Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: East Pasco Medical Center (EPMC) is a non-profit 85-bed acute care hospital facility located in the East Pasco subdistrict of HRS District V. There are only two hospitals in the subdistrict -- EPMC in Zephyrhills and Humana in Dade City, which is approximately ten miles north. Humana is a 120- bed acute care hospital facility. Both facilities offer the same services and share the same medical staff. On or about September 17, 1987, EPMC submitted an application for a Certificate of Need to add 35 medical/surgical beds via a fourth floor addition to its existing facility. Its existing 85 beds are located in private rooms, and it is proposed that the additional 35 beds will also be placed in separate rooms. The application submitted to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) projected a total project cost of $4,531,000. This figure was revised at the hearing to a project cost of $2,302,900. With regard to acute care services, the State Health Plan seeks to assure geographic accessibility. All residents of East Pasco County currently have access to acute care hospital services within the travel times suggested by the State plan. The State Health Plan also seeks to promote the efficient utilization of acute care services by attaining an average annual occupancy rate of at least 80 percent. The District V Local Health Plan emphasizes that additions to inpatient acute care beds in a subdistrict should not be considered unless a numeric bed need is shown and certain occupancy thresholds have been met. The recommended occupancy thresholds for medical/surgical beds are 80% for the subdistrict and 90% for the facility seeking to add beds. Application of the bed need methodology contained in HRS's Rule 10- 5.011(1)(m), Florida Administrative Code, indicates a numeric need for 57 additional acute care medical/surgical beds in the East Pasco subdistrict for the planning horizon period of July, 1992. The rule provides that HRS will "not normally approve" additional beds unless average occupancy in the subdistrict is greater than 75 percent. However, the rule permits HRS to award additional beds when there is a calculated need, notwithstanding low occupancy in the subdistrict, if the applicant had a minimum of 75% average occupancy during the 12 months ending 14 months prior to the Letter of Intent. Rule 10- 5.011(1)(m)7.e., Florida Administrative Code. The rule also permits HRS to award additional beds where the calculated numeric need substantially exceeds the number of existing and approved beds in the subdistrict and there is an access problem related to travel time. For the relevant time period, the acute care occupancy rate for the East Pasco subdistrict was below 75% percent. Indeed, over the past few years, the average occupancy rate in that subdistrict has been 54 to 58 percent. Humana only operates at about a 55% occupancy. The East Pasco subdistrict does experience seasonal fluctuations in medical/surgical occupancy, with the season for high occupancy beginning in late October and ending in mid- to late April. In addition to tourists, it is expected that the revival of the citrus industry in East Pasco County will bring more migrant pickers to the area during the peak season months. The seasonal increase in occupancy directly corresponds with a large increase in seasonal population, particularly in the Zephyrhills area. The Zephyrhills area population is much older than the Dade City population and is also much older than the State average. The HRS acute care bed need rule includes considerations of seasonal peak demands. When considering both hospitals in the subdistrict, there has been a decline in peak seasonal occupancy rates over the past few years. While the population of the East Pasco subdistrict has grown, and is expected to increase by approximately 7,200 in 1992, there is a trend of declining utilization in the subdistrict. This decline is due to increased used of outpatient services and shorter lengths of hospital stay attributable to the current reimbursement system. The medical/surgical use rate fell from 454 patient days per 1,000 population in 1986 to 414 patient days per 1,000 population in 1988. There was a similar decline in the acute care use rate. Assuming a constant medical/surgical use rate, the projected demand for 1992 would be 2,980 additional medical/surgical patient days in the subdistrict according to population projections, and about 4,267 incremental patient days according to local health council projections. EPMC's Letter of Intent to add 35 additional beds was filed in mid- July, 1987. Its acute care occupancy rate for the period of April, 1986 through March, 1987 was 75.3 percent. Occupancy at EPMC from May, 1986 to April, 1987 was 73.6%; occupancy from June, 1986 through May, 1987 was 73%; and occupancy from July, 1986 to June, 1987 was 72.2 percent. EPMC does experience periods of high occupancy during the peak season months. High occupancy levels have a greater impact upon smaller hospitals due to their lesser degree of flexibility. On occasion, during the winter months, EPNC is required to refuse admittance to patients due to crowded conditions within its facility. Patients are sometimes transferred or referred to other facilities, including Humana, although the necessity for such transfers or referrals is occasionally due to a lack of intensive or critical care beds as opposed to a lack of medical/surgical beds. During the periods of time when EPMC had high occupancy levels, beds were available at Humana. EPMC's current payor mix includes a high level of Medicare (over 60%), and it is committed, through both its Christian mission and an agreement with the County, to treat indigent and Medicaid patients. The actual amount of indigent or charity care provided by EPNC was not established. In any event, EPMC desires to increase its bed size in order to help maintain a proper payor mix at the hospital so as to ensure the financial survival of the hospital. It is felt that a greater number of beds, given the rise in population, and particularly elderly population, would allow EPNC to serve a greater number of private and/or third party insurance paying patients. While the evidence demonstrates that EPMC may operate with a less favorable payor mix than Humana, the evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate that EPMC will suffer financial ruin without additional beds. Likewise, it was not established that the patients which EPNC must turn away in the winter months are consistently paying patients. Increasing the number of beds at EPNC to 120 beds does not necessarily mean that its profitability would be improved. Volume and payor mix are the most critical factors in determining whether a hospital will be profitable. There is currently a nursing shortage throughout the nation. Rural areas, such as the eastern portion of Pasco County, experience even greater difficulty in attracting nursing personnel to the area. Due to the shortage of nurses, as well as the seasonal demand, EPMC is required to use contract care nurses throughout the year. While it would prefer to employ its own nursing staff, EPMC will use contract staff due to the seasonal variations in its nursing requirements. The use of contract or registry nurses costs 50% to 60% more on a daily basis; however, lower occupancy during the off-peak months does not justify year- round employment for as large an in-house nursing staff. For its proposed 35 beds, EPMC projects nurse manpower requirements as follows: 1 nurse manager, 4.2 R.N. charge nurses, 15.1 R.N. staff and 14.1 L.P.N. staff, for a total of 34.4 full time equivalent nursing positions. The recruiting efforts of EPNC to fill these positions will include advertising, visiting nursing schools and colleges, utilizing student nurses at the hospital and use of the Adventist Health System international network. Humana currently has 15 vacancies, or 12 to 13% of its nursing staff. Humana's nursing salaries have increased 20% over the past eighteen months. As noted above, EPNC and Humana compete for the same nursing personnel. Humana's personnel director believes that if EPNC increases its nursing staff by 34 FTEs, Humana's nursing staff will be approached to fill those positions. As a consequence, Humana will experience additional nursing shortages and will be required to further increase salaries. It is proposed that the project cost of adding 35 beds to EPMC will be financed with 100% debt financing through a bond issue. The financing will be part of a much larger bond issuance intended to finance several other projects within the Adventist hospital system. No evidence was adduced that such a bond issuance had been prepared or approved, and there was no evidence concerning the other projects which would be financed in conjunction with this project. In 1987, EPNC was carrying about five million dollars of negative equity. The hospital is currently greater than 100% financed. As noted above, the original Certificate of Need application filed with HRS listed the total project cost to be $4,531,000. In its response to omissions, EPMC stated that the construction cost would be $175 per square foot. In the updates submitted at the hearing, EPNC proposed a project cost of $2,302,900, which included a construction cost of $85 per square foot. A more reasonable cost for the addition of a floor to an existing facility would be $125 per square foot, plus an inflation factor of 6% and architectural and engineering fees of 6 to 7%. The proposed equipment list submitted by EPNC fails to include major equipment items such as an overhead paging system, a nurse call system, examination room equipment, medication distribution equipment, bed curtains, shower curtains, patient and staff support lounge items, and IV pumps. EPNC's updated equipment cost budget fails to include tax, freight, contingency and installation costs. The projected equipment costs should be tripled to adequately and reasonably equip a 35-bed nursing unit. The projected utilization and pro formas submitted by EPMC are not reasonable and were not supported by competent substantial evidence. EPMC's projected utilization for the proposed 35-bed unit is 8,950 patient days in the first year of operation and 9,580 in the second year of operation. Applying the current use rate to the population projections submitted by EPMC's expert in demographics and population projections produces only about 2,980 additional patient days in the year 1992. Given the fact that EPMC's current market share is approximately 54%, there is no reason to believe that Humana would not absorb at least some of those projected additional patient days. There are many months of the year in which additional patient days could be filled within the existing complement of 85 beds at EPNC. Depending upon the ultimate cost of the project, the break even point for financial feasibility purposes would be approximately 3,500 to 4,000 patient days. The concept behind a pro forma is to develop a financial picture of what operations will be in the first two years of operation. EPMC stated its revenues and expenses in terms of 1988 dollars and used its current revenue- to-expense ratios for projecting operations four years into the future. This is improper because gross revenues are going up, reimbursement is not increasing as rapidly and expenses, particularly salaries and insurance, are increasing. In addition, EPMC's projected 1992 salaries in several categories were less than they are currently paying for such positions. EPMC currently provides good quality of care to its patients. The only future concern in this realm is the fact that in the winter months, its intensive and critical care unit beds are often full and there is no room for additional patients. Additional medical/surgical volume from the proposed 35- bed unit would lead to additional intensive and critical care bed demand.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of East Pasco Medical Center for a Certificate of Need to add 35 acute care beds to its existing facility be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30 day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. (Case No. 88-1227) The proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties have been carefully considered and are accepted, incorporated and/or summarized in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: Petitioner: Third sentence rejected as not established by competent, substantial evidence. Accepted, but not included as irrelevant to the ultimate resolution of the issues. Rejected. The Personnel Director of Humana presented testimony in this proceeding. Accepted as an accurate restatement of testimony, but rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. 16. Second sentence rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. A18. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 20. First sentence rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. First sentence rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 27 and 30. Accepted as an accurate restatement of testimony, but rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. Rejected as immaterial to the issue of need in the year 1992. First sentence rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. First and third sentences rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. 37 and 38. Rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. 44. Last sentence rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Accepted only if the factors of volume and payor mix are also considered. Partially rejected as speculative and not supported by competent substantial evidence. All but first two sentences rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence and an erroneous conclusion of law. Rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence and an erroneous conclusion of law. Last sentence rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Second sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. 58. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 60. Rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. 62 - 67. The actual figures regarding total costs, projected utilization and those figures utilized in the pro formas were not established by competent substantial evidence and, therefore, the findings regarding the financial feasibility of the project are rejected. 71. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 74. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 77. Rejected as an improper factual finding and contrary to the evidence. 78 and 79. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. First sentence rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Last sentence rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Respondent: 2 and 6. Partially accepted with the additional considerations of the applicant's occupancy levels and geographic accessibility. 9. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 19(a) Interpretation of rule not sufficiently explicated at hearing. 56 - 58. Actual figures are not established by competent evidence due to the failure to establish with reliability the total costs of the project. Intervenor: Second sentence accepted with the additional considerations of the applicant's occupancy levels and geographic accessibility. Third sentence rejected. Interpretation of rule not sufficiently explicated at hearing. First sentence rejected, but this does not preclude a consideration of such a period. Third sentence rejected as not established by the greater weight of the evidence. 31. Second sentence rejected as speculative. 40 and 41. Accepted as factually correct, but not included due to the showing of unused capacity within the East Pasco subdistrict. 55 and 56. Actual figures are not established by competent evidence due to the failure to establish with reliability the total costs of the project. 63 and 72. Same as above with regard to second sentence. 92. Rejected as an overbroad statement or conclusion. 97. Second sentence rejected as overbroad and not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: E.G. Boone and Jeffrey Boone 1001 Avenida del Circo Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 Stephen M. Presnell Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, Florida 323a2 James C. Hauser Messer, Vickers, Caparello, French & Madsen, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Memorial Hospital of Jacksonville, Petitioner, seeks, via a variance, approval of an intensive care/coronary care unit (ICU/CCU) in excess of the 5,000 square foot requirement of the 1973 Life Safety Code, which has been adopted and is enforce by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Respondent herein), pursuant to Rule 10D-28.79, Florida Administrative Code. The unit size in question is approximately 11,540 square feet, which is, of course, approximately twice the size of the ICU/CCU unit size permitted by the 1973 Life Safety Code. The Respondent disapproved the Petitioner's request for a variance based inter alia on the fact that the Petitioner's plans, as presented, exceeded the 5,000 square foot requirement by approximately 6,000 square feet and due to the fact that the number of feet from the patient beds to the exits was in excess of the 50 feet exit requirement set forth in the 1973 Life Safety Code. Rudolph Nudo, Petitioner's Director of Engineering for approximately thirteen years, studied the plans presented for approval by Respondent and has been involved in the variance request from the outset. During January of 1978, Petitioner engaged the architectural firm of Ellerbe and Associates to arrive at a design that would be efficient both in terms of space utilization and in terms of cost efficiency. Based on its studies, Ellerbe decided upon a triangular design. The working drawings, plans and specifications were submitted to the City of Jacksonville for approval, which approval has been granted. The City of Jacksonville`s code is patterned largely from the 1973 Life Safety Code. During a meeting with the Respondent's agents during August of 1978, Respondent's officials voiced concern about the excessive square feet contained in the ICU/CCU unit and, based therein, formally submitted a letter of denial to Petitioner based on the excessive square feet. Presently, exterior construction has commenced on the proposed unit and Petitioner is now awaiting approval of its interior construction plans. Petitioner has indicated its desire to comply fully with all other requirements in terms of the necessary time/ratings for the fireproofing of walls, et cetera. In terms of other safety precautions, the Petitioner regularly conducts safety inspections and fire drills. Petitioner has not been cited for any safety infractions by the Respondent. Don Benson, the architect employed by Ellerbe and Associates assigned to this project, has been engaged in the design of medical facilities since approximately 1964. The plans, as submitted, have space to accommodate approximately twenty-four beds for coronary and intensive care patients. As stated, the design is triangular and the monitoring station is semi-circular. (See Petitioner's Exhibit A.) The burn factor for the wall is rated by Underwriters Laboratories (UL) for a period of up to two hours. The facility as planned is a one-story unit and is designed for easy ingress and egress to other adjacent units. Dr. Kay E. Gilmore, M.D., a cardiologist who has specialized in heart and vascular diseases for approximately seven years, was a member of the Petitioner's in-house committee charged with studying and implementing the design for the proposed ICU/CCU unit. Prior to submittal of the proposal, Dr. Gilmore visited various sites to study other ICU units which were operational. Dr. Gilmore, as did other witnesses, noted that in ICU units, a primary concern is that of complete visualization and monitoring of patients at all times. Dr. H. Azcuy, M.D., who has been engaged in the practice of pulmonary medicine since approximately 1964, is Petitioner's Director of Respiratory Therapy. Dr. Azcuy is a member of the Critical Care design unit committee and has been instrumental with the planning for the proposed facility. Dr. Azcuy remarked that most patients which he treats have respiratory problems and that all patients in the intensive care unit are prohibited from smoking due to the presence of oxygen in the critical care units. Vernon Wallace, Petitioner's biomedical engineer, is in charge of the procurement and maintenance of all patient care equipment at the facility. Recognizing that fire hazards are potential problems in all hospitals, Messr. Wallace testified that all equipment purchased by Petitioner is of high-level workmanship, most of which operates on very low voltage, thereby reducing the likelihood of fires. Messr. Wallace testified that during his tenure with Petitioner, no fire has occurred at the hospital nor has it been necessary to evacuate patients for any reason. Mary Nikoden, an R.N. for approximately thirty-three years and Petitioner's Director of Nursing for the past ten years, has been employed in many phases of patient care at hospitals and nursing homes. Ms. Nikoden testified that patients are interchanged regularly from the intensive care units to the critical care units as patient load fluctuates. She cited one problem, i.e., the movement of patients from the ICU/CCU units which is hampered due to the bulky equipment and the necessity to constantly monitor intensive and critical care patients. She opined that if the units were combined, patient care would be enhanced due to the fact that similarly trained employees work in both units. She also pointed out that the proposed design would increase patient care due to the fact that patients can be observed at all times and access will be increased and/or enhanced if the proposed design is approved. Karen Cornelius, a registered nurse who holds a master's degree in nursing, has been employed at Memorial Hospital since approximately September of 1976. From 1964 through 1967 she was employed at Cornell University Hospital and from 1967 through 1970 she was head nurse in charge of the surgery and intensive care units at Cornell. She was employed at Grady Memorial Hospital in Atlanta from 1970 through 1973, and from 1973 through 1975 she trained personnel in the intensive care and coronary care units at Grady Memorial Hospital. Ms. Cornelius was involved in the input and the design of the room sizes for the proposed unit. According to Ms. Cornelius, one of the basic reasons for the proposed design is to maximize the use of the staffs from the intensive care and coronary care units who are regularly interchanged and cross-coordinated. Ms. Cornelius has visited and compared other area hospital intensive care and coronary care units and is of the opinion that the proposed plan is far superior due to the easy patient visibility and the ability to constantly monitor patients' vital signs. During the year of 1978, Petitioner submitted a request for an equivalency (waiver) from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, which approval was granted in early March, 1979, with certain recommendations and conditions respecting exit requirements; the necessity to increase the frequency of fire drills, installation of adequate fire extinguishers and smoke exhaust systems and single-story construction (Petitioner's Exhibit 8). John T. Ludwig, an electrical engineer who holds a Ph.D. in engineering, has had vast experience in various engineering positions. Messr. Ludwig received his Ph.D. in 1954 and relocated to Pinellas County during 1966. Since 1971, he has been employed by the Respondent in the Bureau of Health Facilities, where he is now in charge of the review of plans for nursing homes and hospitals. Messr. Ludwig concluded that the Petitioner's plans as proposed were unsafe due to the "failure to consider fire safety and the undue risks of harm which would result to patients' lives if the proposed plans here approved." Among Messr. Ludwig's concerns were the facts that intensive care and coronary care patients differ with respect to the type of life support equipment necessary to maintain proper patient care; potential problems which might result due to the distance between patient suites and exits; corridor problems (the storing of combustibles in the hallways) and the inability to visualize patients from the central nursing station due to the triangular design. Max C. Karrer, M.D., is an associate of Memorial Hospital who specializes in obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. Karrer is a member of the committee charged with investigating the concept for the proposed critical care/intensive care unit. As a member of this committee, Dr. Karrer visited intensive care and critical care units of Hollywood, California; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; the University of Maryland Trauma Center; Machua General Hospital and a hospital in Cambridge, England. Dr. Karrer concluded that the proposed plan was one of the better plans he had observed because, among other things, personnel use would be maximized; better use could be made of patient beds; better care would result based on the number of dollars spent and the utilization of and the interchange of staffs from the intensive care and coronary care units. Additionally, he noted that the proposed plan made possible the ability to constantly visualize patients and was by far the best designed intensive care unit he had seen. During the examination of Dr. Karrer, it was brought out that the hospital dispenses medication on the unit-dosage system and all stored linens in the proposed unit was of the fire-retardant type. Thus, he concluded that the likelihood of a fire was remote in this unit since no combustibles are stored in the corridors as charged by Respondent's agents. Ben F. Britt, a registered architect licensed to practice in Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina and Florida, has practiced architecture for approximately fifteen years and is presently the Medical Facilities' architect for Area I in Florida. This area has approximately eighty-four hospitals and more than ninety nursing homes. Messr. Britt testified that the spread of fire was the primary reason that the Life Safety Code of 1973 restricted the area for an intensive care or coronary care unit to 5,000 square feet. He also cited the problem respecting the transfer of patients who necessarily had attached to their person monitoring equipment which could not be easily moved from one location to another. Messr. Rudolph Nudo was recalled to emphasize the fact that the Petitioner reviewed all safety codes when the subject design was implemented and that there were no linens stored which were not of the fire retardant type; that inasmuch as the Petitioner dispenses medication on the unit system, no boxes are stored in the hallways which could be the source of a potential fire hazard. Messr. Nudo also testified that the Petitioner would install the necessary exits to comply with all codes which the Respondent enforces. He testified that the additional size was justified in this case based on the additional safety features which were present in the design and the type of equipment utilized. Messr. Benson was recalled to emphasize the fact that the proposed unit consists of single rooms which were the optimum in coronary care units and that the trend in intensive care and coronary care units is toward centralization of such units.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Daniel Francis Sanchez was licensed as a physician by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners having been issued license number ME0038795. At all times relevant hereto Respondent was Regional Medical Director of IMC which operated HMO offices in Hillsborough and Pinellas Counties. On October 17, 1985, Alexander Stroganow, an 84 year old Russian immigrant and former cossack, who spoke and understood only what English he wanted to, suffered a fall and was taken to the emergency room at Metropolitan General Hospital. He was checked and released without being admitted for inpatient treatment. Later that evening his landlady thought Stroganow needed medical attention and again called the Emergency Medical Service. The ambulance with EMS personnel arrived and concluded Stroganow was no worse than earlier when taken to the emergency room and they refused to transport him again to the hospital. The landlady then called the HRS hotline to report abuse of the elderly. The following morning, October 18, 1985, an HRS case worker was dispatched to the place where Stroganow lived. She was let in by the landlady and found an 84 year old man who was incontinent, incoherent, apparently paralyzed from the waist down, with whom she could not carry on a conversation to find out what condition he was in. She called for a Cares Unit to come and evaluate the client. An HRS Cares Unit is a two person team consisting of a social worker and nurse whose primary function is to screen clients for admission to nursing homes and adult congregate living facilities (ACLF). The nurse on the team carries no medical equipment such as a stethoscope, blood pressure cuff, or thermometer, but makes her determination on visual examination only. Upon arrival of the Cares Unit both members felt Stroganow needed to be placed where he could be attended. A review of his personal effects produced by his landlady showed his income to be over the maximum for which he could qualify for medicaid placement in a nursing home; that he was a member of IMC's Gold- Plus HMO; his social security card; and several medications, some of which had been prescribed by Dr. Dayton, a physician employed by IMC at the South Pasadena Clinic. The Cares team ruled out ACLF placement for Stroganow at the time because he was not ambulatory but felt he needed to be placed where he could be attended to and not left alone over the coming weekend. To accomplish this, they proceeded to the South Pasadena HMO clinic of IMC to lay the problem on Dr. Dayton, the Assistant Medical Director for IMC in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic. Stroganow had been a client of the South Pasadena HMO for some time and was well known at the clinic and by EMS personnel. There were two and sometimes three doctors who treated patients at this clinic and, unless the patient requested a specific doctor, he was treated by the first doctor available. Stroganow had not specifically requested he be treated by Dr. Dayton. When the Cares team met with Dr. Dayton they advised him that Stroganow had been taken to Metropolitan General Hospital Emergency Room the night before but did not advise Dayton that the EMS team had refused to transport Stroganow to the hospital emergency room a second time the previous evening. Dayton telephoned the emergency room at Metropolitan General to ascertain the medical condition of Stroganow when brought in the evening before. With the information provided by the Cares team and the hospital, Dayton concluded that Stroganow should be given a medical evaluation and the quickest way for that to occur was to call the EMS and have Stroganow taken to an emergency room for evaluation. When the Cares team arrived, Dayton was treating patients at the clinic. A doctor's office, or clinic, is not a desirable place to have an incontinent, incoherent, non- ambulatory patient brought to wait with other patients until a doctor is free to see him. Nor is the clinic equipped to do certain procedures frequently needed in diagnosing the illness and determining treatment needed for an acutely ill patient. EMS squads usually arrive within minutes of a call to 911 for emergency medical assistance and it was necessary for someone to be with Stroganow with the EMS squad arrived. Accordingly, Dayton suggested that the Cares team return to Stroganow and call 911 for assistance in obtaining a medical evaluation of Stroganow. If called from the HMO office, the EMS squad would have arrived long before the Cares team could have gotten back to Stroganow. Dr. Dayton did not have admitting privileges at any hospital in Pinellas County at this time. Upon leaving the South Pasadena HMO clinic, the Cares team returned to Stroganow. Enroute, they stopped to call a supervisor at HRS to report that the HMO had not solved their problem. The supervisor then called the Administrator at IMC to tell them that one of their Gold-Plus patients had an emergency situation. Respondent, Dr. Sanchez, called and advised that Dr. Dayton would take care of the problem. Later, around 2:00 p.m. when no ambulance had arrived, the Cares team called 911 from a telephone a block away from Stroganow's residence and arrived back just before the emergency squad. The EMS squad again refused to transport Stroganow to an emergency room and this information was passed back to Sanchez who directed that Stroganow be taken to Lake Seminole Hospital. This was the first time either Dayton or Sanchez was aware that the EMS squad had refused to transport Stroganow to an emergency room. Although Sanchez did not have admitting privileges at Lake Seminole Hospital, IMC had a contractual agreement with Lake Seminole which provided that certain staff doctors at Lake Seminole would admit patients referred to Lake Seminole by IMC. Pursuant to this contractual arrangement, Stroganow was admitted to Lake Seminole Hospital where he was treated for his injuries and evaluated for his future medical needs.
The Issue Whether Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") Rules 10- and 10-17.005 (originally published as 10-16.001, 10-16.005), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Standing Humana is a corporation engaged in the business of constructing and operating hospitals in Florida. It has applied to HRS for a certificate of need to construct and operate a 100-bed acute care hospital to be located south of the St. Johns River in the area known as Mandarin, in Duval County, Florida. The challenged Subdistrict Rule places this area in Subdistrict 3 of HRS District IV. Humana's (Mandarin) application for a certificate of need (CON) was denied by HRS on February 23, 1983, and Humana requested a formal Section 120.57(1), hearing. The case was then transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned Case Number 83-934. The final hearing in that CON case began on September 6, 1983, and recessed on September 7, 1983. In the instant case--on Humana's request, and without objection by HRS--official recognition was given to the transcript of that hearing, as filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Prior to the CON hearing in Case Number 83-934, on August 12, 1983, HRS published proposed Rules 10-16.001 and 10-16.005 ("Subdistrict Rule") at Volume 9, Number 32, pages 1952 through 1957, Florida Administrative Weekly. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1) After the CON hearing recessed, and after a public hearing on the proposed Subdistrict Rule, HRS published changes to the rule on September 23, 1983, at Volume 9, No. 38, page 2475-2476, Florida Administrative Weekly. These changes were made in response to comments which HRS received at a public hearing held on the proposed rule. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2) On September 26, 1983, HRS filed the Subdistrict Rule with the Department of State for adoption, effective October 16, 1983. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3) Thereafter, the Bureau of Administrative Code, Department of State, informed HRS that since other rules were already numbered in Chapter 10-16, Florida Administrative Code, the Subdistrict Rule would be published in Chapter 10-17, Florida Administrative Code. (Petitioner'S Exhibit No. 28) At the CON hearing, Humana attempted to introduce evidence which HRS challenged as inconsistent with Rule 10-5.11(23) the state-wide acute care bed- need rule, and the Subdistrict Rule--then a proposed rule not yet adopted by HRS. The presiding hearing officer, acknowledging the "proposed rule" status of the Subdistrict Rule, sustained HRS objections to the admission of evidence proposing a methodology, or subdistrict bed-need allocations, inconsistent with those contained in the (proposed) Subdistrict Rule. He did, however, rule that the two non-agency parties could offer evidence for the purpose of showing that HRS, or the local health council in conjunction with HRS, had developed bed-need formula or techniques for subdistricts beyond, or inconsistent with, the proposed Subdistrict Rule and the underlying local health council's district plan. (DOAH Case No. 83-934, pp. 220-221, Transcript of Hearing). II. The Rule Adoption Process In response to Section 381.494(7)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), requiring local health councils to develop district plans using a "uniform methodology," HRS transmitted to the councils written guidelines for designating and allocating bed-need among various subdistricts. (Petitioner's Exhibit Dos. 9 and 10) The statute does not express or imply that the word, "methodology" should be given a meaning other than that assigned by ordinary and common usage. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines the term as: "a body of methods, rules and postulates; a particular procedure or set of procedures." A methodology is not necessarily a mathematical formula. These guidelines, transmitted to the local health councils in early 1983, describe the relationship between HRS and the councils, the format and content elements of district health plans, and the requirements for stating district health care policies and priorities. Examples are provided. The guidelines require that local plans contain a district health profile--an overview of the area's population characteristics, community health status and prevailing health related attitudes and behaviors. Components are also required, including detailed information on the district's health care resource inventories, costs and utilization patterns, analysis of local services as well as recommendations and priorities for future health systems development. For at least three types of existing health care facilities--acute care hospitals, nursing homes, and psychiatric specialty hospitals information must be provided on current capacity, physical status, service areas, and recommendations for future developments. A time frame is imposed for accomplishing each phase of the plan development, with the final phase adoption of the local health plan--to be accomplished by December, 1983. Finally, the guidelines, at page 15, point out the statutory requirement that HRS adopt, by rule, those elements of the approved district plans necessary for review of applications for certificates of need: Adoption Into Rules Section 7(b) of Chapter 381.493 states that "Elements of an approved district plan necessary to the review of any certificate of need application shall be adopted by the Department as a part of its rules." This should be kept in mind through- out the plan development process. Local policies and priorities are the items most pertinent to certificate of need review since information on bed need and capacity are either determined at the state level or must be updated to the time of certificate of need application, review and appeal. There- fore, the local health council will be ex- pected to develop a separate submission of their policies and priorities in the proper format for rule promulgation within thirty days of the adoption of the local health plan. State agency staff will assist in the development and refinement of these documents. (Petitioner'S Exhibit No. 9) HRS interpreted its responsibility under Section 381.494, as one of assuring that district health plans were consistent with the state-wide uniform bed-need methodology prescribed in Rule 10-5.11(23). Under subparagraph "d" of that rule, local health plans must designate subdistricts according to HRS guidelines. Subparagraph "e" requires that beds be allocated to designated subdistricts consistent with the total number of beds allocated to the district under the rule, and consistent with subparagraph "i," which contains geographic accessibility standards. Rule 10-5.11(23) * * * * * Acute Care Service Subdistrict Designation. Acute care service sub- district designations shall be adopted, as necessary, by each Local Health Council as an element of its local health plan according to guidelines developed by the State Health Planning Agency. Designations will become effective for the purposes of this rule upon the filing of the adopted local health plan acute care subdistricting elements with the Secretary of State. Subdistrict Bed Allocations. Subdistrict bed allocations by type of service shall be made by the Local Health Councils consistent with the district total acute care bed allocation as determined by the methodology contained in paragraph (f) below, as well as any adjustments to the allocation as determined by the provisions of paragraphs and (h) below. Such allocations shall also be consistent with the provisions 9f paragraph (i) and the requirements of Section 381.494(7)(b) , Florida Statutes. * * * * * Geographic Accessibility Considerations. Acute care hospital beds should be available and accessible within an automobile travel time of 30 minutes under average travel conditions to at least 90 percent of the population residing in an urban area subdistrict. Acute care hospital beds should be available and accessible within a maximum automobile travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions to at least 90 percent of the population residing in a rural area sub- district. The elements of the District IV health plan contained in the Sub- district Rule are consistent with the uniform methodology prescribed in Rule 10-5.11(23) and HRS guidelines. In response to these guidelines, the District IV health council adopted and transmitted to HRS, on July 7, 1983, the acute care component of the district health plan. After the district council approved this component and allocated beds to the various subdistricts, HRS supplied updated population figures resulting in an increase in the total number of beds allocated to the district. The council's staff then adjusted the number of beds allocated to the subdistricts on a pro rata basis. These adjustments were consistent with the council's policy, as reflected by its approval of the acute care component. No evidence has been presented to show that the council's staff lacked authority to make these adjustments. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7) In addition to allocating district wide bed-need among the subdistricts of District IV, the acute care component contains detailed information and analysis concerning acute care bed-need. This information is pertinent but not necessary to the review of CON applications in District IV. (Petitioner's Exhibit No 7) The challenged Subdistrict Rule simply designates subdistricts and allocates bed-need among them; other data and analysis contained in the acute care component are not included. HRS, however, is now drafting an addition to the Subdistrict Rule (Section 10-17.005), titled "subsection (3), Acute Care Policies and Priorities," which incorporates additional portions of the district plan for use in reviewing CON applications in District IV. This draft rule allows exceptions based on local conditions: When there are more than one widely separated hospital service areas located within a single subdistrict, such as St. Augustine in South Duval Subdistrict 3, Bunnell and Daytona Beach in Subdistrict 4, and unforeseen growth, change and makeup of population, or other circumstances cause a significant increase in the demand for inpatient care within one of the service areas, the State should make exception to the District Health Plan when it is reasonable and logical to do so. (Petitioner'S Exhibit No. 34) This provision was contained in the district plan at the time HRS adopted the Subdistrict Rule. (Petitioner'S Exhibit No. 7) The Subdistrict Rule, with the exception of St. Lukes' Hospital, allocates beds among the subdistricts on the basis of the number of patient-days currently utilized by the hospitals in each subdistrict, projected for 1988. St. Lukes' Hospital, now located on the north side of the St. John's River in Subdistrict 1, will move to the south side of the St. John's River in Subdistrict 3, the subdistrict where Humana seeks to build its Mandarin hospital. This move from north to south is accounted in the subdistrict allocation by assuming that 34 percent of the current (north) St. Lukes' Hospital patient-days will come with the hospital when it moves from Subdistrict 1 to Subdistrict 3, and that the remainder will come from Subdistrict 3 (south) patients. With 66 percent of St. Lukes' bed capacity allocated for Subdistrict 3, there will be no additional bed-need in that subdistrict for years. HRS prepared an economic impact statement (EIS) in connection with its adoption of the subdistrict rules, including the Subdistrict Rule under challenge. The EIS addresses the agency's cost to implement the proposed rules, the cost or economic benefit to persons directly affected, and the affect on competition. The data and methods used in preparing the EIS are also briefly summarized.
Findings Of Fact By application dated September 28, 1988 respondent/applicant, Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc. (SFRMC), filed an application with respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), seeking the issuance of a certificate of need (CON) authorizing the expenditure of approximately $19.98 million to construct a new three story clinical and ancillary services building at its facility located in Fort Myers, Florida. After the application was filed, and certain additional information was provided by SFRMC, HRS issued proposed agency action in the form of a letter on January 13, 1989 advising that it intended to issue SFRMC a CON. On February 3, 1989, HRS published in the Florida Administrative Weekly a notice of its intent to grant the CON. After learning of this action, petitioner, Lee Memorial Hospital (Lee), filed a petition for formal administrative hearing seeking to contest the proposed agency action. That prompted this proceeding. The state agency action report, which is a part of this record, reflects that the applicant proposes to: ... add 4 additional operating rooms to the existing 11; 16 new cardiac surgery recovery beds to the existing 16; and 8 new CCU beds to the existing 8 (by conversion of med/surg beds) in a new three story building that will be a replacement/expansion to the existing facility. The requested project will not constitute an increase in the licensed beds of the applicant's facility. The proposal does not request approval of any new services or change in the total number of beds that are licensed for the applicant's facility, but it does include redesignation of 8 existing medical/surgical beds to add to the 8 additional CCU beds requested. New space for Central Supply Services, as well (as) new and additional administrative, staff support areas, land public areas have been planned. (Emphasis added) These changes were sought by SFRMC to meet "(t)he need and demand for Cardiac services (that have) increased dramatically over the last seven years due to the community's growth, technological advancements and changing clinical practices." According to the allegations in the petition, Lee operates a health care facility in Fort Myers, Florida, which is in the same health planning district as SFRMC. The petition goes on to aver that Lee provides a wide range of medical services and programs, including cardiac surgery and recovery, cardiac catheterization laboratories, CCU, and non-invasive diagnostic cardiology services as proposed in SFRMC's application. The petition alleges further that, due to the sheer size of the project and the "substantial change" in services that will occur, Lee is entitled to a hearing. Based upon these considerations, Lee alleges that its open heart surgery program will be substantially affected if the CON is issued. HRS has authorized Lee to operate an open heart surgery program. However, by stipulation dated March 28, 1988 in DOAH Case No. 87-4755, it has agreed not to begin this program until at least April 1, 1990. If approved, SFRMC's building addition would not be completed until May 1, 1990, or one month after Lee's program begins. The application reflects that SFRMC will increase its total square footage by 25%, operating room capacity by 57%, and SICU capacity by 64%. In all, the project will add approximately 68,000 square feet to the facility complex. In addition, operating expenses associated with the project will total in excess of $28 million per year. Finally, utilization of existing facilities will be enhanced by the new addition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center's motion to dismiss the petition of Lee Memorial Hospital be GRANTED and that Lee's petition for formal administrative hearing be dismissed with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1989.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), should grant the application of the Petitioner, RHPC, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Hospital (Riverside), for a certificate of need, CON Action No. 6582, for the addition of 31 acute care beds.
Findings Of Fact The Applicant and the Application. The applicant, the Petitioner, RHPC, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Hospital (Riverside), is a 102 bed acute care hospital 1/ located at 6600 Madison Street, New Port Richey, Florida, in the West Pasco County Subdistrict of HRS Service District 5, which also includes Pinellas County and East Pasco County. Included among its complement of beds are 14 obstetrical (OB) beds. There are no existing pediatric beds. Riverside's application is for a certificate of need to spend approximately $2,000,000 to renovate its existing OB unit, add 14 beds to the OB unit, add 11 medical/surgical beds and add six pediatric beds. The addition of the pediatric unit will be accomplished by relatively minor alterations to existing space and existing beds, and the cost attributable to this phase of the application is negligible. Similarly, the 11 additional med/surg beds will be accomplished by adding beds to existing private rooms, to create semi-private rooms, at a cost of only approximately $44,000. (Gas and electric lines for the additional beds already have been run to the headwall of these rooms and can be connected without difficulty or much expense.) Most of the $2 million total capital expenditure proposed in the application is attributable to the cost of modernizing the OB unit, with the addition of 14 beds in the process. The addition of 14 beds to the unit does not add significantly to what the modernization effort would cost without the addition of the 14 beds. The proposed new OB unit would include private rooms, to go along with the semi-private rooms that make up the existing 14-bed unit. In addition, the proposed modernized 28-bed OB unit would consist of the combined labor/delivery/recovery/post-partum (LDRP) rooms now preferred by most patients. Pertinent State Health Plan Provision. The 1989 State of Florida Health Plan states at the outset of a list of preferences to be utilized in comparing applications for additional acute care beds: No additional acute care beds should generally be approved unless the subdistrict occupancy rate is at or exceeds 75 percent, or, in the event of an existing facility, an applicant shall demonstrate that the occupancy rate for the most recent 12 months is at or exceeds 80 percent. The Need Methodology. Using the F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038 methodology, the district and subdistrict would show numeric need of approximately 201 and 230, respectively. See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(5). Regardless of the calculated bed need, HRS does not normally approve additional beds in a subdistrict unless the annual average acute care bed occupancy rate is 75 percent or higher during the 12-month base period of July, 1989, through June, 1990. See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(d). The 670 licensed beds in the West Pasco Subdistrict reported only 68.92% occupancy during the 12- month base period, resulting in no projected need for additional acute care beds in the subdistrict for the applicable 1996 planning horizon. Even when a subdistricts's need for additional acute care beds projected by the methodology is zero, an application by an existing hospital still may be approved where that hospital's annual average occupancy rate exceeds 75 percent for the 12-month base period (again, in this case, from July, 1989, through June, 1990.) See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(e). During the 12-month base period from July, 1989, through June, 1990, Riverside's occupancy averaged 72.40%, not high enough to be approved under F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(e). Observation Bed Days. Three types of beds days are included in a category of so-called "outpatient observation bed days." First, "twenty-three hour patients" are patients who are not eligible for inpatient services under the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) criteria for the Medicare program. Second, "observation patients" are similar non-Medicare patients. Third, some outpatients (or ambulatory surgery patients) also use beds for part of a day. With new cost containment and review/regulation developments in hospital care, more patients are spending up to 23 hours in the hospital before a decision is made that further hospitalization in not needed. As a result, "observation" bed use has increased. Outpatient observation services have been recognized and defined by HCFA. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida (the Medicare intermediary) and the Health Care Cost Containment Board (HCCCB) have addressed issues such as reimbursement, billing and reporting of observation beds. Services are provided to "observation bed" patients under doctor's orders, including diagnostic services, observation and monitoring by nursing personnel and/or medical intervention or treatment. Calculation of occupancy rates under the HRS need methodology does not take into account the so-called "observation bed days." 2/ There was no evidence that any part of District V or the West Pasco Subdistrict are inaccessible geographically. Other Need Factors. The evidence showed that there is a seasonal peak utilization and occupancy of acute care beds in District V and in the West Pasco Subdistrict during approximately October or November through March or April each year. This seasonal peak is reflected by the statistics. As previously stated, Riverside's occupancy averaged 72.40% during the period from July, 1989, through June, 1990. During the first quarter of 1990, occupancy was 86.83%. Riverside's average occupancy for calendar year 1990 was 73.87%. For the period from March, 1990, through February, 1991, average occupancy for Riverside's acute care beds was 71.2%. 3/ For the period from March, 1990, through February, 1991, occupancy for Riverside's obstetrics beds was 92.9%. There is no acute care pediatric unit in the West Pasco subdistrict. Subdistrict residents (as well as others in Riverside's general service area) needing level II pediatric services generally go to a Pinellas County or East Pasco County hospital for them. Given the choice, some but not all of these patients likely would prefer to get these services at Riverside, depending primarily on the severity of the particular medical needs. But the evidence did not quantify the number predicted to switch to Riverside. Also, occupancy of pediatric beds in Pasco county was less than 15% during 1987 and 1988. Medical Care for the Poor. The State Health Plan also notes that the uncompensated care burden on hospitals has grown during the 1980s because of a growing number of low-income persons; simultaneously, the proportion of persons covered by Medicaid has dropped. Numerous statewide studies, moreover, have shown that hospitals' uncompensated care is increasing at the same time that their ability to absorb the cost of care is decreasing. Riverside's predecessor bought the hospital from Pasco County in 1982. As a condition to the purchase, Riverside's predecessor agreed to provide Medicaid and indigent care for Pasco County in perpetuity. When Riverside purchased the hospital on December 29, 1983, it assumed the contractual obligation to provide Medicaid and indigent care in perpetuity. Riverside is a disproportionate share provider within the meaning of the State and local health plans. Approximately, 13% of Riverside's total annual patient days are for Medicaid patients. In 1990, 2,647 of Riverside's obstetrical, and 4,272 of its non-obstetrical patient days, were Medicaid. Riverside's charity care deduction from gross patient revenue for fiscal year 1990 was 1.07% of gross patient revenue. Riverside's Medicaid deduction from gross patient revenue for fiscal year 1990 was 5.96% of gross patient revenue. Approximately, 14.8% of Riversides's services go to Medicaid and indigent patients. Although Riverside has only 14% of the beds in the West Pasco subdistrict, it does more than 90% of the non-emergency, non-OB Medicaid care. Approval of the Riverside application would enable Riverside to spread its administrative and overhead costs over a larger base, thereby reducing average charges. Approval of the Riverside application also would make Riverside more profitable and thereby better able to absorb the cost of the Medicaid and indigent care it provides. If Riverside converts existing acute care beds to pediatric or OB beds, it probably would have to squeeze out paying patients during seasonal occupancy peaks, thereby losing more revenue and profits. Competition. If the Riverside application is approved, Riverside's share of the market represented by the West Pasco subdistrict will rise from approximately 14% to approximately 18%. HCA controls the rest of the market. There are no existing OB beds in the West Pasco subdistrict other than at Riverside. The HCA hospital in New Port Richey had an OB unit which it recently abandoned. As a result of the grant of Bayonet Point's application, CON Action No. 6583, with which Riverside had been in direct competition in this application review cycle, Bayonet Point now is approved for a seven-bed OB unit as part of its bed complement. Upgrading its existing OB unit and adding 14 more OB beds will enable Riverside to capture more private paying patients, which will better enable it to compete with the HCA hospitals. At present, Riverside's OB unit is utilized almost exclusively by indigent and Medicaid patients because of the hospital's contract with Pasco County. This unit now is operating at close to absolute capacity. With the upgrades and additional beds, Riverside can work to capture some private pay patients; without them, Bayonet Point will capture the private pay patients. Financial Feasibility. Riverside operated at a deficit from 1983 essentially to the present. By the end of 1990, Riverside had accumulated a deficit of $8.8 million. Riverside's corporate parent, American Healthcare Management, Inc. (AHM), was funding the deficit. From 1985 through December, 1989, AHM was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. During that time period, there was legitimate concern whether AHM would be able to continue to fund Riverside deficits. AHM emerged from bankruptcy in December, 1989, stronger financially. It has since become stronger still. AHM reduced its debt by approximately $88 million. Part of the debt reduction was achieved by the sale of $43 million of underperforming assets. In addition, $45 million of bond debt was exchanged for common stock on September 30, 1991. The interest savings on the bond-for-stock exchange is $6 million a year. As a result, AHM's current debt-to-equity ratio is approximately $160 million to $130 million. AHM's corporate staff has been reduced from about 102 to 65. Its corporate office were transferred from expensive quarters in Dallas, Texas, to less expensive quarters in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Corporate expenses have been greatly reduced as a result. Accounts receivable have been reduced by better collection methods, and the $43 million of assets sold to reduce corporate debt had been underperforming. AHM had $21 million cash and short-term investments as of December 31, 1989. As of the date of the final hearing, it had $18 million cash and short- term investments. Riverside's gross margin (profit) for the first nine months of 1991 was $4 million. After depreciation, amortization, and interest and home office costs, Riverside generated approximately $1.2 million for the first nine months of 1991. Internal cash flow generated by AHM and Riverside would be sufficient to finance Riverside's application project. Since the capital costs of Riverside's proposed project are relatively small, financial feasibility is relatively easy to achieve. Besides costing relatively little, the 31 new beds will not increase intercompany interest or management fees significantly. In addition, the 31 new beds would enable Riverside to better compete for private pay patients. Given the expected utilization of the new beds, the proposed project will be to the financial benefit of the applicant. The pro forma bears this out. It projects 75.11% occupancy for the 31 new beds in the second year of operation (July, 1994, to June, 1995). (This projection does not include expected "observation bed days.") A profit of $2,477,199 for the 31 beds is projected for the second year of operation (not counting any portion of the preexisting intercompany interest or management fees).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Riverside application for a certificate of need, CON Action No. 6582, for the addition of 31 acute care beds. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1992.
Conclusions Having reviewed the administrative complaint dated July 16, 2008, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1), and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration ("Agency") has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 2) with the other party to these proceedings, and being otherwise well-advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: The. att ached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Filed June 30, 2009 1:59 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. Respondent shall pay an administrative fine in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1000.00). The administrative fine is due and payable within thirty (30) days of the date of rendition of this Order. Checks should be made payable to the "Agency for Health Care Administration." The check, along with a reference to these case numbers, should be sent directly to: Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Unpaid amounts pursuant to this Order will be subject to statutory interest and may be collected by all methods legally available. Respondent's petition for formal administrative proceedings is hereby dismissed. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's fees. The above-styled case is hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this du, day of- =---' 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Holly Ben on, Secretary Agency fo Health Care Administration A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: David C. Ashburn Attorney for the Respondent Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (U. S. Mail) Mary Daley Jacobs Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2295 Victoria Avenue, Room 346C Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (Interoffice Mail) Finance & Accounting Agency for Health Care Admin. Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Daniel Manry Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (U.S. Mail) Jan Mills Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the <?s = method designated, on this the Z f C J , 2009. Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 922-5873 STATE OF FLORIDA
The Issue Kindred Hospitals East, LLC ("Kindred") and Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc. ("Select-Palm Beach"), filed applications for Certificates of Need ("CONs") with the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA" or the "Agency") seeking approval for the establishment of long-term care hospitals ("LTCHs") in Palm Beach County, AHCA District 9. Select-Palm Beach's application, CON No. 9661, seeks approval for the establishment of a 60-bed freestanding LTCH in "east central" Palm Beach County about 20 miles south of Kindred's planned location. Kindred's application, CON No. 9662, seeks approval for the establishment of a 70-bed LTCH in the "north central" portion of the county. The ultimate issue in this case is whether either or both applications should be approved by the Agency.
Findings Of Fact Long Term Care Hospitals Of the four classes of facilities licensed as hospitals by the Agency, "Class I or general hospitals," includes: General acute care hospitals with an average length of stay of 25 days or less for all beds; Long term care hospitals, which meet the provisions of subsection 59A-3.065(27), F.A.C.; and, Rural hospitals designated under Section 395, Part III, F.S. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.252(1)(a). This proceeding concerns CON applications for the second of Florida's Class I or general hospitals: LTCHs. A critically ill patient may be admitted and treated in a general acute care hospital, but, if the patient cannot be stabilized or discharged to a lower level of care on the continuum of care within a relatively short time, the patient may be discharged to an LTCH. An LTCH patient is almost always "critically catastrophically ill or ha[s] been." (Tr. 23). Typically, an LTCH patient is medically unstable, requires extensive nursing care with physician oversight, and often requires extensive technological support. The LTCH patient usually fits into one or more of four categories. One category is patients in need of pulmonary/respiratory services. Usually ventilator dependent, these types of LTCH patients have other needs as well that requires "complex comprehensive ventilator weaning in addition to meeting ... other needs." (Tr. 26). A second category is patients in need of wound care whose wound is life-threatening. Frequently compromised by inadequate nutrition, these types of LTCH patients are often diabetic. There are a number of typical factors that may account for the seriousness of the wound patient's condition. The job of the staff at the LTCH in such a case is to attend to the wound and all the other medical problems of the patient that have extended the time required for care of the wound. A third category is patients with some sort of neuro-trauma. These patients may have had a stroke and are often elderly; if younger, they may be victims of a car accident or some other serious trauma. They typically have multiple body systems that require medical treatment, broken bones and a closed head injury for example, that have made them "very sick and complex." (Tr. 27). The fourth category is referred to by the broad nomenclature of "medically complex" although it is a subset of the population of LTCH patients all of whom are medically complex. The condition of the patients in this fourth category involves two or more body systems. The patients usually present at the LTCH with "renal failure ... [and] with another medical condition ... that requires a ventilator ..." Id. In short, LTCHs provide extended medical and rehabilitative care to patients with multiple, chronic, and/or clinically complex acute medical conditions that usually require care for a relatively extended period of time. To meet the definition of an LTCH a facility must have an average length of inpatient stay ("ALOS") greater than 25 days for all hospital beds. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.065(34). The staffs at general acute care hospitals and LTCHs have different orientations. With a staff oriented toward a patient population with a much shorter ALOS, the general acute care hospital setting may not be appropriate for a patient who qualifies for LTCH services. The staff at a general acute care hospital frequently judges success by a patient getting well in a relatively short time. It is often difficult for general acute care hospital staff to sustain the interest and effort necessary to serve the LTCH patient well precisely because of the staff's expectation that the patient will improve is not met in a timely fashion. As time goes by, that expectation continues to be frustrated, a discouragement to staff. The LTCH is unlike other specialized health care settings. The complex, medical, nursing, and therapeutic requirements necessary to serve the LTCH patient may be beyond the capability of the traditional comprehensive medical rehabilitation ("CMR") hospital, nursing home, skilled nursing facility ("SNF"), or, the skilled nursing unit ("SNU"). CMR units and hospitals are rarely, if ever, appropriate for the LTCH patient. Almost invariably, LTCH patients are not able to tolerate the minimum three (3) hours of therapy per day associated with CMR. The primary focus of LTCHs, moreover, is to provide continued acute medical treatment to the patient that may not yet be stable, with the ultimate goal of getting the patient on the road to recovery. In comparison, the CMR hospital treats medically stable patients consistent with its primary focus of restoring functional capabilities, a more advanced step in the continuum of care. Services provided in LTCHs are distinct from those provided in SNFs or SNUs. The latter are not oriented generally to patients who need daily physician visits or the intense nursing services or observations needed by an LTCH patient. Most nursing and clinical personnel in SNFs and SNUs are not experienced with the unique psychosocial needs of long-term acute care patients and their families. An LTCH is distinguished within the healthcare continuum by the high level of care the patient requires, the interdisciplinary treatment model it follows, and the duration of the patient's hospitalization. Within the continuum of care, LTCHs occupy a niche between traditional acute care hospitals that provide initial hospitalization care on a short-term basis and post-acute care facilities such as nursing homes, SNFs, SNUs, and comprehensive medical rehabilitation facilities. Medicare has long recognized LTCHs as a distinct level of care within the health care continuum. The federal government's prospective payment system ("PPS") now treats the LTCH level of service as distinct with its "own DRG system and ... [its] own case rate reimbursement." (Tr. 108). Under the LTCH PPS, each patient is assigned an LTC- DRG (different than the DRG under the general hospital DRG system) with a corresponding payment rate that is weighted based on the patient diagnosis and acuity. The Parties The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON Program and licensing LTCHs and other hospital facilities pursuant to the authority of Health Facility and Services Development Act, Sections 408.031-408.045, Florida Statutes. Select-Palm Beach is the applicant for a free-standing 60-bed LTCH in "east Central Palm Beach County," Select Ex. 1, stamped page 12, near JFK Medical Center in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9661, was denied by the Agency. Select-Palm Beach is a wholly owned subsidiary of Select Medical Corporation, which provides long term acute care services at 83 LTCHs in 24 states, four of which are freestanding hospitals. The other 79 are each "hospitals-in-a- hospital" ("HIH" or "LTCH HIH"). Kindred is the applicant for a 70-bed LTCH to be located in the north central portion of Palm Beach County in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9662, was denied by the Agency. Kindred is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kindred Healthcare, Inc. ("Kindred Healthcare"). Kindred Healthcare operates 73 LTCHs, 59 of which are freestanding, according to the testimony of Mr. Novak. See Tr. 56-57. Kindred Healthcare has been operating LTCHs since 1985 and has operated them in Florida for more than 15 years. At the time of the submission of Kindred's application, Kindred Healthcare's six LTCHs in Florida were Kindred-North Florida, a 60-bed LTCH in Pinellas County, AHCA District 5; Kindred-Central Tampa, with 102 beds, and Kindred-Bay Area- Tampa, with 73 beds, both in Hillsborough County, in AHCA District 6; Kindred-Ft. Lauderdale with 64 beds and Kindred- Hollywood with 124 beds, both in Broward County, ACHA District 10; and Kindred-Coral Gables, with 53 beds, in Dade County, AHCA District 11. The Applications and AHCA's Review The applications were submitted in the first application cycle of 2003. Select-Palm Beach's application is CON No. 9661; Kindred's is CON No. 9662. Select-Palm Beach estimates its total project costs to be $12,856,139. Select-Palm Beach has not yet acquired the site for its proposed LTCH, but did include in its application a map showing three priority site locations, with its preferred site, designated "Site 1," located near JFK Medical Center. At $12,937,419, Kindred's estimate of its project cost is slightly more than Select-Palm Beach's. The exact site of Kindred's proposed LTCH had not been determined at the time of hearing. Kindred's preference, however, is to locate in the West Palm Beach area in the general vicinity of St. Mary's Hospital, in the northern portion of Palm Beach County along the I-95 corridor. This is approximately 15 to 20 miles north of Select's preferred location for its LTCH. There is no LTCH in the five-county service area that comprises District 9: Indian River, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, Martin, and Palm Beach Counties. There are two LTCHs in adjacent District 10 (to the south). They have a total of 188 beds and an average occupancy of 80 percent. The Agency views LTCH care as a district-wide service primarily for Medicare patients. At the time of the filing of the applications, the population in District 9 was over 1.6 million, including about 400,000 in the age cohort 65 and over. About 70 percent of the District 9 population lives in Palm Beach County. More than 70 percent of the District's general acute care hospitals are located in that county. Kindred's preferred location for its LTCH is approximately 40 to 50 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH; Select-Palm Beach is approximately 25 to 35 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH. The locations of Select Palm-Beach's and Kindred's proposed LTCHs are complementary. The SAAR Following its review of the two applications, AHCA issued its State Agency Action Report ("SAAR"). Section G., of the report, entitled "RECOMMENDATION," states: "Deny Con #9661 and CON #9662." Agency Ex. 2, p. 43. On June 11, 2003, the report was signed by Karen Rivera, Health Services and Facilities Consultant Supervisor Certificate of Need, and Mr. Gregg as the Chief of the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation. It contained a section entitled "Authorization for Agency Action" that states, "[a]uthorized representatives of the Agency for Health Care Administration adopted the recommendations contained herein and released the State Agency Action Report." Agency Ex. 2, p. 44. The adoption of the recommendations is the functional equivalent of preliminary denial of the applications. In Section F. of the SAAR under the heading of "Need," (Agency Ex. 2, p. 40), the Agency explained its primary bases for denial; it concluded that the applicants had not shown need for an LTCH in AHCA District 9. The discussions for the two, although not precisely identical, are quite similar: Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc.(CON #9661): The applicant's two methodological approaches to demonstrate need are not supported by any specific discharge studies or other data, including DRG admission criteria from area hospitals regarding potential need. The applicant also failed to provide any supporting documentation from area physicians or other providers regarding potential referrals. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Kindred Hospitals East, L.L.C. (CON #9662): The various methodological approaches presented are not supported by any specific DRG admission criteria from area hospitals suggesting potential need. The applicant provided numerous letters of support for the project from area hospitals, physicians and case managers. However, the number of potential referrals of patients needing LTCH services was not quantified. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Id. At hearing, the Agency's witness professed no disagreement with the SAAR and continued to maintain the same bases contained in the SAAR for the denials of the two applications The SAAR took no issue with either applicant's ability to provide quality care. It concluded that funding for each applicant was likely to be available and that each project appeared to be financially feasible once operating. The SAAR further stated that there were no major architectural concerns regarding Kindred's proposed facility design, but noted reservations regarding the need for further study and revision of Select Palm-Beach's proposed surgery/procedure wing, as well as cost uncertainties for Select Palm Beach because of such potential revisions. By the time of final hearing, however, the parties had stipulated to the reasonableness of each applicant's proposed costs and methods of construction. The parties stipulated to the satisfaction of a number of the statutory CON criteria by the two applicants. The parties agreed that the applications complied with the content and review process requirements of sections 408.037 and 409.039, Florida Statutes, with one exception. Select reserved the issue of the lack of a Year 2 of Schedule 6, (Staffing) in Kindred's application. The form of Schedule 6 provided by AHCA to Kindred (unlike other schedules of the application) does not clearly indicate that a second year of staffing data must be provided. The remainder of the criteria stipulated and the positions of the parties as articulated in testimony at hearing and in the proposed orders that were submitted leave need as the sole issue of consequence with one exception: whether Kindred has demonstrated that its project is financially feasible in the long term. Kindred's Long Term Financial Feasibility Select-Palm Beach contends that Kindred's project is not financially feasible in the long term for two reasons. They relate to Kindred's application and are stated in Select Palm Beach's proposed order: Kindred understated property taxes[;] Kindred completely fails to include in its expenses on Schedule 8, patient medical assistance trust fund (PMATF) taxes [citation omitted]. Proposed Recommended Order of Select-Palm Beach, Inc., p. 32, Finding of Fact 97. Raised after the proceeding began at DOAH by Select- Palm Beach, these two issues were not considered by AHCA when it conducted its review of Kindred's application because the issues were not apparent from the face of the application. AHCA's Review of Kindred's Application Kindred emerged from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings on April 20, 2001, under a plan of reorganization. With respect to the events that led to the bankruptcy proceeding and the need to review prior financial statements, AHCA made the following finding in the SAAR: Under the plan [of reorganization], the applicant [Kindred] adopted the fresh start accounting provision of SOP 90-7. Under fresh start accounting, a new reporting entity is created and the recorded amounts of assets and liabilities are adjusted to reflect their estimated fair values. Accordingly, the prior period financial statements are not comparable to the current period statements and will not be considered in this analysis. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30. The financial statements provided by Kindred as part of its application show that Kindred Healthcare, Kindred's parent, is a financially strong company. The information contained in Kindred's CON application filed in 2003 included Kindred Healthcare's financial statements from the preceding calendar year. Kindred Healthcare's Consolidated Statement of Operations for the year ended December 31, 2002, showed "Income from Operations" to be more than $33 million, and net cash provided by operating activities (cash flow) of over $248 million for the period. Its Consolidated Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2002, showed cash and cash equivalents of over $244 million and total assets of over $1.6 billion. In light of the information contained in Kindred's CON application, the SAAR concluded with regard to short term financial feasibility: Based on the audited financial statements of the applicant, cash on hand and cash flows, if they continue at the current level, would be sufficient to fund this project as proposed. Funding for all capital projects, with the support of its parent, is likely to be available as needed. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30 (emphasis supplied). The SAAR recognized that Kindred projected a "year two operating loss for the hospital of $287,215." Agency Ex. 2, p. Nonetheless, the SAAR concludes on the issue of financial feasibility, "[w]ith continued operational support from the parent company, this project [Kindred's] is considered financially feasible." Id. The Agency did not have the information, however, at the time it reviewed Kindred's application that Kindred understated property taxes and omitted the Public Medicaid Trust Fund and Medical Assistance Trust Fund ("PMATF") "provider tax" of 1.5 percent that would be imposed on Kindred's anticipated revenues of $11,635,919 as contended by Select-Palm Beach. Consistent with Select Palm-Beach's general contentions about property taxes and PMATF taxes, "Kindred acknowledges that it likely understated taxes to be incurred in the operation of its facility." Kindred's Proposed Recommended Order, paragraph 50, p. 19. The parties agree, moreover, that the omitted PMATF tax is reasonably projected to be $175,000. They do not agree, however, as to the impact of the PMATF tax on year two operating loss. The difference between the two (approximately $43,000) is attributable to a corporate income tax benefit deduction claimed by Kindred so that the combination of the application's projected loss, the omitted PMATF tax, and the deduction yields a year two operating loss of approximately $419,000. Without taking into consideration the income tax benefit, Select-Palm Beach contends that adding in the PMATF tax produces a loss of $462,000. Kindred and Select-Palm Beach also disagree over the projection of property taxes by approximately $50,000. Kindred projects that the property taxes in year two of operation will be approximately $225,000 instead of the $49,400 listed in the application. Select-Palm Beach projects that they will be $50,000 higher at approximately $275,000. Whether Kindred's or Select-Palm Beach's figures are right, Kindred makes two points. First, if year two revenues and expenses, adjusted for underestimated and omitted taxes, are examined on a quarterly basis, the fourth quarter of year two has a better bottom line than the earlier quarters. Not only will the fourth quarter bottom line be better, but, using Kindred's figures, the fourth quarter of year two of operations is profitable. Second, and most importantly given the Agency's willingness to credit Kindred with financial support from its parent, Kindred's application included in its application an interest figure of $1.2 million for year one of operation and $1.03 million for year two. Kindred claims in its proposed recommended order that "[i]n reality ... this project will incur no interest expense as Kindred intends to fund the project out of cash on hand, or operating capital, and would not have to borrow money to construct the project." Id., at paragraph 54, p. 20. Through the testimony of John Grant, Director of Planning and Development for Kindred's parent, Kindred Healthcare, Kindred indicated at hearing that its parent might, indeed, fund the project: A ... Kindred [Healthcare] would likely fund this project out of operating capital. Like I said, in the first nine months of this year Kindred had operating cash flow of approximately $180 million. So it's not as if we would have to actually borrow money to complete a project like this. Q And what was the interest expense that you had budgeted in Year Two for this facility? A $1,032,000. Q ... so is it your statement then that this facility would not owe any interest back to the parent company? A That's correct. Tr. 221-222 (emphasis supplied). If the "financing interest" expense is excluded from Kindred's statement of projected expenses in Schedule 8 of the CON application, using Kindred's revised projections, the project shows a profit of approximately $612,0002 for the second year of operation. If Select-Palm Beach's figures and bottom line loss excludes the "finances interest" expense, the elimination of the expense yields of profit for year two of operations in excess of $500,000. If the support of Kindred's parent is considered as the Agency has signaled its willingness to do and provided that the project is, in fact, funded by Kindred Healthcare rather than financed through some other means that would cause Kindred to incur interest expense, Kindred's project is financially feasible in the long term. With the exception of the issue regarding Kindred's long term financial feasibility, as stated above, taken together, the stipulation and agreements of the parties, the Agency's preliminary review contained in the SAAR, and the evidence at hearing, all distill the issues in this case to one overarching issue left to be resolved by this Recommended Order: need for long term care hospital beds in District 9. Need for the Proposals From AHCA's perspective prior to the hearing, the only issue in dispute with respect to the two applications is need. This point was made clear by Mr. Gregg's testimony at hearing in answer to a question posed by counsel for Select-Palm Beach: Q. ... Assuming there was sufficient need for 130 beds in the district is there any reason why both applicants shouldn't be approved in this case, assuming that need? A. No. (Tr. 398). Both applicants contend that the application each submitted is superior to the other. Neither, however, at this point in the proceeding, has any objection to approval of the other application provided its own application is approved. Consistent with its position that both applications may be approved, Select-Palm Beach presented testimony through its health care planner Patricia Greenberg3 that there was need in District 9 for both applicants' projects. Her testimony, moreover, rehabilitated the single Kindred methodology of three that yielded numeric need less than the 130 beds proposed by both applications: Q ... you do believe that there is a need for both in the district. A I believe there's a need for two facilities in the district. Q It could support two facilities? A Oh, absolutely. Q And the disagreement primarily relates to the conservative approach of Kindred in terms of not factoring in out-migration and the narrowing the DRG categories? A Correct. ... Kindred actually had three models. Two of them support both facilities, but it's the GMLOS model that I typically rely on, and it didn't on the surface support both facilities. That's why I reconciled the two, and I believe that's the difference, is just the 50 DRGs and not including the out-migration. That would boost their need above the 130, and two facilities would give people alternatives, it would foster competition, and it would really improve access in that market. Tr. 150-51. Need for the applications, therefore, is the paramount issue in this case. Since both applicants are qualified to operate an LTCH in Florida, if need is proven for the 130 beds, then with the exception of Kindred's long term financial feasibility, all parties agree that there is no further issue: both applications should be granted. No Agency Numeric Need Methodology The Agency has not established a numeric need methodology for LTCH services. Consequently, it does not publish a fixed-need pool for LTCHs. Nor does the Agency have "any policy upon which to determine need for the proposed beds or service." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)1. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2), which governs "Fixed Need Pools" (the "Fixed Need Pools Rule") states that if "no agency policy exist" with regard to a needs assessment methodology: [T]he applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)2. The Fixed Need Pools Rule goes on to elaborate in subparagraph (e)3 that "[t]he existence of unmet need will not be based solely on the absence of a health service, health care facility, or beds in the district, subdistrict, region or proposed service area." Population, Demographics and Dynamics The first of the four topics to be addressed when an applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology is "population, demographics and dynamics." The Agency has not defined service areas for LTCHs. Nonetheless, from a health planning perspective, it views LTCH services as being provided district-wide primarily for Medicare patients. Consistent with the Agency's view, Select-Palm Beach identified the entire district, that is, all of AHCA District 9, as its service area. It identified Palm Beach County, one of the five counties in AHCA District 9, as its primary service area. In identifying the service area for Select-Palm Beach, Ms. Greenberg drew data from various sources: population estimates for Palm Beach County and surrounding areas; the number of acute care hospital beds in the area; the number of LTCH beds in the area; the types of patients treated at acute care hospitals; and the lengths of stay of the patients treated at those hospitals. AHCA District 9 has more elderly than any other district in the State, and Palm Beach County has more than any other county except for Dade. Palm Beach County residents comprise 71% of the District 9 population. It is reasonably projected that the elderly population (the "65 and over" age cohort) in Palm Beach County is projected to grow at the rate of 8 percent by 2008. The "65 and over" age cohort is significant because the members of that cohort are most likely to utilize hospital services, including LTCH services. Its members are most likely to suffer complications from illness and surgical procedures and more likely to have co-morbidity conditions that require long- term acute care. Persons over 65 years of age comprise approximately 80 percent of the patient population of LTCH facilities. Both Select-Palm Beach and Kindred project that approximately 80 percent of their admissions will come from Medicare patients. Since 90 percent of admissions to an LTCH come from acute care facilities, most of the patient days expected at Select-Palm Beach's proposed LTCH will originate from residents in its primary service area, Palm Beach County. When looking at the migration pattern for patients at acute care facilities within Palm Beach County, the majority (90 percent) come from Palm Beach County residents. Thus, Select- Palm Beach's projected primary service area is reasonable. Just as Select-Palm Beach, Kindred proposes to serve the entire District. Kindred proposes that its facility be based in Palm Beach County because of the percentage of the district's population in the county as well as because more than 70% of the district's general acute care hospitals are in the county. Its selection of the District as its service area, consistent with the Agency's view, is reasonable. Currently there are no LTCHs in District 9. Availability, Utilization and Quality of Like Services The second topic is "availability, utilization and quality of like services." There are no "like" services available to District residents in the District. Select-Palm Beach and Kindred, therefore, contend that they meet the criteria of the second topic. There are like services in other AHCA Districts. For example, AHCA District 10 has at total of 188 beds at two Kindred facilities in Fort Lauderdale and Hollywood. The Agency, however, did not present evidence of their quality, that they were available or to what extent they are utilized by the residents of AHCA District 9. Medical Treatment Trends The third topic is medical treatment trends. Caring for patients with chronic and long term care needs is becoming increasingly more important as the population ages and as medical technology continues to emerge that prolongs life expectancies. Through treatment provided the medically complex and critically ill with state of the art mechanical ventilators, metabolic analyzers, and breathing monitors, LTCHs meet needs beyond the capability of the typical general acute care hospitals. In this way, LTCHs fill a niche in the continuum of care that addresses the needs of a small but growing patient population. Treatment for these patients in an LTCH, who otherwise would be cared for without adequate reimbursement to the general acute care hospital or moved to an alternative setting with staff and services inadequate to meet their needs, is a medical trend. Market Conditions The fourth topic to be addressed by the applicant is market conditions. The federal government's development of a distinctive prospective payment system for LTCHs (LTC-DRG), has created a market condition favorable to LTCHs. General acute care hospitals face substantial losses for the medically complex patient who uses far greater resources than expected on the basis of individual diagnoses. Medicare covers between 80 and 85 percent of LTCH patients. The remaining patients are covered by private insurance, managed care and Medicaid. LTCH programs allow for shorter lengths of stay in a general acute care facility, reduces re-admissions and provide more discharges to home. These benefits are increasingly recognized. Numeric Need Analysis Kindred presented a set of needs assessment methodologies that yielded numeric need for the beds applied for by Kindred. Select-Palm Beach did the same. Unlike Kindred, however, all of the needs assessment methodologies presented by Select-Palm Beach demonstrated numeric need in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applications. Select-Palm Beach's methodologies, overall, are superior to Kindred's. Select-Palm Beach used two sets of needs assessment methodologies and sensitivity testing of one of the sets that confirmed the methodology's reasonableness. The two sets or needs assessment methodologies are: (1) a use rate methodology and (2) length of stay methodologies. The use rate methodology yielded projected bed need for Palm Beach County alone in excess of the 130 beds proposed by the two applicants. For the year "7/05 - 6/06" the bed need is projected to be 256; for the year "7/06 - 6/07" the bed need is projected to be 261; and, for the year "7/07 - 6/08" the bed need is projected to be 266. See Select Ex. 1, Bates Stamp p. 000036 and the testimony of Ms. Greenberg at tr. 114. If the use rate analysis had been re-computed to include two districts whose data was excluded from the analysis, the bed need yielded for Palm Beach County alone was 175 beds, a numeric need still in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applicants. The use rate methodology is reasonable.4 The length of stay methodologies are also reasonable. These two methodologies also yielded numeric need for beds in excess of the 130 beds proposed. The two methodologies yielded need for 167 beds and 250 beds. Agency Denial The Agency's general concerns about LTCHs are not without basis. For many years, there were almost no LTCH CON applications filed with the Agency. A change occurred in 2002. The change in the LTCH environment in the last few years put AHCA in the position of having "to adapt to a rapidly changing situation in terms of [Agency] understanding of what has been going on in recent years with long-term care hospitals." (Tr. 358.) "... [I]n the last couple of years long-term care hospital applications have become [AHCA's] most common type of application." (Tr. 359.) At the time of the upsurge in applications, there was "virtually nothing ... in the academic literature about long- term care hospitals ... that could [provide] ... an understanding of what was going on ... [nor was there anything] in the peer reviewed literature that addressed long-term care hospitals" id., and the health care planning issues that affected them. Two MedPAC reports came out, one in 2003 and another in 2004. The 2003 report conveyed the information that the federal government was unable to identify patients appropriate for LTCH services, services that are overwhelmingly Medicare funded, because of overlap of LTCH services with other types of services. The 2004 report gave an account of the federal government decision to change its payment policy for a type of long-term care hospitals that are known as "hospitals-within- hospitals" (tr. 368) so that "hospitals within hospitals as of this past summer [2004] can now only treat 25 percent of their patients from the host hospital." Id. Both reports roused concerns for AHCA. First, if appropriate LTCH patients cannot be identified and other types of services overlap appropriately with LTCH services, AHCA cannot produce a valid needs assessment methodology. The second produces another concern. In the words of Mr. Gregg, The problem ... with oversupply of long-term care hospital beds is that it creates an incentive for providers to seek patient who are less appropriate for the service. What we know now is that only the sickest patient ... with the most severe conditions are truly appropriate for long-term care hospital placement. * * * ... [T]he MedPAC report most recently shows us that the greatest indicator of utilization of long-term care hospital services is the mere availability of those services. Tr. 368-369. The MedPAC reports, themselves, although marked for identification, were not admitted into evidence. Objections to their admission (in particular, Kindred's) were sustained because they had not been listed by AHCA on the stipulation required by the Pre-hearing Order of Instructions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Agency for Health Care Administration that: approves Select-Palm Beach's application, CON 9661; and approves Kindred's application CON 9662 with the condition that financing of the project be provided by Kindred Healthcare. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2005.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 10432 filed by East Florida-DMC, Inc. (DMC), to build an 80-bed acute care hospital in Miami-Dade County, Florida, AHCA District 11, or CON Application No. 10433 filed by The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Florida d/b/a Jackson Hospital West (JW), to build a 100-bed acute care hospital in Miami-Dade County, Florida, AHCA District 11, on balance, satisfy the applicable criteria; and, if so, whether either or both should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the parties’ stipulations, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, other evidence presented at the final hearing, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County d/b/a Jackson Hospital West and Jackson Health System (JHS) JHS is a taxpayer-funded health system located in and owned by Miami-Dade County. It is governed by The Public Health Trust of Miami Dade-County, Florida (PHT), a seven-member board. JHS owns and operates three acute care hospitals in Miami-Dade County--Jackson Memorial Hospital (JMH); Jackson North Medical Center (JN); and Jackson South Medical Center (JS)--as well as three specialty hospitals: Holtz Children’s Hospital (Holtz); Jackson Rehabilitation Hospital; and Jackson Behavioral Health Hospital. JHS also owns and operates numerous other non- hospital healthcare facilities within Miami-Dade County. JHS’s applicant in this proceeding is JW which, if approved, will be another acute care hospital in JHS. JHS is an academic teaching institution, and the University of Miami (UM) is JHS’s affiliated medical school. Over 1,000 UM residents staff JMH pursuant to an operating agreement with JHS. JN and JS are not academic medical centers. JHS annually receives sales tax and ad valorem tax revenues from Miami-Dade County in order to help fund its operations. JS and JN are community hospitals operated as part of JHS. JS was acquired in 2001. JS is licensed for 226 beds and is also home to a verified Level II trauma center. The JN facility was acquired by JHS in 2006. The facility is licensed for 382 beds. East Florida (DMC) DMC is an affiliate of HCA Healthcare, Inc. (HCA), the largest provider of acute care hospital services in the world. DMC will operate within HCA’s East Florida Division (EFD), which is comprised of 15 hospitals, 12 surgery centers, two diagnostic imaging centers, four freestanding emergency departments, nine behavioral health facilities, and one regional laboratory, along with other related services. There are three HCA-affiliated hospitals in Miami-Dade County: KRMC; Aventura Hospital and Medical Center (Aventura); and Mercy Hospital, a campus of Plantation General Hospital (Mercy). Kendall Regional (KRMC) KRMC, which is located at the intersection of the Florida Turnpike and Southwest 40th Street in Miami-Dade County, is a 417-bed tertiary provider comprised of 380 acute care beds, 23 inpatient adult psychiatric beds, eight Level II neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) beds, and five Level III NICU beds. It is a Baker Act receiving facility. KRMC is a verified Level I trauma center. It also has a burn program. KRMC is also an academic teaching facility, receiving freestanding institutional accreditation from the Accrediting Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) in 2013. KRMC currently has six residency programs including, among others, surgery, internal medicine, podiatry, anesthesia, and surgical critical care. Its teaching programs are affiliated with the University of South Florida, Nova Southeastern University, and Florida International University. KRMC also participates in scholarly and clinical research. In 2017, KRMC had over 82,000 Emergency Department (ED) visits. It treated over 115,000 total inpatients and outpatients that year. There are 850 physicians on KRMC’s medical staff. It offers a full range of medical surgery services, interventional procedures, obstetrics (OB), pediatric, and neonatal care, among many other service lines. KRMC primarily serves southern and western portions of Miami-Dade County but also receives referrals from the Florida Keys up through Broward County, Palm Beach County, and the Treasure Coast. Its main competitors include, but are not limited to: Baptist Hospital; Baptist West; South Miami Hospital; PGH; Hialeah; CGH; JS, and Palm Springs General Hospital. The Tenet Hospitals PGH, Hialeah, and CGH are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Tenet South Florida. These are all for-profit hospitals. PGH is a 368-bed tertiary facility that opened in the early 1970s. It has 297 licensed acute care beds, 48 adult psychiatric beds, 52 ICU beds, and 15 Level II NICU beds. It is located at the Palmetto Expressway and Northwest 122nd Street in Hialeah, Florida. The hospital employs about 1,700 people and has over 600 physicians on its medical staff. PGH is a tertiary-level facility offering a variety of specialty services, including adult open heart surgery, a comprehensive stroke center, and robotic surgery. It has inpatient mental health beds and serves the community as a Baker Act receiving facility. It also offers OB and Level II NICU services with approximately 1,500 births a year. It has approximately 70,000 ED visits and between 17,000 and 18,000 inpatient admissions per year. In addition to its licensed inpatient beds, PGH operates 31 observation beds. PGH is ACGME accredited and serves a significant teaching function in the community. It has approximately 89 residents and fellows. The hospital provides fellowships in cardiology, critical care and interventional cardiology, and also has rotations in neurology and gastroenterology. Residents from Larkin General Hospital also rotate through PGH. PGH generally serves the communities of Opa Locka, Hialeah, Miami Lakes, Hialeah Gardens, Doral, and Miami Springs. In reality, all of the hospitals in the county are competitors, but more direct competition comes from Palm Springs Hospital, Memorial in Miramar, Mount Sinai, Kendall, and even its sister hospital, Hialeah. Hialeah first opened in 1951 and is a 378-bed acute care facility. It has 356 acute care beds, 12 adult psychiatric beds, and 10 Level II NICU beds. The ED has 25 beds and about 40,000 visits per year. It has approximately 14,000 inpatient admissions and 1,400 babies delivered annually. It offers services including cardiac, stroke, robotic surgery, colorectal surgery, and OB services. The hospital has a Level II NICU with 12 beds. CGH is located in the City of Coral Gables and is near the border between Coral Gables and the City of Miami on Douglas Road. It first opened in 1926. Portions of the original structure are still in use. CGH has 245 licensed beds, over 725 employees, 367 physicians, and over 100 additional allied providers on its medical staff. The hospital has a full-service ED. Its service lines include general surgery, geriatrics, urology, treatment of cardiovascular and pulmonary disease, and others. The hospital has eight operating rooms and offers robotic surgery. The ED has 28 beds divided into the main area and a geriatric emergency room. It had about 25,000 ED visits last year, which is lower than prior years, due in part to the presence of over a dozen nearby urgent care centers. CGH has over 8,500 inpatient admissions per year and is not at capacity. While patient days have grown slightly, the average occupancy is still just a little over 40%, meaning, on average, it has over 140 empty inpatient beds on any given day. The hospital is licensed for 245 beds, but typically there are only 180 beds immediately available for use. Agency for Healthcare Administration (AHCA) AHCA is the state health-planning agency charged with administration of the CON program as set forth in sections 408.31-408.0455, Florida Statutes. The Proposals Doral Medical Center (DMC) DMC proposes to build an 80-bed community hospital situated within the residential district of Doral. The hospital will be located in southwestern Doral in zip code 33126 and will serve the growing population of Doral, along with residential areas to the north and south of Doral. The hospital will be located in the City of Doral’s residential district on Northwest 41st Street between Northwest 109th Avenue to the east, and Northwest 112th Avenue to the west. Doral has seen significant growth in the past 15 years and has been consistently included on the list of the fastest growing cities in Florida. The new facility will have a bed complement of 80 licensed acute care beds, including 72 medical/surgical and eight OB beds. The proposed acute care hospital will be fully accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Facilities and licensed by the State of Florida. No public funds will be utilized in construction of the hospital and it will contribute to the state, county, and municipal tax base as a proprietary corporation. DMC will offer a full range of non-tertiary services, including emergency services, imaging, surgery, intensive care, cardiac catheterization, and women's services, including an OB unit, and pediatric care. DMC will be a general medical facility that will include a general medical component and a surgery component. Although DMC will operate an OB unit, NICU services will not be offered at DMC. If DMC’s patients need more advanced services, including NICU, the EFD hopes they will receive them from KRMC. The open medical staff will be largely community-based, but University of Miami physicians would be welcome at DMC. Before the hospital is built, KRMC will construct and operate a freestanding emergency department (FSED) at the location that will eventually become the ED of DMC. Construction of the FSED is now underway, and Brandon Haushalter, chief executive officer (CEO) of KRMC, estimated that it will open in March or April of 2019. Jackson West JHS proposes to build a community hospital to be known as “Jackson West” near the eastern edge of Doral. The proposed 100-bed general acute care hospital would have medical surgical and obstetrical beds and offer basic acute care services. JHS is a public health system owned by Miami-Dade County. All of JHS’s assets, as well as its debts, belong to the county. JHS is a not-for-profit entity, and therefore does not pay taxes, though it receives hundreds of millions of dollars from property taxes and sales taxes in Miami-Dade County. JHS’s main campus is a large health campus located near the Midtown Miami area in between Allapattah (to the north) and Little Havana (to the south). In addition to JMH, the campus includes Holtz Children’s Hospital, a behavioral health hospital, an inpatient rehabilitation hospital, and several specialty clinics. Bascom-Palmer Eye Institute, a Veterans Administration hospital, and University of Miami Hospital are also located adjacent to Jackson West’s main campus. JMH is a 1,500-bed hospital with a wide array of programs and services, including tertiary and quaternary care, and a Level I trauma program, the Ryder Trauma Center. JMH receives patients from throughout Miami-Dade County, elsewhere in Florida, and internationally. JMH is a teaching hospital and has a large number of residents, as well as professors from the University of Miami, on staff. UM and JMH have had a relationship for many years, and in addition to research and teaching, UM provides physician staffing to JMH. JN is a 342-bed community hospital located in between Miami Gardens and North Miami Beach, just off of I-95 and the Turnpike. JS is a 252-bed community hospital located in the Palmetto Bay area just south of Kendall. It has stroke certification and interventional cardiology, and was recently approved for a trauma program, which began in May 2016. Both JN and JS were existing hospitals that were acquired by JHS. JHS has never built a hospital from the ground up. In 2014, JHS leadership directed its internal planning team to review the healthcare needs of county residents. JHS’s analysis identified a need for outpatient services in western Miami-Dade, the only remaining quadrant of the county in which JHS did not have a hospital or healthcare program at the time. As part of its due diligence, JHS then consulted healthcare firm Kurt Salmon & Associates (KSA) to independently evaluate the data. KSA’s investigation validated a need in the west county for adult and pediatric outpatient services, including need for an FSED. This prompted JHS to explore opportunities for expansion of outpatient services where needed: in the western corridor of Miami-Dade. This was also the genesis of JHS’s long-range plan to first build an FSED in the Doral area, to be followed ultimately by the addition of a general acute care hospital at the site. The JW site is a 27-acre parcel of land located just west of the Palmetto Expressway and north of 25th Street. The site is in an industrial area only a short distance from the western end of the runways at Miami International Airport. The site is located in zip code 33122, which is very sparsely populated. JW proposed a primary service area (PSA) consisting of zip codes 33126, 33144, 33166, 33172/33122, 33174, 33178, and 33182, and a secondary service area (SSA) of zip codes 33155, 33165, 33175, and 33184. JW intends to serve general, acute care non-tertiary patients and OB patients. Detailed below, trends in the JW service area do not demonstrate need for its proposed hospital. The location of the JW site will not contribute to the viability of the proposed hospital. According to 2010 census data, only 328 people live within a one-mile radius of the JW site. Since 2000, only 32 total people have moved into that same area around the JW site--an average of three per year. There are virtually no residences within a one-mile radius of the JW site. From 2000 to 2010, the population within a two- mile radius of the JW site decreased by a rate of 9.4%. The JW health planner projects JW’s home zip code of 33122 will have a total population of only eight (8) people in 2022. From 2012 to 2014, the use rate in the JW service area for non-tertiary patients decreased by 3.9%. That decline continued at a steeper pace of 4.2% from 2014 to 2017. This was largely due to the 65+ age cohort, the demographic of patients that utilize inpatient services the most. The 65+ age cohort is growing at a slower pace in the JW service area than in Miami- Dade or Florida as a whole. Non-tertiary discharges in the JW service area are declining at a greater pace than that of Miami- Dade County--negative 4.2% compared to negative 1.9%. The rate of projected population growth in the JW PSA is decreasing. The projected rate of growth for the JW service area is lower than that of Miami-Dade County and Florida as a whole. The OB patient base JW intends to rely on is projected to remain flat. The inpatient discharges for all ages in the JW service area have declined from 2014 to 2017. For ages 0-17, discharges in the JW service area declined 21.4% during that time period. The discharges for ages 18-44 declined by 4.8%, and the discharges for ages 45-64 declined by 8.9%. The discharges for the important 65+ age cohort declined by 0.1%. Specifically, the discharges for ages 65-74 declined by 6.5%, and the discharges for ages 75-84 declined by 3.3%. The discharges for ages 85+ are the only age cohort that has not declined from 2012 to 2017. Overall, the non-tertiary discharges per 1,000 population (i.e., use rate) for all ages in the JW service area declined from 2012 to 2014 by 6%, and from 2014 to 2017 by 7.8%. Despite these declines in discharges in the JW service area, the health planners who crafted the JW projections used a constant use rate for the 0-17, 18-44, and 45-64 age cohorts. The JW health planners used a declining use rate for the 65+ age cohort. These use rates were applied uniformly across all zip codes, despite wide variance in actual use rates in each zip code. Applying the zip code specific use rates in conjunction with the other assumptions used by the JW health planner demonstrates that the JW projections are unreasonable. For instance, JW’s reliance on a uniform use rate over-projects the number of discharges in JW PSA zip code 33178 by nearly 1,000 patients. This occurs because the population is only growing at a 2% rate in the zip code, but JW’s reliance on service area-wide projections cause the discharges to grow at an extraordinary rate of 8.9% per year. Applying actual use rates across all zip codes causes a drastic change in the JW PSA and SSA definition. Section 408.037(2) requires a CON applicant to identify its PSA and SSA by listing zip codes in which it will receive discharges in descending order, beginning with the zip code with the highest amount of discharges, then proceeding in diminishing order to the zip code with the lowest amount of discharges. The zip codes, which comprise 75% of discharges, constitute the PSA; and the remaining zip codes, which consist of the remaining 25% of discharges, makes up the SSA. However, JW did not project its utilization in this manner. In its application, JW did not define its service area, PSA, and SSA zip codes in descending order by number or percentage of discharges. When this correct adjustment is made, its PSA consists of zip codes 33126, 33172, 33178, 33174, 33144, and 33165; and its SSA consists of zip codes 33175, 33166, 33155, 33182, and 33184. Zip codes 33166 and 33182 were in the original JW PSA, and zip code 33165 was in the original JW SSA. As such, JW’s home zip code should actually be in its SSA. JW health planners call this illogical, but it demonstrates that the JW site is located within a zip code that has almost no population of potential patients. JHS is developing an FSED and outpatient/ambulatory facilities on the JW site regardless of whether its CON application for a hospital is approved. Construction has begun on the JW site, and JHS is actually building a “shelled in” structure intended to house a future hospital, notwithstanding lack of CON approval for the hospital. There is no contingency plan for use of the shelled-in hospital space if CON approval is not obtained. JHS executives unequivocally stated that they intend to continue pursuing CON approval for the JW hospital, even if the proposed DMC hospital is approved. Indeed, JHS has filed third and fourth CON applications for its proposed JW hospital. The budget for the JW campus is $252 million. Sixty to $70 million is being funded from a bond issuance approved by voters in Miami-Dade County. Notably, the bond referendum approved by voters made no mention of a new hospital. The remaining $180 to $190 million is being funded by JHS, which has chosen to only keep 50 days cash-on-hand, and put any surplus toward capital projects. This is well below the number of days cash-on-hand ws advisable for a system like JHS. The specific programs and services to be offered at JW have not been finalized, but it is clear that JW will be a small community hospital that will not offer anything unique or different from any of the existing hospitals in the area, nor will it operate NICU beds. Patients presenting to JW in need of specialized or tertiary services will need to be transferred to another hospital with the capability of serving them, most likely JMH. The Applicants’ Arguments Doral Medical Center (DMC) DMC’s arguments in support of its proposed hospital may be summarized as follows: Geographic features surrounding Doral create transportation access barriers for the residents of the area; Doral is a densely-populated community that is growing quickly and lacks a readily accessible hospital; KRMC, which is the provider of choice for Doral residents, is a growing tertiary facility that cannot sufficiently expand to meet its future demands. DMC will serve much of the same patient population currently served by KRMC and help decompress KRMC’s acute care load so KRMC can focus on its tertiary service lines; From a geographic standpoint, the Doral community and its patients are isolated from much of Miami-Dade County to the north, west, and east, and the nearest hospitals. East Florida-DMC is a subsidiary of HCA and would be a part of the HCA EFD. Michael Joseph is the president of the EFD, which includes 15 hospitals and other facilities from Miami north through the Treasure Coast. Mr. Joseph authorized the filing of the DMC CON application, which proposes an 80-bed basic acute care hospital that includes 72 medical surgical and eight OB beds. As noted, there will be neither unique services at DMC nor any tertiary services, such as a NICU. HCA anticipates that DMC patients needing tertiary services would be referred and treated at KRMC. The proposed hospital would be built on 41st Street, between Northwest 109th Avenue and Northwest 112th Avenue. This site is located on the western edge of Doral, just east of the Everglades. When the consultants were retained to write the first DMC CON application, HCA had already made the decision to go forward with the project. Mr. Joseph described Miami-Dade County as one of the most competitive markets in the country for hospital services. There is robust competition in the Miami-Dade market from the standpoints of payors, physicians, and the many hospitals located in the county, including Jackson, HCA, Tenet, Baptist and others. HCA is not proposing this project because any of the existing hospitals in the area do not provide good quality care. HCA is currently building an FSED on the DMC site that will open regardless of whether the DMC hospital is approved. Mr. Joseph acknowledged that there is a trend toward outpatient rather than inpatient care. Inpatient occupancy of acute care hospitals in Miami-Dade County has been declining in recent years. Managed care has added further pressure on reducing inpatient admissions. Surgical advances have also resulted in fewer inpatient admissions. Surgeries that formerly required an inpatient stay are now often done on an outpatient basis. Mr. Joseph agreed that 30 minutes is a reasonable travel time to access an acute care hospital. The home zip code for the proposed DMC hospital is 33178. KRMC’s market share for that zip code is 20%. Individuals in that zip code are currently accessing a wide variety of hospitals. PGH is only 6.7 miles away and has the fourth highest market share in that zip code. HCA’s healthcare planning expert, Dan Sullivan, acknowledged that, if approved, DMC would likely have an adverse financial impact on KRMC and other area hospitals. Several witnesses testified that the travel time from the DMC site to KRMC is about 10 minutes, and that an ambulance could do it in as little as five minutes. As to the argument that the residents of Doral face geographic access barriers, the evidence did not indicate that there is anything unique about Doral from a traffic standpoint compared to other parts of Miami-Dade County. People come in and out of Doral on a daily basis in significant numbers for work and other reasons via various access points. Witnesses agreed that 25 to 30 minutes is a reasonable drive time for non-tertiary acute care services, and the evidence showed that residents of Doral, and the DMC service area, are well within 30 minutes of multiple hospitals providing more intensive services than are proposed by DMC. Indeed, many residents of DMC’s service area are closer to other hospitals than to the DMC site. None of the DMC witnesses were able to identify any patient in Doral who had been unable to access acute care services, or had suffered a bad outcome because of travel from Doral to an area hospital. The evidence did not establish that there currently exists either geographic or financial access barriers within the service area proposed to be served by DMC. Jackson West As in its Batch One application, JW advances six arguments as to why its proposed hospital should be approved. They are: It will serve a significant amount of indigent and Medicaid patients. JHS already serves residents of the proposed service area, which JW characterizes as “fragmented,” in that residents go to a number of different hospitals to receive services. Development of the freestanding ED and ambulatory center is under way. JW would provide an additional opportunity to partner with UM and FIU. There is physician and community support for the project. JW will add to the financial viability of JHS and its ability to continue its mission. JW presented very little analysis of the types of factors typically considered in evaluating need for a new hospital. JW did not discuss existing providers and their programs and services, the utilization of existing hospitals, and whether they have excess capacity, or other important considerations. Instead, JW advanced the six arguments noted above, for approval of its proposed hospital, none of which truly relate to the issue of need. First, JW states that its proposed hospital will serve a significant level of Medicaid and indigent patients. While it is true that JHS serves a significant amount of Medicaid and indigent patients, there are a number of reasons why this is not a basis to approve its proposed hospital. As an initial matter, JW treads a fine line in touting its service to Medicaid and indigent patients, while also targeting Doral for its better payer mix and financial benefit to JHS. JHS also receives an enormous amount of tax dollars to provide care to indigent and underserved patients. While other hospitals in Miami-Dade County provide care to such patients, they do not receive taxpayer dollars, as does JHS, although they pay taxes, unlike JHS. Also, Medicaid is a good payer for JHS. With its substantial supplement, JHS actually makes money from Medicaid patients, and it costs the system more for a Medicaid patient to be treated at a JHS hospital than elsewhere. More significantly, there is not a large Medicaid or indigent population in Doral, nor evidence of financial access issues in Doral. Second, JW argues that its CON application should be approved because JHS already serves patients from the Doral area, which JW characterizes as “fragmented” because area residents go to several different hospitals for care. This so- called “fragmentation” is not unique to Doral, and is not unusual in a densely-populated urban market with several existing hospitals. The same phenomenon occurs in other areas of Miami-Dade County, some of which actually have a hospital in the localized area. The fact that Doral residents are accessing several different hospitals demonstrates that there are a number of existing providers that are accessible to them. As discussed in greater detail below, residents of the Doral area have choices in every direction (other than to the west, which is the Everglades). JHS itself already serves patients from the Doral area. If anything, this tells us that patients from Doral currently have access to the JHS hospitals. Third, JW argues that its CON application should be approved because development of the JW campus is under way. This is irrelevant to the determination of need, and is simply a statement of JHS’s intent to build an FSED and outpatient facilities on a piece of land that was acquired for that purpose, regardless of CON approval. Fourth, JW argues for approval of its proposed hospital because it would provide an additional opportunity to partner with UM and Florida International University (FIU). However, the statutory criteria no longer addresses research and teaching concerns, and JHS’s relationship with UM or FIU has no bearing on whether there is a need for a new hospital in the Doral area. Moreover, JW did not present any evidence of how it would partner with UM or FIU at JW, and there does not seem to be any set plans in this regard. Fifth, JW claims that there is physician and community support for its proposed hospital, but it is very common for CON applicants to obtain letters in support for applications. Indeed, the DMC application was also accompanied by letters of support. Sixth and finally, JW argues that its proposed hospital will add to the financial viability of HSA and allow it to continue its mission. However, JW provided no analysis of the projected financial performance of its proposed hospital to substantiate this. The only financial analysis in the record is from KSA, a consulting firm that JHS hired to analyze the programs and services to be developed at JW. The KSA analysis posits that the JW FSED project will lose millions of dollars and not achieve break-even unless there is an inpatient hospital co-located there so that JW can take advantage of the more lucrative hospital-based billing and reimbursement. The sixth “need” argument relates to the issue of JHS’s historical financial struggles, which bear discussion. Only a handful of years ago, the entire JHS was in dire financial trouble, so much so that selling all or parts of it was considered. Days cash-on-hand was in the single digits, and JHS fell out of compliance with bond covenants. JHS’s financial difficulties prompted the appointment of an outside monitor to oversee JHS’s finances. Price Waterhouse served in that role, and made several recommendations for JHS to improve its revenue cycle, make accounting adjustments, and improve its staffing and efficiency. As a result of these recommendations, JHS went through a large reduction in force, and began to more closely screen the income and residency of its patients. As a result of these measures, overall financial performance has since improved. Despite its improved financial position, JHS still consistently loses money on operations, including a $362,000,915 loss as of June 30, 2018. JHS clearly depends upon the hundreds of millions of non-operating tax-based revenues it receives annually. JHS’s CEO expressed concerns over decreases in the system’s non-operating revenue sources, and claimed that JHS needs to find ways to increase its operating revenue to offset this. JW is being proposed as part of this strategy. However, JHS’s chief financial officer testified that “the non-operating revenues are a fairly stable source of income.” In fact, JHS’s tax revenues have gone up in the last few years. JHS sees the more affluent Doral area as a source of better paying patients that will enhance the profitability of its new hospital. Beyond this aspiration however, there is no meaningful analysis of the anticipated financial performance of its proposed hospital. This is a glaring omission given that a significant impetus for spending millions of public dollars on a new hospital is to improve JHS’s overall financial position. The KSA analysis referenced above determined that changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System rule would result in the JW campus losing hundreds of millions of dollars and never reaching “break even,” absent an inpatient hospital on the campus for “hospital based” billing and reimbursement. Though a financial benefit to the system, the increased reimbursement JHS would receive by having an inpatient hospital on the JW campus would be a financial burden on the healthcare delivery system since it would cost more for the same patient to receive the same outpatient services in a hospital- based facility. Reports by KSA also state that a strategic purpose of JW is to attract patients that would otherwise go to nearby facilities like PGH and Hialeah, and to capture tertiary or higher complexity cases which would then be sent to JMH. JW’s witnesses and healthcare planning experts fully expect this to happen. In 2015, and again in 2017, JHS conducted a “Community Health Needs Assessment,” which is required by law to be performed by public safety net hospitals. The assessments were conducted by gathering responses to various questions from a wide array of community leaders and stakeholders, including the CEOs of JHS’s hospitals, about the healthcare needs of the community. The final Community Health Needs Assessment documents are lengthy and cover a variety of health-related topics, but most notable for this case is that: (1) nowhere in either the 2015 or 2017 assessment is the development of a new hospital recommended; and (2) expansion into western Miami-Dade County scored by far the lowest on a list of priorities for JHS. In its application and at hearing, JW took the position that JW can enter the Doral area market without impacting existing providers to any meaningful extent. While JW acknowledges that its proposed hospital would impact the Tenet Hospitals, it argues that the impact is not significant. The evidence established that the financial impact to the Tenet Hospitals (calculated based upon lost contribution margin) would total roughly $3 million for lost inpatients, and $5.2 million including lost outpatients. While these losses will not put the Tenet Hospitals in financial peril, they are nonetheless significant and material. The Existing Healthcare Delivery System Miami-Dade County is home to 18 freestanding acute care hospitals, comprising a total of 7,585 licensed and approved acute care beds. With an average annual occupancy of 53.8% in calendar year 2017, there were, on average, approximately 3,500 unoccupied acute care beds in the county on any given day. While the countywide occupancy rate fluctuates from year to year, it has been on a downward trend in the past several years. As pointed out by several witnesses, the lack of a hospital in Doral is not itself an indication of need. In addition, population growth, and the demands of the population for inpatient hospital beds, cannot be considered in a vacuum. Sound healthcare planning requires an analysis of existing area hospitals, including the services they offer and their respective locations; how area residents travel to existing hospitals and any barriers to access; the utilization of existing hospitals and amount of capacity they have; and other factors which may be relevant in a given case. The population of Doral currently is only about 59,000 people. It is not as densely populated as many areas of Miami-Dade County, has a number of golf course communities, and is generally a more affluent area with a higher average household income than much of Miami-Dade County. As set forth in JW’s CON application, the better payer mix in Doral was a significant factor behind its decision to file its CON application. Although there is not a hospital within the Doral city limits, there are a number of healthcare providers in Doral and several hospitals nearby. PGH and Palm Springs Hospital are just north of Doral. KRMC is just south of Doral. Hialeah is northeast of Doral. CGH, Westchester General, and NCH are southeast of Doral. JMH and all of its facilities are east of Doral. And there are others within reasonable distance. KRMC is only six miles due south of the proposed DMC site, and PGH is just eight miles north of the DMC site. As to the JW site, PGH is 6.9 miles distant, CGH is 8.6 miles distant, and Hialeah is 7.4 miles distant. Residents of the Doral area have many choices in hospitals with a wide array of services, and they are accessing them. The parties to this case, as well as other existing hospitals, all have a share of the Doral area market. JW calls this “fragmentation” of the market and casts it in a negative light, but the evidence showed this to be a normal phenomenon in an urban area like Miami, with several hospitals in healthy competition with each other. Among the experts testifying at the hearing, it was undisputed that inpatient acute care hospital use rates are on the decline. There are different reasons for this, but it was uniformly recognized that decreasing use rates for inpatient services, and a shift toward outpatient services, are ongoing trends in the market. Recognizing the need for outpatient services in the Doral area, both JW and DMC (or, more accurately, their related entities) have proposed outpatient facilities and services to be located in Doral. Kendall Regional Medical Center KRMC is currently the dominant hospital provider in the Doral area. Regarding his motivation for filing the DMC application, Mr. Joseph readily admitted “it’s as much about protecting what I already currently provide, number one.” KRMC treats Medicaid and indigent patients. KRMC has never turned away a patient because it did not have a contract with a Medicaid-managed care company. The CEO agreed that there is no access problem for Medicaid or charity patients justifying a new hospital. It was argued that KRMC is crowded, and the DMC hospital would help “decompress” KRMC, but the evidence showed that KRMC has a number of licensed beds that are not being used for inpatients. In addition, its ED has never gone on diversion, and no patient has ever been turned away due to the lack of a bed. Moreover, the census at KRMC has been declining. It had 25,324 inpatient admissions in 2015, 24,649 admissions in 2016, and 23,301 in 2017. The most recent data available at the time of hearing reflected that KRMC has been running at a little less than 75% occupancy, before its planned bed additions. KRMC is between an eight to 10 minute drive from Doral, and currently has the largest market share within the applicants’ defined service areas. KRMC is readily available and accessible to the residents of Doral. KRMC currently has a $90 million dollar expansion project under way. It involves adding beds and two new floors to the West Tower--a new fifth floor which will add 24 ICU beds and 24 step-down beds, and a new sixth floor which will house the relocated pediatric unit and 12 new medical-surgical beds. KRMC is also adding a new nine-story, 765 parking space garage and other ancillary space. This expansion will reduce the occupancy rate of KRMC’s inpatient units, and in particular its ICUs. These bed additions, in conjunction with increasing emphasis on outpatient services and the resultant declining inpatient admissions, will alleviate any historical capacity constraints KRMC may have had. There are also a number of ways KRMC could be further expanded in the future if needed. The West Tower is designed so it could accommodate a seventh floor, and the East Tower is also designed so that an additional floor could also be added to it. In addition, KRMC recently completed construction of a new OR area that is built on pillars. The new construction includes a third floor of shelled-in space that could house an additional 12 acute care beds. Moreover, this new OR tower was designed to go up an additional two to three floors beyond the existing shelled-in third floor. It is clear that KRMC has implemented reasonable strategies for addressing any bed capacity issues it may have experienced in the past. Decompression of KRMC is not a reason to approve DMC. Palmetto General Hospital Evidence regarding PGH was provided by its CEO Ana Mederos. Ms. Mederos is a registered nurse and has lived in Miami-Dade County for many years. She has a master of business education from Nova University and has worked in several different hospitals in the county. Specifically, she was the chief operating officer (COO) at Cedars Medical Center, the CEO at North Shore Medical Center, the CEO at Hialeah Hospital, and has been the CEO at PGH since August of 2006. Ms. Mederos is one of the few witnesses that actually lives in Doral. She travels in and out of the area on a daily basis. Her average commute is only about 15 minutes, and she has multiple convenient options in and out of Doral. PGH is located just off the Palmetto Expressway at 68th Street. It opened in the early 1970s and has 368 licensed beds, including 52 ICU beds. The hospital employs about 1,800 people and has over 600 physicians on its medical staff. PGH’s occupancy has declined from 79.8% in 2015 to 64% in 2016, and even further to 56.7% in 2017. There are many reasons for this decline, including pressure from managed care organizations, the continued increase in the use of outpatient procedures, improvements in technology, and increased competition in the Miami-Dade County market. Ms. Mederos expects that inpatient demand will continue to decline into the foreseeable future. PGH recently activated 31 observation beds to help improve throughput and better accommodate the increasing number of observation patients. PGH offers high-quality care and uses various metrics and indicators to measure and monitor what is going on in the hospital. The hospital has also been recognized with numerous awards. Through its parent, Tenet, PGH has contracts with just about every insurance and managed care company that serves the community. The hospital treats Medicaid and indigent patients. PGH’s Medicaid rate of $3,580 per patient is significantly lower than the rate paid to JMH. PGH has an office dedicated to helping patients get qualified for Medicaid or other financial resources, which not only helps the hospital get paid for its services, it also assists patients and families to make sure that they have benefits on an ongoing basis. Roughly 9-10% of PGH’s patients annually are completely unfunded. PGH only transfers patients if there is a need for a service not provided at the hospital, or upon the patient’s request. PGH does not transfer patients just because they cannot pay. PGH pays physicians to take calls in the ED which also obligates those physicians to provide care to patients that are seen at the hospital. PGH is a for-profit hospital that pays income taxes and property taxes, and does not receive any taxpayer subsidies like those received by JHS. Ms. Mederos reviewed the applications of JW and DMC, and articulated a number of reasons why, in her opinion, neither application should be approved. She sees no delays in providing care to anyone in the area, as there are hospitals serving Doral in every direction. There are a multitude of FSEDs available and additional FSEDs are being built in Doral by both applicants. There is another FSED being built close to PGH by Mount Sinai Medical Center. NCH has also opened an FSED that has negatively affected the volume of pediatric patients seen at PGH. There are also multiple urgent care centers. It was Ms. Mederos’ firm belief that persons living in Doral have reasonable geographic access to both inpatient and outpatient medical services. Ms. Mederos’ testimony in this regard is credited. There are no programs or services being proposed by either applicant that are not already available in the area. Ms. Mederos also noted that there is currently no problem with access to OB services in the area. However, she has a particular concern in that both applicants propose to offer OB services, but neither is proposing to offer NICU services. The evidence showed that most all of the hospitals that provide OB services to the Doral area offer at least Level II and some Level III NICU services. Thus, in terms of OB care, both proposed hospitals would be a step below what has developed as the standard of care for OB patients in the county. Ms. Mederos acknowledged that PGH does not have a huge market share in the zip codes that the applicants are proposing to serve, but that does not mean that the impact from either would not be real and significant. If a hospital is built by either applicant, it will need physicians, with some specialists in short supply. There are tremendous shortages in certain medical fields, such as orthopedics and neurology. In addition, there will be additional competition for nurses and other staff, which will increase the cost of healthcare. The loss of $1.3 to $2 million in contribution margin, as projected by Tenet’s healthcare planner, is a negative impact on PGH as hospital margins become thinner, and those numbers do not include costs like those needed to recruit and retain staff. PGH is again experiencing a nursing shortage, and losing nurses, incurring the higher cost for contract labor, paying overtime, and essentially not having the staff to provide the required services is a serious potential adverse impact from either proposed new hospital. JHS also tends to provide more lucrative benefits than PGH, and a nearby JW hospital is a threat in that regard. As a final note, Ms. Mederos stated that her conviction that there is no need for either proposed hospital in Doral is even more resolute than when she testified in the Batch One Case. With continued declines in admissions, length of stay and patient days, the development of more services for the residents of Doral, the shortages of doctors and nurses, the ever increasing role of managed care that depresses the demand for inpatient hospital services and other factors, she persuasively explained why no new hospitals are needed in the Doral area. Coral Gables Hospital (CGH) Maria Cristina Jimenez testified on behalf of CGH, where she has worked in a variety of different capacities since 1985. She was promoted to CEO in March 2017. She has lived in Miami her entire life. Ms. Jimenez has been involved in initiatives to make her hospital more efficient. She is supportive of efforts to reduce inpatient hospitalizations and length of stay, as this is what is best for patients. Overall, the hospital length of stay is dropping, which adds to the decreasing demand for inpatient services. CGH is accredited by the Joint Commission, has received multiple awards, and provides high-quality care to its patients. It also has contracts with a broad array of managed care companies as do the other Tenet hospitals. CGH treats Medicaid patients, and its total Medicaid rate is less than $3,500 per inpatient. The hospital has a program similar to PGH to help patients get qualified for Medicaid and other resources. CGH also provides services to indigent patients, and self-pay/charity is about 6% of the hospital’s total admissions. The hospital does not transfer patients just because they are indigent. Physicians are compensated to provide care in the emergency room and are expected to continue with that care if the patients are admitted to the hospital, even if they do not have financial resources. CGH also pays income and property taxes, but does not receive any taxpayer support. CGH generally serves the Little Havana, Flagami, Miami, and Coral Gables communities, and its service area overlaps with those of the applicants. In order to better serve its patients and to help it compete in the highly competitive Miami-Dade County marketplace, CGH is developing a freestanding ED at the corner of Bird Road and Southwest 87th Avenue, which is scheduled to open in January 2020. This will provide another resource for patients in the proposed service areas. Ms. Jimenez had reviewed the CON applications at issue in this case. She does not believe that either hospital should be approved because it will drain resources from CGH, not only from a financial standpoint, but also physician and nurse staffing. CGH experiences physician shortages. Urologists are in short supply, as are gastrointestinal physicians that perform certain procedures. Hematology, oncology, and endocrinology are also specialty areas with shortages. The addition of another hospital will exacerbate those shortages at CGH. While CGH does not have a large market share in the proposed PSA of either applicant, anticipated impact from approval of either is real and substantial. A contribution margin loss of $1.2 to $2.2 million per year, as projected by Tenet’s healthcare planner, would be significant. The drain on resources, including staff and physicians, is also of significant concern. Hialeah Hospital Dr. Jorge Perez testified on behalf of Hialeah. Dr. Perez is a pathologist and medical director of laboratory at the hospital. More significantly, Dr. Perez has been on the hospital’s staff since 2001 and has served in multiple leadership roles, including chair of the Performance Improvement Council, chief of staff; and since 2015, chair of the Hialeah Hospital Governing Board. Hialeah offers obstetrics services and a Level II NICU with 12 beds. Approximately 1,400 babies a year are born there. Hialeah’s occupancy has been essentially flat for the past three years, at below 40%, and it clearly has ample excess capacity. On an average day, over 200 of Hialeah’s beds are unoccupied. Like other hospitals in the county, Hialeah has a number of competitors. The growth of managed care has affected the demand for inpatient beds and services at Hialeah. Hialeah treats Medicaid and indigent patients. Approximately 15% of Hialeah’s admissions are unfunded. As with its sister Tenet hospitals, Hialeah is a for- profit hospital that pays taxes and does not receive tax dollars for providing care to the indigent. Dr. Perez succinctly and persuasively identified a variety of reasons why no new hospital is needed in Doral. First and foremost, there is plenty of capacity at the existing hospitals in the area, including Hialeah. Second, both inpatient admissions and length of stay continue trending downward. Care continues to shift toward outpatient services, thereby reducing the demand for inpatient care. According to Dr. Perez, if a new hospital is approved in Doral it will bring with it adverse impacts on existing hospitals, including Hialeah. A new hospital in Doral will attract patients, some of which would have otherwise gone to Hialeah. Moreover, Doral has more insured patients, meaning the patients that would be lost would be good payors. There would also be a significant risk of loss of staff to a new hospital. Dr. Perez’s testimony in this regard is credible. Statutory and Rule Review Criteria In 2008, the Florida Legislature streamlined the review criteria applicable for evaluating new hospital applications. Mem’l Healthcare Grp. v. AHCA, Case No. 12- 0429CON, RO at 32 (Fla. DOAH Dec. 7, 2012). The criteria specifically eliminated included quality of care, availability of resources, financial feasibility, and the costs and methods of proposed construction. Lee Mem’l Health System v. AHCA, Case No. 13-2508CON, RO at 135 (Fla. DOAH Mar. 28, 2014). The remaining criteria applicable to new hospital projects are set forth at section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes. Section 408.035(1)(a): The need for the healthcare facilities and health services being proposed. Generally, CON applicants are responsible for demonstrating need for new acute care hospitals, typically in the context of a numeric need methodology adopted by AHCA. However, AHCA has not promulgated a numeric need methodology to calculate need for new hospital facilities. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e) provides that if no agency need methodology exists, the applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology, which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory and rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Both applicants propose to build small community hospitals providing basic acute care and OB services in the Doral area of western Miami-Dade County. Both applicants point to the increasing population and the lack of an acute care hospital in Doral as evidence of need for a hospital. The DMC application focuses largely on geographic access concerns, while the JW application is premised upon six arguments as to why JHS contends its proposed JW hospital should be approved. The lack of a hospital in Doral is not itself an indication of need.3/ In addition, population growth, and the demands of the population for inpatient hospital beds, cannot be considered in a vacuum. Sound healthcare planning requires an analysis of existing area hospitals, including the services they offer and their respective locations; how area residents travel to existing hospitals, and any barriers to access; the utilization of existing hospitals and amount of capacity they have; and other factors which may be relevant in a given case. Doral is in the west/northwest part of Miami-Dade County, in between the Miami International Airport (to the east) and the Everglades (to the west). It is surrounded by major roadways, with US Highway 27/Okeechobee Road running diagonally to the north, US Highway 836/Dolphin Expressway running along its southern edge, US Highway 826/Palmetto Expressway running north-south to the east, and the Florida Turnpike running north- south along the western edge of Doral. To the west of the Turnpike is the Everglades, where there is minimal population and very limited development possible in the future. The City of Doral itself has an area of about 15 square miles, and is only two or three times the size of the Miami International Airport, which sits just east of Doral. Much of Doral is commercial and industrial, with the largest concentration of residential areas being in the northwest part of the city. While there is unquestionably residential growth in Doral, the population of Doral is currently only about 59,000 people. Doral is not as densely populated as many areas of Miami-Dade County, has a number of golf course communities, and is generally a more affluent area with a higher average household income than much of Miami-Dade County. JW proposes to locate its hospital on the eastern side of Doral, just west of Miami International Airport, while the DMC site is on the western side of Doral, just east of the Everglades. JW’s site is located in an industrial area with few residents, while the DMC site is located in an area where future growth is likely to be limited. Both sites have downsides for development of a hospital, with both applicants spending considerable time at hearing pointing out the flaws of each other’s chosen location. Both applicants define their service areas to include the City of Doral, but also areas outside of Doral. Notably, the entire DMC service area is contained within KRMC’s existing service area, with the exception of one small area. While the population of Doral itself is only 59,000 people, there are more concentrated populations in areas outside of Doral (except to the west). However, the people in these areas are closer to existing hospitals like PGH, Hialeah, KRMC, and others. For the population inside Doral, there are several major roadways in and out of Doral, and area residents can access several existing hospitals with plenty of capacity within a 20-minute drive time, many closer than that. It was undisputed that inpatient acute care hospital use rates continue to decline. There are different reasons for this, but it was uniformly recognized that decreasing inpatient use rates, and a shift toward outpatient services, are ongoing trends in the market. These trends existed at the time of the Batch One Case. As observed by Tenet’s healthcare planner at hearing: “The occupancy is lower today than it was two years ago, the use rates are lower, and the actual utilization is lower.” Both applicants failed to establish a compelling case of need. While there is growth in the Doral area, it remains a relatively small population, and there was no evidence of community needs being unmet. Sound healthcare planning, and the statutory criteria, require consideration of existing hospitals, their availability, accessibility, and extent of utilization. These considerations weigh heavily against approval of either CON application, even more so than in the prior case. Section 408.035(1)(b): The availability, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing healthcare facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant; and Section 408.035(1)(e): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to healthcare for residents of the service district. As stated above, there are several existing hospitals in close proximity to Doral. Thus, the question is whether they are accessible and have capacity to serve the needs of patients from the Doral area. The evidence overwhelmingly answers these questions in the affirmative. Geographic access was a focal point of the DMC application, which argued that there are various barriers to access in and around Doral, such as a canal that runs parallel to US Highway 27/Okeechobee Road, train tracks and a rail yard, industrial plants, and the airport. While the presence of these things is undeniable, as is the fact that there is traffic in Miami, based upon the evidence presented, they do not present the barriers that DMC alleges. Rather, the evidence was undisputed that numerous hospitals are accessible within 20 minutes of the proposed hospital sites, and some within 10 to 15 minutes. All of Doral is within 30 minutes of multiple hospitals. These are reasonable travel times and are not indicative of a geographic access problem, regardless of any alleged “barriers.” In addition, existing hospitals clearly have the capacity to serve the Doral community, and they are doing so. Without question, there is excess capacity in the Miami-Dade County market. With approximately 7,500 hospital beds in the county running at an average occupancy just over 50%, there are around 3,500 beds available at any given time. Focusing on the hospitals closest to Doral (those accessible within 20 minutes), there are hundreds of beds that are available and accessible from the proposed service areas of the applicants. KRMC is particularly noteworthy because of its proximity to, and market share in, the Doral area. The most recent utilization and occupancy data for KRMC indicate that it has, on average, 100 vacant beds. This is more than the entire 80-bed hospital proposed in the DMC application (for a service area that is already served and subsumed by KRMC). Moreover, KRMC is expanding, and will soon have even more capacity at its location less than a 10-minute drive from the DMC site. From a programmatic standpoint, neither applicant is proposing any programs or services that are not already available at numerous existing hospitals, and, in fact, both would offer fewer programs and services than other area hospitals. As such, patients in need of tertiary or specialized services will still have to travel to other hospitals like PGH, KRMC, or JMH. Alternatively, if they present to a small hospital in Doral in need of specialized services, they will then have to be transferred to an appropriate hospital that can treat them. The same would be true for babies born at either DMC or JW in need of a NICU. Similarly, there are bypass protocols for EMS to take cardiac, stroke, and trauma patients to the closest hospital equipped to treat them, even if it means bypassing other hospitals not so equipped, like JW and DMC. Less acute patients can be transported to the closest ED. And since both applicants are building FSEDs in Doral, there will be ample access to emergency services for residents of Doral. This criterion does not weigh in favor of approval of either hospital. To the contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly established that existing hospitals are available and accessible to Doral area residents. Section 408.035(1)(e), (g) and (i): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to healthcare, the extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness, and the applicant’s past and proposed provision of healthcare services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. It goes without saying that any new hospital is going to enhance access to the people closest to its location; but as explained above, there is no evidence of an access problem, or any pressing need for enhanced access to acute care hospital services. Rather, the evidence showed that Doral area residents are within very reasonable travel times to existing hospitals, most of which have far more extensive programs and services than either applicant is proposing to offer. Indeed, the proposed DMC service area is contained within KRMC’s existing service area, and KRMC is only 10 minutes from the DMC site. Neither applicant would enhance access to tertiary or specialized services, and patients in need of those services will still have to travel to other hospitals, or worse, be transferred after presenting to a Doral hospital with more limited programs and services. Although it was not shown to be an issue, access to emergency services is going to be enhanced by the FSEDs being built by both applicants. Thus, to the extent that a new hospital would enhance access, it would be only for non-emergent patients in need of basic, non-tertiary level care. Existing hospitals are available and easily accessible to these patients. In addition, healthy competition exists between several existing providers serving the Doral area market. That healthy competition would be substantially eroded by approval of the DMC application, as HCA would likely capture a dominant share of the market. While approval of the JW application might not create a dominant market share for one provider, it would certainly not promote cost-effectiveness given the fact that it costs the system more for the same patient to receive services at a JHS hospital than other facilities. Indeed, approval of JW’s application would mean that the JW campus will have the more expensive hospital-based billing rates. Florida Medicaid diagnosis related group (DRG) payment comparisons among hospitals are relevant because both DMC and JW propose that at least 22% of their patients will be Medicaid patients. Data from the 2017-18 DRG calculator provided by the Medicaid program office was used to compare JHS to the three Tenet hospitals, KRMC, and Aventura Hospital, another EFD hospital in Miami-Dade County. The data shows that JHS receives the highest Medicaid rate enhancement per discharge for the same Medicaid patients ($2,820.06) among these six hospitals in the county. KRMC receives a modest enhancement of $147.27. Comparison of Medicaid Managed Care Reimbursement over the period of fiscal years 2014-2016 show that JHS receives substantially more Medicaid reimbursement per adjusted patient day than any of the hospitals in this proceeding, with the other hospitals receiving between one-third and one-half of JHS reimbursement. In contrast, among all of these hospitals, KRMC had the lowest rate for each of the three years covered by the data, which means KRMC (and by extension DMC) would cost the Medicaid program substantially less money for care of Medicaid patients. Under the new prospective payment system instituted by the State of Florida for Medicaid reimbursement of acute care hospital providers, for service between July 1, 2018, and March 31, 2019, JHS is the beneficiary of an automatic rate enhancement of more than $8 million. In contrast, KRMC’s rate enhancement is only between $16,000 and $17,000. Thus, it will cost the Medicaid program substantially more to treat a patient using the same services at JW than at DMC. Furthermore, rather than enhance the financial viability of the JHS system, the evidence indicates that the JW proposal will be a financial drain on the JHS system. Finally, JHS’s past and proposed provision of care to Medicaid and indigent patients is noteworthy, but not a reason to approve its proposed hospital. JW is proposing this hospital to penetrate a more affluent market, not an indigent or underserved area, and it proposes to provide Medicaid and indigent care at a level that is consistent with the existing hospitals. JHS also receives the highest Low Income Pool (LIP) payments per charity care of any system in the state, and is one of only a handful of hospital systems that made money after receipt of the LIP payments. HCA-affiliated hospitals, by comparison, incur the second greatest cost in the state for charity care taking LIP payments into consideration. Analysis of standardized net revenues per adjusted admission (NRAA) among Miami-Dade County acute care hospitals, a group of 16 hospitals, shows JHS to be either the second or the third highest hospital in terms of NRAA. KRMC, in contrast, part of the EFD/HCA hospitals, is about 3% below the average of the 16 hospitals for NRAA. DMC’s analysis of standardized NRAA using data from 2014, 2015, and 2016, among acute care hospitals receiving local government tax revenues, shows JHS receives more net revenue than any of the other hospitals in this grouping. Using data from FY 2014 to FY 2016, DMC compared hospital costs among the four existing providers that are parties to this proceeding and JMH as a representative of JHS. Standardizing for case mix, fiscal year end, and location, an analysis of costs per adjusted admission shows that the hospitals other than JMH have an average cost of between a half and a third of JMH’s average cost. The same type of analysis of costs among a peer group of eight statutory teaching hospitals shows JHS’s costs to be the highest. It should also be noted that if JW were to fail or experience significant losses from operations, the taxpayers of Miami-Dade County will be at risk. In contrast, if DMC were to fail financially, EFD/HCA will shoulder the losses. When the two applications are evaluated in the context of the above criteria, the greater weight of the evidence does not mitigate in favor of approval of either. However, should AHCA decide to approve one of the applicants in its final order, preference should be given to DMC because of its lower costs per admission for all categories of payors, and in particular, the lower cost to the Florida Medicaid Program. In addition, the risk of financial failure would fall upon EFD/HCA, rather than the taxpayers of Miami-Dade County. Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e): Need considerations. Many of the considerations enumerated in rule 59C- 1.008(2)(e) overlap with the statutory criteria, but there are certain notable trends and market conditions that warrant mention. Specifically, while the population of Doral is growing, it remains relatively small, and does not itself justify a new hospital. And while there are some more densely populated areas outside of the city of Doral, they are much closer to existing hospitals having robust services and excess capacity. Doral is a more affluent area, and there was no evidence of any financial or cultural access issues supporting approval of either CON application. The availability, utilization, and quality of existing hospitals are clearly not issues, as there are several existing hospitals with plenty of capacity accessible to Doral area residents. In terms of medical treatment trends, it was undisputed that use rates for inpatient hospital services continue trending downward, and that trend is expected to continue. Concomitantly, there is a marked shift toward outpatient services in Miami-Dade County and elsewhere. Finally, both applicants are proposing to provide OB services without a NICU, which is below the standard in the market. While not required for the provision of obstetrics, NICU backup is clearly the most desirable and best practice. For the foregoing reasons, the considerations in rule 59C-1.008(2)(e) do not weigh in favor of approval of either hospital.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Healthcare Administration enter a final order denying East Florida-DMC, Inc.’s CON Application No. 10432 and denying The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Florida, d/b/a Jackson Hospital West’s CON Application No. 10433. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2019.