The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Education Practices Commission is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility to revoke or suspend, or take other appropriate action with regard to teaching certificates as provided in sections 1012.795 and 1012.796, Florida Statutes (2016). § 1012.79(7), Fla. Stat. Petitioner, as Commissioner of Education, is charged with the duty to file and prosecute administrative complaints against individuals who hold Florida teaching certificates and who are alleged to have violated standards of teacher conduct. § 1012.796(6), Fla. Stat. Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate 962539, covering the areas of English, English for Speakers of Other Languages, Middle Grades Integrated Curriculum, and Reading, which is valid through June 30, 2017. During the 2013-2014 school year, Respondent was employed as a science teacher at Sims Middle. He continued teaching at Sims Middle for the 2014- 2015 school year, and currently teaches at Woodham Middle School in Escambia County. Among his teaching assignments, Respondent taught an eighth-grade honors science class during the school day’s first period. Among his students in that class was T.L. T.L had, in 2010, been diagnosed with Type I diabetes. By her eighth-grade year, T.L. was an “independent diabetic,” using an insulin pump and capable of carrying her meter and lancing device with her. On March 6, 2014, during a discussion of the consequences of the failure of various organs, Respondent made a comment that was substantially similar to that alleged in the Administrative Complaint, i.e., “Your pancreas can die and you could go into sugar shock; go into a coma and die, like (T.L.) could.” Respondent was standing in front of T.L.’s desk at the time. His position meant that the students were, or should have had their attention directed to Respondent. Thus, his statement would have been obvious. The investigation performed by Mr. Stokes indicated that comments similar to that involving T.L. “are often made” by Respondent; that T.L. likely took the statement “the wrong way” due to Respondent’s “dry sense of humor”; that Respondent “often makes comments trying to be funny but it usually just makes people feel weird”; and that he has made similar comments regarding other students in the past. The statements contained in Mr. Stokes’ report are not accepted for the truth of the matters asserted, but are used herein as evidence of Respondent’s overly loose and unsuccessfully “funny” teaching style. The statements contained in Mr. Stokes’ report also support a finding, made herein, that Respondent did not single T.L. out for disparate treatment, but (misguidedly) used her condition, with benign intent, to reinforce the importance of his lesson plan. In that regard, even T.L.’s mother, who was aggravated by the incident, admitted that the instruction as to what can happen when one’s pancreas dies “would have been appropriate in the classroom,” with her concern being the personalization of the instruction. However, she acknowledged that Respondent’s “unprofessional” comments had previously been directed to other students, and were not restricted to T.L. The evidence suggests that T.L.’s diabetic condition was not unknown. T.L.’s close circle of friends knew, having been told by T.L. C.P. testified that T.L.’s diabetes was fairly common knowledge. On at least one occasion prior to Respondent’s statement, the alarm on T.L.’s insulin pump went off during class. Respondent asked the class whether the sound was a cell phone, to which T.L. replied “Oh, that is my pump, sorry,” and turned the alarm off. T.L. carried the pump in her pocket, and she testified that the other students “probably just thought I had something weird in my pocket, but didn’t really know what it was.” T.L.’s mother testified that “her tubing was usually visible, depending on what she was wearing.” Finally, the topic of T.L.’s award-winning science project was the effect of contaminants at the site of a finger stick when testing one’s blood for glucose. While there was no evidence that T.L.’s diabetes was the subject of a general announcement, or that it was a topic of particular concern amongst her peers, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that it was unlikely that her condition was unknown to those in her class. The comment that forms the basis for the Administrative Complaint, though related to the class lesson plan, was inappropriate and unnecessary. Despite the fact that T.L.’s diabetes was not unknown to her peers, Respondent’s act of using her as an example was embarrassing to her. Respondent’s testimony that his use of T.L. as an example of an unchecked diabetic reaction was purely happenstance is not plausible. The evidence is convincing that Respondent was well aware of T.L.’s diabetes, and used her as an example of someone who had the condition that was the topic of discussion. However, there was no evidence that Respondent made the statement maliciously, or with the intent to embarrass or humiliate T.L. Prior to the incident in question, T.L., along with other students, used her telephone with Respondent’s permission in his class after completing Florida Writes testing, and Snapchatted a video to a friend. That became known when the friend asked Respondent why students in her later class period could not use their phones in similar circumstances. Respondent verbally admonished both T.L. and her friend, with his primary concern seeming to be that he could get in trouble for having allowed his first-period students to use their phones in class. T.L. was not written up for the incident, and there was no adverse effect on her grades. On March 5, 2014, Respondent received a letter of reprimand from Sims Middle regarding the incident of allowing students to use telephones in class. Although the incident that forms the basis for the Administrative Complaint occurred on March 6, 2014, there is insufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between the two. The suggestion that the incident in question was retaliation, or was otherwise precipitated by the Snapchat incident, is not accepted. On March 28, 2014, Respondent received a letter of reprimand from Sims Middle for the incident in question. Other than the two reprimands described herein, both having been issued in the span of little more than three weeks, he had not been the subject of any previous disciplinary actions during his eleven-year period of employment with the Santa Rosa County School District. There was no evidence that T.L.’s mental health was actually affected by the incident. The testimony of T.L. and her mother is evidence that she was, and remains, a bright, articulate, well-adjusted, straight-A student. However, rule 6A-10.081(3)(a) “does not require evidence that Respondent actually harmed [T.L.]'s health or safety. Rather, it requires a showing that Respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to protect the student from such harm.” Gerard Robinson, as Comm’r of Educ. vs. William Randall Aydelott, Case No. 12-0621PL ¶ 76 (Fla. DOAH Aug. 29, 2012; EPC Dec. 19, 2012). Under the circumstances described herein, Petitioner proved that Respondent, though without specific intent or malice, failed to make reasonable effort to protect T.L. from embarrassment, a condition reasonably contemplated to be harmful to her mental health pursuant to rule 6A-10.081(3)(a).
Recommendation Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent violated rule 6A-10.081(3)(a). It is further recommended that Respondent be issued a reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2016.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Section 231.2615, Florida Statutes (2000), and Rule 6B-1.006, Florida Administrative Code, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds Florida Educator Certificate No. 711503, covering the areas of elementary education, varying exceptionalities, and pre-kindergarten handicapped. Respondent's certificate was valid at all times material to this proceeding. Respondent began teaching in 1995. There have been no complaints against Respondent prior to the allegations in this case. Over the years, Respondent has attempted to help students over and beyond her classroom duties. On at least two occasions, she temporarily has taken students into her home in time of need. Flagler County School Board employed Respondent as an exceptional student education (ESE) teacher at Flagler Palm Coast High School (FPC) in the Flagler County School District during the 2000-2001 school year. That school term was her first year on the faculty at FPC. J.E. was a 17 year-old male student who attended FPC during the 2000-2001 school year. J.E. was classified as an 11th-grade ESE student because he suffered from attention deficit disorder. J.E. also worked as a part-time firefighter with the Flagler Beach Fire Department. J.E.'s employment as a firefighter was sponsored by the Boy Scouts of America Explorer Program. At some point during the month of October 2000, J.E. transferred into Respondent's math class. Initially, J.E. was unable to make a passing grade in math due to his learning disability. J.E.'s academic problems were aggravated by several in-school and out-of-school disciplinary suspensions, which caused him to miss class. Toward the end of November or the beginning of December 2000, J.E. was arrested for fighting with his sister. He was in the custody of the juvenile authorities for several days before being placed on juvenile home detention. When J.E. returned to school, Respondent contacted J.E.'s mother, D.B. Respondent requested permission to tutor J.E. after school to help him make up missed assignments. After receiving the approval of the juvenile authority staff, D.B. agreed that Respondent could tutor J.E. Respondent and D.B. agreed that, after each tutoring session, Respondent would transport J.E. to the place where D.B. was employed. Respondent then informed the assistant principal that she would be assisting J.E. after school in her classroom. The tutoring sessions began on December 12, 2000, and lasted for almost two weeks. The sessions terminated when FPC recessed for the holidays. During the tutoring sessions, Respondent and J.E. spent time working on J.E.'s math assignments. However, as time passed, they progressively spent more time discussing personal issues. These conversations included discussions regarding J.E.'s problems and history of abuse, as well as the physical abuse that Respondent experienced during her marriage to her ex-husband. Respondent revealed that she had been molested as a child, a fact that Respondent had shared only with her long-term boyfriend, her sister, and her closest friends. Respondent told J.E. about her two children and her relationship with her boyfriend. At times, Respondent spoke negatively about her boyfriend, referring to him as an "asshole." Respondent and J.E.'s student-teacher relationship became more personal as they spent more time together. J.E. began visiting Respondent during her planning period, during which they would discuss personal issues. Occasionally, J.E. would visit Respondent during her science class even though he was scheduled to be in another class. The personal conversations continued during the time that J.E. waited in Respondent's car for his mother at the school bus compound, sometimes for 20 to 30 minutes. Prior to one tutoring session, Respondent allowed J.E. to ride with her to a fast-food restaurant. She then took J.E. by the fire station before returning to the school. Respondent did not have anyone's permission to transport J.E. off campus. Sometime before the holiday break, J.E. told Respondent that he liked the music of a certain rap artist. The last day of school before the holiday break, Respondent gave J.E. a gift bag containing a compact disk (CD) of the artist's music. The gift bags that Respondent presented to other students contained only cookies and trinkets. On the afternoon of December 27 or 28, 2000, J.E. invited Respondent to visit the fire station with her children, a 9-year-old son and an 11-year-old daughter. Respondent and her children spent approximately one hour at the station while J.E. showed them the facility and firefighting equipment. Next, J.E. told Assistant Fire Chief Shane Wood (Chief Wood), that he was going to a nearby park with Respondent and her children. He advised Chief Wood that he would return to the station if it received a call. J.E. rode to the park in Respondent's vehicle. Francis Abramczyk, another student firefighter and J.E.'s friend, rode a bike to the park at J.E.'s request. When the group arrived at the park, Respondent asked Mr. Abramczyk to watch her children so she and J.E. could talk in a nearby gazebo. About 45 minutes after Respondent and J.E. left to go to the park, Chief Wood got off from work. Chief Wood then rode his motorcycle to his parent's house near the park. Chief Wood visited his parents for 10-15 minutes before riding his motorcycle to the park where he spoke briefly to J.E. Respondent and J.E. were sitting in the gazebo when Chief Wood came by on his motorcycle Once in the gazebo, Respondent and J.E. spent at least 30 minutes talking about Respondent's recent trip to North Carolina, among other things. During this time, Respondent and J.E. sat side-by-side. At one point in time, Mr. Abramczyk saw Respondent's hand resting on J.E.'s hand, which was resting on his leg. Respondent jerked her hand back when she made eye contact with Mr. Abramczyk, who was retrieving a ball from the far side of the gazebo. While sitting in the gazebo, Respondent asked J.E. if he was willing to baby-sit for her that evening while she went out with a girlfriend. Respondent told J.E. that she would not be returning home until late and suggested that he spend the night at her residence. J.E. did not think his mother would approve of Respondent's suggestion. In the meantime, Mr. Abramczyk decided to walk to a nearby store to get some ice cream. Respondent's son tagged along with Mr. Abramczyk. When Mr. Abramczyk returned to the park, Respondent and J.E. were sitting in Respondent's vehicle. While J.E. was sitting in Respondent's vehicle, two or three girls came to the park in a car. One of the girls was J.E.'s former girlfriend. At first J.E. did not want the girls to see him, but eventually he got out of Respondent's vehicle and talked to Mr. Abramczyk and the girls. During this conversation, J.E. was teased about hanging out with his teacher. Mr. Abramczyk rode the bike back to the fire station after this conversation. At approximately 5:00 p.m., J.E., Respondent, and Respondent's children went back to the fire station. J.E. then called his mother to ask permission to baby-sit for Respondent. D.B. told him that he could baby-sit. In a later conversation between Respondent and D.B., Respondent stated that she would not be home that evening until approximately 2:00 a.m. Respondent asked D.B. if J.E. could spend the night at her residence. D.B. responded negatively, telling Respondent to take J.E. home or to the fire station where there was adult supervision at all times. After leaving the fire station, J.E. rode with Respondent and her children to a convenience store where Respondent purchased soft drinks and snacks for her children. She also purchased several wine coolers for herself. At approximately 6:00 p.m., Respondent, her children, and J.E. arrived at Respondent's residence. J.E. changed out of his work uniform before walking to a nearby beach with Respondent and her children. The children played on the beach and in the clubhouse area while Respondent talked to J.E. During this time, Respondent consumed one of her wine coolers. J.E., Respondent, and her children returned to Respondent's home after spending about an hour at the beach. Next, Respondent prepared dinner for J.E. and her children. She then got dressed to go out while J.E. played video games with the kids in the living room. The evidence is not clear and convincing that Respondent walked out of her bedroom into the living room wearing only a skirt and bra during this time. Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. Respondent left her residence to meet her girlfriend, taking her wine coolers with her. The girlfriend was not at home, so after waiting for a while, Respondent returned to her home between 9:30 and 10:30 p.m. The evidence is not clear and convincing that Respondent was heavily intoxicated when she returned. Respondent's long-term boyfriend was spending time that evening with one of his male friends. The boyfriend usually stayed with Respondent but decided that evening to stay at his separate residence in St. Augustine, Florida, because he had consumed some beer and did not want to risk driving back to Respondent's residence. However, Respondent did not know that the boyfriend would not come to her house later that evening. When Respondent returned to her residence, her children were asleep and J.E. did not want to go home. Without checking with J.E.'s mother, Respondent decided to let J.E. stay. J.E. listened to music in Respondent's bedroom while she straightened up the house and did the laundry. Respondent took time to talk to J.E. and to listen to some music with him. Sometime during the evening, Respondent spoke to her boyfriend on the telephone. During this call, Respondent learned for the first time that her boyfriend probably would not be returning to her home that night. Respondent talked to her boyfriend a second time that night from her garage. When she went back into the house, J.E. pretended to be asleep but when Respondent approached him, he sat up and appeared to have been crying. Respondent assumed that J.E. was upset because he was jealous of her boyfriend. The evidence is not clear and convincing that Respondent provided J.E. with alcohol or engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with him while he was in her home. However, Respondent admitted during the hearing that J.E. might have consumed beer kept in her refrigerator while she was gone because she found one beer can in her closet weeks later. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Respondent drove J.E. to the fire station. The lights were off in the station. After waiting a few minutes to see if any of the adult firemen were going to return to the fire station, Respondent drove J.E. home, arriving there between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m. On the way to J.E.'s house, Respondent made J.E. promise not to tell anyone that he baby-sat at her residence. She paid J.E. $20 for baby-sitting. When J.E. got home, his mother was asleep on the couch. D.B. woke up as J.E. entered the house. She did not smell any alcohol on him or see any signs of intoxication. Respondent went with her children to the fire station two days later on December 29, 2000. The purpose of the visit was to return one of J.E.'s CDs that he had left at her house. Respondent visited with J.E. for about 15 minutes. During the visit on December 29, 2000, J.E. appeared upset. He told Respondent that he was worried because a man from his past was about to be released from jail. He also stated that he had been fighting with his mother. J.E. told Respondent that he was afraid the fire chief would not like him having visitors. He wanted Respondent to leave, telling her that he would talk to her later. By the end of December, Respondent knew that the other students were teasing J.E. about their close relationship and that he was embarrassed about the situation. J.E. and Respondent had agreed that they would not continue with the after-school tutoring and that they would not socialize at school or at the fire station. Despite this agreement, Respondent returned to the fire station on December 31, 2000. The purpose of the visit was to give J.E. a six-page handwritten letter that included references to Respondent's personal experiences. Several of J.E.'s friends from FPC were at the fire station when Respondent arrived. When J.E.'s friends told him that Respondent was in the lobby area, he told them he did not want to see her and hid in a back room in an effort to avoid her. Two of J.E.'s friends then told Respondent that J.E. was not at the fire station. Respondent started to leave when she realized that her son, who had been waiting in the car, had probably gone into the fire station through the open bay doors. Respondent then went into the station through the bay doors to look for her son. Upon entering the bay, Respondent noticed that J.E. was at work. Instead of asking about her son, Respondent approached J.E. holding the letter. As Respondent walked toward J.E., his friends began to tease him again. J.E. was visibly upset and demanded to know what Respondent was doing at the station. Respondent knew or should have known that she was giving the other students reason to pick on J.E. J.E. was angry and embarrassed by Respondent's presence. He told Respondent to come back later just to hasten her departure. He shredded the letter as soon as she left the station. Notwithstanding J.E.'s extreme displeasure during Respondent's visit, Respondent returned to the fire station later that day about 5:00 p.m. J.E. was not there when Respondent arrived. At that time, Chief Wood told Respondent that J.E. was gone and that she needed to stop visiting him at the station because it did not look right for her to be there "hanging all over J.E." The relationship between J.E. and Respondent dropped off beginning in early January 2001. Shortly after the holidays, J.E. became angry with Respondent. He told her to go screw her boyfriend. Respondent just ignored this comment. On another day during the first week of January, J.E. attempted to leave Respondent's class on a pretext that he was required to go to the school attendance office. J.E. became angry when Respondent would not let him leave the classroom. A short time later, during the same class period, two of J.E.'s friends walked by and looked into the classroom through the window in the door. J.E. noticed his friends, went to the door to speak with them, and asked them to help get him out of class. Respondent again refused to let him leave, causing him to be even more angry. Respondent told J.E. that if he left the class without permission, she would write him up. He then said, "You're gonna write me up? Well, I could do something about that." The first semester ended on January 8, 2001. Although J.E. was failing math in early December, he received a grade of B in Respondent's class for the semester. He then transferred to another teacher's math class for the second semester. After the transfer, J.E.'s grades began to decline again. The other students continued to tease J.E. about Respondent. On or about January 19, 2001, a rumor surfaced that Respondent was pregnant with J.E.'s child. Respondent first learned about the rumor during her science class. The class discussion involved the harmful effect of fumes from spray bottles on the environment and humans. Someone in the class stated that fumes could harm a fetus like Respondent's fetus. Another student said, "Oh, I wonder who the father is." A third student responded, "Oh, it's J.E." The class then began laughing. Respondent made no effort to report the incident to FPC's administrators. Instead, on a day when Respondent was extremely depressed and disillusioned with her career, and when she was feeling "emotionally cheated" and/or "manipulated" by J.E., Respondent wrote J.E. an e-mail message that states as follows: Hi I hope your Term 2 classes are going well so far, and life in general. I heard you're in Mr. Krenichen's class for Algebra now. If you need any help or need a place to escape to you know where to go. I still have 3rd period planning, except for lunch duty 3rd lunch. Even if you still are or stay mad at me forever, I'm still rooting for you to make it. I hope you're staying out of trouble. Well, I just wanted to say hi. I was thinking about you and my kids have been asking about you too. They think you're so cool! Yeah, I guess you're all right most of the time. Ha Ha. I miss you. I miss you talking to me every day most of all. Well, see you around. K. p.s. I also wanted to thank you for keeping your word. Means a lot. Gives me a little bit of hope the whole thing wasn't a lie all along. That helps even if that's all I'll ever have. Well, there's other things I need to talk to you about but don't want to say in an e-mail, so will just let you go now. Bye. Respondent's statement in the e-mail that she hoped J.E. was not still mad at her referred to her refusal to let J.E. leave class. She thanked him for keeping his word about not dropping out of school, not telling anyone that he baby-sat at her home, and not revealing her personal confidences. The e-mail was not specifically romantic in nature but clearly and convincingly evidences an inappropriate personal relationship between Respondent and J.E. After receiving this e-mail, J.E. asked Chief Wood to help him draft a reply that would break off his relationship with Respondent. Chief Wood declined to help but told J.E. he would proofread the message after J.E. wrote it. After reading the e-mail, Chief Wood decided that J.E. had adequately communicated his message to Respondent and did not make any changes. On or about January 24, 2001, a fellow student told J.E. that Respondent had said she was pregnant with J.E.'s child. J.E. became frightened by the false rumor. That same day, J.E. lied to his mother, stating that Respondent had given him alcohol and that, while he was in an intoxicated state, Respondent had forced him to have sexual intercourse on the night that he visited her home. D.B. immediately contacted the sheriff's office. On January 26, 2001, the principal of FPC confronted Respondent with J.E.'s allegations regarding the alcohol and sexual misconduct. During this conversation, Respondent stated that she wished she had never had J.E. baby-sit in her home. She admitted that her relationship with J.E. was inappropriate. Respondent immediately drafted and submitted her resignation effective February 6, 2001, the day of the next scheduled school board meeting. Following Respondent's resignation, J.E. continued to endure severe teasing at the hands of his classmates. Some students referred to J.E. as a "teacher fucker." Understandably, such comments caused J.E. a great deal of stress. J.E. eventually dropped out of FPC and entered the adult education program, where he admitted to one student that he did not have sex with Respondent. He told the student that he wished he could take it all back. Respondent is now employed in a real estate office.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That EPE enter a final order suspending Respondent's certificate for two years followed by five years of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary F. Aspros, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Matthew K. Foster, Esquire Brooks, Leboef, Bennett & Foster, P.A. 863 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Marian Lambeth, Program Specialist Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent violated sections 1012.795(1)(f), (1)(g), and (1)(j), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a), as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Education Practices Commission is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility to revoke or suspend, or take other appropriate action with regard to teaching certificates as provided in sections 1012.795 and 1012.796, Florida Statutes (2016). § 1012.79(7), Fla. Stat. Petitioner, as Commissioner of Education, is charged with the duty to file and prosecute administrative complaints against individuals who hold Florida teaching certificates and who are alleged to have violated standards of teacher conduct. § 1012.796(6), Fla. Stat. Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate 1128573, covering the areas of Elementary Education, English, English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) and Middle Grades Integrated Curriculum, which is valid through June 30, 2021. During the 2013-2014 school year, until her voluntary resignation effective June 3, 2015, Respondent was employed as a language arts teacher at Gulf Breeze High School. Since that time, Respondent has been employed as a third-grade teacher at a private Christian academy in Pensacola, Florida. Material Allegations The material allegations upon which the alleged violations are predicated are, in their entirety, as follows: On or about July 19, 2008, Respondent illegally operated a boat while under the influence of alcohol. As a result of conduct, she was arrested and charged with Boating Under the Influence. On or about February 18, 2009, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of Boating Under the Influence. In or around January 2015 through March 2015, Respondent provided a forum where underage students illegally consumed alcohol and/or consumed alcohol in the presence of students. This conduct includes, but is not limited to, instances: in or around February 2015, wherein Respondent provided alcohol to underage students; and on or about March 20, 2015, when Respondent drove to J.H.'s, a student's, home, while under the influence of alcohol, and thereafter, attempted to drive J.H. while so inebriated. On or about April 24, 2015, Respondent illegally operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. On or about May 26, 2015, as a result of the aforementioned conduct, Respondent was arrested and charged with DUI-Second Conviction More Than Five (5) Years After Prior Conviction. On or about April 7, 2016, Respondent pled nolo contendere to an amended charge of Reckless Driving; adjudication was withheld. Count 1 Count 1 alleged a violation based upon Respondent having “been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of guilty to, regardless of adjudication of guilt, a misdemeanor, felony, or any other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic violation.” The Count was based on the two incidents described in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Amended Administrative Complaint as follows: Boating Under the Influence -- 2008 On or about July 19, 2008, Respondent was maneuvering a boat onto a trailer at the Navarre Beach boat ramp. Her husband was driving their vehicle, and had backed their trailer into the water. As a result of actions at that time, Respondent was placed under arrest for Boating Under the Influence (BUI), a misdemeanor (her husband was arrested for Driving Under the Influence). Respondent entered a plea of no contest to the BUI offense and, on February 18, 2008, was adjudicated guilty. Subsequent to the final hearing, counsel for Petitioner researched the issue and discovered that the incident occurred prior to Respondent’s initial certification as a teacher. As a result, Petitioner correctly concluded and stipulated “that no disciplinary action should be taken as a result of this conviction.” Driving Under the Influence -- 2015 On April 24, 2015, Respondent and a friend drove, in the friend’s car, to Pensacola Beach for drinks. Respondent left her car in a Publix parking lot. Upon their return, Respondent correctly perceived that she was not fit to drive home. Her phone was dead, so she got into her car and started it in order to charge the phone. She called her son and asked that he come pick her up. At some point after calling her son, Respondent called her soon-to-be ex-husband, from whom she was in the process of a bitter divorce, and engaged in a heated and animated discussion with him. A complaint was called in, and Officer Kidd was dispatched to the scene. Upon his arrival, Officer Kidd observed Respondent in her car, with the engine running, “yelling at someone on the phone.” He noticed a bottle of Crown Royal in the center console. Respondent refused to perform field sobriety tasks. Office Kidd’s observations of Respondent while she was in the car and upon her exiting the car led him to believe that she was impaired. Respondent had been in the car, with the engine running, and was clearly in control of the vehicle regardless of her intent to drive. Although Respondent’s son arrived on the scene to take her home, Respondent was arrested and transported to jail.2/ Respondent was charged with DUI. The charges were reduced, and she entered a nolo plea to reckless driving. The trial judge withheld adjudication. Count 2 Count 2 alleged a violation based upon Respondent having “been found guilty of personal conduct that seriously reduces that person’s effectiveness as an employee of the district school board.” The Count was based on the incidents described in paragraph 4 of the Amended Administrative Complaint. March 20, 2015 -- The Garage On or about March 20, 2015, over spring break, Joshua Hartley was at Pensacola Beach with friends, including Respondent’s son. He had his father’s car. Apparently, Joshua’s father, Jon Hartley had been trying for some time to reach Joshua and have him return the car. Joshua and his group of friends had plans to stay at the beach into the evening. Respondent’s son suggested that Respondent, who he knew to be at the beach, could follow Joshua home, and then return him to his friends at the beach. Respondent was called, and she followed Joshua from the beach to his house, a drive of perhaps 15 minutes. When Joshua and Respondent arrived at the house, Mr. Hartley, Ms. Barrett, and a third man were sitting and drinking in the open garage. Other than agreement that Respondent and Joshua showed up at the house at the same time, the description of the events by Joshua Hartley, Mr. Hartley, and Ms. Barrett were so divergent that the three might well have been in different places. Ms. Barnett described the incident as occurring between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m., when it was dark. She testified that Joshua and Respondent pulled up in separate vehicles, and that Mr. Hartley initially approved of Joshua returning to the beach with Respondent as a good deed, since Joshua purportedly indicated that “she’s really drunk.” She indicated that Joshua got into the passenger seat of Respondent’s vehicle, whereupon Respondent put the vehicle in gear, and lurched forward, almost hitting Mr. Hartley’s vehicle. At that time, Ms. Barrett indicated that Mr. Hartley ran down, startled by the driving error, told Joshua that he could not go with her, and offered to let Respondent stay with them until she sobered up. Ms. Barrett further described Respondent as essentially falling out of her bathing suit, barefoot, staggering, with slurred and vulgar speech, and highly intoxicated. After about an hour, and as Respondent was preparing to leave, Ms. Barnett testified that Joshua, who had remained with the adults in the garage since his arrival, went to his room. Ms. Barnett testified that Respondent then excused herself to use the restroom. Ms. Barnett testified that after 15 minutes or so, she went inside, and found Respondent “exiting Joshua’s bedroom.” Her description of the event is not accepted, and her veiled insinuation that something improper occurred -- for which no evidence exists -- did not go unnoticed. Mr. Hartley described the incident as occurring between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. He testified that Joshua and Respondent arrived at the house in Respondent’s car with Joshua as the passenger. He was “positive” that Joshua was not driving because he was 15 years old and did not have a driver’s license. When they pulled into the driveway, Mr. Hartley testified that he walked down to the vehicle and that Joshua got out of the car. Mr. Hartley was unsure if Joshua stayed in the garage at all, but at most went to his room after a matter of minutes. Respondent joined the adults in the garage. Mr. Hartley indicated that Respondent “looked like she had been at the beach” and, though her speech was not slurred, he could tell she had been drinking because he could smell alcohol and by “the way she was speaking.” His description of Respondent was far from the florid state of intoxication as described by Ms. Barnett. Mr. Hartley offered no description of Respondent’s vehicle lurching forward, Respondent staggering, or of Joshua asserting that Respondent was really drunk. Finally, his concern that “the grown, intoxicated woman [as described by counsel in his question] was in your 15 year old son’s bedroom” was based solely on Ms. Barnett’s description of what she claimed to have seen. Joshua testified that he drove to his house in his father’s black Lincoln Aviator, and that Respondent followed in her white Ford Expedition. It was daylight, around 4:00 in the afternoon. Upon their arrival, Respondent pulled onto the grass next to the driveway. Mr. Hartley was mad, possibly about Joshua having the car, would not let him return to the beach, and sent him to his room within a minute of his arrival. Joshua testified that Respondent was in typical beach attire. He had no complaint as to Respondent’s actions either at the beach or at his house, and did not see her drinking. He did, however, indicate that “they” told him that “she might have been drunk or something.” He testified that after Respondent spent some time with the adults in the garage, she then went inside to use the restroom. Joshua’s door was open, and Respondent stood at the door and apologized if she had gotten him into trouble. She then left. Given the dramatic divergence in the stories of the witnesses, the evidence is not clear and convincing that anything untoward occurred when Respondent agreed to give Joshua a ride to his house to return his father’s car, and offered to return him to his friends at the beach. Though credible evidence suggests that Respondent had alcohol on her breath, there was no evidence that she was “under the influence of alcohol,” that she was not able to lawfully drive a vehicle, or that Joshua suspected that she had been drinking. Ms. Barrett’s more dramatic testimony that Respondent was drunk and staggering, falling out of her clothes, with her speech slurred and profane, and the intimation that she was in Joshua’s bedroom in that condition, is not accepted. The evidence adduced at the hearing was not clear and convincing that, on March 20, 2017, Respondent engaged in personal conduct that seriously reduced her effectiveness as an employee of the district school board. February 15, 2015 -- Mardi Gras There was a good bit of evidence and testimony taken that Petitioner was seen drunk and staggering down the street at the 2015 Pensacola Mardi Gras, and was seen and assisted by students in that condition. However, the basis for the Amended Administrative Complaint was not that Respondent was publically intoxicated, but that she “provided alcohol to underage students.” Pensacola has a Mardi Gras event with a parade and floats. In 2015, “Fat Tuesday” was on February 17. The big 2015 Mardi Gras parade was on Sunday, February 15. Respondent had a group of friends that were in a Mardi Gras Krewe and she had been helping them with the float. She apparently drank a good bit. By the time her friends were ready to join the parade, around noon to 1:00 p.m., Respondent determined that she was drunk enough that she should go to the hotel room the group had rented. Unlike the evidence for the “Garage” incident, the evidence was convincing that Respondent was very intoxicated. Ms. Smith testified that Respondent joined a group of alumni and students at a Subway parking lot where they had gathered to watch the parade. The evidence is persuasive that Respondent came upon the scene by happenstance, and that the parking lot was not her destination. While there, Respondent very likely consumed one or more “Jello-shots.” However, the suggestion that Respondent was in any condition to have brought the Jello-shots with her to the parking lot is rejected. Rather, the evidence supports that the shots were there, and that she partook. It would not have been out of character for Respondent to have taken them and handed them around. Furthermore, the testimony that Respondent was distributing beers to students is, for the same reason, simply not plausible. After a while, Ms. Smith, followed but not assisted by Mr. Brayton, assisted Respondent to her hotel. Respondent was, by this time, in a state colloquially known as “falling-down drunk.” She could not walk unassisted, and at one point laid down on a picnic table. It was at this time that Respondent and Ms. Smith were photographed, a picture that received some circulation. Ms. Smith finally delivered Respondent to her hotel, where Respondent’s son saw them and relieved Ms. Smith of any further duties. Mr. Brayton’s testimony that he thereafter entered Respondent’s hotel room was not supported by Ms. Smith or others. His testimony regarding Respondent’s son and his friends at the hotel was not clear and convincing. January 2015 -- The House Party Amelia Smith testified to an alleged incident in the fall of 2014 in which she was at Respondent’s house and students were having a party in the garage at which students were drinking. There was no allegation in the Amended Administrative Complaint as to any event in the fall of 2014. Ms. Klisart testified to an incident involving students drinking at Respondent’s house around the Martin Luther King holiday, which in 2015 was on January 19. That corresponds to Petitioner’s statement that she returned to her house after an evening celebrating her birthday,3/ to find her son and his friends having a party in the garage at which students were drinking. The allegation in the Amended Administrative Complaint that Respondent provided a forum where underage students illegally consumed alcohol in January 2015 was adequately pled. The evidence supports a finding that Respondent had been drinking when she arrived at her house. The evidence is not clear and convincing that she joined the students in the garage, but she clearly knew the party was ongoing, that it involved high school students, that the students were drinking, and that she made no effort to put a halt to the party. Notoriety of the Incidents The evidence is clear and convincing that the incidents described herein were widely known by students at Gulf Breeze High School, by other teachers, and by the school administration. Counts 3 and 4 Count 3 alleges that “Respondent has violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession prescribed by State Board of Education rules.” Count 4 alleges “that Respondent has failed to make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to student's mental health and/or physical health and/or safety.” Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a) “does not require evidence that Respondent actually harmed [a student’s] health or safety. Rather, it requires a showing that Respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to protect the student from such harm.” Gerard Robinson, as Comm’r of Educ. v. William Randall Aydelott, Case No. 12-0621PL, RO at 76 (Fla. DOAH Aug. 29, 2012; EPC Dec. 19, 2012). Under the circumstances described herein, Petitioner proved that Respondent, by allowing, if not condoning, student drinking at her home in January 2015, failed to make reasonable effort to protect students from harm.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent violated sections 1012.795(1)(g) and (1)(j), and rule 6A- 10.081(3)(a). It is further recommended that Respondent be placed on probation for a period of five years, and be required to obtain treatment through the Recovery Network Program at a frequency and for a duration deemed appropriate by the Education Practices Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2017.
Findings Of Fact THIS CAUSE comes on for consideration based upon the Petition for Determination of the Invalidity of the existing Rules 6A-14.416 and 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code, for allegedly being in violation of the provisions of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petition was filed on September 22, 1978 and the hearing was conducted on October 20, 1978. The hearing rises out of the collateral Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes hearing in which an administrative complaint had been filed under the guise of Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code, (in addition to certain statutory authority) against the current Petitioner, Gregory Bruce Nelson. During the course of that hearing it developed that Gregory Bruce Nelson, through his affirmative defenses to the Complaint, wished to challenge Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code for alleged violation of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. In response to that challenge, the Section 120.57(1) hearing, (which is reported as Lee G. Henderson, as Director of the Division of Community Colleges, Petitioner, vs. Gregory Bruce Nelson, Respondent, DOAH Case Number 78-283), has been stayed pending the outcome of the case sub judice. An order was entered by the undersigned allowing for sufficient time to file the Section 120.56, Florida Statutes challenge to Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code and Mr. Nelson has complied with the terms and conditions of that order as to timeliness of the Petition for review pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Concurrently, Mr. Nelson has availed himself of the opportunity to submit a challenge to Rule 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code. The issue of consideration of the validity of Rules 6A-14.416 and 6A- 14.417, Florida Administrative Code, is properly joined and will be determined. Respondents moved to strike certain portions of the Petition at the commencement of the hearing and the motion was granted as to paragraphs 3(f), (g) and paragraph 4(d) and a portion of paragraph 5, beginning with the words ".... deprivation to Nelson of due process of law..." to the conclusion of said paragraph 5. In addition, the clause containing the Petitioner's prayer for relief was stricken in its language, "and directing Respondents to dismiss Case No. 78-283 with prejudice." An additional motion was made to strike the name of Lee G. Henderson, as Director of the Division of Community Colleges as a named Respondent. In view of the fact that the Director of the Division of Community Colleges is not responsible for the promulgation of rules and regulations of the State Board of Education, he is hereby deleted and stricken as a party Respondent. The Petitioner, Gregory Bruce Nelson, is an employee of the Florida Junior College, an institution governed by Chapter 230, Florida Statutes. Nelson holds a certificate issued under the terms and conditions of Rule 6A- 14.415, Florida Administrative Code. The pending Amended Petition for Revocation of Mr. Nelson's teaching certificate makes reference to the substantive basis for action as being found in Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code, and the due process requirements for such revocation or suspension of the Petitioner's teaching certificate are ostensibly found in Rule 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner's attack on the rules in question falls into two broad categories. The first category concerns the procedural requirements for the adoption of the rules and the second category is a contention on the part of the petitioner that the rules, as adopted, constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The rules were adopted under the requirements of the then Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The adoption took place on December 3, 1974 and the rules became effective and operative on December 19, 1974. The controlling requirements for such adoption and effect and operation may be found in the former Administrative Procedures Act in operation in December 1974. Specifically, those provisions were Section 120.031 and Section 120.041,Florida Statutes. The Respondent in this cause met all conditions for the adoption of rules in terms of procedural requirements set forth in the aforementioned sections of the former Administrative Procedures Act. This can be determined by an examination of the Respondent's Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence which is a certified copy from the State of Florida, Department of State, of the promulgation and adoption of the rules in question on December 3, 1974, and of the filing of the rules with the Department of State on December 10, 1974, to become effective on the next day, December 19, 1974. Moreover, the rules were adopted by a public hearing which was noticed through publication in four newspapers of general circulation in the State of Florida on dates 10 to 30 days before the public hearing of December 3, 1974. Copies of the advertisements used in giving the notice may be found as the Respondent's Composite Exhibit #2, admitted into evidence. In view of the fact that the rules were adopted in accordance with the procedures set forth in the former Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and were adopted by a public hearing properly noticed, it was not necessary to comply with the conditions of the new Administrative Procedures Act, Laws of Florida 1974, Chapter 74-310, which became effective January 1, 1975. In particular, this refers to the requirements set forth in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and Section 120.72, Florida Statutes, pertaining to Laws of Florida 1974, Chapter 74-310, effective January 1, 1975. Therefore, the Petitioner's claim of procedural violations as a basis for overturning Rules 6A-14.416 and 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code, is not well founded. The remaining question is whether or not the rules on their face constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of the current Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Turning to a consideration of the Respondent's Exhibit 41, it can be seen that in adopting and promulgating 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code, the State Board of Education made reference to Section 230.755, Florida Statutes as their general statement of authority and to the fact that the law being implemented was Section 230.759, Florida Statutes. Those provisions use the following language: "Section 230.755, Minimum standards for community colleges.-- The state board shall prescribe minimum standards which must be met before a community college is organized, acquired or operated, and which will assure that the purposes of the community college are attained. * * * Section 230.759 Employment of community college personnel.-- Employment of all personnel in each community college shall be upon recommendation of the president, subject to rejection for cause by the board of trustees and subject to the rules and regulations of the state board relative to certification, tenure, leaves of absence of all types, including sabbaticals, remuneration, and such other conditions of employment as the division of community colleges deems necessary and proper; and to policies of the board of trustees not incon- sistent with law." Section 230.755, Florida Statutes, is a general statement establishing minimum standards for the organization, acquisition or operation of the various community colleges in the state. it does not create legislative authority for the relocation or suspension of the teaching certificates of those individuals who are employed in the community college system In the State of Florida. Section 230.759, Florida Statutes prescribes the method by which individuals may be hired by the community college. However, that provision is not sufficiently broad enough in its language to authorize procedures for the revocation or suspension of the teaching certificates of those personnel employed by the community college in the State of Florida. One other background item should be examined in discussing the authority for promulgating Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code. As was noted in the course of the hearing, the published accounts of Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code contains a reference to Section 229,053(1), Florida Statutes, which was not found in the rule as originally filed with the State of Florida, Department of State. Consequently, it may be argued that Section 229.053(1), Florida Statutes, may not be utilized in supporting the promulgation and adoption of rules 6A-14.416, Florida Statutes, because it was left out of the official Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code, filed with the Department of State. That provision, Section 229.053, Florida Statutes, reads as follows: Section 229.053 General powers of state board.-- The state board of education is the chief policy-making and coordinating body of public education in Florida. It has the general powers to determine, adopt or prescribe such policies, rules, regulations, or standards as are required by law or as it may find necessary for the improvement of the state system of public education. Except as otherwise provided herein it may, as it shall find appropriate, delegate its general powers to the commissioner of education or the directors of the divisions of the department. " Assuming for purposes of argument that Section 229.053(1), Florida Statutes may be properly attributed to Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code, as an attempted statement of authority for the exercise of the powers found in the subject rule, the provision Section 229.053(1), Florida Statutes, could not authorize the exercise of the powers found in that rule; which rule attempts to allow for the revocation or suspension of a teaching certificate held by a member of a staff of the community college in the State of Florida. Section 229.053(1), Florida Statutes is a general statement of the powers of the state board of education, only. No other provisions of Chapter 230, Florida Statutes, were offered in support of Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code. Nonetheless, a review of Part II of Chapter 230, Florida Statutes, dealing with community colleges, in existance at the time that the rule was adopted and promulgated, does not reveal any provision of that Part which would allow for the adoption of rules pertaining to penalties against the holders of certificates to teach in the community colleges of the State of Florida. Consequently, Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, and is invalid in its entirety. Rule 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code, is a due process statement of procedure to implement the provisions of Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code. Again, it has as its statement of authority found in the Respondent's Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence, the then existing provisions of Sections 230.755 and 230.759, Florida Statutes. That statement of authority is also found in the published compilation of rules made by the Department of State. For the reason that there exists no statement in Chapter 230, Florida Statutes, as it existed at the time that the Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code was promulgated, that allows penalties to be placed against the certificate held by the community college teachers, there is likewise no authority to establish procedures for undertaking a consideration of probable cause to revoke or suspend and the subsequent hearing on revocation or suspension. The rationale in reaching this opinion is the same as was utilized in the consideration of Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code. Therefore, Rule 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes and the entire language of Rule 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code is invalid.
