The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioners on the basis of race or national origin at Respondent's place of public accommodation.
Findings Of Fact At issue in these consolidated cases are the complaints by Petitioners Mitchell and Beck that they were subjected to discrimination when they visited Respondent's Orlando restaurant on December 3, 2011. Petitioner Mitchell is an African-American male, and Petitioner Beck is an Asian female. They live in Tampa and have been dating for approximately five years. Prior to December 3, 2011, they had visited BB King's in Orlando several times--four or five times, according to Petitioner Mitchell. On each of those occasions, they had enjoyed the restaurant's services and were not subjected to any form of discrimination. BB King's is a southern-style barbecue restaurant and live music venue. Respondent operates four BB King's locations. The Orlando restaurant is the largest, occupying 14,000 square feet spread over two stories, with three bars, a stage, and a dance floor. The restaurants are named after the famous African- American blues musician, B.B. King. At the Orlando restaurant, B.B. King and other blues musicians (such as Ray Charles and Howlin' Wolf, both African-Americans) are portrayed in paintings and images on the exterior walls, and inside the restaurant on the stage, on the walls, on the menus, and on the glassware. BB King's has a racially diverse clientele. A large majority of Respondent's customers are African-Americans. Respondent has a non-discrimination policy, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or other classification. All of Respondent's employees receive training on the company's non- discrimination policy, as part of the extensive initial-hire training process in the company's policies and procedures. The Orlando BB King's is at its busiest on Saturday nights, particularly between 7:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. During this time, there is usually a wait for a table. The waiting time ranges from five minutes to two hours. Respondent's seating policies and procedures were at the heart of the incident of which Petitioners complained. The seating policies and procedures in effect as of December 3, 2011, established through the credible testimony of Respondent's witnesses and corroborating exhibits, are described below. Respondent does not offer reservations in the traditional sense of reserving a table to accommodate a particular number of customers at a particular time. Instead, Respondent offers a variation of traditional reservations, called priority seating. Priority seating arrangements can be made in advance by telephone, online, or in person, for a particular group expecting to arrive at a particular time. While priority seating does not guarantee that a table will be ready when the group arrives, if an appropriate-sized table is not ready, the group is given first-in-line status, so they would receive the next available table of the size needed to accommodate the group, ahead of any walk-ins who are waiting for the same-sized table. Respondent limits the number of priority seating arrangements it will make for a given time slot. It is common, therefore, for priority seating slots to be filled in advance, particularly for the restaurant's peak days and peak times. When persons request tables for time slots with no more priority seating openings, those persons are told that they are welcome to come to the restaurant as walk-in customers. Through its seating policies and procedures, Respondent seeks to strictly control seating and to discourage customers from seating themselves. That is particularly important when the restaurant is very busy, for several reasons: to maintain order; to rotate the seating of customers among the different server zones so as to evenly spread the work load among the servers; to ensure that priority seating is provided to those who timely avail themselves of that option; and to maximize use of seating capacity when demand is at its peak. To help control seating, upon entering the Orlando BB King's restaurant, customers are informed by a sign at the reception station: "Please Wait To Be Seated." Another "Please Wait To Be Seated" sign tops a pole at the front of the velvet- roped area demarking the line for customers waiting to be seated. To reinforce the message of its "Please Wait To Be Seated" signs, Respondent places "Reserved" signs on each vacant table. Respondent's witnesses acknowledged that these tables are not actually reserved in the traditional sense of being held for a particular group with reservations, although tables may be held for priority seating, a term used interchangeably with reservations.2/ But the signs are not used for that purpose; instead, the signs are used as a means to discourage impatient customers from trying to seat themselves despite being told to wait to be seated. Another seating policy employed by Respondent is referred to as the 75 percent rule. Under this rule, unless and until 75 percent of a group wanting to sit together at one table is physically present at the restaurant, customers who are part of the group are not seated and are not even put on a waiting list nor provided a pager for a table. In other words, if two customers tell the hostess that they are a part of a group of four and are waiting for two other persons to arrive, those two customers will not be seated at a table for four, nor will they be put on the wait listing and given a pager for a table for four. Respondent's witnesses credibly explained that this rule served the purpose of maximizing use of available seating capacity, which is particularly important on busy nights during peak hours. The night in question--December 3, 2011--was a Saturday night during tourist season. Petitioners decided to drive from Tampa to Orlando, a prime tourist destination location, to return to the BB King's restaurant they had previously enjoyed. Petitioners did not make seating arrangements in advance. Instead, on the way to the restaurant, Petitioner Beck called BB King's on her cell phone to try to make reservations, between one and two hours before Petitioners expected to arrive. Petitioner Beck spoke with "Robbie," who told her that she could not make a reservation, but that they were welcome to walk in. Respondent's witnesses credibly explained that by the time Petitioners attempted to make seating arrangements, the priority seating limits surely would have been reached. Thus, it was reasonable and consistent with Respondent's seating policies for Petitioner Beck to be told that she could not make a reservation, but that they were welcome to walk in. Petitioner Beck acknowledged that the person with whom she spoke did not know the race or national origin of either Petitioner. Petitioners proceeded on to BB King's, arriving between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. The restaurant was very busy. In addition to the normal crowds at this peak time, the restaurant was hosting three special events for Nike: one Nike event was for a group of 50 people, between 6:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.; the second Nike event was for a group of 41 people, between 7:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.; and the third Nike event was for another group of 50 people, between 7:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. Petitioners checked in with the hostess at the front reception station. Petitioners were greeted in a friendly manner by the hostess and were given a pager that would signal when their table was ready. Within five to ten minutes, the pager signal was activated. Petitioners returned the pager to the hostess, who turned Petitioners over to a runner, the BB King's employee who escorts guests from the reception area to their tables and provides them with menus and silverware. The runner led Petitioners to a table for two. However, Petitioners refused the two-seater table offered to them, and informed the runner that they needed a table for four, as they were waiting for another couple who had not arrived yet.3/ Petitioners must have told the hostess that they were a party of two, not four, when they first checked in, so as to be put on the waiting list and given a pager for a two-seater table. Petitioners failed to explain why they did not inform the hostess upon checking in that they were waiting for two more persons and needed a table for four, instead of waiting until they saw the table to which they were led to tell the runner that they actually needed a table for four. The logical inference from Petitioners' description (and from Petitioner Beck's evasiveness described in endnote 3) is that Petitioners developed the story that they were expecting another couple after they were led to the table for two, perhaps because they were not happy with the location of the two-seater table and preferred the location of the four-seater tables, or perhaps because they just wanted more elbow room. The credibility of Petitioners' story is undermined by the following facts: Petitioner Mitchell admitted that there was no set time established to meet this other couple at the restaurant; the other couple that was supposed to meet Petitioners never showed up during the hour that Petitioners estimated they were at the restaurant in total; Petitioners did not offer testimony by the other couple to corroborate their story; and Petitioners did not even name the other couple when asked in discovery for names of persons with knowledge of the facts underlying Petitioners' complaints. Ironically, the new information that Petitioners were waiting for another couple, belatedly offered to the runner in an attempt to switch to a four-seater table, triggered the 75 percent rule, which ultimately was the source of Petitioners' dissatisfaction. The credible evidence establishes that if Petitioners had accepted the two-seater table they were offered, they would have been served, as they had been on prior occasions. Instead, pursuant to the 75 percent rule, Petitioners were escorted by the runner back to the reception area, and were told to let the hostess know when the couple they were waiting for had arrived. Petitioners asked to be put on the waiting list and be issued a pager for a table for four, but the hostess followed the 75 percent rule and reasonably refused to do so. No evidence was offered to prove that the 75 percent rule was used as a means to discriminate against Petitioners because of their race or national origin. Petitioners offered no evidence to prove that any other customers who did not have 75 percent of their group present were seated at tables, or were put on the waiting list and issued pagers. Petitioners offered no evidence to prove that the 75 percent rule was not applied uniformly to all other customers regardless of their race or national origin. Petitioners offered no evidence that the 75 percent rule was waived for any customers who were not members of Petitioners' protected race or national origin classes. After Petitioners were returned to the reception area and told to let the hostess know when the rest of their party arrived, Petitioners went to the bar area to wait. Petitioner Beck ordered a drink, and was served without incident. Petitioners observed an African-American couple seated at a nearby table for four. When the African-American couple was finishing their meal and about to vacate their table, they asked Petitioners if they wanted to be seated at the table, and Petitioners gladly took them up on their offer. The African-American couple who offered Petitioners their table left and Petitioners remained seated at the table for four. Petitioners did not have menus or silverware, because they were not seated by a runner. A server approached the table, but did not stop to take Petitioners' orders. The server seemed upset according to Petitioners, perhaps because they had seated themselves, contrary to Respondent's seating policies and procedures. Then a different server came to the table. According to Petitioners, that server took their orders for drinks and dinner, and brought them drinks. Petitioners believe that the first server must have reported them to the hostess, because the same hostess who had told Petitioners previously to wait until the rest of their group arrived came over to tell Petitioners that they needed to get up from the table. Someone who Petitioners described as a manager also came up to tell Petitioners that they needed to vacate the table because the rest of their group had not arrived. At hearing, Petitioners testified that they did not know the name of the manager with whom they spoke. Petitioners claim that they told the unidentified manager that they should not have to leave the four-seater table, pointing out that there was a Caucasian couple seated at a four- seater table. According to Petitioners, the manager told them he did not have the heart to ask the other couple to move. Petitioner Beck testified that the manager made this comment while Petitioners were waiting in the bar area before seating themselves. Petitioner Mitchell, on the other hand, claimed that this conversation occurred after the manager asked them to get up from the four-person table. Petitioners' testimony in this regard was not credible. When Petitioners were asked to vacate the table from which they had seated themselves, after arguing for a brief period, Petitioners ultimately agreed to vacate the table. They then decided to leave the restaurant. Apparently they were allowed to leave without paying for the drinks they had ordered and been served while seated at the table for four, and apparently they abandoned the dinner orders they had placed. It was clear from Petitioners' testimony that they did not understand Respondent's seating policies. Petitioners seemed to be under the misimpression that Respondent had a policy against seating couples at tables for four. Instead, according to the credible testimony of Respondent's witnesses, couples are often seated at tables for four early in the evening, but that as the evening progresses into the peak hours, the hostess begins to direct couples to two-seater tables, using the four-seater tables for groups of three or four. This maximizes use of the available seating, a reasonable and necessary policy for a busy restaurant/entertainment venue. The testimony of Respondent's witnesses was consistent in this regard, and included the credible testimony of Ms. Olivo, who was the hostess on December 3, 2011, but who has not worked for Respondent since 2012. The credible evidence established that Petitioners were asked to vacate the table for four, not because there were only two of them, but rather, because their story that they were waiting for another couple triggered the 75 percent rule, and because, after they were told to wait until the rest of their group arrived, they chose to ignore those instructions and seat themselves. Petitioners failed to prove that Respondent's practice of sometimes seating couples at tables for four and sometimes directing couples to tables for two was a choice made on the basis of race or national origin, as opposed to a reasonable judgment for maximizing use of seating capacity based on how busy the restaurant is. Petitioners acknowledged that the Caucasian couple they claim to have pointed out to the manager was not the only couple they observed seated at a table for four. To the contrary, Petitioners admit that the couple who made the nice gesture that, unfortunately, was contrary to Respondent's seating policies, of offering Petitioners "their" table as they were getting up to leave was an African-American couple. Petitioners offered no evidence to prove how long either the Caucasian couple or the African-American couple seated at tables for four had been at the restaurant, whether they were seated with all of their party present, whether they were waiting for others to join them, or whether they had improperly seated themselves. These couples might have arrived hours earlier, well before the peak time, and lingered to enjoy their food and the live entertainment. That Petitioners admitted to having observed both a Caucasian couple and an African-American couple at tables for four is evidence that Respondent was not using its seating policies as a means to discriminate, but rather, applied its policies in a non-discriminatory manner to accommodate customers both within and outside the protected classes who were not shown to be similarly situated to Petitioners. In fact, Petitioners admitted that when the two of them previously visited Respondent's Orlando restaurant, they had been seated at tables for four. Petitioners also contend that the unidentified manager who asked them to vacate the table informed them that the table was "reserved" for a group of three Caucasian customers who had priority seating arrangements. According to Petitioners, this threesome arrived at the restaurant after Petitioners. Petitioners do not contend that the three Caucasian customers did not have 75 percent of their group present; mathematically, the threesome being seated at a table for four must have had at least 75 percent of their group present. Moreover, Petitioners offered no evidence that the three customers did not have priority seating arrangements. Accordingly, Petitioners' description does not support Petitioners' assertion of discrimination, but rather, a consistent application of Respondent's seating policies and procedures. Petitioners were not entitled to be seated or to be placed on a waiting list for a table for four, because their claim to be waiting for another couple triggered the 75 percent rule; Petitioners ignored the instructions to wait for the rest of their group, and violated another seating policy by seating themselves. Petitioners did not attempt to make seating arrangements in time to secure priority seating, as the Caucasian threesome apparently had done. Thus, the Caucasian threesome was entitled to priority seating over walk-in customers on the waiting list for a four-seater table. Petitioners had not yet qualified to be placed on the walk-in waiting list. Consistent with Respondent's seating policies, Petitioners were properly asked to vacate the table at which they had seated themselves. As with the 75 percent rule, no credible evidence was offered to prove or suggest that the do-not-seat-yourself rule, announced to all customers by the sign at the reception station, was applied in a discriminatory fashion. Respondent's witnesses credibly testified that it is common for customers to try to skirt the seating policies by seating themselves when a table is vacated, particularly on a busy Saturday night, such as on December 3, 2011. Management and staff are all on alert to look for tell-tale signs, such as customers sitting at a table without menus or silverware. When this occurs, the hostess or a manager will inform these customers that they cannot seat themselves, and they are asked to leave the table. The credible testimony established that customers of all races and national origins are asked to leave tables when they violate the seating policies by seating themselves. Petitioners also argue that the use of the word "reserved" on signs placed on tables is inconsistent with Respondent's seating policy that does not allow tables to be reserved in the traditional sense. However, Respondent reasonably explained its seating policies and procedures, including its use of the "reserved" signs. Whether Respondent's seating policies are clear or confusing, good or bad, or make sense to Petitioners are not questions for determination in this proceeding. Instead, the question is whether Respondent's actions taken pursuant to its seating policies and procedures were motivated by intentional discrimination. Petitioners did not prove that Respondent used "reserved" signs as a means to discriminate against Petitioners because of their race or national origin. Petitioners do not contend that they were subjected to any form of direct discrimination, such as racial or ethnic slurs or derogatory comments of any kind. Instead, Petitioners Mitchell and Beck proved only that they are African-American and Asian, respectively; that they could have enjoyed all of the benefits offered at BB King's had they accepted the table for two they were offered; that they were not seated at a table for four because they claimed to be waiting for another couple to join them; and that they were asked to leave a table at which they had seated themselves. No credible proof was offered from which to infer that Respondent's actions were motivated by intentional discrimination based on race and national origin. For reasons explained in a series of motions and Orders (see endnote 1), the undersigned exercised the authority provided in section 120.569(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2012), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.380(b)(2), to assess costs against each Petitioner in connection with sanctions imposed for their discovery violations. By Order issued July 11, 2013, Petitioner Mitchell was ordered to pay $1,067.50 to Respondent to reimburse a portion of the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in attempting to obtain discovery and enforce orders compelling discovery. By separate Order issued July 11, 2013, Petitioner Beck was ordered to pay $1,098.00 to Respondent to reimburse a portion of the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in attempting to obtain discovery and enforce orders compelling discovery. As of the final hearing, these assessments had not been paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: In DOAH Case No. 12-3992, that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order: dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner Freddie Mitchell; and assessing $1,067.50 against Petitioner Mitchell for discovery violations, to be paid to Respondent, pursuant to the Order entered on July 11, 2013; and In DOAH Case No. 13-517, that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order: dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner Genevieve Abad Beck; and assessing $1,098.00 against Petitioner Beck for discovery violations, to be paid to Respondent, pursuant to the Order entered on July 11, 2013. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner on the basis of her disability.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner, Joan Vassar, was an individual participant in a tenant-based voucher arrangement under the Section 8 Housing Program funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and administered by the Tallahassee Housing Authority (THA). Petitioner was a resident of The Lakes at San Marcos (The Lakes), an apartment complex located at 4768 Woodville Highway in Tallahassee, Florida. Respondent, CMP CHP San Marcos Ltd. (San Marcos), is the owner of The Lakes, which is managed by a company known as HSI. Petitioner has been diagnosed with fibromyalgia and has suffered multiple strokes. Petitioner is disabled for purposes of the Fair Housing Act. Beginning in August 2009, Petitioner rented apartment 1533 at The Lakes, a one-bedroom apartment on the third floor of building 15. Petitioner’s rent was paid directly to San Marcos by THA pursuant to Petitioner’s one-bedroom housing choice voucher. Petitioner had difficulty climbing the stairs to her third-floor apartment and often took breaks at each landing to rest. There was no elevator at The Lakes as an alternative means of accessing the third floor of building 15. By all accounts, Petitioner’s tenancy at The Lakes was peaceful and without incident. In 2011, Valarie Gosier-Coleman became the assistant manager of The Lakes. Petitioner described Ms. Gosier-Coleman as compassionate toward her. Ms. Gosier-Coleman occasionally disposed of Petitioner’s garbage for her and retrieved Petitioner’s mail. In May 2014, Petitioner reported to Ms. Gosier-Coleman that her health had declined, that she would need a live-in caregiver, and that she wished to move to a two-bedroom, first-floor apartment. On June 4, 2014, in response to Petitioner’s request, Respondent informed Petitioner in writing that two two-bedroom, first-floor apartments--1311 and 1413--would become available beginning August 1, 2014. Apartment 1413 was located in the building next to Petitioner’s existing apartment, and Petitioner indicated she would accept that apartment. HSI requires all occupants of an apartment to complete an application and be approved to rent. Petitioner brought her would-be caregiver to The Lakes to apply for apartment 1413. However, the caregiver was reticent to complete the financial information section of the application. Although she took the incomplete application with her when she left the office, the caregiver never submitted a completed application for the apartment. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner was offered apartment 1116, a one-bedroom first-floor apartment. On July 16, 2014, Petitioner rejected that apartment, sight unseen, as “too far in the back of the complex.” On July 31, 2014, Petitioner renewed her lease for apartment 1533. At that time, she wrote to management, “I do not want a (2) bedroom apt. any place except where I specified for personal reasons. I have been here for 5 years and am very secure and familiar with my neighbors in my building . . . . Plus, my family lives in this same building on the first floor.”1/ No other first-floor apartments became available at The Lakes between August and October 2014. Shortly after renewing her lease, Petitioner informed HSI that she desired to leave The Lakes. Petitioner requested to break her lease, which Respondent allowed. Respondent refunded Petitioner’s deposit in full.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., denied Petitioners full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services offered at its place of public accommodation, in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact Parties and Jurisdiction Petitioners are African Americans who reside in the State of Ohio, who visited Orlando, Florida, in June 2011 and stayed at Lake Eve Resort beginning on June 21, 2011. Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., was the owner of Lake Eve Resort, located at 12388 International Drive, Orlando, Florida, at all times relevant hereto. Each Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Commission as follows: Jessica Austin – July 20, 2012 Denise Austin – July 21, 2012 Tracie Austin – January 18, 2013 (Amended Complaint)2/ Bonlydia Jones – July 11, 2012 James Austin – July 31, 2012 Dionne Harrington – August 1, 2012 Esther Hall – January 28, 2013 (Amended Complaint)3/ Boniris McNeal – March 27, 2013 Summer McNeal – March 27, 2013 Derek McNeal – March 27, 2013 In each Complaint, the Petitioner alleges that the most recent date of discrimination is June 22, 2011. On June 21, 2012, Petitioners Esther Hall, Summer McNeal, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, and Dionne Harrington, each filed a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) with the Commission. Each TAQ is signed by the named Petitioner, is stamped received by the Commission on June 21, 2012, and contains the specific facts alleged to be an act of discrimination in the provision of public accommodation by Respondent. Allegations of Discrimination On or about May 23, 2011, Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, entered into a Standard Group Contract with Lake Eve Resort (the Resort) to reserve 15 Resort rooms for five nights at a discounted group rate beginning June 21, 2011.4/ The rooms were to accommodate approximately 55 members of her extended family on the occasion of the Boss/Williams/Harris family reunion. Petitioners traveled from Ohio to Orlando via charter bus, arriving at the Resort on the evening of June 21, 2011. Erika Bell, a relative of Petitioners, drove a rental car from Ohio to Orlando. She did not arrive in Orlando until June 22, 2011. Petitioners checked in to the Resort without incident. However, one family member, John Harris, was informed that the three-bedroom suite he had reserved for his family was not available due to a mistake in reservations. He was offered two two-bedroom suites to accommodate his family. Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, dined off-property on the evening of June 21, 2011, to celebrate her wedding anniversary. Petitioner, Bonlydia Jones, left the Resort property shortly after check-in to shop for groceries. Petitioners, Dionne Harrington and Esther Hall, were very tired after the long bus trip and went to bed early on June 21, 2011. Petitioner, Denise Austin, arrived in Orlando with the family on June 21, 2011. On the morning of June 22, 2011, Ms. Jones received a call from Mr. Harris, informing her that the Resort management wanted to speak with them about his room. That morning, Ms. Jones and Mr. Harris met with two members of Resort management, Amanda Simon and Marie Silbe. Mr. Harris was informed that he needed to change rooms to a three-bedroom suite, the accommodation he had reserved, which had become available. Mr. Harris disputed that he had to change rooms and argued that he was told at check-in the prior evening he would not have to move from the two two-bedroom suites he was offered when his preferred three-bedroom suite was not available. After some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Harris would move his family to an available three-bedroom suite. The Resort provided an employee to assist with the move. Following the meeting with management, Ms. Jones went to the pool, along with Ms. Harrington and other members of the family. After a period of time which was not established at hearing, Mary Hall, one of Ms. Harrington’s relatives, came to the pool and informed Ms. Harrington that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Harrington left the pool and entered the lobby, where she observed police officers and members of Resort management. She approached a member of management and was informed that she and her family were being evicted from the Resort and must be off the property within an hour. Ms. Harrington left the lobby and returned to her room, where her mother, Ms. Hall was sleeping. Ms. Harrington informed Ms. Hall that the family was being evicted from the Resort and instructed Ms. Hall to pack her belongings. Ms. Jones’ cousin, Denise Strickland, came to the pool and informed her that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Jones entered the lobby where she was approached by a member of management, who introduced herself as the general manager and informed her that the family was being evicted. Ms. Jones requested a reason, but was informed by a police officer that the owners did not have to give a reason. In the lobby, Ms. Jones observed that an African- American male was stopped by police and asked whether he was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion. He was not a family member. Ms. Jones observed that no Caucasian guests were approached in the lobby by management or the police. Ms. Austin was on a trolley to lunch off-property on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from her cousin, Ms. Strickland. Ms. Strickland informed Ms. Austin that the family was being evicted from the Resort and she needed to return to pack her things. Ms. Austin returned to the property, where she was escorted to her room by a security guard and asked to pack her belongings. Ms. McNeal was en route to rent a car and buy groceries on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from Ms. Strickland informing her that the family was being evicted and that she needed to return to the Resort to pack her belongings. Upon her arrival at the Resort, Ms. McNeal entered the lobby. There, she was approached by Resort staff, asked whether she was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion, and informed that the Resort could not honor the reservations and the family was being evicted. Ms. McNeal observed that Caucasian guests entering the lobby were not approached by either the police or Resort management. Ms. McNeal was escorted to her room by both a police officer and a member of management and instructed to be out of the room within 30 minutes. Ms. McNeal inquired why they were being evicted, but was told by a police officer that the Resort was not required to give a reason. Erika Bell received a call from her mother, Ms. Austin, while en route to the Resort on June 22, 2011. Ms. Austin informed Ms. Bell that the family was being evicted from the Resort and asked her to call the Resort and cancel her reservation. Respondent gave no reason for evicting Petitioners from the property. Respondent refunded Petitioners’ money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: Finding that Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., committed an act of public accommodation discrimination in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011), against Petitioners Jessica Austin, Denise Austin, Tracie Austin, James Austin, Bonlydia Jones, Esther Hall, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, Summer McNeal, and Dionne Harrington; and Prohibiting any future acts of discrimination by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in Petitioner's Public Accommodations Complaint of Discrimination and, if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations grant Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a black woman. On March 27, 2007, Petitioner went shopping at the Wal- Mart Supercenter located at 9300 Northwest 77th Avenue in Hialeah Gardens, Florida (Store). This was Petitioner's "favorite store." She had shopped there every other week for the previous four or five years and had had a positive "overall [shopping] experience." At no time had she ever had any problem making purchases at the Store. At around 5:00 p.m. on March 27, 2007, Petitioner entered the Store's electronics department to look for two black ink cartridges for her printer. In her cart were several items she had picked up elsewhere in the store (for which she had not yet paid). Because the cartridges she needed were located in a locked display cabinet, Petitioner went to the counter at the electronics department to ask for assistance. Maria Castillo was the cashier behind the counter. She was engaged in a "casual conversation," punctuated with laughter, with one of the Store's loss prevention officers, Jessy Fair, as she was taking care of a customer, Carlos Fojo, a non-black Hispanic off-duty lieutenant with the Hialeah Gardens Police Department. Lieutenant Fojo was paying for a DVD he intended to use as a "training video." The DVD had been in a locked display cabinet in the electronics department. A sales associate had taken the DVD out of the cabinet for Lieutenant Fojo. It was Store policy to require customers seeking to purchase items in locked display cabinets in the electronics department to immediately pay for these items at the electronics department register. Lieutenant Fojo was making his purchase in accordance with that policy. Two Store sales associates, Carlos Espino and Sigfredo Gomez, were near the counter in the electronics department when Petitioner requested assistance. In response to Petitioner's request for help, Mr. Espino and Mr. Gomez went to the locked display cabinet to get two black ink cartridges for Petitioner, with Petitioner following behind them. Ms. Castillo and Mr. Fair remained at the counter and continued their lighthearted conversation, as Ms. Castillo was finishing up with Lieutenant Fojo. Petitioner was offended by Ms. Castillo's and Mr. Fair's laughter. She thought that they were laughing at her because she was black (despite her not having any reasonable basis to support such a belief). She turned around and loudly and angrily asked Ms. Castillo and Mr. Fair what they were laughing at. After receiving no response to her inquiry, she continued on her way behind Mr. Espino and Mr. Gomez to the display cabinet containing the ink cartridges. When Mr. Espino arrived at the cabinet, he unlocked and opened the cabinet door and removed two black ink cartridges, which he handed to Mr. Gomez. Petitioner took the cartridges from Mr. Gomez and placed them in her shopping cart. Mr. Espino tried to explain to Petitioner that, in accordance with Store policy, before doing anything else, she needed to go the register in the electronics department and pay for the ink cartridges. Petitioner responded by yelling at Mr. Espino and Mr. Gomez. In a raised voice, she proclaimed that she was "no thief" and "not going to steal" the ink cartridges, and she "repeated[ly]" accused Mr. Espino and Mr. Gomez of being "racist." Instead of going directly to the register in the electronics department to pay for the cartridges (as she had been instructed to do by Mr. Espino), Petitioner took her shopping cart containing the ink cartridges and the other items she intended to purchase and "proceeded over to the CD aisle" in the electronics department. Mr. Espino "attempt[ed] to speak to her," but his efforts were thwarted by Petitioner's "screaming at [him and Mr. Gomez as to] how racist they were." Lieutenant Fojo, who had completed his DVD purchase, heard the commotion and walked over to the "CD aisle" to investigate. When he got there, he approached Petitioner and asked her, "What's the problem?" She responded, "Oh, I see you too are racist and I see where this is coming from." Lieutenant Fojo went on to tell Petitioner the same thing that Mr. Espino had: that the ink cartridges had to be taken to the register in the electronics department and paid for immediately ("just like he had paid for his [DVD]"). Petitioner was defiant. She told Lieutenant Fojo that she would eventually pay for the cartridges, but she was "still shopping." Moreover, she continued her rant that Lieutenant Fojo and the Store employees were "racist." "[C]ustomers in the area were gathering" to observe the disturbance. To avoid a further "disrupt[ion] [of] the normal business affairs of the [S]tore," Lieutenant Fojo directed Petitioner to leave and escorted her outside the Store. In taking such action, Lieutenant Fojo was acting solely in his capacity as a law enforcement officer with the Hialeah Gardens Police Department. Once outside the Store, Lieutenant Fojo left Petitioner to go to his vehicle. Petitioner telephoned the Hialeah Gardens Police Department to complain about the treatment she had just received and waited outside the Store for a police officer to arrive in response to her call. Officer Lawrence Perez of the Hialeah Gardens Police Department responded to the scene and met Petitioner outside the Store. After conducting an investigation of the matter, Officer Perez issued Petitioner a trespass warning, directing that she not return to the Store. At no time subsequent to the issuance of this trespass warning has Petitioner returned the Store (although she has shopped at other Wal-Mart stores in the area). While Petitioner has been deprived of the opportunity to shop at the Store, it has been because of action taken, not by any Store employee, but by Hialeah Gardens law enforcement personnel. Moreover, there has been no showing that Petitioner's race was a motivating factor in the taking of this action.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order dismissing Petitioner's Public Accommodations Complaint of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether this case should be dismissed based on Petitioner's failure to make an appearance at hearing.
Findings Of Fact On January 7, 2011, the undersigned issued the Initial Order in this case. Petitioner and Respondent responded to the Initial Order. On February 10, 2011, the undersigned issued a Notice of Hearing, scheduling the hearing for March 28, 2011. The Notice of Hearing was not returned as undeliverable to Petitioner. Indeed, Petitioner wrote and filed several letters regarding her upcoming hearing and case in general. On March 18, 2011, the hearing was convened as scheduled. After waiting 15 minutes, Petitioner did not appear at the hearing and did not contact the undersigned’s office regarding any problem with commencing the hearing as scheduled. Accordingly, no evidence to support Petitioner’s allegations was introduced at the hearing. Given this lack of evidence, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Gayle Wilburn 1006 East Johnson Avenue, #4 Pensacola, Florida 32514 Robert E. Larkin, Esquire Allen Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Vanessa Brown, a member of a protected class, was denied rental of a room at the hotel called the Sleep Inn owned by Respondent, Capital Circle Hotel Company, on or about May 27, 2000, on the basis of her race (African-American) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a member of a protected class (African- American). Respondent was on May 27, 2000, and is the owner of the Sleep Inn located in Temple Terrace, Florida, which is a public lodging establishment. In the early morning hours of May 27, 2000, Petitioner was denied accommodations at the Sleep Inn. Cheryl Dodd was working as night auditor and desk clerk for Respondent on May 26, 2000, and May 27, 2000. At approximately 4:00 a.m., Petitioner entered the Sleep Inn with Frederich Mobley (also African-American) and asked to rent a room. Before Petitioner could complete her request, Dodd told Petitioner she was sold out. Dodd made no effort to check the Sleep Inn computer system or reservation card system to determine if a room was available before immediately interrupting Respondent and telling her that no room was available and no room would be available until the next day in the afternoon. Petitioner and Mobley left the lobby of the Sleep Inn and returned to the parking lot. In the parking lot, Mitchell Jamerson was wiping down his car, because he could not sleep. Jamerson (an African-American) struck up a conversation with Mobley and Respondent. He asked the two of them if they had been told there were no rooms available. Jamerson told them that he was with a softball team and four of his team members had called to tell him they had had car trouble, would not be able to get to the motel that night, and that their rooms would not be needed. About ten minutes after Petitioner left the hotel lobby with Mobley, a Caucasian male entered the hotel lobby and came back out. Jamerson spoke to the gentleman, and he said he had just rented a room for him and his wife for the night, without a reservation. Jamerson accompanied Petitioner and Mobley back into the lobby. Petitioner asked Dodd why she could not have a room when a room had just been rented to the Caucasian male. Dodd said she had given the Caucasian male a room with a cot. Petitioner asked why she was not offered that room. Dodd told Petitioner that she did not think they would want a room with a cot and that there were no other rooms available. Dodd told Petitioner that she (Petitioner) could speak to the manager the next day, and gave her the card of John C. Walters. The time of the end of Petitioner's second visit to the lobby was 4:10 a.m. on May 27, 2000. At approximately 12:00 a.m., Jamerson had gone to the front desk and told the desk clerk, Dodd, that three rooms reserved by his team would not be needed that night because his team members had had car trouble in Wildwood. Jamerson and his team (other than the four mentioned above), including both African-Americans and Caucasians, had checked in at approximately 7:30 p.m. on the evening of May 26, 2000. The rooms they were given were missing towels. During the registration and when asking for towels, they believed they were treated rudely. Jamerson stated that the clerk on duty at 12:00 a.m. midnight and at 4:00 a.m. on May 27, 2000, was the same person at the desk when he checked in with his team at 7:30 p.m. on May 26, 2000. Dodd testified that she came on duty at 11:00 p.m. that night for an 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. However, John C. Walters, the manager of the Sleep Inn, stated that Dodd often helped out during shifts other than the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. Neither Dodd nor Walters could identify who was on shift at the hotel for the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift that night. Dodd, contrary to the testimony of Jamerson, Petitioner, and Mobley, said Petitioner came into the hotel both times with two men. Dodd also said that she had checked in two sets of parents and two African-American females into two rooms at approximately 11:00 p.m. or 12:00 a.m. She stated that the individuals had reservations and were parents of members of the baseball team. Jamerson stated that his team was the only team in the hotel, that he knew the teams in the competition that were to attend and that all the teams were comprised of adult women. No parents of his team stayed at the hotel on May 26, 2000, or May 27, 2000. Dodd's testimony on this incident is not credible. Dodd testified that she was running the night audit at the time Petitioner and Mobley entered the hotel, and could not check whether a room was available. Dodd admitted that she did not make that information known to Petitioner or Mobley. Dodd testified that she had started running the audit sometime between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. that night, as was her practice, and that the audit took one to one and a half or two hours to run. However, Walters testified that he was not there the night of May 26, 2000, or May 27, 2000, but the audit took about 45 minutes. Dodd testified that she had had a gentleman call in to cancel a room because he had had car trouble. She testified that the gentleman had called approximately 30 to 45 minutes after Respondent and Mobley left the lobby. She said she told the gentleman that called that she would try to rent out the room, and if she could, she would not bill him even though according to policy she should. She then testified that the Caucasian male to whom she rented the room entered the lobby approximately 15 minutes later. Dodd testified that when she had a reservation and the person called in to cancel after 6:00 p.m. she would bill that client, but would rent out the room if possible. She said she could check people in and out while the audit was running. This testimony is not credible. Robert Bland testified that the policy of Respondent was to bill the customer who had a reservation if they canceled after 6:00 p.m. and not to rent the room out. The policy was based on the fact that the customer was being billed for the room and had a right to have that room available for him/her whether or not anyone else appeared to ask for the room. Bland presented a composite exhibit of the driver's license photographs of 14 African-Americans who rented rooms between May 10, 2000, and May 28, 2000. Bland could not confirm whether or not that was all the African-Americans who had rented rooms in the month of May or just all between the period of May 10, 2000, and May 28, 2000. Bland stated that all computer records of the registrations and other records other than the driver's license photos he presented for the period of May 2000 had been destroyed on a hard disk that had been damaged. Of those driver's licenses produced to demonstrate that the hotel did provide rooms to African-Americans, seven of those driver's licenses belonged to members of Jamerson's baseball team who had signed in on May 26, 2000, at 7:30 p.m. after Dodd was on duty. Jamerson's team had made reservations through one party by telephone and no identification had been made at the time of the reservations of their ethnic background. Bland could not state who had accepted the reservations of the African-Americans identified by driver's license photographs who were not members of Jamerson's team. Bland could not state that he knew that Dodd had ever rented a room to any African-American other than Jamerson's team members, who had arrived with prior reservations. Bland stated that Dodd had been given a new employee manual which was developed after Bland took over as Director of Operations. This was sometime after Dodd had actually started work at the Sleep Inn. No training was given to Dodd or any other employee on that manual. The manual states that no one should discriminate on the basis of any categories of discrimination. No other information that was provided indicated that Bland could verify that Dodd had read the manual. Dodd stated that she was provided an Employee Manual which warned against discriminating against minorities, and she did know from working in the hospitality industry that she should not discriminate. Dodd further testified that no one at the Sleep Inn asked her, suggested to her, or implied to her that she should give preferential treatment to Caucasians over African- Americans. Dodd specifically testified that at the time Petitioner came into the Sleep Inn, she was running the night audit of the motel on the computer and that to her knowledge no rooms were available at that time. Dodd further testified that early after Petitioner left the lobby, a room became available, that she was not aware Petitioner was waiting in the parking lot, and that the next prospective guests to enter the motel were a Caucasian couple. Walters testified that at the Sleep Inn, while he was there he rented to anyone who could rent a room. His purpose was to place "heads in beds."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: Finding that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her race (African-American); Awarding Petitioner $500 in compensatory damages; Issuing a cease and desist order prohibiting Respondent from repeating this practice in the future; and A reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen F. Baker, Esquire Stephen F. Baker, P.A. 800 First Street South Winter Haven, Florida 33880 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tricia A. Madden, Esquire Tricia A. Madden, P.A. 500 East Altamonte Drive, Suite 200 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, a public lodging establishment, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner, who is African-American, by refusing to provide her accommodations or service based upon race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Phyllis Phyl ("Phyl") is an African-American woman who resides in Boca Raton, Florida. Respondent G6 Hospitality, LLC, d/b/a Studio 6 ("Studio 6"), is the owner and operator of the Studio 6 Extended Stay Hotel located in Pompano Beach, Florida (the "Hotel"). Phyl arrived at the Hotel at around 1:30 p.m. on February 22, 2014. Previously, she had made a reservation for a two-night stay, booking a nonsmoking room with a queen bed. Phyl was aware that check-in time at the Hotel was 3:00 p.m., but she decided to take a chance that a room would be available for earlier occupancy. When Phyl attempted to register, however, the clerk informed Phyl that no rooms were available for early check in. Phyl elected to wait in her car, which was parked in the Hotel's parking lot. From there, she watched a black man enter the Hotel and walk out a few minutes later. Phyl assumed that he, too, had been told that his room was not ready. She did not, however, witness his attempt to check in (if that is what occurred), and therefore Phyl lacks personal knowledge of this man's transaction with the Hotel, if any.2/ Unhappy, Phyl walked around the Hotel grounds and peered through the window of an apparently vacant room, which she determined, based on her observation, was clean and ready for occupancy. Phyl might have been mistaken, for she could not see, e.g., the bathroom, but even if her assumption were correct, the fact is not probative of discriminatory intent. This is because a room is not "available" for guest occupancy at this Hotel until after a manager has inspected the room, deemed it "clean," and caused such information to be entered into the Hotel's computer system, at which point the front-desk clerk is on notice that the room is ready. Thus, there is a delay between the time the housekeeping staff finishes cleaning a room and the time the front-desk clerk is able to let the room to a guest. After peeking in the seemingly empty room, Phyl returned to her car, and soon she noticed a white couple enter the Hotel, from which they exited several minutes later. Phyl did not witness the couple's activities inside the Hotel. The man and woman got into their car and drove around the Hotel premises. Phyl followed. She watched the couple park, leave their car, and enter a room. She observed the man retrieve some luggage and bring his bags to the room. Phyl assumed that this couple had just checked in. Phyl returned to the Hotel lobby and inquired again about the availability of a room. This time the clerk told her a room was ready. Phyl checked in at 2:09 p.m. Phyl stayed two nights, as planned, and paid the rate quoted in her reservation. When she checked out on February 24, 2014, the clerk refunded the $25 security deposit Phyl had given the Hotel at check in, which was required because she wanted to pay cash for the room (and did). Phyl claims that the clerk was rude to her, and so she left without taking a receipt. Hotel business records show that on February 22, 2014, no guest checked in between Phyl's arrival at 1:30 p.m. and 2:09 p.m., when she herself checked in. The white man who (together with a female companion) seemed to have checked in while Phyl was waiting actually had checked in earlier that day, at 11:14 a.m. The undersigned rejects as unfounded Phyl's contention that the Hotel's records are unreliable and possibly fraudulent and instead accepts them as persuasive evidence. Ultimate Factual Determinations At the material time, the Hotel was a "public lodging establishment" within the reach of section 509.092, Florida Statutes, and a "public accommodation" as that term is defined in section 760.02(11). Thus, the Hotel is accountable to Phyl for unlawful discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act if such occurred. The greater weight of the evidence, however, fails to establish that the Hotel refused accommodations or service to Phyl, or otherwise unlawfully discriminated against her. Rather, the Hotel provided Phyl the type of room she had reserved, at the quoted rate, for the length of stay she requested. Indeed, despite arriving 90 minutes before the Hotel's published check-in time, Phyl was able to get a room early, after waiting little more than half an hour. The Hotel's conduct, in this instance, cannot be faulted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Phyl's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2015.
