The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly assessed a civil penalty against Petitioner, pursuant to Section 213.29, Florida Statutes (2007),1 after Respondent was adjudicated and sentenced in a criminal proceeding for the offense of theft of state funds.
Findings Of Fact Integrated Copy Systems failed to file sales tax returns or failed to remit sales tax, or both, to the Department during the periods July 2003 through April 2005. In an attempt to secure compliance, on May 12, 2005, the Department recorded a tax warrant with the clerk of court for Hillsborough County in the amount of $24,060.95. The amount of tax due listed on the warrant was $18,400.29, an amount which included, in part, an estimate of tax liability. This estimate was appropriate since Integrated Copy Systems had not filed sales tax returns for certain periods, and Respondent had no information as to the amount of taxable sales made for those periods. Petitioner was subsequently arrested and charged with the offense of theft of state funds, a third-degree felony, in State of Florida v. Michael Maynard, Case No. 05-22960, in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County, Florida. On December 13, 2007, Petitioner entered a plea to the criminal charge and was sentenced to probation, with conditions which included the payment of restitution,3 and adjudication was withheld. Petitioner testified that as part of an agreement in his criminal case, he paid the outstanding taxes and that "zero" taxes were due. Petitioner also testified that pursuant to an agreement with the prosecuting attorney, he was assessed and paid a civil fine $1,000.00. Petitioner made some payments to the Department for the sales taxes which he failed to remit for the periods of July 2003 through April 2005. However, Petitioner has not paid all the outstanding sales taxes owed for the subject time period, despite his belief to the contrary. The records generated and/or produced by Petitioner, which purport to reflect the payments made to the Department, do not take into account the accrual of interest and other penalties. The Department properly applied Petitioner's payments to the outstanding sales taxes owed by Integrated Copy Systems. To calculate the amount of sales and use tax owed by Integrated Copy Systems, the Department applied all payments made towards the tax liability of the company. The Department also removed the estimated amount of tax from the total amount of taxes due upon receipt of the company's sale tax returns for the missing periods. The Department accurately determined that as of December 21, 2007, Integrated Copy Systems still owed $7,075.48 in sales tax. On March 19, 2008, the Department issued a Notice of Final Assessment Sales or Use Tax, Penalty and Interest. The amount of the penalty assessed against Petitioner, in his capacity as corporate officer or responsible party, is $14,150.96, which is 200 percent of Integrated Copy Systems' tax liability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Revenue, enter a final order sustaining the sales tax assessment of $7,075.48; and the penalty assessment of $14,150.96 45. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, as the managing member of PNC, LLC (PNC), is personally liable for a penalty equal to twice the total amount of the sales and use tax owed by PNC to the State of Florida.1/
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes. PNC is a now-dissolved Florida limited liability company that did business under the name "CHEAP" at 309 South Howard Avenue, Tampa, Florida. PNC was registered as a business and filed its Articles of Organization with the Secretary of State on June 16, 2010. Until the company was dissolved by the Secretary of State in 2018 for failure to pay the 2017 annual filing fees, Mr. Scott served as its managing member and had administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes. Verna Bartlett was PNC's controller. PNC was registered with the Department as a dealer pursuant to section 212.18, Florida Statutes, and was issued Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration 39-8015401140-8. A certificate of registration requires the taxpayer to file sales and use tax returns and pay to the Department all taxes owed as they are received. After making numerous attempts to collect delinquent sales tax owed by PNC for tax reporting periods in 2013 and 2014, the Department filed this action seeking to impose a personal penalty assessment against Mr. Scott, the managing member of the company. Section 213.29, Florida Statutes, provides that any person who has administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes and who willfully fails to pay the tax or evades the payment of the tax shall be liable to a penalty equal to twice the amount of tax not paid. The penalty is based only on the taxes owed, and not the interest and fees that have accrued. The statute provides that if the business liability is fully paid, the personal liability assessment will be considered satisfied. On January 18, 2018, the Department issued a NAPL against Mr. Scott after PNC failed to pay the sales and use taxes owed the State for the reporting periods from February 2013 through October 2014. The outstanding taxes, exclusive of interest or penalties, total $79,325.75. The NAPL imposes a total penalty of $158,647.50, or twice the amount of sales tax owed by PNC. No payments have been made on the account since the issuance of the NAPL, and, PNC, now closed, currently has a total liability in excess of $200,000.00. During the relevant time period, Mr. Scott was personally responsible for collecting PNC's sales tax and remitting it to the Department; he had the authority to sign checks on behalf of PNC; he made financial decisions as to which creditors should be paid; he made the decision to use the sales tax collected for the business and for stipulation payments; and he made the decision not to remit the sales tax that was collected. This was confirmed by PNC's controller, Ms. Bartlett, who responded to the Department's Requests for Admissions. Mr. Scott also confirmed to a Department tax specialist that the admissions provided by Ms. Bartlett were accurate. Mr. Scott either never remitted payment or did not remit payment timely on behalf of PNC for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January through October 2014. Tax warrants were issued and judgment liens were recorded for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January, February, and April through October 2014. Resp. Ex. 5 and 6. All warrants and liens relate to reporting periods that fall within the personal liability assessment period. A Notice of Jeopardy Finding and Notice of Final Assessment (Notice of Jeopardy) dated June 18, 2014, was issued to PNC pertaining to the April 2014 reporting period. Resp. Ex. This notice was issued after Mr. Scott ceased making regular tax payments, the estimated deficiency was substantial, and the Department determined that collection of the tax would be jeopardized by further delay. A Notice of Jeopardy and Notice of Final Assessment dated August 7, 2014, also was issued to PNC pertaining to the April, May, and June 2014 reporting periods. Resp. Ex. 12. Because PNC reported more than $20,000.00 in sales tax each year, unless a waiver was obtained, Mr. Scott was required to file and pay PNC's sales tax electronically for all reporting periods within the personal liability period. See § 213.755(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 12-24.003. Despite having obtained no waiver, Mr. Scott never filed returns or paid PNC's sales tax electronically. And even though he never remitted a payment electronically, Mr. Scott indicated on at least six sales tax returns during the relevant time period that sales tax for the reporting period was remitted electronically. The only conclusion to draw from this action is that Mr. Scott filed or directed the filing of these returns knowing them to be false. The record shows that, dating back to 2011, Mr. Scott has a long-standing history of failing to abide by the tax laws of the state as it relates to PNC. For example, on September 15, 2011, Mr. Scott was referred for criminal investigation by the state attorney for his failure to pay taxes. Also, numerous returns were filed without a payment. This is prima facie evidence of conversion of the money due. § 212.14(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent's Exhibit 1 summarizes numerous contacts by the Department's Tampa District Office with Mr. Scott regarding collection notices, telephone calls, emails, assessment letters, warrant letters, and the like in an effort to secure compliance with tax laws. It is fair to find that Mr. Scott willfully attempted to evade or avoid paying sales and reemployment taxes during the relevant period. To prevent its Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration from being revoked, PNC entered into a compliance agreement on July 10, 2013, to pay past due sales tax and reemployment tax totaling $65,789.25. The agreement required PNC to: (a) accurately complete all past due tax returns and reports no later than July 10, 2013; (b) remit all past due payments in accordance with the attached schedule, which required 11 monthly payments of $4,000.00 beginning on August 10, 2013, and a final balloon payment on July 10, 2014; (c) accurately complete and file all required tax returns and reports for the next 12 months; and (d) timely remit all taxes due for the next 12 months. A $15,000.00 down payment also was required to be paid on or before July 10, 2013. An addendum to the agreement (added by Mr. Scott) provided that "[a]ll payments, including the $15,000.00 down payment, shall first be applied to Sales and Use Tax." Although the down payment was made timely, the agreement was breached the first month (August) because Mr. Scott did not make the payment electronically. However, the agreement was not voided by the Department until October 12, 2013. Therefore, any payments made on or after October 12, 2013, were not considered compliance payments and are not subject to the addendum in the agreement. A somewhat confusing aspect of this dispute concerns Mr. Scott's contention, by way of cross-examination, that contrary to the addendum, the Department incorrectly applied his $15,000.00 down payment and subsequent compliance payments to the reemployment tax account, rather than the sales tax account, and that his sales tax liability should be reduced by that amount. As noted above, the addendum governs only the payments that predate October 12, 2013, which are the down payment ($15,000.00) and the August and September payments -- $4,000.00 each month. This issue was not raised by Mr. Scott until the Department issued a NAPL on April 13, 2017. The NAPL issued on April 13, 2017, indicated that the outstanding tax owed by PNC through October 31, 2014, was $90,808.17, and the personal assessment was twice that amount. In response to Mr. Scott's request, the Department acknowledged that it incorrectly applied the down payment to the reemployment account. Also, it took a second look at the two payments made in August and September, which predate the voiding of the agreement. The August installment payment consisted of two separate checks: $3,390.00 for sales tax and $610.00 for reemployment tax, and these amounts were applied in that manner. The September payment, $4,000.00, submitted in one check, was applied in the same manner as the August payment, with $610.00 going to the reemployment tax and the remainder to sales tax. Therefore, only $1,220.00 was incorrectly applied to the reemployment tax during those two months. On July 3, 2017, the Department reapplied a total of $16,551.00 from the reemployment tax account to the sales tax account for the relevant reporting periods. Mr. Scott contends the reapplication of the $16,551.00 to sales tax should reduce the amount of sales tax due by that amount. However, section 213.75(2) dictates that if a lien or warrant has been filed against the taxpayer, as is true here, the payment shall be applied in a priority order spelled out in the statute. Thus, the Department applied that amount in the following order: against the costs to record the liens against PNC; against the administration collection processing fee, if any; against any accrued interest; against any accrued penalty; and against any tax due. Under this priority order, the penalty/interest/fees categories totaled $5,066.58, while the tax liability category totaled $11,484.42. A detailed breakdown of this allocation is found in Respondent's Exhibit 29. Therefore, the total tax liability on the 2017 NAPL ($90,808.17) is reduced by $11,484.42, resulting in a total tax liability of $79,323.75, as shown on the updated 2018 NAPL. In the same vein, in his PRO, Mr. Scott argues that he was not given credit for payments of $9,110.24, $2,688.53, $178.28, and $1,321.80, which reduce his sales tax liability to $66,024.90 and the personal assessment to $132,049.80. See Pet'r Ex. 10. However, all of these payments (some of which are bank levies) were made after the compliance agreement was voided and do not apply to the reporting periods in this case. By way of cross-examination, Mr. Scott also contends that he was never given an accounting of what PNC owes despite "multiple requests" for the same. The record shows otherwise. On April 13, 2017, the 2017 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09, a computer-generated form which lists, in detail, a taxpayer's outstanding taxes owed by reporting period. A second copy of a ZT09 was faxed to him the following day. In his May 3, 2017, letter protesting the 2017 NAPL, Mr. Scott alleges that payments were not applied properly. In response, the Department sent a fax to Mr. Scott on May 10, 2017, listing checks that were not honored by the bank and requesting information concerning which payments PNC contends were not applied properly. In his response on May 12, 2017, Mr. Scott did not provide the requested information. On January 17, 2018, the 2018 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09. Finally, on April 12, 2018, per Ms. Bartlett's request, the Department mailed a ZT09 with the outstanding amounts due. Finally, in its PRO, the Department points out that after the hearing ended, it discovered that it made an error, in Mr. Scott's favor, in calculating his sales tax liability for the relevant reporting periods. Had it correctly calculated the amount of payments made by PNC, the sales tax liability for the relevant period would be increased from $79,323.75 to $84,444.35, which in turn would increase the personal assessment. However, the Department consents to the lower tax and assessed penalty amount, as reflected on the 2018 NAPL.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, is liable to the Department for a penalty of $158,647.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent Cavalier Group filed applications for and obtained orders of registration from petitioner for Miami's Green Acres, Units I and II, in 1967 and 1968. Miami's Green Acres is located in the far western portion of Dade County and consists of 488 lots, ranging from 2 1/2 to 10 acres in size. Most of the lots have been sold by way of Agreement for Deed, and the last sale to the public occurred in 1974. Well over 200 lots have been deeded to the purchasers. The Florida Public Offering Statement, effective April 1, 1969, filed with the petitioner provides in pertinent part that "Miami's Green Acres presently has a mile and one-half of graded access roads. All other similar roads within the subdivision will be completed at the time the deed is required to be delivered to the purchasers." It further provides that "Access to the individual tracts will be pro- vided by graded access roads composed of compacted sand and rock .... These streets have been dedicated to Dade County for public use, but have not been accepted for maintenance." With respect to real estate taxes, the Public Offering Statement provides that "Real estate taxes will be advanced by seller as per contract and purchaser billed therefor prior to deeding of property. Seller retains possession until contract is paid in full and title is conveyed." The Agreements for Deed contain similar provisions. Tommy Farrell, a securities examiner with the petitioner, inspected the subject Miami Green Acres on May 22, 1979. Out of approximately eighteen (18) miles of road promised in the Public Offering Statement, Ms. Ferrell observed only 1 1/4 miles of drivable roads and approximately 6 miles of road which had been originally cut through, but were currently impassable by automobile. The road work has been completed for Unit I of the subdivision. According to Eugene R. Melton, respondent's president, the road work for Unit II has not been completed for various reasons. Initially, the construction of roads was held back because respondent's mortgagee, Arvida Corporation, refused to join in the declaration of easements. This fact concerning Arvida's refusal was made known to the petitioner at the time petitioner approved respondent's registration. Without any further notice to the petitioner concerning the promised road completion, respondent did not begin construction on the roads for Unit II until November, 1974. Approximately two weeks of work was accomplished when Dade County issued a cease and desist order. In February or March of 1975, the cease and desist order was lifted and construction recommenced. In May or June, 1975, heavy rains occurred and construction stopped. At this time, according to Mr. Melton, the road work was approximately 25 to 30 percent complete. No further work was done on the roads until May of 1976, when respondent entered into a contract with a company for the remainder of the work. This work continued only for a few months, bringing the completion up to 40 percent, according to respondent. Except for cleaning up, no further work occurred in 1976 or thereafter. Apparently, the Department of Environmental Regulation and the Army Corps of Engineers became involved in the project and all work ceased. Again, except for the 1968 failure of the mortgagee to join in the dedication of easements, respondent has never advised the petitioner of the problems it was having in the construction of the roads. Kenneth Harris, who was accepted as an expert witness in agricultural road construction, estimated that the cost of completing the remaining road work would be $16,400.00. This estimate was based upon a view of the premises and the assumption that the fill materials could be obtained at a price substantially below market price. Mr. Harris could not recall which roads he traversed while making his physical inspection and he underestimated the amount of road work needed to be done. The last subdivider's annual report submitted to the petitioner by the respondent indicates that approximately $75,000.00 remains to be spent on road work. Respondent did not pay the real estate taxes that accrued on lots within the subdivision during the years 1977 and 1978 prior to the date such taxes became delinquent. These taxes, with the exception of two or three parcels still unpaid, were not paid by respondent until March of 1980. 1/ Prior to March of 1980, respondent had collected from purchasers monies for reimbursement for taxes that had not been timely paid. Respondent did issue warranty deeds to some purchasers at the time that the 1977 and 1978 real estate taxes were delinquent. It is not clear from the evidence how many such deeds were issued, whether the purchasers were aware that the taxes were outstanding at the time they received their warranty deeds, or whether those purchasers had indeed already paid respondent for the taxes. The quarterly encumbrance reports filed by respondent with the petitioner covering the period from January 1, 1978, through June 30, 1979, do not inform the petitioner that the taxes were unpaid and delinquent. After the filing of the Notice to Show Cause, respondent included the unpaid taxes as an encumbrance on the quarterly encumbrance reports.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that: the respondent be found guilty of violating Sections 478.121(3) and 478.052(2), Florida Statutes (1977), (now ss. 498.033(3) and 498.039(3)); a civil penalty be imposed against the respondent for such violations in the total amount of $5,000.00; the respondent submit to the Petitioner within thirty (30) days of the final order a new estimate from a duly licensed engineer of the cost of constructing all roads promised in the Florida Public Offering Statement; the respondent enter into an improvement trust account based upon the estimated cost of completion of the promised road work; and the respondent be ordered to immediately pay all delinquent real estate taxes. Respectfully submitted and entered this 28th day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue The issue posed herein is whether or not the Petitioner remitted to Respondent, pursuant to Chapter 212.05(1), Florida Statutes, the, proper amount of sales tax on the boat "Captain Deebold" which was purchased on November 29, 1976. A related issue, assuming that the proper sales taxes were not remitted by Petitioner, is whether or not a levy of penalty and interest is warranted under the circumstances.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, legal memoranda submitted by the parties and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Petitioner purchased the vessel "Captain Deebold" on November 29, 1976, and alleged that the purchase price of the boat was $20,000.00. Accordingly, Petitioner remitted to the Department sales taxes based on the declared value of $20,000.00. Respondent maintained that the subject boat was purchased for the sum of $75,000.00 and has, therefore, issued an assessment against Petitioner for the additional taxes, penalty and interest. By letter dated November 29, 1978, Respondent's Revenue Investigator, Leslie J. Smithling, advised Petitioner that a routine verification concerning his purchase of the subject boat revealed a transaction amount of $75,000.00 upon which the four percent Florida Sales Tax is $3,000.00. Petitioner was further advised therein that his remittance in the amount of $4,202.00 was due no later than December 15, 1979. Taxes, penalties and interest were calculated as follows: Purchase Price $75,000.00 Tax Rate 4% Tax $ 3,000.00 Minus Tax Paid (Based on $20,000.00) $ 800.00 Tax Due $ 2,200.00 Administrative Penalty (Ch. 212.12[2], F.S.) $ 550.00 Fraud Penalty (Ch. 212.12[2], F.S.) $ 1,100.00 Interest: 1% per month from 8/1/77 to 12/1/77 16% Plus $.72 daily thereafter Total Interest Accrued $ 352.00 Total Tax, Penalties & Interest Due $ 4,202.00 In support of its position that the true purchase price of the boat was only $20,000.00, Petitioner points out that the seller of the boat, Frank Deebold, had neglected the boat and had only made repairs that were absolutely necessary to operate the vessel. Thus, when Petitioner purchased the vessel, numerous repairs were made to make it seaworthy including 1) repaired electrical wiring; 2) sealed the deck seams; 3) reconnected the port fuel tank; 4) repaired the clutch in the port engine; 5) repaired leaks in the starboard stern quarter; 6) replaced and rebolted the chines; 7) replaced a section of the keel; 8) rebuilt the main clutch; 9) caulked deck; 10) replaced or repaired the winch on the anchor; 11) reworked and/or repaired the engine room, including insulation, lighting, lining, painting and hauling. To perform these repairs, Petitioner places the value on materials utilized at approximately $18,000.00. Additionally, Petitioner estimated that the value of his labor involved in making the approximately $25,000.00. The articles of agreement for the purchase of the boat provides in pertinent part as follows: Witnesseth, that if the said party of the second part shall (purchaser) first make the payments and perform the covenants hereinafter mentioned on his part to be made and performed, the said party of the first part (seller) hereby covenants and agrees to convey and assure to the said party of the second part, his heirs, personal represent- atives or assigns, clear of all encumbrances, whatever by a good and sufficient bill of sale the Oil Screw vessel, Captain Deebold, o/n294675, gross tons-36, its equipment, hull, machinery, present insurance policies and business including fifty or more used rods and reels, one 3.5 KW Lister auxiliary generator, used and in need of repair, spare Jabsco water pump (used and in need of repair), spare 24 volt DC alternator, spare 24 volt DC main engine starter, spare stub shaft, three spare propellers (used and in need of repair) and a spare UHF Pierce- Simpson radio transceiver (used and in need of repair) and the said party of the second part hereby covenants and agrees to pay to the said party of the first part the sum of seventy-five thousand and 00/100 ($75,000.00) dollars in the manner following. . . . Nevertheless, Petitioner stressed that inasmuch as the Articles of Agreement provided that the seller only required Petitioner to maintain insurance coverage in the amount of $50,000.00 indicating that the purchase price was something less than $75,000.00 and in fact was no more than $50,000. Pursuant to the Articles of Agreement, the amount insurance coverage required was $50,000.00. Petitioner also declared that included in the $75,000.00 purchase price were other items which included the business (dock space), and reduced prices for miscellaneous supplies and fuel prices. In this regard, an examination of the Articles revealed that these items were provided Petitioner on a cost plus basis and the dock space was leased for an amount based on a rebate of the percentage of ticket sales or charter fees received. Petitioner ultimately sold the boat for 95,000.00. Petitioner initially tried to sell the boat for the sum of $105,000.00 of which $10,000.00 represented the value he (Petitioner) placed on the business. An examination of the accounting records introduced indicated that Petitioner placed the sum of $75,000.00 as the purchase price for the boat. Petitioner thought that his estimation of the labor and materials necessary to properly repair the boat were items that could be used as a setoff to reduce the amount of taxes due. Petitioner testified that he, in no way, intended to defraud the Respondent of taxes properly due and owing. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner remit to the Respondent the proper interest as set forth herein in paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner remit to the Respondent an administrative penalty of 5 percent of the aggregate taxes due as set forth herein in Paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner not be held liable for payment of for allegedly filing a "false or fraudulent" return for reasons set forth herein in Paragraph 6 of the Conclusions of Law. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of February 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February 1981.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner owes the taxes, interest, and penalties assessed by the Department of Revenue based upon its audit of Petitioner for the period of August 1, 1996, through July 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Petitioner is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of selling and installing floor covering materials, such as carpet and tile. Petitioner's business is located in Hillsborough County, Tampa, Florida. Petitioner sales fall into two basic categories: "cash and carry sales" and "installation sales." The "cash and carry sales" are retail sales of floor covering materials to customers that come into Petitioner's store. These sales do not involve any installation work by Petitioner. The "installation sales" are sales in which Petitioner installs the floor covering material in the customer's home or business. These sales are performed pursuant to a lump-sum contract which incorporates the price of the installation and the price of the floor covering materials being installed. Petitioner purchases the floor covering materials from suppliers and distributors. Those purchases become part of the inventory from which Petitioner makes its "installation sales." Petitioner also makes general purchases of goods and services necessary for the day-to-day operation of its business. These purchases include items such as cleaning supplies and vehicle repairs. Petitioner made several fixed-assets purchases during the audit period for use in its business. It purchased a word processor in August 1996, and it purchased equipment and fixtures in December 1996. On those occasions that Petitioner collected sales tax from its customers on the "cash and carry sales" or paid sales tax on its inventory purchases and general purchases, it remitted or reported those amounts to the Department. However, as discussed below, Petitioner did not collect the full amount of sales tax due on each sale, nor did it pay the full amount of sales tax due on each purchase. The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida's sales tax laws. The Department is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers to determine their compliance with the sales tax laws. By letter dated September 10, 2001, the Department notified Petitioner of its intent to conduct a sales tax audit of Petitioner's records for the period of August 1, 1996, through July 31, 2001. The audit was conducted by David Coleman, a tax auditor with seven years of experience with the Department. Petitioner designated its certified public accountant, P.J. Testa, as its representative for purposes of the Department's audit. That designation was memorialized through a power of attorney form executed by Petitioner on March 5, 2002. Mr. Coleman communicated with Mr. Testa throughout the course of the audit. Mr. Coleman conducted the audit using a sampling methodology agreed to by Mr. Testa on behalf of Petitioner. Pursuant to that methodology, Mr. Coleman conducted a comprehensive review of Petitioner's year-2000 purchase and sales invoices and extrapolated the results of that review to the other years in the audit period. The sampling methodology was used because of the volume of records and transactions during the audit period and because of the unavailability of all of the records for the audit period. The year 2000 was chosen as the sample period because Petitioner's records for the other years in the audit period were incomplete or unavailable. Mr. Coleman's audit of the year-2000 invoices focused on three broad types of transactions. First, he reviewed invoices of Petitioner's retail "cash and carry sales." Second, he reviewed the invoices through which Petitioner purchased the floor covering materials that it later sold as part of its "installation sales." Third, he reviewed the invoices through which Petitioner made general purchases of tangible personal property used in the day-to-day operation of its business. The sampling methodology was used for the audit of Petitioner's "cash and carry sales," the inventory purchases related to the "installation sales," and the general purchases. The methodology was not used for the audit of Petitioner's fixed-asset purchases; Mr. Coleman reviewed all of the available records for the fixed-asset purchases during each year of the audit period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's retail "cash and carry sales" identified 29 invoices during year-2000 on which no sales tax or less than the full sales tax was paid by the customer. Those invoices amounted to $17,451.30, on which $1,178.11 in total sales tax was due, but only $552.97 was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $625.14 for the retail sales during the sample period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's purchases of floor covering that was later sold in the "installation sales" identified a considerable number of purchases during year-2000 on which no sales tax or less than the full sales tax was paid by Petitioner to the supplier or distributor of the materials. Those purchases amounted to $123,398.52, but only $123,397.80 of that amount was taxable. On the taxable amount, $8,330.07 in total sales tax was due, but only $6,810.68 was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $1,519.41 for Petitioner's inventory purchases during the sample period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's "general purchases" identified 10 sales during year-2000 on which sales tax was not paid. Those invoices amounted to $2,914.76, on which $196.77 in sales tax was due, but none of which was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $196.77 for the general purchases during the sample period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's fixed-asset purchases identified only two transactions during the entire audit period on which Petitioner did not pay the full sales tax. Those transactions amounted to $5,078.92, on which $330.14 in total sales tax was due, but none of which was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $330.14 for the fixed-asset purchases during the audit period. The tax deficiencies calculated by Mr. Coleman for year-2000 for each category described above take into account any sales tax collected by Petitioner from its customers or paid by Petitioner to its vendors. After Mr. Coleman computed the tax deficiencies based upon his audit of the year-2000 records, he calculated a "percentage of error" for each category of sales/purchases. The percentage of error is the ratio used to extrapolate the results of the audit of the year-2000 records over the remainder of the audit period. No percentage of error was calculated for the fixed-asset purchases because Mr. Coleman reviewed the available records for those purchases over the entire audit period, not just year-2000. The percentage of error was calculated by dividing the sales tax deficiency identified in a particular category for the year-2000 by the total sales/purchases in that category for the year-2000. For the year-2000, Petitioner had retail sales of $1,143,182.45; general purchases of $21,254.88; and inventory purchases of $1,214,016.24. As a result, the applicable percentages of error were 0.000547 ($625.14 divided by $1,143,182.45) for the retail sales; 0.009258 ($196.77 divided by $21,254.88) for the general purchases; and 0.001252 ($1,519.41 divided by $1,214,016.24) for the inventory purchases. The percentages of error were then multiplied by the total sales in the applicable category for the entire audit period to calculate a total tax deficiency in each category. Petitioner's total retail sales over the audit period were $4,455,373.40. Therefore, the total tax deficiency calculated for that category was $2,437.12 (i.e., $4,455,373.40 multiplied by 0.000547). Petitioner's total general purchases over the audit period were $110,741.49. Therefore, the total tax deficiency calculated for that category was $1,025.25 (i.e., $110,741.49 multiplied by 0.009258). Petitioner's total inventory sales over the audit period were $3,130,882.10. Therefore, the total tax deficiency calculated for that category was $3,919.86 (i.e., $3,130,882.10 multiplied by 0.001252). Petitioner's total tax deficiency was computed by adding the deficiencies in each category, as follows: Retail Sales $2,437.12 General Purchases 1,025.25 Inventory Purchases 3,919.86 Fixed-asset purchases 330.14 TOTAL $7,712.37 Of that total, $6,863.02 reflects the state sales tax deficiency; $313.77 reflects the indigent care surtax deficiency; and $535.58 reflects the local government infrastructure surtax deficiency. The sales tax rate in effect in Hillsborough County during the audit period was 6.75 percent. The state sales tax was six percent; the remaining 0.75 percent was for county surtaxes, namely the local government infrastructure surtax and the indigent care surtax. That rate was used by Mr. Coleman in calculating the tax deficiencies described above. On October 4, 2002, Mr. Coleman hand-delivered the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Change (NOI) to Petitioner. The NOI is the end-product of Mr. Coleman's audit. The NOI identified the total tax deficiency set forth above, as well as a penalty of $3,856.26, which is the standard 50 percent of the tax deficiency amount, and interest of $2,561.63, which is calculated at a statutory rate. The NOI included copies of Mr. Coleman's audit work- papers which showed how the taxes, penalties, and interest were calculated. The NOI also included a copy of the "Taxpayers' Bill of Rights" which informed Petitioner of the procedure by which it could protest the audit results reflected on the NOI. On October 29, 2002, the Department issued three NOPAs to Petitioner. A separate NOPA was issued for each type of tax -- i.e., sales tax, indigent care surtax, and local government infrastructure surtax. The cumulative amounts reflected on the NOPAs were the same as that reflected on the NOI, except that the interest due had been updated through the date of the NOPAs. Interest continues to accrue on assessed deficiencies at a cumulative statutory rate of $1.81 per day. The NOPAs were sent to Petitioner by certified mail, and were received by Petitioner on November 1, 2002. By letter dated November 5, 2002, Petitioner protested the full amount of the taxes assessed on the NOPAs and requested a formal administrative hearing. The letter was signed by Mr. Testa on Petitioner's behalf. The protest letter does not allege that the methodology used by Mr. Coleman was improper or that the results of the audit were factually or legally erroneous. Instead, the protest letter states that Petitioner was disputing the results of the audit because it was "following procedures set forth by an agent from a previous audit who established the manner in which [Petitioner was] to compute sales tax on the items being questioned by the current auditor." Mr. Testa made similar comments to Mr. Coleman during the audit. When Mr. Coleman requested documentation from Mr. Testa to corroborate those comments about the procedures allegedly established by the prior auditor, Mr. Testa was unable to provide any such documentation. The record of this proceeding is similarly devoid of evidence to support Petitioner's allegation on this point. The record does not contain any evidence to suggest that Petitioner ever modified or revoked Mr. Testa's authority to represent it in connection with the audit or this protest, which Mr. Testa initiated on Petitioner's behalf. Petitioner, through Mr. Testa, had due notice of the date, time, and location of the final hearing in these cases. Neither Mr. Testa, nor anyone else on Petitioner's behalf, appeared at the final hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order imposing the taxes, interest, and penalties against Petitioner in the full amounts set forth in the three Notices of Proposed Assessment dated October 28, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the Stipulation of Facts and documentation attached thereto, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner is registered to do business in Florida and is required to collect and remit sales tax. In January of 1982, petitioner was given written notice of respondent's intent to audit petitioner's books and records for the 1979, 1980, and 1981 fiscal years. The audit apparently occurred during March and April of 1982. On June 16, 1982, the respondent, through Tax Auditor John Felton, issued a "Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes." Petitioner was advised that if it bias aggrieved by the proposed audit changes, it would have until July 16, 1982, "or such additional time as may be authorized by the Department in writing" to contact the office and discuss any problems. Petitioner was further advised that if it did not avail itself of the discussion privilege, the Department would issue a proposed notice of deficiency in the amount of $6,975.68 for delinquent sales taxes, penalty and interest through June 16, 1982. By a form letter dated September 9, 1982, the Department provided the Notice of Proposed Assessment of tax, penalty and interest in the amount of $6,975.68. The form letter stated that, if there were objections to the proposed assessment, petitioner would have until November 9, 1982, or such additional time as may be authorized by the Department in writing, to contest the assessment pursuant to informal protest provisions. These provisions require a written protest postmarked within 60 days of the Proposed Assessment, or a written request within that same period of time for an extension of time to file the written protest. Mr. John Felton, a Tax Auditor for the respondent in California, visited the petitioner's office on September 22, 1982, for a post-audit meeting. Petitioner apparently informed Mr. Felton of the existence of exemption certificates but did not, at that time, have the appropriate documentation for the tax credits. Mr. Felton advised petitioner of the documentation required to support any claimed tax credits. By letter dated October 1, 1982, Mr. Felton enclosed the June 16, 1982 sales tax audit, the September 9, 1982 Notice of Proposed Assessment and advised petitioner's staff accountant as follows: "... You will note that some action must be taken with respect to the Notice of Proposed Assessment by 11/9/82. As soon as you have accumulated your docu- mentation in support of any claimed tax credits, contact me and I will have a revised proposed assessment issued. If I may be of further assistance, please call me at 714-956-4311 (preferably, since I expect to be out of my Sunnyvale office most of October) or 408-737-1405." Petitioner's General Accounting Manager attempted to telephone Mr. Felton on several occasions during the last week of October and the first week of November, 1982. These attempts were unsuccessful. Petitioner does not allege that it mailed any documentation to Mr. Felton or the Department or that it filed a timely written protest or a timely request for an extension of time to file a protest. On November 16, 1982, Mr. Felton called petitioner's staff accountant, who advised Mr. Felton that he would mail documentation supporting the tax credits on or before November 24, 1982. Having received no such documentation, Felton, by inter- office memorandum dated December 10, 1982, recommended to the respondent that the original proposed assessment dated September 9, 1982, be processed. Petitioner was notified by letter dated January 31, 1983, that the prior audit had become final and requesting petitioner to forward its remittance of $7,236.56, said amount consisting of the original assessment plus updated interest.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, G. H. Johnson Construction Company, Inc., is a general contractor with an office in, and doing business in, the State of Florida. During the period from June 1, 1984, through May 31, 1987, the Petitioner did not pay State of Florida use tax on $244,916.62 of items purchased for use in the State of Florida. During the period from July 1, 1987, through July 31, 1988, the Petitioner did not pay State of Florida use tax on $4,344.88 of items purchased for use in the State of Florida. During the period from April 1, 1985, through March 31, 1987, the Petitioner did not pay Hillsborough County local option indigent health care tax and discretionary sales surtax on $37,083.77 of items purchased or used in Hillsborough County, Florida. The tax rate established by Hillsborough County for those taxes was 0.0328767 percent. The tax due was $92.71. The Petitioner did not pay State of Florida intangible tax on $622,634 of accounts receivable on the books of the company as of January 1, 1984. The Petitioner paid State of Florida intangible tax on only $516,690 of $743,865 of accounts receivable on the books of the company as of January 1, 1986. The Petitioner did not pay State of Florida intangible tax on $1,615,661 of accounts receivable and $225,000 of loans to stockholders on the books of the company as of January 1, 1987. The Petitioner did not pay State of Florida intangible tax on $942,449 of accounts receivable and $225,000 of loans to stockholders on the books of the company as of January 1, 1988. On or about March 12, 1989, the Petitioner made a partial payment in the amount of $11,394.14. The letter transmitting the payment both stated that "we wish to contest the interest and penalties which have been accrued" and also requested "that the interest and penalties be waived." The letter concluded: "It is understood that acceptance of this payment constitutes acceptance of the above proposal that the interest and penalties be waived." The DOR accepted the payment without direct comment on the closing remarks in the letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Revenue, enter a final order assessing against the Petitioner, G. H. Johnson Construction Company, Inc.: (1) sales and use tax in the amount of $5,025.05; (2) interest in the amount of $8,236.36 as of September 24, 1992, and accruing at the rate of one percent per month on the $5,025.05 of tax due from that date forward; and (3) penalty in the amount of $5,512.42. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-0285 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The DOR uses additional available information to ascertain, as best it can, where purchases are delivered and used. Those means include, but are not limited to, conferring with the taxpayer and requesting evidence showing delivery and use elsewhere. Rejected as subordinate to facts contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as not supported by any competent evidence and as subordinate to facts contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected in part as conclusion of law and in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. Subordinate clause, rejected as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. Main clause, rejected as conclusion of law. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. In part, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary; in part, rejected as paraphrasing the letter. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not supported by the evidence why the taxpayer sent the March 12, 1989, letter and check. 10.-11. Rejected in part as conclusion of law and in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. 12. Not a proposed finding of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Largely subordinate to facts found. In part, conclusion of law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 5.-8. Largely subordinate to facts found. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 9.-10. In part, conclusion of law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 11. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-13. In part, conclusion of law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. In part, argument. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. In part, argument. Otherwise, subordinate and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Matias Blanco, Jr., Esquire 701 North Franklin Street Tampa, Florida 33602 James McAuley, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Dr. James Zingale Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1992, there were several Democratic candidates for the office of Tax Collector for Walton County. Among the Democratic candidates was Sue Carter who had been employed in the Walton County Tax Collector's Office prior to resigning to run for tax collector. The first Democratic primary was held in September, 1992, resulting in a runoff primary between Sue Carter and Sue Rushing in October, 1992. Ms. Carter defeated Ms. Rushing. In November, 1992, Sue Carter won the general election. Respondent, Teresa Gomillion (Gomillion), was employed in the Walton County Tax Collector's Office in 1992. Pat Pollard, Tammy Day, Patty Lynch, and Sylvia Rushing were also employed in the tax collector's office during the 1992 election campaign. Ms. Lynch and Gomillion supported Ms. Carter. Ms. Day did not support Ms. Carter. Ms. Rushing was related to Sue Rushing, Ms. Carter's opponent. Ms. Pollard did not support any candidate for the office of tax collector. Pat Pollard's work station was located about three feet away from Gomillion's work station. She overheard Gomillion ask a customer of the tax collector's office for whom he was going to vote. This was the only time that Ms. Pollard heard Gomillion talk to a customer concerning the race for tax collector. Gomillion and other employees in the tax collector's office did discuss the race for tax collector during office hours. Pam Dyess has been employed at a car dealership in DeFuniak Springs for 16 years. During 1992, her job responsibilities required her to go to the tax collector's office to handle the tag and title work for the dealership. After the first primary, Ms. Dyess went to the tax collector's office during working hours and while she was there the subject of the first primary was discussed. Ms. Dyess stated that she had voted for Harley Henderson. Ms. Gomillion joined the conversation and asked Ms. Dyess why she had voted for Harley Henderson and made some disparaging remarks about Mr. Henderson's qualifications. Rodney Ryals is now and was an employee of the City of DeFuniak Springs during the fall of 1992. During the election, Mr. Ryals spent a great deal of time at the tax collector's office taking care of city business and visiting with his friend Ms. Pollard. While Ryals was at the tax collector's office Gomillion told him, "You better vote for Sue Carter, she's the only qualified candidate." Ryals had told Gomillion and Ms. Lynch that they should not campaign on the job because it was illegal. Both women told him that if they did not politick that they might lose their jobs. Both Jack Little, the tax collector, and Ms. Carter had advised Gomillion not to politick in the tax collector's office. Having judged the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, I find that Gomillion did not hand out campaign literature while she was on the job at the tax collector's office.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a final order finding that Teresa Gomillion violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and recommending a civil penalty of $500 and a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2067EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-10: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted to the extent that Ms. Gomillion had solicited Mr. Ryals' vote but rejected as far as Mr. Ryals observing Ms. Gomillion soliciting other customers. Paragraph 12: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Mr. Ryals testimony that Ms. Gomillion handed out campaign literature not to be credible. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 15-16: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 4: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting both recitation of testimony and argument. Paragraph 5: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected to the extent that it implies that Ms. Gomillion properly performed her duties. The greater weight of the evidence shows that Ms. Gomillion's actions were prohibited by the tax collector and were not part of her duties. Paragraphs 6-8: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance except as it relates to Ms. Gomillion's solicitation of Mr. Ryals. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 10: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 11-12: Rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraph 13: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 14: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 15-16: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 17: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 18-19: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 21-22: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 23: The first sentence is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 25: The first sentence is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Michael E. Ingram Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs, PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 E. Allan Ramey, Esquire 13 Circle Drive Post Office Box 369 Defuniak Springs, Florida 32433-0369 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner, a corporation headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina, is in the business of operating movie theatres both within and without the State of Florida. At these theatres Petitioner Operates concession stands which sell both candy items and drinks in various sizes at different prices to persons who frequent the theatres. For the period of time from September, 1985 through May, 1985, Petitioner remitted to the Department of Revenue sales tax on the total taxable value of all taxable items sold at its concession stands in all of its Florida theatres, in accordance with the presumptive effective rate of tax of 5.63 percent contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code. As a result of an audit for a previous period dated October 1, 1982, Petitioner remitted to the Department of Revenue the amount of $10,637.00 for sales tax on taxable items sold at its concession stands during this audit period in accordance with the presumptive effective tax rate of 4.5 percent as contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code during the audit period. On August 15, 1985, Petitioner filed with the Department of Revenue, as agent for Respondent, two (2) applications for sales tax refund in the amount of $16,876.52 and $10,637.00. The applications were dated August 13, 1985, and were timely filed. During the refund periods at issue in this matter, the Petitioner: (a) posted and charged flat prices for the various items offered for sale, which prices included sales tax (b) kept records of daily and weekly sales of taxable items at each of its Florida theatres (c) kept records of daily attendance at each movie shown by each Florida theatre and (d) kept records of weekly calculations, through inventory analysis, of sales of drinks and candy items, including the number, size and price of each item sold at each of its Florida theatre. During the refund periods at issue in this matter, the Petitioner did not maintain cash registers at its concession stands in its Florida theatres and did not maintain records made contemporaneously with the sale of taxable items from the concession stands which separately itemized the amounts of sales tax collected on each sale transaction occurring at the theatres' concession stands. Rather, Petitioner chose, for its own convenience, to operate a "cash box" operation at each of its concession stands in its Florida theatres and willingly remitted sales tax to the Department of Revenue pursuant to the presumptive effective tax rate contained in Rule 12-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code for the relevant periods. In April, 1985, Petitioner placed computerized cash registers in each of its Florida theatre concession stands. These cash registers provided tapes of each individual transaction each day, specifically recording each taxable and nontaxable sale and the amount of sales tax due on each taxable sale with a daily summation on each tape at each theatre. Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code, requires concessionaires such as Petitioner to remit sales tax at a rate of 5.63 percent of taxable sales under the present 5 percent statutory sales tax schedule and at 4.5 percent of taxable sales under the previous statutory sales tax schedule unless a concessionaire, through its records, shows another effective rate by "proof to the contrary". Petitioner produced an effective tax rate of 5.13 percent for the month of April 1985, for all its Florida theatres by dividing the total sales tax collected during April, 1985 by the total taxable sales during April, 1985, as evidenced by the cash register tapes from all of Petitioner's concession stands in Florida. Petitioner then used that tax rate as a base to retroactively reconstruct an effective tax rate for the refund periods by assuming that the product sales mix (product mix of products sold) and the transactional sales mix (the number of items purchased together in a single transaction by a customer) experienced during the refund periods were the same as that experienced during the month of April, 1985. There was no competent evidence that the product sales mix or the transactional sales mix experienced during the refund periods were the same as that experienced during the nonth of April, 1985. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support Petitioner's reconstructed effective tax rates that were used to calculate the refunds. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show "proof to the contrary" that its reconstructed effective tax rates are correct or that the presumptive effective tax rate contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code were incorrect for the refund periods at issue in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Comptroller enter his final order DENYING Petitioner's refund applications. Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1986.
