The Issue The issues for determination in this case are 1) whether Respondent Department of Environmental Protection, Hillsborough County, as the permitting authority, should issue a final Title V Air Operation Permit to Respondent Southeast Oil Development Corporation, for its fiberglass lay-up and abrasive blasting facility in Thonotosassa, Florida; and 2) whether the conditions contained in the Draft Title V Air Operation Permit proposed for issuance to Southeast Oil are sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable provisions of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 62, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, JAMES REINA, ANGELO M. REINA, NANCY C. REINA, HELEN REINA, and STEVE QUICK, are residents of Thonotosassa, in Hillsborough County, Florida, and reside within one-third mile of a fiberglass lay-up and abrasive blasting facility owned and operated by Respondent SOUTHEAST OIL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. Petitioners’ residences are located to the southwest of the fiberglass facility. Respondent, SOUTHEAST OIL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (SOUTHEAST), owns and operates a fiberglass lay-up and abrasive basting facility located at 11801 Elyssa Road, Thonotosassa, in Hillsborough County, Florida. Respondent, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY (EPC), is the local regulatory agency authorized to act as the permitting authority for Title V Air Operations permits. EPC is processing and acting on the subject’s air permit on behalf of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, pursuant to operating agreements between the state and local agencies. The SOUTHEAST facility operation which is the subject of these proceedings consists of taking a steel tank shell and abrasive blasting around the filer ports openings. The tank is then covered with a layer of mesh, mylar, and styrene based fiberglass resin. The tank is rotated to aid in an even application. Prior to shipment, wood crates are cut to protect the tank in transit. The SOUTHEAST facility has been in continuous operation, manufacturing tanks at this location since 1985. During the manufacturing process, there is no open air venting while chemicals are mixed. Manufacturing is conducted in an enclosed and covered facility. Chemical containers are tightly capped when not in use. The SOUTHEAST facility currently manufactures approximately 150 tanks on an annual basis. The tanks are primarily used for gasoline storage. Styrene is the chemical that produces a fiberglass odor during the tank manufacturing process. Under the terms and conditions of its current and proposed permits, SOUTHEAST is limited in the amount of styrene allowed to be used in the manufacturing process. Approximately three years ago, SOUTHEAST changed its formula for the manufacturing process. The current formula includes a secret ingredient designated “Ingredient A” which contains significantly less styrene than SOUTHEAST’S prior formula. The use of “Ingredient A” has resulted in less styrene emission during the manufacturing process. The fiberglass odor emitted during the manufacturing process is sporadic and dependent on the wind and weather conditions. Petitioners do not detect the odor on a continual basis, and for several months at a time, there is no noticeable odor. The objectionable nature of the odor is dependent on the various sensitivities of the Petitioners. On at least two occasions within the last year, some of the Petitioners have complained to EPC of the odor; however, EPC’s investigators who responded to the complaints in a timely manner were unable to detect significant levels of fiberglass odor at Petitioners’ residences. The investigators did not consider the odors detected as objectionable. The fiberglass odor emitted during the manufacturing process is not offensive to all of the neighboring businesses and residences. The owner of the business closest in proximity to SOUTHEAST has not made a complaint regarding an objectionable odor emission and does not consider the odor objectionable. There is no evidence that the odor emitted during the manufacturing process presents a health problem to the residents of the area. The permit proposed by EPC contains conditions controlling the emission of objectionable odors and places limits on the amount of styrene which may be utilized by SOUTHEAST during the manufacturing process.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order granting Southeast Oil’s Application for Title V Air Operation Permit for the fiberglass lay-up and abrasive blasting facility, with the conditions included in the December 13, 1996, Draft Permit with conditions. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. RICHARD HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: David M. Carr, Esquire 600 East Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Richard E. Fee, Esquire Ganther and Fee, P.A. 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Barnett Plaza, Suite 1030 Tampa, Florida 33602 Sara M. Fotopulos, Esquire Vernon R. Wagner, Esquire Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Commission 1900 9th Avenue Tampa, Florida 33605 Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 James Reina, pro se 9947 Fowler Avenue Thonotosassa, Florida 33592 Angelo M. Reina, pro se Nancy C. Reina, pro se 9949 Fowler Avenue Thonotosassa, Florida 33592 Helen Reina, pro se 9951 Fowler Avenue Thonotosassa, Florida 33592 Steve Quick, pro se Betty Quick, pro se 9953 Fowler Avenue Thonotosassa, Florida 33592
The Issue Whether the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has issued an agency statement defined as a rule which has not been adopted by rulemaking as required by Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes. (All statutory citations are to the 2000 codification of the Florida Statutes. All rule citations are to the current Florida Administrative Code.)
Findings Of Fact On April 20, 2001, DEP's Southwest District office issued an Intent to Issue with respect to Tampa Bay Desal's application for a NPDES permit for the construction and operation of a proposed desalination facility (DEP File No. FL0186813-001-IW1S). DEP's Intent to Issue for the Tampa Bay Desal NPDES permit provided in part: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's proposed permitting decision may petition for an administrative proceeding (hearing) under sections 120.569 and 120.57 of the Florida Statutes. The Intent to Issue for the NPDES permit also specified the type of information that must be included in a petition filed under Sections 120.569 and 120.57. SOBAC timely challenged DEP's proposed agency action concerning the Tampa Bay Desal permit application. The challenge is currently pending as DOAH Case No. 01-1949. The Intent to Issue the Tampa Bay Desal permit also included the statement: "Mediation under section 120.573 of the Florida Statutes is not available for this proceeding." On June 7, 2001, SOBAC filed a Petition to Invalidate Agency Statement under Section 120.56(4). SOBAC alleged that the statement regarding mediation met the definitions of a rule but was not adopted by rulemaking as required by Section 120.54(1)(a). By correspondence dated June 13, 2001, DEP notified counsel for SOBAC of DEP's willingness to participate in mediation in an effort to resolve the issues underlying the administrative challenge. However, DEP's offer to participate in mediation was predicated, at least in part, on the following conditions: the parties would agree on the selection of the mediator; any discussions and documents introduced in the mediation would remain confidential; and notwithstanding the mediation, discovery in the administrative proceeding would continue, and the parties would be prepared to proceed to the final hearing as scheduled. On or about June 14, 2001, Tampa Bay Desal agreed, at least in principle, to participate in mediation with SOBAC under those conditions. There was no evidence that either DEP or Tampa Bay Desal ever agreed to toll the administrative proceeding (DOAH Case No. 01-1949) pending mediation. On or about June 15, 2001, counsel for SOBAC contacted DEP and accepted DEP's offer to participate in a mediation conference. On or about July 23, 2001, the Department, SOBAC and Tampa Bay Desal participated in a mediation conference in an effort to resolve the issues underlying SOBAC's challenge to Tampa Bay Desal's permit application. Mediation efforts failed. According to the evidence, SOBAC is an organization with an interest in various environmental permitting activities in and around Tampa Bay. SOBAC monitors local newspapers for DEP notices of intent to issue permits. Besides the Tampa Bay Desal permit, SOBAC has become aware of three other DEP notices of intent of interest to SOBAC. One was a notice of intent to issue a permit to Tampa Electric Company (TECO) for NPDES permit modifications relating to and for purposes of accommodating the Tampa Bay Desal project. This notice of intent also contained the statement: "Mediation under Section 120.573, Florida Statutes, is not available for this proceeding." SOBAC nonetheless requested mediation under Section 120.573. When the time to challenge the notice of intent was about to expire, SOBAC also filed an administrative challenge under Sections 120.569 and 120.57. The TECO challenge also was referred to DOAH, where it was given Case No. 01-2720 and consolidated with Case No. 01-1949. TECO never agreed to mediation, and DEP never responded to SOBAC's request for mediation. Another case involved a TECO air pollution permit unrelated to the desalination project. The notice of intent to issue stated: "Mediation is not available for this proceeding." The evidence did not indicate that SOBAC took any action with respect to this notice of intent to issue. The third case involved IMC Phosphates Company and a permit to operate a barge loading facility handling phosphate materials. The notice of intent to issue stated: "Mediation under Section 120.573, F.S. is not available in this proceeding." SOBAC filed an administrative challenge to this permit under Sections 120.569 and 120.57. IMC never agreed to mediation. The evidence was not clear whether SOBAC received a response to its request for mediation. After initiating the instant proceeding, SOBAC researched the Florida Administrative Weekly (FAW) from September 1999 through the date of final hearing and found 30 notices of intent, all of which stated essentially that mediation was not available for (or in) the proceeding, and one notice of intent. No further explanation was given. Of the 30, 24 were electric power plant siting cases, 4 were water quality exemptions, one involved a state revolving loan fund, and one was a joint coastal permit case with consent to use sovereign lands and requested variances. SOBAC presented no evidence as to DEP intents to issue not published in FAW. However, DEP entered into the record evidence of one other DEP notice, apparently not published in FAW, of intent to issue a coastal construction control line permit stating that mediation under Section 120.573 was available and describing procedures to be followed for mediation. SOBAC presented no other evidence to explain why mediation was not offered in the examples given or why it was offered on the one occasion. There also was no evidence as to whether any of the statements regarding availability of mediation reflected by the evidence were intended to mean that mediation was available in one type of case but not in another. Such an intent would have to be inferred. But the evidence was not sufficient to infer such an intent. SOBAC complains that the statements in DEP's notices of intent as to availability of mediation under Section 120.573 force SOBAC to either waive rights or timely initiate administrative challenges under Sections 120.569 and 120.57 and incur litigation costs which might be unnecessary if mediation were initiated. But there was no evidence of any case in which the parties agreed to mediation under Section 120.573. (The failed attempt at mediation in DOAH Case No. 01-1949 was not conducted under Section 120.573.) Second, even if the parties agreed to mediation under Section 120.573, the evidence did not prove the likelihood that mediation would be successful; if not, and if administrative litigation resumed, mediation would have added to the cost of litigation.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the administrative complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating construction industry licensees. Such authority includes, but is not limited to, the discipline of air conditioning contractors in the State of Florida. At all times material to this case, Respondent, Jose R. Gonzalez, was a certified air conditioning contractor, license number CA C035486. According to licensing records, Respondent does business as Rainbow Mechanical, Inc. Neither Nelson Rodriguez nor N.V. Air and Appliance Corporation is licensed in Florida as a state-certified or state- registered contractor. Neither has been approved by Miami-Dade County to perform contracting services. Neither Hector Salvador nor Electro Mundo Corporation is licensed in Florida as a state-certified or state-registered contractor. Neither has been approved by Miami-Dade County to perform contracting services. In September of 1995, an electrical surge caused extensive damage to a home located at 2342 Southwest 128th Avenue, Miami, Dade County, Florida. As a result of the surge, the air conditioning units and all electrical appliances were damaged. The condenser for the central air conditioning system had to be replaced. Michael Rodriguez, the son of the property's owner who resided at the home, sought assistance from the insurance carrier, Allstate. He notified Allstate of the damages and expected an adjuster would come to assess the repairs. Instead, one early morning in late September or early October 1995, Michael Rodriguez was awakened by Nelson Rodriguez who was removing the air conditioning condenser. When Michael Rodriguez questioned the activity (he had not heard back from Allstate), Nelson Rodriguez referred him to Hector Salvador. Mr. Salvador arrived at the property a short while later and advised Michael Rodriguez that he (doing business as Electro Mundo Corporation) had been retained by Allstate to do the work. Thereafter, Salvador and Nelson Rodriguez were given access to the property on numerous occasions to correct the electrical problems. Michael Rodriguez became suspicious of their work when nothing seemed to work better after repairs. He became so concerned as to the quality of the work that he began to make inquiries to building officials. Eventually, Michael Rodriguez discovered a permit had not been pulled for the work. Later he determined that Nelson Rodriguez and Salvador were not licensed. Meanwhile, Salvador contacted Respondent and asked him to pull a permit for the job. Respondent considered himself a subcontractor to Electro Mundo. At the time the Respondent applied for the permit for the air conditioning work at the homeowner's residence, Respondent knew that the work he described in the permit application (replacement of the condenser) had already been performed by an unlicensed contractor, without a permit. On or about August 21, 1996, Respondent completed a permit application for the subject home. Such application identified Rainbow Mechanical as the contractor and described the work as "replaced condenser." The permit did not address the other numerous electrical repairs needed. Respondent did not replace the condenser at the subject home. That work had been performed by Electro Mundo or Nelson Rodriguez. Respondent's involvement at the home consisted of pulling the permit, calling for an inspection, correction of a cable problem identified by the inspector, and calling for a re- inspection which passed. Respondent never talked personally to the property owner or the son. Respondent never had a written contract with anyone to perform the work. Respondent maintains that Electro Mundo reimbursed him for the permit fees but did not pay him for any service for the job. Electro Mundo was not approved or authorized by Allstate to make the electrical repairs to the subject home. Electro Mundo is not on Allstate's quality vendor list. The property owner never contracted with Electro Mundo to perform electrical services at the property but permitted access to the property based upon the direction of an individual named Maria Torres who represented Allstate had dispatched Salvador to the job. Although factually not similar to the violation alleged in this matter, Respondent was previously disciplined by the Construction Industry Licensing Board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,500, suspending Respondent's license for a period of sixty days, imposing a probationary period thereafter, and awarding costs of prosecution. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney Hurst, Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Construction Industry Licensing Board 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dorota Trzeciecka, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Construction Industry Licensing Board 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Josefina Perez-Cofino, Esquire 7860 Northwest 71 Street, Suite 302 Miami, Florida 33166
Findings Of Fact Prior to March of 1981, Maxmedia held permits 8463-6 and 8462-6 issued by the Department for signs on property leased from Lust Industries located approximately at the intersection of U.S. 17/92 and Virginia Avenue in the city of Orlando, Florida. On March 23, 1981, Maxmedia advised the Department that the sign for which it held the above permits had been dismantled, and permits numbered 8463-6 and 8462-6 were returned to the Department for cancellation. On March 18, 1981, the Department received the application of Lust Industries for a sign at the location where the Maxmedia sign had been permitted, to be erected on property owned by Lust Industries. This application contained several irregularities, and the Department accepted it as an application only for the south face of the proposed sign. On May 27, 1981, the Department received the application of Lust Industries for the north face of this sign. The requested permits were issued by the Department on May 27, 1981. On February 24, 1981, Maxmedia executed a lease to property located approximately 30-50 feet south of the Lust Industries property. The term of this lease was to run from April 1, 1981 to April 1, 1984. On March 21, 1981, the Department received an application from Maxmedia for permits to erect signs at the location 30-50 feet south of the location owned by Lust Industries where Maxmedia had permits until it surrendered them. These permits were denied by the Department because of the permit application already received from Lust Industries for a sign 30 to 50 feet to the north. On March 23, 1981, Maxmedia applied to the city of Orlando for a building permit to erect the sign at its leased location south of the Lust Industries property, and this permit was issued to Maxmedia by the city. In January or February, 1981, Lust Industries had applied to the city of Orlando for a permit to build a sign on property near the sign of Maxmedia which was dismantled in March of 1981, but the requested city permit was denied because of the proximity of this location to the Maxmedia sign. After, the Maxmedia sign had been taken down, Lust Industries again applied for a city of Orlando building permit, but this was after the city permit had already been issued to Maxmedia; thus, the city again denied a permit to Lust Industries due to the existence of the outstanding permit held by Maxmedia. In May or June of 1981, after having received a building permit from the city of Orlando, and after having leased the property, Maxmedia proceeded to erect the sign 30-50 feet south of the Lust Industries property. It is this sign that is the subject of the Department's violation notice issued on June 30, 1982. It is the existence of this sign of Maxmedia, permitted by the city of Orlando, and erected on land currently leased, that prevents Lust Industries from obtaining the city of Orlando building permit it needs in order to be able to erect a sign 30 to 50 feet to the north. Thus, the Department seeks to revoke the state permits it issued to Lust Industries which violate the harmony of regulations provisions of the statutes and rules.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue its Final Order revoking the permits held by Lust Industries, dismissing the Notice of Violation against Maxmedia, Inc., and granting the application of Maxmedia, Inc., for permits as requested in its application received on March 24, 1981. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 18th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M. S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 William F. Poole IV, Esquire 644 West Colonial Drive Orlando, Florida 32802 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire P. O. Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Paul N. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Bayfront commenced construction of the biological waste incinerator here at issue prior to March 21, 1992, the effective date of the moratorium on construction of biological waste incinerators and was exempt from that moratorium. An inspection of the premises on April 9, 1992, (exhibit 5) showed substantial work had been accomplished and the inspector concluded, and DEP's legal counsel concurred, that in order to have achieved the construction progress shown on April 9, 1992, the work had to have been commenced prior to March 21, 1992. Further, a building permit to renovate the building into which the waste incinerator was placed was issued November 12, 1991, (exhibit 7) and a building permit to install a waste incinerator was issued March 4, 1992, (exhibit 6). No contradictory evidence was submitted by Petitioner. Respondent's witnesses testified without contradiction that Bayfront's application for an operation permit was complete in all respects, including certification by a professional engineer; that all test results showed the emissions into the atmosphere were within the prescribed standards; that certain conditions contained in the construction permit as a result of the settlement agreement resolving the challenge to the issuance of the construction permit are contained in the operation permit; that those conditions exceed the conditions required by the rules for incinerators; and that Bayfront affirmatively provided the Department with reasonable assurance based on plans, test results, installation of pollution control equipment, or other information that the operation of the incinerator will not discharge, emit, or cause pollution in contravention of DEP's standards as contained in Rule 17-4.070(1), Florida Administrative Code. This testimony is accepted as factual. The draft permit authorizes Bayfront to burn a maximum of fifteen hundred pounds per hour of waste. Each time a test run is conducted to check the emissions, the pounds of waste burned per hour during the test establishes an upper limit on the rate of burning waste. As explained by James L. McDonald, the engineer processing air pollution applications for the Department at Transcript p. 50-51: The construction application asked for a permit at fifteen hundred pounds per hour. So the construction permit is -- the condition that we would want, the Department would normally want the test within ten percent of that fifteen hundred pounds an hour in order to go ahead and issue, if its in total compliance, to issue an operating permit at fifteen hundred pounds. Since the test came in at a reduced rate, below the ten percent, then that's why in the operating permit condition twenty-one says you're limited to the rate that we're, the test was conducted. [sic] Now, also, its interesting to note that in their test, if you look at their runs two and three -- because there are rules that say the Department could accept two runs out of three if a condition occurred that was out of their control -- if your average runs two and three, they would average within ten percent of fifteen hundred. So, as a permit processor, it even gave me some reasonable assurance that they could probably comply with the fifteen hundred. But, since the test of all three runs came in as an average of twelve fifty-one, then the operating permit included that twelve fiftyone. And like the real world out there, just like power plants, when it comes time for their annual testing, if they are at half speed, their business is down, it allows them to test at half speed. We won't require them to go up to full speed. They can test at half speed. But then they are limited there. And if they go above it at a later date they would have to retest. So they can work their way back up to where the Department has reasonable assurance that the upper limit of fifteen hundred pounds -- that's where later in condition twenty-one of the operating permit it says but in no case shall the maximum permit or burning rate of fifteen hundred pounds per hour be exceeded. Petitioner's second two grounds for challenging the issuance of the operation permit was answered by McDonald's testimony, above quoted, and this evidence was not rebutted by Petitioner. The primary thrust of the evidence presented by Petitioner was that Bayfront had somehow misled the City of St. Petersburg regarding the operation of the incinerator and had not complied with all of the City's requirements in other respects, ergo, Bayfront could not be relied on to comply with the conditions in the operation permit. This evidence is irrelevant to the determination of whether or not the operation of the incinerator complies with all of the Department rules. The conditions of the operating permit require Bayfront to submit periodic reports to the Department from which the Department can determine whether the conditions in the permit are being complied with. Furthermore, the Department requires the permittee to notify the Pinellas County Department of Environmental Management at least fifteen days prior to the date on which each formal compliance test is to begin (Permit Condition No. 22) to allow them to witness the test, if desired. The construction permit, complying with the settlement agreement, required Bayfront to adhere to more frequent testing and more extensive testing then is required by the rules for operating biological waste incinerators. All of the tests and reports submitted by Bayfront on the operation of this incinerator met all of the requirements in the construction permit and the draft operation permit.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Bayfront Medical Center be issued Permit No. AO52- 224337 to operate a biological waste incinerator at Fifth Avenue South and Eighth Street, St. Petersburg, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November 1993 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Adrian W. Helm, Esquire 925 14th Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33712 Daniel N. Burton, Esquire Thomas K. Maurer, Esquire Terri L. Gillis-Tucker, Esquire Foley and Lardner 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1800 Orlando, Florida 32801 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Pinewood should be granted a permit to construct and operate an air pollution source, specifically a concrete batching plant. Petitioners contend that Pinewood has failed to give reasonable assurances that it can operate the plant in harmony with the Department's rules and regulations, and that deed restrictions on the property where Pinewood proposes to construct the plant prohibit it. Pinewood and the Department contend that Pinewood has provided reasonable assurance that the plant will not result in violation of the Department's air pollution source standards.
Findings Of Fact Pinewood is seeking to construct a concrete batching plant on Big Pine Key, Florida. The plant would be located within 1,000 feet of a body of water known as "Coupon Bight." Petitioners reside in a residential area across Coupon Bight from the plant location. Their residences are approximately one mile from the plant. If the proposed plant resulted in violations of the Department of Environmental Regulation's air pollution standards, Petitioners would suffer a degradation of their living environment. This would be especially true if the proposed plant resulted in violations of the Department's standards for particulate or dust emissions. Pinewood was formed as a corporation in August, 1981. It appears that the corporation was formed primarily to construct and operate the concrete batching plant which is the subject of this proceeding. In November, 1981, Pinewood obtained applicable construction permits from Monroe County, Florida. Pinewood ordered the plant from Stephens Manufacturing Company in Kentucky. The plant was constructed on the site during November, 1981. Anthony Paterniti, Pinewood's President, was responsible for obtaining the local permits and constructing the plant. He was not aware that permits would be required from the Department of Environmental Regulation before the plant could be constructed and operated. The Department of Environmental Regulation cited Pinewood for constructing the plant without the proper permits by initiating an enforcement proceeding. The enforcement proceeding was concluded by the Department and Pinewood entering into a consent order. Pinewood paid a fine of $250. Paterniti construed the consent order as allowing him to operate the plant. During April, 1982, the plant operated for nineteen days. The Department again initiated enforcement proceedings. These proceedings were concluded by the Department and Pinewood again entering into a consent order. During this time, Pinewood filed its application with the Department to construct and operate the concrete batching plant. The plant, while already constructed, has not operated since April, 1982. The plant, which Pinewood has already constructed and proposes to operate, is a ten yard batching plant. It batches, or loads, aggregate and cement into a cement truck, where the materials are mixed while on route to a job site. The plant is large enough to load only one truck at a time. The only air pollution that is likely to result from operation of such a plant is particulate emissions, or dust. In order to reduce these emissions, a "bag house" is installed in such a manner as to trap cement dust. The "bag house" functions in the manner of a vacuum cleaner, allowing air to pass through it, but trapping emissions. In normal use, a plant such as Pinewood's would emit approximately one-half pound of cement dust per hour into the air. Without use of the "bag house" from 7 to IS pounds per hour could be expected to be emitted. A second source of particulate emissions from operation of a hatching plant is the loose aggregate that is stored adjacent to the plant. If the aggregate is not properly stored, wind can blow it about and cause substantial emission of cement dust into the air. It is possible to virtually eliminate this source of pollution. Pinewood proposes to store loose aggregate within concrete bins. During high wind episodes, the bins could be covered. Pinewood also proposes to keep loose aggregate wet by sprinkling it with water, thus reducing that source of pollution. Other dust that might result from operation of a hatching plant such as would result from the utilization of heavy trucks in dusty areas are controllable. Pinewood has placed a firm marl base around the plant which can be kept wet during dry times. So long as the proposed concrete hatching plant is properly operated, and loose aggregate in the area is properly managed, it is not likely that emissions from the operation would result in violation of the Department's air pollution standards set out in Chapter 17-2, Florida Administrative Code. Pinewood's plant would be operated by Anthony Paterniti. Paterniti is a licensed general contractor. He is familiar with the operation of batching plants. While operating the plant is not difficult and maintenance requirements are minimal, it is necessary that proper operating and maintenance procedures be carefully observed. The property on which Pinewood proposes to operate its batching plant is owned by David S. and Judy A. Shephard. It appears that the Shephards are partners in the cement batching plant venture with Pinewood, and that they are prepared to enter into a lease agreement with Pinewood. The deed by which the Shephards obtained the property contains the following deed restriction: "The property may not be used as a site of a cement plant." Local government authorities in Monroe County have apparently interpreted this restriction to not include a concrete batching plant, but rather pertain to a cement manufacturing plant. There was testimony offered at the hearing from which it could be concluded that the intent of the restriction was to include batching plants. Petitioners have contended that there is a likelihood that operation of the plant would result in violations of water quality standards in Coupon Bight. The evidence does not sustain that contention. In an effort to get the petitioners to drop their opposition to this permit application, Paterniti wrote a letter dated June 1, 1982, to all the Petitioners. The letter included the following: I think that you all should know that the Benhams [two of the originally named Petitioners] themselves have an illegal duplex on RU-1 zoning on lot 17, block 3 Pine Channel Estates. I intend to file a zoning violation with the Monroe County Zoning Dept. and have this violation of our zoning laws investigated. I am prepared to go to court over this matter. * * * I would like to ask your group to write a letter to the DER withdrawing your request for a hearing. If you do this, I will not file the zoning violation with the county, which I intend to do this week. You leave me no other choice. The tone of this letter is certainly threatening; however, it does not stand as evidence to establish that Pinewood is incapable of properly operating a concrete batching Plant. No evidence was offered as to the interests of Petitioners other than Naubereit and Kite in this proceeding, and no appearance was entered on their behalf at the hearing.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the owner and developer of the Plaza Venetia Marina, located in Biscayne Bay in Dade County, Florida, immediately north of the Venetian Causeway. The marina is constructed on submerged lands leased from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. On May 4, 1976, DER issued Permit No. 13-30-0364-6E to Respondent. That permit authorized the construction of two concrete marina docks, one "T" shaped and 255 feet long, and the other "J" shaped and 500 feet long. The project site is north of the Venetian Causeway on the western edge of Biscayne Bay, Section 31, Township 53 North, Range 42 East, Dade County, Florida. On August 18, 1977, DER issued Permit No. 13-30-3984 to Respondent. That permit authorized the construction of a 700 foot long "J" shaped pier with 24 finger piers and associated mooring pilings, and the construction of a 280 foot long "T" shaped pier. This permit authorized construction to be undertaken directly north of the docks authorized by Permit No. 13-30-0364-6E described above. On August 18, 1977, Respondent applied to DER's West Palm Beach office for a permit to construct the center pier of the Plaza Venetia Marina. On October 27, 1977, DER issued Permit No. 13-30-0740-6E to Respondent. This permit, which is the only one of the three permits at issue herein, authorized construction of a boat tie-up and fueling facility for a public marina. This facility represented a final phase of a master plan which includes the two other marinas with tie-up accommodations authorized by Permit Nos. 13-30-0364-6E and 13-30-3984. The drawings which accompanied the permit application carried the designation "FUEL" on the large platform at the end of the center pier of the marina. The cover letter from Respondent's authorized agent explained that " . . . the fueling area has been made sufficiently large so as to isolate the fuel pumps." No specific mention was made in the application or supporting materials of any building to be constructed on the central pier, and none of the permit drawings initially filed with DER depict any such building. DER employees who processed the permit, however, knew at some time during the processing of the permit application that some sort of structure would likely be constructed on the platform at the end of the center pier, although the plans did not disclose such a building, and the agency made no inquiries about, nor requested any additional information from Respondent concerning the type of structure contemplated. At the time of the issuance of Permit No. 13-30-0740-6E Respondent did not know the exact nature, size, or height of any structure that it might wish to build on the central platform. At the time, Respondent had only a conceptual idea of a structure that might accommodate the uses it contemplated for the platform. The words "fueling station" appear on the platform at the end of the center pier in one of the drawings attached to Permit No. 13-30-0740-6E. That drawing was not initially filed with the original permit application, but was provided during the permitting process by Respondent prior to issuance of the permit. Permit No. 13-30-0740-6E was issued to Respondent on October 27, 1977, pursuant to the authority granted DER under Chapters 253 and 403, Florida Statutes. Nowhere in the permit is there any reference to Section 258.165, Florida Statutes. The permit, by its expressed terms, authorized the following: To construct a boat tie-up and fueling facilities [sic] for a public marina. The facility will extend approximately 390 feet into Biscayne Bay from the bulkhead line. The dock will provide tie-up spaces for 20 boats and six fuel slips, and will contain floating oil collars in case of oil or gasoline spillage. This facility represents the final phase of a master plan which includes two other marinas with tie-up facilities . . . On January 11, 1979, some approximately fourteen months after issuance of the permit for the center pier, Respondent sent a letter to DER's West Palm Beach office which read as follows: Enclosed please find a copy of a letter as sent to the Army Corps, re: the service facility you and I discussed for the already approved fuel dock (State No. 13-30-0740-6E) for the Plaza Venetia Marina. I also enclose copy of the plans. Please review as quickly as possible since we intend to start construction on the marina within 30 to 45 days. (Emphasis added.) Enclosed with the January 11, 1979, letter to DER was a copy of a January 11, 1979, letter to the Army Corps of Engineers which read as follows: Recently I reviewed with [a Corps representative] the placement of a small service accommodation facility on the already approved fuel dock for the Plaza Venetia Marina . . . I left a set of plans with [the Corps] at the Corps office in Miami Beach. The facility is in close keeping with the permitted use of the marina. It will occupy less than half the already approved area of the fueling facility. It will be constructed on an already permitted facility. Included are a small bait and tackle shop; convenience store; captains' office; observation area and required bathrooms. The discharge from the bathrooms will flow directly into the main County sewer disposal system and will utilize a sewer pump-out facility located on the fuel dock. * * * After carefully reviewing my existing permit, the limited nature of the facility described, and its sole purpose of servicing the already permitted marina, please advise me if any modifications are required. I look forward to hearing from you as quickly as possible on this matter since construction of the marina is projected to begin within the next 30 to 45 days. A copy of the floor plan of the proposed building was attached to the January 11, 1979, letter received by DER. This floor plan indicates areas to be included in the building for bait and tackle facilities, a food store, storage areas, restroom facilities, and a marina office. Also shown on the floor plan is a storage area for electric carts to be used in servicing vessels utilizing the marina facility. The record in this cause establishes that Respondent never intended its January 11, 1979, letter to DER to be a request for a permit modification or an application for a new permit. Instead, the letter was intended only as a request for DER review of and comments on the proposed structure to be built at the end of the central pier. DER representatives in its West Palm Beach office forwarded the letter to the Tallahassee office of DER. DER never responded either orally or in writing to Respondent's communication of January 11, 1979, enclosing the building plan. On June 19, 1979, DER had opened its file No. 13-9916 in its standard form dredge and fill permitting section in Tallahassee in response to a letter received from Respondent requesting the addition of some dolphin pilings along the bulkhead at the Plaza Venetia Marina. The request from Respondent was treated as standard form application because the scope of the entire marina project exceeded short-form criteria. After receiving this request from Respondent, DER sent a completeness summary to Respondent within 30 days of receipt of the application requesting that Respondent provide approval from the Department of Natural Resources for the use of sovereignty submerged lands. Through various correspondence, this application was expanded to include several additional modifications to the overall marina, including reconfiguration of the fuel dock, addition of finger piers, reconfiguration of the "T" docks, and addition of a 12-foot boardwalk. Finally, the application was modified so that it constituted an application to consolidate the three existing permits. On January 29, 1980, Respondent submitted the last item of information required by the completeness summary except for DNR approval for use of sovereignty submerged lands. The aforementioned letter of January 11, 1979, from Respondent, which included the building floor plan, was apparently placed in DER file No. 13-9916 relating to Respondent's requested permit modification. Although the floor plan is contained in this file, the record in this cause clearly establishes that neither Respondent nor DER treated either the January 11, 1979, letter or the enclosed plan as a request for modification of Permit No. 13-30-0740-6E. DER file No. 13-9916 sat dormant for almost three years awaiting DNR consent for the use of state-owned lands. By letter dated July 10, 1981, DER requested Respondent to indicate whether it wished to pursue the permit modification application further since it had been 1,085 days since DER had notified Respondent of the necessity to furnish notification from DNR concerning further use of state sovereignty submerged lands. By letter dated July 15, 1981, Respondent withdrew its permit modification application. On April 20, 1979, the City of Miami issued a valid building permit for the marina fueling station. Respondent notified DER in July, 1979, that it was beginning construction of the marina. Construction of the central pier began on July 16, 1979, and ended on June 11, 1980. Construction of the fueling platform began on February 28, 1981, with erection of the fueling station walls beginning sometime after April 1, 1981. Subsequent to the commencement of construction DER representatives inspected the building site on several occasions. Respondent was not made aware in advance of when these inspections would occur since they were scheduled at the sole discretion of DER. DER first learned of the actual construction of the marina fueling station after receipt of a citizen complaint on December 1, 1981. Upon inspection of the site by DER personnel on December 2, 1981, it was discovered that the building on the fuel dock was partially complete with finish work and the placement of some interior and exterior walls remaining to be accomplished. DER served a warning notice on Respondent on December 7, 1981, advising Respondent of an alleged violation of its existing permit. A second warning letter was sent to Respondent on January 26, 1982, followed by the issuance of the Notice of Violation by DER. DER incurred costs and expenses of $405.40 in investigating the alleged violation. The structures authorized by Permit Nos. 13-30-0364-6E, 13-30-3984, and 13-30-0740-6E ("the structures") have been constructed by Respondent. The structures are located within the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve ("the Preserve") established by Section 258.165, Florida Statutes. Biscayne Bay at the site of the structures is a navigable water of the State of Florida. A building with a floor area of approximately 3,800 square feet and a roof area of 5,292 square feet has been constructed at a cost of approximately $500,000 on the platform at the end of the center pier of the marina. The net area of the platform contains about 9,640 square feet. It has been stipulated by the parties that construction of the building on the center pier will not result in significant adverse water quality or biological impacts which were not contemplated when the above-referenced permits were issued for the marina. The building as presently constructed has provisions for the following uses: a waiting area for water-borne transportation, a bait and tackle shop and marine supply store, an electric cart parking and recharging station, and an attendant's room with cash register and equipment for the fuel pumps. All of these uses are customarily associated with the operation of marina facilities. The building as constructed differs in several minor respects from the one shown on the plans submitted to DER in the January 11, 1979, letter from Respondent. What had been shown on those plans as outdoor seating has been enclosed, walls and proposed uses have been relocated within the building, and the entire building has been moved back on the fuel dock. It is concluded, however, that these changes are of such a minor nature as to not constitute a material departure from the plans furnished to DER in January of 1979. As-built plans for the building have never been provided by Respondent to DER. At the time of Respondent's application for the permit for the center pier, DER rules required that a permit applicant provide cross-sectional drawings of proposed structures to be built in conjunction with docking facilities such as those proposed by Respondent. Drawings attached to the permit application show two cross sections through the center pier, but neither of these cross sections depict a building to be constructed on the pier. Respondent did not submit cross-sectional drawings for the building at the time of its application, and none had been submitted to DER as of the date of final hearing in this cause. However, DER at no time requested such cross-sectional drawings, despite the fact that those agency representatives processing Respondent's permit application assumed from the outset that some structure would and could be built by Respondent on the platform attached to the central dock under the terms of the October 27, 1977, permit. The estimated cost for removal of the building at the end of the central pier is $150,000-$200,000.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, dismissing the Notice of Violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul R. Ezatoff, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Clifford A. Shulman, Esquire and Thomas K. Equels, Esquire Brickell Concours 1401 Brickell Avenue, PH-1 Miami, Florida 33131 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lee Rohe, Esquire Assistant Department Attorney Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Elton Gissendanner, Director Department of Natural Resources Executive Suite 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, Petitioner, v. CASE NO. 82-1640 FLORIDA EAST COAST PROPERTIES, INC., Respondent. /
