The Issue Whether Respondent Gulf Coast Community College (Respondent or the College) violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes, by subjecting Petitioner Derek A. Robinson (Petitioner) to discrimination in employment or by subjecting Petitioner to adverse employment actions in retaliation of Petitioner’s opposition to the College’s alleged discriminatory employment practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. The College is a public institution of higher education located in Panama City, Florida. In 1998, Petitioner was hired by the College to work in its custodial department as a custodian. Petitioner held that position until his termination on February 11, 2009. The College's custodial department is part of the College's maintenance and operations division (collectively, ?Maintenance Division?) managed by the campus superintendent. The two other departments within the Maintenance Division are the maintenance and grounds departments. During the relevant time period, there were approximately 40 to 50 employees in the Maintenance Division. Of those, there were approximately 21 to 28 custodians in the custodial department. Most of the custodians were African-Americans and there were only three Caucasian custodians. The Caucasian custodians were Tom Krampota, Josephine Riley, and Tommy Gillespie. Custodial staff typically work shifts beginning at 2:00 p.m. and ending at 10:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. They are generally assigned housekeeping duties for a specific building. In addition to Monday through Friday, the College is also open on most weekends. Prior to 2001, the College began designating one employee to work a non-rotating weekend shift. Unlike other custodians, the designated weekend custodian worked from 10:00 a.m. to 10:30 p.m. on Fridays and 6:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. The weekend custodian was not assigned to a particular building, but rather worked in various buildings as needed and was to be available to open doors to campus buildings during weekend hours. Petitioner was the designated weekend custodian from 2001 until his duties were changed in September 2008. Dr. John Holdnak, who worked for the College for 26 years in various capacities, including four years as Director of Human Resources, was the one who established the position of designated weekend custodian. Dr. Holdnak served as the College's Vice-President for Administration Services for his last eight years of employment with the College until leaving in July, 2008. As vice-president, Dr. Holdnak reported directly to the president of the College, Dr. James Kerley. Sometime prior to 2008, Dr. Holdnak observed that the departments in the Maintenance Division were underperforming, not adequately supervised, and failing to meet expectations. Dr. Holdnak observed that the Maintenance Division employees took excessive breaks and showed lack of effort in their work. For example, mold was found in some of the classrooms, an open window with a bird's nest was found in another, maintenance orders were backlogged, and Dr. Holdnak received a number of complaints from faculty and College employees regarding the Maintenance Division's level of service. As a result of Dr. Holdnak's observations, the College removed the campus superintendent from his position because of the superintendent's inability to manage line supervisors, provide leadership, or supervise personnel. After that, Dr. Holdnak personally supervised the Maintenance Division for a time in order to assess and develop a solution to the problem. Based upon Dr. Holdnak's assessment, the College sought applications for a new campus superintendent who could change and clean-up the culture of the Maintenance Division. At the time, the three department supervisors within the Maintenance Division were: Carlos "Butch" Whitehead for maintenance, Dan Doherty for custodial, and Ronny Watson for grounds. All three supervisors were Caucasian. The vacancy for the campus superintendent position was advertised. Dr. Holdnak encouraged John Westcott to apply for the campus superintendent position because he had previously worked with Mr. Westcott on a College construction project and was impressed with his vigor and work ethic. Mr. Westcott, a Caucasian, applied. So did custodial department supervisor, Dan Doherty, and three other candidates. Mr. Westcott disclosed on his application that he had been convicted of a felony twenty years prior to his application. Dr. Holdnak determined that Mr. Westcott's prior conviction would not impact his candidacy for the position. The applicants were screened by a selection committee composed of a number of College employees from various divisions, including Petitioner. Of the five applicants who applied, the selection committee's first choice was John Westcott, who was qualified for the position. Petitioner did not agree with the selection committee's first choice and was not impressed with Mr. Westcott during the screening process because Mr. Westcott referred to himself as the "terminator." Based upon the selection committee's first choice and the conclusion that Mr. Westcott satisfied the necessary criteria to change the Maintenance Division's culture, Dr. Holdnak recommended that the College hire John Westcott as the new campus superintendent. John Westcott was hired as campus superintendent in January 2008. Once Mr. Westcott was hired, Dr. Holdnak specifically directed him to take control of his departments, ?clean up the mess? and hold his mid-level supervisors responsible for their subordinates' results. Dr. Holdnak instructed Mr. Westcott to take a hands-on approach, physically inspect and visit the buildings to ensure cleanliness, increase effectiveness, stop laziness, and decrease work order backlogs. During his tenure, Mr. Westcott increased productivity and reduced backlogs. Mr. Westcott took more initiative than previous superintendents with cleaning and maintenance, and he conducted weekly walkthroughs. While Mr. Westcott was campus superintendent, the backlog of 400 work orders he had inherited was reduced to zero. During Mr. Westcott's first month as campus superintendent, he had an encounter with a Caucasian employee named Jamie Long. On January 31, 2008, Mr. Westcott issued a written memorandum to Mr. Long as a follow-up from a verbal reprimand that occurred on January 28, 2008. The reprimand was Mr. Westcott's first employee disciplinary action as campus superintendent. According to the memorandum, the reprimand was based upon Mr. Long's confrontation and argument with Mr. Westcott regarding the fact that Mr. Westcott had been ?checking-up? on him. According to the memorandum, Mr. Westcott considered "the manner in which [Mr. Long] addressed [him as] totally inappropriate and could be considered insubordination." Mr. Long disputed Mr. Westcott's version of the incident and later sent a letter to College President Dr. Kerley dated June 23, 2008, complaining about "the alleged incident of insubordination" and the "almost non-stop harassment by John Westcott." There was no mention or allegation in the letter that John Westcott was racist or had discriminated against anyone because of their race. After Dr. Holdnak left the College in July 2008, John Mercer assumed his responsibilities. Mr. Mercer, like Dr. Holdnak, had the perception that custodial work was below par based on complaints and personal observations. He therefore continued to direct Mr. Westcott to address these deficiencies to improve the custodians' performance. Petitioner was the designated weekend custodian when Mr. Westcott was hired. In February 2008, Dr. Holdnak discovered a problem with the amount of paid-time-off Petitioner received as a result of his weekend schedule. The problem was that if a holiday fell on a weekend, Petitioner would take the entire weekend off, resulting in a windfall of 37.5 hours in additional paid-time- off for Petitioner over other employees because his work hours on the weekends were longer. In order to correct the problem, in approximately March 2008, Petitioner was placed on a similar holiday pay schedule as all other employees. At the time, the then-director of the College's Department of Human Resources, Mosell Washington, who is an African American, explained the change to Petitioner. According to Mr. Washington, Petitioner was not happy about the change in his holiday pay schedule. Petitioner, however, does not blame Mr. Westcott for initiating the change. Because of the change in his holiday pay schedule, Petitioner was required to work or use leave time for the additional working hours during the Fourth of July weekend in 2008. Petitioner called and asked to speak with Mr. Westcott regarding the issue. During the phone call, Petitioner used profanity. After being cursed, Mr. Westcott hung up the phone and then advised Mr. Washington, who told Mr. Westcott to document the incident. The resulting written reprimand from Mr. Westcott to Petitioner was dated July 11, 2011, and was approved by Mr. Washington. When Mr. Washington presented Petitioner with the written reprimand, Petitioner refused to sign an acknowledgement of its receipt and abruptly left the meeting without any comment. Petitioner did not tell Mr. Washington that he believed he was being targeted or discriminated against because of his race. In addition to setting forth Mr. Westcott's version of what occurred, the written reprimand advised Petitioner that the College had a grievance procedure, and also stated: I have an open door policy and will gladly address any concerns you may have whether personal or job related. If you have a grievance, tell me, but in the proper manner and in the proper place. Petitioner did not take advantage of either the College's grievance procedure or Mr. Westcott's stated open door policy. The College maintains an anti-discrimination policy and grievance policy disseminated to employees. The College's procedure for employee grievances provides several levels of review, starting with an immediate supervisor, then to a grievance committee, and then up to the College's president. Under the College's anti-discrimination policy, discrimination and harassment based on race or other protected classes is prohibited. Employees who believe they are being discriminated against may report it to the Director of Human Resources. Likewise, harassment is prohibited and may be reported up the chain of command at any level. Petitioner acknowledged receipt of the College handbook and policies on August 17, 2007. In addition, both the College President, Dr. Kerley, and Vice President, John Mercer, maintain an ?open door? policy. After receiving the July 11, 2008, written reprimand, Petitioner spoke to both Dr. Kerley and Mr. Mercer, at least once, on July 15, 2008. Petitioner, however, did not tell them that he had been discriminated against because of his race. In fact, there is no credible evidence that a report of race discrimination was ever made regarding the July 11, 2008, written reprimand prior to Petitioner's termination. Petitioner, however, did not agree with the July 11, 2008 written reprimand. After speaking to Dr. Kerley and Mr. Mercer, Petitioner met with Jamie Long, the Caucasian who had earlier received a write-up from Mr. Westcott, for assistance in preparing a written response. The written response, dated August 4, 2008, and addressed to Mr. Washington, Mr. Westcott, and Mr. Mercer, stated: On July 25, 2008, I was called into Mosell Washington's office and was given a written letter of reprimand from John Westcott, the Campus Superintendent, which states that on July 3, 2008, I had used profanity in a phone conversation with him regarding my 4th of July work schedule. From the schedule that I received in February, from Mosell Washington, I believed I was off that weekend. I am writing this letter to dispute Mr. Westcott's version of our conversation and to protest the letter of written reprimand. Mr. Westcott says in the reprimand that I was insubordinate to him and had used profanity. I did not use profanity, and I do not believe that I was insubordinate in any manner to him during our brief conversation. I feel that my work record and my integrity speaks for itself. I have never been insubordinate, or been a problem to anyone until John Westcott, and had I known that I was supposed to be on the job that weekend, I would have been there. Mr. Washington, Mr. Westcott, and John Mercer all deny receiving the written response. In addition, contrary to the written response, at the final hearing, Petitioner admitted that he used profanity during the call and said ?ass? to Mr. Westcott. Moreover, the written response does not complain of race discrimination, and Dr. Kerley, Mr. Mercer, Dr. Holdnak, Mr. Washington, and Mr. Westcott all deny that they ever received a complaint of race discrimination regarding the incident. Evidence presented at the final hearing did not show that the written reprimand given to Petitioner dated July 11, 2008, was racially motivated, given in retaliation for Petitioner’s statutorily-protected expression or conduct, or that a similarly-situated non-African-American who used profanity to a supervisor would not be subject to such a reprimand. Mr. Westcott generally worked a more traditional Monday through Friday schedule and, because of Petitioner's weekend work schedule, had minimal contact with Petitioner. In fact, Mr. Westcott would not usually be on campus with Petitioner, except Fridays, and the two men rarely spoke until Petitioner's work schedule was changed in September 2008. During the weekends that he worked at the College, Petitioner was on-call and expected to return communications to his pager or mobile phone, even during his lunch breaks, regardless of his location. On Friday, August 22, 2008, after receiving a request from faculty member Rusty Garner, Petitioner’s supervisor Dan Doherty asked Petitioner to clean the music room floor. On Sunday afternoon, August 24, 2008, Mr. Mercer and Mr. Westcott were working when they received word from Mr. Garner that the music room floor had not been cleaned. After unsuccessful attempts to reach Petitioner by cell phone and pager, both Mr. Mercer and Mr. Westcott drove around the College campus to find him. They were unsuccessful. The reason Petitioner could not be reached was because he had left campus and had left his telephone and pager behind. According to Petitioner, he was on lunch break. Mr. Mercer and Mr. Westcott found another employee, Harold Brown, to help prepare the music room for Monday. Mr. Mercer was upset because he had to take time out from his own work to find someone to complete the job assigned to Petitioner. That same afternoon, Mr. Mercer reported the incident by e-mail to Mr. Washington and requested that appropriate action be taken. On August 27, 2008, Petitioner’s supervisor, Dan Doherty, issued a written reprimand to Petitioner for the August 24th incident. No evidence was presented indicating that the written reprimand was racially motivated, or that a similarly situated non-African-American who could not be located during his or her shift would not be subject to such a reprimand. In September 2008, Dr. Kerley unilaterally determined that no single employee should work his or her entire workweek in three days. He believed this schedule was unsafe, and not in the best interests of the college. He therefore directed Mr. Westcott and Mr. Mercer to implement a rotating schedule for the weekends. Mr. Westcott was not in favor of the change because it meant additional scheduling work for him to accommodate new rotating shifts. No credible evidence was presented that the schedule change was because of Petitioner’s race, or made in retaliation for Petitioner’s statutorily-protected expressions or actions. From August 27, 2008, through January 2009, there were no other disciplines issued to Petitioner or reported incidents between Petitioner and Mr. Westcott. In December, 2008, a group composed of most of the custodial employees, including Petitioner, conducted a meeting with the College's president, Dr. Kerley, and vice-president, Mr. Mercer. The group of custodians elected their new supervisor James Garcia, an Asian-Pacific Islander, as their spokesperson for the meeting. The custodians' primary purpose for the meeting was to address complaints regarding Mr. Westcott’s management style, his prior criminal conviction, and approach with employees. They felt that Mr. Westcott could not be pleased. Various concerns about Mr. Westcott expressed by the employees were condensed into three typed pages (collectively, ?Typed Document?) consisting of two pages compiled by Jamie Long and his wife Susan Long which contained 12 numbered paragraphs, and a third page with six unnumbered paragraphs. Mr. Garcia did not transmit the Typed Document to the president or vice- president prior to the meeting. Neither Jamie Long nor his wife attended the meeting. During the meeting, Mr. Garcia read several of the comments from the Typed Document and Dr. Kerley responded to each comment that was read. Mr. Garcia did not read through more than the first five of the 12 items listed on the Typed Document. The Typed Document was not reviewed by the president or vice-president and they did not retain a copy. Petitioner asserts the comment listed in paragraph 9 on the second page of the Typed Document constitutes a complaint or evidence of racial animus. Although not discussed at the meeting or reviewed by Dr. Kerley or Mr. Mercer, paragraph 9 states: During a recent candidate forum, Westcott used the term ?black ass? in regard to School Superintendent James McCallister. This was heard by at least two witnesses. Q. Are such racial slurs and inappropriate, unprofessional behavior condoned and acceptable? Mr. Westcott denies making the alleged statement referenced in paragraph 9 of the Typed Document. No evidence of other racial remarks allegedly made by Mr. Westcott was presented. There is no evidence that the College or its administration condoned the alleged statement. President Kerley, Vice President Mercer, and Mr. Washington all gave credible testimony that they were not made aware of the statement and that, if the statement in paragraph 9 of the Typed Document or any alleged racial discrimination by Mr. Westcott had been brought to their attention, immediate action would have been taken. As a result of custodial employees’ complaints about Mr. Westcott’s management style, Dr. Kerley and Mr. Mercer required Mr. Westcott to attend several sessions of management training. In addition, Dr. Kerley counseled Mr. Westcott against using harsh tactics and rough language that may be acceptable on a construction site, but were not appropriate on a College campus. On February 9, 2009, Mr. Westcott observed both Petitioner and a co-worker leaving their assigned buildings. He asked their supervisor, Mr. Garcia, to monitor their whereabouts because he thought that they appeared to not be doing their jobs. Mr. Westcott also told Mr. Garcia that, although the two workers may have had a legitimate reason for walking from their assigned buildings, he had not heard anything on the radio to indicate as much. The next day, on February 10, 2009, Mr. Garcia told Petitioner that Mr. Westcott had wanted to know where they had been headed when they left the building the day before. Petitioner responded by saying that if Mr. Westcott wanted to know where he was, Mr. Westcott could ask him (Petitioner). Later that day, Petitioner spoke to Mr. Washington on campus. Petitioner was very upset and said to Mr. Washington, ?What’s wrong with Westcott? He better leave me alone. He don’t know who he’s messing with.? Later that same afternoon, Petitioner had a confrontation with Mr. Westcott. According to a memorandum authored that same day by Mr. Westcott: I [John Westcott] had stopped outside the mailroom to talk with Beth Bennett. While talking with her I observed Derek [Petitioner] leave Student Union West. After seeing me, he returned to Student Union West and waited outside the door. Beth walked toward the Administration building and I headed through the breezeway. Derek approached me and said that he had heard that I wanted to ask him something. I asked him what he was talking about. He said that I wanted to ask him where he was going the evening before. I said ok, where were you going? Derek said that it was ?none of my f_ _ _ ing business.? I told him that since I was his supervisor, that it ?was? my business. At this time, he stepped closer to me in a threatening manner and said ?if you don’t stop f_ _ _ ing with me, I’m going to f_ _ _ you up.? I told him that if he would do his job, that he wouldn’t have to worry about me. He replied ?you heard what I said--- I’ll f_ _ _ you up?, as he walked back into SUW. I left the breezeway and went to John Mercer’s office to report the incident. Mr. Westcott’s testimony at the final hearing regarding the incident was consistent with his memorandum. While Petitioner’s version of the confrontation is different than Mr. Westcott’s, at the final hearing Petitioner admitted that Mr. Westcott had a legitimate question regarding his whereabouts and that he failed to answer the question. And, while he denied using the specific curse words that Mr. Westcott attributed to him, Petitioner testified that he told Mr. Westcott to leave him the ?hell? alone because he was doing his job. While there is no finding as to the exact words utilized by Petitioner to Mr. Westcott, it is found, based upon the testimonial and documentary evidence, that on the afternoon of February 9, 2009, Petitioner was confrontational towards Mr. Westcott, that Petitioner refused to answer a legitimate question from Mr. Westcott, that Petitioner demanded that Mr. Westcott leave him alone even though Mr. Westcott had a legitimate right to talk to Petitioner about his job, and that Petitioner used words that threatened physical violence if Mr. Westcott did not heed his warning. After Mr. Westcott reported the incident to Mr. Mercer, both Mr. Mercer and Mr. Westcott went to Dr. Kerley and advised him of the incident. Dr. Kerley believed the report of the incident and that Petitioner had threatened Mr. Westcott. Mr. Washington was then informed of the incident. After reviewing Petitioner’s employment history, including Petitioner’s recent attitude problems, as well as Mr. Washington’s own interaction the same day of the latest incident, Mr. Washington concluded that Petitioner should be terminated. Mr. Washington gave his recommendation that Petitioner be terminated to Dr. Kerley, who adopted the recommendation. The following day, February 11, 2009, Mr. Washington called Petitioner into his office and gave him a memorandum memorializing Petitioner’s termination from his employment with the College. The memorandum provided: This memorandum is written notification that because of a number of incidents which the administration of the college deems unprofessional, adversarial, and insubordinate, you are hereby terminated from employment at Gulf Coast Community College, effective immediately. At the time that he presented Petitioner with the memorandum, Mr. Washington provided Petitioner with the opportunity to respond. Petitioner told Mr. Washington, ?It is not over.? Petitioner did not state at the time, however, that he believed that his termination, change of schedule, or any disciplinary action taken against him were because of racial discrimination or in retaliation for his protected expression or conduct. Further, at the final hearing, Petitioner did not present evidence indicating that similarly-situated non-African- American employees would have been treated more favorably than was Petitioner for threatening a supervisor. Further, the evidence presented by Petitioner did not show that the decision to terminate him was based on race or in retaliation for protected expression or behavior, or that the facts behind the reason that Petitioner was fired were fabricated. Following his termination, Petitioner met with both Dr. Kerley and Mr. Mercer and apologized for acting wrongly. The empirical record evidence of discipline against College employees in the Maintenance Division during Mr. Westcott’s tenure does not demonstrate a tendency by Mr. Westcott or the College to discriminate against African- American employees. The majority of disciplines and the first discipline taken against Mr. Long by Mr. Westcott were administered to Caucasians. In total, Mr. Westcott only reprimanded five employees. Of these, three were Caucasian -- Mr. Long, Mr. Whitehead, and Mr. Doherty. Despite the fact that the majority of the custodians were African-American, only two African-Americans were disciplined -- Petitioner and Harold Brown. During Mr. Westcott’s employment, the only two employees who were terminated were Petitioner and a white employee, Mark Ruggieri. Excluding Petitioner, all African-American witnesses testified that Mr. Westcott treated them equally and not one, except for Petitioner, testified that they were treated differently because of their race. The testimony of Petitioner’s African-American co-workers is credited over Petitioner’s testimony of alleged discrimination. Harold Brown’s discipline was based upon the fact that he gave the College’s master keys to an outside third-party contractor. Although Mr. Brown disagreed with the level of punishment he received, in his testimony, he agreed that he had made a mistake. Mr. Brown further testified that he did not believe African-Americans were targeted. According to Mr. Brown, Mr. Westcott did not discriminate against him because of his race, and ?Westcott was an equal opportunist as far as his behavior? and ?seemed agitated towards everybody when he was in his moods.? Mr. Garcia was the lead custodian when Petitioner was terminated and is currently the College’s custodial department supervisor. While several employees told Mr. Garcia that they did not like Mr. Westcott’s management style, Mr. Garcia never heard a racist comment and testified that Mr. Westcott was strict and threatened the entire custodial and maintenance staff. Butch Whitehead believes that Mr. Westcott attempted to get him and his maintenance crew ?in trouble.? He had no personal knowledge of the manner in which Mr. Westcott treated Petitioner. Mr. Whitehead's testimony does not otherwise support a finding that Mr. Westcott was a racist or that the College discriminated against Petitioner because of his race. Tom Krampota, a Caucasian and longtime employee and former supervisor, agreed that Mr. Westcott was firm with all custodians and complained about everybody, but was not a racist. Lee Givens, an African-American, testified that his custodial work was monitored because Mr. Westcott took issue with dust and cleanliness, but that if he did his job Mr. Westcott did not bother him. Mr. Givens did not testify that he felt discriminated against because of his race, but rather stated that Mr. Westcott made the job hard for ?all the custodians.? Horace McClinton, an African-American custodian for the College, provided a credible assessment of Mr. Westcott in his testimony which summarized how Mr. Westcott treated all of his subordinates: There were certain things that he wanted us to do that we should have been doing already, and he was just there to enforce it . . . he did not think anybody was doing their job . . . . He was put there to make sure we were doing our job . . . . I don't think he was a racist. Mr. McClinton further testified that all Maintenance Division employees, including Caucasian supervisors, were afraid of Westcott because it was ?his way or the highway.? Latoya ?Red? McNair testified that he was being monitored like the other custodians but did not believe it was because of race. Just as Petitioner’s co-workers’ testimony does not support a finding that Mr. Westcott was a racist, Dan Doherty’s deposition testimony does not support a finding that Mr. Westcott’s actions against Petitioner were because of race. A review of Mr. Doherty’s deposition reflects that Mr. Doherty has no first-hand knowledge of actual discrimination. Mr. Doherty stated, ?I don't know? when asked how he knew Westcott was motivated by race. Nevertheless, according to Mr. Doherty, five African-Americans were singled out, including Petitioner, Mr. McClinton, Mr. Givens, Mr. McNair, and Mr. Brown. Two of these alleged ?victims? outright denied that Mr. Westcott treated them unfairly because of race. The others did not testify that they believed Mr. Westcott treated them differently because of race. Mr. Doherty testified that besides the five identified, the remaining African-Americans were not criticized or targeted. Mr. Doherty also conceded that it was possible that Mr. Westcott just did not like the five custodians. Further, despite the fact that Mr. Doherty was written up by Mr. Westcott more than any other employee, including Petitioner, Mr. Doherty never reported Mr. Westcott for discrimination and did not state in his exit interview from the College that Mr. Westcott was a racist or complain that race was an issue. Rather than supporting a finding that Mr. Westcott was motivated by race, Mr. Doherty’s testimony demonstrated that the problems he had with Mr. Westcott were similar with those pointed out by others—-namely, that Mr. Westcott had a prior criminal conviction, had a harsh management style, and closely scrutinized all workers. While Petitioner and Mr. Long contend that they raised the issue of discrimination with the College's management, the College's president, vice-president, director of human resources, former vice-president, and superintendent all deny receiving a report of discrimination or that any employment action was based on race or in retaliation. Mr. Long’s testimony that he complained of race is not substantiated because he did not witness any discrimination first hand. He also never documented his alleged concerns about racial discrimination prior to Petitioner's termination. In addition, in his testimony, Mr. Long admitted that he never heard Mr. Westcott use a racially discriminatory term. Likewise, Petitioner never documented alleged discrimination until after being terminated. Considering the evidence presented in this case, and the failure of Petitioner and Mr. Long to document alleged complaints when an opportunity was presented, it is found that the allegations of reported complaints of discrimination by Mr. Long and Petitioner are not credible. Further, the testimony from Petitioner’s co-workers and supervisors, which indicates that Mr. Westcott was harsh with all employees but not racially discriminatory, is credited. It is found that Petitioner did not show that any employment action by the College or Mr. Westcott against him was based on race. Rather, the evidence presented in this case demonstrates that Petitioner was not targeted or treated differently from any other employees based upon race. The evidence also failed to show that Petitioner was retaliated against because of his protected expression or conduct. In sum, the evidence did not show that Petitioner was subject to racial discrimination or wrongful retaliation, and Respondent proved that Petitioner was terminated for engaging in a pattern of unprofessional, adversarial, and insubordinate behavior, including a threat to his supervisor’s supervisor, John Westcott.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2011.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against based upon race?
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Deland Housing Authority (the Authority), provides subsidized housing to low-income families in Deland, Florida. Linda McDonnell has been the Executive Director of the Authority since approximately 1990. Petitioner, Marjorie R. Ross, a black female, was employed by the Authority as a Project Management Aide, beginning on or about June 14, 1993. At the time of Petitioner's hire, Greg Norton, the Public Housing Manager, was her immediate supervisor. Petitioner's job duties included, among others, maintaining residents' records and files, computing and inputting utility charges, preparing and issuing monthly rent statements to residents, and preparing 14-day notices (late rent notices). Petitioner's performance evaluation, for the period August 21 to December 21, 1993, rated her overall performance as "needs improvement." In comments attached to the evaluation, it was noted that Petitioner "tried to do too many things at once," causing decreases in her productivity. The comments also stated Petitioner "needs to make an effort to straighten her office each day" and that her "greatest shortfall as an employee is the manner in which she relates to the other employees." From the date of this evaluation, tension existed between Petitioner and McDonnell. For example, McDonnell cautioned Petitioner about speaking to persons outside the organization without permission. On September 26, 1994, McDonnell approached Petitioner to introduce a visiting HUD representative to Petitioner. Petitioner did not speak with the representative, despite McDonnell's repeated requests, because of McDonnell's previous instructions not to speak without permission. Petitioner received a written reprimand for her conduct. On July 25, 1995, McDonnell gave Petitioner a memo that documented Petitioner's habit of promising to create certain projects and failing to complete them. At the end of July 1995, Norton resigned from the Authority. On July 31, 1995, McDonnell conducted a staff meeting relating to Norton's resignation. During the meeting, McDonnell instructed Petitioner to only write receipts for rent checks, but to refrain from entering the receipts into the computer. Despite this instruction, Petitioner subsequently removed rent receipts from McDonnell's secretary's desk and entered them into the computer. As a result, Petitioner received a reprimand and was given a day off without pay. Petitioner received another written reprimand on September 27, 1995, for failing to follow established Authority policy regarding reporting absences. Authority policy required employees to complete an absentee report upon returning to work from an unscheduled absence. Petitioner failed to complete an absentee report upon returning from an unscheduled absence on September 25, 1995, and was not given pay for the absence. Petitioner applied for the position vacated by Norton as Public Housing Manager. The Authority hired Connie Grobstein, a white female, in September 1995. The stated reason for hiring Grobstein was her experience in grant writing; McDonnell stated that writing grants was an important part of the job. Grobstein had little if any experience with public housing. Grobstein became Petitioner's direct supervisor and Petitioner was asked to teach her the day-to-day operations of the office. During September 1995, Grobstein wrote several memos to McDonnell regarding Petitioner's work performance and attitude. On December 21, 1995, Petitioner received a written reprimand from Grobstein for, among other infractions, failing to timely issue 14-day notices. The reprimand stated, "any additional violations of Authority procedures will lead to further disciplinary actions up to and including termination." On February 6, 1996, Grobstein and Petitioner had a confrontation in front of a tenant regarding the start date of a lease. Even though her office was several doors away, McDonnell could hear Grobstein and Petitioner arguing about the lease. As a result of the incident, McDonnell terminated Grobstein.1/ Petitioner was suspended for one day as a result of the argument with Grobstein. While Petitioner was absent, McDonnell discovered that several resident files, which Petitioner was responsible for maintaining, were missing necessary documentation. McDonnell contacted the Authority's attorney, who advised McDonnell that she had no choice but to terminate Petitioner's employment. On February 12, 1996, Petitioner's employment was terminated. The stated reasons for her termination were: consistent problems with her work performance; the incident with Grobstein on February 6, 1996; refusing to follow instructions; giving out rent credits/reductions without approval; attempting to undermine McDonnell and the Authority; demonstrating a poor attitude and an unwillingness to cooperate with others; and failing to complete her work in a timely manner. Respondent maintains a disciplinary policy for Authority employees. Pursuant to this policy, employees may be discharged for, among other reasons, insolence or insubordination; failure to obey legitimate orders from a supervisor; mistreatment (verbal, psychological or physical) of a client or fellow employee; and neglect or willful disregard of the responsibilities, duties and work rules of a position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioners based on their race in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2006) ("Florida Civil Rights Act").
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: All Petitioners are African-American males; all were employed by Respondent. Petitioners Alexander, Daniels and West were discharged on September 20, 2006. Petitioner Cole was laid off on August 25, 2006. Respondent, Solid Wall Systems, Inc., is an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act; it constructs cast-in- place solid concrete wall structures for the production home industry. This construction methodology is typically employed in large residential developments, and the construction "critical path" requires timely completion of each construction progression. For example, if walls are not timely completed, roof truss installation will be delayed, erection equipment will be idle, follow-up subcontractors are delayed, and money is lost. Petitioner, Ralph Alexander, was employed by Respondent in July 2004, as a laborer, being paid $9.00 per hour. He received pay raises and a promotion to leadman during the next several years. At his discharge, he was a leadman being paid $14.00 per hour. Petitioner, Stevie Daniels, was employed by Respondent in March 2004, as a laborer, being paid $9.00 per hour. He received pay raises and a promotion to leadman during the next several years. At his discharge, he was a leadman being paid $13.00 per hour. Petitioner, Ernest West, Jr., was employed by Respondent in October 2004, as a laborer and paid $9.00 per hour. He received pay raises during the next several years. At his discharge, he was being paid $11.00 per hour. Petitioner, Carlos Cole, was hired in September 2003, as a yard helper with Space Coast Truss, a subsidiary of Respondent's corporate owner, being paid $6.50 per hour. In October 2003, he was transferred to Respondent and received $9.00 per hour. He received pay raises and a promotion to leadman during the next several years. At his discharge, on August 25, 2006, he had been promoted to leadman and was being paid $15.00 per hour, but was working as a laborer. On September 11, 15 and 19, 2006, Petitioners Alexander, Daniels and West were "written-up." That is, they were disciplined for failing to follow the specific instructions of supervisors. On September 11, 2006, Petitioners Alexander, Daniels and West were on a "stripping" crew working at Wedgefield in East Orange County. Alexander was advised that the job had to be completed that day, because trusses were scheduled to be installed the following day. Notwithstanding direction to the contrary, the crew left the job without completing the stripping. The time cards of Petitioners Alexander, Daniels and West indicate that these Petitioners "clocked-out" at between 5:24 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. It is between 30 and 45 minutes from the job site and Respondent's yard. Petitioners would have spent several additional minutes cleaning up before "clocking- out." Not only did Petitioners fail to complete the job, they left the job site early. Petitioner Ernest West, Jr., had a part-time job working for Space Coast Cleaning, a janitorial service, from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., Monday, Wednesday and Friday. The job was located in Viera approximately 15 to 20 minutes from Respondent's yard. September 11, 2006, was a Monday and a work day for West's part-time job. Petitioner West told Respondent's operations manager that they left the job site so that he could get to his part-time job on time. On September 15, 2006, Petitioners Alexander, Daniels and West were assigned to strip a multi-unit job site in Titusville. The crew was told to complete the stripping before they left the job site. Time cards indicate that Petitioners "clocked-out" between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. Petitioners left the job unfinished, because they thought they would be unable to complete the job that day. On September 19, 2006, Petitioners Alexander, Daniels and West were assigned to strip a building at Viera High School. After a building is stripped, crews have standing orders not to leave any "cap" forms on the job site. This is a particular type of form that crews are specifically instructed to return to the main yard immediately after use and re-stock in bins for use on subsequent projects. On this day, Petitioner Alexander called Roy Brock, a field manager, and inquired regarding the "cap" forms. He was instructed to bring all forms to the yard. Brock visited the Viera High School job site after the stripping crew had returned to the yard and found several caps that had been left at the site. He loaded them on his truck and returned them to the yard. As a result of these three incidents, which were deemed acts of insubordination, Petitioners Alexander, Daniels and West were terminated on September 20, 2006. In May, June, and July 2006, the housing construction market suffered a significant decline. This was reflected by Respondent having a profit of $10,000 in May, a profit of $2,000 to $3,000 in June, and a $60,000 loss in July. In August, there was literally "no work." Respondent's employees were being sent home every day because there was no work. As a result of the decline in construction, Vince Heuser, Respondent's operations manager, was directed to lay off employees. Petitioner Cole was among five employees laid off on August 25, 2006. Of the five, three were African-American, one was Caucasian, and one was Hispanic. Seven Hispanic laborers were hired on July 5 and 6, 2006. Respondent had taken over the cast-in-place wall construction portion of two large projects from a subcontractor named "JR." The general contractor/developer, Welch Construction, requested that these seven Hispanic individuals, who had been "JR" employees, and had done all the stripping on these two Welch Construction jobs, be hired to complete the jobs. Hiring these seven individuals to continue to work on the jobs was part of the take-over agreement. In September 2006, three Hispanic laborers were hired. Two were hired to work on "amenity walls" which require a totally different forming process than does the standard solid- wall construction. The third was hired to work on the Welch jobs as he had worked with the "JR" crew previously.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter final orders dismissing the Petitions for Relief for Petitioners Ralph Alexander, Stevie Daniels, Ernest West, Jr., and Carlos Cole. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Adrienne E. Trent, Esquire Enrique, Smith and Trent, P.L. 836 Executive Lane, Suite 120 Rockledge, Florida 32955 Chelsie J. Roberts, Esquire Ford & Harrison, LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her age, race, and/or national origin.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's race is black and her nation of origin is Jamaica. She was born on January 12, 1933. Petitioner completed a State of Florida employment application on August 7, 2002, for the position of Human Services Worker II at the Department's Gulf Coast Center in Fort Myers. The state employment application does not require an applicant to list her age or date of birth. All applicants for the Human Services Worker II position were required to sign a "willingness survey" indicating the applicant's willingness to work beyond the hours of a normal shift and/or willingness to work on an assigned day off, if such was required, in order for the facility to meet its minimum staffing requirements. Petitioner read and signed the willingness survey. The Department hired Petitioner for the Human Services Worker II position on September 13, 2002. Her letter of appointment informed Petitioner that she was required to complete a 12-month probationary period before attaining permanent status. Petitioner is a certified nursing assistant ("CNA"), and the job for which she was hired involved the provision of direct care, supervision, and assistance to residents of the Gulf Coast Center. Gulf Coast Center is a 24-hour licensed intermediate care facility for the developmentally disabled, primarily the mentally retarded. Gulf Coast Center's license requires that a minimum number of direct care staff be present and on duty 24 hours per-day, every day of the year, for each residential unit. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.430(d)(3). Petitioner was assigned to the second shift (2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.), with Mondays and Tuesdays as her days off. She worked in the Madison Cottage, which houses 16 profoundly retarded adult females exhibiting a variety of extreme behaviors, including self-injury and aggression towards facility staff. The third shift in Madison Cottage began at 10:45 p.m. and ended at 6:45 a.m. The minimum staff required for the second shift was six persons. The minimum staff required for the third shift was three persons. To ensure that the minimum staff requirements were met, Gulf Coast Center promulgated a "holdover policy," which was in effect at the time Petitioner was hired and throughout her employment. The policy provided that staff persons on one shift could not leave the facility until the next shift met the minimum staffing requirement. In practice, the holdover policy was most commonly invoked when an employee from an incoming shift called in sick. The supervisor of the outgoing shift would first invoke the "pull policy," contacting other cottages in Gulf Coast Center to ascertain whether they could pull an employee from their incoming shifts to fill the slot of the absent employee. If no one was available from another unit, the supervisor would then seek a volunteer from her own cottage to work the incoming shift. If no one volunteered, the supervisor was then required to "hold over" an employee from the current shift. Having signed the "willingness survey," this employee was required to work the extra shift, later receiving compensatory leave to ensure that she did not work more than 40 hours in a given week. Employees were given the opportunity to choose which day of the week they would be available for holdover. If the employee failed to choose a day, then her supervisor would assign a day. Petitioner failed to choose a day and was assigned Wednesday as her holdover day. Prior to May 21, 2003, Petitioner had worked at least one holdover shift without incident. On Wednesday, May 21, 2003, Laurie Whidden was the acting supervisor of Madison Cottage for the second shift. She was informed that a third-shift employee had called in sick. Ms. Whidden attempted to pull an employee from another cottage to cover the shortage, but no one was available. She asked for volunteers to work the third shift, but received no response. Ms. Whidden then informed Petitioner that she would be required to hold over and work the third shift. Petitioner responded that she could not work the third shift, because she could not leave her sick husband at home alone for 16 hours. Petitioner's husband suffered from heart disease, and at that time, his condition was precarious. Petitioner testified that she frequently had to take her husband to the emergency room. However, Petitioner gave Gulf Coast Center no prior notice that she could no longer work a holdover shift, nor did she make any arrangements for the care of her husband on Wednesday, which she knew was her potential holdover day. On May 21, 2003, Petitioner made no effort to ask a fellow second-shift employee to cover for her that night. Petitioner simply went home at the end of the second shift. There was some dispute as to whether Petitioner answered, "Hell, no," when Ms. Whidden asked her to hold over for the third shift. The weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's assertion that her statement was directed at another employee's remark that Petitioner could sue the state if she came home after working the third shift and found her husband dead on the floor. Petitioner was indicating to the other employee that she wanted her husband alive, not money from the state. Petitioner and Beverly Morgan, another second-shift employee, testified that another employee was sent over from another cottage to work the third shift on May 21, 2003, meaning that Petitioner's refusal to stay had no real impact on the staffing of Madison Cottage. Ms. Whidden testified that no one came from another cottage to cover the shortage and that Ms. Whidden herself stayed to work the third shift. Ms. Whidden's testimony is credited on this point. Ms. Whidden informed Colette Fritts, the residential services supervisor of Madison Cottage, that Petitioner refused to hold over for the third shift on May 21, 2003. Ms. Fritts forwarded the report to Gulf Coast Center's human resources division with a recommendation for disciplinary action against Petitioner. The superintendent of Gulf Coast Center terminated Petitioner's employment. Petitioner produced no credible evidence that her age was a factor in the decision to terminate her employment. Ms. Morgan claimed that one night she overheard Ms. Whidden and Leoncia Trevino, another Human Services Worker II in Madison Cottage, discussing Petitioner's age, saying that if she was too old to hold over, she should quit. Given that Petitioner only once refused to hold over, on the night of May 21, 2003, this testimony is not credible. Further, the evidence established that in March and June 2003, probationary employees in their twenties were terminated for refusing to hold over at the end of their shifts. Petitioner produced no credible evidence that her national origin played a role in the decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner, Ms. Morgan, and Carmel Henry, another Madison Cottage employee, all testified that Ms. Whidden, the acting supervisor, wanted to "get rid" of the Jamaican employees in Madison Cottage before the regular supervisor, Monica Franks, herself a Jamaican, returned from sick leave. However, none of them could point to any action by Ms. Whidden to put such a plan into effect or even any statement by Ms. Whidden that would indicate an animus toward Jamaicans. Ms. Whidden testified that at the time of the events at issue, she knew Petitioner was from an island, but didn't know which one. The source of the rumors regarding Ms. Whidden's intention to get rid of the Jamaicans appears to have been Leoncia Trevino. The other workers in Madison Cottage believed that Ms. Trevino had the ear of management. Ms. Whidden credibly testified that she had no special friendship with Ms. Trevino, who was moved out of Madison Cottage on June 24, 2003, after a confrontation with Ms. Henry, and then resigned her employment at Gulf Coast Center the next day. Petitioner produced no evidence that her race played any part in the decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner was still a probationary employee at the time of her dismissal, meaning that she could be dismissed "at will." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-36.005(3). At the time of her hiring, Petitioner received a copy of the Department's Employee Handbook, which informed her that she could be dismissed at will as a probationary employee. Petitioner was aware of the holdover policy and consented to abide by that policy at the time of her employment. On May 21, 2003, Petitioner refused the lawful order of her duly-delegated supervisor to hold over. This refusal constituted insubordination, which would provide cause for dismissal even for a permanent career service employee. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-36.005(3)(d). The evidence produced at hearing demonstrated that the sole reason for Petitioner's termination was her direct refusal to follow the lawful order of her supervisor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the Department of Children and Family Services did not commit any unlawful employment practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based on an alleged handicap.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as that term is defined in Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Respondent employed Respondent in January 1990. Respondent reassigned Petitioner to the Division of Recreation and Parks in 1993. At the time of his dismissal in October 2003, Petitioner was working as a park ranger at the St. Marks GeoPark in Wakulla County, Florida. Petitioner is a history aficionado. He enjoys researching Florida and Civil War history. He has authored a 200-page book entitled The Civil War in and Around St. Marks, Florida. He has written an article entitled "Forts in St. Marks during the War Between the States." Petitioner enjoys participating in history interpretations for the public. Several times in the past decade, Respondent nominated him for an award for his activities in history interpretations. Petitioner has constructed colonial-era equipment and musical instruments. Although they are his personal property, Petitioner has used them in displays for the public at state parks. Petitioner researched the historical accuracy of his projects both at home and at work. Petitioner had surgery in 2000 for a cervical herniated disc. After the surgery, Respondent made accommodations for Petitioner in the form of lighter duty assignments during his recovery period in keeping with his doctor's request. In a letter dated August 28, 2000, Petitioner's doctor set forth the specific type of work that Petitioner could and could not perform. The doctor released Petitioner to perform desk work, telephone duties, and visitor services but no maintenance duties. At all times relevant here, Thomas Nobles was Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Mr. Nobles and Petitioner have known each other since high school. However, they did not have a good relationship at work. In 2001, Petitioner filed gender discrimination charges against Mr. Nobles. Respondent conducted an investigation and exonerated Mr. Nobles. Mr. Nobles wrote several counseling memoranda and one reprimand, which criticized Petitioner's work performance. Among other things, Mr. Nobles warned Petitioner not to visit a music store in Tallahassee during work hours. In a memorandum dated July 19, 2002, Mr. Nobles discussed his concern over Petitioner's work habits that allegedly caused damage to a state-owned vehicle and other property and Petitioner's inability to complete paperwork. Petitioner responded to each of Mr. Nobles' criticisms in a memorandum dated July 28, 2002. On September 20, 2002, Mr. Nobles wrote a memorandum to document an earlier conversation with Petitioner regarding Mr. Nobles' concern that Petitioner was not keeping the park neat. In the memorandum, Mr. Nobles instructed Petitioner not to bring "personal projects" to work, specifically referring to a mandolin that Petitioner had been sanding in the park office. In a memorandum dated October 22, 2002, Mr. Nobles criticized Petitioner for reading a book about musical instruments. Mr. Nobles warned Petitioner not to let personal projects take priority over the park's appearance and cleanliness. On February 25, 2003, Petitioner called his office to provide his employer with the date of his second neck surgery, which was scheduled for March 5, 2003. During the telephone call, Petitioner asserted that he required further surgery due to his work-related injury. However, Petitioner never filed a workers' compensation claim; he believed that he was not eligible for workers' compensation due to a preexisting condition. After Petitioner's March 2003 surgery, Respondent returned to work. In a letter dated April 10, 2003, Petitioner's doctor released him to work running a museum. On or about May 7, 2003, Petitioner's doctor released him to light- duty work assignments, including no more than one hour of lawn maintenance at a time. In a letter dated July 29, 2003, Mr. Nobles' doctor once again restricted Petitioner's work assignments. Petitioner was not supposed to use heavy machinery or operate mowers, edgers, or similar equipment for prolonged periods of time. The doctor recommended that Petitioner avoid repetitive gripping and lifting. There is no evidence that Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with these accommodations. In the meantime, on July 23, 2003, Mr. Nobles requested Respondent's Inspector General to investigate a posting on the eBay Internet site involving a replica of a 1800s guitar, advertised as being made of wood from the Gregory House, a part of Torreya State Park in Gadsden County, Florida. The Inspector General subsequently commenced an investigation. Petitioner posted the advertisement for the guitar under his eBay site name. Petitioner makes replica mandolins and guitars and occasionally sells them on eBay. Petitioner bragged to at least one co-worker in 2003 that he had made a lot of money selling musical instruments on eBay. One of Petitioner's friends made the "Gregory House" guitar out of discarded roof shingles. Petitioner merely posted the advertisement on his internet site because his friend did not know how to use a computer. During the Inspector General's investigation, Petitioner admitted that he had accessed eBay at work but denied he had used it for bidding. An inspection of the hard drive of the computer at Petitioner's office revealed that someone using Petitioner's eBay password had accessed eBay four times from April-July 2003. Around the general time and date of one of those occasions, someone placed an eBay bid on the "Gregory House" guitar. Additionally, the computer at Petitioner's office had been used to access numerous musical instrument and/or woodworking Internet sites other times from April-July 2003. Petitioner was at work on most, but not all, of the days. A park volunteer admitted that she sometimes used the office computer to access eBay. Respondent's policy prohibits an employee from accessing the Internet for personal use if that use adversely affects the employee's ability to perform his job. Personal use of the Internet should be "limited to the greatest extent possible." Petitioner was aware of Respondent's Internet policy. Nevertheless, he used the Internet for personal reasons at work to access eBay and sites related to his woodworking business after he had been counseled not to let personal projects interfere with his park duties. This caused him to not be available to do park business and, therefore, adversely affected his ability to do his job. Petitioner violated Respondent's Internet use policy. Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment on September 25, 2003, for alleged rule violations, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and perjury. Petitioner appealed to the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), contending that Respondent lacked cause to discipline him. PERC appointed a Hearing Officer to conduct a hearing and issue a Recommended Order. The PERC Hearing Officer conducted a public hearing on October 28, 2003. The Hearing Officer issued the Recommended Order on November 10, 2003. In the instant case, the parties stipulated that they would not re-litigate issues previously litigated at the PERC hearing. The PERC Hearing Officer found as follows: (a) Respondent had cause to discipline Petitioner for violating the computer use policy; and (b) Respondent had discretion to discipline Petitioner by terminating his employment. On November 24, 2003, PERC entered a Final Order adopting the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent did not allow employees, other than Petitioner, to read books unrelated to work during office hours. In fact, Respondent did not terminate Petitioner for any of the following reasons: (a) because he read history books at work; (b) because he might file a workers' compensation claim for a work-related injury; (c) because he filed a gender discrimination against Mr. Nobles; or (d) because Respondent intended to eliminate his position. Rather, Respondent dismissed Petitioner for using the office computer for personal reasons. Respondent has fired other employees for the same reason. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner believed that he was physically incapable of performing the duties of his position. However, there is no evidence that Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with appropriate accommodations as requested by Petitioner's doctors.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen Gerrell, Jr. 10750 Kilcrease way Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Marshall G. Wiseheart, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact The Respondent YWCA is a nonprofit corporation that sponsors educational, social, and recreational programs. The YWCA's purpose states that it is a "movement rooted in the Christian faith"; however, expressed belief in Christianity is not required for membership in the YWCA or for employment by the YWCA. Its membership is comprised of adult women seventeen years of age and older. The personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Equal employment opportunity and affirmative action will be applied in recruitment, hiring, compensation, fringe benefits, staff development, and training, promotion, and any other condition of employment regardless of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, age, national origin, or any other nonperformance factors." (Emphasis added.) Regarding termination, the personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Reasons for staff termination must be carefully documented. They should be based upon objective performance appraisals, which in turn are based upon job descriptions, work plans, and performance standards. Except in cases of reorganization/retrenchment or termination for cause, a probationary period for work improvement must be provided, followed by another performance appraisal." The YWCA of West Palm Beach operates three facilities: Central and Residence, the Mamie Adair Branch, and the Recreation Center. The Mamie Adair Branch primarily serves the black community in West Palm Beach and includes a day-care facility. The Petitioner, Davis, was hired as the Branch Executive of the Mamie Adair Branch of the YWCA, effective July 21, 1980, at a starting salary of $12,000.00. The Petitioner was given copies of the YWCA's personnel policy, affirmative action plan, and job description. She was not given notice of particular standards of behavior to which she was required to conform away from the job. As branch Executive she was supervised by the Executive Director, Jo Prout. The Petitioner successfully completed her initial 90-day probationary period, and her annual salary was increased by five percent to $12,600.00. In October 1981, however, the Petitioner received her annual evaluation and was again placed on three months probations due primarily to an unsatisfactory working relationship with the Branch Committee. The Petitioner had a bad attitude and was antagonistic. The Petitioner became pregnant but did not immediately disclose the fact of her pregnancy. In approximately December, 1981, the Petitioner confided to a coworker that she was pregnant and the coworker, in turn, told the YWCA's Executive Director, Jo Prout, that the Petitioner was pregnant. The YWCA's Executive Director was concerned that the Petitioner's relationship with the Branch Committee would be severely adversely affected if the Committee found out the Petitioner was pregnant and unmarried. Because of this concern, the Executive Director removed the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, effective December 31, 1981. The Petitioner would not have been removed from her position on December 31, 1981, but for the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried. Prior to removing the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, the Executive Director did not attempt less drastic alternatives such as asking the Petitioner not to discuss or disclose her marital status or asking the Petitioner to take a leave of absence. Prior to her removal, the Petitioner had not discussed the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried with members of the Branch Committee or with the YWCA membership in general. At no time had the Petitioner advocated unwed motherhood as an alternative life- style or otherwise advocated or espoused principles contrary to her understanding of Christianity. In the past, certain employees of the YWCA whose on-the-job behavior was contrary to Christian principles received job discipline but were not removed from their positions. A desk clerk at the YWCA's residence, for example, who was found to have stolen property from residence guests was not discharged. The removal of the Petitioner from her position by the YWCA because she was pregnant and unmarried was not justified by the business necessity rule because: A requirement to conduct one's life, including one's off-the-job activities, according to Christian principles, was not disclosed to the Petitioner or to other employees; The YWCA did not discipline or discharge other employees for conduct which conflicted with the YWCA's alleged requirement to conduct one's life by Christian principles; and The YWCA did not show that a requirement of all employees to conduct their lives by Christian principles has a manifest relationship to the employment in question. Then the Petitioner was removed from the Branch Executive position, she was transferred to the position of center consultant for gymnastics. The position of the center consultant for gymnastics to which the Petitioner was transferred was a demotion in that the Petitioner went from an administrative to a non-administrative position. The transfer also changed the Petitioner's employment status from full-time employee to part-time employee with a 25 percent decrease in earned income and a lunch "hour" reduced to 30 minutes. The petitioner's new position as center consultant was a temporary one designated to last no longer than five months. Petitioner was removed from probationary status as a result of the transfer. The position of center consultant to which the Petitioner was transferred was not a legitimate position. The position did not exist prior to December 31, 1981, the date the Petitioner was transferred. No job description was ever written for this position, despite the fact that the YWCA personnel policy required job descriptions. The Petitioner was verbally assigned job tasks inconsistent with her title of center consultant, including cleaning toilets at the gymnastics center. The position was eliminated on February 16, 1982, approximately six weeks after it was created, allegedly due to financial streamlining. The YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, discriminating against her on the basis of sex and marital status by removing her from her position as Branch Executive because she was pregnant and unmarried. Moreover, this transfer was not justified by business necessity. Because the YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, the Petitioner could be entitled to be reinstated to her former position or to a comparable position and could also be entitled to recover lost wages and fringe benefits, plus interest thereon, from the date of the wrongful act, December 31, 1981, to November 31, 1982, the date she was hired by the Lutheran Ministries, set off by any interim earnings and reduced by the Petitioner's unemployment compensation benefits plus her reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Regarding reinstatement, the Petitioner has been and is now willing and able to be reinstated to her former position as Branch Executive or to a comparable administrative position. The employer's argument that the Petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement because she was an unsatisfactory employee is rejected for the following reasons: The employer's allegations that the Petitioner will not satisfactorily perform her job if reinstated are too speculative and any doubts about the Petitioner's entitlement to reinstatement should be resolved in favor of the victim of discrimination; and In the event that the Petitioner's job performance upon reinstatement is not satisfactory, the employer may avail itself of the procedures set forth in its personnel policy to improve the Petitioner's performance or discharge her for unsatisfactory job performance. However, reinstatement may not be feasible in this case due to the fact that another employee has been placed in the Petitioner's former position. If the Petitioner is not reinstated to a comparable administrative position, then she should be compensated by the award of six months front pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Petitioner is entitled to damages in the amount of $13,551, which represents a back pay award of $11,000 plus 10 percent interest, six months front pay in the amount of $6,000, minus $1,575 for salary paid from January 1, 1982 - February 16, 1982, including two weeks severance pay and $2,974 in unemployment compensation benefits. The Petitioner is also entitled to costs of $232.65 and attorneys fees totaling $5,000.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the challenged portions of Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined by Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Respondent The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of building and maintaining the state’s transportation system. Each year the Department lets out hundreds of road and bridge construction projects totaling over one billion dollars. The projects range from sidewalk improvements to major bridge construction. Accordingly, there is a wide range of expertise and qualifications necessary for the different kinds of projects let by the Department in Florida. Section 337.14(1), Florida Statutes, requires any person desiring to bid on any Department construction contract in excess of $250,000 to first be certified by the Department as qualified to perform the work to be let. Pursuant to Section 337.164, Florida Statutes, the Department qualifies contractors to preserve the integrity of the public contracting process, to ensure an open and competitive environment for the benefit of the taxpayers, and to ensure a quality project in terms of public works. Pursuant to Section 337.14, Florida Statutes, persons seeking to bid on contracts in excess of $250,000 must first file an application for a Certificate of Qualification with the Department. The statute specifically authorizes the Department to enact rules addressing the qualification of persons to bid on contracts in excess of $250,000, including requirements with respect to competency, responsibility, equipment, past record, experience, financial resources, and organizational personnel of the applicant. Gregory Xanders is the State Construction Engineer. His duties include setting policy and reviewing contractor responsibility and qualifications under Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code. In conjunction with reviewing a contractor’s qualifications, the State Construction Engineer’s Office receives input from other personnel, including contract managers in the field, the Department General Counsel’s Office, the Department Inspector General’s Office, and other cities and counties who may work with the contractor. The State Construction Engineer’s Office also reviews any intended decision to deny, suspend, or revoke a contractor’s Certificate of Qualification with the Assistant Secretary of the Department. When the State Construction Engineer’s Office makes a preliminary determination that a contractor’s Certificate of Qualification should be suspended, revoked, or denied, the contractor is notified and informed of its rights to an administrative hearing to contest the intended decision under Section 120.569, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner MBI is a company which engages in road building and asphalt paving. Since the early 1980s MBI has been qualified to bid on and awarded several Department projects. Approximately 80 percent of MBI's workload involves Department projects. Pursuant to Department rules, MBI annually submits an application to renew or obtain an updated Certificate of Qualification in order to continue bidding and performing Department projects. In 1997, MBI was denied qualification to bid on Department projects for approximately ten months. However, MBI was subsequently qualified by the Department during calendar year 1999. On or about March 31, 2000, MBI filed an Application for Qualification with the Department. By letter dated May 18, 2000, the Department gave MBI notice of its intent to deny MBI’s Application for Qualification, and stated that any subsequent application would not be considered for a period of two years. The Department’s letter advised MBI that the denial of the application constituted "a determination of non-responsibility to bid on any other construction or maintenance contract" for the same period. Specifically, the letter provided: Please be advised that pursuant to Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 14- 22, Florida Administrative Code, it is the intent of the Department of Transportation (hereinafter Department) to deny Mitchell Brothers, Inc.’s (hereinafter Mitchell Brothers) Application for Qualification dated March 31, 2000. This denial shall preclude consideration of any subsequently submitted Application for Qualification for a period of two (2) years. Additionally, this denial shall constitute a determination of non- responsibility to bid on any other construction or maintenance contract and shall prohibit Mitchell Brothers from acting as a material supplier, contractor, or consultant on any Department contract during the period Mitchell Brothers is not qualified by the Department. The Department’s Notice of Intent denied MBI’s Application based upon a determination that MBI had demonstrated "a pattern of exorbitant and false, deceptive or fraudulent statements, certifications, or materials in claims for payment," and "a lack of management expertise and continuity." By Petition for Formal Hearing dated May 30, 2000, MBI challenged the Department’s Notice of Intent to Deny MBI’s Application for Qualification. MBI’s Petition for Formal Hearing was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 00-2431. On September 18, 2000, the Department served on MBI a Modified Notice of Intent to Deny MBI’s application. The Modified Notice gave additional grounds for the Department’s decision to deny MBI’s Application for Qualification. Among the additional grounds for denying MBI’s Application were the following: MBI submitted false, deceptive, fraudulent, erroneous or unreasonable statements, certifications, or materials in its claims for payment to the Department, the City of Tallahassee, the Leon County School Board, and other owners; MBI submitted claims or statements for services not performed or expenses not incurred; MBI failed to avoid, diminish or otherwise mitigate the effects of construction delays; and MBI failed to reasonably cooperate with the Department’s efforts to investigate the accuracy of MBI’s delay claims and statements. On October 13, 2000, MBI filed it’s Petition Seeking Administrative Determination that Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority (DOAH Case No. 00-4234RX). Specifically, in paragraph 11 of its Petition, MBI alleges that the Rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes specific provisions of the law implemented, and that the Rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency. MBI later alleged that the Department had also exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority. A three-week final hearing was scheduled to commence in DOAH Case No. 00-2431 on October 26, 2000. Shortly prior to hearing, Petitioner filed a Motion to consolidate DOAH Case Nos. 99-2431 and 00-4234RX. The Department opposed the motion based on their counsel's inability to be adequately prepared for the 00-4234RX rule challenge proceeding. In lieu, the parties agreed to temporarily break from the 00-2431 hearing during the second week and commence the rule challenge. However, on the morning of October 26, 2000, MBI filed a Notice of its Withdrawal of its Petition for Formal Hearing in DOAH Case No. 00-2431. Consequently, DOAH Case No. 00-4234RX was scheduled for hearing on November 14, 2000. Based on MBI’s Notice of Withdrawal of its Petition, an Order Closing File was entered in DOAH Case No. 00-2431 on November 1, 2000. On November 2, 2000, the Department entered a Clerk’s Order of Dismissal of MBI’s Petition challenging the denial of its Application for Qualification. "Good Cause" Defined in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, provides: For reasons other than delinquency in progress, the department, for good cause, may determine any contractor not having a certificate of qualification nonresponsible for a specified period of time or may deny, suspend, or revoke any certificate of qualification. Good cause includes, but is not limited to, circumstances in which a contractor or the contractor’s official representative: Makes or submits to the department false, deceptive, or fraudulent statements or materials in any bid proposal to the department, any application for a certificate of qualification, any certification of payment pursuant to s. 337.11(10), or any administrative or judicial proceeding; Becomes insolvent or is the subject of a bankruptcy petition; Fails to comply with contract requirements, in terms of payment or performance record, or to timely furnish contract documents as required by the contract or by any state or federal statute or regulation; Wrongfully employs or otherwise provides compensation to any employee or officer of the department, or willfully offers an employee or officer of the department any pecuniary or other benefit with the intent to influence the employee or officer’s official action or judgment; Is an affiliate of a contractor who has been determined nonresponsible or whose certificate of qualification has been suspended or revoked and the affiliate is dependent upon such contractor for personnel, equipment, bonding capacity, or finances; Fails to register, pursuant to chapter 320, motor vehicles that he or she operates in this state. Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to deny, suspend, or revoke an Application for Qualification based upon a determination of "good cause." "Good cause" is defined by six examples specified in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, but the statute further provides that "good cause includes, but is not limited to" the six circumstances specified in the statute. "Good Cause" Defined in the Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, is entitled: "Suspension, Revocation, or Denial of Qualification." Subsection (1) of this Rule provides in pertinent part: (1) The Department will, for good cause, as that term is defined in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, suspend, revoke, or deny any contractor’s qualification to bid. A suspension, revocation, or denial for good cause pursuant to this rule shall prohibit the contractor from bidding on any Department construction contract for which prequalification is required by Section 337.14, Florida Statutes, and shall constitute a determination of non- responsibility to bid on any other construction or maintenance contract and from acting as a material supplier, subcontractor, or consultant on any Department contract or project during the period of suspension, revocation, or denial. As provided in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, such good cause shall include, but shall not be limited to, the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (e) below. When a specific period of revocation, denial, or suspension is not specified by this rule, the period shall be based on the criteria of Rule 14-22.0141(4), F.A.C., as well as Department contractor certification activities. (a) The contractor’s Certificate of Qualification shall be denied or revoked for at least one year when it is determined by the Department that any of the following has occurred: One of the circumstances specified under Section 337.16(2)(a), (b) or (d), Florida Statutes, has occurred. Affiliated contractors submitted more than one proposal for the same work. In this event the Certificate of Qualification of all of the affiliated bidders will be revoked or denied. All bids of affiliated bidders will be rejected. The contractor made or submitted to the Department false, deceptive, or fraudulent statements, certifications, or materials in any claim for payment or any information required by any Department contract. The contractor defaulted on any Department contract or the contract surety took over any Department contract from the contractor. Rule 14-22.012(1), Florida Administrative Code, authorizes the Department to deny, suspend, or revoke a contractor’s qualification to bid based on a determination of "good cause" as that term is defined in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes. The term is defined by examples contained in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, and in the Rule, but it is not exhaustive. In addition to the list of examples of "good cause" specified in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14- 22.012(1), Florida Administrative Code, the Department consistently considers other criteria contained in Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, which relate to the qualifications of a contractor. Section 337.14, Florida Statutes, requires the Department to consider a contractor’s equipment, past record, experience, financial resources and organizational personnel. Other factors considered are contained in Rule 14-22.003, Florida Administrative Code, which addresses the rating of the applicant, work performance record, quality of work performed, history of payment, timeliness of completing projects, cooperative attitude, contract litigation, claims, defaults, integrity, and responsibility. Both Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code, provide the industry with sufficient guidance as to the criteria for "good cause." Responsibility A contractor bidding on projects of less than $250,000 is presumed to be responsible unless one of the circumstances specified in Rule 14-22.0141, Florida Administrative Code, occurs, in which case the contractor may be deemed "non- responsible." In addition to being "qualified," a contractor seeking to bid on projects over $250,000 must also be deemed to be "responsible." By statute, a contractor must be "responsible" as a prerequisite to being "qualified." Section 337.14(3), Florida Statutes, provides: (3) Upon the receipt of an application for certification, the department shall examine it, verify its statements when necessary, and determine whether the applicant is competent, is responsible, and possesses the necessary financial resources to perform the desired work. The Department must consider the responsibility of the contractor during the review of its Application for Qualification. If a contractor’s qualification has been denied, suspended, or revoked for "good cause," then the contractor is deemed to be non-responsible and not allowed to bid on any project. Under Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, the Department may determine the time period in which a contractor is deemed to be non-responsible. Period of Disqualification As to the period of disqualification, Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, provide a framework of guidelines and, in some instances, detailed timeframes relating to specific circumstances. For example, Section 337.165(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes, specifically requires the Department to deny or revoke a contractor's certification for a period of 36 months when the Department determines that the contractor has been convicted of a contract crime. This statute provides a frame of reference for the Department in establishing the period of disqualification. Within the framework provided by Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code, the Department considers a period of disqualification ranging from 0 to 36 months. Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, states that when a Certificate of Qualification is denied or revoked for any of the specified reasons in Rule 14-22.012(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, the denial or revocation is "for at least one year." This revocation period only provides a lower limit. Rule 14-22.012(1), Florida Administrative Code, further provides: "When a specific period of revocation, denial, or suspension is not specified by this rule, the period shall be based on the criteria of Rule 14-22.0141(4), Florida Administrative Code, as well as Department contractor certification activities." Rule 14-22.0141(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides that a contractor will be "ineligible to bid on Department contracts for a period of time based on the seriousness of the deficiency." Rule 14022.0141(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides examples of factors affecting the seriousness of the deficiency. Under the Rule, the examples of factors affecting the seriousness of the deficiency include impacts on project schedule, cost, quality of work, unsafe conditions allowed to exist, complaints from the public, delay or interference with the bidding process, and the potential for repetition. It is not possible to codify in a rule the precise time period of disqualification for every single instance. Because the facts and circumstances supporting a determination of "good cause" vary, it is impracticable to compile an exhaustive list for each instance.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner, Joyce C. Hallowell, was employed by Respondent as a part- time commission sales associate in the electronics department of Brand Central during the relevant period of time including June 1993. Petitioner worked for Respondent on-and-off for a period of 20 years in various sales positions and both in a full and part-time capacity. Petitioner is an American woman, born: October 14, 1948, who was 44 years of age during the relevant time and a member of a protected class. William Henley became the Store General Manager of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store in May 1993. Accordingly, Henley was, during the relevant time period, the Store General Manager of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store. As Store General Manager, William Henley has responsibility for, inter alia, making employment decisions, including hiring, firing, transferring and promotion decisions. Herman Payne became the Brand Central Manager of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store in 1993. Accordingly, Payne was, during the relevant time period, the Brand Central Manager of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store. As Brand Central Manager, Payne supervised all four departments in Brand Central. He has responsibility for, inter alia, making employment decisions, including hiring, firing, transferring and promotion decisions for personnel in his department. Payne was 41 years old during the relevant time period. Frances Pagan Cusick is the Human Resources Manager for the Sears Melbourne, Florida store. As Human Resources Manager Cusick has responsibility for, inter alia, administering the hiring, equal-employment, and compensation policies of Sears. Cusick was 43 years old during the relevant time period. Brand Central consists of four departments: computers, electronics, small appliances and home appliances. Sales associates work in each of the four Branch Central Departments. Both full-time and part-time sales associates work in Brand Central. Each of the sales associates in Brand Central are paid on the basis of commissions earned from sales. As a consequence, each sales associate's earnings are dependent on the number of sales made. At the time of Henley's and Payne's arrival at the Melbourne, Florida Sears store in May, 1993 and June, 1993, respectively, the store, including Brand Central, was in need of numerous changes and improvements, including improvements in appearance and presentation. In June, 1993, Henley and Payne initiated a cleanup "campaign" throughout the store, including Brand Central, in an effort to make the store more presentable to the public. As part of the clean-up "campaign" in Brand Central, Payne recruited the assistance of all Brand Central employees. Petitioner was uncooperative and refused or was reluctant to assist in various efforts to improve the appearance of Brand Central. She also complained to management about others in her department and their lack of diligence in the clean-up campaign. Hallowell's attitude problems were a serious concern to the management of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store. The management of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store counselled her and documented Petitioner's attitude problems. In June, 1993, a need arose for additional part-time help within the appliance department of Brand Central. A transfer from one section of Brand Central to another is not considered a promotion; rather, it is simply a transfer from one department to another. Henley and Payne ultimately decided who would be transferred to the appliance department of Brand Central. The criteria utilized by Respondent in determining who would be transferred to the appliance department included: (i) satisfactory job performance; (ii) satisfactory customer service; and (iii) a positive attitude. Given the nature of Respondent's business, it is important for Respondent's employees to maintain satisfactory job performance, customer service, and to exhibit a positive attitude. The criteria utilized by Respondent in determining who would be transferred to the appliance department were essential to building a highly motivated team of sales associates. Seniority was not a factor utilized by Respondent in determining who would be transferred to the appliance department. Age was not a factor utilized by Respondent in determining who would be transferred to the appliance department. In June 1993, Petitioner expressed to Herman Payne a desire to transfer from the electronics department to the appliance department of Brand Central. Three individuals were considered for the available, part-time position in the appliance department of Brand Central, to wit: Barbara Gehrlein, Terry Giordano and Petitioner. The transfer which Petitioner sought to the appliance department of Brand Central was not a promotion. However, Petitioner felt that she could earn a higher commission in that department over time. Barbara Gehrlein, who was over fifty at the time, elected not to be considered for the transfer to the appliance department of Brand Central because she was not interested in a part-time position. Gehrlein's preference was to remain in a full-time position. Terry Giordana, who was under forty years of age at the time, was selected for the transfer to the appliance department of Brand Central. Henley and Payne decided that she exhibited a positive attitude and satisfied the other qualification criteria utilized by Respondent. Petitioner was not chosen for the part-time position in the appliance department of Brand Central because of the poor attitude she exhibited during the clean-up campaign. After the selection of Terry Giordano for the part-time position in the appliance department of Brand Central, Petitioner continued to exhibit a poor attitude. Prior to the selection by Respondent of the individual to be transferred to the appliance department of Brand Central, Petitioner admitted to her supervisor, that she had been uncooperative and that she had a "chip on her shoulder." Respondent maintains an Affirmative Action Policy. Sears' Affirmative Action Policy provides, inter alia, that: Sears is proud to reaffirm its commitment of the principles of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action. It is our policy to provide equal employment opportunity in all areas of our employment practices and to assure that there will be no discrimination against any associate or applicant on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, ancestry/ethnicity, citizenship, sexual orien- tation, disability, veteran status, marital status, or any other reason prohibited by law. This policy extends to all of the Sears employment practices including recruitment and hiring, job assignments, education and development, promotions, compensation and benefits, use of company facilities, and all other privileges, terms, conditions of employment. It is further the goal of Sears to provide an atmosphere where all our associates can grow and optimize their performance in an environment free of intimidation and harassment of any form. No direct evidence exists supporting Petitioner's contention that she was denied a "promotion" because of her age. Respondent did not fail to "promote" Petitioner. Respondent did not fail to "promote" Petitioner because of her age and Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of her age. With respect to targeted earnings, studies showed that an employee in the appliance department would earn less than an employee in the electronics department, given certain assumptions. Assuming a total store sales volume of $3 million, it is expected that an employee in the appliance department would earn $10.38 per hour, while an employee in the electronics department would receive $10.43 per hour. With respect to targeted earnings, studies showed that an employee in the appliance department would earn slightly more than an employee in the electronics department, given certain other assumptions. Assuming a total store sales volume of $3-6 million, it is expected that an employee in the electronic's department would earn $11.50 per hour, while an employee in the appliance department would receive $11.67 per hour. During the relevant time period, of the 13 individuals who worked in the appliance department of Brand Central, eight of them (or 61.5 percent) were at least 40 years old. During the relevant time period, of the 23 individuals who worked in all of Brand Central, 13 of them (or 56.5 percent) were at least 40 years old. During the relevant time period, of the 20 sales associates who were promoted at the Melbourne, Florida Sears store, five of them (or 25 percent) were at least 40 years old. During the relevant time period, of the 213 sales associates who were working at the Melbourne, Florida Sears store, 85 of them (or 39.9 percent) were at least 40 years old.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3 (in part), 4, 5, 6 (in part), 7, 8, 9 (in part), 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, and 53. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or subsumed: paragraphs 3 (in part), 6 (in part), 9 (in part), 31, 32, and 41. COPIES FURNISHED: Joyce C. Hallowell 1498 Beche Street, S.E. Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Carlos J. Burruezo, Esquire 390 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1285 Post Office Box 3389 Orlando, Florida 32802-3389 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment action by discriminating against Petitioner based on his race, contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2005).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as defined in Section 760.027, Florida Statutes (2005). Prior to July 1, 2005, Respondent operated the following rehabilitation programs: (a) Tallahassee-Leon County Human Services (TLC) serving outpatient adults in downtown Tallahassee, Florida; (b) a residential program for women and their children known as Sisters in Sobriety (SIS), which is located on Respondent's campus in Woodville, Florida; (c) a foster care program for teenage girls that Respondent houses in the St. Mark's Cottage, which is located on Respondent's campus in Woodville, Florida; (d) a foster care program for teenage boys that Respondent houses in the St. Mark's Lodge, which is located on Respondent's campus in Woodville, Florida; and (e) residential rehabilitation programs, which were located on Respondent's campus in Greenville, Florida. Sometime in July 2005, Respondent sold its Greenville Campus to another corporation. Petitioner is an African-American male. At all times relevant here, Petitioner worked full-time as the Director of Operations at Respondent's Woodville Campus. On August 19, 2002, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity/Anti-harassment Policy Statement, which states as follows in relevant part: Any employee who believes that she/her has been harassed or discriminated against in violation of this policy should report the problem immediately to the Director of Human Resources. Respondent's Human Resources Policies and Procedures manual states as follows in relevant part: Statement of Affirmative Action It is the policy of DISC Village, Inc., to provide equal opportunity for employment, training, promotion, compensation and all conditions of employment for individuals without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age except as provided by law, prior history of emotional, mental, drug or alcohol disability or physical disability. DISC Village will maintain a specific program to maintain and promote non-discrimination in accordance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Any perceived act of discrimination should be reported to the site director and the Human Resources Director . . . immediately. Anti-Harassment Policy DISC Village, Inc. is committed to maintaining a work environment that is free of unlawful harassment and will not tolerate any form of harassment or unlawful discrimination against our employees by anyone. Employees must report any form of harassment, especially sexual, to their direct supervisor and the Human Resources Director . . . as soon as possible. Upon hire, all new employees will receive a copy of the agency Anti-Harassment Policy & Procedure with signoff. At all times relevant here, Qua' Keita Anderson, an African-American female, was a counselor at Respondent's Woodville Campus. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson worked in the SIS program. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson's direct supervisor was Joni Morris-Anderson, Respondent's Director of Women's Residential Services on the Woodville Campus. At all times relevant here, Lisa Bergeron worked for Respondent as Program Supervisor of DISC Adolescent Treatment Center on the Woodville Campus. Prior to July 1, 2005, Harry Rohr, a white male, was the Director of Residential Services at Respondent's Greenville Campus and Woodville Campus. Mr. Rohr was Petitioner's direct supervisor, even though Mr. Rohr spent most of his time at the Greenville Campus prior to July 2005. Petitioner was in charge of the Woodville Campus when Mr. Rohr was not available. After July 1, 2005, Mr. Rohr spent most of his time at Respondent's Woodville Campus. Mr. Rohr made this change because Respondent no longer operated programs on the Greenville Campus. The sale of the Greenville Campus did not cause a change in title or job responsibilities for Petitioner or Mr. Rohr. At all times relevant here, Tom Olk, a white male, was Respondent's Chief Executive Officer. Mr. Olk's office is located in Respondent's administrative facility in Tallahassee, Florida. However, Mr. Olk frequently makes on-site visits to Respondent's Woodville Campus. At all times material here, Lou Logan was Respondent's Deputy Director and head of Respondent's Human Resource Department. Mr. Logan is a white male. Mr. Logan's office is located in Respondent's administrative facility in Tallahassee, Florida. In March 2004, Respondent was in the process of opening the foster care program on the Woodville Campus. Several staff members, including Petitioner, participated in refurbishing an old home as a residence for the foster children. Respondent's staff was hanging curtains when Mr. Logan paid an impromptu visit to the old home. The curtains were printed with African animals, including monkeys. When Mr. Logan stated how nice the curtains looked, a staff member made some comment about the monkeys in the curtains. Another staff member commented about Petitioner having a big role in the decorating project. Mr. Logan then stated, "Oh, Lester is always monkeying around." Mr. Logan made the statement in the spirit of the moment to show how happy he was that the staff was doing such a good job. Petitioner complained to Mr. Olk that Mr. Logan had called him a monkey. Mr. Olk discussed the incident with Mr. Logan and Petitioner, concluding that Mr. Logan had not called Petitioner a monkey. Mr. Olk properly determined that Mr. Logan never intended to make a racially derogatory comment about Petitioner and that Petitioner had taken Mr. Logan's statement out of context. In early June 2005, Petitioner called Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson at home on her day off to discuss some performance issues she was having at work. The conversation took an inappropriate turn when Petitioner asked Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson if she had a "sexual stress reliever." On August 3, 2005, Petitioner picked up a female teenage resident of St. Mark's Cottage from Respondent's offices in Tallahassee, Florida. Petitioner transported the female youth, alone and unsupervised, in his personal vehicle to look for a job. In so doing, Petitioner violated Respondent's policy relative to the transportation of residents and/or patients of the opposite gender. On August 3, 2005, Harry Rohr and Lisa Bergeron observed the same young female client leaning over Petitioner's shoulder at his computer desk in very close proximity to Petitioner's body. Petitioner did not maintain appropriate physical boundaries with the young girl. On August 3, 2005, Mr. Rohr spoke to Petitioner about his violation of the transportation rules and his failure to maintain appropriate physical boundaries with the female client. Mr. Rohr then wrote a memorandum to memorialize the conversation. In the memorandum, Mr. Rohr advised Petitioner to refrain from being alone with any of the teenagers and to concentrate his efforts on the boys of St. Mark's Lodge. Shortly thereafter, Respondent approved Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson's request for a transfer from the Woodville Campus to the TLC Campus. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson wanted to work in downtown Tallahassee, Florida, because she was beginning graduate school and needed a smaller, less stressful caseload. On one occasion, Petitioner and Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson had lunch together at a picnic table on the Woodville Campus. On another occasion, Petitioner ordered take-out meals for Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson and himself. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson paid Petitioner for her meal when she picked it up in Petitioner's office. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner ever paid for Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson's lunch, on or off the Woodville Campus. Upon realizing that Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson's last day at the Woodville Campus was approaching, Petitioner telephoned her at home. During the conversation, Petitioner told Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson that she "owed him something" before she transferred. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson replied that she did not owe Petitioner anything. Petitioner then asked Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson to have lunch with him before her last day at work on the Woodville Campus. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson did not agree to have lunch with Petitioner. Petitioner telephoned Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson one additional time at work. During the call, Petitioner again asked when Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson was going to have lunch with him. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson advised Petitioner that she was uncomfortable having a personal lunch outside of the office. Once again she refused Petitioner's invitation. On August 8, 2005, Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson complained to her supervisor, Ms. Joni Morris-Anderson. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson and Ms. Joni Morris-Anderson are unrelated. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson complained about Petitioner's inappropriate sexual remark, his telephone calls to her home, his insinuation that she "owed him something" before she transferred, and his insistence that she have lunch with him. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson repeated her complaint in the presence of Ms. Bergeron, who advised Ms Morris-Anderson to report the incidents to Mr. Rohr. Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson prepared a written statement and submitted it to Mr. Rohr. The statement reflected her "concern" about Petitioner's behavior, which made her feel uncomfortable and harassed. On August 8, 2005, Mr. Olk visited the Woodville Campus. During that visit, Mr. Olk and Mr. Rohr met with Petitioner to discuss Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson's sexual harassment complaint. The meeting also included a discussion involving Petitioner's unsupervised transportation of a female resident and his failure to maintain appropriate physical boundaries with the same female resident. Mr. Olk explained to Petitioner that Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson's complaint raised serious issues, which required an investigation. Mr. Olk advised Petitioner that if he did not participate in the investigation, he could resign or be terminated. In regard to Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson's allegations, Petitioner stated that "it didn't happen that way." He did not make any other statement except to say that “he needed time to think." Mr. Olk had another scheduled meeting on the Woodville Campus. Mr. Olk asked Petitioner to read Ms. Qua' Keita Anderson's complaint and to discuss it with Mr. Olk upon his return from the other meeting. Petitioner then asked Mr. Rohr if he could have the rest of the day off. Mr. Rohr denied this request because Mr. Olk wanted to continue his discussion with Petitioner and because Mr. Rohr wanted Petitioner to begin the cross-training of Jonetta Chukes. Ms. Chukes is a white female. Prior to July 1, 2005, Ms. Chukes worked in Respondent's office in Tallahassee, Florida, as a Medicaid specialist. Until the Greenville Campus was sold, Ms. Chukes also provided some paperwork services for the programs on the Greenville Campus. Sometime in July 2005, Respondent decided to let Ms. Chukes work part-time in the administrative office in Tallahassee, Florida, and part-time too as a secretary on the Woodville Campus. Additionally, Respondent wanted Ms. Chukes to cross-train in the following areas: (a) the client intake process, formerly exclusively performed by Petitioner; (b) the billing process, formerly exclusively performed by another secretary on the Woodville Campus; and (c) the workforce application process. Cross-training is important to Respondent to ensure that its programs function smoothly when any particular person is not at work. Ms. Chukes did not immediately begin working part-time on the Woodville Campus after Respondent made the decision about her new responsibilities. Ms. Chukes happened to begin that transition on August 8, 2005. When Mr. Olk and Mr. Rohr returned from the other meeting, they intended to finish their conversation with Petitioner. However, they could not locate Petitioner. They soon learned that Petitioner had turned in his keys and employer-provided cell phone, submitted a written letter of resignation, and left the campus. Petitioner never informed anyone that he believed Mr. Rohr was discriminating against him. Mr. Olk was very disappointed that Petitioner did not stay on the premises to complete their discussion. Mr. Olk believed Petitioner was a valuable employee with potential for career advancement. Mr. Olk encouraged Petitioner to pursue his undergraduate degree, which is a requirement for upper management. Respondent reimbursed Petitioner for his tuition at Tallahassee Community College. Respondent does not normally pay for its employees to attend college. In this respect, Petitioner was treated more favorably than his Caucasian counterparts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this July day of 20th, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lester Levon Hall 3871 Gaffney Loop Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Amy Reisinger Harrison, Esquire Lindsay A. Connor, Esquire Ford and Harrison LLP 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 10, 1989, Petitioner, Mark Cleveland, a male, applied through Job Service of Florida, for employment as a telemarketer with Respondent, Sears Roebuck and Company at the Sears store located in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner had several years of sales experience with at least six months of experience in telemarketing. He also had a good speaking voice as evidenced by the fact that he is currently employed as a disc jockey at a local radio station. Clearly, Respondent was qualified for the telemarketing position. The telemarketer position would enable Petitioner to earn approximately $85.00 a week or $365.50 a month. The telemarketing section at the Pensacola Sears store consisted of virtually all women with perhaps three or four rare male telemarketers. Petitioner had two separate interviews with two different Sears employees responsible for filling the telemarketing positions. During the Petitioner's interviews with the two Sears employees, Petitioner was repeatedly questioned on whether he could work with all women or mostly all women and be supervised by women. Petitioner assured his interviewers that he could since he grew up with six sisters and in general liked working with women. Petitioner left the interview with the information that he would be hired after another supervisor reviewed the applications and that he would be called once the supervisor's review was complete. After several days, Petitioner, being excited about what he thought was going to be his new job, called one of the two women who interviewed him. He was informed that the telemarketing positions had been filled. Later that same day Petitioner discovered that the positions had, in fact, not been filled and that he had been told an untruth. The telemarketing positions were eventually filled by women. Petitioner remained out of work for approximately four months before he was hired as a telemarketer by the Pensacola News Journal. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on August 27, 1991, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent did not respond to the Notice. On October 10, 1991, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent's address and acknowledgment of this litigation was confirmed when Respondent filed its answer to the Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Even though Respondent received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Petitioner was present at the hearing. The Respondent did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that it would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Respondent to appear, the hearing was commenced. As a consequence of Respondent's failure to appear, no evidence rebutting Petitioner's facts were introduced into evidence at the hearing and specifically no evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose was introduced at the hearing. 1/ Petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on his sex, given the fact that Sears tried to mislead him into believing the telemarketing positions had been filled when they had not, the positions were all eventually filled by women and Sears' clear concern over Petitioner's ability to work with women. Such facts lead to the reasonable inference that Sears was engaging in an unlawful employment practice based on Respondent being a male, a protected class, in order to preserve a female work force in telemarketing. Such discrimination based on sex is prohibited under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and Petitioner is entitled to relief from that discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner was the subject of an illegal employment practice and awarding Petitioner $1,462.00 in backpay plus reasonable costs of $100.95 and an attorney's fee of $2,550.00. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1992.
