, describes in brief terms the competitive solicitation process, describes the process for awarding competitive and noncompetitive housing credits, and describes the procedures for monitoring and reporting a project's noncompliance with IRC requirements. Section 42(m)(1)(C) lists ten selection criteria that must be incorporated into the QAP. To comply with this requirement, section I.B. of the 2016 QAP provides that the following selection criteria will be considered when determining the allocation of housing credits: project location; housing needs characteristics; project characteristics including housing as part of a community revitalization plan; sponsor characteristics; tenant populations with special housing needs; public housing waiting lists; tenant populations of individuals with children; projects intended for eventual tenant ownership; energy efficiency of the projects; and historic nature of project. These criteria are identical to those listed in section 42(m)(1)(C) and are intended to provide general guidance for the entire housing credit program, and not just RFA-113. Other than the ten criteria, the IRC requires no further detail regarding the selection criteria. However, more specific guidance is found in the individual RFAs, tailored to each type of solicitation. Since late 2013, when the RFA solicitation process began, around 15 to 20 RFAs have been issued annually. Petitioners assert the QAP violates the IRC by not listing the RFA criteria. However, neither the Department of Housing and Urban Development nor the Internal Revenue Service has ever told Florida Housing that the QAP does not comply with the IRC or other applicable federal regulations. The rule cites section 420.507 as Florida Housing's rulemaking authority. That statute has 49 subsections that identify the various powers necessary for Florida Housing to carry out and effectuate the provisions of the law. Pertinent to this dispute is subsection (12), a general grant of authority for Florida Housing "[t]o make rules necessary to carry out the purposes of [part V, chapter 420]," which governs the various low-income housing programs administered by the agency. The rule cites section 420.5099(1) as the law being implemented. That provision designates Florida Housing as the housing credit agency for the state, along with its "responsibility and authority to establish procedures necessary for proper allocation and distribution of low-income housing tax credits and [to] exercise all powers necessary to administer the allocation of such credits." While consistency with section 42 is required in order to satisfy federal requirements, the IRC is not the law being implemented. Petitioners allege the rule exceeds the agency's grant of rulemaking authority and enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. See § 120.52(8)(b) and (c), Fla. Stat. In short, they contend that other than the generic selection criteria required by section 42(m)(1)(C), the QAP fails to include the other selection criteria in RFA-113 that are used during the competitive process. D. Rule 67-60.010(3) Petitioners also challenge rule 67-60.010(3). The entire rule, entitled "Funding Preferences," reads as follows: In connection with any competitive solicitation, where all other competitive elements are equal, the Corporation may establish a preference for developers and general contractors who demonstrate the highest rate of Florida job creation in the development and construction of affordable housing. In any competitive solicitation, the Corporation may prescribe a priority to fund affordable housing projects in the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern and the City of Key West Area of Critical State Concern where, due to challenging environmental, land use, transportation, workforce, and economic factors, it is extremely difficult to successfully finance, develop, and construct affordable housing. The Corporation may establish other funding priorities as deemed appropriate for a competitive program or solicitation. The rule cites section 420.507(12) as the source of rulemaking authority. That statute is a general grant of authority allowing Florida Housing to adopt rules necessary to carry out the purposes of part V, chapter 420, which includes the issuance of tax credits under the Low-Income Housing Credit Program. The rule cites sections 420.507(47), (48), and (49), 420.5087, 420.5089(2), and 420.5099 as the laws being implemented. In their totality, those provisions authorize Florida Housing to adopt rules and procedures for allocating housing credits and loans for programs that it administers pursuant to chapter 420. One authorized procedure is the authority to use RFAs when awarding low-income housing tax credits. See § 420.507(48), Fla. Stat. On the faulty premise that RFA-113 derives its authority from subsection (3) of the rule, rather than statutory law, Petitioners argue that Florida Housing is allocating low- income housing tax credits in a manner that violates section 42 and chapter 420. They contend authority is delegated by the RFA to local governments to choose which developer will receive local funding, thus giving that developer more preferential treatment in the selection process. By doing so, Petitioners assert subsection (3) violates section 120.52(8)(d) by failing to establish adequate standards for agency decisions and vesting unbridled discretion in the agency. As the record shows, the authority to allocate tax credits is not derived from a rule. The source of authority is a statute. Subsection (3) simply informs readers that, besides the statutorily-mandated procedures spelled out in subsections (1) and (2), other types of funding priorities or preferences may be enacted at some future time by the legislature. As these changes occur, the reader is told that specific rules will be adopted to implement those changes. Agency Statements The allegations concerning unadopted rules, all in the RFA, are somewhat confusing. In their PFO, Petitioners request that a final order be entered determining "the policies that make up virtually all of RFA 2016-113 are invalid non-rule policies." Pet'r PFO, p. 23. In paragraph 38 of the PFO, they make reference to RFA pages 2, 13, 20, 22, 40-45, 53-54, 62-63, 67-68, 72, and 110, but elsewhere provide the actual text of only six statements and a brief description of a few others. In the parties' Joint Stipulation, Petitioners assert only that "RFA 2016-113 contains numerous provisions that are invalid exercises of non-rule policy and are without a basis in or are contrary to the law implemented." Jt. Stip., p. 2, § B.1. No statements are identified or described. As detailed in endnote 1, however, their initial Petitions identify the text of some statements and provide a brief description of others, along with the page number on which they are found.1/ Only these statements will be addressed. Petitioners contend that Florida Housing must immediately discontinue all reliance upon them, stop the solicitation process, and issue a new RFA. It is unnecessary to recite each statement in full in order to resolve this dispute. An RFA is issued for each solicitation involving low- income housing credits. Before posting an RFA, Florida Housing typically conducts workshops and posts on-line information to inform prospective applicants of all requirements and any new provisions. By reading the RFA, each prospective applicant is placed on equal footing with the others. RFA-113 consists of six sections: Introduction; Definitions; Procedures and Provisions; Information to be Provided in Application; Evaluation Process; and Award Process. The definitions and funding selection criteria being challenged are found in sections Two and Four, respectively. A lengthy Exhibit A is attached to RFA-113, which includes various forms, instructions, and the like. The evidence shows that RFAs in the low-income rental housing program are not always the same, as they vary depending on such things as the type of project, size of the county, applicable selection criteria, proximity of other developments, program being implemented, demographics being served, and economic conditions in the area. Also, changes in the substantive law or federal regulations require a modification of an RFA's terms and conditions from time to time. For example, RFA-113 contains new criteria used by Florida Housing for the very first time. In short, RFA-113 is tailored to a very narrow class of persons in the six-county area who seek tax credits to build affordable low-income rental property in that area. The selection criteria in RFA-113 are not cast in stone and some are subject to discretionary application. And applicants can achieve points in different ways. During the review process, evaluators have the discretion to either waive or enforce irregularities, depending on how they characterize the irregularity. It is fair to assume from the record that different members of the evaluation committee might assign a different score to the same section of an application. Is Rulemaking Impracticable? Petitioners contend that Florida Housing must adopt by rule the detailed selection criteria, preferences, and definitions contained in every RFA. These terms and conditions change from cycle to cycle and would require Florida Housing to engage in repetitive rulemaking each year, which more than likely would unduly delay the solicitation process. Assuming arguendo the statements are a rule, which they are not, under the circumstances presented here, it is not reasonable to adopt by rule precise or detailed principles, criteria, or standards for every solicitation. See § 120.54(1)(a)2.a., Fla. Stat. Attorney's Fees and Costs As a condition precedent to seeking an award of attorney's fees and costs against an agency for having an illegal unadopted rule, the person bringing the challenge must give the agency 30 days' notice before filing a petition under section 120.56(4), which notice must inform the agency that the disputed statement might constitute an unadopted rule. See § 120.595(4)(b), Fla. Stat. The parties have stipulated that Petitioners failed to provide this notice.
The Issue The issue for determination in this consolidated bid protest proceeding is whether the Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“FHFC”) intended award of tax credits for the preservation of existing affordable housing developments was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact FHFC and Affordable Housing Tax Credits FHFC is a public corporation that finances affordable housing in Florida by allocating and distributing low income housing tax credits. See § 420.504(1), Fla. Stat. (providing that FHFC is “an entrepreneurial public corporation organized to provide and promote the public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing or refinancing housing and related facilities in this state.”); § 420.5099(2), Fla. Stat. (providing that “[t]he corporation shall adopt allocation procedures that will ensure the maximum use of available tax credits in order to encourage development of low-income housing in the state, taking into consideration the timeliness of the application, the location of the proposed housing project, the relative need in the area for low-income housing and the availability of such housing, the economic feasibility of the project, and the ability of the applicant to proceed to completion of the project in the calendar year for which the credit is sought.”). The tax credits allocated by FHFC encourage investment in affordable housing and are awarded through competitive solicitations to developers of qualifying rental housing. Tax credits are not tax deductions. For example, a $1,000 deduction in a 15-percent tax bracket reduces taxable income by $1,000 and reduces tax liability by $150. In contrast, a $1,000 tax credit reduces tax liability by $1,000. Not surprisingly, the demand for tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. A successful applicant/developer normally sells the tax credits in order to raise capital for a housing development. That results in the developer being less reliant on debt financing. In exchange for the tax credits, a successful applicant/developer must offer affordable rents and covenant to keep those rents at affordable levels for 30 to 50 years. The Selection Process FHFC awards tax credits through competitive solicitations, and that process is commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications (“RFA”). Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.009(2) provides that unsuccessful applicants for tax credits “may only protest the results of the competitive solicitation process pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 120.57(3), F.S., and Chapter 28-110, F.A.C.” For purposes of section 120.57(3), an RFA is equivalent to a “request for proposal.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67.60.009(4), F.A.C. FHFC issued RFA 2015-111 on October 23, 2015, and responses from applicants were due on December 4, 2015. Through RFA 2015-111, FHFC seeks to award up to $5,901,631 of tax credits to qualified applicants that commit to preserve existing affordable multifamily housing developments for the demographic categories of “Families,” “the Elderly,” and “Persons with a Disability.” FHFC only considered an application eligible for funding from RFA 2015-111, if that particular application complied with certain content requirements. FHFC ranked all eligible applications pursuant to an “Application Sorting Order” set forth in RFA 2015-111. The first consideration was the applicants’ scores. Each application could potentially receive up to 23 points based on the developer’s experience and the proximity to services needed by the development’s tenants. Applicants demonstrating that their developments received funding from a U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Rural Development program known as RD 515 were entitled to a 3.0 point proximity score “boost.” That proximity score boost was important because RFA 2015-111 characterized counties as small, medium, or large. Applications associated with small counties had to achieve at least four proximity points to be considered eligible for funding. Applications associated with medium-sized counties and those associated with large counties had to achieve at least seven and 10.25 proximity points respectively in order to be considered eligible for funding. Because it is very common for several tax credit applicants in a particular RFA to receive identical scores, FHFC incorporated a series of “tie-breakers” into RFA 2015-111. The tie-breakers for RFA 2015-111, in order of applicability, were: First, by Age of Development, with developments built in 1985 or earlier receiving a preference over relatively newer developments. Second, if necessary, by a Rental Assistance (“RA”) preference. Applicants were to be assigned an RA level based on the percentage of units receiving rental assistance through either a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or USDA Rural Development program. Applicants with an RA level of 1, 2, or 3 (meaning at least 75 percent of the units received rental assistance) were to receive a preference. Third, by a Concrete Construction Funding Preference, with developments incorporating certain specified concrete or masonry structural elements receiving the preference. Fourth, by a Per Unit Construction Funding Preference, with applicants proposing at least $32,500 in Actual Construction Costs per unit receiving the preference. Fifth, by a Leveraging Classification favoring applicants requiring a lower amount in housing credits per unit than other applicants. Generally, the least expensive 80 percent of eligible applicants were to receive a preference over the most expensive 20 percent. Sixth, by an Applicant’s specific RA level, with Level 1 applicants receiving the most preference and Level 6 the least. Seventh, by a Florida Job Creation Preference, which estimated the number of jobs created per $1 million of housing credit equity investment the developments were to receive based on formulas contained in the RFA. Applicants achieving a Job Creation score of at least 4.0 were to receive the preference. Eighth, by lottery number, with the lowest (smallest) lottery number receiving the preference. Rental assistance from the USDA or HUD is provided to existing developments in order to make up for shortfalls in monthly rent paid by tenants. For example, if an apartment’s base rent is $500 per month and the tenant’s income limits him or her to paying only $250 towards rent, then the USDA or HUD rental assistance pays the other $250 so that the total rent received by the development is $500. As evident from the tie-breakers incorporated into RFA 2015-111, the amount of rental assistance, or “RA Level,” played a prominent role in distinguishing between RFA 2015-111 applicants having identical scores. RFA 2015-111 required that applicants demonstrate RA Levels by providing a letter containing the following information: (a) the development’s name; (b) the development’s address; (c) the year the development was built; (d) the total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC;/3 (e) the total number of units that would receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed development were to be funded; (f) all HUD or RD financing program(s) originally and/or currently associated with the existing development; and (g) confirmation that the development had not received financing from HUD or RD after 1995 when the rehabilitation was at least $10,000 per unit in any year. In order to determine an applicant’s RA Level Classification, RFA 2015-111 further stated that Part of the criteria for a proposed Development that qualifies as a Limited Development Area (LDA) Development to be eligible for funding is based on meeting a minimum RA Level, as outlined in Section Four A.7.c of the RFA. The total number of units that will receive rental assistance (i.e., PBRA and/or ACC), as stated in the Development Category qualification letter provided as Attachment 7, will be considered to be the proposed Development’s RA units and will be the basis of the Applicant’s RA Level Classification. The Corporation will divide the RA units by the total units stated by the Applicant at question 5.e. of Exhibit A, resulting in a Percentage of Total Units that are RA units. Using the Rental Assistance Level Classification Chart below, the Corporation will determine the RA Level associated with both the Percentage of Total Units and the RA units. The best rating of these two (2) levels will be assigned as the Application’s RA Level Classification. RFA 2015-111 then outlined a Rental Assistance Level Classification Chart to delineate between the RA Levels. That chart described six possible RA Levels, with one being developments that have the most units receiving rental assistance and six pertaining to developments with the fewest units receiving rental assistance. A development with at least 100 rental assistance units and greater than 50 percent of the total units receiving rental assistance was to receive an RA Level of 1. FHFC also utilized a “Funding Test” to assist in the selection of applications for funding. The Funding Test required that the amount of unawarded housing credits be enough to satisfy any remaining applicant’s funding request. In other words, FHFC prohibited partial funding. In addition, RFA 2015-111 applied a “County Award Tally” designed to prevent a disproportionate concentration of funded developments in any one county. As a result, all other applicants from other counties had to receive an award before a second application from a particular county could be funded. After ranking of the eligible applicants, RFA 2015-111 set forth an order of funding selection based on county size, demographic category, and the receipt of RD 515 financing. The Order was: One RD 515 Development (in any demographic category) in a medium or small county; One Non-RD 515 Development in the Family Demographic Category (in any size county); The highest ranked Non-RD 515 application or applications with the demographic of Elderly or Persons with a Disability; and If funding remains after all eligible Non- RD 515 applicants are funded, then the highest ranked RD 515 applicant in the Elderly demographic (or, if none, then the highest ranked RD 515 applicant in the Family demographic). Draft versions of every RFA are posted on-line in order for stakeholders to provide FHFC with their comments. In addition, every RFA goes through at least one workshop prior to being finalized. FHFC often makes changes to RFAs based on stakeholder comments. No challenge was filed to the terms, conditions, or requirements of RFA 2015-111. A review committee consisting of FHFC staff members reviewed and scored all 24 applications associated with RFA 2015-111. During this process, FHFC staff determined that none of the RD-515 applicants satisfied all of the threshold eligibility requirements. On June 24, 2016, FHFC’s Board of Directors announced its intention to award funding to five applicants, subject to those applicants successfully completing the credit underwriting process. Pineda Village in Brevard County was the only successful applicant in the Non-RD 515 Family Demographic. The four remaining successful applicants were in the Non-RD 515 Elderly or Persons with Disability Demographic: Three Round Tower in Miami-Dade County; Cathedral Towers in Duval County; Isles of Pahokee in Palm Beach County; and Lummus Park in Miami- Dade County. The randomly-assigned lottery number tie-breaker played a role for the successful Non-RD 515 applicants with Three Round Tower having lottery number one, Cathedral Towers having lottery number nine, and Isles of Pahokee having lottery number 18. While Lummus Park had a lottery number of 12, the County Award Tally prevented it from being selected earlier because Three Round Tower had already been selected for funding in Miami-Dade County. However, after the first four applicants were funded, only $526,880 of credits remained, and Lummus Park was the only eligible applicant with a request small enough to be fully funded. All Petitioners timely filed Notices of Protest and petitions for administrative proceedings. The Challenge by Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns Woodcliff is seeking an award of tax credits in order to acquire and preserve a 34-unit development for elderly residents in Lake County.4/ Colonial is seeking an award of tax credits in order to acquire and preserve a 30-unit development for low-income families in Lake County.5/ St. Johns is seeking an award of tax credits to acquire and preserve a 48-unit development for elderly residents in Putnam County.6/ FHFC deemed Woodcliff, Colonial and St. Johns to be ineligible because of a failure to demonstrate the existence or availability of a particular source of financing relied upon in their applications. Specifically, FHFC determined that the availability of USDA RD 515 financial assistance was not properly documented. For applicants claiming the existence of RD 515 financing, RFA 2015-111 stated: If the proposed Development will be assisted with funding under the United States Department of Agriculture RD 515 Program and/or RD 538 Program, the following information must be provided: Indicate the applicable RD Program(s) at question 11.b.(2) of Exhibit A. For a proposed Development that is assisted with funding from RD 515 and to qualify for the RD 515 Proximity Point Boost (outlined in Section Four A.6.b.(1)(b) of the RFA), the Applicant must: Include the funding amount at the USDA RD Financing line item on the Development Funding Pro Forma (Construction/Rehab Analysis and/or Permanent Analysis); and Provide a letter from RD, dated within six (6) months of the Application Deadline, as Attachment 17 to Exhibit A, which includes the following information for the proposed Preservation Development: Name of existing development; Name of proposed Development; Current RD 515 Loan balance; Acknowledgment that the property is applying for Housing Credits; and Acknowledgment that the property will remain in the USDA RD 515 loan portfolio. (emphasis added). FHFC was counting on the letter mentioned directly above to function as proof that: (a) there was RD 515 financing in place when the letter was issued; and that (b) the RD 515 financing would still be in place as of the application deadline for RFA 2015-111. FHFC deemed Woodcliff, Colonial and St. Johns ineligible because their RD letters were not dated within six months of the December 4, 2015, deadline for RFA 2015-111 applications. The Woodcliff letter was dated May 15, 2015, the Colonial letter was dated May 15, 2015, and the St. Johns letter was dated May 5, 2015. FHCA had previously issued RFA 2015-104, which also proposed to award Housing Credit Financing for the Preservation of Existing Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments. The deadline for RFA 2015-104 was June 23, 2015, and Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns applied using the same USDA letter that they used in their RFA 2015-111 applications. Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns argued during the final hearing that FHFC should have accepted their letters because: (a) they gained no competitive advantage by using letters that were more than six months old; (b) waiving the six- month “shelf life” requirement would enable FHFC to satisfy one of its stated goals for RFA 2015-111, i.e., funding of an RD 515 development; and (c) other forms of financing (such as equity investment) have no “freshness” or “shelf life” requirement. However, it is undisputed that no party (including Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns) challenged any of the terms, conditions, or requirements of RFA 2015-111. In addition, Kenneth Reecy (FHFC’s Director of Multifamily Programs) testified that there must be a point at which FHFC must ensure the viability of the information submitted by applicants. If the information is “too old,” then it may no longer be relevant to the current application process. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for FHFC to utilize a six-month shelf life for USDA letters.7/ Furthermore, Mr. Reecy testified that excusing Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns’ noncompliance could lead to FHFC excusing all deviations from all other date requirements in future RFAs. In other words, applicants could essentially rewrite those portions of the RFA, and that would be an unreasonable result. Excusing the noncompliance of Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns could lead to a “slippery slope” in which any shelf- life requirement has no meaning. The letters utilized by Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns were slightly more than six months old. But, exactly when would a letter become too old to satisfy the “shelf life” requirement? If three weeks can be excused today, will four weeks be excused next year? St. Elizabeth’s and Marian Towers’ Challenge St. Elizabeth is seeking low-income housing tax credit financing in order to acquire and preserve a 151-unit development for elderly residents in Broward County, Florida. Marian Towers is an applicant for RFA 2015-111 funding seeking low-income housing tax credits to acquire and preserve a 220-unit development for elderly residents in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The same developer is associated with the St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers projects. In its scoring and ranking process, FHFC assigned St. Elizabeth an RA Level of two. RFA 2015-111 requires that Applicants demonstrate RA Levels by providing a letter from HUD or the USDA with specific information. That information is then used to establish an RA Level for the proposed development. As noted above, the RFA requires the letter to contain several pieces of information, including: (a) the total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC; and (b) the total number of units that will receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed development is funded. RFA 2015-111 provided that a development with at least 100 rental units would receive an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth included with its application a letter from HUD’s Miami field office stating in pertinent part that: Total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC: 99 units. Total number of units that will receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed Development is funded: 100 units*. The asterisk in the preceding paragraph directed readers of St. Elizabeth’s HUD letter to a paragraph stating that: HUD is currently processing a request from the owner to increase the number of units subsidized under a HAP Contract to 100 by transferring budget authority for the one additional unit from another Catholic Housing Services Section 8 project under Section 8(bb) in accordance with Notice H-2015-03. Because of the foregoing statement from HUD, FHFC concluded that St. Elizabeth did not have 100 units receiving rental assistance as of the application deadline. Accordingly, FHFC used 99 units as the total number of units that would receive rental assistance when calculating St. Elizabeth’s RA Level, and that led to FHFC assigning an RA Level of two to St. Elizabeth’s application.8/ If St. Elizabeth had been deemed eligible and if FHFC had used 100 units as the total number of units that would receive rental assistance, then St. Elizabeth would have received an RA Level of one. Given the application sorting order and the selection process outlined in RFA 2015-111, St. Elizabeth (with a lottery number of six) would have been recommended for funding by FHFC, and that outcome would have resulted in Intervenors Isles of Pahokee and Lummus Park losing their funding. St. Elizabeth asserted during the final hearing that the 100th unit had obtained rental assistance financing since the application deadline on December 4, 2015. However, FHFC could only review, score, and calculate St. Elizabeth’s RA Level based on the information available as of the application deadline. While St. Elizabeth argues that the asterisk paragraph sets forth a “condition,” Kenneth Reecy (FHFC’s Director of Multifamily Housing) agreed during the final hearing that the asterisk paragraph was more akin to information that was not explicitly required by RFA 2015-111. FHFC did not use that additional information to declare St. Elizabeth’s application ineligible for funding. Despite being assigned an RA Level of two, St. Elizabeth’s application still could have been selected for funding because RFA 2015-111 merely established RA Level as a basis for breaking ties among competing applications. However, too many applicants for RFA 2015-111 had identical scores, and RFA 2015-111’s use of RA Level as a tiebreaker forced St. Elizabeth’s application out of the running. Under the circumstances, FHFC’s treatment of St. Elizabeth’s application was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. As noted above, tie- breakers are very important, because there is often very little to distinguish one application for tax credits from another. Given that there was a degree of uncertainty about whether St. Elizabeth’s would have 100 qualifying units, FHFC acted reasonably by assigning St. Elizabeth’s application an RA Level of two for this tie-breaker rather than an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers argue that other applications contained language that indicated a degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless, those other applications received an RA Level of one. For example, FHFC assigned an RA Level of one to Three Round and Haley Sofge even though their HUD letters stated that both developments would be “subject to a Subsidy Layering Review to be conducted by HUD.” Marian Towers argued that if FHFC does not accept HUD or RD letters containing conditional language about the number of units that will be subsidized, then FHFC should have assigned an RA Level of six to Three Round and Haley Sofge. If Three Round and Haley Sofge had been assigned an RA Level of six, then Marian Towers (with a lottery number of five) would have been recommended for funding. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers cited another instance in which an application received an RA Level of one, even though its application contained a letter from the RD program stating that “USDA Rural Development will consent to the transfer if all regulatory requirements are met.” (emphasis added). However, St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers failed to demonstrate that the language cited above applied only to those particular applications rather than to all applications for tax credits. For example, if all applications are subject to a subsidy layering review and compliance with all regulatory requirements, then inclusion of such language in a HUD letter (in and of itself) should not prevent an applicant from being assigned an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers also cited a HUD Letter used in another recent RFA by an applicant that received an RA Level of one. The HUD letter in question contained an asterisk followed by the following statement: “It is HUD’s understanding that two separate applications are being submitted – one for each tower comprising St. Andrew Towers. If funded, HUD will consider a request from the owner to bifurcate the St. Andrew Towers HAP contract in order to facilitate the separate financing of each tower.” However, St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers failed to demonstrate why the language quoted directly above should have resulted in the applicant in question being awarded an RA Level less than one. There is no indication that the total number of units receiving rental assistance would change.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order awarding funding to Three Round Tower A, LLC; Cathedral Towers, Ltd; Isles of Pahokee Phase II, LLC; SP Manor, LLC; and Pineda Village. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G.W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2016.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent should grant Petitioner's application for a sales tax exemption certificate as a charitable institution within the meaning of Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for issuing sales tax exemption certificates in accordance with Section 212.08(7). Petitioner is a non-profit, Florida corporation and a charitable organization, within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, for purposes of the federal income tax. On December 29, 1995, Petitioner applied for an exemption from state sales and use tax ("sales tax") as a charitable institution. On February 8, 1996, Respondent denied Petitioner's application. The parties stipulated that Petitioner is a non-profit corporation. The parties further stipulated that the only exemption under which Petitioner may qualify for a sales tax exemption is the exemption for a charitable institution. In order to qualify as a charitable institution, Petitioner must provide one or more of seven services listed in Section 212.08(7). The parties stipulated that the only service Petitioner arguably provides as a charitable institution is that of raising funds for medical research within the meaning of Section 212.08(7)(o)2b(V). It is uncontroverted that Petitioner does not provide medical research directly. Petitioner raises funds for its national organization. The national organization then disburses funds raised by local affiliates. Petitioner failed to submit any competent and substantial evidence showing the disposition of funds by its national organization. Petitioner failed to show that its national organization either provides direct medical research or raises funds for one or more organizations that provide medical research.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and therein DENY Petitioner's request for a sales tax exemption. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1996.
The Issue Whether Rule 67-48.005, Florida Administrative Code, and Section VII on Page 16 of Form 1 of the 1999 Housing Credit Application Package adopted by Rule 67-48.002(10) Florida Administrative Code, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. If so, whether Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact Part V of Chapter 420, Florida Statutes, consisting of Sections 420.501 - 420.517, Florida Statutes, is the Florida Housing Finance Corporation Act. Respondent, Florida Housing Corporation (FHFC), is a public corporation created by the provisions of Section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 420.5099, Florida Statutes, FHFC is the designated housing agency for the State of Florida. FHFC administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program and other housing programs in Florida pursuant to other provisions of the Florida Housing Finance Corporation Act. Pursuant to Section 420.504(2), Florida Statutes, FHFC is an agency of the State of Florida for the purposes of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. FHFC is governed by an independent member Board of Directors appointed by the Governor. The Board members come from specifically designated industries and backgrounds as set forth in Section 420.504(3), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 420.507, Florida Statutes, FHFC has all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of the Florida Housing Finance Corporation Act, including the power to enact rules. 2/ Petitioner submitted an application to the FHFC for 1999 Low Income Housing Tax Credits. The parties stipulated that Petitioner has standing to challenge the validity of the rules at issue in this proceeding. The parties further stipulated that Shepland does not have standing to challenge the validity of the rules at issue in this proceeding. Intervenors, Miami River Park, Ltd., and Wynwood Tower Apartments, Ltd., submitted applications to FHFC for 1999 Low Income Housing Tax Credits. The parties stipulated that these two entities have standing to intervene in this proceeding. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program is a federal program whose purpose is to encourage the development of housing for low-income families in the various states. 3/ Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26 of the United States Code) creates federal income tax credits that are allocated to each state and are awarded through state-administered programs to developers of low-income housing projects. The tax credits equate to a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the holder's tax liability which can be taken each year that the project satisfies the Internal Revenue Code requirements, for up to ten years. The developer typically sells or syndicates the tax credit to generate funding for the proposed project. Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code requires that each state adopt a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) establishing procedures to be followed in awarding low-income credits allocated to the states. Section 420.5099, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: The Florida Housing Finance Corporation is designated the housing credit agency for the state within the meaning of s. 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and shall have the responsibility and authority to establish procedures necessary for proper allocation and distribution of low-income housing tax credits and shall exercise all powers necessary to administer the allocation of such credits. The corporation shall adopt allocation procedures that will ensure the maximum use of available tax credits in order to encourage development of low-income housing in the state, taking into consideration the timeliness of the application, the location of the proposed housing project, the relative need in the area for low-income housing and the availability of such housing, the economic feasibility of the project, and the ability of the applicant to proceed to completion of the project in the calendar year for which the credit is sought. The corporation may request such information from applicants as will enable it to make the allocations according to the guidelines set forth in subsection (2), including, but not limited to, the information required to be provided the corporation by chapter 9I-21, Florida Administrative Code. The executive director of the corporation shall administer the allocation procedures and determine allocations on behalf of the corporation. Any applicant disputing the amount of an allocation or the denial of a request for an allocation may request an appeal to the board of directors of the corporation. For purposes of implementing this program in Florida and in assessing the property for ad valorem taxation under s. 193.011, neither the tax credits, nor financing generated by tax credits, shall be considered as income to the property, and the rental income from rent restricted units in a low-income tax credit development shall be recognized by the property appraiser. The corporation is authorized to expend fees received in conjunction with the allocation of low-income housing tax credits only for the purpose of administration of the program, including private legal services which relate to interpretation of s. 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 420.5099, Florida Statutes, FHFC has established rules for processing applications for housing tax credits. These rules, found in Chapter 67-48, Florida Administrative Code, constitute Florida's QAP. A prime consideration in developing the application process is that the process be completed in a timely manner, since the failure of a state to use all of its allocated credits in a timely manner will result in a loss of housing tax credits. Such a loss is contrary to the statutory mandate that FHFC ensure the maximum use of available tax credits. Petitioner has challenged FHFC's Rule 67-48.005, Florida Administrative Code, which is entitled Applicant Administrative Appeal Procedures, and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Following the Review Committee's determination of preliminary scores and ranking, notice of intended funding or denial of funding will be provided to each Applicant with a statement that: Applicants who wish to contest the decision relative to their own Application must petition for review of the decision in writing within 10 calendar days of the date of the notice. The request must specify in detail the forms and the scores sought to be appealed. Unless the appeal involves disputed issues of material fact, the appeal will be conducted on an informal basis. The Review Committee will review the appeal and will provide to the Applicant a written position paper which recommends either no change in score or an increase or decrease in a score which it deems to be in error. If the Applicant disagrees with the Review Committee's recommendation, the Applicant will be given an opportunity to participate in the informal administrative appeal hearings scheduled by the Review Committee. If the appeal raises issues of material fact, a formal administrative hearing will be conducted pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Failure to timely file a petition shall constitute a waiver of the right of the Applicant to such an appeal. Applicants who wish to notify the Corporation of possible scoring errors relative to another Applicant's Application must file with the Corporation, within 10 calendar days of the date of the notice, a written request for a review of the other Applicant's score. Each request must specify in detail the assigned Application number, the forms and the scores in question. Each request is limited to the review of only one Application's score. Requests which seek the review of more than one Application's score will be considered improperly filed and ineligible for review. There is no limit to the number of requests which may be submitted. The Review Committee will review each written request timely received and will prepare a written position paper, which will be provided to each Applicant who timely filed a notification and to the Applicant whose score has been questioned, which recommends either no change in score or an increase or decrease in a score which it deems to be in error. Failure to timely and properly file a request shall constitute a waiver of the right of the Applicant to such a review. Notice will be provided to all Applicants whose score is reduced or whose Application is deemed ineligible pursuant to 67-48.005(1)(b) that they may contest the decision relative to their own Application by petitioning for review of the decision in writing within 10 calendar days of the date of the notice. The request must specify in detail the forms and the scores sought to be appealed. Unless the appeal involves disputed issues of material fact, the appeal will be conducted on an informal basis. The Review Committee will review the appeal and will provide to the Applicant a written position paper which recommends either no change in score or an increase or decrease in a score which it deems to be in error. If the Applicant disagrees with the Review Committee's recommendation, the Applicant will be given an opportunity to participate in the informal administrative appeal hearings scheduled by the Review Committee. No Applicant or other person or entity will be allowed to intervene in the appeal of another Applicant. If the appeal raises issues of material fact, a formal administrative hearing will be conducted pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Failure to timely file a petition shall constitute a waiver of the right of the Applicant to such an appeal. Petitioner has also challenged the following portion of the application form which has been adopted by reference by FHFC's Rule 67-48.002(10), Florida Administrative Code: . . . In consideration for the Corporation processing and scoring this Application, the Applicant and all Financial Beneficiaries hereby understand and agree that the Corporation will hear appeals only on the Applicant's own score. . . . In 1996, FHFC combined the application processes for the subject low-income tax credit program, the State Apartment Incentive Loan (SAIL) Program (Section 420.587, Florida Statutes) and the Home Investment Partnership (HOME) Program (Section 420.5089, Florida Statutes) to make the application process easier and more efficient. Each year FHFC initiates rulemaking to refine the application process from the previous year and to implement any changes in the application process. The administrative rules, with any amendments, are adopted annually. All prospective applicants under any of the three combined programs are invited to attend rulemaking workshops. After the allocation of tax credits for Florida is known, a Notice of Funding Availability setting forth that allocation, is published in the Florida Law Weekly. For the 1999 allocation period, the notice was published on October 23, 1998. Due to the limited number of housing credits available in each annual application cycle and the number of applications for those credits, there are not enough credits available for distribution in Florida for all applicants to receive housing credits in the year in which they apply. Consequently, applicants are competing for a fixed pool of resources. For the 1999 period, the application cycle was opened and the application form was available to interested persons on October 30, 1998. From November 9 through 11, 1998, application workshops were held in Tallahassee, Miami, and Orlando, to address any questions regarding the application process. Applicants are given what is referred to as the Application Package, which contains all pertinent forms and sets forth the instructions and criteria by which the applications will be evaluated by FHFC staff. Applicants were required to complete the applications and submit them to FHFC by January 7, 1999. Ninety applications for the three combined programs were filed. Each application was evaluated by FHFC staff pursuant to the instructions and criteria contained in the Application Package. Partly because FHFC staff is required to verify information reflected in each application, the evaluation process takes six to eight weeks to complete. The evaluation process results in a score for each application. The scores are reviewed and approved by a Review Committee, consisting of FHFC staff. On March 12, 1999, after scores were approved by the Review Committee, a pre-review score was mailed to each applicant. After the applicants were notified of their pre-review score, they had the week beginning March 15, 1999, to review the scoring of all applications. FHFC rules provide an opportunity for an applicant to question its pre-review score and to challenge the pre-review scores received by other applicants. The challenge to an applicant's own score is referred to as a Direct Appeal. The challenge by an applicant to another applicant's score is referred to as a Competitive Appeal. All Direct and Competitive Appeals were due on or before March 22, 1999. Upon receipt of the Direct Appeals and Competitive Appeals, FHFC staff first review the Competitive Appeals and draft a Competitive Appeal Position Paper for each unique issue raised. The Competitive Appeal Position Papers are approved by the Review Committee before being released, which, for 1999, was on April 5, 1999. The same process is followed for the Direct Appeals. The Direct Appeal Position Papers were approved by the Review Committee and released on April 7, 1999. An applicant whose application was adversely affected by a Competitive Appeal Position Paper (as the result of a Competitive Appeal filed by a competing applicant) has the opportunity to file what is referred to as a Direct Appeal of a Competitive Appeal (DACA). Thereafter, FHFC staff evaluates all issues raised by the Direct Appeals and by the DACAs, and prepares a position paper for each issue. On April 27, 1999, the Review Committee approved the Direct Appeal and DACA position papers. On May 4, 1999, these position papers were mailed to the interested parties. An applicant who was not satisfied with the Direct Appeal or DACA position paper for its application was given a limited period to request a proceeding pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. If there were no disputed issues of material fact, the matter proceeded as an informal hearing. If there were disputed issues of material fact, the matter proceeded as a formal hearing. On June 11 and July 30, 1999, the Board of Directors of FHFC considered the Recommended Order that resulted from each administrative hearing and entered a Final Order, which determined the final scores for each application. Thereafter, the final ranking of the competing applications were completed and approved. Preliminary approval of a tax credit allocation to an applicant is based on the final ranking. An applicant selected for a tax credit allocation is thereafter "invited" by FHFC to a "credit underwriting" whereby the credit-worthiness of the applicant and the proposed project is further scrutinized by a credit underwriter and a draft credit underwriting report is prepared. The credit underwriting process takes fifty to sixty days to complete. For the 1999 cycle, the draft credit underwriting reports were due September 28, 1999. Once the credit underwriting reports are finished, the successful applicant is given a preliminary tax credit allocation. For the 1999 cycle, the applicant then must complete its project or certify that it has expended at least ten percent of its reasonably expected tax credit basis. If the project cannot be completed by the end of the calendar year, the applicant must enter into a Carryover Agreement. The applicant must have expended ten percent of its reasonably expected tax credit basis before it can enter into a Carryover Agreement. The applicant typically has to be prepared to spend large sums of money in a relatively short period of time to meet these requirements. An applicant does not have the opportunity for an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, on the scoring of a competing application after the Competitive Appeal Position Paper has been issued by FHFC staff. 4/ Pursuant to the challenged rules, an applicant who was not satisfied with the Direct Appeal or DACA position paper for another applicant's application is not permitted a Chapter 120 proceeding and is not permitted to intervene if the other applicant has requested a Chapter 120 proceeding. Such appeals, referred to as Cross Appeals, were once permitted by the rules of FHFC. FHFC determined that Cross Appeals disrupted the application process and placed too great a burden on the FHFC staff. Cross Appeals resulted in a process that was difficult to bring to closure and resulted in litigation expenses that were assessed against the total project cost for the development. Using rule development workshops that were appropriately advertised, FHFC adopted rules permitting Competitive Appeals, but prohibiting Cross Appeals. FHFC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in adopting these rules.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Gainesville Amateur Radio Society, Inc. (GARS or petitioner), a Florida non-profit corporation, was incorporated on December 31, 1975. Its stated purpose is to promote an interest in amateur radio operation. Among other things, GARS provides preparation for Federal Communication Commission licensing examinations, supports community activities with free communication services, and encourages public awareness of ham radio activities through the publication of a monthly newsletter called the GARS-MOUTH. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is charged with the responsibility of administering and implementing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. It has the specific task of collecting sales taxes and enforcing the state tax code and rules. By law, certain transactions are exempt from the state sales and use tax. Among these are sales or lease transactions involving "scientific organizations." In order for an organization to be entitled to an exemption, it must make application with DOR for a consumer's certificate of exemption and demonstrate that it is a qualified scientific organization within the meaning of the law. Once the application is approved, the certificate entitles the holder to make tax exempt purchases that are otherwise taxable under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In the case of petitioner, a certificate would enable it to save a hundred or so dollars per year. Claiming that it was entitled to a certificate of exemption as a charitable organization, GARS filed an application with DOR on December 21, 1993. After having the application preliminarily disapproved by DOR on the ground it did not expend "in excess of 50.0 percent of the . . . organization's expenditures toward referenced charitable concerns, within (its) most recent fiscal year," a requirement imposed by DOR rule, GARS then amended its application to claim entitlement on the theory that it was a scientific organization. Although DOR never formally reviewed the amended application, it takes the position that GARS still does not qualify for a certificate under this new theory. Is GARS a Scientific Organization? Under Section 212.08(7)(o)2.c., Florida Statutes, a scientific organization is defined in relevant part as an organization which holds a current exemption from the federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. A DOR rule tracks this statute almost verbatim. Accordingly, as a matter of practice, in interpreting this statutory exemption, DOR simply defers to the final determination of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If the IRS grants an organization a 501(c)(3) status based on the determination that it is a scientific organization, then DOR accepts this determination at face value. DOR does not make an independent determination whether the organization is "scientific" or question the decision of the IRS. This statutory interpretation is a reasonable one and was not shown to be erroneous or impermissible. GARS received a federal income tax exemption from the IRS regional office in Atlanta, Georgia by letter dated August 12, 1993. The record shows that GARS was granted an "exempt organization" status as a "charitable organization" and as an "educational organization" under Treasury Regulation Section 1.501(c)(3). However, GARS did not receive an exempt status as a "scientific organization" nor did the IRS make that determination. Therefore, GARS does not qualify as a scientific organization within the meaning of the law. While petitioner submitted evidence to show that it engages in what it considers to be a number of scientific endeavors, these activities, while laudable, are irrelevant under Florida law in making a determination as to whether GARS qualifies for a sales tax exemption as a scientific organization. Therefore, the application must be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order denying petitioner's application for a consumer certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1200 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 5. Rejected as being irrelevant. 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 13. Rejected as being unnecessary. 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Respondent: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Rejected as being unnecessary. 4. Rejected as being cumulative. 5-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 13-14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 16. Covered in preliminary statement. 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 18-19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 20-21. Rejected as being unnecessary. 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Sidney Schmukler, Esquire 3922 N. W. 20th Lane Gainesville, Florida 32605-3565 Olivia P. Klein, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue At issue in this case is whether Respondents, the Office of Insurance Regulation ("OIR" or "the Office") or the Financial Services Commission ("the Commission") have developed agency statements of general applicability meeting the definition of a rule in section 120.52(10), Florida Statutes (2011), governing its review, evaluation, recalculation, and disposition of excessive profits filings submitted pursuant to section 627.215, Florida Statutes (2011). If so, it must be determined whether those statements have been adopted as rules pursuant to the rulemaking process in section 120.54(1).
Findings Of Fact Premier is a foreign insurer authorized to write workers' compensation insurance in the State of Florida. As a workers' compensation insurer, Premier is subject to the jurisdiction of the Office. Premier began writing workers' compensation insurance coverage in Florida on January 1, 2005. The Office is a subdivision of the Financial Services Commission responsible for the administration of the Insurance Code, including section 627.215. Section 627.215(1)(a) requires that insurer groups writing workers' compensation insurance file with the Office on a form prescribed by the Commission, the calendar-year earned premium; accident-year incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses; the administrative and selling expenses incurred in Florida or allocated to Florida for the calendar year; and policyholder dividends applicable to the calendar year. Insurer groups writing other types of insurance are also governed by the provisions of this section. The purpose of section 627.215 is to determine whether insurers have realized an excessive profit and if so, to provide a mechanism for determining the profit and ordering its return to consumers. Insurer groups are also required to file a schedule of Florida loss and loss adjustment experience for each of the three years prior to the most recent accident year. Section 627.215(2) provides that "[t]he incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses shall be valued as of December 31 of the first year following the latest accident year to be reported, developed to an ultimate basis, and at two 12-month intervals thereafter, each developed to an ultimate basis, so that a total of three evaluations will be provided for each accident year." Section 627.215 contains definitions that are critical to understanding the method for determining excess profits. Those definitions are as follows: "Underwriting gain or loss" is computed as follows "the sum of the accident-year incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses as of December 31 of the year, developed to an ultimate basis, plus the administrative and selling expenses incurred in the calendar year, plus policyholder dividends applicable to the calendar year, shall be subtracted from the calendar-year earned premium." § 627.215(4). "Anticipated underwriting profit" means "the sum of the dollar amounts obtained by multiplying, for each rate filing of the insurer group in effect during such period, the earned premium applicable to such rate filing during such period by the percentage factor included in such rate filing for profit and contingencies, such percentage factor having been determined with due recognition to investment income from funds generated by Florida business, except that the anticipated underwriting profit . . . shall be calculated using a profit and contingencies factor that is not less than zero." § 627.215(8). Section 627.215 requires that the underwriting gain or loss be compared to the anticipated underwriting profit, which, as previously stated, is tied to the applicable rate filing for the insurer. Rate filings represent a forecast of expected results, while the excess profits filing is based on actual expenses for the same timeframe. The actual calculation for determining whether an insurer has reaped excess profits is included in section 627.215(7)(a): Beginning with the July 1, 1991, report for workers' compensation insurance, employer's liability insurance, and commercial casualty insurance, an excessive profit has been realized if the net aggregate underwriting gain for all these lines combined is greater than the net aggregate anticipated underwriting profit for these lines plus 5 percent of earned premiums for the 3 most recent calendar years for which data is filed under this section. . . Should the Office determine, using this calculation, that an excess profit has been realized, the Office is required to order a return of those excess profits after affording the insurer group an opportunity for hearing pursuant to chapter 120. OIR B1-15 (Form F) is a form that the Office has adopted in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-189.007, which was promulgated pursuant to the authority in section 627.215. The information submitted by an insurer group on Form F is used by the Office to calculate the amount of excessive profits, if any, that a company has realized for the three calendar-accident years reported. The terms "loss adjustment expenses," and "administrative and selling expenses," are not defined by statute. Nor are they defined in rule 69O-189.007 or the instructions for Form F. On or about June 30, 2009, Premier filed its original Form F Filing with the Office pursuant to section 627.215 and rule 69O-189.007. Rule 69O-189.007 requires that a Form F be filed each year on or before July 1. The first page of Form F includes section four, under which calendar year administrative and selling expenses are listed. Section four includes five subparts: A) commissions and brokerage expenses; B) other acquisition, field supervision and collection expense; C) general expenses incurred; D) taxes, licenses and fees incurred; and E) other expenses not included above. Premier subsequently filed three amendments to its Form F filing on December 11, 2009; on June 21, 2010; and on January 13, 2012. In each of its amended filings, Premier included the federal income tax expense attributable to underwriting profit it earned during the 2005-2007 period. These expenses were included under section four(E). No guidance is provided in section 627.215, in rule 60O- 189.007, or in the instructions for Form F, to identify what expenses may properly be included in the Form F filing. There is no indication in any of these three sources, or in any other document identified by the Office, that identifies whether federal income taxes are to be included or excluded from expenses to be reported in a Form F filing. While the form clearly references taxes, licenses and fees incurred under section 4(D), the instructions do not delineate what types of taxes, licenses and fees should be included. The instructions simply state: "for each of the expenses in item 4, please provide an explanation of the methodology used in deriving the expenses, including supporting data." The Office takes the position that federal income taxes should not be reported as an expense for the purpose of determining excess profits. It position, as characterized by Petitioner, is that "in determining what expenses may be deducted in calculating whether and to what extent excessive profits have been realized during the reporting period, the Office shall disallow any deduction for federal income tax or the net effect of federal income tax accrued or paid during the reporting period." According to James Watford, a Department actuary who reviews the excess profits reports, this position has not changed at any time in the last ten years. In August 2009, a petition was filed against the Office challenging the statement stated above as an unadopted rule. FFVA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Office of Insurance Regulation, DOAH Case No. 09-4193RU. The proceeding in the FFVA case was placed in abeyance based upon the Office's agreement to initiate rulemaking. A Notice of Development of Rulemaking was published and a workshop was conducted on February 22, 2010. On or about June 17, 2010, James Watford circulated proposed changes to rule 69O-189.007, which included changes to the instructions to Form F. Among those proposed changes was the addition of the following statement: "[f]ederal income tax is not to be included as an expense because the 'anticipated underwriting profit' is based on a pre-Federal income tax profit and contingencies factor." This language would have placed the position consistently taken by the Office in the materials incorporated into the rule. On November 17, 2010, a second rule development workshop was held on the proposed changes to rule 69O-189.007. However, no further action toward adopting the proposed revisions took place. At some point, the FFVA challenge was dismissed based upon a settlement between the parties, and the Office never sought approval from the Commission to notice the proposed changes for rulemaking. No further action has been taken to adopt the Office's position through the chapter 120 rulemaking process, and no credible explanation was provided to explain why the Office did not present the proposed changes to the Commission to obtain permission to notice the proposed rules. Although Mr. Watford testified that the Office has "clearly enunciated [its] position on federal income tax," he acknowledged that it has not been adopted through the rulemaking process. He stated, "before that ever came into existence, we had discussions with companies about the appropriateness of including that the fact that it is already included in the profit factor. . . . It was not published in a rule, because it is -- we thought it was pretty commonly understood by most parties." The Office insists that it is not feasible to consider federal income taxes in the excess profits calculation. It pointed to no real impediment to adopting its position of not considering federal income taxes through the rulemaking process. On January 4, 2011, Governor Scott issued Executive Order 11-1, which temporarily suspended rulemaking for executive branch agencies reporting to the Governor. Executive Order 11-1 was issued 11 months after the Office published its first Notice of Rule Development in February 2010, and did not apply to either the Office or the Commission. The Office also points to publications published by other entities, such as the Actuarial Standards Board and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"), to support its position that federal income taxes may not be considered in determining excess profits. However, section 627.215 does not reference any of these publications, and they are not incorporated by reference in the Office's rule regarding excessive profits. Nor do these publications expressly reference what can be considered for excess profits calculations. During the 2012 legislative session, section 627.215 was amended to delete the excess profits filing requirement for workers' compensation insurance. § 7, ch. 2012-213, Laws of Fla. Section 627.213 had not been amended prior to this year since 2003. However, the Office continues to assert its position with respect to the exclusion federal income taxes as an expense to those filings remaining in the "pipeline." Section 627.215 continues to apply to other types of insurance.
