The Issue The primary issue in this case is whether, as the district school board alleges, a teacher used inappropriate force against one or more students; if the allegations of wrongdoing are proved to be true, then it will be necessary to decide whether the school board has just cause to impose a ten-day suspension without pay on the teacher as punishment.
Findings Of Fact The Palm Beach County School Board ("School Board"), Petitioner in this case, is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Palm Beach County Public School System. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Zedrick Barber ("Barber") was employed as a history teacher at Howell L. Watkins Middle School in Palm Beach Gardens, a position which he had held for the preceding eight years. This case arises from two separate incidents, which occurred in the spring of 2014. In both situations, the School Board alleges, Barber used inappropriate force against a student. Barber acknowledges that he made physical contact with a student on each occasion but claims that he did so——reasonably under the circumstances——to prevent harm to the student, other students, and himself. As Barber is the only person having personal knowledge of the events in question who testified at hearing, the evidence supports his accounts. The findings below are based on Barber's testimony and statements concerning the incidents. The earlier episode occurred on February 5, 2014. On that day, a girl in Barber's class named D.G. became angry at the boy sitting behind her because he kept placing his feet on the back of her chair. Attempting to discourage him from continuing to annoy her in this manner, D.G. began punching the boy's legs. He refused to budge, however, which merely increased D.G.'s frustration. She grew increasingly loud and disruptive, causing Barber to intervene. He instructed D.G. to stop hitting the boy, and she calmed down. Before long, though, D.G. resumed punching the boy. Barber directed D.G. to place a chair just outside the classroom door and sit there, where Barber could keep an eye on her. This upset D.G., who shoved a book in Barber's direction, which fell from her desk to the floor. D.G. then rose from her seat. Instead of obeying Barber's instruction to relocate, D.G. turned her back on the teacher and started pushing her desk toward the boy who had aggravated her. At this point, Barber stepped in to prevent D.G. from overturning the desk and hurting the boy. He reached out and grabbed D.G.'s belt loop, pulling her towards himself. D.G. broke free and ran out of the room. She was later returned to Barber's classroom and finished the day without further incident. Under the circumstances, Barber's de minimis contact with D.G.'s person constituted a reasonable effort to protect D.G. and others from personal injury or conditions harmful to learning. The second incident took place on March 31, 2014. J.T. entered Barber's classroom that day brandishing a blister pack of pills and bragging that he had drugs. Barber told J.T. to sit down, for the students would be taking a quiz. During the quiz, J.T. became disruptive, jumping up and exclaiming that he needed to leave, to take his pills. Barber, who had not received any notice that J.T. had a legitimate reason to take medication while in school, reasonably refused to let J.T. out of class to ingest pills, the nature of which Barber was unaware. Barber instructed J.T. to take a seat and finish his assignment. J.T., however, continued to misbehave, demanding to take the pills. Barber made a gesture which signaled that he would push the classroom "panic button" to call for assistance if J.T. persisted in making trouble. This did not deter J.T., who stood up defiantly. Barber feared he might bolt for the door and moved to block J.T.'s exit. As Barber walked toward the door, J.T. charged the teacher. J.T. stumbled as he drew near to Barber, striking him in the chest with both fists as he fell forward. Barber held J.T.'s arms, pinning them against the student's sides, while asking J.T. to calm down. J.T. screamed, "Let me go!" J.T. struggled to escape and began kicking Barber repeatedly. While restraining J.T. in an embrace-like hold to prevent the student from assaulting him or others, Barber pressed the panic button to summon assistance. A security guard soon arrived and Barber let go of J.T. The student made a sudden movement as if to hit Barber, but the guard quickly took hold of J.T. and removed him from the classroom. Under the circumstances, Barber's physical contact with J.T., which was defensive in nature, constituted a reasonable effort to protect J.T. and others (including Barber himself) from personal injury or conditions harmful to learning.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order exonerating Barber of all charges brought against him in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Jean Marie Middleton, Esquire School District of Palm Beach County Office of General Counsel 3300 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-323 Post Office Box 19239 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-9239 (eServed) Mark S. Wilensky, Esquire Dubiner and Wilensky, LLC 1200 Corporate Center Way, Suite 200 Wellington, Florida 33414-8594 (eServed) Dr. Robert Avossa, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3300 Forest Hill Boulevard, C-316 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 (eServed) Pam Stewart, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Polk County School Board (Petitioner) has just cause for terminating the employment of Respondent, David McCall.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was employed by the Petitioner under a professional services contract as a classroom teacher at Lake Region High School, a unit of the Polk County Public School System. On Wednesday, October 3, 2007, a student entered the Respondent’s classroom approximately ten minutes after class had commenced. The student’s tardiness was apparently related to her participation as a donor in a blood drive occurring at the school on that date. At the time the student entered the classroom, the Respondent was engaged in administering a standard quiz, and the time allotted for the quiz was about to end. The Respondent directed the student to remain outside the classroom and take the quiz. The student advised the Respondent that she donated blood and, feeling dizzy, had hit her foot on a doorway. She told the Respondent that she injured her toe and requested that she be allowed to go to the school clinic. The Petitioner presented a statement allegedly written by the student asserting that her toe was bleeding at the time the Respondent observed the toe. The student did not testify, and the written statement is insufficient to establish that the toe was bleeding at the time she entered the classroom. The Respondent testified that he observed the toe and saw perhaps a minor abrasion but saw no evidence of serious injury. The Respondent declined to refer the student to the clinic and again instructed the student to remain outside the classroom and complete the quiz. The student remained outside the classroom and presumably began taking the quiz. Shortly thereafter, another teacher walking in the hallway observed the student sitting outside the Respondent’s classroom with a paper towel under her foot. The teacher observed the student shaking and blood on the towel and asked the student about the situation. The student advised the teacher of the circumstances, stating that she felt like she was going to “pass out.” The teacher, with the assistance of a third teacher, obtained a wheelchair, retrieved the student’s belongings from the Respondent’s classroom, and advised the Respondent that the student was being taken to the clinic. After the student was transported to the clinic, her mother was called. The mother came to the school and retrieved her daughter, observing that the toe was bloody and swollen. The mother subsequently took her daughter to a doctor and testified that the student was referred for x-rays of the injured toe. Later on October 3, 2007, the student’s mother contacted the school principal, Joel McGuire, to inquire as to the manner in which the matter had been handled by the Respondent. The principal advised the mother he would follow up on her inquiry. On Thursday morning, October 4, 2007, Principal McGuire sent an email to the Respondent and asked him to come to Principal McGuire’s office during a planning period or after 2:30 p.m. “to confirm some information” about the student. The Respondent did not respond to the email and did not comply with Principal McGuire’s request to meet at that time. After receiving no response from the Respondent, Principal McGuire left a copy of the email in the Respondent’s mailbox at approximately 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, October 4, 2007, with a handwritten note asking the Respondent to come to the principal’s office on the following Friday morning “before school.” The Respondent did not respond to the note left in the mailbox and did not appear at the principal’s office prior to the start of Friday classes. Based on the lack of response, Principal McGuire sent another email to the Respondent on Friday, October 5, 2007, and asked him to come to the principal’s office at 6:30 a.m. on Monday. The email advised that the meeting was “to discuss the situation which occurred on Wednesday, October 3rd” so that the principal could respond to the mother’s inquiry. Although the Respondent was routinely present on the school campus by 6:30 a.m. on school days, the Respondent replied to the principal and declined to meet at that time, stating that the “proposed meeting time is not within my contracted hours.” The principal thereafter emailed the Respondent and requested that he come to the principal’s office at 10:30 a.m. on Monday, October 8, 2007. The email stated as follows: Mother is really needing information concerning the situation which took place in your class. I do need to meet with you and provide a response to her. I believe 10:30 a.m. is during your planning period. Thanks for coming by my office. The principal received no response to this email and the October 8, 2007, meeting did not occur. The principal thereafter sent a letter to the Respondent dated October 12, 2007, which stated as follows: I am requesting a meeting with you Monday, October 15, 2007, at 8:00 a.m. I will provide a substitute in your classroom in order for you to meet with me. The meeting will be very brief. I need some information about [student], a student you had in 2nd period geometry, in order to inform her mother. This is the sixth request for a meeting. Failure to comply with my request will be deemed insubordination and will require additional actions. The Respondent attended the meeting, but refused to provide any information, stating, “I am not going to respond to you.” By letter dated October 22, 2007, the Respondent received a written reprimand for his “refusal to assist in the investigation of an incident involving [student] on October 3, 2007." The letter advised that the first step of progressive discipline, a verbal warning, was being omitted because of the “seriousness of your actions and the possible consequences.” In relevant part, the letter provided as follows: Attached to this letter is my memorandum setting forth the events and facts as I have best been able to determine. As indicated, you have been uncooperative in our effort to investigate the facts surrounding this incident. Most significantly, when we were finally able to meet in my office on October 15, 2007, you refused to discuss the circumstances surrounding [student’s] situation and you stated specifically, “I am not going to respond to you.” This situation involved an injured student and our school’s response to that incident. Your refusal to assist or participate in the investigation is contrary to your obligation as a teacher to respond suitably to issues of a student’s health and welfare, is adverse to the school’s obligation to address concerns of the parents, and is completely contrary to your obligations as an employee of the Polk County School Board. Please understand that this letter of reprimand is addressed solely to your refusal to participate, cooperate or assist in the investigation of this incident. Should the outcome of the investigation indicate that your conduct in dealing with the student was inappropriate, I am reserving the right to request further disciplinary action by the Superintendent. Please note that a suspension without pay is the next step in progressive discipline as set forth in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. In conclusion, the letter directed the Respondent to prepare a signed “full written report” of the incident, including “your recollections and observation of the events and your justification for your actions you took in response to this incident.” The letter directed the Respondent to deliver the report within five days of the Respondent’s receipt of the letter and, further, stated that “refusal to take such action and to cooperate in the investigation may have serious consequences regarding your employment.” The memorandum attached to the letter provided a chronology of events identifying all participants and specifically referencing the principal’s multiple attempts to obtain information from the Respondent. The Respondent failed to provide the written statement as required by the October 22, 2007, letter of reprimand and failed to otherwise provide information to the Petitioner. By letter dated November 15, 2007, from Principal McGuire to Superintendent Dr. Gail McKinzie, the principal requested that the superintendent issue a five-day suspension without pay to the Respondent for “gross insubordination.” The letter misidentified the date of the incident as October 4, 2007. By letter dated November 29, 2007, the superintendent suspended the Respondent without pay for five days. The letter, repeating the misidentification of the date of the incident, stated in relevant part as follows: On October 4, 2007, you denied a student’s request to go to the school clinic. It was determined that the student had a broken toe. Your administrator, Joel McGuire, has made six verbal requests and two written requests for information on this incident. The last request was made on October 22, 2007, in a formal letter of reprimand which stated “your refusal to take such action and to cooperate in this investigation may have serious consequence for your employment. This recommendation for a five day suspension without pay is provided for in Article IV section 4.4-1 of the Teacher Collective Bargaining Agreement and is a result of your continued insubordination and refusal to follow the requests of your immediate supervisor. Please be advised that future incidents of this nature may result in additional disciplinary action. The letter of suspension advised the Respondent that the suspension would be in effect from December 5 through 7, 10, and 11, 2007, and that he should report back to work on December 12, 2007. The Respondent served the suspension without pay. In a letter dated December 13, 2007 (“Subject: October 4, 2007, incident”), from Principal McGuire, the Respondent was advised as follows: I have made repeated verbal and written requests from you for your explanation of the events in which you participated on October 4, 2007, involving a student requiring medical attention. This is my final request to you for a written explanation of those events. You are herby directed to report to my office at 10:30 a.m. on Monday, December 17, 2007, and you are instructed to have with you at that time a written explanation of the events in question. You shall also be prepared to answer any questions regarding what occurred on that day and the actions you took. You should not have any classes at that time, but I will provide coverage for you if for any reason that is required. Please understand that this is a very serious matter, and you have previously received a five day disciplinary suspension. The next step in progressive discipline is termination, and insubordination can be just cause for termination. I hope that you will conduct yourself appropriately, if you wish to remain an employee of the Polk County School Board. On December 17, 2007, the Respondent appeared at the principal’s office at the appointed time, but asserted that he had not been involved in any incident on October 4, 2007, and declined to otherwise provide any information. Although the date of the incident, October 3, 2007, had been misidentified as October 4, 2007, in the referenced series of letters, there is no evidence that the Respondent was unaware of the specific event about which the information was being sought. It is reasonable to presume that the Respondent was fully aware of the matter being reviewed by Principal McGuire. In response to the December 17, 2007, meeting, Principal McGuire issued a letter dated December 18, 2007 (“Subject: October 3, 2007, incident”), essentially identical in most respects to the December 13, 2007, letter and correcting the referenced date. The letter scheduled another meeting for 10:30 a.m. on December 19, 2007. On December 19, 2007, the Respondent appeared at the principal’s office at the appointed time and declined to answer any questions, stating that he was invoking his rights under the Constitutions of the State of Florida and the United States of America. By letter to Superintendent McKinzie dated January 2, 2008, Principal McGuire recommended termination of the Respondent’s employment. Principal McGuire restated the chronology of the October 3, 2007, incident and wrote as follows: I have made repeated verbal and written requests of Mr. McCall to provide an explanation of the circumstances in order to include them in our investigation of the events. He refused to comply with each of those requests. He received a formal letter of reprimand and a five-day suspension without pay for his gross insubordination. Since his suspension, I have made written requests of Mr. McCall to provide an explanation of those events, and he has blatantly refused to do so. By letter also dated January 2, 2008, Superintendent McKinzie notified the Respondent that he was being suspended with pay and that she would recommend to the full school board that his employment be terminated. The letter set forth the grounds for the termination as follows: Since the incident on October 3, 2007, you have refused repeated verbal and written requests by the school administration to provide an explanation of the events which occurred on that date or to otherwise participate in the investigation of those events. As a result of your refusal to provide an explanation or participate in the investigation, you have received a formal written reprimand and a five-day suspension without pay. Since your suspension, you have again refused specific requests by your principal to provide an explanation of these events. Based on these facts, it is my opinion that you have intentionally violated the Principles of Professional Conduct of the Education in Florida by failing to make reasonable efforts to protect a student from conditions harmful to learning and/or the student's mental and/or physical health and/or safety (Rule 6B-1.006 FAC). Further you have engaged in ongoing, gross insubordination by repeatedly refusing to take certain actions which are a necessary and essential function of your position as a School Board employee. Progressive discipline, as specified in the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement, has been followed in this case, and the next step of progressive discipline is termination. Therefore, it is my conclusion that "just cause" exists for your termination as an employee of the Polk County School Board. The Respondent requested a formal administrative hearing to challenge the termination, and the Petitioner referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Prior to the instant hearing, the Respondent made no effort to provide any information to the Petitioner regarding the events of October 3, 2007.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order terminating the employment of David McCall. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald H. Wilson, Jr., Esquire Boswell & Dunlap, LLP 245 South Central Avenue Post Office Drawer 30 Bartow, Florida 33831 David McCall 3036 Spirit Lake Drive Winter Haven, Florida 33880 Dr. Gail McKinzie, Superintendent Polk County School Board Post Office Box 391 Bartow, Florida 33831-0391 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in the conduct alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges. If so, whether such conduct provides the School Board of Miami-Dade County with just or proper cause to terminate his employment.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The School Board is responsible for the operation, control, and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Respondent is now, and has been since 1986, employed by the School Board as a Data Input Specialist II. Prior to the effective date of his suspension pending the outcome of the instant dismissal proceeding (that is, prior to the close of business on June 21, 2000), Respondent was assigned to the D. A. Dorsey Educational Center (Dorsey), an adult education center. His suspension pending the outcome of the instant dismissal proceeding is the only disciplinary action that has been taken against him in the approximately 15 years he has worked for the School Board. In discharging his duties as a Data Input Specialist II at Dorsey, Respondent was not responsible for supervising students, nor did he have reason to be with them alone. As a noninstructional employee of the School Board occupying a Data Input Specialist II position, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the United Teachers of Dade (Union) and covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School Board and the Union (Union Contract), effective from July 1, 1999, to June 30, 2002. Article XXI, Section 3, of the Union Contract contains "[p]rocedures for [c]ontinued [e]mployment of [e]ducational [s]upport [p]ersonnel." It provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Upon successful completion of the probationary period, the employees' employment status shall continue from year to year, unless the number of employees is reduced on a district-wide basis for financial reasons, or the employee is terminated for just cause. Just cause includes but is not limited to, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, immorality, and/or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Such charges are defined, as applicable, in State Board Rule 6B-4.009. The employee is entitled to be represented by up to two representatives of the Union at any conference dealing with disciplinary action(s). Where the Superintendent recommends termination of the employee, the Board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the termination by notifying the School Board Clerk of the employee's intent to appeal such action within 20 calendar days of receipt of the written notice. Following receipt of an appeal, the Board shall appoint an impartial administrative law judge, who shall set the date and place mutually agreeable to the employee and the Board for the hearing of the appeal. Prior to the hearing, the Board will file and serve the employee with a Specific Notice of Charges. The Board shall set a time limit, at which time the findings of the administrative law judge shall be presented. The findings of the administrative law judge shall not be binding on the Board, and the Board shall retain final authority on all dismissals. The employee shall not be employed during the time of such dismissal, even if appealed. If reinstated by Board action, the employee shall receive payment for the days not worked and shall not lose any seniority or be charged with a break in service due to said dismissal. Dismissals are not subject to the grievance/arbitration procedures. Respondent has a seven-year-old daughter, J. Since his wife passed away in 1994, he has raised J. as a single parent. Four years ago, Respondent opened his home to a 13- year-old boy, D. J. J., whose family had been evicted from the apartment in which they had been living. D. J. J.'s stepmother had just died and his father was unable to properly care for him. From the time that D. J. J. first became a member of Respondent's household until the incident that is the focus of the instant case (Subject Incident), Respondent treated D. J. J. like a son. D. J. J., however, did not always reciprocate and act like a dutiful son. At times, he was rude and disrespectful toward Respondent and refused to follow Respondent's instructions. On three or four occasions prior to the Subject Incident, he even used physical force against Respondent. Respondent responded to these physical attacks, not by hitting D. J. J. back, but with words designed to impress upon D. J. J. that he needed to act appropriately and respect Respondent. While Respondent's words may not have had any long-lasting impact on D. J. J., by talking to D. J. J., Respondent was able to resolve the situation without the use of any force. D. J. J. was also physically aggressive toward Respondent's sister, Sara Payne, and Respondent's niece, Shara Payne. On one occasion, during a visit to Sara's home, D. J. J. asked Sara "to have sex with him." When Sara attempted to get D. J. J. to leave, he refused and grabbed Sara by the arms. Sara, however, was able to free her arms from D. J. J.'s grasp and push D. J. J. out the door. Sara reported to Respondent, prior to the Subject Incident, what had happened during D. J. J.'s visit. Respondent was also made aware, prior to the Subject Incident, of an instance where D. J. J. had walked into his niece's, Shara's, classroom at Miami Northwestern High School, demanded that she leave with him, and, when she refused, pulled her by arm, until a teacher intervened by calling school security. There is no indication that either Sara or Shara suffered any injuries as a result of the above-described incidents. The Subject Incident occurred on September 8, 1999. On that date, D. J. J. was 16 years of age, stood approximately five feet, two inches tall, weighed 160 pounds, 1/ and had a muscular build. Respondent was approximately 25 years older, 13 inches taller, and 40 pounds heavier than D. J. J. Upon returning home from work on September 8, 1999, Respondent reprimanded D. J. J. for not having done his chores around the house. D. J. J., in turn, without saying anything, picked up his house key and headed to the front door "as if he was going to leave." When he saw D. J. J. walking toward the door, Respondent asked D. J. J. for the house key. D. J. J. ignored Respondent's request. He continued walking, silently, toward the door. Respondent followed D. J. J., "sticking close to [D. J. J.] because [Respondent] didn't know [D. J. J.'s] intention." As Respondent repeated his request that D. J. J. hand him the key, D. J. J. went into the kitchen, took a hammer, laid the key down on the counter, and struck the key with the hammer with sufficient force to bend the key. D. J. J. then threw the key to the floor, moved toward Respondent, and struck Respondent in the jaw with a closed fist. After punching Respondent, D. J. J. walked into the living room and picked up a key chain containing Respondent's house and car keys. (Respondent did not have another key to the house.) The front door was locked from the inside 2/ and therefore D. J. J., if he wanted to exit the house (by conventional means), needed the house key to unlock the front door. (All of the house's windows, except for the "safety window," had bars on them, and the safety window was locked, with no key readily available to unlock it.) Concerned that he and his daughter (who was also in the house at the time) might be locked in the apartment if D. J. J. left with the house key, 3/ Respondent repeatedly requested that D. J. J. give him back his keys. Without saying a word, D. J. J. walked into his bedroom and sat down on his bed. Respondent followed him, demanding that D. J. J. return the keys. He told D. J. J., "you can leave and it won't be no trouble, just give me the keys." Maintaining his silence, D. J. J. stood up and started walking toward the bedroom door where Respondent was standing. As D. J. J. approached Respondent, 4/ Respondent took a hot (plugged-in and turned-on) iron that was on a nearby ironing board in the bedroom and struck D. J. J. with the iron in the face, thereby bruising and burning the side of D. J. J.'s face. A scuffle ensued, with D. J. J. trying to take the iron away from Respondent. During the scuffle, Respondent was burned on the leg by the iron, as it fell to the floor. D. J. J. then exited his bedroom and walked into the hallway, with Respondent following behind him. 5/ The hammer that D. J. J. had used to bend his house key was in the hallway. Respondent picked the hammer up and hit D. J. J. on the back of head with it. Neither Respondent's hitting D. J. J. on the back of the head with the hammer, nor Respondent's striking D. J. J. on the side of the face with the hot iron, was reasonably necessary to protect Respondent or his daughter against D. J. J. or to further any other legitimate purpose. Bleeding from the head wounds Respondent had inflicted, D. J. J. went to the telephone that was in the hallway and called the police, who shortly thereafter arrived on the scene. After speaking with D. J. J. and Respondent, and then examining D. J. J.'s injuries, the police placed Respondent under arrest for "aggravated child abuse." The police waited until Respondent's sister, Tatiana (who had agreed to care for J. in Respondent's absence), arrived at the house before transporting Respondent from the scene. Respondent spent the night in jail. The following day, September 8, 1999, Respondent was released pursuant to an Order of Pretrial Release Conditions, which, among other things, prohibited Respondent "from having any contact with" D. J. J. and required Respondent to "stay at least 500 feet away from [D. J. J.], [D. J. J.'s] home, place of employment and/or school at all times." On October 18, 1999, the State Attorney's Office filed, in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 99-30932, an "information for aggravated child abuse" against Respondent alleging the following: GREGORY PAYNE, on or about SEPTEMBER 8, 1999, in the County [of Miami-Dade] and [the] State [of Florida], did unlawfully feloniously commit an aggravated battery upon D. J. J., a child of sixteen (16) years of age, by HITTING HIM IN THE HEAD WITH A HAMMER AND BY PLACING A HOT IRON ON HIS FACE, and during the commission of such felony the defendant committed an aggravated battery in violation of s.827.03(1), Fla. Stat., 6/ contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. That same day, Respondent was arrested and taken into custody for violating the requirement of the September 8, 1999, Order of Pretrial Release Conditions that he "stay away" from D. J. J. Respondent remained in jail until October 26, 1999. On that date, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to the "aggravated child abuse" charge filed in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 99-30932, after having discussed the matter with his attorney and determined that it was in his best interest to enter such a plea. Respondent was thereafter adjudicated guilty of the crime and ordered to serve one year of community control, followed by one year of probation, during which he was required to "enter and successfully complete the Anger Control Program." 7/ The School Board learned of Respondent's "aggravated child abuse" conviction through a records check (Records Check E-02988). A conference-for-the-record with Respondent was held on February 23, 2000, "to address Records Check E-02988 concerning Aggravated Child Abuse, noncompliance with School Board policy and rules regarding Employee Conduct, a review of the record, and [Respondent's] future employment status with Miami-Dade County Public Schools." At the conference, Respondent was provided a copy of the records check findings and provided the opportunity, of which he took advantage, to "respond to the allegation that [he] 'w[as] arrested and later convicted of Aggravated Child Abuse.'" After doing so, he was advised that further review of the matter would be undertaken and that he would remain in his current assignment pending the outcome of such further review, provided he did the following: Remain in control of [him]self at all times and, specifically, during work hours. Comply with School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A- 1.21, Employee Conduct, a copy of which was provided to [him]. At all times material to the instant case, School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21(I), Employee Conduct, has provided as follows: All persons employed by the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida are representatives of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools. As such, they are expected to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system. Unseemly conduct or the use of abusive and/or profane language in the workplace is expressly prohibited. A pre-dismissal conference-for-the-record was held with Respondent on May 19, 2000. At the conference, Respondent was told that a recommendation for his dismissal would be made based upon the following charges: Just cause, including but not limited to, immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violation of School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, Responsibilities and Duties. The Superintendent of Schools subsequently made such a recommendation to the School Board. At its June 21, 2000, meeting, the School Board suspended Respondent and initiated a proceeding to terminate his employment "for just cause, including, but not limited to, immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violation of School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, Responsibilities and Duties. Respondent formally appealed his proposed termination pursuant to Article XXI, Section 3F. of the Union Contract, and the School Board subsequently referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of an Administrative Law Judge to conduct a hearing on the appeal. Prior to the hearing, the School Board filed and served on Respondent a Notice of Specific Charges, as required by Article XXI, Section 3F. of the Union Contract.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order terminating Respondent's employment on the grounds set forth in Counts I through III of the Notice of Specific Charges. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2001.
Findings Of Fact The Business of Respondent The Respondent is a public employer with its principle place of business located in Orange County, Florida, where it is engaged in the business of operating a school system. Respondent is created directly by the Florida State Constitution or legislative body so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the government and is administered by individuals who are responsible to the public officials or to the general electorate. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The Employee Organization Involved The Orange County Classroom Teachers Association is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. Background During April, 1975, PERC certified the employee organization as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the following collective bargaining unit: INCLUDED: All certified non-administrative personnel including the following: teachers, teachers-countywide, teachers-exceptional, teachers-gifted, speech therapist, teachers- specific learning disabilities, teachers-adults full-time, guidance personnel, occupational specialist, teachers-adult basic education, librarians-media specialist, deans, department chairpersons, physical therapist. EXCLUDED: All other positions of the Orange County Public Schools. Soon thereafter, the CTA and the School Board began negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. Each party submitted written proposals or counter proposals. (See Joint Exhibit #3 and #4, received in evidence). When negotiations began, teachers in the bargaining unit represented by the CTA were employed in one of the following categories: 10, 11, or 12-month contract. While most bargaining unit members were on 10-month contract status, some guidance counselors and approximately 90 teachers commonly referred to as vocational/technical teachers were on 12-month contract status. `These 90 vocational/technical teachers had been on 12-month contract status since at least 1970 and some since at least 1965. The negotiations resulted in a collective bargaining agreement which became effective on October 1, 1975. (Joint Exhibit #1). Neither the CTA's proposals nor the School Board's counter proposals for the 1975-76 contract contained a provision expressly granting the School Board the right to unilaterally change 12-month employees to 12 month status. Additionally, there was no specific discussion during negotiations regarding the alteration of the vocational/ technical teachers' 12-month contract status. During late spring, 1975, the Charging Party, and others similarly situated, were informed that during the 1975-76 fiscal year (which runs from July 1, 1975 through June 30, 1976) they would be employed for a full twelve months. They began their twelve month period of employment on July 1, 1975, prior to the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement-between the Board and the teachers' union. At that time there were approximately 200 teachers employed within the vocational/technical and adult education department. During the 1975-1976 school year, the school system with the exception of the post-secondary programs operated for two full semesters plus a summer school. Portions of the post-secondary programs, such as the vocational/technical and adult educational programs operated on a year-round basis. During the school year, the School Board decided to institute a system- wide program of year-round schools by adopting the quinmester system. Under the quinmester system the year is divided into five terms, each consisting of forty- five (45) days of student class time. Students can attend all five terms (or quins) thereby allowing them to graduate early, take extra courses or make up failed courses. Respondent takes the position that it was not possible to employ teachers on the 12-month basis as they would not be available for the required number of days. This is based on the fact that, as stated during the hearing under the 12-month system of employment, employees were only available for a total of 233 working days. Such a figure is derived by taking the number of days in a year, 365, and subtracting the number of Saturdays and Sundays, 104, which leaves 261 days. The School Board allows up to nineteen (19) days annual leave each year. Further, employees did not work on nine legal holidays on which the school system was closed which together with the 19 days annual leave made an additional 28 days that the employees would not be available for work in addition to the 104 Saturdays and Sundays. Thus when Saturdays, Sundays, Holidays and leave time are subtracted from the total 365 days, there are 233 available working days that employees working on a 12-month basis would be available. Therefore, the Board contended that in making its operational decision to change to a year-round school system, by adoption of the quinmester program, it needed employees to be available for 237 days if the teacher would be available to work all five quinmesters. Such a figure is derived by computing the number of days that the student will attend and the number of days that the teacher would therefore be required to be in attendance. Under the quinmester system, the student attends classes forty-five (45) days each quinmester, which means that the teacher needs to be present at least 225 days when the students are going to be present. Additionally, the Respondent urges that the collective bargaining agreement (Joint Exhibit #2) requires that teachers be on duty twelve (12) days when the students are not in attendance. These twelve days consist of five days of preplanning, five days of in-service training and two days of post-planning. With these figures, it is apparent that the teacher who is to work the entire year must be available the 225 days which the students are to be present together with the twelve days which the students are not present. Thus, wider this system, the teachers must be available 237 days during the school year. It is based on these figures that the Respondent contends that it made the operational decision to convert to a year-round school system, during the spring of 1976. In so doing, the Board advised its employees in the bargaining unit that they would be employed for an initial period of ten (10) months and given an extended contract for services rendered in programs extending beyond the regular school year. The regular school year comprises 196 days during a 10-month period of employment. Under the 10-month appointment, the teacher would be employed for an initial period of 196 days as provided for by the collective bargaining agreement and by statute. Out of the 196 days, the teacher earns 4 days leave which leaves available 192 work days in the initial employment period. The 192 work days include the 12 days that teachers are present and students are not. It also includes 180 days that the teacher is present with the students. This of course equals the first 4 quinmesters. The teacher employed to work year-round during the fifth quinmester would, under the operation of the quinmester system, be issued an extended contract to cover the additional 45 days of the fifth quinmester. By so doing, the 45 working days of the fifth quinmester with the 192 working days of the initial employment period provided for in the 10-month contracts provides the total 237 days needed to implement the year-round school system. It suffices to say that the neither the employee organization nor Respondent bargained about the implementation of the year-round school system. The teachers' union was not given advance notice of this action by the school board nor was there any attempt by the school board to bargain the impact of this decision with the teachers' union. During the course of the hearing, the Respondent introduced evidence to establish that the Charging Party and others similarly situated who are employed on a 10-month basis would receive a salary of $17,629.00 whereas the salary for the same services rendered under the 10-month plus extended contracts for the fifth quinmester would be $18,063.75. Respondent also introduced evidence establishing that the sick leave under either system was identical and that the Charging Party and others similarly situated are able to work 4 more work days under the 10-month plus extended contract than was available under the 12-month system. As stated, Respondent does not deny that it made its decision to employ vocational/technical teachers on a 10 month plus extended contract basis and that such was a departure of the contract status which said teachers had received in the past. In making its decision, Respondent contends that its acts were permissible under Chapter 447.209,F.S., since it is clothed with the statutory authority to unilaterally "determine the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organizations and operations It contends further that armed with this authority, it was not required to bargain concerning its management rights (which it contends that this was) in that here there is no violation of any contractual provision or of any other section of Chapter 447, Florida Statues, since Chapter 447 does not call for year-round bargaining. Chapter 447.309, F.S., provides in pertinent part that a certified employee organization and the public employer shall jointly bargain collectively in the determination of the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees. Respondent contends that since a collective bargaining agreement "shall contain all the terms and conditions of employment for the bargaining unit employees" and that since the current collective bargaining agreement does not provide in any part that bargaining unit employees are given a contractual right to a 12 month contract, there has been no violation of Chapter 447, F.S. While research reveals no reported decisions in Florida defining or otherwise interpreting terms and conditions of employment, other public employment relations boards aid state courts have determined that terms and conditions of employment means "salaries, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment". The length of the work year is a function of hours or work and thus has been determined to be a term of employment, and thus a public employer is required to negotiate with its employees concerning all terms and conditions unless a specific statutory provision prohibits negotiations on a particular item. See for example, Board of Education of Union Free School District #3 of the Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y. 2nd 122 at 129. First of all it is clear in this case that there has been no bargaining on this item and further that there has been no express waiver to bargain regarding the employment term. It is also clear that the employees in question had been granted 12 month contracts during previous years and that they were not advised of the alteration of the term of their contracts until Respondent had unilaterally made its decision to employ said teachers on a 10 month plus extended contract basis. Finally, there is no specific statutory provision which prohibits the parties from negotiating the term of the employment contract other than Section 447.209(5), F.S., which is inapplicable here. Based thereon, I find that the Respondent's actions in unilaterally adopting a year round instructional program by terminating the 12 month contract status of teachers-adult full-time and teachers-adult basic education by placing such teachers on 10 month plus extended contract status was a unilateral alteration of a term and condition of said employees' employment relationship in violation of Sections 447.501(1)(a) and (c) and is a derivative violation of Section 447.301(a) of the Act.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it: Bargain collectively upon request, with the Orange County Classroom Teachers Association as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above. Such duty to bargain shall extend to all mandatory subjects of bargaining including changes in the term of the contract year of said bargaining unit employees. Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by PERC, a notice substantially providing: that it will not refuse to bargain, upon request, with the Orange County Classroom Teachers Association, as exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above; and that its duty to bargain shall extend to all mandatory subjects of bargaining including, but not limited to, any changes in the term of the employment contracts of bargaining unit employees. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rowland, Petruska, Bowen & McDonald by John W. Bowen, Esquire 308 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Thomas W. Brooks, Esquire Staff Attorney for the Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John W. Palowitch, President Orange County Classroom Teachers Association 6990 Lake Ellenor Drive Orlando, Florida
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent, a noninstructional employee.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner hired Respondent in December 2002 to provide clerical services at Sunset Elementary School, where she worked until she was suspended, as described below. Sunset Elementary School is a magnet school that receives more applications than it can accept. At all material times, Respondent was the sole magnet clerk, who handled the vast amount of paperwork through the recruitment/application process that runs annually from October 1 through January. These duties included ensuring that the paperwork was accurate and scheduling interviews with candidates. Under her 12-month contract, Respondent was required to perform her duties from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. daily. A new principal arrived at Sunset Elementary School for the 2003-04 school year. Immediately, Respondent began having problems with attendance, arriving late or not at all. At first, the principal spoke with Respondent informally, reminding her of her duties and the importance that she arrive at work on time every day. When informal discussions failed to result in any improvement, the principal sent Respondent a memorandum dated September 24, 2003, identifying seven absences for various reasons and six tardies. The memorandum requires Respondent to provide advance notice of absences and a physician's note for absences due to illness. This intervention was ineffective. By memorandum dated April 16, 2004, the principal detailed 21 additional absences or tardies during the same school year since the prior memorandum. These absences included seven consecutive school days in April. As the principal testified, the main purpose of this memorandum was to learn if Respondent had quit. By memorandum dated July 21, 2004, the principal reprimanded Respondent for her excessive absences and tardies during the preceding school year. Respondent's attendance was not satisfactory the following school year. By memorandum dated April 14, 2005, the principal again reprimanded Respondent for repeated absences and tardies and failure to comply with the directives from the preceding school year. Since the memorandum of July 21, 2004, Respondent had been absent, tardy, or left early 43 times. In the six weeks since the April 14, 2005, reprimand, Respondent missed all or part of six days of work. By memorandum dated May 25, 2005, the principal reprimanded Respondent for gross insubordination due to the six absences or tardies since the April 14 memorandum. Again, Respondent failed to respond to these interventions. During the 2005-06 school year, she was absent 45 times, as advised by memorandum to her from the principal dated June 12, 2006. By memorandum dated June 13, 2006, from the principal, Respondent was again reprimanded for her absences and tardies during the preceding school year. On October 13 and 19, 2006, Respondent failed to appear at work without prior (or subsequent) authorization. Petitioner conducted a conference for the record on November 7, 2006, at which its representatives discussed with Respondent her noncompliance with attendance rules. By memorandum dated November 21, 2006, from the principal to an assistant superintendent, the principal recommended dismissal of Respondent for gross insubordination and unsatisfactory attendance. By letter dated December 20, 2006, the assistant superintendent informed Respondent of her intention to ask Petitioner, at its January 17, 2007, meeting, to suspend Respondent without pay and initiate dismissal proceedings against her, unless Respondent requested a hearing within 20 days. Respondent timely requested a hearing. Article XXI, Section 3.D of the applicable collective bargaining agreement applies to "educational support employees" and provides: Upon successful completion of the probationary period, the employees' employment status shall continue from year to year, unless the number of employees is reduced on a district-wide basis for financial reasons, or the employee is terminated for just cause. Just cause includes, but is not limited to, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, immorality, and/or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Such charges are defined, as applicable, in State Board Rule 6B-4.009.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing Respondent from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Rudolph F. Crew Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, No. 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1308 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Ana I. Segura, Esquire Janeen R. Richard, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Amy Marie Utrera 1201 Southwest 124th Court, Unit C Miami, Florida 33184
Findings Of Fact The Petition herein was filed by the Petitioner with PERC on March 18, 1976. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). The hearing in this case was scheduled by Notice dated May 2, 1976. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2). The City of Cocoa, Florida, is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Section 447.002(2). (Stipulation, Transcript of Record, Page 5, 6). 1/ The Petitioner is an Employee Organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Section 447.002(10). (Stipulation, TR 6). The Petitioner has requested recognition as the bargaining agent of the persons described in the petition. (Stipulation, TR 6, 7). There is no contractual bar to holding an election in this case, and there is no collective bargaining history which would effect the issues in this case. (Stipulation, TR 7). PERC has previously determined that the Petitioner is a duly registered Employee Organization. (See: Hearing Officer's Exhibit 3). At the hearing the parties stipulated that the Petitioner is so registered. (TR 7). PERC has previously determined that the Petitioner filed the requisite showing of interest with its petition. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 4). No evidence was presented at the hearing to rebut the administrative determination previously made by PERC. Petitioner and the Public Employer stipulated and agreed that employees within the Public Employer's Police Department who hold the positions of Communications Officers; Secretary, Detective Bureau; and Records and Identification Clerk should be included in the collective bargaining unit previously certified by PERC in Case No. 766-2030. The job descriptions of employees who hold the positions of Communications Officer; Secretary, Detective Bureau; and Identification Clerk were received in evidence as Joint Exhibits 1, 2, and 3. The job descriptions accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of the employees who hold those positions. ENTERED this 12 day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Respondent's employment should be terminated for the reasons set forth in the Petition.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The School Board is responsible for the operation, control, and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) in Palm Beach County, including Boca Raton Community High School (BRCHS). Respondent is employed by the School Board as a custodian, but is currently under suspension pending the outcome of these proceedings. As a custodian employed by the School Board, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the SEIU/Florida Public Services Union (SEIU) and covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School Board and SEIU (SEIU Contract). Article 7 of the SEIU Contract is entitled, "Employees Contractual Rights." Section 2 of this article provides as follows: Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee status shall be continuous unless the Superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). In the event the Superintendent seeks termination of a continuous employee, the School Board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the termination. The appeals process shall be determined in accordance with Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). Article 8 of the SEIU Contract is entitled, "Management Rights," and it provides, in pertinent part, that the School Board has the right "to manage and direct its employees, establish reasonable rules and procedures, take disciplinary action for proper cause, and relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons." Article 17 of the SEIU Contract provides as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Union, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. All disciplinary action shall be governed by applicable statutes and provisions of the Agreement. Further, an employee shall be provided with a written charge of wrongdoing, setting forth the specific charges against that employee as soon as possible after the investigation has begun. Any information which may be relied upon to take action against an employee will be shared promptly with said employee and his/her Union representative as soon as possible. Copies of any written information/correspondence that is related to the action of the employee or the investigating administrator(s) will be provided promptly to the employee and his/her Union representative. An employee against whom action is to be taken under this Article and his/her Union representative shall have the right to review and refute any and all of the information relied upon to support any proposed disciplinary action prior to taking such action. To this end, the employee and the Union representative shall be afforded a reasonable amount of time to prepare and present responses/refutations concerning the pending disciplinary action and concerning the appropriateness of the proposed disciplinary action. This amount of time is to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. Only previous disciplinary actions which are a part of the employee's personnel file or which are a matter of record as provided in paragraph # 7 below may be cited if these previous actions are reasonably related to the existing charge. Where just cause warrants such disciplinary action(s) and in keeping with provisions of this Article, an employee may be reprimanded verbally, reprimanded in writing, suspended without pay, or dismissed upon the recommendation of the immediate supervisor to the Superintendent and final action taken by the District. Other disciplinary action(s) may be taken with the mutual agreement of the parties. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable School Board rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With A Written Notation. Such written notation shall be placed in the employee's personnel file and shall not be used to the further detriment of the employee, unless, there is another reasonably related act by the same employee within a twenty four (24) month period. Written Reprimand. A written reprimand may be issued to an employee when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article. Such written reprimand shall be dated and signed by the giver of the reprimand and shall be filed in the affected employee's personnel file upon a receipt of a copy to the employee by certified mail. Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay by the School Board may be issued to an employee, when appropriate, in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. The length of the suspension also shall be determined by just cause as set forth in this Article. The notice and specifics of the suspension shall be placed in writing, dated, and signed by the giver of the suspension and a copy provided to the employee by certified mail. The specific days of suspension will be clearly set forth in the written suspension notice which shall be filed in the affected employee's personnel file in keeping with provisions of Chapter 119 and 231.291 of the Florida Statutes. An employee may be dismissed when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable law. An employee against whom disciplinary action(s) has/have been taken may appeal through the grievance procedure. However, if the disciplinary action(s) is/are to be taken by the District, then the employee shall have a choice of appeal between either the Department [sic] of Administrative Hearings in accordance with Florida Statutes or the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. Such choice must be exercised within fifteen (15) days of receipt of written notification of disciplinary action being taken, and the District notified accordingly. If the grievance procedure is selected, the grievance shall be initiated at Step Three. Prior to her suspension pursuant to Article 7, Section 2, of the SEIU Contract in December 2008, Respondent was assigned to BRCHS. Respondent started working as a custodian at BRCHS in or around 2006. At the time, she was a full-time employee, with hours from 2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Respondent had poor attendance as a full-time employee. In or around December 2007, at Respondent's request, the School Board changed her status to a permanent part-time employee, with a four-hour, instead of an eight-hour, work day, five days a week. She continued to work an evening shift. It was hoped that the change to part-time status would result in improvement in Respondent's attendance. Respondent's attendance, however, did not improve. Consequently, on December 3, 2007, Cheryl Lombard, an assistant principal at BRCHS, sent Respondent the following memorandum concerning "[e]mployment [e]xpectations": In order to improve your job performance the following directives must be adhered to in order for the school operations to run efficiently: You are directed to report to duty at your assigned time 4:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, April 10, 2009. You are directed to work your complete four-hour shift from 4:00-8:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. You are directed to bring a doctor's note for every absence stating the dates you were under the doctor's care and that you have been released to perform all job responsibilities without restrictions. You are directed to notify the lead custodian/night administrator anytime you must leave campus during duty hours. You are directed to complete a TDE for all absences, late arrivals, and early dismissals from work. You are directed to follow your duty schedule. You are directed to clean all assigned areas in accordance with the procedures outlined by the District. You are directed to complete all assignments given in accordance with directions given. You are directed to refrain from using your cell phone except during your fifteen- minute break. In case of emergency, please contact Dr. Lombard. You are to report to the head custodian/designee upon your arrival on duty. You are directed to sign out with the lead custodian every night. You are directed to speak to all staff members and others in a professional manner while on District property or on duty. You are directed to refrain from threatening fellow custodians. Failure to follow any of the above mentioned directives will be considered insubordination and may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination. In December 2007, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 9.75 hours. She was also out on medical/sick leave a total of 9.5 hours. On January 25, 2008, Ms. Lombard issued Respondent a verbal reprimand (which was followed-up by a "written notation"). The written notation read as follows: This correspondence is being given to you as a Written Notation of a Verbal Reprimand for Violation of School Board Policy 1.013 as it pertains to insubordination for failure to follow Directives Re: Attendance. Specifically, you have had excessive tardies and absences. Furthermore, you have failed to produce a doctor's note stating that you were under his/her care, as was required per the memo you received on December 3, 2007. You are directed to cease such conduct immediately. Further, you are to desist from engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future. Failure to do so will result in further disciplinary action up to and including a recommendation for termination. In January 2008, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 22 hours. On February 6, 2008, Ms. Lombard issued Respondent a written reprimand, which read as follows: This correspondence is being given to you as a Written Reprimand for insubordination Re: Attendance after our January 25, 2008 meeting. Specifically, on January 28 and February 4 you were absent and on January 30 you were 30 minutes late for your four (4) hour shift. Your conduct violated School Board Policy 1.013. Regardless of the circumstances that may have brought them about, such inappropriate actions and/or inactions on your part do not reflect positively on your position. You are directed to cease such conduct immediately. Furthermore, you are to desist from engaging in the same or similar action in the future. Failure to do so will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. Respondent was out on medical/sick leave for a total of approximately six weeks in February and March 2008. On April 17, 2008, Ms. Lombard issued Respondent another written reprimand. This written reprimand read as follows: This correspondence is being given to you as a Written Reprimand for insubordination regarding attendance after our April 15, 2008, meeting. Specifically, on April 16, you were absent for two and one half hours of your four hour shift. Your conduct violated School Board Policy 1.013. Regardless of the circumstances that may have brought them about, such inappropriate actions and/or inactions on your part do not reflect positively on your position. You are directed to cease such conduct immediately. Furthermore, you are to desist from engaging in the same or similar action in the future. Failure to do so will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. In April 2008, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 21 hours. In May 2008, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 36 hours. Respondent's brother and father passed away in April and May 2008, respectively. In June 2008, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 51.5 hours. In July 2008, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 21 hours. She was also out on medical/sick leave a total of 15 hours. 24, Up to and including August 6, 2008, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 7.5 hours that month. On August 6, 2008, the principal of BRCHS issued Respondent a written directive, which read as follows: On August 6, 2008, you met with Ms. Lombard, Assistant Principal, and HR Manager Bob Pinkos to discuss the seriousness of your chronic absenteeism and tardiness. During that meeting the Written Directive provided you on December 3, 2007 addressing attendance at work and compliance [with] the duty schedule was discussed. Furthermore, the following disciplinary actions have been issued related to insubordination for failure to adhere to the December 3, 2007 directives. January 28, 2007 [sic] Verbal Reprimand with Written Notation issued for failure to follow the December 3, 2007 directive. February 6, 2008, Written Reprimand issued for insubordination for failure to follow the December 3, 2007 directive. April 17, 2008, a second Written Reprimand issued for insubordination for failure to follow the December 3, 2007 directive. A copy of the December 3, 2007 directive is enclosed for your review. Although you have received several disciplinary actions advising you to comply with the December 3, 2007 [directive] your behavior with respect to attendance at work and compliance [with] your duty schedule continues to fail to meet expectations. Future similar incidents, to include those that may occur beyond the date of this directive and related to failing to follow the December 3, 2007 directive, will be considered insubordination and subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment. Your immediate attention to this matter will be appreciated as it would positively impact the operation at Boca Raton Community High School. The remainder of the month of August 2008, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 22.25 hours and out on medical/sick leave a total of 3.5 hours. In September 2008, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 33.25 hours. She was also out on medical/sick leave a total of 4 hours. In October 2008, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 23.25 hours. She was also out on medical/sick leave a total of 5 hours. At the end of October 2008, following the completion of an "administrative personnel investigation of Respondent's "behavior with respect to attendance at work and compliance [with her] duty schedule," a "pre-disciplinary meeting" was held at which Respondent was given the opportunity to "explain or rebut the outcome of the investigation." At the meeting, Respondent acknowledged that she had "missed lots of time from work," but she claimed that she had "been trying to improve her attendance." In November 2008, Respondent was absent without leave and/or pay a total of 24.25 hours. Respondent was out on medical/sick leave for her entire four hour shift on December 1, 2008. On December 2, 2008, she was absent without leave and/or pay .25 hours. The following day, she was suspended. Respondent's poor attendance has adversely affected others at BRCHS. Sometimes, the work Respondent was responsible for was done, in her absence, by the other custodians at the school, which "created a bit of unrest" because these custodians also had their own work to do. On other occasions, when Respondent was absent, the work she was assigned went undone, which created a "problem for teachers [and their students] when they c[a]me in the next morning" and had to deal with classrooms that were not cleaned.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order sustaining Respondent's suspension and terminating her employment with the School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sonia E. Hill-Howard, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Karen Gadson 1711 Wedgewood Plaza Drive Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 Dr. Arthur C. Johnson Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard, C316 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a black female who has been continuously employed by the Respondent, at the Gretchen Everhart School since approximately February of 1975. Prior to that time she worked for approximately seven years as a licensed practical nurse. The Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner initially interviewed for an employment position with the Respondent in February, 1975. She was hired as a "pupil personal services worker," a combination social worker and guidance counselor. She was paid out of the Respondent's "social worker budget" and was not hired specifically as a nurse. The Petitioner maintains that upon her hiring she requested that her beginning salary be adjusted to reflect her prior work experience as a licensed practical nurse and that request was denied. However, the record reflects that she did not make any formal request for prior work experience pay credit at that time. Her formal complaint was not actually filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations until October 28, 1985, well in excess of the 180 day requirement for filing such an action imposed under Section 760.10(10), Florida Statutes. Thus, even if she had made a formal request for such pay credit in 1975, its denial then would not now be actionable. Moreover, the Petitioner did not establish that any salary schedule, implementing regulation or collective bargaining agreement existed which provided for a salary adjustment of this type in 1975. On October 9, 1984, the Petitioner filed a written supplemental salary request with Dr. Paul Onkle, then the director of employee relations for the Respondent. She requested that she be given experience pay credit for seven years of prior experience as a licensed practical nurse at Sunland Hospital in Tallahassee, Florida. That request was denied. There is no evidence which would establish the date on which an initial, collective bargaining agreement between the Respondent and the Leon Classroom Teachers Association (LCTA), was first ratified. The Petitioner has been employed in a position included in that bargaining unit represented by the LCTA ever since the date of the first collective bargaining agreement, however. Accordingly, the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment have been fixed by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, ever since ratification of the initial agreement. On April 8, 1985, the Petitioner again wrote to Dr. Paul Onkle requesting his review of certain experience pay credit granted to Carolyn Peterson and Joanne Cox Arnette, in conjunction with which she requested his reconsideration of her request for experience pay credit. Ms. Peterson and Ms. Arnette are white female employees of the Respondent. Dr. Onkle instructed her on the proper means of filing a grievance and thereafter she executed a "Level I grievance" document on April 23, 1985, and delivered it to her immediate supervisor, Mrs. Susan Raker, the principal of Gretchen Everhart School. On April 24, 1985, Mrs. Raker denied the Level I grievance request on the ground that the Petitioner's salary had been set in compliance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect. Thereafter, pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect, the Petitioner filed a "Level II grievance" with Dr. Onkle, who was then the director of Employee Relations. Dr. Onkle denied that grievance on June 24, 1985. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at that time, the responsibility to pursue the grievance after this denial was upon the Petitioner and the LCTA. No further review of Petitioner's request was ever formally sought, however. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect when the requests for salary credit were filed in 1984 and 1985, no prior work experience credit was permitted for any non-teaching position, except for military service and certain work experience for vocational certification. The position in which the Petitioner was employed at that time did not involve any verified work experience which was required for vocational certification and there were no other provisions in the collective bargaining agreement in effect at that time by which the Petitioner would be entitled to receive a salary increase based upon her prior, non-teaching, licensed practical nurse employment. The Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent discriminated against her on account of her race by refusing to compensate her for prior work experience, while allegedly compensating similarly situated white employees an additional amount based upon similar work experience, thus violating Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. In view of this allegation, the work experience credit granted to a number of white employees, and the circumstances under which it was granted, must be examined. Carolyn Peterson was a white employee who began working with the Respondent in 1974 and became a full-time Occupational Specialist in 1976. In 1979, she was granted a salary increase based upon her prior work experience as an area sales manager and assistant buyer for Maas Brothers Department Store. Her position with the Respondent that year required her to be vocationally certified by the Florida Department of Education, and she was so certified. The collective bargaining agreement in existence at the time she was granted the salary increase for prior work experience specifically allowed such credit for each year of verified work experience above that required for certification of vocational teachers. The Petitioner, on the other hand, has not, in her employment position with the Respondent, ever been required to be vocationally certified by the Florida Department of Education. Thus, the Petitioner and Ms. Peterson are not "similarly situated" nor or they comparable employees with respect to their entitlement to any salary adjustment for prior work experience. Joanne Cox Arnette is a white person employed by the Respondent who was initially employed as a teacher in 1977. On approximately April 21, 1977, she requested credit for certain prior work experience, including four years of teaching in a public school system in Florida, four years of employment with the Florida Department of Education, and one year of teaching experience at the Florida A & M University. Her position was among the positions included in the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA. The collective bargaining agreement in existence at the time Ms. Arnette requested that credit specifically included and allowed for such credit for prior employees of the Florida Department of Education, by virtue of Section 238.01, Florida Statutes (1977) having been incorporated by reference in the terms of that collective bargaining agreement. That particular provision providing salary adjustment for prior work experience as an employee of the Department of Education terminated with the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the Respondent and the LCTA in 1979. It has been the practice and policy of the Respondent, however, at least as early as 1977, to continue to maintain experience credit for prior employment to an individual employee who was initially qualified for such a salary increase based upon prior employment experience; even though subsequent collective bargaining agreements, entered into after that employee obtained that salary increase, no longer included provisions authorizing such increases. Further, it has been the policy and practice of the Respondent, at times pertinent hereto, to consider and determine any requests for salary increases, based upon prior work experience, in the context of the collective bargaining agreement or other appropriate provisions prevailing and applicable at the time the request is made. Thus, for the reasons stated above, the Petitioner and Ms. Arnette are also not "similarly situated" employees and their positions are not comparable, within the meaning of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Gary Coates is a white person who was employed by the Respondent in March of 1976. In 1982, he requested and was granted a salary increase based upon credit for certain prior work experience. He was employed at that time in a position which was included in the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA. He was granted a salary increase for three years of teaching experience in a public hospital. An examination of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time Mr. Coates requested the salary increase reflects that credit was allowed for prior teaching experience in a public hospital or public institution. Mr. Coates met those requirements and was granted work experience credit for those three years. He also requested a salary increase for other work experience, and that request was denied by reason of the Respondent's determination that the experience involved did not qualify him under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the Petitioner and Mr. Coates are not "similarly situated" employees and their prior work experience was not comparable within the meaning of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Mr. Tom Heiman, a white person, was hired in September, 1985. He was hired as a social worker, which is a non-teaching position, also included within the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA. Social workers have been included within that unit since the unit was first certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission. In administering the collective bargaining agreement with respect to social workers, the Respondent has followed a policy and practice of interpreting that collective bargaining agreement to allow credit for prior social work experience as if such experience was in fact prior "teaching" experience. Mr. Heiman was granted work experience credit for six years of prior social work, although he was denied work experience credit for other prior work experience. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect in 1985, he was entitled to be credited with each year of teaching or social work experience in a public hospital or a public institution which required teacher certification in an area "in field" with a corresponding teaching position assignment. He was properly certified in that field and was otherwise entitled to receive work experience credit for his six years prior social work experience. Thus, Mr. Heiman and the Petitioner are not "similarly situated" employees either, and their work experience is not comparable. Mr. Gerald Torano, a white person, was first hired in October, 1985, as a social worker. His position with the Respondent was also included within the LCTA bargaining unit. He was granted a salary increase in 1985 based upon five years experience as a social worker in a public institution, as well as with the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. He was granted a salary increase pursuant to the same collective bargaining agreement by which Mr. Tom Heiman became eligible for such an increase. Just like Mr. Heiman, Mr. Torano requested additional work experience credit for other past experience which the Respondent denied, based upon the fact that such additional work experience did not qualify him for increased salary credit under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement prevailing at the time he made the request. Thus, the Petitioner and Mr. Torano are also not "similarly situated" employees, nor was their prior work experience comparable. Ms. Jean Schneggenberger is a white person first hired by the Respondent in February, 1985. She was a registered nurse and was hired in that capacity as a Registered School Nurse. Her position is not included within the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA, rather, she is known as a "classified employee," which is a term used by the Respondent to describe those employees whose positions are not included within any accepted bargaining unit, for which there is a collective bargaining agreement in force. Although the Petitioner never asserted in these proceedings that Ms. Schneggenberger was an example of another white employee who had been treated differently and more favorably then Petitioner, the Petitioner offered substantial testimony in an attempt to demonstrate that she had in fact engaged in comparable "nursing duties" or in "nursing related duties" while engaged as a counselor and social worker at the Gretchen Everhart School. Thus, an examination of the manner in which Ms. Schneggenberger's salary as a nurse was computed is relevant to this proceeding. The record establishes that for the year 1984-85, the Respondent adopted a separate salary schedule and implementing regulations related to all "classified" employees. Those implementing regulations applicable to Ms. Schneggenberger are found in the Respondent's Exhibit 4, beginning at paragraph 2A. Ms. Schneggenberger is the only person employed by the Respondent in the position of "Registered School Nurse." Accordingly, neither the Petitioner nor any other employee of the Respondent is "similarly situated" or comparable in his position to Ms. Schneggenberger and her position.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief from an alleged unlawful employment practice filed by the Petitioner, Annie M. Francis, be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3185 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Accepted. 2-3. Accepted generally, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. Accepted, but not for its material import. 6-7. Accepted generally, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 8. Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. 9-13. Accepted generally, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 14-16. Accepted. 17. Rejected as to its material import. 18-20. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. 21-22. Accepted. 23. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 24-25. Rejected as immaterial. 26-27. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. 28. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. 29-30. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. 31-33. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 34. Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Accepted. 3. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 4-8. Accepted. 9. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 10-17. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Danni Vogt, Esquire 308 East Park Avenue, Room 209 Post Office Box 11301 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 C. Graham Carothers, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Charles Couch, Superintendent Leon County School Board 2727 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
