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LOUIS D. P. SILVESTRI vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 01-003497 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Sep. 05, 2001 Number: 01-003497 Latest Update: Feb. 15, 2002

The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is now, and has been since 1976, a firefighter employed by Miami-Dade County and, as such, a Special Risk member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner's date of birth is September 19, 1937. Accordingly, on July 1, 1998, the effective date of DROP, Petitioner was 61 years of age and had approximately 22 years of creditable service as a Special Risk member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner was aware that he needed to file an application to join DROP within 12 months of July 1, 1998, but he opted not to file such an application because he believed that the retirement benefits he would receive if he joined DROP within this 12-month period would not be enough for him to "live on" after he stopped working.2 Petitioner thought that it would be in his best interest, instead, to wait until 2003 to retire (and enjoy higher retirement benefits). On June 7, 2001, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Governor Bush, which read, in pertinent part, as follows: Yesterday I met with the head spokesman of FL. State Retirement concerning my participation in the D.R.O.P. [and] he advised me to send this note. As you know it started in 1998 at which time I was offered a small window because of my age (unlawful discrimination) for which I was not able to get into because of the insignificant amount offered as permanent retirement. Since then, as anticipated, my retirement has increased from the high 30's to the low 60's due thanks to you . . . Now, I am asking, by special request, to be allowed to enter into the D.R.O.P. either to finish these two years or to be given an opportunity to go for the whole 5 years, which I doubt I would complete. . . . Petitioner's e-mail correspondence was referred to the State Retirement Director who, by letter dated June 8, 2001, advised Petitioner that Petitioner's "request to join DROP at this late date must be denied."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order finding that Respondent is not eligible to participate in DROP because he did not elect to do so within the time frame prescribed by Subsection (13)(a)2. of Section 121.091, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57121.011121.021121.091121.1905
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H. GLENN BOGGS, II vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 01-002020 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 23, 2001 Number: 01-002020 Latest Update: Aug. 15, 2002

The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible to receive retirement credit for the period of his employment with the Florida Bar from July 1, 1977 through June 4, 1981.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the Florida Bar from July 1, 1977 to June 4, 1981. The record is unclear as to the nature of his employment at the Florida Bar. He is presently employed as a professor at Florida State University and has approximately 24 years' credit in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Employees of the Florida Bar are paid as part of an overall budgetary process generated primarily from members' dues. Their salaries are not established by or funded by legislative appropriation. The Florida Bar has its own pension system that is a defined contribution plan funded entirely by the Florida Bar. The Bar employees contribute nothing to their pension system. This system has been in place since approximately 1970. Salaries of state officers and employees are reported from the State Comptroller to the Division of State Retirement. No salaries of the Florida Bar were paid or reported to the Division for the period of time Petitioner was employed at the Florida Bar. In the 1970's the FRS went from an employee/employer funded system to a strictly employer funded system which became known as a non-contributory system. The Florida Bar does not participate as a paying agency of the FRS and employees of The Florida Bar do not participate in any state employee benefit system. Beginning in 1955, until the establishment of the FRS, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners participated in the former public retirement system. When the FRS was created, participants, such as the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, began reporting into the new system and were allowed to participate in the new system. Mr. Ragsdale, administrator of the enrollment section of the Division, established that the employees of the Board of Bar Examiners participated by contributing into the former retirement system.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for retirement service credit for the period of his employment with the Florida Bar. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2001.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57121.021121.051122.02216.011216.262 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-6.001
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LEO A. PRICE vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 80-001029 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001029 Latest Update: Oct. 06, 1980

Findings Of Fact The petitioner, Leo A. Price, was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) at the time of his retirement in June, 1979. He became an FRS member on January 1, 1979, by transferring from the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS). Mr. Price was appointed to a teaching position for the 1950-51 school year on June 8, 1950, by the Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Florida. He performed some limited duties for the Board of Public Instruction at the beginning of the 1950-51 school year, but his service was cut short as a result of illness. He received no salary payments for this service. Mr. Price recovered from his illness and began teaching in Dade County on January 31, 1951. He enrolled in the Teachers' Retirement System in February, 1951, and represented on his enrollment blank that he began service on January 31, 1951, and that he had not taught in Florida in prior years. Enrollment forms are required prior to membership in TRS. Mr. Price taught continuously from January 31, 1951, through June 30, 1979. On June 20, 1979, the School Board of Dade County retroactively approved a leave of absence for Mr. Price for the period from September, 1950, through January 30, 1951. No leave of absence had been authorized by the School Board prior to this retroactive authorization. Ruth Sansom, Assistant Bureau Chief, Bureau of Benefits, Division of Retirement, testified that she has worked with TRS and FRS in a supervisory capacity since 1963. In these seventeen years, no member has been allowed a service credit for a leave of absence that was retroactively granted.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner, Leo A. Price, seeking a service credit for the period of time from September, 1950, through January, 1951, be denied. It is further RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner, Leo A. Price, for interest on all uncashed benefit warrants, be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 19 day of September, 1980. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Leo A. Price 1000 N. E. 96th Street Miami Shores, Florida 33138 Diane R. Keisling, Esquire Suite 207C, Box 81 Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303

Florida Laws (2) 238.05238.06
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CAROLYN JOHNSON-ROLLINS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 03-004024 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Oct. 30, 2003 Number: 03-004024 Latest Update: Sep. 20, 2004

The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner's employment as a substitute teacher is creditable service under the Florida Retirement System, entitling her to retirement benefits and whether she may purchase retirement credit for out-of-state and federal service prior to vesting.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, aged 53, applied for retirement benefits from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) on October 20, 2003. Petitioner has 4.53 years of creditable service with the FRS due to her employment as a full-time teacher with the Alachua County School Board (School Board). She worked for the School Board from sometime in the early 1970s through May 1977. In May 1977, Petitioner terminated her employment with the School Board. She then joined the military, serving four years of active duty. After completing her military service in 1981, Petitioner worked out of state as a civil service employee with the Federal government. She also worked for a period of time in the private sector. In the 1990s, Petitioner returned to Alachua County, Florida. She worked as a substitute teacher for the School Board for approximately four years, from November 21, 1999 through February 14, 2002. Before beginning her employment as a substitute teacher/temporary employee in 1999, Petitioner signed a document entitled "Acknowledgement of FRS Status and Alternative Plan." This document clearly advised Petitioner that her employment as a substitute teacher was not covered under FRS. Petitioner was not employed by a participating employer in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001. She needs an additional 1.47 years of credible service in order to vest in FRS with six years of credible service.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to FRS benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert R. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carolyn Johnson-Rollins Apartment N118 2701 Northwest 23rd Boulevard Gainesville, Florida 32605 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57121.021121.091121.1115121.1122
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TILTON H. DAVIS vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 90-000036 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 04, 1990 Number: 90-000036 Latest Update: Aug. 31, 1990

The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to retain retirement benefits received by him during the time periods May 19, 1983, through December 31, 1983; May 18, 1984, through December 31, 1984; and May 17, 1985 through June 30, 1985.

Findings Of Fact On June 26 and 27, 1990, respectively, the Respondent and the Petitioner submitted to the Hearing Officer their proposed Findings of Fact. In the Appendix to the Recommended Order the Hearing Officer submitted recommended rulings thereon. The following constitutes the rulings in this Final Order on those proposed Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 2, and 3 are hereby accepted and adopted in that they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 4 is hereby rejected as an ultimate finding of fact in that it a recitation of isolated bits and pieces of testimony of witnesses, and it is not proper as an ultimate finding of fact. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 5 is hereby rejected upon the authority of Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173 (Fla.), in that it is based upon statements of the parties as to the working relationship, which under the Cantor case is not competent evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 is hereby rejected upon the grounds and for the reason stated in Paragraph No. 3. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is accepted to the extent that on November 1, 1984, the Petitioner was an employee of the Union County School Board, and continued as such through June 30, 1987, but the remainder of that proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is hereby rejected in that it is based on the statements and arrangements of the parties, which, based upon the Cantor case do not constitute competent evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, and 11, are hereby rejected in that each of them is ambiguous, irrelevant, not based upon any competent substantial evidence in the record, and do not serve to either prove or disapprove any of the issues in this cause. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 10, is hereby rejected in that is erroneous as to the dates in question and as to the number of hours in the School Board workweek. The dates in 1983, 1984, and 1985, during which the Petitioner's retirement benefits had been suspended because of exceeding the 780-hour work limitation were as follows: May 19, 1983, through December 31, 1983; May 18, 1984, through December 31, 1984; and May 17, 1985, through June 30, 1985. The Respondent's proposed Finding of Fact Nos. 1 through 8 are each hereby accepted and adopted in that they are each based upon competent, substantial evidence.

Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner was overpaid retirement benefits for the time periods of May 25, 1985 through June 30, 1985, in the amount of $3024.66. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1990.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68121.091
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MARY C. BOBBITT vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 00-004762 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Nov. 28, 2000 Number: 00-004762 Latest Update: Sep. 27, 2024
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CARLOS O. COTO vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 02-002832 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 18, 2002 Number: 02-002832 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2002

The Issue Whether Petitioner's application to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On August 24, 2001, Petitioner submitted to the Division a Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), Form FRS DP-11. On the form, Petitioner indicated his name, social security number, birth date (June 22, 1946), his position title (guidance counselor), present Florida Retirement System employer (Miami-Dade County Public Schools), work phone, home phone, and home mailing address. These entries were followed by the a printed statement, which read as follows: I have resigned my employment on the date stated below and elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.). My DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I first reach my normal retirement date as determined by the Division of Retirement . I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a monthly retirement benefit and my DROP benefit. I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement after the DROP begin date. If I fail to terminate my employment in accordance with s. 121.021(39)(b), F.S., on my DROP termination date, my retirement will be null and void and my FRS membership shall be established retroactively to the date I began DROP. I have read and understand the DROP Accrual and Distribution information on the reverse side of this form. The "DROP begin date" and the "DROP termination and resignation date" that were filled in the form were August 1, 2001, and July 31, 2006, respectively. On the "Beneficiary Designation" portion of the form, Petitioner named his wife, Marianne F. Coto, as his "primary" beneficiary, and his daughter, Claudine Coto, as his "contingent" beneficiary. Their birth dates (but not their social security numbers) were noted on the form. At the bottom of the form was the following "Employer Certification," signed and dated (August 24, 2001), by Miami- Dade County Public Schools personnel officer, Maria Perez: This is to certify that the above named member will be enrolled as a DROP participant on the date stated and will terminate his or her employment on the date stated. On August 24, 2001, Petitioner also submitted to the Division a Florida Retirement System Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment, Form FRS DP-ELE. On the form, Petitioner indicated his name, social security number, birth date, his position title, present Florida Retirement System employer, work phone, home phone, and home mailing address. These entries were followed by a printed statement, which read as follows: Resignation From Employment to Participate in the DROP: I elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.), as indicated below, and resign my employment on the date I terminate from the DROP. I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach my normal retirement date as determined by law and that my DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I reach my normal retirement date, although I may elect to participate in the DROP for less than 60 months. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee my employment for the DROP period. I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a monthly retirement benefit and my DROP benefit under Chapter 121, F.S. I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement after my DROP begin date. On the form, Petitioner indicated that his "DROP begin date" and his "DROP termination and resignation date" were August 1, 2001, and July 31, 2006, respectively. Also on the form was an "Employer Certification," signed and dated (August 24, 2001), by Ms. Perez, the aforementioned Miami-Dade County Public Schools personnel officer, which was identical to the "Employer Certification" on the Form FRS DP-11 that Petitioner had submitted. Petitioner did not submit to the Division (along with Forms FRS DP-11 and DP-ELE) Form FRS 11o, on which he was required to indicate the form of payment of retirement benefits he desired. (Pursuant to the Division's Rule 60S-4.010, Florida Administrative Code, there are four optional forms of payment from which to choose.) Neither did Petitioner furnish the Division with any proof of age. In addition, Petitioner, in September of 1998, had submitted to the Division an Application to Purchase Retirement Credit for a Leave of Absence, but had not yet paid the amount necessary to purchase the credit. Accordingly, by letter dated September 8, 2001, the Division advised Petitioner of the following: This will acknowledge receipt of your Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) You will be notified should we need additional information. If there is an amount due your account, please make your check payable to the Florida Retirement System (FRS) and reference your social security number on all future correspondence with this office. Date Received: 08/24/2001 Member SSN: . . . . Drop Begin Date: 08/2001 Drop End date: 07/31/2006 Amount Due, if any: $1,126.78 Option Selected: None The following items must be received. Please provide Birth date verification of joint annuitant if Option 3 or 4 is selected. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1). Your birth date verification is required. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1.) Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, Form FRS-11o is required. The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from 1975-76. If you do not elect to pay the above amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notification of your intent. A Final Salary Certification, FC-1, with current year salary and terminal leave payments (excluding sick leave payments) must be received from your employer. Your employer is aware of this requirement. AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE OR CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT. Petitioner did not provide the Division with the items listed in the September 8, 2001, letter. The Division therefore sent Petitioner a follow-up letter, dated October 24, 2001, which read as follows: DROP RETIREMENT APPLICATION TO BE EFFECTIVE: 08/2001 The item(s) listed below must be received to complete your DROP application and retain the above retirement date: Please provide Birth date verification of joint annuitant if Option 3 or 4 is selected. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1). Your birth date verification is required. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1.) Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, Form FRS-11o is required. Payment of $1,126.78. Please make your check payable to the Florida Retirement System and note your social security number on the face. Otherwise, provide a written statement indicating that you do not wish to purchase this service. Not having received any response from Petitioner, the Division sent Petitioner an identical letter on November 29, 2001. Still not having received any response from Petitioner, the Division sent Petitioner another letter, dated January 3, 2002, requesting that Petitioner provide the items that had been requested from him in the previous correspondence. The January 3, 2002, letter warned that the items "must be received immediately to avoid cancellation [of Petitioner's] DROP application." The items were not provided by Petitioner. Accordingly, the Division sent him the following letter, dated February 14, 2002: For your Florida Retirement System (FRS) Application for Service Retirement and Deferred Option Program (DROP), DP-11 to be effective 08/2001, the following item(s) previously requested, must be received within 21 calendar days from the date you receive this letter: Please provide Birth date verification of joint annuitant if Option 3 or 4 is selected. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1). You should place your social security number on any documentation provided. Your birth date verification is required. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1.) You should place your social security number on any documentation provided. Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, Form FRS-11o is required. Payment of $1,126.78. Please make your check payable to the Florida Retirement System and note your social security number on the face. Otherwise, provide a written statement indicating that you do not wish to purchase this service. It is our intent to disapprove your application for the DROP if the requested information and documents are not received within the 21-day period. Should we disapprove your DROP application, the following will be applicable to you: You will be deemed to not have retired and the DROP application will be null and void. If you are eligible to participate in the DROP in the future, you will be required to submit a New Notice of Election to participate in the Deferred [Retirement] Option Program and Resignation of Employment and a new Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program during the 12-month period of your latest DROP eligibility date. You will be required to repay your employer for any annual leave payments you received as the result of applying for DROP. Your FRS membership will be reestablished retroactively to the effective date of DROP for which you applied. Your employer will be required to pay the FRS Trust Fund any difference between the DROP contributions and the contributions required for the applicable FRS class of membership. Also you submitted a Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program and Resignation of Employment, DP-ELE, with a resignation date to take effect in the future. Because it is discretionary with the employer as to whether such resignation can be rescinded, you should contact your employer for further information. The beneficiary you designated on the retirement application you filed will remain in effect unless changed by you at a later date. Please call me if you have any questions. Petitioner received this February 14, 2002, letter from the Division on February 25, 2002, but, as of April 9, 2002, had not provided any of the items listed in the letter. Accordingly, on that date (April 9, 2002), Doug Cherry, the Division's Benefits Administrator, telephoned Ms. Perez, and asked her to attempt to make contact with Petitioner and remind him that that if he did not submit the items listed in the February 14, 2002, letter, his application to participate in DROP would be denied. On April 18, 2002, Ms. Perez faxed Mr. Cherry a copy of Petitioner's passport, along with a note that Petitioner would make additional submissions at a later date. No additional submissions were made by Petitioner. Accordingly, on May 29, 2002, the Division sent Petitioner the following letter: We have not received the items that were requested in our February 14th letter (copy enclosed) to you. Accordingly, your Florida Retirement System (FRS) Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), DP-11, cannot be approved. Therefore, the following are applicable to you: You are deemed to not have retired and the DROP election is null and void. If you are eligible to participate in the DROP in the future, you will be required to submit a New Notice of Election to participate in the Deferred [Retirement] Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment and a new Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) during the 12-month period of your latest DROP eligibility date. You will be required to repay your employer for any annual leave payments you received as the result of your having applied for the DROP. Your FRS membership is being reestablished retroactively to 08/2001, the date of your DROP participation. Your employer will be required to pay to the FRS Trust Fund the difference between the DROP contributions (12.50%) and the contributions required for the applicable FRS class of membership during the period you participated in the DROP. Also you submitted a Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program and Resignation of Employment, DP-ELE, with a resignation date to take effect in the future. Because it is discretionary with the employer as to whether such resignation can be rescinded, you should contact your employer for further information. By copy of this letter, we are advising your employer that immediate action is required by the employer to correct your FRS retirement plan on the next payroll reported to the Division. Your employer will be billed for the appropriate FRS contribution adjustments, if any, based on you not having joined the DROP. This letter constitutes final agency action. If you do not agree with this decision and wish to appeal this action, you must file a formal petition for review in accordance with the enclosed Rule 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.) within 21 days of receipt of this letter. Your petition should be filed with the Division of Retirement at the above address. Upon receipt of the petition, you will be notified by the Division or the Administrative Law Judge of all future proceedings and hearings. If you do not file an appeal within the 21-day period, you will waive your right to request a hearing or mediation in this matter in accordance with Rule 28-206.111, F.A.C. You may contact Doug Cherry at . . . should you desire additional information. Petitioner responded by sending the following letter to Mr. Cherry: I received a certified letter signed by Maurice Helms for Erin B. Sjostrom, which asks to contact you regarding a formal appeal to the action of your agency to cancel my D.R.O.P benefits for this 2001 to 2002 school year. Please allow this to serve as the formal appeal. Needless to say I am very frustrated and upset and would like to request your help to sort through this process. A bit of background history first I believe will help. I started working for Miami-Dade County Public Schools in 1970. At that time I was told it was necessary to be a U.S. citizen to be able to work as a teacher in the school system. I had already decided that and since I had officially turned 22, I became a naturalized U.S. citizen and submitted a copy of the Certificate of Naturalization to the School Board through the Dade County office. Where is that record and why am I being asked to produce it again after having accumulated 31 years of service and after I explained to the local retirement officer in charge, Maria Perez, that I had lost the original when I lost almost the entire contents of my house to Hurricane Andrew in 1992? Honestly since I had submitted [a] copy of my U.S. passport with birth-date and all other pertinent information and I also have my Florida Driver's License, which I have had since 1963 or so, and has been what I have used to verify my age and for identification purposes since I was a kid, (although now I am told by your office that this is not a valid acceptable proof, kindly explain why not?) I never thought it was necessary for me to obtain a copy of the Certificate of Naturalization (U.S. citizenship). Also please tell me why passport and driver's license and 31 years of continuous service on record is not sufficient. It is not as if I were trying to retire after a short time of service. I do have 31 years of service! I do not feel this is the right way to treat a dedicated teacher at the end of his career and I hope you agree with me and will help. To comply with the requirement of another piece of proof of age (which I fail to see the need of in my case where I already have 31 years of verifiable and documented service to Miami-Dade County Public Schools as stated before) I requested a copy of my child's birth certificate from the Bureau of Vital Statistics. This was also a frustrating experience. I requested one copy to be sent to me and one to Dade County Public Schools to the attention of Maria Perez. I was told that the copy would arrive in approximately 10 to 14 days. I have not yet received it. I assume that Ms. Perez never received it either. After thirty-one years of faithful service to the State of Florida, which you have on record, and my birth date established with you over 31 years ago, I find it ludicrous that, after having submitted my passport, having requested, although not having been able to get a copy from the Bureau of Vital Statistics, of my child's birth certificate within a number of days, that your office does not find this to be sufficient proof and that based on the technicality that you have only one instead of two forms of verification of my age, now you will cancel my D.R.O.P., which in essence means forfeiting close to $30,000 that I should have accumulated in my account. Please see the circumstances and kindly reconsider the action taken. I will be extremely grateful. Mr. Cherry responded to Petitioner's letter by sending the following letter, dated June 10, 2002, to Petitioner: This is in response to your letter received in our office on June 6th concerning cancellation of your DROP application. The letter from the Division dated May 29th canceling your DROP application was sent only after several prior notices were also sent. The birth date verification issue raised in your letter was only one of the pending items on your application. We sent an acknowledgment of your application dated September 8, 2001, informing you that we needed an option selection, your birth date verification, your spouse's birth date verification if you selected option 3 or 4 and either payment for your leave of absence or a statement that you did not wish to purchase the service. After receiving no response, we sent memos on October 24, 2001, November 29, 2001 and January 3, 2002, all requesting the same information. We never received any response to these notices. We then sent our February 14th letter by certified mail (which you signed for on February 25, 2002) informing you of our intent to cancel because your application was not complete. A copy of all of this correspondence is enclosed. Again, we received no response [to] this letter. Before sending our cancellation letter, I personally called the Dade School Board and asked them to contact you in one last effort to avoid cancellation. It was only then that we received (on April 18th) a copy of your passport but none of the other required documentation was submitted. After waiting until May 29th for the remaining items to be submitted, we sent the final cancellation letter. It was approximately eight months from our first notice to you of items pending on your application, to the May 29th letter of cancellation. That was certainly sufficient time to submit the needed information and also explain about the difficulty you might have obtaining additional birth date verification. However, during those eight months we had no contact or response from you despite our repeated notices. To summarize, your DROP application is not being cancelled because of birth date verification, but because you did not submit all of the items needed to complete your application, even though you had eight months to do so. Your letter will be forwarded to our Legal section and they will contact you concerning the appeal process. The "Legal Section," after receiving Petitioner's letter, referred the matter to DOAH.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order denying Petitioner's application to participate in DROP. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2002.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57121.011121.021121.091
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KENNETH JENNE vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 08-001829 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Apr. 14, 2008 Number: 08-001829 Latest Update: May 28, 2009

The Issue Whether the Petition has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS) as a result of a guilty plea in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, for acts committed in connection with Petitioner's employment with the Broward County Sheriff's Department.

Findings Of Fact From the Joint Stipulation of Facts: The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Department of Management Services. Petitioner was employed as an Assistant State Attorney by the State Attorney's Office from December 1972 to January 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed as Executive Director of the Broward County Charter Commission from January 1974 to November 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed by the Broward County Board of County Commissioners from March 1975 to November 1978. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS, and this service is credited as service under the FRS. In November 1978, Petitioner was elected to serve as a member of the Florida Legislature; he continued to serve as a state legislator for approximately 18 years. As a state legislator, Petitioner was a member of the FRS class of State Elected Officers, and this service is credited service under the FRS. Most recently, Petitioner was the elected Sheriff of Broward County. By reason of his service as Sheriff, Petitioner was a member of the FRS. Petitioner was initially appointed Sheriff in January 1998 by then-Governor Lawton Chiles. Petitioner was subsequently elected Sheriff in 1998 and reelected in 2000 and 2004. As Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner was Broward County's chief law enforcement officer and was responsible for directing the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BSO"), a law enforcement agency that currently employs over 6,000 employees. The office of Sheriff is a constitutional office established under Article VIII, Section 1(d), Constitution of Florida. Upon assuming his duties as Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner took an oath to support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States and the State of Florida and to faithfully perform the duties of sheriff pursuant to Article II, Section 5(b), Constitution of Florida. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner wrote a letter to Governor Charlie Crist notifying him of his resignation from the office of Sheriff of Broward County. By reply letter of the same date, Governor Crist accepted Petitioner's resignation. Petitioner is not retired from the FRS and currently does not receive FRS retirement benefits. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner was charged, by information, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, and three counts of filing a false tax return, in violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206(1). The same four-count information is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr- 60209-WPB as document 1. At all times relevant to the information, Petitioner was the Sheriff of Broward County. The section of the information entitled "General Allegations" contains numerous references to Petitioner's service as Sheriff of Broward County and the power and authority vested in that position. The "Objects of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: An object of the conspiracy was for JENNE to unlawfully enrich himself by obtaining monies from P.P. and L.N., who were Broward Sheriff's Office vendors, by making false representations, omitting to state material facts, and concealing material facts concerning, among other things, the ultimate destination of monies that JENNE asked P.P. and L.N. to give to his secretaries, A.V. and M.Y. It was further an object of the scheme for JENNE to perpetuate and conceal the scheme and the actions taken in furtherance of it by, among other things, making false, misleading, and incomplete statements in public filings and to investigators. The "Manner and Means of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: JENNE and M.Y. arranged for JENNE to receive $20,000 from P.P. by having the money transferred from P.P. through JENNE's secretary, M.Y., to JENNE. JENNE and M.Y. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds. JENNE provided L.N. with access to off- duty Broward Sheriff's Office deputies, who L.N. hired to do work for his companies. On two different occasions, in exchange for the access to the deputies, JENNE instructed L.N. to pay money to JENNE's secretary, A.V., purportedly to compensate A.V. for work done for L.N. JENNE instructed A.V. to cash checks given to her by L.N. and to have the cash deposited into JENNE's bank account. JENNE and A.V. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds, which totaled $5,500. JENNE perpetuated this fraud and attempted to prevent its detection by mailing incomplete and misleading annual financial disclosure forms, which did not list his receipt of the payments from P.P. and L.N., to the Florida Commission on Ethics. On or about September 5, 2007, after being advised of the nature of the charges against him, the above-referenced information, and of his rights, Petitioner waived in open court prosecution by indictment and consented to proceeding by information. The same waiver of indictment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 13. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered into an agreement with the United States of America to plead guilty as charged in the four-count information. The same plea agreement is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 3. Paragraph 7.c. of the plea agreement provides: 7. The United States and the defendant agree that, although not binding on the probation office or the court, they will jointly recommend that the court make the following findings and conclusions as to the sentence to be imposed: * * * c. Advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count: That, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, the applicable guideline to be used in calculating the defendant's advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count is § 2B1.1; that under § 2B1.1(a)(1), the Base Offense Level is 7; that under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), four levels are added because the loss was between $10,000 and $30,000; that under § 3B1.3, two levels are added because of the defendant's abuse of his position of public trust; and that under § 3E1.1(b), two levels are subtracted for acceptance of responsibility . . . The United States Sentencing Guide, Section 3B1.3, referenced in paragraph 7.c of the plea agreement, provides in relevant part that "[i]f the defendant abused a position of public . . . trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels." USSG § 3B1.3. Paragraphs 10. and 12. of the plea agreement provide: 10. The defendant confirms that he is guilty of the offenses to which he is pleading guilty; that his decision to plead guilty is the decision that he has made; and that nobody has forced, threatened, or coerced him into pleading guilty. The defendant affirms that he has discussed this matter thoroughly with his attorneys. The defendant further affirms that his discussions with his attorneys have included discussion of possible defenses that he may raise if the case were to go to trial, as well as possible issues and arguments that he may raise at sentencing. The defendant additionally affirms that he is satisfied with the representation provided by his attorneys. The defendant accordingly affirms that he is entering into this agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and with the benefit of full, complete, and effective assistance by his attorneys. * * * 12. This is the entire agreement and understanding between the United States and the defendant. There are no other agreements, promises, representations, or understandings. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered a statement of factual basis for guilty plea with the United States of America (hereinafter "factual proffer"), wherein he agreed that, if the case went to trial, the government would have been able to establish the facts recited therein beyond a reasonable doubt. The same factual proffer is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 8. On or about September 5, 2007, a hearing was held in which Petitioner pled guilty as charged in the information. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted to committing the acts set forth in the charges and to which he pled guilty. In addition, at the hearing Petitioner admitted to the following facts and to committing the following actions: At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that he received an $8,130 benefit from P.P. in November 2001 in connection with the demolition of a house he owned in Lake Worth, Florida. Within P.P.'s internal accounting system, the $8,130 check was attributed to the "HIDTA project" (i.e., a lease committing BSO and HIDTA as tenants of an office building owned by P.P.). Petitioner never reported the $8,130 benefit on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that, in September 2002, he had received $10,000 from P.P. as a reward for his work concerning a new company called SuperTech Products, Inc. Petitioner never reported the $10,000 payment on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. Prior to becoming Sheriff, Petitioner was a partner in Conrad, Scherer & Jenne, a law firm located in Fort Lauderdale. Petitioner was with the firm from 1992 through the beginning of 1998, when he left to become Sheriff. While Petitioner was at the firm, he, like some other partners, drove a car paid for by the firm's investment arm, CSJ Investments. In October, 1997, at Petitioner's request, the law firm, through CSJ Investments, bought a used 1994 Mercedes E320 convertible for Petitioner to drive. The price of the Mercedes was $61,297. Rather than pay for the car all at once, the firm financed the car with a 60-month loan. When Petitioner left the firm in early 1998 following his appointment as Sheriff, he took the Mercedes with him. Despite the fact that Petitioner no longer worked for the firm, the firm continued to pay off the Mercedes loan for the balance of the loan term, making the final payment in 2003. The loan payments were $1,320 per month, resulting in a total eventual cost to the firm of approximately $79,234 in loan payments, all but approximately $1,320, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. In addition, after Petitioner left the law firm, the firm continued to pay for the insurance on the Mercedes. The insurance payments continued even unto September 2007. At that time, the firm had made a total of approximately $30,961 in insurance payments on Petitioner's behalf, all but approximately $880, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. Petitioner never disclosed any of the loan payments or insurance payments made by the firm on his behalf on any state ethics filing. During the time that Petitioner was receiving these undisclosed payments from Conrad, Scherer, the firm was billing BCSO for legal work that it was doing on its behalf. At the hearing, Petitioner did not take any exception or make any objections to the facts as summarized in the factual proffer. In fact, with the exception of one non-substantive addition, Petitioner accepted the factual proffer as indicated. On or about November 16, 2007, a judgment was entered on the aforesaid guilty plea, wherein Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of all counts charged in the four-count information. The same judgment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 59. By certified letter dated January 24, 2008, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's proposed action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of the aforesaid guilty plea. The notice set forth the basis for the Division's decision and informed Petitioner of his right to an administrative hearing. Petitioner, by and through counsel, timely requested a formal administrative hearing to challenge said proposed agency action. [End of Stipulated Facts] The parties agreed that the following exhibits would be considered in this cause: Petitioner's resignation letter dated September 4, 2007; Governor Crist's letter accepting Petitioner's resignation dated September 4, 2007; The Information filed against Petitioner on September 4, 2007, in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Plea Agreement offered in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Statement of Factual Basis for Guilty Plea of Defendant Kenneth C. Jenne in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Transcript of the Plea of Guilty before the Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, U.S. District Judge, United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209- WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Waiver of Indictment from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Judgment in a Criminal Case from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Agency Action letter dated January 24, 2008; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2001 (with attachments and amendments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, June 27, 2002; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2002 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 7, 2003; and Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2004 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 1, 2005. Petitioner did not have a trial on the merits of the charges against him. Instead, he voluntarily accepted and admitted to the factual allegations set forth in the charging and plea documents. The factual statements set forth in those documents are not subject to interpretation or conjecture. They must be considered facts of this case based upon the stipulation of the parties. Petitioner was notified of the Department's preliminary decision to forfeit the FRS benefits and rights and Petitioner timely challenged that decision.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner was convicted of crimes that require the forfeiture of his rights and benefits under the FRS, pursuant to Florida law. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Mark Herron, Esquire Thomas M. Findley, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Post Office Box 15579 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5579 Clifford A. Taylor, Esquire Barbara M. Crosier, Esquire Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160D Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

USC (2) 18 U. S. C. 37126 U. S. C. 7206 Florida Laws (6) 112.3173120.57121.091800.04838.15838.16
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RICHARD A. CASTILLO, JR. vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 94-001750 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 01, 1994 Number: 94-001750 Latest Update: Apr. 06, 1995

The Issue Whether the purported selection of Option 2 for payment of Florida Retirement System disability retirement benefits to Lon Emory Sweely, now deceased, and his beneficiary, the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., was valid and effective.

Findings Of Fact On or about June 20, 1990, Lon Emory Sweely executed a Division of Retirement Form FR-13 Florida Retirement System Application for Disability Retirement. The application indicated that Sweely's disability resulted from AIDS-related conditions. It selected Option 1, which the application designates as the "Maximum Benefit" and describes as follows: Full benefits payable to the member for his lifetime. If death occurs before the total benefits paid to member equals the contributions made, the difference, if any, is refunded to beneficiary in a lump sum payment. In so doing, Sweely rejected Option 2, which the application designates as "Ten Years Certain," and describes: Lifetime benefit to member, but not less than 120 monthly payments to someone. A decreased retirement benefit payable to a member during his lifetime, and in the event of his death with a period of ten (10) years after his retirement, the same monthly amount shall be payable for the balance of such ten (10) year period to his beneficiary, or in case the beneficiary is deceased, in accordance with Section 121.091(3), Florida Statutes, as though no beneficiary has been named. The application, also designated the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., as Sweely's sole beneficiary. (Sweely previously had designated the Petitioner as his beneficiary, with the Petitioner's mother as the first contingent beneficiary, on a Division of Retirement Personal History Record Form FRS-M10 (Revised 3/89) executed by Sweely on January 25, 1990.) At the time of Sweely's application for disability retirement, Sweely knew that he had full-blown AIDS and that his life expectancy would have to be estimated at approximately two years or less. There also is evidence that Eulah Lee McWilliams, the principal at the elementary school where Sweely taught, counseled Sweely on his options and advised Sweely to select the "Ten Years Certain" option. It is clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided. McWilliams believed that Sweely wanted the Petitioner to have the benefits of the "Ten Year Certain" Option 2. Based on their conversations, McWilliams believed that Sweely concurred with her recommendation in order to provide the maximum possible benefit to the Petitioner upon Sweely's death. But, in the face of Sweely's knowledge and McWilliams's advice and understanding, the application indicates that Sweely selected Option 1. There was evidence that the Petitioner was present and assisting Sweely when the Form FR-13 was executed and that the Petitioner filled out part of the form at Sweely's direction, as writing was inconvenient and difficult for Sweely at the time. But there was no evidence that Sweely was unable to make informed decisions when he executed Division of Retirement Form FR-13 on or about June 20, 1990. The evidence also did not prove that Sweely's choice of Option 1 was inadvertent error. At that point in time, Sweely may have wanted to be optimistic and to be able to enjoy and share with the Petitioner the maximum possible monthly benefit for as long as Sweely lived. McWilliams testified that, at the time, Sweely was trying to remain "up-beat" concerning his illness, in part thinking that this might extend his lifetime. A decision to choose Option 1, contrary to McWilliams's recommendation, also would not have been inconsistent with an earlier decision by Sweely in April, 1990, (this time in conformance with McWilliams's recommendation) to postpone applying for retirement benefits until he exhausted all of his accumulated fully-paid sick leave. Had Sweely died while on sick leave, the Petitioner would not have received the additional retirement benefits he is seeking in this case. (It is not clear from the record exactly what the benefits would have been, but it seems that the Petitioner would not have been entitled to any of the additional retirement benefits he is seeking in this case. Cf. Section 121.091(7), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990); F.A.C. Rule 60S-4.008.) A little over a month later, Sweely's condition worsened, and on or about August 14, 1990, he had to be hospitalized again (as already had happened from time to time during Sweely's full-blown AIDS.) On or about August 15, 1990, the Division of Retirement approved Sweely's application for disability retirement, effective July 1, 1990. On the same date, the Division of Retirement also sent Sweely a Division of Retirement Form FST-40c (R5/89) Acknowledgement of Retirement Application and a blank FRS- 11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members." The Form FST-40c (R5/89) requested that Sweely "review carefully how the option one and two are paid to your beneficiary." The descriptions of the options in the Form FRS-11o were somewhat different from those in the Form FR-13 application. Option 1 was not called the "Maximum Benefit," and it was described as follows: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthy benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributionss I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. (Emphasis in the original.) Option 2 was not called "Ten Years Certain," and it was described as follows: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly benefit payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit payment in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both me and my beneficiary equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. The FRS-11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members" also stated in bold and underlined upper case type: "MEMBER MUST SIGN AND DATE IN THE PRESENCE OF A NOTARY PUBLIC." Whenever Sweely was hospitalized, the emotional strain on the Petitioner increased, and the time spent with Sweely in the hospital left the Petitioner less time to accomplish normal household tasks. The Petitioner's life and home usually became disorganized during Sweely's hospitalizations, and the Petitioner often allowed mail to pile up at their home at these times. The Petitioner testified that, notwithstanding Sweely's hospitalization and its disruptive effect on his life and habits, he happened to collect and read the mail on August 16, 1990. He testified that among the items of mail he read that day was the envelope postmarked the day before in Tallahassee, Florida, containing the Division of Retirement Form FST-40c (R5/89) Acknowledgement of Retirement Application and the blank FRS-11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members." The Petitioner testified that he telephoned McWilliams to discuss the forms with her, and she asked him to bring them to the hospital. He testified, and she confirmed, that she met with the Petitioner at the hospital, looked at the forms, and explained them to the Petitioner. Believing, based on the conversations she had with Sweely before June 20, 1990, that Option 2 was Sweely's actual choice, McWilliams advised the Petitioner to choose Option 2. McWilliams testified that she discussed the matter with Sweely and with the Petitioner in Sweely's presence on August 16, 1990. (It certainly is possible that, had they discussed the matter with Sweely on August 16, 1990, Sweely might have chosen Option 2 at that time.) But the Petitioner testified that they did not discuss the matter with Sweely on August 16, 1990. The Petitioner explained that, although Sweely was oriented and physically able to write his name and, from time to time, was mentally lucid on that day, the Petitioner did not think that Sweely was in a position to give full consideration to the matter at the time they were discussing the forms because he was on morphine, was lethargic, and was having difficulty breathing without a non-rebreather mask. The Petitioner also did not think it was necessary to trouble Sweely with the matter, since the Petitioner believed that the selection of Option 2 on the Form FRS-11o was redundant and also that he was authorized to execute the form for Sweely as his attorney-in-fact under a purported durable power of attorney which Sweely executed on or about February 28, 1990, authorizing the Petitoner to act in Sweely's behalf in all matters. Under the circumstances on the afternoon of August 16, 1990, the Petitioner did not think that Sweely would have wanted to be troubled with the matter unnecessarily. He checked Option 2 and signed Sweely's name to the Form FRS-11o. On numerous previous occasions, the Petitioner had signed Sweely's name on Sweely's personal checks to pay Sweely's bills. In doing so, the Petitioner believed that he was acting properly under the authority of the purported durable power of attorney, and the bank always honored the checks the Petitioner signed this way. But on June 13, 1990, a physician insisted that the Petitioner sign a Division of Retirement medical records release form FR-13b in his own name as attorney-in-fact for Sweely. Himself not thinking well or clearly under the circumstances, the Petitioner assumed that his signature on the Form FRS-11o was valid. The Petitioner testified that it did not occur to him that there were notary services available for his use at the hospital. He testified that, after checking Option 2 and signing the Form FRS-11o, he telephoned his father, who was a notary, and asked him to come to the hospital to notarize something for him. The Petitioner's father confirmed this and also confirmed the Petitioner's testimony that they met in the hallway outside Sweely's hospital room, where the Petitioner gave his father the signed form and asked him to notarize it. Both testified that they did not discuss the form in any detail before the Petitioner returned to Sweely's hospital room. The Petitioner's father testified that he notarized the form thinking that Sweely had signed it. Sweely died two days later on August 18, 1990.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order: (1) that the purported selection, on the Form FRS-11o dated August 16, 1990, of Option 2 for payment of Florida Retirement System disability retirement benefits to Lon Emory Sweely, now deceased, and his beneficiary, the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., was invalid and ineffective; and (2) that the previous selection of Option 1 on the Form FR-13 executed on or about June 20, 1990, is valid and shall be given effect. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to the Petitioner, his actions were not in accordance with the statement.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-14. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to McWilliams, his actions were not in accordance with the statement, and McWilliams also testified that Sweely tried to remain "up-beat," thinking that this might extend his lifetime.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (Specifically, it was clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided.) Last sentence, not proven (as to expression of "clear and unqualified acknowledgment and understanding); also rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to McWilliams, his actions were not in accordance with the statement, and McWilliams also testified that Sweely tried to remain "up-beat," thinking that this might extend his lifetime.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (Specifically, it was clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided.) 17.-30. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 31. "Substantially," rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 32.-35. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-7. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Ultimate and penultimate sentences, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (The evidence was that the Patient Care Technician Records were prepared near the beginning of each nursing shift and reflected conditions at that time. Meanwhile, there was evidence that the patient's mental state would "wax" and "wane." When the patient "waned" and was lethargic, it was difficult to communicate with him. Changes during the course of a shift may or may not be noted in the Progress Notes. While the Patient Care Technician Records indicate that the patient was both oriented and lethargic, the 8 a.m. progress notes indicate "lethargic at times." The progress notes also indicate that, earlier in the day, the patient had difficulty breathing without the non-rebreather mask and that, by 2 p.m., he was wearing the mask continuously. Even disregarding the possibility that the morphine dosage was enough to affect his judgment, the patient's lethargy and his difficulty breathing without the mask probably would have made it difficult for him to communicate on legal matters on the afternoon of August 16, 1990.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Ultimate and penultimate sentences, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (He did not allege that Sweely could not communicate or write his name. He testified that he did not think Sweely would have been able to think clearly or want to be troubled with the form unnecessarily. He did not think he had to discuss it with Sweely or have Sweely sign it.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, Dr. Breen's curt medical evaluation of Sweely's general medical condition on August 16, 1990, was not for the purpose of evaluating whether it was possible or prudent to have him considering legal documents and making important legal judgments. In addition, Dr. Breen saw the patient early in the morning and would not have seen changes during the course of the day. 11.-12. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 13. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that Castillo, Jr., "insist[ed] that Sweely was incompetent, unable to provide or receive meaningful communication on August 16--and could not execute the form himself . . .." (Rather, he testified that he did not think Sweely would have been able to think clearly or want to be troubled with the form unnecessarily.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 14.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith F. Roberts, Esquire 201 North MacDill Avenue Tampa, Florida 33609 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (2) 120.52121.091 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-9.001
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ESTELL R. DORAIS vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 83-002051 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002051 Latest Update: Jun. 01, 1990

Findings Of Fact John Wallace began service as a Sumter County school board member on January 1, 1959. (Joint Stipulation). On or about January 1, 1959, he completed a blue-top computer enrollment card (Petitioner's Exhibit 1), which also designated his wife Effie as his first beneficiary of his retirement benefits and his daughter, Mrs. Kindle Johnson, as the second beneficiary. (Joint Stipulation). Effie Wallace died January 22, 1963. (Joint Stipulation) John Wallace married Estell Loudin June 9, 1964. (Joint Stipulation). John Wallace executed an election to transfer to the Florida Retirement System, effective December 1, 1970. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). (Joint Stipulation). John Wallace died September 8, 1975. (Joint Stipulation). On November 12, 1975, Betty Carruthers, an employee of the Sumter County School Board, notified the Division of Retirement of Mr. Wallace's death. Margie Smith in the Division of Retirement completed a form (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) setting forth the information she received from Betty Carruthers in the November 12, 1975, telephone conversation. Not having any beneficiary designation form in the School Board file, Carruthers simply advised Smith that petitioner was Wallace's second wife, his first wife, Effie, having predeceased him. Smith's quick check of the Division of Retirement records management section did not uncover Wallace's designation of beneficiary form. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 5). On March 9, 1977, the Division of Retirement received petitioner's FR- 11, an application (albeit on the incorrect form) for her deceased husband's benefits, along with certain supporting documents. In an April 13, 1977, letter (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) sent out over David Ragsdale's name but written and signed by a benefits calculation specialist trainee, petitioner was erroneously informed that she was the beneficiary of her husband's benefits, since he had designated his first wife Effie, who had predeceased him. But after the letter went out, it came to the attention of Marjorie Smith that the April 13, 1977 letter was incorrect since Wallace's original January 1, 1959 designation of beneficiary form designated Wallace's daughter, Mrs. Kindle [sic] Johnson, who is still living, as Wallace's second beneficiary. In a June 5, 1977, latter (Petitioner's Exhibit 7), again sent out over David Ragsdale's name but dictated by Marjorie Smith and signed by Ragsdale's secretary, petitioner was informed that respondent had located the designation of beneficiary card, signed by Mr. Wallace, designating his daughter, Mrs. Kindle [sic] Johnson, as his second beneficiary. On June 20, 1977, Randall Thornton, petitioner's attorney at the time, wrote a letter (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) to David Ragsdale, seeking a copy of the beneficiary card upon which the respondent based its decision in the June 15, 1977, letter to petitioner. On July 12, 1977, Mr. Thornton sent another letter to the respondent, attention Mrs. Ferguson (Petitioner's Exhibit 9), asking again for a copy of the beneficiary designation upon which its decision was based awarding Mr. Wallace's retirement benefits to his daughter. On the same date, respondent sent Mr. Thornton a letter (Petitioner's Exhibit 10), enclosing a copy of the original enrollment card. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Thornton's secretary called petitioner into the office on July 15, 1977, the day after Thornton received and reviewed respondents' July 12, 1977 letter. Petitioner looked at the copy of Wallace's designation of beneficiary form and stated that she did not believe her husband had written both his first wife's name and his daughter's name as first and second beneficiaries, respectively, at the same time. She did not, however, prove this at final hearing. Petitioner did not prove that there is or ever was another designation of beneficiary executed by Mr. Wallace other than Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Prior to 1972, if a member of the Florida Retirement System or any pension plan in existence prior to December 1, 1970, wanted to change his designated beneficiary, he would complete another blue-top enrollment card. In 1972, a new enrollment form, FRS-M10, was instituted consisting of three identical parts. If a member of the Florida Retirement System completed the form, the original would be sent to the respondent, with a copy to the agency employing the individual and a copy to the individual. (Carruthers deposition, p.4). Respondent has searched its records and has found no other designation of beneficiary form signed by Mr. Wallace apart from Petitioner's Exhibit 1. The files at the Sumter County School Board have been searched and no designation of beneficiary signed by Mr. Wallace found. (Carruthers deposition, p.3). Petitioner's attorney Randall Thornton has searched his files and found no designation of beneficiary signed by Mr. Wallace other than Petitioner's Exhibit (Thornton deposition, p.18)

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying petitioner's request for benefits on the ground that she is not, in law and fact, entitled to benefits resulting from the death of her husband, John Wallace. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1984.

Florida Laws (2) 121.091122.12
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