The Issue Petitioner charged that Respondent Employer had committed an unlawful employment practice by racial discrimination.
Findings Of Fact This cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on or about February 17, 2005, following a "Determination: No Cause" by the Florida Commission on Human Relations and the filing of a timely Petition for Relief by Petitioner. Final Hearing was originally noticed on March 2, 2005, for June 1, 2005. Following numerous continuances requested by one or both parties or occasioned by problems arising out of service of discovery by Respondent upon Petitioner, a Notice of Hearing was issued on August 26, 2005, for December 1, 2005, in Jacksonville, Florida. On November 14, 2005, an Amended Notice of Hearing, amended only as to location within the City of Jacksonville was entered and served. Two days before December 1, 2005, which was the date that had been scheduled for final hearing since August 26, 2005, Petitioner telephoned the office of the undersigned to orally request a continuance. The undersigned's secretary advised him the request must be made in writing. The very day before the scheduled hearing, Petitioner filed a "Motion for Extension With Cause," which was essentially a request for a continuance based on Petitioner's allegedly having been unable to obtain legal counsel and unable to engage in discovery using subpoenas. This pleading also indicated that Petitioner had received the November 14, 2005, Amended Notice of Hearing and that he was aware of the new location for the final hearing. Petitioner's Motion was untimely, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.210. The record of the Division does not indicate that Petitioner ever applied for any type of subpoena and does indicate that Petitioner had many months in which to obtain an attorney. Because there was no time for a written order to be entered before the final hearing date, the undersigned, through her secretary, advised Petitioner that his Motion was denied as without good cause and that he should appear for the hearing the following day. At the time and place appointed, the final hearing was convened on December 1, 2005. Respondent was represented by a corporate agent, witnesses, and legal counsel, all of whom had traveled some distance to be there. After waiting 30 minutes, neither Petitioner, nor any attorney on his behalf, had appeared. The undersigned "sounded the docket" outside the hearing room, and Petitioner was not there, either. It was further determined that Petitioner had not telephoned the office of the undersigned to indicate any reason he could not physically attend the final hearing. After 40 minutes, Respondent orally moved to dismiss.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Antwoine L. Edwards, Esquire Ford & Harrison, LLP 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Steven Bell Post Office Box 2117 Interlachen, Florida 32148
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Precision Tune Auto Care, on account of his race, or a result of a sexually abusive work environment in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter, an employee of Respondent, is an African-American male. Precision owns and operates five automobile service facilities in northwest Florida. They are generally referred to as the 9th Avenue (Pensacola) facility, the 9-Mile (Pensacola) facility, the Navy Boulevard (Pensacola) facility, the Fort Walton Beach facility, and the Crestview facility. Though there was no direct testimony as to the number of persons employed by Precision, the evidence is persuasive that each facility has a minimum of 4 to 6 full-time employees. Therefore, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish that Respondent employs more than 15 full-time employees at any given time. Petitioner’s Hiring On June 14, 2013, Petitioner started work at Respondent’s 9th Avenue location in Pensacola, Florida, as a lube-tech. When Petitioner was hired, Ms. Abbott was the manager of the 9th Avenue location, having started in that position in April 2013. Petitioner was not hired by Ms. Abbott. Rather, Mr. Geiger interviewed Petitioner and approved his hiring for the 9th Avenue lube-tech position. Prior to his employment at the 9th Avenue facility, Petitioner worked at Respondent’s Navy Boulevard facility. He was there for a single day. The circumstances of his departure were not explained. When Petitioner started work at 9th Avenue, he was provided with employee procedures handbooks issued by Respondent and by Lyons HR, Respondent’s payroll management company. Both handbooks contained policies prohibiting sexual harassment, and provided means for reporting complaints. On June 6, 2013, Petitioner signed written acknowledgement pages for each of the handbooks. Respondent’s employee procedures handbook had been revised in March 2013. The written acknowledgement page signed by Petitioner for Respondent’s employee procedures handbook was for an earlier revision. The evidence was persuasive that the page signed by Petitioner was one of a stack “kept in a drawer” for that purpose, a stack that had not been replaced when the handbook was updated. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Petitioner received the employee procedures handbooks issued by Respondent and Lyons HR. In addition, current handbooks were available at each of Respondent’s facilities for the employees’ use. Petitioner alleged in his Employment Complaint of Discrimination that he was hired at 9th Avenue because it was the only one of Respondent’s locations at which African- Americans were employed, which Petitioner attributed to Ms. Abbott’s alleged desire “to be with a black guy.”1/ The preponderance of the evidence establishes that Respondent employed African-American workers at its other locations, in positions including those of manager and technician. Lube-techs are employed by Respondent to perform oil changes. As they gain experience, they may be assigned to perform simple maintenance work. Technicians are employed by Respondent to perform a range of automotive repairs. Technicians are required to own a set of mechanics’ tools sufficient to perform more complex work, involving mechanical work, repair and replacement of water pumps, power steering pumps and the like. When he was hired as a lube-tech at 9th Avenue, Petitioner had neither the skills nor the tools to perform work as a technician. When he started work, Petitioner was perceived as a very good employee, doing work without being asked, cleaning, and generally doing extra work around the facility. As a result, Petitioner received a raise of 25 cents per hour after six-to-eight weeks on the job. Technician work is desirable because technicians have the ability to earn commissions. Petitioner soon began asking for technician work. His requests were refused. Although Petitioner was allowed to do some extra work, Mr. Geiger believed that he was not ready to be a full-time technician. On August 5, 2013, Morgan Hancock was hired as a technician at 9th Avenue. He had previously been a technician at another Precision facility. Petitioner felt as though he should have been given the opportunity to work as a technician, and there began to be friction between Petitioner and Mr. Hancock. As a result of the perceived slight at his not being promoted to technician, Petitioner began to exhibit a “bad attitude” and his performance began to “slack off.” His willingness to do more undesirable tasks that were expected of all employees, including cleaning, deteriorated over the ensuing weeks. He made several requests to transfer to a technician’s position at other Precision facilities, discussing the matter with both Ms. Abbott and Mr. Geiger. The dates of the verbal requests are unclear, though it appears that one was made on September 5, 2013, and one was made to Mr. Geiger within two weeks prior to Petitioner’s November 20, 2013, termination. The evidence is persuasive that the requests to transfer were denied for a number of non-discriminatory reasons. First, as set forth above, Petitioner did not have sufficient skills or an adequate set of tools to work as a technician. Second, Precision had been cutting back on employees, and there were no positions open at the other facilities for someone of Petitioner’s level of skill and experience. Finally, one of Petitioner’s requests was for a transfer to the Navy Boulevard facility. Petitioner had previously worked there for a short period, and the manager simply did not want him back. There is no evidence to support a finding that Petitioner’s requests for transfer were denied as a result of some racial animus, or as a result of Ms. Abbott’s alleged sexual desire for Petitioner. By the time Petitioner was at the end of his 90-day probationary period, his performance was such that he did not receive a discretionary salary increase. The evidence is persuasive that the decision was based on Petitioner’s increasingly poor job performance and not, as alleged by Petitioner, retaliation by Ms. Abbott for Petitioner’s failure to satisfy her sexual requests. On September 26, 2013, at Petitioner’s request, Ms. Abbott wrote a letter on Precision letterhead stating that Petitioner had worked for Precision since August 6, 2012. Petitioner had, in fact, started work for Precision in June 2013. Petitioner characterized the letter as evidence of Ms. Abbott’s willingness to falsify a document as a means of gaining favor with Petitioner, and as an enticement for Petitioner to provide sexual favors. Ms. Abbott testified, convincingly, that Petitioner asked her to write the letter so he could show one year of Florida residency, and therefore qualify for in-state tuition at George Stone, a technical center in Pensacola, where he wanted to take classes to gain skills to be a technician. She wanted to help him, and so wrote the letter knowing it to be false. Mr. McCoy witnessed Ms. Abbott giving the letter to Petitioner, and testified it was accompanied by no suggestive remarks. Her agreement to write the letter on Petitioner’s behalf was ill-advised, and upon its discovery, she was reprimanded by Mr. Gerhardt. The letter does not, by any means, suggest that Respondent or Ms. Abbott discriminated against Petitioner in any way, or that Ms. Abbott used the letter as an inducement for Petitioner to provide her with sexual favors. On October 7, 2013, Bret Ramsey was hired at 9th Avenue. Mr. Ramsey, who is Caucasian, was a technician who had previously worked at Respondent’s Navy Boulevard location. Mr. Ramsey worked at 9th Avenue for two weeks, at which time he transferred back to Navy Boulevard. Mr. Geiger could not remember the reason for Mr. Ramsey’s transfer, but assumed that Navy Boulevard was in need of an experienced and qualified technician. As to whether Petitioner would have been a suitable candidate for the transfer, Mr. Gerhardt testified credibly that the manager of the Navy Boulevard location would not accept Petitioner due to his past employment there. Mr. Ramsey’s transfer does not support a finding that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race, or that Ms. Abbott was “keeping” Petitioner at 9th Avenue to satisfy her sexual urges. Respondent required its employees to “clock-out” for their lunch hour and leave the premises. By so doing, it was easier to ensure that work hours were not confused with off-duty lunch hours and to “keep payroll straight.” Respondent’s policy was applied evenly to all employees. Ms. Abbott would occasionally buy lunch for all of the employees at 9th Avenue, either when they were busy, or as thanks for their hard work. Petitioner characterized Ms. Abbott’s acts of kindness and gratitude towards the employees of 9th Avenue as “buying me expensive lunches” to induce cooperation with her requests for sexual favors, a characterization that finds no evidentiary support. Petitioner testified that Ms. Abbott would come to work drunk. Aside from the fact that Ms. Abbott’s state of sobriety, or lack thereof, has no bearing on whether Petitioner was subject to racial discrimination or sexual harassment, the evidence was insufficient to support Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner testified that Ms. Abbott cut his hours as retaliation for his failure to submit to her sexual advances. The time records for Petitioner demonstrates that Petitioner worked 40-hours plus overtime on 19 of the 23 weeks that he was employed at 9th Avenue, including five of his last six full weeks of employment. The other four weeks ranged from 35.90 to 38.68 hours per week. Thus, there is nothing to support the assertion that Petitioner’s hours were cut for any reason. Petitioner’s supposition that Ms. Abbott may have altered his time records--which records are managed and kept by Lyons HR--is not persuasive. Petitioner’s Termination On November 18, 2013, Ms. Abbott, after having spent the day cleaning the service pits, instructed employees to place all cars needing service on the facility’s lift racks, and not over the pits. That day, Petitioner pulled a car into position over a pit. Mr. McCoy advised Petitioner that Ms. Abbott had instructed that all cars were to be put on a rack. Petitioner responded to the effect that if Ms. Abbott wanted the car racked, she could rack it herself, sprinkling his response with some choice profanities. His response was loud enough that Ms. Abbott could overhear it through the window between the shop and the reception area. As a result of what Ms. Abbott understandably perceived as insubordination, she prepared a written warning based on the fact that “employee was told multiple times to place vehicles on lifts not over pit [and] refused.” She presented the Discipline/Discharge Form to Petitioner, who refused to sign the form to acknowledge receipt. Mr. McCoy was called in to witness that Petitioner refused to sign the warning. Petitioner became argumentative with Ms. Abbott, who then instructed him to go home for the day. Upon leaving the premises, Petitioner “peeled out” of the parking lot, spraying gravel in the direction of other parked cars. By that time, Ms. Abbott had called Mr. Geiger to discuss the circumstances of the written warning. Mr. Geiger was able to hear the sound of Petitioner’s exit from the premises. That act was taken by Mr. Geiger and Ms. Abbott as a second instance of misconduct warranting discipline. Ms. Abbott discussed the situation regarding Petitioner with Mr. Geiger and Mr. Gerhardt. The decision was made by the three of them, based upon that day’s behavior and Petitioner’s increasingly bad attitude, that Ms. Abbott should terminate Petitioner from employment. November 19, 2013, was a scheduled day off for Petitioner. When Petitioner returned to work on November 20, 2013, he presented Ms. Abbott with a letter in which he requested a transfer to another Precision location. In his letter, he indicated that he had previously discussed a transfer with Ms. Abbott because of “lack of communication, lack of supervision, lack of procedure standards and underlying personality conflicts.” No mention was made of any discriminatory or sexually inappropriate actions on the part of Precision or Ms. Abbott. Petitioner requested that Ms. Abbott sign the transfer request to acknowledge receipt, which she did. Her acknowledgement of receipt of the transfer request does not support a finding that Respondent or Ms. Abbott discriminated against Petitioner. Ms. Abbott advised Petitioner that a transfer was out of the question, and that he was being terminated from employment. Petitioner demanded that she give him a copy of his termination papers. Ms. Abbott advised that he would be faxed his Termination Record by Respondent’s human resources department. Petitioner then left the premises. He was subsequently sent a copy of the Termination Record as stated. Uniform Return When Petitioner left the employ of Respondent, he failed to return the company-issued uniforms, valued at $466.00. On January 6, 2014, after several verbal attempts by Ms. Abbott to recover the uniforms, Mr. Gerhardt sent a certified letter to Petitioner at his address of record. The address to which the letter was mailed, 6881 Twiggs Lane, Pensacola, Florida 32305, is the same address provided to the FCHR by Petitioner in his December 29, 2013 Employment Complaint of Discrimination, and his July 21, 2014 Petition for Relief. Mr. Gerhardt’s letter advised Petitioner that if he did not return the uniforms by January 31, 2014, the matter would be turned over to the state attorney. Petitioner did not return the uniforms and, as promised, the matter was turned over to law enforcement. Respondent has taken legal action to recover uniforms from former employees in the past, including Caucasian former employees. Ultimate Findings of Fact Up to and including the time of his termination, Petitioner did not contact the employee hotline, file a complaint, discuss with co-workers or management, or otherwise claim that he had been the subject of discrimination because of his race, or that Ms. Abbott had acted in a sexually inappropriate way towards him. No witness, other than Petitioner, testified that they ever saw Ms. Abbott dress “provocatively” or in other than standard work attire, ever heard Ms. Abbott tell off-color or racially-charged jokes, or ever heard or observed Ms. Abbott interacting with Petitioner in an inappropriate manner. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that any personnel decisions regarding Petitioner, including those regarding his requests to transfer, his written warning, and his termination, were made due to Petitioner’s race, or in furtherance of any effort to sexually harass or obtain sexual favors from Petitioner. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that any persons who were not members of the Petitioner’s protected class, i.e., African-American, were treated differently from Petitioner, or were not subject to similar personnel policies and practices.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Precision Tune Auto Care, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Reggie Dancy, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-0068. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2014.
The Issue Did the Respondent engage in a discriminatory employment practice by suspending the Petitioner from work?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Joeann F. Nelson, is a Black female. In 1997, she was employed as an aide working with developmentally disabled persons at Sunrise Community, Inc. The Respondent, Sunrise Community, Inc. (hereafter “Sunrise”) is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. On or about April 24, 1997, the Petitioner was suspended from her employment for a number of days by Sunrise. The Petitioner filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (hereafter “the Commission”) on May 8, 1997, alleging that her suspension was racially motivated, and a violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The staff of the Commission investigated the complaint, and issued its Determination of No Cause on May 16, 2000. At the same time, the Commission gave the Petitioner notice of her right to an administrative hearing on the Commission’s findings. The Petitioner, while employed by the Respondent, was asked by her immediate supervisor to participate in taking residents of the facility to their group home. The Petitioner refused to take the residents complaining that another co-worker was scheduled to take the residents on the day in question. The supervisor told the Petitioner that the person who was scheduled to take the residents was too old to handle that job, and the Petitioner got into an argument about this matter. As a result of this refusal to take the residents and the argument, the Petitioner was suspended for a number of days. The refusal to follow the directions of her supervisor regarding her work and the confrontational argument with the supervisor over being asked to do a specific task that was within her job duties generally were sufficient cause for discipline. The Petitioner did not show that she was singled out or treated differently because of her race, either in being asked to perform the task or in being suspended for refusing to do the task. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a second complaint with the Commission on June 30, 1997, and raised additional issues regarding her discharge when she asked for her formal hearing on the Commission’s determination of no cause on the original complaint. However, the only matter properly before the undersigned in these proceedings is her suspension.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the complaint upon a finding that there was no cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: JoeAnne Nelson Post Office Box 76 Crawfordville, Florida 32326 Steven M. Weinger, Esquire Kurzban, Kurzban, Weinger, Tetzeli, P.A. 2650 Southwest 27th Avenue Second Floor Miami, Florida 33133 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent, Sanford Housing Authority (Respondent), committed an unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner, Jimitre Smith (Petitioner), be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female who was pregnant during a portion of the time events occurred related to her employment with Respondent. At the time of Petitioner’s initial employment with Respondent, the Sanford Housing Authority operated public housing complexes within its geographical area pursuant to a HUD program to provide housing assistant to low income, qualified residents. At some point, the Orlando Housing Authority stepped in to take over the management of Respondent’s properties. Due to the deteriorating condition of Respondent’s properties, residents were provided Section 8 vouchers so that they could obtain private rental opportunities. In the midst of the transition period, Petitioner’s employment with Respondent ended. Petitioner was initially hired by Respondent to replace a receptionist who was out on maternity leave. The assignment was part-time and temporary. It began on or about March 31, 2010. When the receptionist returned to work, Petitioner was offered a second part-time job as leasing clerk. Although the record is not clear when this second job started, it is undisputed that Petitioner sought and was granted maternity leave due to her own pregnancy on September 27, 2010. It was during this time period that the Orlando Housing Authority stepped in to take over Respondent’s responsibilities. Mr. Fleming, an employee of the Orlando Housing Authority, served as the Interim Executive Director for Respondent. In November 2010 residents were advised of the plan to demolish the substandard housing units. Since the units would not be leased, a leasing clerk was no longer required. Although Petitioner had been told she could return to work after her maternity leave, there was no position available for her at that time. Once the Orlando Housing Authority took over management, all of the day-to-day work was assigned to its employees. Respondent kept a handful of maintenance workers, but there is no evidence Petitioner sought and/or was denied that type of job. Petitioner claimed she should have been offered or allowed to apply for a job with the Orlando Housing Authority. There is no evidence that entity was required to hire her or that it refused to hire her because of her gender or pregnancy or that Respondent refused to recommend Petitioner for employment due to her gender or pregnancy. When Petitioner was cleared for return to work in December 2010, there was not a job to return to as Respondent did not have a position for her. There is no evidence that Respondent hired anyone during or after Petitioner’s pregnancy or that Petitioner was refused a job that she was qualified to perform. Had a suitable job been available, it most likely would have come through the Orlando Housing Authority. In January of 2011, Respondent formally eliminated Respondent’s part-time position through a reduction in workforce decision. At that time, Petitioner received a severance payment from Respondent and an offer for other job training opportunities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, and dismissing her employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jimitre Rochelle Smith 804 South Bay Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Ricardo L. Gilmore, Esquire Saxon, Gilmore, Carraway and Gibbons, P.A. Suite 600 201 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black female. At all times material, Petitioner was employed by Respondent corporation in one of its general retail merchandise stores in Ocala, Florida. Petitioner was hired by Respondent's white male store manager, Mr. John Sasse, on October 20, 1992, as a stock clerk in the shoe department. Petitioner was terminated on January 10, 1993, within the ninety day probationary period published in Respondent's employee handbook. In making the foregoing finding of fact, it is recognized that Petitioner attempted to show that the probationary period for new employees was only sixty days. However, she only showed that the sixty day period was applicable in a different time frame than is material here. On October 31, 1992, while working in a stock room, Petitioner's back and neck were injured when a box fell on her. Supervisors called an ambulance, and Petitioner was transported to the emergency room of a local hospital. She was treated but not hospitalized. Respondent duly filed the "Notice of Injury" as mandated by Chapter 440 F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Act," and began to pay Petitioner's medical expenses. Prior to her injury, Mr. Sasse considered Petitioner to be only a marginal employee. Petitioner was released by hospital doctors for return to work as of November 6, 1992. At that time, she had no work restrictions imposed by a doctor, so Mr. Sasse reassigned Petitioner to her usual duties. Petitioner worked at the tasks she felt she could do until November 11, 1992, when she returned to the hospital. She was examined and medicated. Later that same day, as is standard procedure with workers' compensation injuries wherein the employer pays for an injured worker's medical care and as a result has the legal right to specify which doctors attend the employee, Mr. Sasse ordered Petitioner to go to "Care One," a "walk-in" medical facility specializing in occupational medicine. Petitioner went to Care One, where she was again examined and medicated. Petitioner was released for work the same day with written work restrictions from the Care One doctor. Petitioner's resentment against Respondent that she had been injured in the first place apparently was a motivating force in her actions after she returned to work the second time. Petitioner's candor and demeanor while testifying, as well as her persistence in returning her testimony to the circumstances surrounding the box falling upon her in the storeroom, made it very clear that she considered it discriminatory, or at least unfair, that Respondent had "forced" her or anyone to work under the cluttered stock room conditions that had resulted in her initial accident or injury. In Petitioner's mind, at least, the fact that an accident or injury had occurred in the first place was sufficient to establish "dangerous working conditions" and "an unlawful employment practice." After November 11, 1992, she persisted with these complaints to the employer. However, no competent evidence established a nexus between Petitioner's race and her pre-injury job assignments, and no evidence demonstrated that after her accident, the Respondent-employer handled her workers' compensation medical care any differently because she was black. On November 11, 1992, Care One's written restrictions provided: Restricted Employee should avoid movements of the upper body and neck that would place undue stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and working above the shoulders. Employee should avoid lifting > 20 pounds, avoid frequent bending and twisting of the back, and avoid strenuous pushing and pulling. Mr. Sasse and his subordinate supervisors assigned Petitioner tasks consistent with Mr. Sasse's interpretation of Petitioner's written restrictions, as modified over time by subsequent information. On November 11, 1992, a position was created for Petitioner in the soft goods department. At this time, Petitioner became the only black clerk in the soft goods department. Initially, Mr. Sasse told her she was not to reach above her shoulders or bend to pick up anything below her knees. Petitioner complained that these tasks constituted too much physical exertion for her due to her physical condition. Petitioner continued to complain about the accident and her pain. The employer and insurance carrier continued to refer her back to Care One. There was a short delay with regard to some medical services requested by Petitioner or by referring and consulting doctors under the workers' compensation medical care delivery system, but the employer/insurance carrier in due course authorized physical therapy, a consultation with an orthopedic specialist, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for further diagnosis. Derrick Proctor, a black male employee and Petitioner's friend, presented as a credible witness, even though he claimed to have been fired by Mr. Sasse under what Mr. Proctor termed "suspicious circumstances" and at the time of formal hearing had some type of action pending against this employer. Mr. Proctor described Petitioner as "embittered" against the employer because of the employer's refusal or delay in dealing with Petitioner's medical concerns and stress. However, it appears that Petitioner's problems, if any, were common disputes and communication delays inherent in the workers' compensation medical care delivery system. For instance, when asked, the doctors reported directly to the employer, insurance carrier, and store manager concerning the Petitioner- employee's medical condition, consultant treatment, and recovery progress. On December 10, 1992, Mr. Sasse told Petitioner that he had received an oral report on her December 9, 1992 MRI results and that they were negative. This conversation occurred before any of the doctors had reported the MRI results to the Petitioner, and Petitioner inferred therefrom that information was being withheld from her. Later, on December 22, 1992, Petitioner learned, during a reprimand and counselling session for insubordination and failure to work up to her capacities, that the employer had been informed much earlier that she could return to work with no restrictions. (See Findings of Fact 32-36) Although Mr. Sassy and others had told her this before December 22, 1992, the events of December 22, 1992 triggered a belief in Petitioner that the employer was "out to get" her. Notwithstanding the extreme light duty assigned her, Petitioner complained about the work assigned and was uncooperative about helping supervisors find a job description she felt she could perform. Although Petitioner may not have known about it until November 25, 1992, on November 20, 1992 Care One deleted the prior restrictions on lifting items over 20 pounds, bending, and strenuous pushing and pulling, and narrowed her restrictions to the following: Restricted. Employee should avoid movements of the upper body and neck that would place undue stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and work above the shoulders. In December 1992, Mr. Proctor was required to close his department, hardware, every night, and Petitioner closed the soft goods department some nights. Petitioner considered being required to close some nights to be discrimination against her since she was the only black employee in the soft goods department at that time and the white female employee in soft goods had been switched to the day shift in Petitioner's place. The greater weight of the evidence shows that the whole store's evening hours increased from midnight to 1:00 a.m. due to the Christmas season, and on December 6, 1992, Petitioner was assigned to work nights so that she could go to daytime medical and physical therapy appointments. The employer's accommodation of Petitioner's situation in this respect was comparable to the accommodation given a white female employee in soft goods. Beginning November 23, 1992, that white female employee, Ms. Audrey, had been assigned to a daylight shift so that her husband, who had bad night vision, could drive her to and from work. Race was not a factor in the accommodation rendered Ms. Audrey or Petitioner. Who closed the store during December 1992 depended upon who worked the evening shift, not race. It is not entirely clear on the record whether, on December 3, 1992, Petitioner withdrew from physical therapy because she could not do the weight training assigned her or was rejected by the physical therapist as a client because she would not cooperate in weight training. Petitioner testified that she returned to physical therapy thereafter for ultrasound treatment. It is clear that Petitioner believed she was rejected by the therapist because she could not lift the heavy weights assigned her by the therapist as part of Petitioner's planned recovery. It is also clear that the decision to end the weight phase of Petitioner's treatment did not have employer input. By December 5, 1992, Petitioner's personally professed physical limitations and complaints about Mr. Sasse's treatment of her had resulted in Mr. Sasse accommodating her by creating a "make-work" job description. Under it, she was asked to push a cart that other employees had hung clothes on; she was not required to load the car with clothes. She was required only to pick up single articles of clothing that were left in the women's dressing rooms and return them to the racks. She was told only to bend if an occasional article of clothing was found on the floor. She was also told to open dressing room doors for customers and, if requested, fetch more clothes for them to try on while they remained in the dressing room. Petitioner was permitted to wear her softly padded neckbrace at all times, even though she presented no written doctor's instructions to do so. Petitioner described it as an "agony" imposed on her by the employer when, on December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse ordered her not to sit continuously on the sales floor in a chair she had removed from the women's dressing room. Petitioner had previously complained because she had been required to sit for long hours on a very hard chair Mr. Sasse had provided for her, and this time she had gotten a different chair herself. On December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse told her she must leave the dressing room chair in the dressing room for the customers, that she was not permitted to sit all the time on the sales floor where customers could see her, and she must not just sit without doing any work, until all her work was done. He told her to do a variety of the tasks of which she was capable, including but not limited to sitting while pricing goods. Petitioner considered these orders to be contrary to her doctor's limitations and to constitute "physical abuse." Petitioner repeatedly requested time off with pay so that she could recover completely through bed rest. Mr. Sasse would not allow her time off for medical reasons without a doctor's written approval. Petitioner considered this condition imposed by management to be "abusive." Petitioner described Mr. Sasse as being rude to her on December 6, 1992, when he refused to discuss her accusations of "physical abuse" and her request for time off in the presence of other employees and customers in the public buffet area of the store, and walked off, leaving her there. Petitioner referred to this incident as at least part of her "opposition to unlawful employment practices" which she believed resulted in her termination. Petitioner presented no evidence that a doctor had ever recommended that she stay at home and do nothing so that she could heal. From all the evidence, it is inferred that as a probationary employee, Petitioner had no accrued sick leave to expend for this purpose. Ms. Gardner was a long-time white female employee who had her doctor's approval for knee surgery and who required a month of bed rest at home afterwards. The employer allowed Ms. Gardner to use earned compensatory time as sick leave for that purpose during the month of December 1992. By mid-December, 1992, Mr. Sasse was frustrated because Petitioner refused to do every job he devised, even the "make work" ones, and he believed that she only pretended to be busy when he was watching her. Mr. Sasse had told Petitioner that she could do normal work again and she would not accept this from him without hearing it also from her doctor. Mr. Sasse decided to discipline Petitioner for not working up to her limitations as he understood them and for insubordination. He directed the soft goods manager trainee, Ms. Lynn Tyler, a white female, to "write up" Petitioner. Ms. Tyler and the assistant store manager, Ray Harding, a white male, met with Petitioner on December 22, 1992 to discuss the contents of the prepared memo. One of the supervisors' concerns at the time Petitioner was "written up" was that they could not get Petitioner to do anything at all without an argument, even after pointing out various light work job duties on a walk around the whole store. They were also concerned that without Petitioner doing some tasks, the employer had to pay other employees overtime to accomplish what Petitioner was not accomplishing in her regular shift hours. It was stipulated that Petitioner was never asked to work overtime. Petitioner refused to sign the December 22, 1992 memorandum of reprimand because she did not agree with it and because Tyler and Harding were, in her opinion, "grudgeful." Petitioner was informed later on December 22, 1992 by her Care One doctor that he had, indeed, released her for normal work activities effective December 16, 1992. His December 16, 1992 report which had been previously received by the employer read: Please note employee's current duty status is as follows: Regular May return to normal work activities full time. After her accident, Petitioner was observed by Derrick Proctor doing some of the same types of physical exertion the employer had required that she do before the accident, including reaching above her head to put clothes on and take them off clothes racks and picking clothes up from the floor, but he never knew her medical restrictions other than what she told him. He also observed her in agitated conversations with Ms. Tyler and Mr. Sasse while she was wearing a neck brace. On January 7, 1993, he saw Ms. Tyler "very out of sorts" when talking to the Petitioner. At first, he stated that he did not consider Petitioner to be rude or insubordinate on these occasions because the topic was working conditions, but later he admitted that he could not overhear what was actually said on all these occasions. Mr. Proctor also observed that, "Mr. Sasse rode everybody pretty hard," including white workers. It was "his way of getting things done." Mr. Proctor once observed Petitioner hiding in another department, behind racks, to avoid management. Petitioner acknowledged and described her "hiding out" at that time to Mr. Proctor as due to her "feeling mistreated" and "avoiding management." In her formal hearing testimony, Petitioner described it as "opposing unlawful work practices and abusive treatment." After learning on December 22, 1992 of her release from all medical restrictions, Petitioner continued to be uncooperative with management. Petitioner's testimony conceded that she had understood that all doctors had released her with no restrictions as of December 28, 1992 and that she had still refused to reach and bend in the stock room when ordered to do so by Mr. Sasse and Ms. Tyler on January 7, 1993. After evaluating Petitioner's continued failure or refusal to perform even the lightest of duties, Mr. Sasse decided to terminate Petitioner before her ninety days' probationary period ended. Mr. Sasse, who was terminated by Respondent-employer sometime later in 1993 and who, at the time of formal hearing, was litigating an unemployment compensation claim against Respondent, had no reason to fabricate information or testify favorably for the Respondent-employer. He was credible to the effect that the decision to terminate Petitioner in January 1993 was his unilateral decision and that he made his decision without reference to, or motivation by, Petitioner's race. Specifically, it was Mr. Sasse's foundational assessment that Petitioner could physically do the light work he assigned her after reasonable accommodation for a temporary disability but that she would not do the work assigned by him that caused him to terminate her. Petitioner testified that she was replaced by a white female. In fact, a white female was hired approximately one or two weeks prior to Petitioner's January 10, 1993 termination, with a due date to report to work on January 11, 1993, which subsequently turned out to be the day immediately following Petitioner's termination. The employer did not hire this white female with the intent of replacing Petitioner, but she was ultimately placed into the soft goods department. Mr. Proctor testified that other blacks worked in soft goods after Petitioner's termination. Within four weeks of Petitioner's termination, three new employees were hired. None of these were assigned to the soft goods department. Mr. Standley Gillings, a black male, was originally employed in another of Respondent's Ocala stores. In October 1993, Mr. Gillings was demoted with a loss of pay and transferred to the store from which Petitioner had been fired ten months earlier. His new immediate supervisor in that store was also black. Respondent continued to employ Mr. Gillings under the black supervisor until Mr. Gillings found another job and quit.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1994.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination dated June 2, 1998, alleges that Respondent discriminated against him because of his age and in retaliation for opposing illegal behavior. FCHR received the Charge of Discrimination on June 18, 1998. For purposes of this Recommended Order of Dismissal, it is assumed that the Charge of Discrimination was timely filed with FCHR. As of December 15, 1998, 180 days after Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination, FCHR had not assigned an investigator to investigate Petitioner's complaint or taken any other action related to the complaint. As of January 19, 1999, 35 days after December 15, 1998, Petitioner had not requested an administrative hearing. By letter dated June 2, 1999, Petitioner requested FCHR to forward his complaint to the Division of Administrative Hearings. FCHR received the request for an administrative hearing on June 7, 1999. This request was filed 354 days after June 18, 1998, 174 days after December 15, 1998, and 139 days after January 19, 1999. Petitioner does not argue or present any facts to support a finding that the doctrines of equitable tolling or excusable neglect apply in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, the appropriate relief for such action.
Findings Of Fact For purposes of this case, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent in July of 2007. Although the Petitioner had worked for the Respondent in prior years (at another location), he had voluntarily left the company to pursue other opportunities. When the Petitioner returned to employment with the Respondent in connection with this case, it was ten years after a heart transplant. At the time of hiring, the Respondent knew the Petitioner's medical condition and age. The Petitioner is approximately 61 years of age. The Respondent is a national corporation with several sites for engineering and manufacture of its products. The Respondent is an equal opportunity employer and maintains policies prohibiting unlawful discrimination. One of the Respondent's facilities, Sykes Creek, is located in Brevard County, Florida. The Petitioner was hired to work at the Sykes Creek facility in the role of engineering supervisor. The Sykes Creek site builds luxury power yachts ranging from 50–to-60 feet in length. The price of these yachts runs from approximately $900,000 to $2,000,000 each. Typically, the yacht is ordered and customized to the buyer's specification. The Petitioner was responsible for supervising and directing work at Sykes Creek and reported to Kevin Shaw, his immediate supervisor. Mr. Shaw in turn reported to the plant manager, Steven Fielder. The Petitioner reviewed the work and attendance of approximately 21 hourly employees. When the Petitioner was hired (2007), the Sykes Creek facility produced 116 yachts and employed approximately 575 people. Within the Petitioner's department (engineering) there were 26 people; four others like Petitioner were salaried employees. The economic crunch that struck most of the nation drastically reduced the Respondent's business. In 2008 the Respondent instituted unpaid furloughs and layoffs due to the lack of business. By 2009 the economic condition in the industry had not improved. Accordingly, the Respondent had to make additional cuts to its staff. To that end, Mr. Fielder advised Mr. Shaw that the Petitioner's department would have to be cut to reduce the number of hourly employees and one salaried employee. To determine who should be cut, the Respondent looked to the number of years of service with the company and the skill set/education they provided for the facility. The Petitioner had the shortest length of service with the Respondent except for an employee named Julie Halesma. That person was not chosen for lay-off because she was a credentialed industrial engineer. The Petitioner did not have those credentials. The Petitioner was not offered a lower, hourly paid position because he did not have the skill set to perform the work as well as the hourly employees who were already doing the jobs. A number of employees were laid off the same day the Petitioner was dismissed. The Petitioner's job position was eliminated and has not, as of the date of hearing, been restored. The Respondent has continued to lay off workers. In 2009 the Sykes Creek facility was down to 175 employees. The engineering department was down to 15 people. Absent a return to more prosperous times, it is not expected that the facility will be able to rehire employees. The job tasks that the Petitioner performed are now shared by other employees at the facility. Throughout his time at the Sykes Creek facility, the Petitioner was allowed to take time off as needed to attend to medical issues. Based upon the frequency of the medical leave, the Respondent knew or should have known that the Petitioner's medical condition required monthly treatment. The extent of the medical treatment, however, was unknown to the Respondent. As a salaried employee the Petitioner did not have to "punch the clock." The Respondent allowed the Petitioner to complete his work as he might dictate so that he was free to leave the facility to attend to his medical needs. Clearly, the Respondent knew the Petitioner had had the heart transplant at the time of hiring but that medical condition did not impede the Petitioner's ability to perform his job assignments. The medical situation required that he be absent, but there is no indication that Petitioner could not perform his job. The cost of the Petitioner's medical care was unknown to the persons charged with making the lay-off decisions. The cost of the Petitioner's medical care played no part in the decision to eliminate the Petitioner's job. Similarly, the Petitioner's age did not play a part of the Respondent's decision to eliminate the Petitioner's job. The Respondent articulated legitimate business reasons for eliminating the Petitioner's job position. Clearly the Respondent knew of the Petitioner's age at the time of hiring. The Respondent did not replace the Petitioner with a younger employee. The Respondent's explanation for whom it chose to retain in employment was not based upon an employee's age but rather legitimate business interests. Episodes during which the Petitioner required medical attention at the facility did not rise to a level to cause the Respondent to be concerned for Petitioner's medical well-being. Incidents of the Petitioner being light headed or with low blood sugar did not cause the Respondent to seek to eliminate the Petitioner's job position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by the Petitioner, and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Rolf J. Bierman 1035 Palmer Road Rockledge, Florida 32955 Brian W. Koji, Esquire Bona M. Kim, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 324 South Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 225 Tampa, Florida 33606 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment, or retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37, Section 4(1)(a)(1).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37, Section 16. Petitioner is an African-American female and filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Respondent engaged in race, color, and gender discrimination; retaliation; and the creation of a hostile work environment. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 16. Respondent operates a car dealership and is in the business of selling and servicing new and used automobiles and trucks in several states, including Florida. Respondent was not Petitioner's employer. Petitioner was a temporary worker during the relevant period, and her employment contract was with an employment agency. No written employment contract existed between the parties to this proceeding. The employment agency paid Petitioner, and Respondent paid the employment agency. The employment agency assigned Petitioner to Respondent from January 13 through January 23, 2004. Other than Petitioner’s uncorroborated testimony, there is no written or other evidence that Respondent intended Petitioner’s temporary assignment either to become a permanent position or to last for six weeks. The fact-finder finds the testimony of Petitioner to be less than credible and persuasive. From January 13 until January 21, 2004, Petitioner worked at Respondent's Tampa office at Lexus of Tampa Bay located on North Dale Mabry Avenue, Tampa, Florida. Respondent transferred Petitioner to its office at Lexus of Clearwater, Florida, on January 21, 2004, and terminated the assignment from the employment agency on January 23, 2004. The termination of assignment occurred in Pinellas County, rather than Hillsborough County, Florida. Petitioner began her assignment at Lexus of Tampa Bay on January 13, 2004, as a receptionist. Respondent paired Petitioner with Ms. Mary Ann Browne, a full-time receptionist and Caucasian female. Respondent charged Ms. Browne with training Petitioner in the responsibilities of a receptionist. Petitioner alleges that Ms. Browne engaged in unprofessional conduct during the 10 days she trained Petitioner. The unprofessional conduct, according to Petitioner's testimony included "racial undertones." For example, Ms. Browne asked Petitioner why, "Black people are all family, cousins, sisters, brothers." Petitioner responded, "Don't ask me. I wouldn't be that black." Ms. Browne allegedly stated aloud that two female employees who hugged in greeting each other were lesbians. Ms. Browne allegedly called another African-American employee a "pimp" and referred to an Hispanic employee as a "macdaddy." The fact-finder does not know the meaning of the term "macdaddy," or even how to spell the term, and the record does not provide an adequate definition or spelling. Ms. Browne allegedly referred to homosexual customers as "flamers." Finally, Ms. Browne allegedly engaged in threatening physical behavior by tossing items at Petitioner across the reception desk. No one but Petitioner heard the alleged racial and sexist comments by Ms. Browne or witnessed the physically aggressive behavior. The preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing of discrimination or retaliation. Nor does the preponderance of evidence show that Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment. Finally, a preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice. The evidence of Ms. Browne's conduct consists of Petitioner's testimony and a diary that Petitioner created contemporaneously with the acts Petitioner attributes to Ms. Browne. No other employees at Lexus of Tampa Bay witnessed the events evidenced in Petitioner's testimony and diary. Ms. Browne left her employment with Respondent in the fall of 2004 and did not testify. Ms. Toni Davis, now Ms. Toni Scotland, was a receptionist during part of the relevant time but was not present during the entire time because she was being promoted to a position in accounting. Ms. Scotland did not recall any improper behavior by Ms. Browne in 2004. The Investigative Report based its recommendation of a finding of cause on statements attributed in the Report to then Ms. Davis and the documentation of the disciplinary action taken by Respondent against Ms. Browne. However, Ms. Scotland testified that she did not recall being contacted by an investigator for the Board and denied making any statements to the investigator. The investigation took approximately 3.5 years to complete because the investigator is the only investigator for the Board and because the investigator suffered a heart attack during the investigation. At the hearing, the testimony of the investigator concerning statements he attributed to Ms. Scotland, also Ms. Davis, was vague and sparse and is less than credible and persuasive. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent is responsible for the acts Petitioner attributes to Ms. Browne. Petitioner complained to her employment agency about the conduct of Ms. Browne. The employment agency notified Respondent, and Ms. Helene Ott, the supervisor at the time, interviewed both Petitioner and Ms. Browne on January 19, 2004. The only complaint made by Petitioner to Ms. Ott on January 19, 2004, was that Ms. Browne went to the break room to bring back a drink in separate disposable drink cups for Ms. Browne and Petitioner. Upon returning with the drinks, Ms. Browne told Petitioner that Ms. Browne had spit in Petitioner's cup. Petitioner did not tell Ms. Ott that Petitioner witnessed Ms. Browne spit in the cup. Petitioner's version of events changed at the hearing. Petitioner testified that she saw Ms. Browne spit in Petitioner's cup. Petitioner testified that Ms. Browne offered to refill the cup Petitioner already had on the receptionist desk, grabbed the cup, stood, drew up a large volume of spit from deep in Ms. Browne's throat, and let the long volume of liquid drop into Petitioner's cup in full view of Petitioner. Petitioner further testified in tears that she stated repeatedly to Ms. Browne, "Give me back my cup!" The foregoing testimony of Petitioner is less than credible and persuasive. The fact-finder is not persuaded that any reasonable person would have wanted Ms. Browne to return the cup. The cup was a disposable cup from the vending area which was of no value to Petitioner. Petitioner did not relate this version of the events to Ms. Ott when Ms. Ott investigated Petitioner's complaints on January 19, 2004. The version of events that Petitioner related to Ms. Ott on January 19, 2004, is consistent with the contemporaneous account by Mr. Browne. When Ms. Ott interviewed Ms. Browne on January 19, 2004, Ms. Browne admitted that she told Petitioner she had spit in Petitioner's cup when Ms. Browne returned from the vending area to the reception desk with Petitioner's drink. Ms. Browne also admitted to engaging in offensive language, offensive commentary about customers, and unprofessional conduct. A preponderance of evidence does not show that Respondent created or fostered a work environment that was hostile toward Petitioner. On January 19, 2004, Ms. Ott issued a written counseling/final warning to Ms. Browne for her use of “offensive language, offensive commentary about customers, and unprofessional conduct.” The disciplinary action advised Ms. Browne that any further misconduct would result in the termination of her employment. On January 20, 2004, Ms. Ott interviewed Petitioner again concerning additional complaints from the employment agency. Petitioner told Ms. Ott that Ms. Browne used vulgar and unprofessional language, but Petitioner did not state to Ms. Ott that Ms. Browne made racial or sexist comments. On January 21, 2004, Ms. Ott needed to fill another temporary vacancy at Lexus of Clearwater. Ms. Ott asked Petitioner to go to Clearwater, and Petitioner went to the Clearwater office voluntarily. Respondent ended the employment agency assignment on January 23, 2004. Ms. Ott described Petitioner’s performance as “very good." On January 23, 2004, Ms. Ott offered to write a letter of reference for Petitioner. Ms. Ott told Petitioner that Ms. Ott would consider Petitioner for a position at Lexus of Tampa Bay or Lexus of Clearwater if the need arose.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order issued in this proceeding should find that Respondent is not guilty of the allegations made by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Leslie P. Stokes 4714 Pleasant Avenue Palm Harbor, Florida 34683 Gail P. Williams Hillsborough County Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601-1110 Andrew Froman, Esquire Alva L. Cross, Esquire Fisher & Phillips LLP 401 East Jackson Street, Suite 2525 Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of discriminating in employment against Petitioner on the basis of her race.
Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner, who is black, as an inspectress on April 11, 1988. An inspectress supervises the work of maids, who are responsible for cleaning the hotel rooms. On July 3, 1988, the housekeeper, Mr. Douglas Knight, who supervised Petitioner, informed her that, due to an excess of personnel, she was no longer needed as an inspectress. He offered her a position as a maid. The record does not reveal whether the change in duties would have resulted in less pay. Petitioner apparently declined the position. When she did so, Respondent terminated her. Although Respondent had received no warnings concerning unsatisfactory job performance, the work of the maids had clearly been unsatisfactory up to the time of her offered reassignment. The white woman who allegedly replaced Petitioner as an inspectress was Mrs. Triplett, who was married to the head maintenance manager of the hotel. Shortly after losing her job elsewhere, she was hired by Respondent around June 9, 1988, to replace the assistant housekeeper, who was on maternity leave until July 6, 1988. Mrs. Triplett was reassigned to the position of inspectress around June 18, 1988, and later promoted to housekeeper about two weeks after Petitioner's departure. Mr. Knight, who hired Mrs. Triplett, was friends with Mr. Triplett and later terminated for inefficiency in performing his work.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Jones Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Latricia W. Dukes 4189 Tatum Street Orlando, FL 32811 Gale Brandy Ramada Main Gate Resort 2950 Reedy Creek Boulevard Kissimmee, FL 32741
The Issue Did Respondent engage in unlawful employment practices directed to Petitioner, as defined in Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. In particular, did Respondent knowingly terminate Petitioner's employment based on Petitioner's age? Was Petitioner denied the opportunity to become kitchen manager because of her age? Is Petitioner entitled to take up her former duties as a cook at Respondent's restaurant or to be promoted to kitchen manager? Has Petitioner sustained damages, including loss of back and future pay and related benefits?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Christina D. McGill is a Caucasian woman who at the time of the alleged unlawful employment practice at issue was 41 years of age. Mrs. McGill worked at the Moorings Restaurant in Pensacola Beach, Florida, as a cook. The restaurant employed from 18 to 20 people during the operative time and all of these employees were of the Caucasian race. Both men and women were employed at the Moorings Restaurant. Prior to six months before October 11, 1997, Mrs. McGill was a cook at the restaurant. Candy Montague was one of her fellow employees. Mrs. McGill believes that Ms. Montague was approximately 25 or 26 or perhaps even 27 years old in 1997. During the time when Ms. Montague was a waitress, Mrs. McGill and Ms. Montague enjoyed an amicable relationship. Approximately six months prior to October 11, 1997, Ms. Montague was promoted to general manager of the restaurant. Subsequent to becoming general manager, Ms. Montague occasionally made remarks concerning Mrs. McGill's age. Ms. Montague remarked that Mrs. McGill was the oldest person in the kitchen, that "the old lady has to go home to her husband," and that she listened to "old timer" music. These remarks bothered Mrs. McGill. Some of these remarks were made on the premises during working hours and some were made at parties which were held subsequent to closing time. Mrs. McGill's husband, Lewis O. McGill, is much younger than Mrs. McGill. He worked as a waiter at the Moorings until he resigned sometime prior to October 11, 1997. He heard co- workers comment with regard to the fact that he was much younger than Mrs. McGill. These comments were made during after-hours drinking parties. He never heard Ms. Montague make these comments. Mr. McGill stated that he could offer no evidence which would indicate that Mrs. McGill was fired because of her age. When Ms. Montague became general manager she reduced the number of hours Mrs. McGill could work. She commented that Mrs. McGill was too old to lift heavy objects. When Mrs. McGill attempted to attain a position as kitchen manager, Mrs. McGill talked to the owner of the restaurant about the job. This made Ms. Montague unhappy. A younger person, Forrest Jameson, was also trying to obtain that job. Mrs. McGill does not know who eventually was appointed to that position. A few days prior to October 11, 1997, Mrs. McGill slipped and fell while off duty and injured herself. She called in sick. When she called Ms. Montague on October 11, 1997, to determine her work schedule, Ms. Montague told Mrs. McGill that she had been terminated for threatening people with knives, failing to follow orders, and exhibiting misconduct in general. Mrs. McGill earned about $300 weekly while working for the Moorings Restaurant. She received about $108 per week unemployment compensation from October 11, 1997 until June 30, 1998. From February 1998 until February 1999 she was employed at Beall's Outlet in Gulf Breeze and received approximately $128 per week in salary. She worked for Allan Davis Souvenirs from February 1999 to August 2000 and received about $250 per week.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which dismisses Petitioner's claim of discrimination based upon age. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Christina D. McGill 7680 West Highway 90 Apartment 158 Pensacola, Florida 32561 The Moorings Restaurant 655 Pensacola Beach Boulevard Pensacola Beach, Florida 32561 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox RoadSuite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
