The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued August 25, 2000, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating insurance licenses and appointments pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations in this case, the Respondent has been licensed as a Life Health and Annuity Agent, Life Health and Variable Annuity Agent, and a Health Insurance Agent in this state. On March 7, 1982, the Respondent was celebrating her birthday, she turned 22 that day, and was returning home with her husband when the vehicle they were in was stopped for a minor traffic infraction (expired tag). Believing he had to perform a "pat down" for his safety, the officer felt the Respondent's purse and noticed a bulge in the shape of a small weapon. The small hand gun had been a birthday present to the Respondent. Upon discovering the weapon, the officer charged the Respondent with carrying a concealed firearm. Initially the Respondent entered a written plea of not guilty but subsequently changed the plea in open court to one of nolo contendere. In connection with the plea change, the court entered an Order Granting Probation and Fixing Terms Thereof. The fact that the Respondent was placed on probation is not disputed. Further, as the Court determined the Respondent was not likely to again engage in a criminal course of conduct, adjudication was withheld and probation set for a period of one year. The Respondent successfully completed that year of probation and has had no further incidents of criminal misconduct. The Respondent erroneously believed that the successful completion of the probationary period, and the fact that adjudication had been withheld, resulted in the expungement of the criminal record. As the Respondent later found out, criminal records are not automatically sealed or expunged. On November 2, 1999, the Respondent filed an application for licensure as a life health and variable annuity agent with the Petitioner. That application contained two questions dealing with the applicant's past criminal history. As to both questions, the Respondent erroneously entered "no" responses. Had the Respondent entered accurate answers, both responses would have been "yes" based upon the status of the Respondent's criminal record at the time the application was submitted to the Petitioner. The Respondent has a medical condition that she claims has damaged her long term-memory. According to the Respondent, she answered the questions as she did because she did not remember all the facts surrounding the criminal history at the time the application was completed but that, even if she had, she would have assumed the matter was sealed and fully resolved since adjudication was withheld. The Respondent's account in this regard has been deemed credible. The Respondent did not intend to mislead the Petitioner and acted more in ignorance of the law as to the prior arrest and probation than in willful disregard of her responsibility to disclose it. At the time Respondent completed her application for licensure she read the paragraph that appears at the bottom of the third page of said application in bold typeface that states: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU HAVE READ ALL OF THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS CAREFULLY AND HAVE ANSWERED THEM FULLY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT AS IT RELATES TO AN APPLICANT'S LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS. THE DEPARTMENT DEEMS ALL MATTERS THAT ARE PART OF AN APPLICANT'S LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT AND MATERIAL ELEMENT OF THE APPLICATION, THE OMISSION OF ANY PART OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORD IS A MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION OR MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT IN AND OF ITSELF. YOUR FAILURE TO DIVULGE YOUR COMPLETE LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORD ON THIS APPLICATION CAN RESULT IN YOUR APPLICATION BEING DENIED. In addition to the foregoing, the application submitted by the Respondent provided the following statement: Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for license and the facts stated in it are true. I understand that misrepresentation of any fact required to be disclosed through this application is a violation of The Florida Insurance and Administrative Codes and may result in the denial of my application and/or the revocation of my insurance license(s). The answers provided by the Respondent to the two questions (application questions numbered 18 and 19) were incorrect, misleading, and were presumably used to support the issuance of the Respondent's licenses. Although the Respondent is eligible to have her criminal record sealed or expunged, as of the date of the hearing she had not completed that process. During the investigation of this matter, the Respondent fully cooperated with the Petitioner and obtained copies of documents as requested.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance impose an administrative fine against the Respondent in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of prosecuting this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Santurri, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph H. Fernandez, Esquire The Law Offices of Brand & Fernandez, P.A. 2 Northeast 40th Street Suite 403 Miami, Florida 33137 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, admissions made by Respondent, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. He holds license number 0265883. In March of 1990, Ulrich Wingens, by and through his attorney, Charles Burns, entered into a written contract to purchase from Jupiter Bay Shoppes Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "JBS") certain commercial property located in Palm Beach County. Respondent brokered the sale. The sale contract provided that JBS was responsible for payment of Respondent's broker's fee of $50,000.00 and that such compensation was to "[t]o be due and payable only if closing occur[red]." Respondent received a $20,000.00 earnest money deposit from Wingens in connection with the sale. The sale contract provided that the $20,000.00 was to be held in the Jim Towns Realty escrow account. The sale did not close. Litigation between Wingens and JBS ensued. During the pendency of the litigation, the parties instructed Respondent to continue to hold Wingens' $20,000.00 earnest money deposit in escrow until they advised him to do otherwise. Wingens and JBS settled their dispute before the case was scheduled to go to trial. On November 14, 1991, the judge assigned to the case, Palm Beach County Circuit Court Judge Edward H. Fine, entered an order directing Respondent "to immediately transfer to Fleming, Haile & Shaw, P.A. Trust Account the escrow deposit in the amount of $20,000.00 and any accrued interest thereon." Respondent did not comply with the order. He had appropriated the $20,000.00 for his own personal use and benefit and was not holding it in escrow. This was contrary to the instructions he had received from Wingens and JBS. At no time had Wingens or JBS authorized Respondent to take such action. Wingens' attorney, Burns, brought the matter to the attention of the Department. The Department assigned one of its investigators, Terry Giles, to the case. As part of her investigation, Giles interviewed Respondent. During the interview, Respondent admitted to Giles that he had closed his real estate office in October of 1991 and had not at any time prior to the interview notified the Department of the closure. At the time he closed his office, Respondent's real estate broker's license was still in active status.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III and IV of the Administrative Complaint and revoking his real estate broker's license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of August, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE IN CASE NO. 93-1315 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the "findings of facts" proposed by the Department in its post-hearing submittal: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. First sentence: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Accepted as true, but not incorporated because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 3-13. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. 14-15. Accepted as true, but not incorporated because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. Accepted as true, but not incorporated because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Legal Section, Suite N 308 Hurston Building, North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Mr. James C. Towns 7101 Smoke Ranch Road #1007 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are clear and uncontroverted. On or about February 5, 1975, Martin E. Kulok terminated his employment as a mortgage solicitor with ABC Investment Corporation. ABC Investment Corporation wrote and advised the Division of Finance on February 10, 1975, that Kulok had left his employ. On February 5, 1975, Kulok applied for licensure as a mortgage solicitor with Financial Resources Corporation On February 12, 1975, the Division of Finance cancelled Kulok's registration as a mortgage solicitor with ABC. On February 20, 1975, the Division of Finance issued Kulok's license as a mortgage solicitor with Financial Resources Corporation. On February 13, 1975, while unlicensed, Kulok sold what purports to be a first mortgage to Lincoln H. Evans in behalf of Financial Resources Corporation. Kulok has applied for licensure as a mortgage solicitor with Joseph Maddlone, and said application is at issue because the Division of Finance asserts that Kulok's sale to Evans while he was unlicensed between February 12 and February 20 "demonstrates deficiencies in qualities of experience, integrity, and competency" which are essential to the issuance of a mortgage solicitor's license. It is clear that in issuing licenses, the Division of Finance issues licenses to the broker, in this case Financial Resources, and that nothing is forwarded to the mortgage solicitor. Kulok was physically located in Miami, Florida and his broker's office was located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Kulok stated that he called his broker frequently to determine what the status of his license was. On February 13, 1975, some eight days after completing his application, his broker advised him that he could go out and sell. On February 13, 1975, Kulok's application was received by the Division of Finance. The apparent basis for requiring issuance of licenses to brokers and requiring brokers to delicense solicitors is that they are more responsible than solicitors. See Subsection 498.04(9)(10), F.S. It appears that in the instant case Financial Resources Corporation was not as responsible as many people, including Mr. Kulok and the Division, thought it was. Fortunately, the issue presented here is not Mr. Kulok's status when his application for licensure had been received but had not been granted by the Division. Under the procedures adopted by the Division of Finance the solicitor is dependent upon the good faith representations of his broker, to whom the Division also looks for control. By inquiring of and being told by his broker that he was able to sell, Kulok did what he could do to determine his status. Certainly he could have done more, but he had no basis to mistrust his broker. Under the facts presented here, there is no evidence that Kulok lacks the "experience, integrity, and competency" to be licensed as a mortgage solicitor, and that is the issue.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing conclusions of law and findings of fact, the Hearing Officer recommends that Kulok's license be granted. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of April, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Barclay, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Martin B. Kulok 150 S.E. 25th Road, No. 14F Miami, Florida 33129 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Respondent Farrington holds a registered general contractor's license. He has worked in the construction business in and around Pensacola, Florida, for the last ten or fifteen years at least. On April 25, 1975, respondent caused to be filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida an original petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, on behalf of Rotunda Construction Company, Inc. (Rotunda). Both at the time of the filing of the petition and at the time of the final hearing, respondent served as Rotunda's president and as its qualifying licensee. Respondent is also a principal stockholder in the corporation. There has been no adjudication of bankruptcy in the course of the Chapter XI proceedings. No receiver has been appointed, nor have Rotunda's creditors sought the appointment of a receiver. There has been no composition of creditors. Rotunda was in the business of building single family dwellings, using borrowed money which it repaid after the houses were finished and sold. In 1974, Rotunda had 20 to 30 houses under construction for which Commonwealth Corporation (Commonwealth) a mortgage broker, had agreed to supply financing. In June of 1974, however, Commonwealth experienced financial difficulties, initiated proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, and stopped furnishing Rotunda the construction money it had contracted for. Without the money Commonwealth had promised, Rotunda was unable to meet all its obligations as they came due. (A dozen or so other contracting companies also had serious financial problems in the wake of Commonwealth's collapse.) When several major creditors threatened foreclosure suits, Rotunda filed a petition pursuant to Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. At the time Rotunda initiated Chapter XI proceedings, the Citizens and Peoples National Bank was a principal creditor. The bank has since been satisfied and, in the opinion of Eric Jay Nicholson, who works for the Citizens and Peoples National Bank, respondent now enjoys a "very good" reputation for financial responsibility. John Scott Carr, a mortgage banker in the employ of Southern American Mortgage Co., has known respondent for eight years and has overseen the loan of more than $2,000,000.00 to respondent or to companies he controlled. According to Mr. Carr, respondent is among the "top one or two contractors in the area." Wayne Walden, formerly associated with the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Santa Rosa County, testified that respondent is "very responsible financially." Respondent has a very good reputation among lenders, and has demonstrated outstanding financial responsibility. He is presently actively engaged in the contracting business. Since the filing of the petition, Southern American Mortgage Co., the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Santa Rosa County, and Mr. Donald A. Shear, a concrete supplier, have all extended credit to respondent or corporations he controls.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Barry Sinoff, Esquire 1010 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Mr. Charles S. Liberis, Esquire and Mr. Larry G. Parks, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1832 Pensacola, Florida 32598
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's request for a hearing to contest a Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (Amended Assessment) issued by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation (Division), was timely filed by virtue of the doctrine of equitable tolling.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency responsible for enforcing the various requirements of chapter 440. Respondent is a Florida limited liability company engaged in the construction business. Its offices are located at 1717 West Memorial Drive, Lakeland, Florida. On April 6, 2015, while driving in Spring Hill, Florida, Dale Russell, a Division compliance inspector, observed three individuals reroofing a single-family residence located at 1006 Chastile Drive. The three individuals confirmed that they were employed by Respondent's construction firm. Mr. Russell contacted Mr. Hutchinson, the owner of the corporation, who confirmed that the three individuals were employed by his firm and that the three were not covered by workers' compensation insurance. Because Mr. Hutchinson was in Lakeland that day, a Stop-Work Order was not served. However, the two agreed to meet at a later date in the Division's Tampa District Office. A Stop-Work Order and request for business records was served on Mr. Hutchinson by another investigator on April 8, 2015. The Stop-Work Order contained an Order of Penalty Assessment, which explained how a penalty is calculated, but gave no specific amount pending a review of Respondent's financial records. On May 20, 2015, an Amended Assessment was prepared indicating that Respondent was being assessed a total penalty of $96,364.78 for failing to secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance. The Amended Assessment was personally served on Respondent by Mr. Russell on May 26, 2015, when Mr. Hutchinson visited the Tampa District Office. The standard assessment form contains two important deadlines that must be met by the employer. On the first page, the form states that pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028, "if the Division imputes the employer's payroll, the employer shall have twenty business days after service of the first amended order of penalty assessment to provide business records sufficient for the Division to determine the employer's payroll for the period requested in the business records request for the calculation of the penalty." It goes on to state that these records may be used to recalculate the employer's penalty "only if the employer provides all such business records within the twenty days after service of the first amended order of penalty assessment. Otherwise, the first amended order of penalty assessment will remain in effect." This means that Respondent had until June 23, 2015, in which to provide business records to the District Office. On the second page of the Amended Assessment is a section entitled Notice of Rights (Notice). Among other things, it states that if the employer requests a hearing, he "must file the petition for hearing so that it is received by the Department within twenty-one (21) days of your receipt of this agency action." Notably, this timeframe is measured in calendar days, not business days, and means that if Respondent decided to request a hearing rather than providing additional financial records, the request had to be filed with, and received by, the Division no later than June 15, 2015. During his meeting with Mr. Hutchinson, the investigator explained the Amended Assessment, section by section. He specifically told Mr. Hutchinson that he had 20 business days in which to produce additional business records. He also told him that he had 21 calendar days in which to request a hearing. Mr. Russell is an experienced investigator, having worked as a deputy sheriff for 28 years before working as a Division inspector. He has issued numerous notices and is very familiar with the deadlines. Although Mr. Hutchinson testified that he asked Mr. Russell to confirm that he had 21 business days in which to file his business records, and was told that this was correct, which differs from Mr. Russell's version of the conversation, the testimony of the experienced investigator is accepted as being the most credible on this issue. The undersigned finds that Mr. Russell correctly explained the ramifications of the two deadlines and he did not mislead Mr. Hutchinson. The facts here do not demonstrate equitable tolling. Even though he was given accurate information regarding the two deadlines, it is evident that Mr. Hutchinson, a lay person, either misunderstood what he was told or was just plain confused. Obviously, he did not read the instructions on the Amended Assessment before submitting his records. Faced with a potential $96,364.78 assessment, it is somewhat surprising that Mr. Hutchinson did not contact the Tampa District Office after the May 26 meeting to reconfirm the precise date on which the records (or request for a hearing) were due. Even at hearing, he admitted that he did not know the difference between submitting business records and requesting a hearing. Believing that he had 21 business days to provide business records, Mr. Hutchinson carried his records to the Tampa District Office on June 24, 2015, or one day past the deadline established in the Amended Assessment. He was told by a Division supervisor that the submission was untimely and he had waived his right to produce them. Even though it was now too late, she recommended that Mr. Hutchinson prepare a request for a hearing, which would be submitted to Tallahassee for legal counsel to review. Pursuant to her instructions, that same morning, Mr. Hutchinson prepared a handwritten, one-page letter requesting a hearing. According to Respondent, the assessment is based on missing checks that, if produced, would establish that no penalty assessment is warranted. At hearing, over the Division's objection, Respondent was allowed to introduce into evidence bank records and copies of checks. See Resp. Ex. 6-23. Although the Division has not yet reviewed them, it acknowledged that they may substantially reduce the assessment. Throughout this proceeding, Respondent's qualified representative has contended that the Amended Assessment is defective because it does not inform the employer that a qualified representative can represent its interests. The first paragraph of the Notice in both the Amended Assessment and the Stop-Work Order states that "you may be represented by counsel," but it makes no reference to a qualified representative. However, in the second paragraph, which provides information regarding the filing of a petition requesting a hearing, it states that the petition must contain "the name, address, and telephone number, and facsimile number of the attorney or qualified representative of the petitioner (if any) upon whom service of pleadings and other papers shall be made." While more clarity in the first paragraph of the Notice would be appropriate, there is sufficient information in the Notice, if read, to alert the employer that alternative representation is allowed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order determining that Respondent's request for a hearing was untimely. However, it is recommended that the business records provided by Respondent at hearing be reviewed and considered to determine the correct amount owed, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed) Trevor Sutor, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) Jamison Jessup, Qualified Representative 557 Noremac Avenue Deltona, Florida 32738-7313 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact On September 6, 2001, Petitioner Bowers filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) a Charge of Discrimination against Respondent, Big Red Waste, Inc. The Charge recited that the most recent or continuing date of discrimination was July 10, 2001, for a finite, one-time act of alleged unlawful employment practice, to wit: termination on the basis of race (Black) and in retaliation. One hundred and eighty days from the filing of Petitioner's Charge with the Commission would have been on or about March 5, 2002. On September 19, 2003, the Commission entered a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. On December 23, 2003, the Commission entered an Amended Dismissal and Notice of Rights. The Commission's Amended Dismissal and Notice of Rights (Amended Dismissal) recited that on May 14, 2002, the Commission had received notice that Respondent had filed a voluntary Chapter 7 Petition in Bankruptcy. Therefore, it is presumed that as of May 14, 2002, an automatic stay of proceedings before the Commission was in effect. The Commission's Amended Dismissal also stated: . . . It has been more than 180 days since Complainant's complaint was filed, and since no determination has been made due to the automatic stay that was issued in Respondent's bankruptcy case, and since Complainant has been previously notified by the Commission of his obligation to file a Notice of Claim [in the federal bankruptcy court], the Commission hereby dismisses this Charge of Discrimination and provides the following Notice to Complainant. Since the Commission did not make a determination of cause or no cause on your complaint within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, you may proceed as if the Commission determined there was reasonable cause. Section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes; Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 829 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2002). You must initiate a civil lawsuit within 1-year from the date of this dismissal, or an administrative action with the Division of Administrative Hearings within 35 days of the date of this dismissal, provided neither date has exceeded a total of four (4) years from the initial date of the violation. Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes; Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2000). If more than four (4) years have passed once the automatic stay is lifted on Respondent's bankruptcy case, you must file your civil lawsuit, or your administrative action within 30 days of the lifting of the automatic stay. Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 739 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1999). If the Respondent has not emerged from bankruptcy, and if you determine you do not want to wait until Respondent emerges from bankruptcy, you may file a Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay, and present your argument and authorities to the bankruptcy judge assigned to Respondent's bankruptcy case. The Commission does not assist Complainants with filing the Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay. You must consult an attorney on your own for that purpose. [Bracketed material added for clarity.] One year from the Commission's December 23, 2003, Amended Dismissal will be December 22, 2004. Thirty-five days from the Commission's December 23, 2004, Amended Dismissal would have been January 27, 2004. Four years from July 30, 2001, the initial date of the violation, will be July 29, 2005. On February 12, 2004, Petitioner sent a letter to the Commission stating that the Commission's "right to sue" letter did not include a blank Petition for Relief. However, the referral packet from the Commission to the Division included no "right to sue letter." The Commission's response to the Order of the undersigned dated May 3, 2004, does not contain a "right to sue" letter. On February 17, 2004, the Commission entered an Order to Show Cause Why Case Should Not Be Closed Because of Bankruptcy Proceedings (Commission's Order to Show Cause). The Commission's Order to Show Cause noted that Respondent had filed a Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy, Chapter 11, on October 9, 2001, and that the same case was converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding on May 7, 2002. The Commission's Order to Show Cause also noted that a letter advising Petitioner of the bankruptcy was sent on May 20, 2002, and that a final order distributing all assets and dismissing the bankruptcy case was entered on September 9, 2002. The Commission ordered the parties to show cause, before March 19, 2004, why the discrimination case before the Commission should not be closed. The referral packet from the Commission to the Division included a Response to the Commission's Order to Show Cause, filed with the Commission by the trustee in bankruptcy, on or about March 8, 2004. That Response recites that Respondent's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed by a September 9, 2002, Order and that "upon the dismissal order becoming final all of the assets of Big Red Waste, Inc., reverted to that corporation and the automatic stay was terminated and vacated as to all creditors and claimants against Big Red Waste, Inc." The bankruptcy court docket was provided to the Division by the Commission in response to the May 3, 2004, Order herein. Assuming a 30-day appeal period, the dismissal by the Bankruptcy Court became final, at the latest, as of October 8, 2002. Therefore, the latest date the automatic stay was lifted would also have been October 8, 2002, although the September 9, 2002, date of the Bankruptcy Court's Order would be reverted-to, absent an appeal, and there is no evidence of an appeal. According to the Commission's response to the May 3, 2004, Order herein, the Petition for Relief in the instant discrimination case was "inadvertently dated March 13, 2004," but was filed with the Commission on March 9, 2004. The Petition for Relief recites repeatedly, "see attached complaint." There was no complaint attached to the Petition in the packet referred by the Commission to the Division, and none was provided in response to the May 3, 2002, Order herein. Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the May 3, 2004, Order herein, it is presumed that the "complaint" referred to in the Petition for Relief is the September 6, 2001, Charge of Discrimination, and it may further be presumed that no continuing pattern of discrimination continued after the finite termination date of July 1, 2001. However, by the Petition for Relief, Petitioner attempted to add as a party Respondent, Respondent's president, Yvonne Kiawtkowski. Petitioner has as yet demonstrated no good cause to add Respondent's president, in her individual capacity, to this administrative discrimination case when she was not individually charged in the original Charge before the Commission. The copy of the Petition for Relief and Attachments sent to the most recent address in the Commission file for Respondent's Corporation apparently were returned to the Commission. The same has occurred with regard to all papers mailed by the Division to that address. Therefore, no Notice of Hearing can be sent by the Division to Respondent's Corporation. Telephone calls by the undersigned's secretary to Big Red Waste, Inc.'s last known phone number, which was provided in the Commission's referral packet, have resulted in an oral response that the party at that phone number is not Big Red Waste, Inc. Recently, the Commission determined that Ms. Kiawtkowski has a new personal address. On June 21, 2004, the Petition for Relief and Attachments were returned to the Commission from that address too. The Commission has stated it cannot determine whether Ms. Kiawtkowski ignored the certified mail receipt for this mailing or whether she no longer resides in that area.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wayne N. Bowers 10951 Laureate Drive, Apartment 601 San Antonio, Florida 78249 Yvonne Kwiatkowski, President Big Red Waste, Inc. Post Office Box 549 Alachua, Florida 32615 Yvonne Kwiatkowski, President Big Red Waste, Inc. Post Office Box 730981 Ormond Beach, Florida 32173
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Edward Willison Carroll, III, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a Credit Life, including Credit Disability Insurance Agent; General Lines - Property, Casualty, Surety and Miscellaneous Lines Agent; General Lines - Motor Vehicle Physical Damage and Mechanical Breakdown Agent; Ordinary Life, including Health Insurance Agent; Health Insurance Agent; and Automobile and Inspection and Warranty Association Salesman. On March 10, 1980, respondent filed a verified application with petitioner for examination as a General Lines Agent (Property, Casualty, and Miscellaneous Lines) . Question number 13 of the application asked the following: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony? If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet. Date Name of Court Address of Court Nature of Charge and Outcome Respondent answered no to this question. On May 28, 1982, respondent filed a verified application with petitioner for examination as an Ordinary Life including Disability Agent. Question number 15 of the application asked the following: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony? If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet. Date Name of Court Address of Court Nature of Charge and Outcome Respondent answered no to this question. Respondent's answers to question 13 on the March 10, 1980, application and question 15 on the March 28, 1982, application were false. On December 11, 1970, the State Attorney for the Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, filed an information with the circuit court which charged that respondent did on December 3, 1970, in Leon County, Florida ... knowingly commit a lewd or lascivious act in the presence of Alice Leigh Divita, a female child under the age of fourteen years, to-wit: of the age of six years, without intent to commit rape upon said child, contrary to Section 800.04, F.S. On March 9, 1971, respondent entered a plea of guilty to the crime of fondling, as charged in the information. The court withheld adjudication of guilty and imposition of sentence, and placed respondent on probation for a period of three years. At hearing, respondent conceded that he had been charged with the aforementioned felony. He averred, however, that his failure to disclose such charge on his applications was not intended to be deceitful but was premised on his belief that he could properly answer no to such inquiries because adjudication of guilty had been withheld. While respondent may reasonably have believed that he could respond in the negative to an inquiry concerning felony convictions, his contention that he held an honest belief that he could also respond in the negative to inquiries about whether the had ever been charged with a felony is not persuasive. But for the foregoing charge, respondent has not been charged or convicted of any other felonies. Nor, has the respondent been shown to have engaged in any improprieties as an insurance agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered suspending respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure for three months. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of August, 1988. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2 & 3. Addressed in paragraph 2. 4 & 5. Addressed in paragraph 3. 6. Addressed in paragraph 5. 7 & 8 Addressed in paragraph 6. 9 & 10. Addressed in paragraphs 7 and 8. 11. Addressed in paragraph 9. 12-14. Rejected as not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Office of Legal Services 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Thomas L. Neilson, Esquire 105 West Fifth Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32303 The Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
