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PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs MICHAEL L. CHIUCHIOLO, 93-004233 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Aug. 02, 1993 Number: 93-004233 Latest Update: Dec. 29, 1995

The Issue Whether Respondent resigned his position of employment with Petitioner and, if not, whether Respondent's position of employment with Petitioner should be terminated for cause, specifically, the Respondent's alleged absence without leave, his alleged abuse of sick leave, and his alleged theft of school property.

Findings Of Fact Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a painter pursuant to an annual contract from January 17, 1983, until January 29, 1993. Respondent was not a member of the instructional staff, a principal, or a supervisor. Respondent did not submit to the Petitioner a formal resignation of his employment, nor did he ever intend to do so. A School Board employee with an annual contract may be dismissed during the term of his contract for cause. Respondent had frequently taken leave during his term of employment with the Petitioner and he was aware of the School Board's policies pertaining to leave. Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local 1277, AFL-CIO (IBFO). The collective bargaining agreement between the IBFO and the School Board contains terms and conditions of employment pertinent to this proceeding. Article IV, Section F pertains to "Return from Leave" and provides as follows: Failure to return to work at the expiration of approved leave shall be considered as absence without leave and grounds for dismissal. This section should be subject to extenuating circumstances preventing timely return, as determined by the Superintendent. Article IV, Section A of the collective bargaining agreement pertains to sick leave and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 3. Sick Leave Charged -- Sick leave shall be charged in no less than half-day segments. Each school or Department shall record absences on an hourly basis. When the appropriate half-day increment is reached, based upon the assigned employee workday, the employee shall have 1/2 day of accumulated sick leave deducted. . . . * * * 10. False Claim -- False claim for sick leave shall be grounds for dismissal by the School Board. Petitioner's Administrative Directive D-3.47(3) is a rule of the School Board and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (3) District employees shall not convert School Board property, including any equipment and supplies, for personal business or activity. CONVERSION OF SCHOOL BOARD PROPERTY In November 1992, Warren Haan, the paint supervisor for the Petitioner's Department of Maintenance and Operations, was told by Jacques Brisson, Respondent's foreman, that it appeared to him that Respondent was taking school property for his own use. Mr. Haan investigated the allegations and went to the area in the maintenance department where the employees parked their vehicles. Mr. Haan looked into Respondent's personal vehicle and discovered that Respondent had placed inside of his vehicle property of the School Board. The evidence established that Respondent intended to convert this property to his own use. The property, which was taken from the Respondent before he could remove it from school grounds, consisted of an empty paint bucket, painter's rags, a small quantity of caulk, and a caulking gun. Mr. Haan referred this matter to the school security department on January 4, 1993. Respondent had not been disciplined at the time of his alleged resignation because the matter was still under investigation at that time. Respondent testified that other painters regularly took items such as empty paint buckets and paint rags. This self-serving testimony does not establish that Petitioner routinely permitted painters to violate the clear school policies pertaining to unauthorized use of school property. To the contrary, the testimony of Mr. Brisson established that theft had been a problem that he had tried to stop. ABUSE OF SICK LEAVE The Respondent occasionally was employed as a painter by individuals and entities other than the Petitioner. Such employment was permissible, but an employee was not permitted to perform services for private individuals while out on sick leave. The Respondent reported to work on December 3, 1992, and left his employment in the late morning using sick leave for the remainder of the day. That same day, Mr. Haan received information that led him to believe that Respondent had taken sick leave, but that he was working as a painter at a house under construction in an area referred to as Boca Grove in Boca Raton, Florida. Mr. Haan went with Dave Traill, another school board employee, to this private residence at approximately 2:30 p.m. on December 3, 1992, where he observed Respondent's automobile. He went to the residence under construction and asked to see the Respondent. The Respondent thereafter came out of the house and talked with Mr. Haan and Mr. Traill. Mr. Haan and Mr. Traill did not see what Respondent had been doing inside the residence. Respondent testified that he had seen his doctor for a brief appointment earlier that day and had gone from his doctor's office to the residence at Boca Grove. Respondent admitted at the formal hearing that he had agreed to paint the house for the owner, but asserted that he had gone to the house to tell the owner that he would not be working that day. Respondent testified that he had taken vacation leave when he actually worked on the private residence. Respondent admitted that he had spent approximately two hours on December 3, 1992, while on sick leave going over with the owner items of work that he was to perform. This meeting was a necessary part of the painting job he was to do for the owner. From the evidence presented, it is found that on December 3, 1992, the Respondent performed services unrelated to his duties as a school board employee for his personal gain at this house in Boca Grove while absent from his employment with the Petitioner pursuant to sick leave. Respondent abused Petitioner's sick leave policy. ABSENCES WITHOUT LEAVE In January 1993, Petitioner took time off from his work to attend to his wife, who continued to experience physical problems resulting from a heel fracture on August 28, 1992. Respondent contacted his foreman, Jacques Brisson, at approximately 7:30 a.m. on Monday, January 25, 1993, to request that he be allowed to take that week off as vacation time. Mr. Brisson approved that leave, but he informed Respondent that he would have to contact Warren Haan, the painting supervisor, if he wanted to take any additional time off. Respondent was absent from his employment without approved leave on Monday, February 1, 1993; Tuesday, February 2, 1993; Wednesday, February 3, 1993; and Thursday, February 4, 1993. Friday, February 5, 1993, was not a scheduled work day since the paint department was on a four day work week. Respondent testified that he contacted Mr. Haan during the last week of January 1993 and told him he may need to be off work for a week or longer. Respondent also testified that Mr. Haan authorized his leave during the last week of January 1993. Mr. Haan testified at the formal hearing, but he was not questioned about this conversation or whether he authorized leave for the Respondent during any part of February 1993. Mr. Haan testifed that Respondent's employment was terminated because he was absent without authorization for the days in February and that Respondent would have contacted Mr. Brisson to obtain authorization for leave. Respondent later testified that he did not know why he had not contacted anyone prior to being absent on February 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1993. The apparent conflicts in Respondent's testimony are resolved by finding that while Respondent may have told Mr. Haan at some time during January 1993 that he needed to take some time off, he did not seek and he was not given authorization to be absent from his employment on February 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1993. On February 5, 1993, Warren Page, Coordinator of Petitioner's Department of Maintenance and Plant Operations, sent to Respondent by certified mailing a letter which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: This is to confirm that you have not reported to work since January 29, 1993. You have not contacted this office as required to report your intended absences. You have not requested or received approval for a short term leave of absence. Therefore, you are currently absent without approved leave. In the absence of any correspondence from you, I can only assume that you have decided not to continue working as a Painter for the Palm Beach County School Board. Please be advised that your name will be submitted to the Palm Beach County School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting for acceptance of your resignation from employment. Should you have any questions, feel free to contact this office. Respondent received the certified mailing on Saturday, February 6, 1993. On Monday, February 8, 1993, Respondent contacted Lawrence G. Zabik, the Petitioner's Assistant Superintendent for Support Services, and asked him what he should do about the certified mailing that he had received. Mr. Zabik told Respondent that he should meet with Mr. Page to see if he could work things out. Respondent did not contact Mr. Page, and he did not report to work. During a regularly scheduled meeting in February, 1993, the School Board voted to accept his resignation with an effective date of January 29, 1993. January 29, 1993, was the effective date of the acceptance of Respondent's "resignation" and the date his employment with the School Board was terminated because it was the last day Respondent was out on authorized leave. This action was taken pursuant to Petitioner's Administrative Directive D- 3.27(2)(c), which provides as follows: (c) When employees do not report for duty for three (3) consecutive days without notifying their supervisor, the principal/department head will initiate a certified letter to the employees stating that their resignations will be recommended to the School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. By notice dated March 2, 1993, Respondent was notified that the School Board had accepted his resignation as a painter with an effective date of January 29, 1993. The notice dated March 2, 1993, contained an old address for the Respondent. Consequently, he did not receive a copy of the notice until May 24, 1993, when he was officially informed that his employment had been terminated effective January 29, 1993, the last day on which Respondent had been on approved leave. Respondent thereafter requested a formal hearing to contest his termination, and this proceeding followed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order which terminates the employment of the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4233 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The greater weight of the evidence established that the incident involving conversion of school board property occurred in November 1992, but that it was reported to Mr. Sapyta on January 4, 1993. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, and 15 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2, 3, and 10 are rejected as being unnecessary as findings of fact, but the proposed findings are adopted either as preliminary matters or as conclusions of law. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent they are contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are adopted by the Recommended Order or are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in the first sentence of paragraph 11 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached since there is no contention that Respondent had exhausted his sick leave. The proposed findings in the second sentence of paragraph 11 are rejected. Specifically, Mr. Haan's credibility was not eroded as asserted by Respondent. The other findings of fact in paragraph 11 are adopted by the Recommended Order or are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 12 and 14 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached since this is a de novo proceeding. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 17 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are subordinate to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Hazel Lucas, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board Office of the General Counsel 381 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5813 Glen J. Torcivia, Esquire One Clearlake Centre 250 Australian Avenue South Suite 1504 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Isidro M. Garcia, Esquire 3501 South Congress Avenue Lake Worth, Florida 33461 Dr. C. Monica Uhlhorn, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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VIOLA D. COOPER vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-003538 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-003538 Latest Update: Dec. 19, 1989

The Issue Whether the Petitioner was absent from work without authorization for three consecutive workdays so that she is deemed to have abandoned her position and to have resigned as a Career Service employee.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Viola D. Cooper began her employment with Respondent Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on October 19, 1987. She held the position of Support Service Aide at the Landmark Learning Center in Opa Locka, Florida. When she was hired, she was given a copy of the Department's Employee Handbook which contains attendance and leave policies. She signed a receipt for the handbook which acknowledged that she understood it was her responsibility to review the handbook in detail. On several occasions, Petitioner was counseled by her immediate supervisor regarding the proper procedures to follow when Petitioner would be late reporting to work and when Petitioner wanted to use some of the leave time available to her. Additionally, on August 8, 1988, Petitioner received a written reprimand from her supervisor for being absent from work without authorized leave. That written reprimand recited that Petitioner was scheduled to work on July 5, 1988, and that she failed to come to work and failed to call. She was, accordingly, assessed eight hours of leave without pay for that particular day and was advised that a future violation of absence without authorized leave would result in disciplinary action ranging from a 10-day suspension to dismissal. She was further reminded in that written reprimand that she was required to request leave when she was going to take time off from work. On May 3, 1989, Petitioner advised her then supervisor Barbara Butler that she intended to take off some time to visit her sick mother, that she did not know exactly when she would be doing that, and that she did not know how long she would be gone. She told Butler she did not want to use any of her annual leave (vacation) time available to her; instead, she wished to take leave without pay so as to not use her annual leave time for that purpose. Her supervisor again advised her as to the proper procedures and further advised her that if she wished to take leave without pay such a request must be presented in writing in advance to Edward Dixon, the Food Service Director at Landmark. Petitioner understood the instructions given to her by Butler. She advised Butler that she would attempt to finish working the rest of that week but that if she found out that she needed to go even in the middle of the night, she would do so. Petitioner worked May 4 and May 5, 1989. During the time period of May 3 when Butler advised her to follow the proper procedures and informed her, once again, as to what the proper procedures were, through May 5, her last day of work, Petitioner submitted no request for leave to her supervisor and made no request of Dixon for authorized leave without pay. Petitioner was not scheduled to work on May 6 and 7, a Saturday and a Sunday. From Monday, May 8, 1989, through Thursday, May 11, 1989, Petitioner failed to report to work. Petitioner had not requested that she be permitted to take leave from her work assignment, and no authorization had been given to her by anyone to not report for work on those days. Butler advised Dixon that Petitioner had stated that she might be taking time off to visit her mother, and Dixon's subsequent attempt to contact Petitioner to ascertain why she had failed to report to work for four consecutive days was unsuccessful. By certified letter dated May 11, 1989, Dixon and Ulysses Davis, Superintendent at Landmark Learning Center, advised Petitioner that she had not called in or reported to work on May 8 through May 11 and, therefore, she had abandoned her position and was deemed to have resigned from the Career Service. They further advised Petitioner that her resignation would be effective on the date she received the letter or on the date that they received the undelivered letter directed to her. Petitioner received that letter on May 19, 1989. Between May 8, 1989, and May 19, 1989, Petitioner had made no contact with anyone at Landmark Learning Center. By May 19, 1989, Petitioner had been absent without leave for 10 consecutive workdays. On May 19, Petitioner appeared at Landmark Learning Center to pick up her pay check. Although she went to the food service area while she was at Landmark, she did not speak to Butler, Dixon, or anyone else regarding her lengthy unauthorized absence or her failure to request leave in advance of failing to appear for work. Similarly, she failed to speak to anyone in Landmark's personnel office regarding her failure to request leave time.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner was absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays and is therefore deemed to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of December, 1989. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3538 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact contained in her paragraphs numbered 1-3 have been rejected as being contrary to the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4, and 7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as being contrary to the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 8 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Judd-Edwards Assistant Regional Director 2171 Northwest 22nd Court Miami, Florida 33142 Julie Waldman and Caridad Planas, Esquire 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue 5-424 Miami, Florida 33128 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta L. Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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KAREN HOWE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF STEPHEN HOWE vs WESTERN AND SOUTHERN FINANCIAL GROUP, 04-003236 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Sep. 15, 2004 Number: 04-003236 Latest Update: Jun. 02, 2008

The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Western and Southern Financial Group (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA) in terminating employment of Stephen Howe (Petitioner) without reasonable accommodation. § 760.10, Fla. Stat.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, a subsidiary of Cincinnati-based Western & Southern Financial Group Inc. Respondent is a home service company that requires sales representatives to call on policy holders on a regular basis for sales and service. The district sales office in Pensacola, Florida, is one of 181 sales offices headed by a district sales manager. Jim Swaim served as the district sales manager for Respondent’s Pensacola Office from August 5, 2002 until November 3, 2003. Petitioner Stephen Howe became a Western and Southern sales representative on January 25, 1993, compensated pursuant to a Sales Representative Agreement of that same date, inclusive of the incorporated Sales Representative Schedule of Commissions, setting forth his compensation schedule and job duties. He intermittently served as a sales manager, but voluntarily became a sales representative pursuant to a Sales Representative Agreement dated June 28, 1999. He remained a sales representative until his termination on February 3, 2003. Petitioner was admitted to the hospital and therefore absent from work beginning August 28, 2002, due to an unrelenting headache and elevated blood pressure. The conditions cited by Petitioner's physician were sleep apnea and pheochromocytoma (pheo), which is a tumor on the adrenal gland that causes excess adrenaline production. Treatment for pheo usually takes four to five weeks, and is conducted on an outpatient basis. Petitioner’s disability was documented in September 2002, by Dr. Shawbilz, a neurologist, who reported at that time to Respondent personnel and described Petitioner’s dizziness, syncope and headaches. It was noted that Petitioner could not drive at that time due to obstructive sleep apnea, syncope and headache. Petitioner's family doctor, Dr. Mayeaux, prepared a report to Respondent on October, 2002, defining Petitioner's condition as serious and “requiring a period of incapacity from work and subsequent treatment”. Petitioner’s condition included high blood pressure, syncope, tremor, diaphoresis and palpitations. On October 2 and 8, 2002, Dr. Mayeaux sent a letter to Lori Mitchell, a registered nurse and the head of the Benefits Department of Respondent, outlining Petitioner's severe uncontrolled hypertension and a rare debilitating adrenal tumor. The doctor did not feel Petitioner should be working at that time. Later, in further correspondence dated October 28, 2002, Dr. Mayeaux opined Petitioner should not operate a motor vehicle at that time. On November 18, 2002, Dr. Mayeaux forwarded another letter to Respondent's benefit department outlining additional concerns about Petitioner’s syncope, chest pain, palpitations, diaphoresis, and disability to perform meaningful work or drive. On December 19, 2002, Dr. Mayeaux forwarded another letter to Respondent noting the now determined severe sleep apnea of Petitioner as a basis for daytime somnolence and drop attack/syncope. He again opined that Petitioner needed surgical relief from ear, nose and throat (ENT) issues to address sleep apnea prior to return to work. Respondent initially denied insurance for the surgery to address these issues while also denying Petitioner’s disability insurance claim. On December 30, 2002, Dr. Mayeaux again wrote to Lori Mitchell and noted Petitioner’s additional adrenal gland tumor. He opined, "[Petitioner] may not work until these problems have been satisfactorily resolved." On January 23, 2003, Mayeaux again wrote to Respondent’s Benefits Department continuing his disability opinions and noting, "aggressive surgical evaluation and intervention is underway at this time." Petitioner’s blood pressure continued to be labile and uncontrollable, but Mayeaux hoped to control this with surgery for Petitioner’s tumor. Sleep apnea, another of Petitioner’s disabilities, exists when a sleeping person experiences episodes where the individual is without breath. Petitioner did not respond well to the non-surgical treatment for this disorder, in which a machine is used to force air into the sleeping person’s breathing passages. The machine is called a “C-PAP”. Such treatment was prescribed for Petitioner without the best of success. Mayeaux hoped future surgery for the sleep apnea would help Petitioner’s severe case of this disorder by enlarging Petitioner’s breathing airway. The sleep apnea symptoms would have prevented him from driving in the course of his work. Petitioner’s wife observed Petitioner’s condition worsening beginning around August 2, 2002, when Petitioner would come home once or twice a day while working to take a nap. The tumor on Petitioner’s adrenal glands substantially limited major life-sustaining activities. As established by deposition testimony of Dr. Mayeaux, hormones secreted by Petitioner’s adrenal glands were affected by the tumor on his adrenal glands. There was evidence in Petitioner’s blood of over-production of adrenaline, with a by-product being excessive production of epinephrine. That he considered this to be a substantially limiting factor is one reason Mayeaux opined that Petitioner should not be working in his then-existing condition. Deposition testimony of Lori Mitchell establishes that she wrote a letter to Petitioner on September 9, 2002, requesting disability information for short-term disability. Subsequently, she sent a letter to Petitioner approving disability beginning September 13, 2002 Per Petitioner’s medical release provided to her, she had the ability to consult with Dr. Mayeaux. Mitchell was aware of all information received from Dr. Mayeaux. Mitchell was aware that Respondent's Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) Department sent Petitioner a letter telling him that his absence of August 28, 2002, through October 8, 2002, was recorded as a "serious health condition." She also knew short-term disability was authorized for Petitioner through her department for the period ending October 8, 2002, following a review of his medical records. Short Term Disability is defined under Respondent's plan for associates "who are regularly unable to per form normal duties of their regular occupation due to sickness or injury." Mitchell was also aware of the "pheo" tumor, which can develop on an individual’s adrenal glands. She understood Dr. Mayeaux’s letter to her describing the tumor in Petitioner’s case as "debilitating" to mean "impairing him." She understood Dr. Mayeaux's letter of October 10, 2002, to her to mean Petitioner was prevented "from performing his daily activities" by his symptoms. Mitchell’s supervisor, Noreen Hayes, explained that the approval of the extension of short-term disability benefits through November 30, 2002, was based on "all doctor's notes associated with [Petitioner’s] condition." Mitchell was familiar with Dr Mayeaux's December 5, 2002 letter concerning the sleep apnea and breathing issues of Petitioner, as well as other letters from Mayeaux on December 30, 2002, and January 23, 2003. She identified a Respondent Medical Leave of Absence form executed on December 12, 2002, where his doctor opined Petitioner had "a serious health condition that makes you unable to perform the essential functions of your job" and that the condition would continue until rectified. Dr. Terrell Clark is Respondent's Vice President and Medical Director. He recalled information received regarding high blood pressure and sleep apnea to "evaluate what time might be appropriate for [Petitioner’s] disability." He was also aware of a concern for brain problems due to Petitioner’s head CT scan. He was aware of the "pheo" tumor diagnosis on Petitioner’s adrenal gland and resultant production of abnormal hormones. He also agreed that the condition was very treatable. He also was acquainted with the correspondence of Dr. Mayeaux on Petitioner’s behalf. Dr. Mayeaux opined it would be possible for Petitioner to have performed an office-type job that did not require driving. His ability to provide service to his clients was otherwise unimpaired. During August, 2002 to February, 2003, Petitioner was in constant contact with Respondent personnel and his clients by phone. In the words of Karen Howe, "he was always on the phone" until the end of his employment. The phone was part of his normal job activity. During this same time, Petitioner filled out all his clients’ paperwork and paperwork for their families in regard to financial matters. He was also able to give advice to clients as he always had. There are clerical positions in the field offices of Respondent. In Cincinnati, Ohio, Respondent has hundreds of clerical positions that do not require driving as an essential function of the job. The company has 1,900 clerical sedentary positions. Most of these do not require driving. Dr Mayeaux sent a letter to Respondent dated January 30, 2003, stating that Petitioner could return to work so long as he did not drive. He also told Petitioner earlier that he could work if someone else drove. No direct credible evidence was presented that having Petitioner's wife drive him would not result in a reasonable accommodation for Petitioner. The company does not insure the vehicle Petitioner drove as part of his work. There is also no direct credible evidence that Respondent required Petitioner to be covered with insurance over and above what he and his wife ordinarily carried on their vehicle. No evidence was presented assailing the driving abilities of Petitioner’s wife. Petitioner's job did not require that he drive at any certain time. His wife often rode with her husband while he was meeting with his clients or Respondent personnel during the years of his employment. She routinely went by the local office, saw his manager, and no one ever objected to her riding with Petitioner. Petitioner’s wife asked his district manager, on her husband’s behalf, three or four times if she could drive her husband after he was told by his doctor not to drive. Her requests were denied. She was willing to do this without pay, with the vehicle he customarily used, that they both owned, and kept well insured. She drove him to his last day at work where, when informed that he was fired, he cried. Thomas Johnson is the company vice president responsible for administering Respondent’s leave-of-absence policy. Respondent personnel monitor when an employee "can return to work.” Johnson initially received a form noting Petitioner began his leave of absence as a result of illness on August 28, 2002. Johnson receives information from a Respondent committee that meets to discuss whether to allow accommodations for injured employees. Pursuant to the committee’s action, Johnson notified Petitioner that Short Term Disability was approved through November 30, 2002. Johnson wrote a letter on January 23, 2003, to Petitioner to return to work on full-duty status on February 2, 2003, or be terminated. This letter was based on a meeting of his department’s medical and legal personnel. At the meeting, which resulted in Johnson’s letter to Petitioner, all of those in attendance decided not to accommodate Petitioner. At that meeting they never discussed restructuring or modifying Petitioner’s position or reassigning him, even though the only restriction Johnson was aware of was the restriction on Petitioner’s driving. At that meeting, they did discuss time for Petitioner to provide medical information in regard to Petitioner’s fitness to return to work. As a result of the denial by the committee of further Short Term Disability Leave, Petitioner's right to a further leave of absence ended, absent a "fitness for duty" report. Johnson informed Petitioner of the Respondent committee’s action by another letter dated January 27, 2003, sent from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Petitioner in Pensacola, Florida, through regular post office mail to a numbered post office box. Per that letter, Johnson required that Petitioner have the requisite fitness for duty report by February 3, 2003, or be terminated. Petitioner was not provided the appropriate form for the report as part of this communication and he was not given any time to obtain the information, yet he was terminated for not having it. Johnson instructed Petitioner's District Manager on February 3, 2003, that Petitioner could not work that day because of "unauthorized leave of absence". Johnson sent a letter on February 3, 2003, terminating Petitioner. The clause Johnson used to terminate Petitioner was "absence for two days without notice." Johnson received a letter from Dr. Mayeaux dated January 30, 2003, after he had sent his February 3, 2003 letter to Petitioner. Mayeaux’s letter stated that Petitioner could work as long as he did not drive. Petitioner showed up for work on February 3, 2003, with only the letter of January 23, 2003. The employment agreement provided by Respondent to Petitioner does not spell out what medical evidence is to be provided to prevent application of the "unauthorized leave of absence" clause used to terminate Petitioner. By company policy, there is no right for an unpaid leave of absence because of a disability claim. Johnson was fully informed and received regular information from Lori Mitchell regarding Petitioner’s condition as reported by his doctors to her. When an employee such as Petitioner is absent from the office, this fact is reported to Respondent’s home offices without notice to the affected employee. Dean Vonderheide is the director of Respondent’s benefit department. His testimony establishes that the Summary Plan Description given to Respondent employees for Short Term Disability provides no information regarding where an employee can get the forms to file claims. A terminated employee is not entitled to long-term disability benefits. Neither Lori Mitchell, R.N.; vice president Dr. Clark; or vice president Johnson made any effort to contact Petitioner or his doctor to supplement or add to what was included by Dr. Mayeaux in his correspondence dated January 30, 2003. Petitioner was wrongfully terminated by Respondent on the basis of Petitioner’s disability without fair consideration by Respondent of Petitioner’s request for accommodation, i.e. , that his wife be permitted to chauffer Petitioner in the course of his continued employment or that alternative employment for Petitioner within Respondent’s company be considered by Respondent. Such provision had been made for a former salesperson of Respondent. Petitioner lost wages from his termination of employment with Respondent up and through his death on July 6, 2003. The income tax records in evidence show that Respondent paid Petitioner a total of $42,057.09 in the taxable year 2002.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Stewart, Esquire 4519 Highway 90 Pace, Florida 32571 Alice M. Fitzgerald, Esquire Western & Southern Financial Group 400 Broadway Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-3341 Linda G. Bond, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

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CLARA M PENNY vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 85-001530 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-001530 Latest Update: Dec. 26, 1985

The Issue Whether the petitioner abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service System under the circumstances of this case.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a permanent full-time employee in the Bureau of Workers' Compensation within the Division of Risk Management in the Department of Insurance. Her job title was Secretary Specialist. Her immediate supervisor was Lawrence Sharp, Chief of the Bureau. However, on February 6, 1985, Mr. Sharp was on annual leave, and Ms. Peggy Veigas was the acting supervisor. On February 6, 1985, Petitioner took two hours of authorized leave from work from 8 a.m. to 10 a.m., in order to attend a Leon County Court hearing on charges of cashing bad checks. The checks had been repaid in advance of the hearing: however, petitioner was immediately adjudicated guilty of writing bad checks, sentenced to 12 days in jail, and taken into custody. Petitioner was due to return to work at 10:00 a.m., but was unable to do so because of circumstances beyond her control. She was taken directly from her court appearance to the Leon County Jail. However, prior to being transported to the jail, she was able to ask her husband, who had accompanied her to court, to call her employer and ask for emergency leave to cover the 12 days she would be serving her sentence. Mr. Penney called petitioner's office at about 2 p.m. on February 6, 1985, and in the absence of Mr. Sharp the call was referred to Ms. Veigas, the acting supervisor. Mr. Penney explained that Mrs. Penney would not be at work for the next eight to ten days and requested emergency leave for that period of time. Mr. Penney was very vague about the nature of the emergency and Mrs. Penney's whereabouts. He did not explain that Mrs. Penney was in jail because he felt it would be embarrassing to Mrs. Penney. Ms. Veigas stated that emergency leave could be granted but she would have to talk to Mrs. Penney. She told Mr. Penney to have Mrs. Penney call her. Mr. Penney stated that Mrs. Penney could not call in and implied that Mrs. Penney was out of town. Ms. Veigas explained that Mrs. Penney needed to call her as soon as she could get to a phone and, if necessary, for her to call collect. Mr. Penney interpreted Mrs. Veigas' statement, that she could grant the leave but Mrs. Penney would have to call as soon as possible, as meaning that the leave was approved and that Mrs. Penney had to call work as soon as she was able to do so. However, in making the statement, Mrs. Veigas meant only that there was a possibility that leave would be granted and Mrs. Penney needed to call and explain the nature of the emergency. The subsequent actions of both Mr. Penney and Mrs. Veigas were consistent with their respective conceptions of the conversation. That afternoon, after the telephone call, Ms. Veigas went to the personnel office and discussed the matter with Ms. Cooper. Ms. Veigas wanted to find out how she should handle the request for leave and whether she should wait for Mr. Sharp to return from his vacation. Mr. Yohner, the Chief of Personnel Management, was consulted, and he stated that when Mrs. Penney called, Ms. Veigas would have to determine whether she would approve the leave or not. Ms. Veigas was told by Ms. Cooper to wait until Ms. Veigas heard from Mrs. Penney "so we would know whether it was an illness or whatever it was." (T-47) However, the nature of the emergency was determined without the necessity of a call from Mrs. Penney. Within a short period of time after the call from Mr. Penney, Ms. Veigas mentioned the request for emergency leave to Ms. Benefield. Ms. Benefield told Ms. Grissom about the call from Mr. Penney, and the two speculated that Mrs. Penney might be in jail. They were aware that Mrs. Penney had financial problems. While Ms. Grissom stood by, Ms. Benefield telephoned the jail and was told that Mrs. Penney was in jail for passing bad checks. They immediately communicated the information to Ms. Veigas, and the three of them, along with a woman named Edna, discussed the situation for about five or ten minutes. Ms. Veigas then conveyed the information to Mr. Yohner, Ms. Cooper and Mr. Beardon, the Director of the Division of Risk Management, who had previously been informed of the call from Mr. Penney. The following day Mr. Sharp returned to work and was informed of the entire situation. Mr. Sharp discussed the matter with Mr. Beardon. Mr. Beardon had his assistant call the State Attorney's Office to verify that Mrs. Penney was in jail. Thus, by the end of the workday on February 7, 1985, Mrs. Penney's co-workers, her immediate supervisor, the Chief of Personnel Management, and the Director of the Division of Risk Management were all aware that Mrs. Penney, through her husband, had requested emergency leave, and they were all aware that the emergency leave had been requested due to Mrs. Penney's incarceration. On either February 6th or 7th, Mr. Yohner notified Mr. Gresham, the Director of the Division of Administration and Mr. Yohner's supervisor, that a possible abandonment of position situation existed. Mr. Gresham was not informed that petitioner had requested emergency leave. On Friday, February 8th, or on the following Monday, Mr. Sharp called a friend of his in the Department of Administration, Don Bradley, to gain advice on application of the rule relating to abandonment of position. He was told that when someone missed three days of work without having authorization, it was the same thing as resigning and required termination. Mr. Sharp relayed the information to Mr. Beardon. Mr. Sharp did not consider petitioner's leave request and did not know whether he had the authority to approve the leave since at least a portion of the leave requested would have been without pay.2 After three days expired and Mrs. Penney had neither reported for work nor called the office, Mr. Beardon contacted Mr. Yohner to discuss the situation. He also discussed the situation with his superior in the Department. Though Mr. Beardon was aware that Mrs. Penney had requested leave through her husband and was aware that she was absent from work only because she had no choice, Mr. Beardon did not consider her request for leave. His reason was that Mrs. Penney did not personally request the leave. He did not consider the possibility that Mrs. Penney was not able to call in person. Mr. Beardon felt that a call from Mrs. Penney was necessary to find out "all of the pertinent facts and why the request was needed." However, it is apparent that Mr. Beardon already knew why the requested leave was needed and had already discovered the pertinent facts. Nevertheless, Mr. Beardon determined that, under the abandonment rule,3 petitioner had abandoned her job and her employment should be terminated. He recommended that the personnel office proceed with the action in accordance with the rule. Mr. Yohner informed Mr. Gresham of Mr. Bearden's recommendation that petitioner be terminated from the Career Service via the abandonment rule. A letter was prepared for Mr. Gresham's signature, notifying Petitioner of her termination from the Career Service. Mr. Gresham signed the letter and mailed it to petitioner at her home address. By the letter dated February 11, 1985, and then by an amended letter dated February 12, 1985, petitioner was notified that she had been absent without authorized leave for three consecutive days, and therefore she was deemed to have abandoned her position pursuant to Rule 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, and to have resigned from the Career Service. Meanwhile, Mr. Penney was under the impression that the emergency leave had been granted. He was able to speak with his wife for the first time on February 9, 1985, and the first question petitioner asked her husband was whether the leave had been granted. He told her that it had been, and she displayed visible signs of relief at the knowledge. Petitioner's husband also told her that she should call Ms. Veigas at her earliest opportunity. Mrs. Penney made diligent attempts to contact her employer both before and after she spoke with her husband on February 9, 1985. On each day of her incarceration she made written requests to the Captain at the jail for permission to use the telephone to call her employer. However, she received no response. In accordance with jail policy, which allowed one phone call per week at a set time, she was permitted use of the telephone on only one occasion, on February 11, 1985 at about 11 p.m. in the evening. Mrs. Penney's sentence was reduced by Judge McClamma and she was released from jail on February 14, 1985. She received the termination letter that evening when she got home. The next morning she called Mr. Yohner and stated that she wanted to return to work. Mr. Yohner informed her that she was no longer an employee of the Department. Mrs. Penney's position was advertised on February 19th and readvertised on March 4, 1985. Sometime after March 4, 1985, a replacement was hired. Although the workers compensation bureau had a very heavy case load, Mrs. Penney's work performance had been satisfactory. Indeed, she had been promoted to the position of Secretary Specialist from her previous position of Clerk-Typist III with the bureau. Petitioner had no intent to abandon her position in the Career Service, and she had no intent to resign her position. The Department had actual knowledge of the petitioner's whereabouts during her absence from work, and had actual knowledge that she intended to return to work as soon as she could. Further, the Department was aware that petitioner had requested leave to cover the period of time she would be gone. However, instead of taking action on the request, one way or the other, the Department left the request in limbo. A decision was never made to approve or disapprove the request. The only explanation given for not considering the request was that Mrs. Penney had not made it personally. However, it is quite clear that at the time of Mr. Penney's call the Department considered the call a legitimate request for leave from Mrs. Penney even though the call was not made by her. Ms. Veigas did not tell Mr. Penney that the leave could not be granted because Mrs. Penney had not called in person. Indeed, the first thing Ms. Veigas did after the telephone call was go to the personnel office to find out how she should "process the request". The only reason that the Department wanted to talk to Mrs. Penney personally, prior to determining whether leave should be granted, was to discover the nature of the emergency. Although Mr. Penney explained that there was an emergency, that Mrs. Penney was unable to call, and that leave was being requested to cover the period of time that Mrs. Penney would be unable to work, he was very vague about the nature of the emergency. The Department understandably wanted to know the reason for the request before deciding to grant leave. However, once the Department discovered Mrs. Penney's circumstances, it was in a position to make an informed decision on the leave request, and there was no rational basis for its failure to do so. Although the granting of leave is discretionary, the discretion must be exercised. Apparently, the Department officials believed that Mrs. Penney's absence from work for three consecutive days mandated termination notwithstanding the pending request for leave. Because the Department failed to take any action on the leave request, Mrs. Penney was never notified that her request for leave had been denied. Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, it must be concluded that Mrs. Penney did not abandon her position.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered ruling that the circumstances presented by this case do not constitute abandonment of position as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.10(2)(a) and directing that the petitioner be reinstated to her former position as of February 15, 1985. DONE and ENTERED this ;26th of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 1985.

Florida Laws (2) 120.577.10
# 4
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. NELSON BELL, 84-002951 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002951 Latest Update: Feb. 01, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter hereof and the parties hereto pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent has been employed as a permanent full-time employee since March 7, 1980 with Petitioner's facility, Landmark Learning Center (hereafter, "Landmark") located in Opa-locka, Florida and is subject to the Career Service rules of Chapter 22A, Florida Administrative Code. The purpose of Landmark is to train, program, and modify the behavior of retarded clients so that they may realize their fullest potential for self care and independence. Ulysses Davis is the Superintendent of Landmark. Immediately below him in the chain of command is Deborah Wicks Kahn, Residential Services Director. Hers is a supervisory administrative position also over the entire facility. Within Respondent's unit, which is one of several units within Landmark, there are other supervisors between Respondent and Deborah Kahn. Approximately 1980, Respondent was convicted in federal criminal court of bank fraud but remained at liberty pending resolution of an appeal and various post-conviction relief procedures for reduction of a three-year sentence. Respondent has had a history of leaves of absence during his employment with Landmark. The longest hospitalization established by his medical records was from January 30, 1983 to May 6, 1983 at North Miami Hospital for approximately 96 days or three months; from September 18, 1983 to September 25, 1983 (approximately six days) he was again hospitalized at North Miami Hospital. At that time, ulcer disease was ruled out by Dr. Bertram P. Shapiro (Bell Composite Exhibit 7). These hospitalizations were known to Respondent's supervisors and co-workers and occurred during periods when leave had been authorized, although the nature of the type of leave (i.e., sick leave, annual leave, disability leave, leave without pay) was not established. Everyone at Landmark seems to have known that thereafter Respondent was on medication for his stomach and assumed or had been told by the Respondent that his problem was associated with bleeding ulcers. The usual procedure followed at Landmark requires that any leave of absence of one to two days may be approved by a lower level supervisor on an employee's bi-weekly time sheet. Leaves of absence in excess of one-two days require approval of at least Director Kahn. If the leave requested will be completed within the current two-week pay period, the bi-weekly time sheet may be used by the employee to make his leave request and approval is indicated on the time sheet itself. A time sheet is signed by Director Kahn or a lower level supervisor if the shorter leave is approved, and if it is disapproved, the word "disapproved" and the supervisor's or Director's signature is signed at the bottom. So that multiple time sheets will not be tied up by extended leave requests, a separate written request is required from the employee and a separate outside proof of need therefor must be attached to the employee's written request for all leave requests in excess of a two-week period. For instance, if the request is for extended educational leave, the employee's request must be made in writing with an attached verification of the program from the educational institution. If the request is for extended medical leave, the employee's request must be made in writing with an attached doctor's statement verifying the employee's need therefor. Superintendent Davis requires that his subordinate supervisors get his approval before they grant any extended leave request. In extended leave cases, a separate approval letter is typed, signed by Superintendent Davis and sent certified mail, return receipt requested, to the employee whose leave has been approved. Director Kahn testified she habitually would approve leave requests in increments of one, two and three months after getting guidance from Superintendent Davis or the personnel office. Shortly prior to October 17, 1983, Respondent requested a leave of absence for two months which Director Kahn denied due to an agency-wide survey (inspection). She wrote on the bottom of this request that Respondent would also need to get a supportive medical statement. When the survey concluded, Respondent approached Director Kahn about a leave of absence which she said she would approve if the Respondent provided a supporting medical statement. Director Kahn understood this to be a renewal of Respondent's request for either two or three months of medical or personal leave. Respondent states he understood this to be a request for one year of medical leave, specifically October 17, 1983 through October 17, 1984. Director Kahn again asked for a supporting medical statement. Director. Kahn left on vacation for three weeks immediately following this conversation. Respondent, in response to telephoned information from his lawyer, reported to Federal Prison Camp, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and on October 17 and 13, 1983 was processed in accord with federal prison procedures to begin serving his criminal sentence. Part of this process is a thorough medical examination (Bell Exhibit 6) and he thereafter received extensive treatment for his medical problems, including ulcers. After Director Kahn returned from three weeks' vacation, the person she left in charge in her office presented her with a medical statement on Dr. Bertram Shapiro's stationery, dated October 17, 1983, urging that Respondent be granted a one-year medical leave of absence (Bell Exhibit 3). The date this item was stamped into the Landmark personnel office is November 10, 1983. No formal written request of Respondent for one year's medical leave was received by Director Kahn, Superintendent Davis, or the Personnel Office. Despite the absence of a formal written request from Respondent for one year to correspond with Dr. Shapiro's statement dated October 17, 1983, a letter authorizing two months' leave of absence from October 19 through December 19, 1983 was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Respondent at 2146 N.W. 61st Street, Miami, Florida 33142 (HRS Exhibit 1). This letter was signed by Ulysses Davis, Superintendent, and Deborah Wicks Kahn, Residential Services Director, Facility II. It states that Respondent's failure to report for duty December 20, 1983 would constitute unauthorized leave and three consecutive days of unauthorized leave would result in Respondent being deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned his position in accord with Section 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's November 17, 1993 letter was delivered November 25, 1983 to 2146 N.W. 61st Street, Miami, Florida 33142 and was signed for by Respondent's sister-in-law, Vesturee Brownlee (HRS Exhibit 2). This address continued to be the legal address of Respondent from October 17, 1983 at least through the date of the hearing. Respondent admitted intentionally not notifying Petitioner of any other address where he right be reached until mid-May 1984. Indeed, Respondent and his girlfriend, Ann White, a co-employee, worked diligently until mid-May 1984 to camouflage his criminal incarceration and exact location from everyone at Landmark. Further, this address appears as his legal address on all of his federal prison incarceration documents (Bell Exhibit 6). At hearing, Respondent denied that he received the November 17, 1983 letter but it is clear that he knew its contents because approximately December 19, 1983 Respondent telephoned Director Kahn at her home and requested an extension to a full year's leave dating from the doctor's statement dated October 17, 1984. Director Kahn said three months' leave might be authorized. Despite discussing his ulcer problems, no mention of jail or his actual whereabouts was made by Respondent. Although a written request and new doctor's statement was not submitted by Respondent, his oral telephone request to Director Kahn was acted upon. On January 20, 1984, a letter (HRS Exhibit 3) was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Respondent at his last known address. This letter, signed by Ulysses Davis, Superintendent, and Deborah Wicks Kahn, Director, authorized leave from December 17, 1983 to Friday, April 27, 1984. Instructions were given that if Respondent could not report on Monday, April 30, 1984 at 8:00 a.m., he must, prior to that date, complete a blank leave request showing his anticipated date of return and submit it to "me". Since the letter was signed by two supervisors, I interpret its intent to be that the Respondent could have submitted his completed leave request to either Superintendent Davis or Director Kahn. Again, Respondent was instructed that failure to either report for work timely on April 30 or to submit a written request for extension would result in a determination of abandonment of his position pursuant to Section 22A- 7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's January 30, 1984 letter was delivered on February 8, 1984 to Respondent's last known address and was signed for by Rosa L. Bell, Respondent's mother (HRS Exhibit 4). Although at hearing Respondent denied that he received Petitioner's January 30, 1984 letter, it is clear that he knew the contents thereof because in at least four telephone conversations with Landmark employees, Ann White and Leah Black, Respondent discussed the concern over his medical condition and absence from the job which had been expressed to Ms. White and Ms. Black by Director Kahn and other Landmark employees. On April 30, 1984, Respondent again did not report to work nor did he complete and submit to anyone at Landmark a written leave request form. In excess of three consecutive days Passed without Petitioner receiving any communication from Respondent. Petitioner did not report to work at any time during this period because he was still involuntarily incarcerated in Lexington, Kentucky. On May 8, 1984, a letter (Bell Exhibit 1) was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Respondent at his Miami address. This letter was signed by Superintendent Davis and by Leah F. Black FOR Director Kahn in Ms. Kahn's absence. This letter, designated a "warning of abandonment letter," states that Respondent's failure to report for work or otherwise make contact after April 27, 1984 had resulted in Respondent being placed on an unauthorized leave of absence and that unless Respondent contacted the signatories with a "reasonable and acceptable" excuse for the unauthorized absence since April 27, 1984 and/or reported for work by close of business on May 17, 1984, a determination of abandonment pursuant to Section 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, must be made. Respondent was specifically cautioned that a "response is vital to your continued employment." The letter provided Respondent the option of resigning if he sent a letter of resignation by May 17, 1984. This letter was delivered on May 11, 1984, to Respondent's Miami address. It was signed for by Rosa L. Bell, Respondent's mother (Bell Exhibit 1). At hearing Respondent denied that he received Petitioner's May 8, 1984 letter but it is clear that he knew its contents and import because he admittedly signed and sent a two page typed letter dated May 16, 1984 to Superintendent Davis. (Tr. 151) This letter was received in the Superintendent's office on May 21, 1984. (Bell Exhibit 2) This was four days after the requested due date of May 17, 1984 for any excuse. Respondent's May 16, 1984 letter informed his supervisor for the first time that Respondent was serving a federal sentence for bank fraud, that he was scheduled to be released June 30, 1984; that he felt he was not guilty of crime, that he was unaware of Director Kahn having her vacation during the time when Respondent requested his leave, that he did not confide his jail problem to Director Kahn because he did not trust her, that in December Director Kahn told him she did not receive the Respondent's one year leave request letter from Donna Bailey, that Respondent had been in touch with Ms. Leah Black since 1983 and recently hand informed Ms. Black of his present location due to rumors, that before leaving Landmark, Respondent requested a leave of absence of one year, that at that time Respondent had accumulated four months of accrued leave and requested four months leave with pay and the remainder as leave without pay, that Director Kahn told him she could not approve his leave request without a physician's statement and he had attached such a statement to his letter request before he left Landmark and gave it to Donna Bailey. Superintendent Davis and Director Kahn believed Respondent to be sick until receipt of his letter dated May 16, 1984. That date is the first date either had actual knowledge of his physicial location and that he was in jail. In Respondent's absence, his supervisors were required to hire temporary employees to fill his position as Behavior Program Specialist. Sometimes they were not able to hire any temporary fill-in personnel and this created additional work for other full-time employees in covering Respondent's caseload. Sometimes the temporary help they were able to hire were not of a comparable skill level with Respondent or someone who might have taken the job full-time. As long as Respondent was on a leave of absence they were unable to advertise for a skilled full-time replacement. This had a detrimental effect on Landmark's in-depth applied behavior modification program. Superintendent Davis determined that Respondent's admission of involuntary incarceration, even if coupled with institutional medical care, did not constitute a reasonable and acceptable excuse as requested in Petitioner's May 8, 1984 letter. This determination is consistent with Landmark's internal policy. Superintendent Davis has previously refused all employees' requests for extended leave for the purpose of serving involuntary jail time. He testified that he would not have granted any of Respondent's previous leave time nor any extensions thereof if the jail sentence had been known to him. His basis for this policy is that criminal sentences are detrimental to employees' functions as role models. He applied this policy to Respondent because Respondent's position as a Behavior Program Specialist requires intensive leadership and role modeling/programming of retarded clients. Superintendent Davis also considered the Respondent's failure to disclose his incarceration to be dishonest dealing with the agency. Superintendent Davis further determined that the date of his receipt of Respondent's May 16, 1984 letter was beyond the allotted time for such excuse. Respondent maintained that he was diagnosed early on the morning of October 17, 1983 by Dr. Shapiro as needing a year's ulcer treatment, applied for and got the leave of absence from Director Kahn some time between Noon and 2:00 P.M. that same day, and thereafter, between 4:30 - 5:00 P.M., he was telephoned by his lawyer to report that very day to federal prison in Eglin, Florida. Respondent says that he had a normal appointment with Dr. Shapiro at 10:45 A.M., October 17, 1983, and at that time received the statement indicating need for a year's leave of absence (Bell Exhibit 3), returned to Landmark, wrote out on a legal pad what was apparently an explanation to Director Kahn that he wanted to use 4 months of accumulated leave with pay (annual and sick leave combined) and to receive 6 months leave without pay to cover October 17, 1983 through October 17, 1984; that he then gave this to Donna Bailey to type, that Director Kahn signed her approval on the typed letter and he returned his letter and medical letter to Donna Bailey. Stephanie Green states that she was with Respondent at the doctor's office on October 17, 1983, and saw him give his typed letter request, the medical letter, and his timesheets to Donna Bailey. Ms. Green does not recall any approval at the bottom of Respondent's letter. Ann White, Respondent's girlfriend, supports some of this information but contradicts much by saying she saw Respondent's letter request at her home on a separate occasion and saw the doctor's letter before that date when hue showed it to her at Landmark. She then says that at the end of October 1983, she examined Respondent's personnel file and saw the Respondent's typed letter request with Director Kahn's approval written at the bottom with the medical letter. These witnesses may have seen another earlier leave request, but timesheets and approval on the bottom of an employee's request would be inappropriate for extended leave request and approval. Director Kahn absolutely denies giving a year's approval in writing at any time and denies ever receiving a typed letter request for one year signed by Respondent. Her secretary was not Donna Bailey but was Sandra Williams. Based upon observation of the candor and demeanor of the witnesses testifying and their credibility or lack thereof, I choose to believe Director Kahn. Independent of the credibility of the live testimony, I also find supportive of Ms. Kahn's testimony the Respondent's admission that he gave his documents, if they were given, to someone not her secretary. Respondent further stated that at that time before his lawyer's call he intended a vacation to get away from it all instead of immediate medical care. Also clearly supportive of Ms. Kahn's testimony is Bell's Exhibit 2 wherein Respondent admits Director Kahn told him in their December phone conversation that she did not receive his letter request for a year's leave and that he was not approved for a year but might be approved for an additional three months after the original December 19, 1953 date. On June 6, 1984, Superintendent Davis sent a letter, (HRS Exhibit 5), certified mail, return receipt requested, to Respondent Bell at Antaeus Unit, Post Office Box 2000, Lexington, Kentucky, 40511. This was the return address on the envelope of Respondent's May 16, 1984 letter. At hearing, Respondent denied receipt of this letter but was admittedly incarcerated by the federal government at that location at that time and did not return to Miami until June 17, 1984. Petitioner's June 6, 1984 letter was received at that address on June 11, 1984, and was signed for by "D.D. St (illegible)" (HRS Exhibit 5). The undersigned finds that Respondent did receive on that date Petitioner's June 6, 1984 letter which stated that Respondent's failure to report on April 30, 1984, and thereafter was now considered abandonment of his position under Section 22A- 7.10 (2)(a) and that he was deemed to have resigned as of the date the letter was received or date it was returned to Petitioner if that occurred. The undersigned is not impressed by Respondent's analysis of Bell Exhibit 5. This item was found among Petitioner's business records, in Respondent's Personnel file. It is a handwritten, undated memorandum which reads in one handwriting "N. Bell went out on med. leave but last med slip is 10/83. Needs one every 30 days even the leave is for year-they keep jumping back and forth on AL to SL, etc." To which, another's hand has replied, "notified Bill Miller 2/13/84 will send in." At best, its message is ambiguous and one obvious interpretation is that monthly doctor's statements would be required by Petitioner from Respondent although the payroll employees already had the medical statement dated October 17, 1983 specifying one year, and that some confusion existed as to how to debit the Respondent's four months accumulated annual and sick leave during his absence. Under the foregoing findings of fact, Respondent abandoned his position upon his unexcused absence for three consecutive days after April 30, 1984.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that, Respondent having been absent without approval for 3 consecutive workdays he be deemed to have abandoned the position of Behavior Program Specialist and to have resigned from the Career Service effective Jun 6, 1984. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Langer, Esquire 255 Alhambra Circle Suite 312 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 John Abramson, Esquire 799 Brickell Avenue Suite 800 Brickell Center Miami, Florida 33131 Gilda Lambert Secretary, Dept. of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David H. Pingree Secretary, Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.577.10
# 5
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. F. D. MORGAN, 84-004026 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004026 Latest Update: May 21, 1990

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Respondent has been a permanent full-time employee of petitioner's for over 22 years and at the time of the alleged abandonment was employed as a Engineer Technician III in petitioner's Second District and is subject to the Career Service rules of Chapter 22A, Florida Administrative Code. Walter Henry Skinner, III, is the District Engineer, Second District, with offices in Lake City, Florida, covering a 16 county area over northeast Florida. In this instance, directly below Mr. Skinner in the chain of command is Raymond O. Humphreys, Resident Construction Engineer. His is a supervising position as contract administrator for road and bridge contracts let by the petitioner to private contracting firms for construction of roads and bridges within 9 counties of the second district. Respondent has worked within Mr. Humphreys' jurisdiction since March, 1976. The record is not clear, but apparently there is at least one other supervisor between Mr. Humphreys and respondent, the position of survey crew chief. Respondent was granted leave of absence without pay on Humphreys' recommendation on May 1, 1983 through July 12, 1983 (Petitioner's Exhibit 9); October 3, 1983 through April 2, 1983 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8); and again on April 3, 1984 for 6 months (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4). Respondent returned to work before the end of this 6 months leave of absence without pay. The record does not reflect when respondent returned to work but apparently he returned to work sometime after his release from the Hamilton County Jail on July 9, 1984. The record shows that respondent was working on September 21, 1984 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3). Respondent was granted 4 hours annual leave on September 24, 1984, 8 hours of annual leave on September 25, 1984 and 8 hours annual leave on September 26, 1984. On September 27, 1984 petitioner placed respondent on unauthorized leave of absence without pay. On September 27, 1984 petitioner was advised by Roger Tanner, respondent's probation officer, that respondent had bean incarcerated in the Hamilton County Jail on September 26, 1984. Petitioner knew that respondent had 78.2 hours of accrued annual leave and 524.0 hours of accrued sick leave. Petitioner did not notify respondent that he had been placed on unauthorized leave without pay on September 27, 1984 until October 4, 1984 when petitioner delivered to respondent a letter from Skinner advising him that he had abandoned his position with the petitioner. Respondent had been incarcerated in the Hamilton County Jail on: (1) April 22, 1983 to July 5, 1983; (2) July 23, 1983; (3) August 11, 1983 to August 12, 1983; (4) September 22, 1983 to July 9, 1984; and (5) September 26, 1984 to October 6, 1984. The evidence reflects that respondent had a "drinking problem" of which petitioner was aware but did very little "counseling" with respondent in this regard. On October 1, 1984 Mr. Markham, Humphreys Resident Office Manager, contacted Judge John Peach's office and was informed by his secretary, after she discussed the matter with Judge Peach, that respondent's "problem would be resolved in a few days" or at least "by the weekend." Respondent worked with a survey crew taking final measurements and checking work in the field completed by the contractors. Respondent was assigned to this survey crew by Humphreys because respondent did not have a valid driver's license. Walter H. Skinner had been delegated authority to take this type action against respondent by Mr. Pappas, Secretary of the Department of Transportation and such delegation was in effect at all times material herein.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that it be found that respondent did not abandon his position and resign from the Career Service as contemplated under Rules 22A-7.1O(2)(a) and 22A-8.O2, Florida Administrative Code and that respondent be reinstated to his position of Engineer Technician III as of September 27, 1984. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald K. Hudson, Esquire Post Office Box 948 Jasper, Florida 32052 Daniel C. Brown Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul A. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla General Counsel 562 Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (1) 7.10
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ANITA BULLARD vs APALACHEE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE, 01-002626 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marianna, Florida Jul. 05, 2001 Number: 01-002626 Latest Update: Feb. 13, 2002

The Issue Whether Respondent committed violations of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner began working at Apalachee Correctional Institute (ACI) in 1993. ACI had about 1,600 to 1,800 inmates during times pertinent to this case. The inmates assigned to ACI are those found to be mentally disturbed. ACI is divided into the East Unit and the West Unit. Petitioner was hired as a Clerk Typist Specialist. She worked in the health services area performing typing and filing in the East Unit. In time Petitioner developed carpal tunnel syndrome. She had three surgeries, two of which involved her wrists. These medical problems prevented her from working a normal schedule and she had to expend her leave in order to cover her absences. Because of the problems with her wrists, she had, from time to time, difficulty typing without experiencing pain. Ann Lashley was employed in the West Unit. In 1995, she had a disagreement with her co-workers and, as a result, she was transferred to the East Unit. Subsequently, Petitioner was moved to the West Unit. Much of the work accomplished by the clerk-typists was related to transcribing psychiatrists' notes. The psychiatrists in the East Unit often typed their own notes. The psychiatrists in the West Unit did not. Therefore, there was more typing for the clerk-typists in the West Unit. Petitioner had difficulty keeping up with this additional typing. John Frank Williams was the overall supervisor of the East and West Units. He does not know, or in any event does not recall, why Petitioner was transferred. Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim based on a date of accident of August 1, 1993. Petitioner's medical situation was coordinated with the Florida Division of Risk Management. A contract service, Compensation Rehabilitation Associates, was employed to audit Petitioner's work station and to determine what, if any, special equipment might assist Petitioner in accomplishing her employment duties without pain. A representative of Compensation Rehabilitation Associates opined that Petitioner required an ergonomically designed chair. Mr. Williams ordered one for her and Petitioner used it. Mr. Williams had work which had to be addressed. Nevertheless, he was aware of Petitioner's limitations and need to visit doctors and made diligent efforts to resolve the situation, including scheduling her work hours in a manner which would permit her to seek medical care. Petitioner related the following events which she contended constituted harassment: In 1994, when she first had problems with one of her wrists, she was told by Kenneth Swann to type with one hand. She was also told, at some time, by Dr. Cherry to type with one hand. She attended a meeting where Mr. Williams said, apparently in response to her continuing medical difficulties, that no one would want her. Joseph Thompson, at some point, told her she was not a team player. Dr. Loeb placed Petitioner at maximum medical improvement (MMI) on June 6, 1995 with no impairment or restrictions. Dr. Vogter placed the Petitioner at MMI on June 25, 1995, with an impairment rating of 17 percent, with restrictions of light duty and no continuous transcription work. Dr. Chason placed the Petitioner at MMI on April 7, 1998, with regard to psychological care, with a zero impairment rating. In a letter from Margaret Forehand dated August 12, 1996, a Personnel Technician II of ACI, Petitioner was informed that she was being placed on alternate duty. This letter outlined Petitioner's proposed work hours and took into consideration her need for reduced hours of typing and her need to visit her doctors. Petitioner, in response to this letter, declined to return to work. She had failed to report for work on August 15, 1996, and has been continuously absent since that date. Her sick leave was exhausted on October 4, 1996. Her Family Medical Leave Act benefits terminated on November 17, 1996. In a letter dated November 25, 1996, C. W. Sprouse, Superintendent of ACI, informed Petitioner that another position had been found for her and invited her to contact Ms. DeDe McMillian so that she could begin working. On or about December 10, 1996, Petitioner called Ms. McMillian and declined the offer. In a letter dated December 17, 1996, C.W. Sprouse informed Petitioner that a personnel action was being taken which could result in her dismissal. She was further informed that she was entitled to a predetermination conference. Petitioner did not request a predetermination conference and on January 3, 1997, her employment with ACI was terminated by Superintendent Sprouse. On May 26, 1998, a Judge of Compensation Claims entered an order adopting a stipulation between Petitioner, ACI, and the Florida Division of Risk Management whereby Petitioner received a lump sum of $50,000. The stipulation further recited that the stipulation resolved any and all issues regarding any aspect of the Petitioner's workers' compensation benefits.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Bullard, Qualified Representative 805 Shelby Avenue Alford, Florida 32420 Ernest L. Reddick, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 12101 Florida Laws (4) 120.57760.01760.02760.10 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.106
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JAMES L. LOWERY, JR. vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 09-003441 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marianna, Florida Jun. 23, 2009 Number: 09-003441 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 2009

The Issue The issue to be resolved concerns whether the Petitioner received, and should be compelled to repay, an alleged salary overpayment of $1,306.09.

Findings Of Fact James L. Lowery, the Petitioner, was employed by the Respondent Department, at all times pertinent. The Department employees are paid bi-weekly, with pay warrants being issued eight days after the end of a pay period. This is based on employee timesheets submitted to the Peoples’ First leave and payroll system. The payroll system will issue an employee a paycheck for the full pay period hours, if his or her timesheet is not timely submitted or if no timesheet is submitted (until a correction and re-calculation is done). That is the default posture. An employee is only paid less or a different amount than his regular salary if a timesheet is timely submitted and reflects less than a full-time number of hours of work or leave- time. Upon an employee’s separation from employment, an audit is conducted of his leave and attendance, to ensure that his final pay is correct. During the audit, the Department reviews the employee’s timesheets to determine what leave codes were used. It generates a cumulative pay report to ensure that the employee was paid correctly for each pay period. Upon conclusion of the audit, the Department sends the employee payment for any leave to which he is entitled, or, if it is determined that he was overpaid, the employee is notified of the hours and amount of the overpayment and repayment is demanded. Mr. Lowery was injured and therefore, had to be absent from work on workers’ compensation leave, starting in May of 2008, for approximately six weeks. He recovered from that injury, but did not return to work because his medication regimen for another condition interfered with his work schedule. Mr. Lowery thereupon began to use his accrued sick and annual leave. He exhausted his sick and annual leave by August 2008. He thereupon began using sick leave that he believed had been donated to him from the sick leave pool. Although he believed he was using sick leave pool leave, he actually had received donated sick leave for the period August 8, 2008 through October 30, 2008. The total amount of leave donated to him was 470 hours. Sick leave donations are not a pre-determined amount, but rather the amount an employee can receive depends strictly on how much leave is actually donated to that individual by other employees. Mr. Lowry used all the leave which had been donated to him as of November 14, 2008. Therefore, for the November 14 through November 27, 2008, pay period he had no leave left to his credit, but did not return to work. His timesheets for that pay period show that he was on “Authorized Leave Without Pay.” When the pay warrants were issued for that pay period, the system did not recognize that the Petitioner was on “Authorized Leave Without Pay” and on December 5, 2008, he was paid for 80 hours, in a gross amount of $1,162.00. Since he only had 4.75 hours of sick leave available for that pay period, he was, thus, overpaid for 75.25 hours. Between November 28, 2008, and December 25, 2008, the Petitioner did not work and had no annual, sick or other type of leave to his credit. Nonetheless, a pay warrant was issued to him on January 2, 2009, for payment for 30.75 hours. He was, thus, overpaid for that number of hours. The Petitioner’s timesheet for the period January 9 through January 22, 2009, shows that his hours were coded or entered as follows: 1.50 hours of annual leave, 1.00 hour of sick leave and 77.50 hours of unauthorized leave without pay. Although he had no annual, sick or other leave available to him, a pay warrant was issued to him on January 30, 2009, for the 2.50 hours. He was, thus, overpaid for that amount of hours. The Petitioner did not question the amounts he was paid on December 5, 2008, January 2, 2009, or January 30, 2009, because he believed he was drawing sick leave credit from the sick leave pool and that his timesheets were being taken care of by a supervisor, Otis Ray, in the Tallahassee office. After January 30, 2009, he received no more pay warrants. Upon the Petitioner’s separation from employment, the Respondent conducted the leave audit referenced above, as delineated in the Department of Financial Services’ Payroll Preparation Manual. It was thus determined that the Petitioner had been overpaid for a total of 108.50 hours for the above- referenced pay periods, due to the fact that he had used leave to which he was not entitled and because his timesheet was not timely submitted. In accordance with the Payroll Preparation Manual (in evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit 7), the amount of salary overpaid, and to be repaid, was calculated as follows: $1,013.56 for the warrant issued on December 5, 2008, $267.71 for the warrant issued on January 2, 2009, and $24.82 for the warrant issued on January 30, 2009. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. The Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case. On May 29, 2009, the Respondent notified Petitioner of its position that he owed repayment of $1306.09, the total amount of the three erroneously paid warrants.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Juvenile Justice requiring the Petitioner to repay erroneously paid salary in the amount of $1,306.09, pursuant to a reasonable installment arrangement to be agreed upon by the parties. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 James L. Lowery, Jr. 3875 Old Cottondale Road Marianna, Florida 32448-492 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100

Florida Laws (3) 110.1165120.569120.57
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GWENDOLYN MORSS vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, RETARDATION PROGRAM OFFICE, 76-001758 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001758 Latest Update: Apr. 18, 1977

The Issue Whether the suspension of the Appellant for the reasons stated in the letter of disciplinary action was for good cause.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing the Hearing Officer finds that the agency did not have cause to suspend the Appellant; however, the evidence tends to indicate that the Appellant took more leave totally than she could have accrued in 1975 and 1976. Therefore, prior to any action to reimburse her for the days she was suspended, the Hearing Officer would recommend an audit of her leave records and that she be compensated only if the audit reveals that she took no more leave than she had accrued. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas E. Whitney, Esquire District General Counsel Health and Rehabilitative Services 1350 Orange Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mrs. Dorothy B. Roberts Appeals Coordinator Department of Administration Division of Personnel 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Ms. Gwendolyn Morss 1185 Lincoln Terrace Orlando, Florida 32787

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SHIRLEY JOHNSON vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 86-003038 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003038 Latest Update: Nov. 03, 1986

Findings Of Fact On July 8, 1986, Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, sent Petitioner, Shirley Johnson, a letter to confirm her separation from employment as a Human Services Worker II in Pierce Cottage, Unit II, Facility IV, at the Gulf Coast Center in Ft. Myers. At the time, Johnson was a permanent employee of HRS. Her job at Pierce Cottage was to help care for 29 severely profoundly mentally retarded persons. On or about May 6, 1986, HRS' Gulf Coast Center instituted new policies for applying for authorization for leave from work. /1 No longer would Petitioner and fellow employees be required to notify their immediate supervisor, Twila Bevins, of their absence or tardiness. Instead, the employees are responsible only to notify the group shift supervisor on duty at Pierce Cottage. The employee only advises the group shift supervisor of the employee's intent to apply for authorization for leave and the amount and time the leave would be taken. The group shift supervisor does not approve leave. Authorization for leave must be obtained directly from the immediate supervisor, Twila Bevins, by explaining the reasons for the leave request which would entitle the employee to authorization for leave. Application for authorization for leave can be made either before or after the group shift supervisor is notified. However, no leave can be authorized for an employee who did not personally give notification of anticipated absence unless the employee is incapacitated. Petitioner is a mother of six. She also cares for her father, who has heart disease, and for her mother, who is overweight and has limited mobility. After a separation she has been reconciled with her husband, who, after being out of work, is now employed and contributes to the support of the family. On July 2, 1986, Petitioner and her immediate supervisor agreed that Petitioner would have July 3 and 4 off, but would work from 6:30 A.M. to 2:30 P.M. on July 5. Petitioner also was scheduled to work on July 6, 7 and 8, 1986. During the early morning hours of Saturday, July 5, between approximately 1:00 A.M. and 4:30 A.M., Petitioner's father had a heart attack and Petitioner and her husband went with him to the hospital and stayed there while he was being cared for. When they returned home at approximately 4:30 A.M., they were told by Petitioner's mother that Petitioner's brother was in jail in Ocala and that she was very concerned about her son. At her mother's request, Petitioner and her husband agreed to drive to Ocala to bail her brother out of jail. When they arrived in Ocala, Petitioner's husband, who was driving when they arrived in Ocala, was arrested for driving with a license under suspension and was himself put in jail. Petitioner herself then had to drive back to Ft. Myers to get money to bail her husband out of jail, drive back to Ocala to bail him out, and drive her husband back to Ft. Myers, a drive of a total of approximately 600 miles. Petitioner did not work and did not call in to work on Saturday, July 5. She was absent without authorized leave. On Sunday, July 6, 1986, Petitioner called into work at 6:30 A.M. to explain to the shift supervisor why she had been absent the previous day, and to notify him that she would not be in until approximately 10:00 A.M. However, tired from her ordeal the previous day and developing a severe headache, Petitioner did not work on Sunday, July 6. She called in later in the morning and spoke to one of the women working in Pierce Cottage but did not speak to the group shift supervisor. She was again absent without authorized leave. On the following morning, Monday, July 7, 1986, Petitioner called in at 6:25 A.M. to tell the group shift supervisor she would be late getting in to work. However, her headache got worse, and the pain traveled down to her neck and down one side of her body. The pain was so severe that she was crying uncontrollably. Although she still told her husband that she wanted to go to work to avoid any disciplinary problems, he talked her into letting him telephone Pierce Cottage to say that she would not be able to work on July 7. At approximately 6:45 A.M., her husband telephoned the group shift supervisor and told him that Petitioner would not be at work at all that day because of her physical condition. On Tuesday, July 8, 1986, Petitioner still was in approximately the same physical condition. At approximately 7:00 A.M., her husband telephoned the group shift supervisor at Pierce Cottage, reported her physical condition, and reported that Petitioner would not be in to work on July 8. Petitioner's husband also reported that Petitioner would probably have to see a doctor that day. Petitioner did indeed go to the Lee County Health Department on July 8, 1986, to be seen for her physical condition. Petitioner went to the Lee County Health Department because she and her husband could not afford to pay a private doctor. When Petitioner arrived at the Health Department at approximately 2:00 P.M., there was no doctor available to see her. She left at approximately 3:00 P.M. with a note confirming the she had been at the Health Department between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M., and that she needed a follow-up appointment. Although Petitioner still was suffering from a severe headache on Wednesday, July 9, 1986, she went to work, turning in her note from the Health Department. However, upon arriving, she was advised of HRS' July 8 letter confirming her separation from her employment. After reciting the grounds upon which HRS had taken the position that Petitioner should be deemed to have abandoned her position, the letter stated: "In the event it was not your intention to resign from employment, you are instructed to immediately contact me and provide a reasonable and acceptable explanation for your unauthorized absence from your employment." Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on July 5 and 6, 1986. Petitioner was not incapacitated from telephoning her group shift supervisor on July 7 and July 8, 1986. However, under the circumstances, it was reasonable for her to have her husband telephone for her. She did not intend to abandon her position. As of July 2, 1986, Petitioner had 27 hours of annual leave and 8 hours of compensatory time in her accumulative leave records and available for use July 5 - 8, 1986. She also would earn an additional 5 hours of annual leave and 4 hours of sick leave by July 10, 1986. This would have been enough to cover her absences and permit her to be paid during her absences if authorized and approved.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact' and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order granting the petition in this case and ruling that the circumstances of this case do not constitute an abandonment of Petitioner's position. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1986.

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