The Issue The issue is whether the claim of employment discrimination contained in the Petition for Relief must be dismissed due to Petitioner's execution of a release of all claims.
Findings Of Fact On June 29, 2012, Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated. On July 24, 2012, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination alleging that he was subjected to discrimination. On August 18, 2012, Petitioner signed an agreement. Under the agreement, Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner $5,000.00, net several items, provided Petitioner did not exercise his right to revoke the agreement within the seven days following execution, as provided in the agreement. Petitioner did not revoke the agreement, and Respondent discharged all obligations under the agreement. In exchange, Petitioner agreed to release Respondent from all claims, damages, suits, complaints, damages, losses and expenses, of every nature, legal or equitable, whether known or unknown, which Olascoaga ever had, now has, or may claim to have, upon or by reason of the occurrence of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever . . . . This release specifically includes, but is not limited to, a release of any and all claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act . . . . There is no contention that Petitioner was not acting knowingly or voluntarily when he executed a release of claims.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Carlos Olascoaga's Petition for Relief from employment discrimination for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April 2014.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Education set out to hire a person to fill the position of "Program Director II." The position was in the Department's Division of Public Schools, Bureau of Program Support Services, Management Information Services Section. It is one of the highest positions in the Department. A selection committee was established by the Department to review applicants for the position. The Petitioner and approximately 19 other persons applied for the position and met the minimum requirements. The selection committee selected eight persons, one of whom withdrew, to be interviewed. The committee recommended five of the applicants, including Petitioner, to the Chief of the Bureau of Program Support Services. The Bureau Chief was concerned that none of the applicants recommended to him had experience with management information services at the school district level. He discussed the matter with the Secretary of the Department of Education and with the Director of the Division of Public Schools. The Bureau Chief decided to readvertise the position and to extend the deadline for applicants. His desire was to enhance the pool of applicants. Several additional persons thereafter applied and were interviewed by the selection committee. In addition to the five persons originally recommended to the Bureau Chief, the steering committee recommended an additional person. The Secretary of the Department ultimately decided to hire the new applicant. The Department of Education utilizes an "Affirmative Action-Equal Employment Opportunity Plan." The Plan constitutes Appendix 6-0 of the Department's Policy and Procedures Manual. The Plan sets out the Department's policy of making employment decisions without regard to a person's race, color, sex, religion, creed, national origin, handicap, marital status, political opinions or affiliations, or age; and provides for announcement of position vacancies, employment recruitment, processing of applications, establishment of employee selection committees and the like. The plan has never been promulgated as a rule. To aid selection committees in performing their duties, the Department has promulgated an Employee Selection Committee Handbook. Basically, the handbook summarizes and repeats the provisions of the Affirmative Action-Equal Employment Opportunity Plan and includes suggestions about structuring interviews and interview questions. The Employee Selection Committee Handbook has not been promulgated as a rule. The provisions of the handbook are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Affirmative Action-Equal Employment Opportunity Plan. It has not been established that the Department failed to follow the provisions of its Affirmative Action-Equal Employment Opportunity Plan and Employee Selection Committee Handbook in the selection process which led to the hiring of the Program Director II. It has not been established that the Plan, the handbook, or the selection process itself operated unfairly as to any applicant, including Petitioner.
The Issue Whether this case is properly before the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 2, 2004, the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) forwarded a packet of papers, as more fully described below, to the Division of Administrative Hearings (Division). At the request of the parties, a disputed- fact hearing was scheduled for June 30, 2004 through July 1, 2004. The Charge of Discrimination in this cause bears a signature date of April 23, 2002. It states that the most recent alleged discrimination occurred in December 2001, and alleges race, color, and religious discrimination and retaliation. The copy of the Charge sent to the Division in the Commission's referral packet bears a Commission date-stamp of December 2, 2002. However, Respondent has provided a copy of the Charge, showing that it was first filed with the Commission on November 19, 2002, and the parties are in agreement that November 19, 2002, was the date of actual filing of the Charge with the Commission. The Charge filed with the Commission was accompanied by a cover letter dated November 14, 2002, and a "confidential" affidavit also dated November 14, 2002. On December 6, 2002, Respondent received the Commission's Notice of Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. Thereafter, Respondent submitted its position statement with attachments to the Commission. The parties subsequently engaged in settlement discussions but were unable to come to terms.1/ On November 20, 2003, the law office representing Petitioner notified the Commission that settlement was not possible and that Petitioner's attorney wanted to be advised of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) case number assigned to the same allegations of discrimination by the EEOC, pursuant to the Commission's work-sharing agreement with that Federal agency. On January 21, 2004, Petitioner's attorney's law office again wrote to the Commission requesting the EEOC case number and stating, "[W]e may take our client's issues up in the judicial arena."2/ Petitioner filed with the Commission on February 10, 2004, an Election of Rights signed by her attorney on February 9, 2004, on which the following option had been checked: More than 180 days have elapsed since I filed my charge of discrimination. I wish to withdraw my charge and file a Petition for Relief to proceed with an administrative hearing as provided for under Florida Statutes Section 760.11(4)(b) and (8). On February 16, 2004, the Commission sent a letter to Petitioner's attorney confirming its receipt of the Election of Rights on February 10, 2004, and reciting the foregoing reason stated therein. The Commission attached to its letter a blank petition for relief with instructions that the petition should be completed and returned to the Commission within 20 days. Twenty days from the Commission's February 16, 2004, letter would have been March 8, 2004. By a letter dated March 16, 2004, Petitioner's attorney wrote the Commission advising that for purposes of the EEOC claim, "March 23, 2002," should be used as the last date of discrimination. March 23, 2002, is a date four months after the date alleged in the Charge of Discrimination which had been filed with the Commission. (See Finding of Fact No. 3.) Apparently, the Commission filed the EEOC complaint with that federal agency on March 18, 2004. By a March 18, 2004, form letter, the Commission advised Petitioner, via her attorney, that the EEOC claim had been filed and given a number. The Commission's form advises that Petitioner need do nothing with the EEOC until the Commission has made its final findings in the case before the Commission. The March 18, 2004, EEOC complaint is virtually identical in all respects to the Charge filed by Petitioner with the Commission on November 19, 2002, except for the date of alleged discrimination. (See Finding of Fact No. 9.) On March 29, 2004, Petitioner's attorney signed a second Election of Rights, checking the same reasons as were given in the February 10, 2004, Election of Rights. (See Finding of Fact No. 7.) The second Election of Rights was filed with the Commission on March 31, 2004. On April 1, 2004, the Commission sent a second letter to Petitioner via her attorney, confirming receipt of Petitioner's second Election of Rights dated March 29, 2004, and stating that it had been filed on March 30,[sic] 2004. This Commission letter again reiterated the option requested by the Petitioner. (See Finding of Fact Nos. 7 and 13.) The April 1, 2004, letter from the Commission attached a second blank petition for relief for Petitioner to complete, and further advised: The initial letter dated February 16, 2004 included the Petition for Relief to be filed with the Commission within 20 days of the dated letter. We have not received the Petition for Relief to date; therefore I am enclosing another Petition for Relief to be completed. Forward the original Petition for Relief to the Division of Administrative Hearings and mail a copy to the Division. The Election of Rights Form will be forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for case assignment as requested. On April 1, 2004, the Commission filled out a Transmittal of Petition form, which it forwarded to the Division, attaching only the Commission's April 1, 2004, letter to Petitioner's attorney, a copy of the original Charge of Discrimination incorrectly date-stamped as filed with the Commission on December 2, 2003 (see Finding of Fact No. 3), and a copy of Petitioner's Election of Rights, dated March 29, 2004, which had been signed by her attorney. (See Finding of Fact No. 13.) Petitioner admits that at no time within 20 days of either the Commission's February 16, 2004, letter or the Commission's April 1, 2004 letter, did Petitioner file a Petition for Relief either with the Commission or the Division. Not until after Respondent had moved to dismiss before the Division on June 15, 2004, did Petitioner file a Petition for Relief. On June 24, 2004, that Petition for Relief was filed with the Division, without prior leave of an Administrative Law Judge of the Division. The Petition was not on a Commission form. As of June 25, 2004, the date of oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss and Response thereto, the free-form Petition for Relief had only been filed with the Division and had never been filed with the Commission. On the basis of the record before the Division, it appears that Petitioner has never filed with the Commission a Petition for Relief, also known as a request for administrative hearing. It is undisputed that no Petition for Relief or request for administrative hearing was filed by Petitioner with the Commission within 215 days of filing the Charge of Discrimination with the Commission, which would have been 180 days plus 35 days; nor within 35 days of February 16, 2004, the date of the Commission's first letter advising Petitioner to timely file a Petition for Relief with the Commission; or within 35 days of April 1, 2004, the date of the Commission's second letter advising Petitioner to timely file a Petition for Relief with the Commission.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss this case, which exists only by the Charge of Discrimination, and a late-filed petition before the Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent, First Coast Technical College (Respondent) retaliated against Petitioner, Gregory R. Lulkoski (Petitioner) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), section 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes?1/ Secondary issues raised by Respondent are whether the St. Johns County School Board (School Board) is immune from Petitioner’s allegations, and, if not, whether the School Board was Petitioner’s employer during the relevant period.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the School Board by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). A charter technical school is a creature of Florida statute, distinct from school boards and districts, including those school districts in which they are located, which act as the sponsor of the school. FCTI and the School Board entered into a charter which governed the operating relationship between them. The last operative charter between FCTI and the School Board became effective July 1, 2013. The School Board was the sponsoring entity of FCTC under the charter. The School Board had no involvement in the day to day operations of FCTC when it was operated by FCTI. FCTI had its own management team and board of directors. FCTI had its own articles of incorporation, employment handbook, organizational structure, management plan, human relations (HR) director and department, and its own legal counsel. FCTC’s president, Sandra Raburn-Fortner, entered into a contract of employment with FCTI. No one from the School District is on FCTI’s organizational chart. FCTI and FCTC management, and not the School Board, were responsible for the daily operations of FCTC and all personnel matters of FCTC employees. FCTI had its own procedure in its employee handbook for reporting discrimination and harassment. FCTC employees were designated as School Board employees solely for wage payments, benefits, and collective bargaining purposes under the charter. For this reason, FCTC employees received checks and tax documents from the School Board and the School Board remitted contributions to the Florida Retirement system on their behalf. FCTI reimbursed the School Board for these pass-through expenditures, and the School Board charged FCTI a fee for this service. The School Board’s only involvement in personnel- related decisions of FCTC was the ministerial act of the School Board superintendent signing off on employment decisions made by FCTI officials, which were then placed on the consent agenda of the School Board to be approved at its next meeting. This process--which was necessary given the fact that FCTC employees were designated as School Board employees under the charter for wage payment, benefits, and collective bargaining purposes-- involved ensuring the statutory requirements to take an employment action were met, but did not involve second-guessing the merits of the personnel decisions made by FCTI. Indeed, the charter expressly provides that the School Board assigns and FCTI assumes and retains all responsibility for FCTC employees, including responsibility for the selection and discipline of employees, and all other aspects of the terms and conditions of employment at FCTC. Petitioner submitted his application for employment to FCTC. Petitioner had an FCTC e-mail address and not a school district e-mail address. The School Board was the signatory to some grant applications for funding to be expended at FCTC, however, FCTI was responsible for fulfilling the obligations relating to the grant awards, and appropriately utilizing those funds at FCTC. The School Board was not involved in the day to day administration of programs funded by those grants at FCTC. During the spring of 2016, district personnel became aware of financial irregularities at FCTC through its monitoring of FCTI’s unaudited financial statements. Under state statute, the School Board was required to take certain actions as the sponsor of FCTC when put on notice that FCTC might be in a deteriorating financial condition. The School Board investigated those irregularities and found significant financial mismanagement and budgetary shortfalls at FCTC under FCTI’s administration. On May 3, 2016, the School Board declared that the school was in a deteriorating financial condition. This declaration triggered statutory obligations on the part of the School Board and FCTC to develop a corrective action plan to address these issues. On May 26, 2016, the School Board served a notice of financial emergency stating that it had reason to believe that there was a financial emergency at FCTC and that there was no way to save FCTC other than to terminate the charter and begin operating the programs at FCTC itself. The School Board Superintendent sent a letter to FCTI’s board on June 8, 2016, detailing the findings of the School Board’s investigation into FCTC and the financial issues plaguing the school. On June 14, 2016, FCTI’s board voted to terminate the charter with the School Board and cease operating the programs at FCTC, effective June 31, 2016. On June 15, 2016, the School Board voted to approve an agreement to terminate the charter with FCTI and to take over the programs at FCTC effective July 1, 2016. As part of this transition of the responsibility for operating FCTC, the School Board and FCTI entered into an agreement specifically stating that any liabilities of FCTC arising prior to July 1, 2016, would not be assumed by the School Board. Just before the School Board began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed his Complaint with FCHR. In that Complaint he alleges that he was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity. Petitioner specifically listed two discrete instances of alleged protected activity in his Complaint: I am being discriminated against on the basis of retaliation by my employer. I began employment with Respondent on 11/7/2007, as a Case Manager and most recently as a Grant Writer. On 5/21/2015, I filed a formal grievance due to harassment and nepotism; creating a hostile work environment. This grievance was investigated internally but I never received a response. On 6/30/2015, I filed a second grievance after experiencing retaliation by my Supervisor, Renee Stauffacher. Up to date, both grievances remain unanswered and I continue to experience harassment and retaliation. Petitioner’s claim of discrimination was based solely upon a charge of retaliation. Petitioner did not allege that he was discriminated against based upon race, religion, age, marital status, or any other protected class. Petitioner filed the first grievance referenced in the FCHR Complaint on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then- president, Sandra Raburn-Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and over e-mail. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was mistreated by any School Board employee, and he did not direct the grievance to anyone at the School Board. Petitioner filed this grievance with FCTC’s human resources office. In his second grievance, filed June 26, 2015, Petitioner alleges that Renee Stauffacher, his supervisor at the time, retaliated against him for naming her in his May 21, 2015, grievance by giving him an evaluation on June 26, 2015, that contained some information or statements with which he disagreed, even though he thought the evaluation itself was good and that he was given high numbers. No one from the School Board was involved in this evaluation. When Ms. Stauffacher gave Petitioner this evaluation, she was an employee of FCTC and not the School Board. Petitioner alleges that Sandra Raburn-Fortner retaliated against him for his first two grievances by giving him another position. That change, from “Career Pathways Supervisor” to “Grant Writer” occurred on or about August 4, 2015. Petitioner’s salary did not change. At this time, Ms. Raburn-Fortner, who had a contract with FCTI, was an FCTC employee, and not an employee of the School Board. Later, in the Spring of 2016, Petitioner submitted numerous other grievances, a total of nine more, to FCTC officials and FCTI’s board. Petitioner only introduced his ninth and tenth grievances into evidence at the final hearing. Both are similar. Those grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Raburn-Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s human resources director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Both grievances state that Petitioner believed he was disclosing violations of equal employment opportunity law. During the time that Petitioner submitted these additional grievances, the School Board was in the process of investigating the financial irregularities at FCTC. Petitioner submitted some of these grievances to School Board officials, who told him he needed to take his concerns to the FCTI Board who was still operating FCTC at the time pursuant to the charter. None of Petitioner’s complaints, including those relayed to the School Board and its officials, concerned complaints of discrimination based on a protected class, or retaliation for complaining about discrimination based on a protected class. Petitioner stated he believed he was reporting equal employment opportunity violations in alleging Ms. Raburn-Fortner was hiring or favoring friends and family, because this action prohibited members of many different protected classes from getting a fair shot at positions that would go to family, friends, or associates of Ms. Raburn-Fortner. Petitioner admits all protected classes were treated similarly in this regard and that all protected classes lacked equal access to positions if they were not friends or family of Ms. Raburn-Fortner. While Petitioner does not allege any discrete instances of retaliation that occurred after his title change, Petitioner also contends that he was harassed, including that he felt harassed about how data at the school was handled, the pressure put on him by financial difficulties brought about by the administration of FCTI, and that he was given the cold shoulder by peers. By May 2016, Ms. Raburn-Fortner was no longer working at FCTC.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2018.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was denied training, subjected to unequal terms of employment and denied promotion to three jobs including the position of Lead Custodian with the Respondent in the Physical Plant Department in 1993, on the basis of his gender (male) and race (African- American), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer under the 1992 Florida Civil Rights Act. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a custodian in the Physical Plant Department since July 1989 and during the relevant period of time including 1993 and 1994. Petitioner is a male African-American, and a member of a protected class. Petitioner applied for a promotion to three different positions at the college between August 26, 1993 and December 6, 1993. In late August, 1993, Petitioner applied for the part-time position of House Manager at the college theatre. Petitioner was not selected because his present work schedule would overlap the position at the theatre and his prior work experience was not relevant to the position. In addition, another candidate possessed better interpersonal and communication skills, and his education and work experience was more relevant to the position than the Petitioner's. In early October, 1993, Petitioner applied for the position of HVACR (heating, ventilation, air conditioning and refrigeration) apprentice. The position is a learning position which requires working with a lead mechanic. Part of the job requirement for the apprentice position was the ability to attend trade school in HVACR. During the employment interview Petitioner expressed reservations about attending the HVACR training because he was presently enrolled in night classes at Rollins College. In addition to Petitioner, two white males and a Hispanic male applied for the position. A Hispanic male was selected for the position who had better qualifications. Thereafter, the racial make-up of the HVACR Department consisted of two whites, one black and one Hispanic male. On October 14, 1993, three vacancies for the newly created position of Lead Custodian in the Physical Plant Department was advertised by Respondent. Petitioner was one of nine applicants for the position. The nine individuals who applied for the position of Lead Custodian consisted of four African-American males, three African-American females and two Caucasian females. Following the review of each persons application and file and a personal interview, two African-American males and one African-American female were selected for the positions. Petitioner was not recommended for one of the vacancies. The selection process was based on relevant work experience and work history, and was not based on improper or discriminatory race or gender considerations. Petitioner was not denied training based on his race or gender. Petitioner applied for and attended six seminars covering a variety of subjects over the last several years. Respondent's stated reasons for its promotion and training decisions were not proven to be pretextual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: Accepted in substance: paragraphs: none Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or as comment on the evidence: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Ann Banks, Esquire BAKER & HOSTETLER P. O. Box 112 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Ulysses B. Williams 1020 Polk Avenue Orlando, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner's termination from employment by Respondent on June 15, 2005, was discriminatory in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2005), due to Petitioner's race (African American).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a Black female, was employed by Respondent from November 23, 1998, until her termination on June 14, 2005. Petitioner had performed her duties as a housekeeper adequately during her employment period and had no major disciplinary reports in her record. Her annual reviews indicate she was a fair employee. She had a history of tardiness, but seemed to be getting better in her last years of employment. Petitioner had received a verbal warning notice on March 8, 2005, relating to an altercation with another employee, Katrina Stevens. It appears Petitioner did not instigate the confrontation nor did she actively participate in the argument between Stevens and another employee. She simply happened to be standing nearby when it occurred. A verbal warning notice is preliminary to a reprimand. The other employee, Martine Lane, received a reprimand for the incident. On June 8, 2005, Petitioner received another verbal warning notice, this time for instigating negative remarks toward her supervisor. The gravamen of her complaint about the supervisor was that a certain co-worker had been named Employee of the Month instead of Petitioner. Petitioner became more defiant towards her supervisors and management toward the end of her employment. She would not help out other employees when asked, preferring to tend to her own work area, even when her work was completed. She also made derogatory comments to the co-worker who had won Employee of the Month. When Petitioner's behavior did not change, a decision was made to terminate her employment. It was a difficult decision because good housekeepers were hard to find and Petitioner's work product had always been acceptable. Petitioner had always been well-liked and respected by fellow employees. Both co-workers and management had encouraged Petitioner to apply for supervisory positions when they opened. Her supervisors indicated that, with some training, she could handle a supervisory position. The decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made by the Executive Housekeeper, Steve Jensen. He relied upon input from other management. On June 18, 2005, Petitioner was stopped from clocking in when she came to work. She was told to report to Jensen's office, which she did. At that time Jensen asked her whether she was still happy with her job, then told her she was being terminated. The reasons given were that she was not supportive, not a team player, and had become more belligerent to management. No mention of race was made as a basis for her termination and none seems to have existed. Petitioner was advised she would be entitled to vacation pay, but it was later discovered she had already used up her available vacation time. Respondent subsequently called Petitioner to offer her a different job, but Petitioner had no interest in returning to work for the company. Respondent has anti-discrimination policies in place, is an equal opportunity employer, and employs minorities in supervisory positions. Interestingly, however, there were no other Black housekeepers employed while Petitioner was working. When a supervisory position opened, Respondent would attempt to fill the position from within its existing employee pool. Two such positions opened when Petitioner was employed. Seven then-current employees applied for those positions, including Petitioner. Of the seven, four had prior supervisory experience; Petitioner did not. Two of the applicants had been with the company longer than Petitioner. Five of the seven applicants had computer knowledge and skills; Petitioner did not. Petitioner is the only candidate who admitted a fear of heights, a minor consideration for the position. Petitioner is the only candidate who stated she could not work on weekends. Petitioner was clearly not the best applicant for the job based on comparison to other candidates. Petitioner did not provide any evidence that her race was a basis for her termination from employment. None of her witnesses provided credible statements concerning discrimination. In fact, her witnesses by and large did not see any discrimination by management.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane Hawkins 1556 University Lane, Number 407 Cocoa, Florida 32922 Theodore L. Shinkle, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 1800 West Hibiscus Boulevard, Suite 138 Melbourne, Florida 32901 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a software engineer with almost 30 years of experience in the industry. From 2001 until August of 2006, Petitioner was employed by ITT Industries (ITT). Petitioner's employment with ITT came to an end when he was involuntarily terminated. Following his termination, Petitioner filed an employment discrimination complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that ITT had discriminated against him because he suffered from Tourette's syndrome (which caused him to have vocal tics and to stutter). Petitioner did not take any action to pursue these allegations of employment discrimination beyond filing this complaint against ITT with the EEOC. Petitioner has been unable to obtain a "permanent job" as a software engineer since his termination by ITT. Respondent is a defense contractor that "make[s] [military] simulation and training equipment." In early 2008, Respondent was looking to fill a temporary software engineer position. Edge Dynamics was one of the outside employment agencies that Respondent used to assist it in the hiring process. On January 9, 2008, Edge Dynamics provided Petitioner's resume to Edward Kaprocki, a senior principal software engineer with Respondent. Mr. Kaprocki was responsible for interviewing applicants for the position and making hiring/rejection recommendations. After reviewing Petitioner's resume, Mr. Kaprocki "thought [it] looked interesting enough where it would worth talking to [Petitioner]," and he so advised Sandra Asavedo, his "point of contact" at Edge Dynamics. Ms. Asavedo made the necessary arrangements to set up a face-to-face interview between Mr. Kaprocki and Petitioner. The interview took place in Mr. Kaprocki's office on January 14, 2008. It lasted about 45 minutes to an hour. Petitioner seemed to Mr. Kaprocki to be "a little bit nervous," but Petitioner did not do or say anything to cause Mr. Kaprocki to believe that Petitioner suffered from any disability. During the course of the interview, Petitioner showed Mr. Kaprocki his personal website, which contained information about and pictures of "some of the projects that [Petitioner] had worked on." Based on the interview, Mr. Kaprocki determined that Petitioner did not have the skill-set that was needed for the position Respondent was seeking to fill. Immediately following the interview, Mr. Kaprocki went to his supervisor, Steve Preston, whose office was "right down the hall," and recommended that Petitioner not be hired to fill the position. Mr. Kaprocki then telephoned Ms. Asavedo to let her know that Petitioner was not going to be hired so that she could inform Petitioner. Mr. Kaprocki's decision to recommend against hiring Petitioner had nothing to do with Petitioner's suffering from Tourette's syndrome or his having filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Indeed, at the time he made his decision, Mr. Kaprocki did not even know that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Mr. Kaprocki first learned of these matters only after Petitioner had filed his Complaint in the instant case. After being told that he would not be hired for the position, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Kaprocki several times, pleading with Mr. Kaprocki to "reconsider hiring him." Mr. Kaprocki told Petitioner "that the decision had been made" and would not be reconsidered. Mr. Kaprocki felt that Petitioner, by making these telephone calls, was "badgering and harassing him." To satisfy his own personal curiosity (and for no other reason), Mr. Kaprocki looked online to find out more about the person who was subjecting him to this "badgering and harass[ment]."2 Mr. Kaprocki did not discover, as a result of his online search, that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or that Petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. His search, however, did reveal certain comments Petitioner had made in an online forum that Mr. Kaprocki considered to be "extremely unprofessional." After reading these comments, Mr. Kaprocki was even more confident than he had been before he began his search that he had made the right decision in not recommending Petitioner for employment. Petitioner was never offered a position with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of any unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2009.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawfully discriminatory employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of race and religion, and retaliated against him, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA").
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Lawrence N. Brown, III, is an African- American male and is of the Christian faith. Petitioner has been employed with Respondent since April 14, 2014, at its store located at 3800 Oakwood Boulevard, Hollywood, Florida (hereafter, the "Store"). As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent at the Store. Respondent is a corporation doing business in Florida. Respondent owns and operates the Store at which Respondent was employed at the time of the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions. Employment Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief Petitioner filed an Employment Charge of Discrimination ("Discrimination Charge") with FCHR on or about March 10, 2016.4/ The pages attached to the Discrimination Charge form (which apparently was filled out in typewritten form by FCHR staff) were prepared by Petitioner. On or about July 18, 2016, Respondent issued a Determination: No Reasonable Cause, determining that Petitioner had not shown reasonable cause to believe that Respondent had committed unlawful employment practices against him. On or about August 16, 2016, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief requesting a hearing to determine whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices against him. The Petition for Relief alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful discrimination against him on the basis of both his race and religion, and also alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful retaliation. These charges, as specifically set forth in the Petition for Relief, are the subject of this de novo proceeding.5/ In the Petition for Relief, Petitioner claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race by failing to promote him into supervisory or managerial positions for which he claims he was qualified; by giving him lower scores on his employment evaluations than were given to a white employee working in the same position (part-time hardlines merchandiser); by not paying him as much as they paid that same white employee; and by retaining that same white employee as a part-time hardlines merchandiser in the Toy Department, while moving Petitioner to another position as cashier. Petitioner also claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015, while giving other employees that day off. Additionally, Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal department about having to work on Christmas Day 2015, by removing him as a hardline merchandiser in the Toy Department and reassigning him to a cashier position, then subsequently effectively "terminating" (in his words) his employment. Petitioner seeks an award of $5,000,000 in damages in this proceeding. Background Events As noted above, Petitioner was hired by Respondent on or about April 14, 2014. Petitioner initially was hired in a part-time position as a part-time overnight hardlines replenishment associate. In this position, Petitioner's work scheduling availability was between 10:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. When Petitioner was hired, Alberto Rodriquez was the Store manager. In his position as a part-time employee with Respondent, Petitioner was not guaranteed any specific number of weeks or hours of employment in any given calendar year, nor was he guaranteed that he would attain full-time employee status. The number of work hours Petitioner was assigned was dependent on the company's business needs and on Petitioner's ability to meet the applicable job performance standards. Petitioner acknowledged these and the other conditions of his employment as evidenced by his signature on the Pre-training Acknowledgment Summary dated April 14, 2014. As a result of the elimination of the overnight replenishment associate position, on or about October 26, 2014, Petitioner was transferred to another position as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. In this position, his work scheduling availability was between 6:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. As a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was responsible for stocking store shelves with merchandise, straightening merchandise on store shelves, putting returned merchandise on shelves, and generally keeping the hardlines departments neat and the shelves fully stocked. The Toy Department at the Store was one of several departments that were categorized as "hardlines" departments. In his duties as a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was not assigned to any specific hardlines department, and his responsibilities entailed working in any hardlines department as needed. However, as a practical matter, due to the work demand, Petitioner worked mostly, if not exclusively, in the Toy Department until he was reassigned to the cashier position after Christmas 2015. David Leach became the Store manager in April 2015. At some point before Christmas Day 2015, the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted. Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, December 25, 2015. Petitioner did not volunteer, and had not otherwise requested, to work on Christmas Day 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid holiday for Respondent's employees. On or about December 23, 2015, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, requesting to be removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015. Pursuant to a directive from Respondent's corporate office, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for that day. Petitioner was not required to work on Christmas Day 2015, and he did not work that day. Petitioner was paid for the Christmas Day holiday. Although the Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, some Store employees were scheduled to work, and did work, that day on a volunteer basis, for which they were paid. On December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Petitioner signed the form. The form was marked as showing that Respondent "granted" the religious accommodation. Also on December 28, 2015, Leach informed Petitioner that he had eliminated the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. He offered Petitioner other part-time positions, either as a cashier or in making pizza at the Little Caesar's pizza station in the Store. Leach did not offer any other positions to Petitioner at that time. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, but informed Leach that he was unable to stand in a single place for long periods of time due to injuries he previously had sustained while working on the overnight shift. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, effective January 3, 2016.6/ Petitioner's hourly wage did not change when his position changed to cashier. He continued to make the same hourly wage that he had made as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. At some point on or after December 28, 2015, Petitioner signed a Personnel Interview Record form that reflected his revised work hours associated with his position change to cashier. The form stated his availability to work between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The evidence is unclear as to whether Petitioner did (or did not) call in to inform the appropriate Store personnel that he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or on Thursday, December 31, 2015. Regardless, the persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner worked on Monday, December 28, 2015; did not work on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015; and worked on Saturday, January 2, 2016. The work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, was computer-generated some time during the week of December 27, 2015, through January 3, 2016. If an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to be excused from work on those days, this situation is termed a "no call-no show," and the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week. This is to ensure that there are cashiers available as needed to work on upcoming dates. Regardless of whether Petitioner did or did not call in to inform Respondent he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015, the posted work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work that week. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner did, in fact, work a total of 15.90 hours the week of January 3 through 10, 2016. The work schedule posted as of Saturday, January 9, 2016, also showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner worked a total of 15.41 hours the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. At some point between January 13 and January 26, 2016, Petitioner was moved from the cashier position to the Store's date code specialist position. The date code specialist position also is a part-time position, for which Petitioner is paid the same hourly wage as he was paid as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent, working as the Store's date code specialist. Race Discrimination Claims As previously noted, Petitioner began working for Respondent at the Store on April 14, 2014. His initial employment position was as a part-time overnight replenishment associate. In October 2014, he moved to a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. In both positions, he was responsible for stocking and restocking merchandise in all hardlines departments, so was not assigned exclusively to the Store's Toy Department. However, as noted above, due to work demand in the Toy Department, Petitioner did most, if not all, of his work in that department until he was moved to the cashier position in late December 2015.7/ Petitioner contends that starting in mid-2014,8/ he periodically requested to be promoted to "Toy Lead" or to another supervisory or managerial position. He testified that he had undertaken many activities and implemented various systems to improve the efficiency and productivity of the Toy Department and other departments at the store, and had documented these activities and transmitted that information to the Respondent for inclusion in his personnel file. He testified that rather than promoting him to a supervisory position in the Toy Department, Respondent instead hired a non-African-American person to fill that position.9/ Petitioner additionally testified that he periodically would request to be transferred or promoted to other supervisory positions, but that Respondent did not grant these requests. He contends that since he was qualified for these positions, the only basis for Respondent's decision to fill those positions with other employees was discrimination against him on the basis of his race. In response, Leach testified that there was no formal "Toy Lead" position at the Store; rather, the person supervising the Toy Department is an assistant store manager, a position that entails supervising other hardlines departments besides the Toy Department. Further, Leach testified that in his view, Petitioner was not qualified to occupy certain supervisory positions because of his lack of experience in those areas and his relatively short period of employment with Respondent. Leach also testified that Petitioner had not ever formally applied for a promotion through Respondent's online application process. Petitioner further asserts that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race because he was not paid the same amount as Corey Harper, a white male hardlines merchandiser who also often worked part-time in the Toy Department on the afternoon or evening shift, even though he worked harder and received higher evaluation scores than did Harper.10/ However, Leach credibly testified that Respondent does not currently base its pay rate for part-time employees on job performance evaluation scores, but instead pays them a set hourly pay rate. According to Leach, Respondent has not given an hourly pay rate raise to part-time employees since 2009, so that any pay differential depended on whether employees were hired before or after 2009. Leach credibly testified that Harper has been employed by Respondent since 2004, so had received hourly pay rate raises between 2004 to November 2008; this would result in his hourly pay rate being higher than Petitioner's, even though both are part-time employees. Petitioner testified that when he was moved from the daytime hardlines merchandiser position to the cashier position after Christmas 2015, he made it clear that he wanted to remain in the Toy Department; however, Respondent transferred him out of that department while allowing Harper to remain in a hardlines merchandiser position, which entailed work in the Toy Department. Petitioner also made clear that he wished to return to the hardlines merchandiser position in the Toy Department when such a position became available; however, at some point, Leach reassigned Carol Yaw, who was white, from her previous office manager job to a hardlines merchandiser position. Petitioner asserts that Respondent's actions in allowing Harper to remain as a part-time hardline merchandiser and reassigning Yaw to a hardlines merchandiser position constituted discrimination against him on the basis of his race. However, Leach credibly testified that the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position that Petitioner had occupied was eliminated because of the lack of work in that position, primarily due to declining Toy Department sales after the holiday season. Additionally, immediately after Christmas 2015, Leach consolidated the overnight merchandise unloading and daytime shelf stocking positions and moved the overnight unloading employees to the day shift, where their duties consist of unloading merchandise from trucks and stocking shelves.11/ Leach credibly testified that Harper was not moved from his position because Leach had specifically decided not to move others unaffected by this reorganization out of their existing positions, and that Harper was an afternoon/evening hardlines merchandiser. Leach also credibly testified that he had moved Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position was eliminated because she was a 25-year employee of Respondent, and he felt that she deserved that position out of loyalty for being a long-term employee of Respondent. Petitioner also contends that Respondent's evaluation of his job performance was unfair because it was conducted by an assistant store manager, Marjorie McCue, who was not his direct supervisor. Specifically, he contends that McCue was unfamiliar with his job performance, so did not appropriately consider, in his evaluation, improved Toy Department sales performance and efficiency that were due to measures that he had implemented. Petitioner also contends that McCue initially deliberately gave him an inaccurately low job performance evaluation in an effort to create a record to support terminating his employment, but that when he complained, those lower scores were changed to higher scores. The only performance evaluation regarding Petitioner's job performance that was admitted into evidence is a document titled "Employee Review" that was dated January 31, 2015; Petitioner received a 3.10 overall performance score on this performance evaluation.12/ The Employee Review for Harper dated January 31, 2015, also was admitted into evidence; Harper's overall performance score was 3.00. Upon careful consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden13/ to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his race. To do so, Petitioner must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subject to adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified to do the job; and (4) his employer treated similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class more favorably than he was treated.14/ It is undisputed that Petitioner, as an African- American, is a member of a protected class. However, the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner was subject to adverse employment action. With respect to his assertion that Respondent failed to promote him on the basis of his race, Petitioner needed to show that, in addition to being a member of a protected class, he applied for and was qualified for a promotion; that he was rejected despite his qualifications; and that other equally or less-qualified employees outside of his class were promoted.15/ While Petitioner frequently sent email correspondence to Respondent's corporate legal office requesting to be promoted, the evidence does not show that he followed Respondent's formal online application process for applying for promotions.16/ Further, although the evidence indicates that Petitioner is very hard-working, energetic, bright, and detail-oriented, he did not demonstrate that those characteristics necessarily qualified him for the supervisory positions about which he inquired. He also did not demonstrate that Respondent filled the positions about which he had inquired with less-qualified non-African-American employees. In fact, Petitioner acknowledged, in testimony at the final hearing and in email correspondence with Respondent's corporate legal office, that in his view, some of the individuals who had been promoted were qualified for the positions to which they had been promoted. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not demonstrate adverse employment action by Respondent by failing to promote him on the basis of his race. Petitioner also did not show that he received a lower pay rate and lower evaluation scores than did other similarly- situated employees who were not members of his protected class. The only comparator to which Petitioner referred was Harper, the other part-time hardlines merchandiser that sometimes worked in the Toy Department. However, as discussed above, the evidence showed that Harper actually scored lower than did Petitioner on the January 31, 2015, evaluation.17/ Further, Harper was not similarly situated to Petitioner with respect to pay rate because Harper is a longer-term employee who had received hourly pay rate raises in 2005 through 2008, before Respondent ceased giving raises of hourly pay rates in 2009, but Petitioner was hired in 2014, after Respondent ceased giving hourly pay raises. Petitioner also did not show, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Leach discriminated against him on the basis of his race by electing to reassign him, rather than Harper, to a cashier position after Christmas 2015, and by later reassigning Yaw to fill a full-time hardlines merchandiser position that included responsibilities of working in the Toy Department. As discussed above, when Leach decided to eliminate the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position, he chose not to reassign other employees who were not directly affected by the elimination of that position. The evidence shows that Leach did not reassign Harper to a cashier position because Harper's position was not directly affected by the elimination of the daytime hardlines merchandiser position——not because Leach favored Harper over Petitioner due to race. Also as discussed above, Leach reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position——also a full-time position——was eliminated. Because Yaw was a full-time employee, she did not fill a position for which Petitioner was eligible as a part-time employee; furthermore, under any circumstances, she was not similarly situated to Petitioner because of her longer term of employment with Respondent. For these reasons, neither Harper nor Yaw are similarly situated to Petitioner for purposes of being comparators. For these reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination against him by Respondent on the basis of his race. Further, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of race, Respondent articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions with respect to Petitioner. As discussed above, Respondent did not promote Petitioner because he did not go through Respondent's formal application process for seeking promotions, and also because Leach determined, on the basis of Petitioner's lack of experience and employment longevity, that Petitioner was not qualified for supervisory positions at that time. Additionally, Leach's decisions regarding reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position while retaining Harper and reassigning Yaw to hardlines merchandiser positions were management decisions based on business needs and requirements, rather than on the basis of race. Petitioner did not present evidence showing that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination against him on the basis of his race. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of his race, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Religious Discrimination Claim As previously discussed, shortly before Christmas Day 2015, the employee work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted in the Store. This schedule showed Petitioner as being scheduled to work from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Christmas Day, which fell on a Friday in 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid employee holiday; however, employees could work that day on a voluntary basis and they would be paid time-and-a-half for doing so. As noted above, Petitioner did not volunteer or otherwise indicate that he was willing to work that day. Upon seeing that he was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, which then contacted Leach. Leach had Petitioner removed from the work schedule for December 25, 2015. Petitioner was not required to work that day, did not work that day, and was paid for the Christmas Day 2015 holiday. Petitioner claims that by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day, Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion. Petitioner asserts, as evidence of Respondent's discriminatory intent, that there are others who worked in the Toy Department who were not of the Christian faith, so that if someone was needed to work on Christmas Day, one of those individuals could instead have been scheduled. As previously noted, on December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Leach credibly testified that the purpose of having Petitioner sign the form was to have a written record of Petitioner's religion so that Petitioner would not again be assigned to work on a Christian religious holiday. Petitioner signed the form, but protested being required to do so, because, in his view, Respondent already was on notice that he is of the Christian faith because he always had Sundays off of work. Petitioner testified that when he was hired in April 2014 (notably, before Leach became Store manager) he had verbally requested Sundays off, effectively placing Respondent on notice that he is of the Christian faith. On this basis, Petitioner asserts that Leach and other managers and supervisors at the Store knew that he is Christian and that they nonetheless intentionally scheduled him to work on Christmas Day. Petitioner acknowledged that he never heard Leach make any comments with respect to his (Petitioner's) religion. Leach credibly testified that before he was contacted by Respondent's corporate office regarding Petitioner's concerns about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015, he did not know that Petitioner was Christian, and he had not inferred that from the fact that Petitioner did not work on Sundays.18/ Leach testified, credibly and persuasively, that Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by mistake. He explained that the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was generated using a pre-populated "template" method. This method, which is a method by which the Store sets its weekly work schedules, entails week-to-week copying of the regular——i.e., "template"——work schedule for all Store employees, then modifies that schedule as needed to address changes to individual employee work schedules. Leach explained that in using this method to establish the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, Respondent had inadvertently scheduled employees who had not volunteered to work on Christmas Day. He surmised that this was a possible explanation for why Petitioner mistakenly was scheduled to work that day. As noted above, Petitioner was not the only Store employee scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. Upon consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his religion. To do so, Petitioner must show that he: (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) informed Respondent of this belief; and (3) suffered adverse employment action as a result of failing to comply with the employment requirement that conflicted with his belief. It is undisputed that Petitioner falls within a protected class for purposes of a discrimination claim on the basis of religion. However, Petitioner did not prove the existence of the other two elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of religion. Specifically, Petitioner did not prove that Respondent knew that he was Christian or that his Christian faith prohibited him from working on Christmas Day. As noted above, Petitioner was hired at the Store before Leach became Store manager. Further, because Petitioner had not been required to complete a written religious accommodation form when he was hired in April 2014, Respondent did not have any written notice in its possession that would have informed Leach that Petitioner was Christian or that Petitioner needed certain Christian holidays, such as Christmas Day, off of work. As noted above, Leach credibly testified that he did not know that Petitioner was Christian until Respondent's corporate legal office contacted him regarding Petitioner's religion-based complaint about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The evidence also shows that Petitioner did not suffer any adverse employment action. As soon as Respondent was informed of Petitioner's complaint, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015, did not work that day, and was paid for that holiday. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination by Respondent against him on the basis of his religion. However, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, Respondent produced credible, persuasive evidence showing a legitimate, non- discriminatory basis for its action——that is, that through the Store's use of the template work scheduling system, Petitioner was mistakenly scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. As noted above, as soon as Petitioner complained to Respondent, Respondent immediately accommodated his request by removing him from the Christmas Day 2015 work schedule. Petitioner did not present any evidence showing that Respondent's proffered reason for scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015 was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of his religion. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Retaliation Claim Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by reassigning him from his position as a daytime hardlines merchandiser——a position that he clearly liked and at which he believed he excelled——to a cashier position——a position that he clearly considered demeaning and that also was physically difficult for him to perform due to a previous injury. Petitioner was informed that he was being reassigned to a cashier position only five days (and the first workday) after he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day.19/ Petitioner testified that Leach told him that the part- time daytime merchandiser position had been eliminated due to the lack of work demand, particularly in the Toy Department, after the Christmas season was over. Petitioner testified that when he asked Leach about available positions in to which he could transfer, Leach told him that only cashier or pizza-making positions were available. Petitioner provided evidence that a softlines customer service job, which he claims he would have preferred, was open at the time he was reassigned and that Leach did not inform him of that opening or offer him that position. Petitioner also disputes that the part-time daytime merchandiser job that he had occupied had been eliminated. As evidence, he contends that Harper continued to occupy that position, and also that Leach subsequently reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser rather than transferring him back into a hardlines merchandiser position, as he had requested. The part-time cashier position to which Petitioner was transferred was the same level of employment position in Respondent's employment hierarchy as was the part-time daytime merchandiser position that he previously held. Additionally, as discussed above, as a part-time cashier, Petitioner continued to receive the same hourly pay rate and work scheduling availability as he had received when he was employed as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. As discussed above, on or before January 26, 2016, Petitioner was reassigned to the Store's date code specialist position. According to Leach, that position came open after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, and Leach believed that the date code specialist position would play well to Petitioner's strengths of being methodical and detail- oriented. Petitioner bears the burden, by the greater weight of the evidence, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Respondent. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Petitioner must show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.20/ For the following reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not satisfy his burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. It is determined that Petitioner engaged in a "protected activity" when he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office, by email dated December 23, 2015, that he had been scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The email stated: Attn: Legal My schedule states that I am scheduled for Christmas day. I am a Christian I exercise religious right no work on a high religious day. Christmas is the day I celebrate the birth of Christ thus the name Christmas day. A Jewish person was assigned to my department (toys) and was allowed to have off all the Jewish holidays. I was told that is his right and approved, I said fine, I don't know who was arguing this but this was fine with me, because I have many Jewish friends, so I understand. Easter which falls on a Sunday and Christmas are my holidays. I am requesting off. I am requesting Christmas day off with holiday pay as my religious day, just like I requested Sundays off. Only I can change my religious day and work on Sunday, which I might have to when promoted. If management tells me I cannot be promoted because I exercise my religious right not to work on the seventh day, then I will have to do as Jewish people have done for centuries, they are released from the commandment that they may only eat Kosher. If captured by the enemy they may eat to survive. So if I can only be manager if I give up my religious right not to work on Sunday, then I will do what management says is a requirement. Thank you. Lawrence Brown Kmart-Hollywood, Fl Oakwood Plaza To be a "protected activity," the activity giving rise to the alleged retaliatory action must, at the very least, communicate to the employer that the complainant believes the employer is engaging in discrimination against him. Petitioner's email can be read broadly to inform Respondent that he believed he was being discriminated against on the basis of his religion by being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. To that point, Petitioner specifically compared his circumstances to those of a Jewish employee who had requested and been allowed to have all Jewish holidays off of work. While not specifically using the word "discrimination," Petitioner's email can be reasonably read to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner believed he was being treated differently than a similarly-situated employee who was not a member of Petitioner's protected class and who had been excused from work on the holidays observed by his religion. Additionally, Leach was aware that Petitioner had complained to Respondent's corporate legal department about being scheduled to work on a Christian holiday. Accordingly, it is determined that Petitioner has established the "protected activity" element of his retaliation claim. However, Petitioner did not show that he suffered a materially adverse employment action as a result of having engaged in protected activity. His reassignment to the part-time cashier position effectively was a lateral transfer that did not affect his hourly pay rate or hours of work scheduling availability. Although Petitioner subjectively considered the cashier position to be demeaning and below his skill level21/ and although his job responsibilities changed, the evidence shows that Petitioner was not reassigned to an objectively less prestigious or otherwise inferior employment position. Furthermore, in any event, approximately three weeks after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, Respondent reassigned him to a position as the Store's date code specialist——a position that he has officially held since January 26, 2016, and from which he has not requested to be transferred. In this position, Petitioner earns the same hourly wage and has the same number of hours of work availability as he did in the hardlines merchandiser and cashier positions. He is solely responsible in the Store for ensuring that date-coded merchandise on the shelves has not exceeded its expiration date—— a position that entails significant responsibility and, as Leach put it, is "very important." The evidence also does not support Petitioner's assertion that his removal from the work schedule in early January meant that he was effectively terminated. Although the evidence does not clearly show what days Petitioner did not work during the week after Christmas in 2015, or whether he did (or did not) call in to notify Respondent that he would be absent, the evidence does clearly establish that Petitioner was not scheduled to work the first week of January 2016, and it is also clear that management personnel at the Store did not believe that he had called in to notify them of his absence. Leach explained that if an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to notify the Store of his or her absence, the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week; this is to ensure that there are enough cashiers available as needed to work in the upcoming week. In any event, when Petitioner noticed that he had not been scheduled to work, he contacted the Store's human relations manager, who told him to come back to work. In fact, Petitioner worked the first and second weeks of January 2016, and thereafter, and he continues to be employed at the Store. Further, Petitioner was never told or otherwise notified, formally or informally, that his employment with Respondent had been terminated. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not suffer a materially adverse employment action by being reassigned for a short period of time from a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser to a part-time cashier position. Petitioner also did not demonstrate the existence of a "causal link" between a protected activity and adverse employment action. As discussed above, Petitioner's sending an email to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 constituted a "protected activity." However, as discussed above, it is determined that Respondent did not engage in an adverse employment action; thus, Petitioner's engagement in protected activity did not "cause" Respondent to take any material adverse employment action against him. Furthermore, in any event, Respondent articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position shortly after Christmas Day 2015—— specifically, that the part-time daytime merchandiser position that Petitioner had held was eliminated due to seasonal workload decline and other business management decisions reallocating hardlines merchandise-related tasks between the overnight and daytime shifts. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Respondent retaliated against him for engaging in a protected activity, in violation of section 760.10(7). Damages Petitioner has requested an award of damages in the amount of $5,000,000. However, section 760.11(6), which governs the award of remedies in administrative proceedings brought under the FCRA, does not authorize DOAH to award damages. Further, the evidence establishes that Respondent did not engage in any unlawful employment practices with respect to Petitioner, and, in any event, Petitioner did not present any evidence to support his entitlement to an award of damages in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2017.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent is guilty of unlawful employment practices as alleged in the Petition for Relief. AUTHORITY Chapters 120 and 760, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, D. Paul Sondel, was born August 13, 1928, and was, at the time of final hearing, 65 years of age. On April 11, 1993, Petitioner saw a newspaper advertisement for the position of Analyst I with the Florida Board of Bar Examiners (FBOBE). On April 12, 1993, Petitioner went to the office of the employment agency which the FBOBE was using to locate and screen applicants. Petitioner was told that he would not be allowed to apply or take the pre- employment test for the position because he had a graduate degree and only persons who have a Bachelor's degree but no graduate degree(s) were allowed to apply. On June 1, 1993, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, in which he alleged that the FBOBE requirement that no one would be considered for the position of Analyst I who had a higher level degree than the minimum required Bachelor's degree, served the "intended purpose" of eliminating older applicants, especially those over Petitioner further alleged that the existence and implementation of such FBOBE policy was in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Respondent hired two persons to fill the April 1993 advertised position of Analyst I. One of the persons hired was 24 and the other was 23 years of age. The FBOBE is an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Florida and charged by the court with the responsibility of evaluating the character, fitness and competence of each applicant for admission to the Florida Bar. Petitioner has established that he is a person in a protected group; that adverse employment action was taken against him; that the persons hired for the position in question were outside the protected group; and that, but for his graduate degree, he was qualified for the position in question. The FBOBE has a current staff of 29 full time employees. As of March 30, 1994, of those employees, three were 40 years or older at the time of employment. Nine of these employees are currently 40 or older. The employment application used by the FBOBE does not request any information regarding an applicant's age. The FBOBE have hired individuals in the past who were 40 years of age or older. The FBOBE uses the American Employment Agency, Inc. to advertise vacancies and to conduct preliminary screening. Kathryn E. Ressel has been employed by the Respondent for over 22 years and is currently the Deputy Executive Director of the FBOBE. Ms. Ressel is responsible for the instructions given to the employment agency concerning the qualifications for the position of Analyst I. Ms. Ressel testified that the reason for the FBOBE policy of excluding applicants with post graduate college or university degrees is not intended to restrict employment opportunities to younger persons and is not related to the age of any applicant. Ms. Ressel's testimony is that past experience in hiring persons with graduate degrees has indicated that such persons tend to stay in the Analyst positions for short periods of time and leave when an employment opportunity presents itself in the field for which the person is educated. Ms. Ressel testified that the Analyst I position is an entry level position and that the Analyst receives extensive on-the-job training to enable the newly hired employee to perform assigned duties and meet job related responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. Therefore, according to Ms. Ressel, when Analyst I's leave the employment of the FBOBE after a short time on the job, the Respondent is unable to recoup the time, energy and expense involved in training such individuals. Ms. Ressel's testimony articulates a reasonable nondiscriminatory basis for the employment practice at issue. Ms. Ressel's testimony indicates that the employment policy at issue is age neutral in that it is applied to all individuals who apply for the position of Analyst I, regardless of age. Ms. Ressel's testimony in this regard is unrefuted. Official notice is taken that a given individual is generally older at the time such person receives a graduate degree than when the same individual receives a Bachelor's degree. It does not follow, however, and Petitioner has failed to prove (statistically or otherwise), that in any specific job applicant pool available to the Respondent to fill Analyst I positions, potential applicants with graduate degrees are older than potential applicants who possess only Bachelor's degrees. Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (statistical or otherwise) that the employment policy at issue has a disparate impact on persons 40 years of age or older. Petitioner has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the FBOBE as the basis for rejecting Petitioner's application is in fact a pretext and/or that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition for relief filed in this case be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1994.
