Findings Of Fact Respondent was employed by Petitioner from December, 1982 to December, 1987 as a tariff clerk, a permanent career service position. On September 23, 1987 Respondent became ill and left work without informing her supervisor, Jill Hurd, or her co-workers. Hurd was available on September 23 and 24, 1987 if Respondent had tried to explain her absence or request leave authorization. Respondent presented Health Status Certificates to Petitioner signed by M. R. Grate, Jr., M.D., dated October 30, November 11 and 18, 1987 which certified her inability to return to work from October 27 through November 30, 1987, during which time she was under his care. On the basis of these certificates, Petitioner authorized her sick leave from October 27 to November 30, 1987. Respondent did return to work on December 2, 1987, but was again absent on consecutive work days of December 3, 4 and 7, 1987. On December 3, 1987, Respondent sent a note to Hurd, via her husband, stating she did not feel well and would not be in to work. On December 4, 1987 her husband again brought Hurd a note stating Respondent would not be in because her baby was ill. Respondent's husband called Hurd on December 7, 1987 to state that she was still ill and would not be in to work. Hurd stated that Respondent needed to get back to work. At no time did Respondent request leave for December 3, 4 and 7, 1987, nor was she approved for leave. She simply informed her supervisor, Hurd, through her husband that she was not coming to work each day. Prior to these unauthorized absences in December, 1987, Respondent had received a memorandum from Hurd on January 14, 1987 setting forth specific instructions for calling in sick following a number of unauthorized absences. Respondent was specifically instructed to call her supervisor, Hurd, each morning by 8:30 a.m. when she wanted to take sick leave. Despite this instruction, Respondent never called Hurd on December 3, 4 and 7, 1987, but simply had her husband deliver notes and messages to Hurd on her behalf. This prevented Hurd from discussing with Respondent the extent of her illness and when she expected to return to work. On November 25, 1987 Respondent had an appointment with Dr. Grate, who signed another Health Status Certificate for the period November 30 to December 11, 1987 indicating she remained under his care and was still unable to return to work. However, despite the fact she did report to work on December 2, 1987 and had been given specific instructions about how to apply for sick leave, she never presented Dr. Grate's Health Status Certificate dated November 25, 1987 to Hurd, or anyone else associated with Petitioner, until the hearing in this case. Therefore, Respondent did not present proper medical certification of illness for December 3, 4 and 7, 1987, and instead simply failed to report to work, or to in any way attempt to personally contact her supervisor. A letter dated December 7, 1987 notifying Respondent of her abandonment of position and of her right to a hearing was sent to Respondent from Petitioner's Executive Director by certified mail, return receipt requested. Respondent's husband signed for this letter on December 9, 1987, and Respondent acknowledges receipt.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter Final Order concluding that Respondent has abandoned her position with Petitioner in the career service due to her failure to report to work, or request leave, for December 3, 4 and 7, 1987. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX (DOAH Case No. 88-0161) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 6, 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 8, 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact cannot be made since her post-hearing submission shows no indication that a copy was provided to counsel for Petitioner, despite specific instruction at hearing, and the narrative contained in her letter consists of serial unnumbered paragraphs which primarily present argument on the evidence rather than true proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Adis Vila Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 William S. Bilenky, Esquire Public Service Commission 212 Fletcher Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 Harold McLean, Esquire Public Service Commission Office of General Counsel 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Norma D. Saabir P. O. Box 5802 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-5802 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent was a career-service employee of Respondent. She served as a health service representative assigned to the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Her specific task was to investigate and follow up on contacts for sexually transmitted diseases. Petitioner's Employee Handbook, which Respondent received when she was hired, states: You may request annual leave for any purpose desired, but you must obtain Your supervisor's approval before taking annual leave. If an emergency develops, tell your supervisor of the emergency and ask for verbal approval to use annual leave. When you return to work, complete the leave request form for your supervisor's signature. The Handbook also Provides that certain employees are entitled to one eight-hour personal holiday "at a time which is mutually agreeable to the individual and the immediate supervisor." The local policy of the Seminole County Public Health Unit required each employee to request leave by filling out the back of a timesheet. In this manner, the employee would show the type of leave requested, the date and time of the leave, the employee's initials. The form provided spaces for the signature of the supervisor and the date described in detail in the Paragraph 5 below. The back of the timesheet states: "All Leave and Overtime must be requested and approved in advance." The Handbook requires advance approval of annual leave. Although the blanket statement on the back of the timesheet requires advance approval of all leave and overtime, the Seminole County Public Health Unit routinely did not require advance approval for all types of leave. For instance, sick leave, overtime, and annual leave for less than a few hours were normally approved after the fact. On at least two occasions, including one involving Respondent, annual leave for an entire day was also approved after it had beef taken. However, the Seminole County Public Health Unit normally requires advance approval of annual leave for a Period of one day or more. The instructions on the timesheet direct that the date next to the supervisor's signature indicate the date of the request for leave. Consistent with the varying policies governing leave, the date beside the supervisor's signature on the timesheet was used to show the date of approval of a request for annual leave and the date of the request for sick leave and certain other types of leave. By negative implication, the Handbook also requires written approval of annual leave for nonemergencies because it expressly permits "verbal approval" for annual leave for emergencies. There are no requirements in the Handbook or the timesheets for written approval of requests for other forms of leave, and the Seminole County Public Health Unit did not maintain enforceable policies to that effect. Two persons were authorized to approve requests of Respondent for annual leave. The first person was Charlotte Blades, who was the coordinator of the sexually transmitted disease program of the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Ms. Blades was Respondent's immediate supervisor The other person authorized to approve requests for annual leave was Bernice Duncan, who was the senior community health nurse of the Seminole County Public Health Unit and Ms. Blades' supervisor. In practice, the written approval of Ms. Blades could be revoked by Ms. Duncan. On one occasion, Respondent requested eight hours' annual leave to attend her son's high school graduation on June 9, 1989. Ms. Blades signed the timesheet on May 23, 1989. Between that date and the date of the leave, Ms. Duncan told Respondent that, although Ms. Blades had signed the timesheet, the leave was not approved. Ultimately, Respondent received approval for leave through 2:30 p.m., rather than 5:00 p.m., on the day of the graduation. In late July or early August, 1989, Respondent submitted a timesheet requesting 32 hours' annual leave from August 28-31, 1989. About one week later, before Ms. Blades or Ms. Duncan had acted on the request, Respondent changed the request to September 1, which was the Friday before Labor Day weekend, and September 13-14, 1989. In addition, she requested leave with pay for September 15, 1989, as her personal holiday. According to the timesheets, Ms. Blades approved the September 1 leave request on August 25, 1989, which was a Saturday. She assured Respondent that she would discuss with Ms. Duncan the remaining requests for leave. Respondent followed up with Ms. Blades several times, explaining that she wanted the leave to attend her son's graduation ceremonies from military basic training in South Carolina. Despite her assurances, Ms. Blades had not mentioned Respondent's request to Ms. Duncan before Ms. Blades became sick and missed work from September 6-9. On the second day of Ms. Blades' absence, Respondent took her request to Ms. Duncan, who said that she had not been aware of Respondent's request. Ms. Duncan told Respondent that Ms. Blades was on sick leave and did not respond further. The following day, Respondent spoke again with Ms. Duncan, who this time assured her that if Ms. Blades were not at work on Monday, September 11, Ms. Duncan would sign the timesheet approving the leave requested for September 13-15. Ms. Blades returned to work on Monday, September 11. When Respondent asked her in the morning to sign the timesheet, Ms. Blades refused to do so and told her that it had not yet been approved. Consistent with her prior conversations with Respondent, though, Ms. Blades did not say that the request had been disapproved. Respondent then left the office for much of the day. When she returned, Ms. Blades and Ms. Duncan were both out. The next day, Tuesday, September 12, Ms. Blades spoke with Respondent, but still declined to say whether the request was approved or rejected. She continued to say merely that the request had not yet been approved. Tuesday afternoon, Respondent told a coworker to tell Ms. Blades that Respondent was going to South Carolina and would be back the following Monday morning. While still in town, Respondent telephoned both supervisors shortly after 8:00 a.m. on Wednesday, but they had not arrived at work yet. Respondent asked the receptionist to remind Ms. Blades that Respondent had gone to South Carolina and would return the following Monday morning. Both messages were delivered to Ms. Blades, who relayed them to Ms. Duncan. Respondent then departed for South Carolina, where she remained through at least September 15. At the time of her departure, Respondent knew that her request for annual leave had not been approved and that she was taking unauthorized annual leave. When she arrived back in the office on September 18, Respondent received a copy of a letter dated September 15 that had been mailed to her the prior Friday. The letter states that Respondent had been separated from State service for abandonment of position, effective at the close of business on September 15, 1989. The second paragraph of the letter contains material misstatements of fact. It states that Respondent had been advised that, due to the present work situation, her leave could not be approved. The letter also states that she did not contact her supervisor that she would be absent. No one ever advised Respondent that her leave could not be approved or in fact was rejected until after her return from South Carolina. Also, Respondent informed both supervisors, directly and through third parties, that she would be absent, where she was going, why, and when she would return. However, she did not contact them during the three-day absence. Concerning the request for leave for a personal holiday, neither Ms. Blades nor Ms. Duncan ever informed Respondent that the date was inconvenient. Under the circumstances, Respondent could reasonably infer that the date was agreeable with Ms. Blades. At no time did Respondent intend to abandon her career-service position. The facts do not support a reasonable inference that Respondent abandoned her job during the three days in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding that Respondent has not abandoned her position in Career Service employment with the State of Florida. ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda L. Parkinson Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 701 Orlando, FL 32801 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Alva J. Barfield 1010 Locust Avenue Sanford, FL 32771
The Issue Whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of disability, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Section 760.10 et seq., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Rivero was first employed by Miami-Dade County in November 1984, apparently as a security guard with the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department. He took a physical examination and informed the doctor conducting the examination that he suffered from cluster migraine headaches and that they occurred about six to eight times each month. Mr. Rivero subsequently left his employment with Miami-Dade County, but was re-hired in September 1986. At the time he was re-hired, he advised the recruiting officer that he suffered from migraine headaches. Mr. Rivero was employed by the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department from September 1986 until August 10, 1999. From January 1996 through May 1999, Mr. Rivero was employed as a park ranger by the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department, and he worked at the Metrozoo. His job responsibilities included patrolling areas of the zoo, assisting in emergencies, providing information to patrons, and providing for the safety of patrons and security for Miami-Dade County property. Because of his migraine headaches, Mr. Rivero often was absent from work, and he was advised several times by his supervisors, in documents entitled Record of Counseling, that the frequency of his absences was unacceptable. The most recent Record of Counseling submitted at the hearing by Mr. Rivero was dated November 24, 1997. On January 10, 1995, Mr. Rivero consulted with Ray Lopez, M.D., a neurologist, about his recurring migraine headaches, which had become more intense and frequent after Mr. Rivero was involved in an automobile accident in November 1994. Dr. Lopez diagnosed Mr. Rivero with migraine headaches, with post-traumatic, likely cervicogenic, intensification. Dr. Lopez treated Mr. Rivero for his headaches from January 1995 until at least December 1999. During this time, Mr. Rivero was seen by Dr. Lopez approximately twice a month. Between 1995 and 1999, Mr. Rivero's migraine headaches continued to intensify in severity and frequency. By January 1999, Mr. Rivero found it increasingly more difficult to carry out his duties as a park ranger at Miami-Dade County's Metrozoo when he had a headache, and his headaches were occurring almost daily. Between January 1999 and March 1, 1999, Dr. Lopez wrote several notes documenting Mr. Rivero's inability to work on specified days because of the headaches. Effective March 29, 1999, Mr. Rivero's work schedule was cut from 39 hours per week to 16 hours per week. Mr. Rivero had previously worked Saturdays through Wednesdays, with Thursdays and Fridays off. As a result of the change, Mr. Rivero was assigned to work on Saturdays and Sundays from 10:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. Mr. Rivero last reported for work at the Metrozoo on or about May 22, 1999. Mr. Rivero was unable to continue working because of the frequency and severity of his headaches. Nonetheless, Mr. Rivero called the Metrozoo office regularly between May 22, 1999, and July 18, 1999, to report that he was absent because of illness. He did not, however, have any intention of returning to work after May 1999 because he believed he could no longer perform the duties required of a park ranger.3 In July 1999, Diane Condon, the personnel manager for Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department, was told by Mr. Rivero's supervisor at the Metrozoo that Mr. Rivero had been absent for quite some time, that he had exhausted his paid leave time, and that the reason for his absences was medical. It was suggested to Ms. Congdon that Mr. Rivero be offered leave under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993. In a letter dated July 12, 1999, from John Aligood, Chief of the Human Resources Division of the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department, Mr. Rivero was notified that he had been preliminarily granted family/medical leave but that he would have to present a certification from his doctor within 15 days of the date he received the letter in order for his eligibility for such leave to be finally determined. Mr. Rivero was advised in the July 12, 1999, letter that continuation of the leave was contingent on receipt of medical certification from his doctor; that he must furnish the certification within 15 days after he received the letter; and that "[f]ailure to do so will result in relinquishing FMLA leave; you will then be required to return to the full duties of your job or resign, or you will be terminated for abandonment of position." The July 12, 1999, letter was sent to Mr. Rivero via certified mail, and he picked it up on July 22, 1999. Mr. Rivero contacted Ms. Congdon on July 22, 1999, and told her that Dr. Lopez was unavailable at that time to complete the medical certification. Ms. Congdon advised him that the medical certification was required for the family/medical leave to continue.4 In a letter dated August 10, 1999, which was prepared by Ms. Congdon, Mr. Rivero was advised that his employment had been terminated for abandonment of position because he had failed to provide the medical certification required for continuation of family/medical leave by July 26, 1999, which was 15 days after July 12, 1999.5 Summary The evidence presented by Mr. Rivero is insufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that his employment as a park ranger with the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department was terminated because of his medical condition. Mr. Rivero himself testified that he believed he was unable to perform the duties required by his job as of May 1999 because of his migraine headaches and that he had no intention of returning to work subsequent to May 1999. The evidence presented by Mr. Rivero is sufficient to support the inference that, prior to July 12, 1999, Mr. Rivero did not advise his supervisor at the Metrozoo or anyone else in the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department that he did not intend to return to work after the end of May 1999. His being placed preliminarily on family/medical leave as of July 12, 1999, did not harm Mr. Rivero but, rather, resulted in his health benefits being continued until his termination on August 10, 1999.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief of Ruben Rivero. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Barbara Calhoun, Respondent, is a Career Service employee with permanent status. She has been employed by the Petitioner since approximately 1969 and is presently employed in the capacity of a Resident Lab Assistant (RLA). Mary Ellen Weaver, Nursing Director at Sunland Center at District VII, is in charge of the nurses and other staff personnel at the Sunland Center in Orlando. Mrs. Weaver testified that she approved initially the recommendation by Mrs. Calhoun's supervisor that she be suspended for a continued pattern of absenteeism which had been documented by three previous reprimands, the first of which occurred approximately September 16, 1976. The first reprimand was an oral reprimand of September 16, 1976, and was based on an excessive pattern of sick leave in conjunction with days off. The second one occurred on November 29, 1976, and was submitted by a Mrs. Renner, R.N. and the reviewing officer on that reprimand was Mrs. Graham, R.N. III. The third reprimand occurred on February 5, 1977, a written reprimand the basis therein was excessive absenteeism, with the reviewing officers being Mrs. Renner and Mrs. Graham. (See Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1, 2 and 3.) Documentary evidence introduced reveals that from February 11, 1976, to June 23, 1977, the Petitioner accumulated approximately 19 days of unscheduled absences with the majority of such absences occurring in conjunction with days off and most of which were leave without pay (LWOP) because during the Respondent's approximately eight year employment tenure, she had accumulated no annual or sick leave. (See Joint Exhibit 1.) Without going into a recitation of all of the numerous days in which the Respondent was absent, the following is illustrative. On February 11, 1977, Respondent called in sick which was also without pay because she had accrued no leave. The following day the Respondent called in sick and again this absence was without pay and unscheduled. On March 6, 1977, Respondent had a friend call to advise that she was sick with the flu and again a message was sent the following day, on March 7, 1977. On March 26 the Respondent called in sick which was before she was off for two days. On April 18 the Respondent again called in ill. On May 2 Respondent requested annual leave, which was granted. On May 3 the Respondent called in sick and obtained permission to use annual leave since there was no more sick leave accrued. On May 12 Respondent called in sick and again there was no annual leave accrued to cover the absence. The following day the Respondent called in sick, which was prior to her weekend off. On June 1, 1977, Respondent called in sick after being off on May 30 and May 31. On June 16, 1977, Respondent was off and used an annual leave day, which was unscheduled and without prior approval. On June 23 Respondent called in sick, which was unscheduled. It was at this juncture that Respondent's supervisor recommended a suspension, which was approved by Mrs. Weaver and ultimately sent to a Mr. Windsor for final approval. The Respondent offered no explanation to explain, refute or otherwise contradict the numerous absences nor did she offer any proof of any kind to establish that she was in fact sick in such a sporadic form which occurred in conjunction with her days off. 1/ In view of the above, the undersigned concludes that there is competent and substantial evidence to support the Petitioner's disciplinary action directed toward the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended the personnel action of the Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, be sustained. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of July, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1978.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of disability, and whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact SLCSO is a law enforcement agency in Port St. Lucie, Florida. On April 15, 1996, Petitioner began employment with SLCSO as a corrections officer. She worked as a detention deputy overseeing inmates and was assigned to booking most of her career. Petitioner was good at her job and typically got above average on her evaluations related to her work performance. She also got along with her colleagues. After 2005, when Wesley had a conflict with Lieutenant Stephanie Lyons ("Lt. Lyons"), Petitioner began to believe that she was working in a hostile work environment and that her colleagues were out to get her at the direction of Lt. Lyons. Wesley reported and filed complaints throughout her employment whenever she believed improper behavior occurred. She reported multiple incidents, including ones where she felt employees made statements about her that were untrue. As a result, numerous investigations were conducted by her supervisors and SLCSO Internal Affairs, to which the majority were concluded unfounded. Many of the incidents Wesley reported were unsettling to her and ultimately made her depressed with anxiety, have panic attacks, and elevated her blood pressure. Lt. Lyons, Lt. Daniel O'Brien ("Lt. O'Brien"), Sergeant Jeffrey Jackson ("Sgt. Jackson"), Sgt. James Mullins ("Sgt. Mullins"), and Sgt. Johnny Henry ("Sgt. Henry") were some of Petitioner's supervisors while employed at SLCSO. One incident that has been extremely troubling to Wesley is her observation of Sgt. Jackson punching a pregnant inmate in the stomach. The incident is so upsetting to Wesley that even though she reported the incident when it occurred, she continues to be upset by the incident and continues to relive it, which distresses her. During her employment, Wesley also lost her mom and brother in the same year, 2011. The losses took an added toll on her and caused more emotional difficulties. Another major personal event that stressed Wesley was that she found out the deputy that she thought she had been in a 15-year monogamous relationship with was having an affair with another deputy on Wesley's shift. Those working conditions caused Wesley even more emotional harm. At some point, Wesley had an emotional breakdown, could not get out of bed, and even thought she no longer wanted to live. Eventually, Wesley's illnesses became debilitating, and her high blood pressure was unstable. Wesley started missing work because of her illnesses. She physically was unable to work. On June 20, 2012, after Wesley was absent five times, she was counseled for abuse of sick leave benefits in violation of SLCSO Policy 5.1.33. During the counseling, Wesley was told she "needs to achieve and maintain an acceptable level of sick time usage to improve [her] below average status. Deputy Wesley will receive a below standard on her evaluation for sick time usage." Wesley first applied for the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") on September 25, 2012, but the process was not completed. On February 25, 2014, Wesley was issued a reprimand for abuse of sick leave in violation of SLCSO Policy 5.1.33 after she was absent another five days in 12 months. She was warned that "any further absences will result in continued progressive discipline." Wesley did not lose pay when she was reprimanded. On or about August 21, 2014, Wesley submitted an Intermittent Family Medical Leave Act request for her own "Serious Health Condition" to the SLCSO Human Resources Office ("Human Resources"). Wesley's application was incomplete. On October 8, 2014, Petitioner submitted the outstanding medical certification needed for the application submitted on August 21, 2014. Human Resource Manager Lori Pereira ("Pereira") denied the FMLA request on October 13, 2014, because the medical certification was submitted untimely, 52 days from the date of Petitioner's last absence. On October 22, 2014, Wesley requested reconsideration of her FMLA application, and Human Resources denied it on October 27, 2014. On March 20, 2015, Wesley requested FMLA leave again. In her application, Wesley provided a medical certification filled out by her cardiologist, Dr. Abdul Shadani ("Dr. Shadani"), which stated the patient will be absent from work for treatment "2-6 per year," and the underlying medical condition is systemic arterial hypertension ("hypertension"). "N/A" was the response Dr. Shadani supplied on the medical certification for probable duration of patient's incapacity. The hours/week section was marked intermittent. The certification box was also checked "No" after the question, "Will it be necessary for the employee to work intermittently or to work less than a full schedule as a result of the conditions?" On April 1, 2015, Human Resources approved Wesley's request for Intermittent FMLA leave due to medical reasons. The approval cycle was from August 21, 2014, through August 20, 2015. Pereira backdated Wesley's leave to August 21, 2014, the date Dr. Shadani identified as the beginning of Wesley's medical condition. The backdating converted Wesley's unexcused absences to excused absences, and she avoided additional disciplinary action for unexcused absences. SLCSO policy required that when an employee is on Intermittent FMLA leave, the employee has to call out as needed and report which type of leave is being used. The policy for taking sick leave required that employees call in two hours prior to the shift and notify your supervisor. Wesley felt it was unnecessary to have to call in so frequently. In order to maintain FMLA leave, employees are required to get renewed medical certifications for the cycles. Human Resources notified Wesley when she needed to provide a physician recertification to continue her FMLA leave. When Wesley had to get recertifications, she felt like it was too frequently and that she was being harassed. Obtaining recertifications required that Wesley pay co-pays, which she believed were very expensive since she was not working. Wesley also felt like she was being punished for using the FMLA leave benefit. During the August 21, 2014, to August 20, 2015, FMLA leave cycle, Wesley was absent approximately 444 hours. Pereira discovered Wesley's high leave rate, 444 hours, and noticed that it did not coincide with the projected two to six absences a year on the medical certification. Pereira conferred with her supervisor, Lt. Sheeler, and they decided to verify with Dr. Shadani whether the 444 hours were absences related to Wesley's underlying medical condition to which Wesley had FMLA leave approval. On August 31, 2015, Pereira wrote Dr. Shadani a letter inquiring about the 444 hours Wesley had been absent. By facsimile dated September 4, 2015, Dr. Shadani responded to Pereira's request and confirmed that the amount of absences listed in the medical certification was correct without further explanation or reference to Wesley's hypertension. On September 9, 2015, Human Resources approved Wesley's Intermittent FMLA request for the August 21, 2015, through August 20, 2016, cycle for Petitioner's own serious health condition. It was backdated to cover the dates Wesley missed back to August 21, 2015, even though the recertification was not completed until near the end of the covered FMLA period. While working at SLCSO, Wesley sought mental health counseling to help deal with her feelings about the workplace. She wanted to continue working for SLCSO and perform successfully. Human Resources decided they needed a better understanding of Wesley's condition with the extensive time she had been absent contrary to Dr. Shadani's absence projection. Pereira and Lt. Sheeler decided to request a second opinion since no detailed information was provided from Dr. Shadani. Pereira contacted Dr. Joseph Gage ("Dr. Gage"), a cardiologist and requested that he provide a second opinion. Dr. Gage was asked to review Wesley's job description and evaluate if her 444 hours of absences were reasonable for her medical condition, provide the reasoning for the number of absences from work for her medical condition, and determine if Wesley was capable of performing her job functions. SLCSO also requested that they be invoiced for the co-pay for Wesley's visit to Dr. Gage. On or about September 29, 2015, Pereira spoke with Wesley and told her she needed to go get a second opinion and that SLCSO was choosing a cardiologist, Dr. Gage, for the mandatory second opinion. That same day, Wesley received a call from Stuart Cardiology that she needed to report for a second opinion. SLCSO set up the appointment for Wesley. Wesley felt that SLCSO's making her report for a second opinion was harassment after her doctor, Dr. Shadani, had already responded to the Human Resources' request. Wesley emailed Pereira and told her "I am starting to feel punished for being on FMLA." Wesley also emailed Pereira and asked for the "specific reason(s) for your request for a second opinion." On or about October 2, 2015, Pereira responded to Wesley by email and stated: As I mentioned in our phone call a few moments ago, since Dr. Shadani's medical certification states that you would be absent for treatment for your medical condition for 2-6 times per year and due to the fact that you missed 444 hours within the past year, we are requiring this second opinion with our choice of cardiologist, Dr. Gage. On October 5, 2015, Dr. Gage evaluated Wesley. On October 9, 2015, Dr. Gage provided Human Resources his results of Wesley's evaluation. Dr. Gage was not able to confirm if the absences were from Wesley's hypertension because he did not have her blood pressure measurements during the absent dates. However, Dr. Gage was concerned about Wesley's blood pressure level and instructed Wesley not to return to work until the hypertension was more regulated. Dr. Gage also recommended Wesley expedite a visit to her cardiologist, Dr. Shadani, before being released. Wesley was released to return to work by Dr. Shadani on October 6, 2015. However, she did not provide her return to work release to Human Resources, contrary to SLCSO policy. Instead, Wesley provided the doctor's note to her supervisors. SLCSO policy requires medical clearance be provided to Human Resources if a deputy has missed more than 40 hours of consecutive work. On October 20, 2015, Kimberly Briglia ("Briglia"), the then human resources manager that replaced Pereira, called and told Wesley that a physician medical clearance had to be provided to Human Resources for her to return to work. Briglia's call was followed up by an email, and Wesley felt harassed, which she reported. On October 23, 2015, Lt. Sheeler reminded Wesley by memo that she had been sent an email by Human Resources on October 19, 2015, requesting a fitness for duty evaluation be provided by her physician. The memo informed Wesley that it was a "direct order" that she provide a fitness for duty report by November 2, 2015. Human Resources had sent previous correspondences to Wesley by certified mail that were returned unclaimed. SLCSO's practice was to have documents personally served by Civil Unit deputies when certified mail was unclaimed. Since Wesley had not been claiming her certified mail, Briglia had the SLCSO's Civil Unit personally serve Wesley at her residence with Lt. Sheeler's fitness for duty report memo dated October 23, 2015, to ensure Wesley received it because of the November 2, 2015, impending deadline. Wesley believed the personal service was harassment, and having to go to another doctor for a fitness of duty clearance was also harassment. On October 30, 2015, Wesley provided the fitness for duty report to Briglia and Lt. Sheeler. On October 31, 2015, Wesley was released to full duty without restrictions. On January 5, 2016, Human Resource Specialist Caitlyn Tighe requested Wesley provide a medical recertification to continue her FMLA leave. On January 22, 2016, Wesley provided Human Resources a FMLA medical certification signed by Dr. Shadani even though she felt it was harassing when SLCSO requested such documentation. On March 7, 2016, Wesley requested a retroactive pay increase because she believed that a deputy had received a similar pay increase and that she deserved the same. Wesley continued to believe that her supervisors were harassing her. On or about March 24, 2016, Wesley reported to Captain William Lawhorn ("Capt. Lawhorn") that she had been mistreated by Lt. Lyons yet again, as she had been doing since 2005. Wesley complained of the following problems with Lt. Lyons: Lt. Lyons assigned Sgt. Jackson over Wesley because he was "someone who feeds off of [Lt. Lyons]." Lt. Lyons tried to discipline Wesley while she was applying for FMLA leave. Lt. Lyons directed Sgt. Tom Siegart ("Sgt. Siegart") to call Wesley to let her know that she would need a doctor's note to return to work if she was out another day because she was on her third consecutive sick day. The "needs improvement" on Wesley's performance evaluation was only the rating because Lt. Lyons directed Sgt. Siegart to lower it. Lt. Lyons asked the deputies over radio communications had they seen Wesley who was late for roll call. Wesley believed Lt. Lyons was trying to embarrass her by calling her over the radio and not looking for her when she came in late. On April 19, 2016, Director of Finance Toby Long denied Wesley's request for a pay increase and explained that in 2007, Wesley had been provided an increase that corrected the discrepancy in her pay grade. He also informed Wesley that she had been paid properly since the 2007 increase. On April 22, 2016, Capt. Lawhorn had a meeting with Wesley and Lt. Lyons to discuss the March 24, 2016, complaint. Lt. Lyons agreed not to address Wesley publicly on the radio and talk with her privately going forward. Wesley declined the transfer Capt. Lawhorn offered, and Wesley and Lt. Lyons agreed they could work together. Capt. Lawhorn found no misconduct for any of the five complaints Wesley made on March 24, 2016. He found that the assignment of Sgt. Jackson was an arrangement based on need. The corrective action was moot because it was retracted when it no longer applied since Wesley's FMLA leave was backdated. He also determined that Lt. Lyons frequently used the radio to communicate all issues to deputies and was not singling Wesley out. Next, Capt. Lawhorn decided it was common practice to have a deputy call to check on another deputy about leave and to determine how to plan the work schedule. He also concluded Lt. Lyons used proper discretion when lowering Wesley's rating to "needs improvement," because Wesley had a zero sick leave balance and was tardy to work. Lastly, Wesley had been late at roll call; so, it was appropriate to look for her. Soon after the meeting, Wesley complained to Capt. Lawhorn that Lt. Lyons had discussed the meeting with Lt. Lyons' friend, Deputy Denetta Johnson ("Dep. Johnson"), and Dep. Johnson glared at her. Capt. Lawhorn followed up the complaint by investigating. He met with Dep. Johnson and found out that Lt. Lyons had not discussed the meeting with her. On May 27, 2016, Wesley provided SLCSO a Certification of Health Care Provider for Employee's Serious Health Condition signed by Dr. Shadani to continue her FMLA leave. In May 2016, Wesley's Intermittent FMLA was approved after she provided the FMLA medical recertification to Human Resources. In May 2016, Capt. Lawhorn tried to assist Wesley and found himself compiling a history of Wesley's career, including ten years of complaints against Lt. Lyons and other supervisors, reviewing her discipline and attendance history, medical condition, FMLA leave, and injuries. He evaluated Wesley's complaint that Lt. Lyons and the other supervisors were causing her undue stress and that she was being treated differently. Capt. Lawhorn discovered that Wesley had ten corrective actions for her whole tenure with the sheriff's office, which were related to neglect on-duty charges or sick leave abuse. Her record confirmed approved Intermittent FMLA leave for a personal, serious medical condition. Capt. Lawhorn's review found that Wesley's work history pattern of declining attendance, including periods without a full paycheck, started in 2013 and included: 2013, missed two full paychecks; 2014, missed one full paycheck; 2015, missed ten full paychecks; and 2016, missed four out of nine checks (YTD). Capt. Lawhorn addressed the possibility of Wesley qualifying for workers' compensation benefits because of her complaints about workplace stress, anxiety, and interactions with Lt. Lyons. Capt. Lawhorn addressed the issues in a memo to Major Tighe dated May 16, 2016. However, it was determined that Wesley did not qualify for workers' compensation benefits. By July 2016, Wesley's FMLA leave was running out. Human Resources Clerk JoLeah Rake prepared and sent a letter to Wesley to notify her that the FMLA leave exhausted July 26, 2016. The letter was returned unclaimed. Briglia determined that notifying Wesley that her leave was exhausted was an urgent matter and that she requested personal service to Wesley's residence by the SLCSO Civil Unit to ensure Wesley received the notice. On or about August 3, 2016, Wesley provided a return to work note to Briglia from Dr. Denise Punger ("Dr. Punger"), stating that Wesley could return to work on August 5, 2016. Wesley had just missed five days of work. Briglia could not determine the nature of Wesley's illness because Dr. Punger's note did not provide an explanation for Wesley's five absent days of work. Also, Dr. Punger was not Dr. Shadani, the doctor who had previously provided Wesley's medical certifications for FMLA leave. Briglia was concerned for Wesley's safety and the safety of her co-workers. On August 4, 2016, Briglia made an independent Human Resources decision and requested by letter that Wesley provide a more detailed explanation from Dr. Punger for her absences, to ensure Wesley was fit for duty to return to work. Briglia had the Civil Unit personally serve the letter dated August 4, 2016, to Wesley at her residence. On August 4 2016, Wesley called Briglia to address her displeasure with the request for details from her physician and the personal service at her residence a second day in a row. Wesley described the SLCSO actions as embarrassing, harassment, retaliation, discrimination, and a violation of her rights. Wesley informed Briglia that they were making her situation worse. Briglia told Wesley she would return her call. On August 5, 2016, together Briglia and Lt. Sheeler called Wesley back to explain that it was within SLCSO policy to verify details of medical conditions. They further told Wesley that since the release was signed by a physician other than Dr. Shadani who had previously provided the explanation for her FMLA leave medical certifications and absences, the medical reasons for the absences needed to be clarified and provided. Lt. Sheeler and Briglia also told Wesley that workplace safety was the priority that created the need for the request in order to both protect employees and to make sure SLCSO is not going against the orders of Wesley's doctor. It was also explained to Wesley that civil service was necessary because she did not claim her certified mail, she needed to be notified, and she could not return to work without a fitness for duty clearance. Wesley did not believe Briglia and Lt. Sheeler. Each request for medical documents caused Wesley additional stress. Wesley admitted at hearing that she did not claim her certified mail. Afterwards, Wesley provided a medical excuse slip from Dr. Punger, clarifying that Wesley's absences were due to migraines and high blood pressure. Human Resources allowed Wesley to return to work after receiving Dr. Punger's excuse slip. On August 22, 2016, Wesley filed a complaint against Briglia. On August 22, 2016, Wesley received a corrective action for abuse of sick leave and an informal counseling for the five sick absences in four months that were not FMLA leave related. Wesley violated agency policy by taking time off without accrued sick leave. On or about September 8, 2016, Wesley provided SLCSO a Certification of Health Care Provider for Employee's Serious Health Condition signed by Dr. Shadani. On September 19, 2016, Wesley filed a complaint regarding the August 22, 2016, corrective action. After reviewing the corrective action, Capt. Lawhorn found the corrective action appropriate and the informal discipline fair and supported by policy. Wesley did not lose pay for the discipline. On September 22, 2016, Wesley filed a discrimination case with the FCHR, alleging SLCSO discriminated against her by subjecting her to harassment and discrimination, and retaliation, for taking FMLA leave due to her disability, hypertension. On March 16, 2018, FCHR issued a Determination: No Reasonable Cause. Wesley filed a Petition for Relief on or about April 12, 2018, to contest the determination. Wesley claims in her petition that the requirement that she acquire a second opinion from Dr. Gage, the personal service to her residence by the SLCSO Civil Unit deputies to deliver correspondence, and the requirement that her physician, Dr. Punger, clarify her medical condition to return to work were harassment, discrimination, and retaliation for her utilizing her FMLA leave benefit.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Peggy F. Wesley, pro se (Address of Record) For Respondent: R. W. Evans, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) R. W. Evans, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) Peggy F. Wesley (Address of Record-eServed) Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the issue of abandonment in these proceedings, Petitioner Bynoe was a Career Service Employee, and was employed by the Department of Corrections at Hendry Correctional Institution in Immokalee, Florida, as a Correctional Officer I. In February 1989, the Petitioner submitted a written request for annual leave from June 9, 1989 to June 17, 1989. The leave was approved by the Petitioner's supervisor, Captain Jody Davis. June 6, 1989, Petitioner Bynoe was informed by Captain Davis that he did not have enough hours of annual leave accrued to cover the vacation period which was to begin on June 9, 1989. The prior written approval to the Petitioner for annual leave was revoked as the previously anticipated hours of accrued annual leave did not exist. The Petitioner had only eight hours of annual leave accrued at the time the approval of annual leave was revoked by Captain Davis. In an attempt to accommodate the Petitioner, who had already scheduled vacation plans, Captain Davis told him that the work schedule could be rearranged to allow Petitioner Bynoe to have five days off in a row from June 7, 1989 through June 11, 1989. This work schedule would give Petitioner Bynoe his regular days off of June 7th and 8th. His regularly scheduled days off of June 14th and 15th could be moved to June 9th and 10th, and the eight hours of annual leave available to Petitioner could be used on June 11th. Thus, Petitioner could have time off from work, and Captain Davis could act within his supervisory authority with regard to his approval of leave requests from the Petitioner, who was under his direct supervision. During the discussion between the Petitioner and Captain Davis, the Petitioner requested that he be allowed to take the full vacation period previously scheduled, and that the time from June 12, 1989 through June 17, 1989, be granted as leave without pay. Captain Davis informed Petitioner Bynoe that he did not have the authority to approve such a request, and that such an approval would have to come from someone higher in command. Although the two men ended their conversation with the clear intention to discuss the matter later during the work period on June 6, 1989, they were unable to discuss the matter again on that date. After the Petitioner completed work on June 6, 1989, he left for South Carolina as he had originally planned. On June 9, 1989, Petitioner telephoned Colonel Page at Hendry Correctional Institute. As Colonel Page was on leave, the call was transferred to the personnel manager, Mr. Dick Vollmer. During the conversation, the decision made by Captain Davis to revoke the Petitioner's leave from June 12, 1989 to June 17, 1989, was discussed. Captain Davis' decision was not modified by Mr. Vollmer or anyone else at the correctional institution. The Petitioner did not return to work on June 12, 1989. No additional contact with the institution was initiated by Petitioner until June 19, 1989, when he informed Captain Davis that he was to begin jury duty on that date. The Petitioner was absent from work without an authorized leave of absence on his scheduled work days of June 12, 1989 through June 18, 1989. Captain Davis expected the Petitioner back to work on June 12, 1989. Petitioner Bynoe was scheduled to work from June 12, 1989 to June 20, 1989. The Petitioner did not report to work nor did he contact anyone at the institution until June 19, 1989, when he began jury duty on that date. The Petitioner was absent from work without an authorized leave of absence on his scheduled work days of June 12, 1989 through June 18, 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the evidence, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Secretary of the Department of Administration issue a Final Order finding that Petitioner Bynoe abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accept that Captain Davis spoke with Petitioner. See HO #3 - HO #6. Reject the finding that Captain Davis had not informed the Petitioner that his previously approved leave request had been rescinded. Contrary to fact. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #7 and HO #8. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #8. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. Rejected. This testimony not believed by the Hearing Officer. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. 19.-27. Rejected. Immaterial to these proceedings. Also, Daugherty's testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer, and was rejected in full. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #3. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #8. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See preliminary statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Joan Stewart, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. Post Office Box 11239 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Perri M. King, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent’s employment should be suspended and terminated for the reasons set forth in the Amended Petition for Involuntary Resignation.
Findings Of Fact Respondent began her employment with Petitioner as a substitute teacher in November of 1997, and was later hired as a regular teacher in January of 2000. Respondent held a temporary teaching certificate which expired after the time period at issue in this case. Respondent was first assigned to teach at Santaluces High School and was later assigned to Bear Lakes Middle School, where she taught geography. On April 12, 2002, Respondent was injured in the line of duty while attempting to assist another teacher control unruly students. In that incident Respondent fell and injured both her back and her knee. Respondent was authorized by Petitioner’s workers’ compensation administrators to treat with both Dr. Wexler and Dr. Lichtblau for her injuries.1 Following the accident on April 12, 2002, Respondent continued to work at Bear Lakes Middle School until on or about November 11, 2002, when she was placed on a light duty assignment at another location. Respondent had been placed on light duty by Dr. Wexler because he felt it was medically necessary. Thereafter, Respondent was given several light-duty assignments to accommodate her physician-imposed work restrictions, including assignments to Conniston Middle School, Risk Management, JFK Middle School, Gold Coast Community, and the District’s substitute office. Respondent was placed on light-duty assignments by the Palm Beach County School Board (School Board) for a total of more than ten months. The light-duty assignments provided by the School Board are temporary assignments that are made available in lieu of workers’ compensation payments to employees who are able to perform light duty. They are not offered for an indefinite period of time, nor are they offered as a permanent employment option. Following some confused communications about Respondent’s certification status and some further confused communications as to whether Respondent had reached maximum medical improvement and could return to a seven-and-a-half hour per day classroom teacher position, Respondent was offered a job teaching full-time (seven-and-a-half hours per day) at Jeaga Middle School. Respondent was supposed to begin teaching at Jeaga Middle School in September of 2003. On September 10, 2003, Dr. Wexler, one of Respondent’s treating physicians wrote that he agreed with another physician’s assessment that Respondent had reached maximum medical improvement and could work eight hours per day with certain restrictions that could be accommodated in a classroom teaching setting. Later that month, Dr. Wexler explained that there had been some confusion on September 10, 2003, and that he was of the view that Respondent had not yet reached maximum medical improvement and that Respondent’s work hours should be restricted to four hours per day. Respondent declined the offer of the full-time teaching position at Jeaga Middle School and requested that the School Board offer further light-duty work assignments of no more than four hours per day. The School Board promptly informed Respondent that she would not be offered any further light-duty assignments and that if she was not going to accept the full- time position at Jeaga Middle School, she should apply for leave without pay in order to avoid being terminated by the School Board. At an earlier time following her April 12, 2002, injury, Respondent was on leave without pay for a period of time. During that period she received workers’ compensation benefits in lieu of wages or salary. During that period of time Respondent was dissatisfied with the workers’ compensation benefits she received. Because of that prior negative experience, Respondent did not want to again request leave without pay, which would require her to rely on workers’ compensation benefits until she reached maximum medical improvement. Respondent did not accept the full-time position at Jeaga Middle School and did not apply for leave without pay. Respondent did not apply for any other regular employment opportunities with the School Board. Respondent did continue to request assignment to a light-duty position for four hours per day. The School Board advised Respondent on several occasions that she would not be assigned to any further light-duty positions and that it would be in her own best interest to apply for leave without pay to avoid termination from the School Board. As a teacher employed by the School Board, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Classroom Teachers Association (CTA) and, at all times material to the instant case, has been covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School Board and the CTA (CTA Contract). The subject of unpaid leaves is addressed at page 55 of the CTA Contract, which includes the following language: SECTION C - UNPAID LEAVES: GENERAL PROVISIONS All absences of employees from duty shall be covered by leave applications which are duly authorized, a copy of which shall be provided employees upon request. Except for short-term leaves of absence, and intermittent political leave, unpaid leaves shall be timed such that the employee returns at the beginning of a new grading period. Except for extenuating circumstances, Sick Leave without Pay for Personal Illness or Illness/death of a Family Member, for more than ten (10) days, also shall be timed so that the employee returns at the beginning of a grading period. An employee taking an approved unpaid leave shall retain the same contractual and salary credit status as he/she had upon taking such leave and shall be returned to the same school, and within certification, to the same assignment he/she held prior to taking the leave, if said leave is for a duration of twelve (12) months or less. However, an employee while on an unpaid leave shall be subject to the Excessing Procedure and the Lay-Off/Call-Back Procedure of this Agreement the same as if they were not on leave. If these procedures become operative and affect the employee on leave, he/she may not be returned to the same position he/she held prior to taking leave. Likewise, employees while on an unpaid leave maintain their rights to apply for transfers and/or reassignments as provided by this Agreement. * * * SECTION D - UNPAID LEAVES: SPECIFIC PROVISIONS Short Term Leave of Absence - Any employee desiring short term leave of absence shall make written application for such leave to the Principal or immediate supervisor. Except in emergency situation, such applications shall be approved in advance. Leave for emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance, if prompt report is made to the proper authority. The first five (5) requested days of short term leave, whether covered by one (1) or more than one (1) request, will be approved. Requests for short term leave thereafter, regardless of length, will be granted or denied by the District in its discretion. Applications for more than five (5) working days will require that a reason be given and shall be subject to approval by the Superintendent. Employees shall not be gainfully employed during normal working hours while on such leave. Long Term Leave of Absence - A long term leave of absence is permission granted by the Board, at the District’s discretion, for an employee to be absent from his/her duties for specified periods of time with the right of returning to duty on expiration of the leave. Leave shall be officially granted in advance by the District and shall be used for the purpose set forth in the leave application. Such long-term unpaid leave, when granted, will be for the remainder of the school year, unless otherwise approved with the initial leave request. In addition, up to one (1) additional year of leave shall be granted upon receipt of a written request from the employee, unless the employee has not been reappointed in keeping with other provisions of the Agreement for the next school year. Such extension of long-term leave shall be timed such that the employee returns at the beginning of a new grading period. Once an employee has exhausted the leave privileges under this subsection (Long-term Leaves), the employee shall be required to return to duty for a full year before being eligible for another long-term unpaid leave. As a School Board employee, Respondent is subject to applicable School Board rules and regulations, including School Board Policy 3.80 and School Board Directive 3.27. School Board Policy 3.80 addresses unpaid leaves when an employee’s sickness has extended beyond all compensable leave. School Board Directive 3.27 addresses the general topic of separation from employment. Under the caption “Suspension/Termination” the directive provides: 3. The Principal/Department Head may recommend to the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Relations disciplinary action against an employee if the employee commits one or more of the following offenses, including but not limited to: * * * b. Willful absence from duty without leave in violation of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes (now § 1012.67, Fla. Stat.). * * * e. Incompetent to perform regular work duties. Incompetency is defined as incapacity to perform due to lack of emotional stability or physical ability; or lack of adequate command of the designated area of work. Employees are also incompetent when they repeatedly fail to perform duties prescribed by law and by this district. [2] Respondent was personally advised on numerous occasions that if she did not apply for a leave of absence, she would be absent without approved leave and would be subject to termination. Respondent was absent without authorization.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order terminating Respondent’s employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2005.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Johnny L. Richardson, was a test technician in the receiving/inspection department of the Respondent, Group Technologies Corporation, when he became ill, had to be hospitalized, and went on a medical leave of absence on September 6, 1990. Before he was able to return to work, in addition to the illness that resulted in his initial hospitalization, the Petitioner suffered two pulmonary embolisms that required hospitization and had a lobectomy (removal of part of one lung). At the time of his ultimate discharge from the hospital, the Petitioner was diagnosed with a number of medical conditions. He had hypovolemic shock, viral myocarditis, with cardiomyopathy and right ventricular failure, pulmonary abscesses, congestive heart failure, leukocytosis, chest wall pain and pleurisy. In addition, he already had insulin dependent diabetes mellitus. Because of the length of the Petitioner's medical leave of absence, and the Respondent's needs, the Petitioner's former position in the receiving/inspection department was filled during his absence, in accordance with standard company policy. The Respondent's treating physicans released him to return to work on or about July 2, 1991. At the time, the Respondent was aware of the Petitioner's preexisting insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, and was generally aware that the Petitioner's health problems had required hospitalization and a medical leave of absence. But the Respondent did not have detailed medical information concerning the Petitioner's other medical diagnoses. On or about July 2, 1991, the Petitioner contacted the Respondent's staff nurse to advise her that he had been released to return to work. She made arrangements for him to be seen on July 8, 1991, by the Respondent's consulting physician, in accordance with standard procedures for employees on leave of absence for over 90 days. The consulting physician was a specialist in occupational medicine and had a working knowledge of the Respondent's work place and the jobs performed by its employees. He was to use this expertise and knowledge to verify that the employee could do the job he was to perform and to determine whether any restrictions or limitations were appropriate in view of the employee's medical condition. The staff nurse also advised the Petitioner to contact the Respondent's Human Resources Representative (HR Rep) to tell her that his treating physicians had cleared him to return to work. The next day, the Petitioner telephoned the HR Rep, but she was out on vacation until July 8, 1991. On or about July 8, 1991, the Petitioner was seen by the company's consulting physician. A routine medical examination was conducted, including taking a history. The Petitioner told the doctor that he had coronary heart disease, diabetes, lung abcess and hypertension and was taking various medications, including Coumadin and Lanoxin for his heart disease, Lasix and Prednisone for his chronic lung disease and breathing disorders, and insulin for his diabetes. He also reported the lobectomy. Based on the medical examination, the doctor prepared a report stating that he needed medical records from the Petitioner's treating physicians and that the Petitioner would need a job check before reemployment to ascertain the suitability of the particular job in which he was placed. In addition, the report stated that the Petitioner would have to avoid physical stress and avoid lifting heavy weight. The report also suggested that the Petitioner's exposure to chemicals may have to be limited. The doctor also filled out and gave the Petitioner a form stating that the "disposition" of the examination was that the Petitioner was to have "no duty." The Petitioner gave this form to the staff nurse, but the evidence is not clear when. On the day of the examination, before the report was sent to the Respondent's medical office, or even typed, the doctor telephoned a report to the Respondent's staff nurse. The nurse in turn telephoned the HR Rep and told her that, per the doctor's instructions, the Petitioner was not to work with chemicals and was to limit lifting to 25 pounds. The HR Rep also was advised that it would be best for the Petitioner not to work night shifts due to the medications he was taking. As can be seen, the information on the "disposition" form was not consistent with the information in the written report or with the information in the telephonic report the staff nurse gave the HR Rep that day. The Petitioner also saw the HR Rep on July 8, 1991. (She had just returned from vacation.) It is not clear from the evidence whether, at the time of her meeting with the Petitioner, the HR Rep already had received the telephonic report from the company's staff nurse. During the Petitioner's meeting with the HR Rep, the HR Rep told the Petitioner that she would have to determine whether the company had any test technician positions, or other positions with status and pay commensurate with the Petitioner's former position, that were open. Under company policies, employees returning to work after an extended leave of absence, during which their former positions were filled, were entitled to be considered for other positions with status and pay commensurate with the employee's former position, if any were available. The HR Rep reviewed her open requisition lists and determined that there were no suitable positions open at the time. (On or about June 28, 1991, the Respondent had extended job offers, with start dates in early July, to eight applicants for test technician positions that the company had been in the process of filling in June.) She telephoned this information to the Petitioner on either July 8 or 9, 1991, and told him that she would have to lay him off with recall rights. Actually, company policy provides for laying employees off with recall rights as a result of reductions in work force. It does not specifically apply to the situation where an employee returns to work after an extended leave of absence, during which the employee's former position was filled, and there are no positions with status and pay commensurate with the employee's former position available. But, since there was no other employment status designated by personnel policies for such an employee, the company felt that it was appropriate to lay off such an employee with recall rights. Under company policy, an employee who is laid off with recall rights has a right to be considered for recall before new employees with similar skills are hired. This is not a guarantee of reemployment but only right to be considered for employment before "external candidates" are considered. Actually, even under this interpretation of company policies, the Petitioner should have been laid off with recall rights only if he was ready to return to duty with restrictions (as indicated in the consulting physician's written report, and in the telephonic report from the staff nurse to the HR Rep). If he was unable to return to duty at that time (as indicated by the "disposition" form), he should have been continued on medical leave of absence. At the conclusion of their meeting on July 8, 1991, the HR Rep told the Petitioner that he would be contacted if there were any openings for him, or words to that effect. On or about July 12, 1991, the HR Rep became aware of an employee requisition request with a position with status and pay commensurate with the Petitioner's former position. She contacted the hiring supervisor and asked if he was interested in hiring the Petitioner for the position. The hiring supervisor quickly replied that he was not interested in hiring the Petitioner. Asked why not, he answered that he knew the Petitioner's attendance and performance history from having worked with the Petitioner in past years, and from knowing the Petitioner's reputation, he was not interested in hiring him. Further specifics about the hiring supervisor's reasons for not wanting to hire the Petitioner were neither given nor asked for until approximately January, 1992, which is after the filing of the Charge of Discrimination in this case. If asked, the hiring supervisor would have said that, during a period of time in which they worked together in the early 1980s, the Petitioner was frequently absent from work, frequently wandered away from his work station, and frequently could not be found when needed. Later, in the late 1980s and early 1990, the hiring supervisor had several occasions to inquire as to the reason for delays and was told that there was a bottleneck in the receiving/inspection department because the Petitioner was absent from work again. The Petitioner's absences made it difficult for those depending on the Petitioner's work to meet production deadlines. To attempt to deal with the Petitioner's absences, the company tried to get the employee in the position in the shifts before and after the Petitioner's shift to work overtime. After talking to the hiring supervisor, the HR Rep reported to her supervisor, who helped her research the Petitioner's personnel file to determine if there was "reasonable justification" for the hiring supervisor's rejection of the Petitioner on the basis given to the HR Rep. They learned from the Petitioner's personnel records that, on or about May 17, 1990, the Petitioner's supervisor counseled him that his attendance had to improve. In June, 1990, the Petitioner's performance appraisal reflected the attendance problems. It indicated some improvement but stated that further improvement was necessary for the Petitioner's attendance record to be within company norms. The appraisal also indicated that the Petitioner's performance no longer was improving, as the prior year's appraisal indicated it had been. It is not clear from the evidence whether the HR Rep and her supervisor also reviewed the Petitioner's attendance records. If they had, they would have also seen that the Petitioner was absent from work a total of 220 hours in 1989, not including 64 hours during plant shutdowns. From January to May, 1990, the Petitioner was absent a total of 46 hours, in addition to 124 hours of vacation leave without prior notice. After Sumner declined to hire the Petitioner, the HR Rep did not ask other hiring supervisors to consider the Petitioner for openings before considering external candidates. She did not tell the Petitioner that he had been rejected for the opening on or about July 12, 1991, or that his recall rights effectively had been terminated (in that she no longer was asking hiring supervisors to consider the Petitioner for openings before considering external candidates.) Nonetheless, the Petitioner was not surprised not to be recalled because he knew that employees who are laid off with recall rights are rarely recalled. The Petitioner acknowledges that he cannot prove, by direct evidence, that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of a handicap or perceived handicap. Instead, the Petitioner argues that it should be inferred from the evidence that the Respondent, first, laid off the Petitioner instead of maintaining him on medical leave of absence and, second, did not recall him, in furtherance of plan to terminate his employment because of his handicap or perceived handicap. The inference the Petitioner seeks to have drawn was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. First, as for the decision to lay the Petitioner off, there is no persuasive evidence that it would have been significantly more difficult ultimately to terminate the Petitioner's employment if the Petitioner had been maintained for the time being on medical leave of absence. Second, as to the decision not to recall the Petitioner, it was not proven that the Respondent did not recall the Petitioner for any reason other than the one articulated by the Respondent--namely, hiring supervisor Sumner rejected him for the reasons he gave. The Respondent is an equal opportunity employer and takes affirmative, proactive steps to recruit, hire and retain minorities and handicapped persons. It has completed required affirmative action plans, does adverse impact analyses on a semiannual basis, and advertises and recruits from agencies that deal with disabled persons. While the Respondent did not hire the Petitioner back after his extended medical leave of absence, it has hired others back after medical leaves of absence of 90 days or more. One employee was hired back after heart catheterization and coronary bypass surgery. Another was hired back after rupturing a disc and having back surgery. Both were returned to work with restrictions, after seeing the same consulting physician the Petitioner saw. Their medical conditions were at least as susceptible of being perceived as being handicaps as the Petitioner's. In both of those cases, the employee was able to be returned to the positions from which they had to take leave; they did not have to be laid off. Conversely, other employees who had not been on medical leave of absence but were laid off with recall rights in connection with a reduction in work force also have not been recalled. Three such employees who were laid off during the August, 1990, reduction in force were not even recommended to hiring supervisors for suitable positions that came open during the period of time in which their recall rights were effective, even though they were technically more qualified for the positions, based on their higher job grade levels, than the people ultimately hired for the jobs. The reason they were not recalled was that they had been laid off because their job performance ranked them at the bottom of the "totem pole" of employees subject to possible layoff in the reduction in force. The Petitioner survived the August, 1990, reduction in force because, based on need, no reduction was made in the receiving/inspection department. If there had been, the Petitioner would have been the first to be laid off due his rank at the bottom of the "totem pole" for the test technician positions in his department. The failure to notify the Petitioner that he had been considered by a hiring supervisor, in accordance with his recall rights, and had been rejected, or that his recall rights effectively were terminated, arguably may have been against company policy, may have been bad employee relations, or may have been simply rude and inconsiderate. But none of those possibilities would constitute, nor do they prove, discrimination on the basis of handicap or perceived handicap.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this case. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1224 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-6. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Penultimate sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Third sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 10.-12. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 13. As to second sentence, not necessarily all such employees see Myint on returning. It depends on the staff nurse's judgment as to the necessity. Third sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 14.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 17. Rejected as not proven that the policy itself "entitled" the Petitioner; rather, it was the Respondent's favorable interpretation of the policy. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 18.-19. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 20. As to the last sentence, Sumner gave some specifics at the time, but not many, as reflected in the Findings of Fact. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 21.-23. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (However, as to 22, at least the last time, everyone under Gonzalez got a "merit" increase, and the Petitioner got the smallest raise because his job performance ranked him the lowest on the "totem pole.") 24. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. The rest is rejected as subordinate to facts contrary to those found. 25.-27. In part accepted, but in part rejected. Rejected as not proven that the Petitioner was not considered for the July 12, 1991, opening. Sumner did consider the Petitioner and rejected him. The consideration given to the Petitioner, and the justification for the rejection known to Sumner and Wilson, may or may not have been "reasonable." But, if not "reasonable," their actions did not prove discrimination on the basis of handicap or perceived handicap. Rejected as not proven that Wilson "considered Richardson a potential problem employee because of his long illness." Rejected as not proven that the Respondent ever considered the Petitioner "unqualified." Rejected as not proven that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of handicap or perceived handicap. Rejected in part as argument. Otherwise, generally accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 28.-32. Accepted but generally subordinate and unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-7. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 8. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that his "performance" declined. Rather, the appraisal would indicate that the rate of improvement in his performance had declined. 9.-20. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 21.-23. Generally, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (The information imparted by the doctor was somewhat ambiguous.) 24.-31. Generally, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. The consideration given to the Petitioner, and the justification for the rejection known to Sumner and Wilson, may or may not have been "reasonable." And the Respondent's failure to notify the Petitioner that he had been considered by a hiring supervisor, in accordance with his recall rights, and had been rejected, or that his recall rights effectively were terminated, arguably may have been against company policy, may have been bad employee relations, or may have been simply rude and inconsiderate. But, as found, those actions did not prove discrimination on the basis of handicap or perceived handicap. 32.-34. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald W. Fraley, Esquire Fraley & Fraley, P.A. 501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1225 Tampa, Florida 33602 Grant D. Peterson, Esquire Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson & Harper 1408 North Westshore Boulevard, Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33607 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner was overpaid for the pay period ending July 5, 2001, warrant date July 13, 2001, for 40 hours, equaling $378.74.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, as a Senior Juvenile Detention Officer during the pay period of June 22, 2001 through July 5, 2001. Prior to June 22, 2001, Petitioner exhausted her accrued sick leave. During the referenced pay period, Petitioner claimed 40 hours of sick leave relying on leave that a fellow employee, Marc Gulley, attempted to donate to her. On June 24, 2001, Marc Gulley submitted an Interagency Sick Leave Transfer Request to Donate form to Respondent. On June 27, 2001, Petitioner submitted a Sick Leave Transfer Request to Use form to Respondent. Petitioner was paid, by salary warrant on July 13, 2001, for 40 hours of credited sick leave for the pay period of June 22, 2001 through July 5, 2001. On August 13, 2001, Respondent notified Marc Gulley that his request to donate sick leave to Petitioner was denied because he did not possess the requisite amount remaining of sick leave. On August 15, 2001, Respondent notified Petitioner of the salary overpayment of $378.74 and requested repayment. Respondent presented a salary refund calculation showing the amount Petitioner was paid, the amount she should have been paid when the sick leave transfer was denied, and the amount of the refund she owed to Respondent. Petitioner owed Respondent $378.74 as a result of an overpayment which occurred due to the improper crediting of 40 hours of sick leave transferred from another employee, Marc Gulley. Petitioner left the employ of Respondent on August 27, 2001; on August 24, 2001, Respondent appropriately withheld $378.74 from a warrant issued to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby Recommended that the determination of Respondent, Department of Juvenile Justice, that Petitioner, Janet Bing, was overpaid in the amount of $378.74 be upheld, that withholding $378.74 from Petitioner's pay was appropriate, that Petitioner's claim be denied, and the file be closed. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___ JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Janet Bing 719 Waxwing Court Kissimmee, Florida 34759 Richard D. Davison, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue The issues raised in this case are those set forth in a petition of May 18, 1987, in which the Petitioner, Richard Herring, challenged former Rule 22SM- 3.007, Florida Administrative Code, which became effective on May 29, 1986, and the amendment to that rule which had an effective date of February 1, 1987. In particular, Petitioner believes that the rule in its prior and existing forms exceeded the authority of the enabling legislation which is stated to underlie the promulgation. Petitioner contends that the rule in the prior and present form is arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner claims that the rule in its terms establishes penalties not authorized by the legislature. Petitioner believes that material changes were made to the rule following public hearing which were not supported or noticed or required by statute. Finally, Petitioner argues that the economic impact statements associated with the prior version of the rule and the February 1, 1987, version are not adequate, in that they do not apprise the Petitioner or others similarly situated of the negative implications of the rule. Exhibits and witnesses Richard Herring testified in his own behalf and called as witnesses Pam Hill and Vivian Pyle. In furtherance of his claims he submitted Petitioner's Exhibits 1-29, 32-39 and 42-45 which were received into evidence. Respondent offered Don Bradley as a witness in defense of this action.
Findings Of Fact On July 30, 1984, Richard Herring became a member of the Senior Management Service Personnel System within the State of Florida. He was recognized as a member of Senior Management from that day until March 2, 1987, the date he voluntarily left that system. During that time he served as Deputy Director of Developmental Services within the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). In confirmation of his elevation to the status of Senior Management employee, correspondence of August 3, 1984, was sent to the Petitioner over signature of Vivian Pyle, Central Personnel Officer for HRS. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 2 admitted into evidence. As had been explained in his recruitment, the letter reminded the Petitioner that any future annual leave which he accumulated in excess of 480 hours effective as of the anniversary date of his employment would be converted to sick leave on an hour for hour basis. It further stated that at the point of separation from Senior Management Service, Herring, as an appointee to that system, would be paid for unused annual leave, not to exceed 480 hours. The rule provision pertaining to annual leave in effect at the time of Petitioner's acceptance into Senior Management Service was Rule 22SM-1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code. That rule became effective on March 16, 1981. A copy of the rule may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. The rule in the aforementioned subpart stated: (3) A Senior Management appointee shall be paid for unused annual leave upon separation, not to exceed 480 hours; all other Senior Management benefits shall cease. Payment for sick leave may be made when permitted by Section 110.122, Florida Statutes. The Department of Administration determined to revise the existing rules pertaining to Senior Management Service. To this end, on February 21, 1986, Respondent gave notice of its proposed rule changes. This notification was given in the Florida Administrative Weekly. A copy of the notice, together with the full text of the proposed rule as contemplated in the notice, may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 5 submitted into evidence. The notification states that the change calls for the repeal of existing Rules 22SM- 1.01 through 22SM-1.14, Florida Administrative Code, and the contemporaneous adoption of Rules 22SM-3.001 through 3.011, Florida Administrative Code. This meant that the Respondent had in mind the repeal of the aforementioned Rule 22SM-1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code. The stated purpose of these changes was ". . . to provide a more clearly defined rule structure for the Senior Management Service and to allow for 1985 statutory revisions." The statement of economic impact of the rule was that it would be limited only to the administrative cost of promulgation of the new rules. As noticed, the proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 at Section (6) stated: Upon appointment to a Senior Management position of a person moving from a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, any leave accrued and unused by the person in the prior position shall be subject to the following: Special compensatory leave credits shall be paid for in cash prior to appointment to the Senior Management Service. Regular compensatory leave shall not be transferred into the Senior Management Service. Annual leave shall be retained and be credited to the employee's account for use by the employee with approval of the agency head pursuant to Section 22SM-3.007(3) or paid for on termination from state government. Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. Sick leave not paid for shall be retained and be used or be subject to terminal payment in accordance with Subsection (4) above. Subsection (6)(c) to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 as it speaks to the payment previously earned for annual leave upon termination from state government pertains to new employees who would be appointed to Senior Management positions following the effective date of the rule. It does not contemplate the question of payment of annual leave for those persons who had been appointed to Senior Management Service prior to the effective date of the proposed rule. In fact, the overall Chapter 22SM-3 as proposed did not speak to the question of payment of unused annual leave accrued by those existing employees when they left Senior Management. Conversely, Subsection (4) to this proposed rule spoke to the matter of payment for sick leave for employees who were in Senior Management before the effective date of the proposal, a counterpart to Subsection (6)(d) dealing with employees who would come after the effective date of the proposed rule. The statement of the summary of the rule changes contemplated by the notice of February 21, 1986, may be found in a copy of the summary, Petitioner's Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence. In that summary it indicated: . . . The rule sets certain requirements agencies must conform to in the areas of appointments, performance evaluations, attendance and leave for employees appointed to positions in the Service. Agencies are required to maintain personnel files and records which shall be subject to post audit review by the Department of Administration. Under the statement of economic impact in the summary dealing with cost or benefits to persons directly affected, it was stated: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service employees, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. . . . A public hearing was held on the proposed Chapter 22SM-3. The hearing date was March 7, 1986. In the summary of the hearing and changes, a copy of which may be found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, it is noted that the State of Florida, Department of Insurance, recommended that the payment be made for excess annual leave when an employee leaves Senior Management Service and moves to another service. That change was not adopted. The executive summary of the proposed Rules 22SM-3, found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence identified the fact of the replacement of Chapter 22SM-1 with proposed Chapter 22SM-3 and the fact that any changes to the noticed version of the rule of February 21, 1986, were said to represent only minor technical changes recommended by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. It was stated that no changes were made as a result of the public hearing held on March 7, 1986. This is taken to mean that there were no substantive changes made in that the summary of the public hearing and changes did identify certain modifications to the proposal that were recommended and adopted following the public hearing session. None of those changes that resulted from the public hearing spoke to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007. On May 6, 1986, Glenn W. Robertson, Jr., Secretary to the Administration Commission, wrote to Gilda H. Lambert, Secretary, Department of Administration, to advise her that on that date the Administration Commission had approved with amendment the request to repeal existing Rules 22SM-1.01 through 1.14, Florida Administrative Code, and to adopt proposed Rules 22SM- 3.001 through 3.011. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8, together with the statement of the executive summary identifying the proposed permanent rule amendments which were contemplated by the Administration Commission. Within the statement of amendments promoted by the Administration Commission was an amendment to proposed Rule 22SM- 3.007(6)(c), which stated: (6)(c) Annual leave shall be retained and credited to the employee's account for use by the employee with approval of the agency head pursuant to Section 22SM-3.007 or if the employee is transferring to Career Service, up to 240 hours of Annual leave will be transferred. Any Annual leave balance after the 240 transfer will be paid for except that the amount accrued (sic) since the employee's last anniversary will be paid for on a prorated basis in accordance with the appropriate accrual rate for Career Service. Annual leave will be paid for on termination from state government. Termination from state government --. This change to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c) was at the instigation of the Commissioner of Agriculture in the language. . . . or if the employee is transferring to Career Service, up to 240 hours of Annual leave will be transferred. Any Annual leave balance after the 240 transfer will be paid for except that the amount accrued (sic) since the employee's last anniversary will be paid for on a prorated basis in accordance Service. Annual leave will be paid for on termination from state government. This was not the choice of the Department of Administration in terms of the substance or placement of this language. Ultimately, the language set forth in the amendments to the proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c) as found in Petitioner's Exhibit 8 made their way into the final version of the rule. The language prompted by the Agriculture Commissioner had not been contemplated by the language noticed when the rule was proposed on February 21, 1986, nor was it the product of public comment in the public hearing of March 6, 1986, or based upon remarks received from the APA committee or material received by the proposing agency within 21 days of notice of the proposed rule. The language was never noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly. In May 1986, upon an unspecified date, certification was given from the Department of Administration to the Secretary of State confirming the adoption of Rules 22SM-3.001 through 22SM-3.011, Florida Administrative Code. The effective date of this adoption was May 29, 1986. A copy of that certification to the Department of State may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 9. A copy of the summary of changes by the Administration Commission in its May 6, 1986 meeting setting out the suggested language of the Agriculture Commissioner on the topic of Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c), Florida Administrative Code, may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit 10. This item, as well as the language from Subsection (6)(c) and which was sent to the Secretary of State's office and became the final version of that rule subsection, included an additional sentence which stated, "Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from Senior Management Service," and which had not been set out completely in the executive summary sent to Secretary Lambert on May 6, 1986, found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8 admitted into evidence. This most recently quoted language is, however, the same language as found in the last sentence of Subsection (6)(c) to the notice of that matter given on February 21, 1986. In the final analysis, the changes suggested by the Commissioner of Agriculture were a part of the Administration Commission's deliberations. The final summary of the rules amendments which was filed with the Secretary of State on May 9, 1986, did not depart from the initial summary of the rules amendments pertaining to the replacement of Rules 22SM-1.01 through 22SM-1.14 with Rules 22SM-3.001 through 22SM-3.011. The statement of economic impact remained the same as well. A copy of the summary of the rules amendments and the final statement of economic impact may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 11 admitted into evidence. The final version of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c), which was enacted, was no more specific on the subject of payment of annual leave credits upon termination of an employee who had been appointed to Senior Management Service prior to the effective date of the rule than was the version of that provision noticed on February 21, 1986. When Subsection (6)(c) is read in the context of the overall Section (6), the language describes that experience pertaining to persons appointed to Senior Management following the effective date of the rule and their leave credits brought with them. It does not describe those who were already employees in the Senior Management system before the effective date of the rule and their annual leave credits or annual leave credits earned by new employees upon admission to the Senior Management Service. This circumstance, taken together with the repeal of the previous Rule 22SM- 1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code, means that the question of the payment for annual leave hours upon the termination from Senior Management Service after May 29, 1986, for those who had been appointed to Senior Management Service before that date was unresolved by rules of the Department of Administration beyond May 29, 1986, as was the matter of how to deal with hours earned by the new members who came into the Senior Management Service. This circumstance would remain until the passage of an amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987. Petitioner challenged Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, by petition of May 18, 1987. In that same petition, he challenged Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987. All accumulated annual leave for which Petitioner claims entitlement to payment had been accumulated prior to February 1, 1987. As forecast, Respondent determined to amend certain rules within Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, to include Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code. To this end, on October 17, 1986, Respondent gave notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intention. The summary given by the notice of October 17, 1986, stated: The rule amendments provide for clarification of the designation of positions to be included in the Senior Management Service, provide for the transfer of leave between services, provide for the accrual of 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave each year, and provide for membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The comments on economic impact found in the notice were to the effect: The executive agencies will be required to expend approximately $11,628 in the aggregate to implement the provisions of this rule. The overall purpose and effect of the rules changes was explained as being implementation of provisions made by the 1986 Legislature, as to Part IV, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes. See Petitioner's Exhibit 13/14 admitted into evidence. In this amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Section (6) in existing language becomes Section (10) in the new language. Subsection (6)(c) in the existing language is modified at Subsection (10)(c) by referring to employees as members and deleting the language beginning with " . . or if the employee is transferring . . ." to the end of that Subsection (6)(c). There are added Sections (5) and (6) in the proposed rule which address the circumstance of annual leave credit for persons who were in Senior Management Service at the point the prospective effective date of the rule noticed on October 17, 1986, as well as annual leave credits earned by employees who became members after the effective date of the amendment to the rule. This is a new addition not found in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, which was silent on the treatment of annual leave credits for persons who had been in Senior Management Service before May 29, 1986, and the leave credits yet to be earned by those who became members after that date. For Petitioner's purposes, in this challenge, the proposal to add Sections (5) and (6) was tacit recognition of the fact that in the provisions set forth in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, the question of payment for annual leave upon termination of employees who had been hired before the effective date of that rule was not addressed. The language of the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM- 3.007 at Section as noticed on October 17, 1986, indicated: Upon transfer of a Senior Management Service member to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, annual leave credits shall be retained and shall be calculated and credit as follows: All annual leave credits accrued on the member's last anniversary date shall be prorated at the rate of 20 hours monthly or 9.230 hours biweekly for each period worked thereafter. If the member is transferring to the Career Service, up to 240 hours of annual leave will be transferred and any annual leave balance in excess of 240 hours shall be paid for in cash. Subsection (5)(b) in the proposed amendment spoke to the transfer of 240 if the employee transferred to Career Service, and payment for excess balance over 240 hours earned while Senior Management employees for all that class of employees regardless of their point of employment in the same way Subsection (6)(c) of the May 29, 1986, rule spoke to those matters of payment for annual leave brought with them related to employees who would become members of the Senior Management Service on May 29, 1986, and subsequently. A second category of payment for annual leave was described in the proposed rule noticed on October 17, 1986, Rule 22SM-3.007(6), which stated: Annual leave will be paid for upon termination from state government. Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. This statement pertained to those employees who were members of the Senior Management Service prior to the enactment of the proposed rule and those who would become members and earn credits after the enactment. None of the provisions in the proposed amendments advertised on October 17, 1986, dealt specifically with transfer of or payment for annual leave credits for persons who were not leaving state government, not going to Career Service, but leaving the Senior Management Service to go into other positions within state government over which the Department of Administration had no control as to personnel matters. Effective March 3, 1987, Petitioner transferred to such an organization, namely, the State Legislature. The proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007 noticed October 17, 1986, at Section (3) increased the credit for annual leave and sick leave from 176 hours to 240 hours and 104 hours to 120 hours, respectively. It is couched in terms of giving these benefits upon the appointment and on the anniversary date of appointment to the Senior Management Service. At the commencement of the steps taken to amend Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, the overall summary of the amendments spoke in terms of the provision for transfer of leave between the personnel services, and the increase in accrued leave to 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave and the provision of membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The statement of the economic impact indicated that the executive agencies would be required to expend approximately $11,628 in the aggregate to implement this rule. The statement of costs or benefits to persons directly affected was said to be: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service members, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. This comprehensive statement of the summary of rules and the economic impact statement may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 15 admitted into evidence. A public hearing was scheduled for November 7, 1986, and was held in the Larson Building auditorium, Tallahassee, Florida. This was the sole public hearing held to consider the amendments contemplated by the October 17, 1986, notice. By letter of November 5, 1986, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 16 admitted into evidence, James J. Parry, Director of the Office of Human Resources, State University System of Florida, made mention of his concerns about the proposed amendments. In particular, he was concerned that the higher annual leave and sick leave credits provided in the Senior Management Service and the ability to convert those to sick leave presented potential liability to the State University System when hiring individuals who had been members of the Senior Management Service. He urged change in the language of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(5) which would make it clear that the annual leave credits had to be transferred from Senior Management Service to the receiving employer according to that governmental body's personnel plan, if unaffiliated with the Department of Administration. Furthermore, he suggested that if the annual leave had been converted to sick leave while the employee was with Senior Management Service, upon the affiliation of the employee with the State University System there was a potential of passing along the cost of payment of that unused sick leave upon the termination of that employee's affiliation with the State University System or other governmental employer. He pointed out his belief that the economic impact statement in the proposed rule amendment only spoke to the increase in annual leave credit when in fact there would be an increase in sick leave credit as well. This references the economic impact statement at paragraph 1 to Petitioner's Exhibit 15 where mention is made of the cost incurred to an agency for annual leave accrual rates without mention of concomitant increases in cost for sick leave credits. Parry, by his November 5, 1986, remarks set out in the Petitioner's Exhibit 16, did not reference any specific concern about whether the agency for whom a Senior Manager had worked prior to transfer to the State University System would be liable for payment of annual leave hours accrued prior to transfer. Don Bradley, Chief of the Bureau of Classification and Pay, Department of Administration, received the November 5, 1986, Parry letter on November 6, 1986, a day before the public hearing. (Bradley is the principal author of the version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, under consideration.) That letter was introduced into the record of the public hearing. Bradley recalls that Parry's concern as expressed in the letter and at the point of the public hearing revolved around the fact that the State University System would not allow accumulation of annual leave credit as high in total hours as was allowed by the Senior Management Service. Parry, according to Bradley, wanted to see a revision to the rule amendment which specifically stated that any transferred hours from Senior Management Service to the State University System be in accordance with the personnel rules on annual leave credits utilized by the State University System. Parry is not reported to have expressed an interest at the public hearing on the question of the employing agency of an employee within the Senior Management Service needing to pay for unused annual leave credits prior to transfer of the employee into the State University System, per se. Bradley recalls that there was a related discussion on who would pay for annual leave the State University System did not accept in an effort by Parry to clarify that his organization would not be responsible for payment. The proposed amendments to existing Rule 22SM-3.007 were presented to the Administration Commission. This was done by transmittal to the Office of Planning and Budget of the Governor's Office and from there to the Cabinet Aides to members of the Administration Commission. This submission occurred a week prior to the Cabinet meeting at which the Administration Commission considered the question of the amendments. As set out in Petitioner's Exhibit 17 containing a memorandum from the Department of Administration Secretary, Gilda H. Lambert, dated November 25, 1986, reference is made to the Cabinet Aides' consideration of proposed amendments to 22SM-3.007, described in that document as 22SM-1.007 and changes brought about in this session. That meeting of Cabinet Aides took place on the morning of November 25, 1986, causing certain revisions to be made to the proposed rules on Senior Management Service. It is unclear how the notice was given of the Cabinet Aides' meeting at which point Mr. Bradley and Mr. Parry discussed changes to the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code. In any event, it does not appear that Petitioner would have been apprised of this session. Among those items addressed by Secretary Lambert was a description of what was referred to there as 22SM-1.007 on attendance and leave at Section (5) on page 8 wherein she says that the revision was made to: Clarify that upon transfer to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, unused annual leave credits shall not be paid for and may be transferred subject to the rules governing the system into which the member is transferring. Within Petitioner's Exhibit 17 is the exact nature of Section (5) with the revision being employed. The new language is underlined in this rendition of the version of Section (5) after the Cabinet Aides' meeting. Upon transfer of a Senior Management Service member to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, annual leave credits shall not be paid for and may be transferred subject to the rules governing the system into which the member is transferring. All annual leave credits accrued on the member's last anniversary date shall be prorated at the rate of 20 hours monthly or 9.230 hours biweekly for each pay period or portion thereof, worked subsequent to the member's last anniversary date. As can be seen by this action, Subsection (5)(b) was deleted. These changes were not noticed by publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Mr. Bradley describes the underlined changes alluded to in the preceding paragraph as a product of ongoing negotiations between him and Mr. Parry which took place at the point of the Cabinet Aides' meeting dealing with the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code. In the response to the Parry concerns, Mr. Bradley did not feel that it was necessary to change the proposed language put out in the notice of October 17, 1986, pertaining to Rule 22SM-3.007(5) dealing with transfer of hours to a personnel system not administered by the Department of Administration, in that the receiving employers outside DOA controls were not obligated to receive annual credits above what was called for in their personnel systems. Nonetheless, he acquiesced in the inclusion of language in Section (5) arrived at in the Cabinet Aides meeting which made this point abundantly clear. It is that aspect of the change dealing with the transfer of annual leave credit subject to the rules of the governing system into which the member would be transferring that is seen to address Parry's concerns. The portion of the changes that deal with the unwillingness to pay for annual leave credits unless the employee is leaving Senior Management Service to go out of state government as contemplated by Section (6) may be seen as a related matter, in that the nonpayment of annual leave could cause the entire amount of those credits to be transferred over to the State University System or the Legislature to which Petitioner made his transfer. Nevertheless, Parry's emphasis was to make certain that the State University System not have to accept more annual leave credit than it would allow its employees to carry at any given point in time. The fact of nonpayment increases the potential liability for payment of unused annual leave on the part of a receiving agency. This reality does not comport with Parry's contribution before and at the point of public hearing in protecting his organization. His secondary concern expressed at the public hearing about not paying for excess annual leave his agency would not accept coincides with the idea that he wished to minimize the financial exposure of the State University System. This auxiliary position is not tantamount to advocacy which called for the abolishment of all payment for annual leave upon transfer. Finally, this last expression on the topic of payment for unused annual leave left at point of transfer does not give rise to the notion that it was sufficiently debated to notice interested parties that a rule would be enacted that disallowed payment for annual leave upon transfer to any state agency from Senior Management Service. The changes that came about in Section (5) by the Bradley/Parry discussion at the Cabinet Aides' meeting brought forth the additional penalty to the employee in Senior Management Service that annual leave credit would not be paid for in the future. This expression was contrary to the repealed Rule 22SM- 1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code, in effect prior to May 29, 1986, which allowed payment for annual leave upon any transfer, overturned the silence on this point in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and set aside the less restrictive statement on payment for annual leave in Section (5) as advertised on October 17, 1986. On balance, the addition of the language following the Cabinet Aides' meeting in which it is stated that annual leave credits shall not be paid for in transfer to other state government employment is seen to be a product of the thinking of the Department of Administration, not sufficiently foreseen by actions in the public hearing on November 7, 1986, not duly noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly and not based upon remarks received from the APA committee or material received by the proposing agency within 21 days of the October 17, 1986 notice. The summary of the hearing on November 7, 1986, pertaining to the proposed amendment to the rule describes the participation on the question of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 of other agencies in state government, as well as Mr. Parry from the State University System. A copy of that summary of hearing and changes may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 20 admitted into evidence. The statement of changes found within that exhibit included the elimination of the payment of annual leave in excess of 240 hours if an employee transfers to another position in state government outside of the Selected Exempt Service. This is taken to mean transfer of a Senior Management Service employee to Career Service as described in Subsection (5)(c) noticed on October 17, 1986. It does not speak to the absolute prohibition of payment for annual leave hours accrued prior to transfer from Senior Management Service to any receiving governmental agency. On December 30, 1986, the amendments to Rule 22SM- 3.007 were filed with the Secretary of State. A copy of that filing may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 19 admitted into evidence. Those amendments to Rule 22SM-3.007, to include the changes at Section (5) disallowing payment for annual leave credits upon transfer to another state government agency from Senior Management Service are included. In accordance with the final language of the rule, there is set forth a summary of the rule amendments which may be found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 21. It states: The rule amendments provide for clarification of the designation of positions to be included in the Senior Management Service, provide for the transfer of leave between services, provide for the accrual of 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave each year, and provide for membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The statement of justification for the amendments was that the changes were made to implement 1986 legislation of Part IV, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes. The economic impact statement found within Petitioner's Exhibit 21 said that the aggregate cost to the executive agencies was $11,628. It stated that the number of position descriptions that were involved would be approximately four hundred. On January 31, 1987, there were 1370+ positions in Senior Management Service before the new rule provisions were placed in effect. On February 1, 1987, as a result of the implementation of the 1986 amendment to Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, there were left approximately three hundred fifty Senior Managers. Within the economic impact statement as finally established for the amendments effective February 1, 1987, it is said: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service members, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. Mr. Bradley, author of Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and the amendment to those provisions as printed out on February 1, 1987, said that the Department of Administration had in mind the creation of a Senior Management Service system to try to retain Senior Managers. This included the idea of the discontinuation of payment to Senior Managers except under circumstances where they left state government. He had in mind limiting the idea of automatic payment when a Senior Management Service employee went to the Legislature or the State University System or the court system. To his way of thinking, this would encourage the senior management to remain with the employing agency. As described before, his desired outcome is not achieved until such point as the last version of Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987, came into effect. This was an arrangement without due notice and without regard for the hardship created by the imposition of the nonpayment for transfer rule, unless it can be said that the increase in annual leave credit and sick leave credit contemplated by the February 1, 1987, version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, is seen as an offset. It cannot be so regarded for persons such as the Petitioner who gained very little profit from the increase in annual leave and sick leave hours while losing a substantial number of annual leave credits when he left HRS to go to the Legislature. Petitioner had been made aware sometime in December 1986, of the language of the proposed amendment noticed on October 17, 1986, pertaining to Rule 22SM-3.007. The language discussing the purpose and impact of the proposed amendments would not have given rise to any concerns on his part about the changes that were eventually brought forth in the final version of the rule effective February 1, 1987. On December 10, 1986, Petitioner had an annual leave balance of approximately 536 hours. He used some leave around the Christmas holidays and reduced that, having in mind his belief that only 480 hours could be carried forward into the new year. He felt that he was being threatened in his position as a Senior Manager at HRS, given the fact that a number of Senior Managers were being replaced in that organization in late 1986. By cashing in an amount approaching 500 hours of annual leave, he expected to be paid an amount approximating $10,000, which might assist him in his change in job positions. On April 23, 1987, having not received word on his request for payment of annual leave for Senior Management Service, Petitioner wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Administration to ascertain the outcome of his request for payment. The Secretary was and is Adis Vila. At the same time he wrote to Vivian Pyle, HRS personnel official, making the same request. He expressed concern in his correspondence on the subject of an excessive amount of leave balance being shown by his present employer, the Florida Legislature. Copies of the correspondence to those two individuals may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits 26 and 27 admitted into evidence. By way of response, as noted in Petitioner's Exhibit 28 admitted into evidence, Ms. Pyle answers his inquiry and cites to the fact that Rule 22SM- 3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 5, 1987, does not allow for the payment of annual leave upon transfer into the State Legislature system. In correspondence of that same date from Secretary Vila, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 29 admitted into evidence, the Department of Administration makes reference to the fact that the May 29, 1986, Sections 22SM- 3.007(5) and (6), Florida Administrative Code, indicated that the annual leave should be transferred subject to the rules governing the system where the employee was transferred and that accrued annual leave would be paid only upon termination from state government. The rule referred to in the correspondence does not contemplate persons who had been employed before the rule became effective transferring annual leave to the State Legislature from Senior Management or being paid for that annual leave. Moreover, at the time of his transfer, the applicable version of the rule was the February 1, 1987, statement which specifically disallowed payment for annual leave in any circumstance other than leaving state government. Although an interpretation may be given that the Department of Administration believes that the version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, controls the question of the entitlement of Petitioner to payment for annual leave upon his termination from Senior Management Service on March 2, 1987, that interpretation is not an appropriate one. That version of the rule was amended on February 1, 1987, and by such amendment the language of the May 29, 1986, rule was superseded, regardless of the construction given the May 29, 1986, version of the rule. Consequently, the resolution of the Petitioner's claim to entitlement for payment for annual leave credits accrued must necessarily be resolved under the terms of the rule effective February 1, 1987, if controlled by rule. Based upon computer printout information about Senior Management Service employees who were in the program as of February 1, 1987, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 32 admitted into evidence, Petitioner made calculations as to the value of accumulated annual leave for those employees if they were paid by the Department of Administration at that juncture. That value was in excess of $1.9 million. The calculation made by the Petitioner concerning the amount of potential money Senior Managers would have been entitled to upon transfer does not take into account the possibility of reduced payments in transfer to Career Service under the terms of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986. Obviously, under that version of the rule and the version of February 1, 1987, termination from state government would allow for the payment of all outstanding annual leave. Petitioner's Exhibit 34 admitted into evidence is a copy of the employee handbook in effect at the time that Petitioner took his position with the Florida Legislature. It establishes that the employee may only carry 360 hours of annual leave forward into January 1 of an ensuing year. Hours above that are converted into sick leave. The sick leave credits are not paid in full if the Petitioner leaves state government after working in the Florida House of Representatives. The value of those sick leave hours would be 1/4 of all hours not to exceed 480 hours. When Petitioner left HRS, he asked to be paid for all but approximately 24 hours accumulated annual leave. It was determined subsequently that this meant that 432 hours were being requested for payment. Instead, HRS transferred 432 hours of annual leave to the Florida House of Representatives. The beginning balance of annual leave hours with the Florida House of Representatives was limited to 360 hours with the balance of 72 hours being subject to conversion to sick leave. The conversion of 72 hours of annual leave to sick leave upon the date of employment with the Florida House of Representatives was further exacerbated by the fact that 476.15 hours of sick leave was also sent over. The significance of this was that with the addition of 3.85 sick leave hours, he would reach the maximum number of allowable sick leave hours to be maintained at any given point by an employee of the Legislature. That amount of hours would have been added in the first month in that 8 hours and 40 minutes of sick are obtained for each month of employment by an employee of the Florida House of Representatives. Consequently, not only had 72 of his hours been disallowed as annual leave credit hours but also 68.15 hours within that 72 hours would have no value, in that 476.15 hours had been transferred as sick leave hours, leaving only 3.85 hours to be converted to sick leave from the 72 annual leave hours. Finally, throughout the 1987 year, Petitioner would earn annual leave credits and compensatory leave credits with the Florida House of Representatives, creating a potential loss in annual leave hours at the conclusion of the calendar year 1987 based upon the maximum number of hours having been transferred into the Florida House of Representatives personnel system upon his hiring and the influence of additional hours added to that total. In the payment for sick leave and annual leave as a member of the Legislature, Petitioner would receive a reduced hourly rate compared to the Senior Management position which Petitioner held with HRS, evidencing further economic disadvantage imposed by disallowing the Petitioner's request for payment for the annual leave upon transfer from HRS to the Florida House of Representatives. To further explain, when Petitioner transferred to the Florida House of Representatives, he took an $8,640 pay cut. Again, payment for the claimed hours of annual leave would have been somewhere approximating $10,000, which would have offset the dire consequences of the salary reduction when changing from HRS to the Florida House of Representatives. Petitioner never sought to present evidence or argument concerning Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and the amendment to that rule effective February 1, 1987. Prior to this case, he did not participate in the public hearing which was conducted concerning those matters.
