The Issue The issue to determine in this matter is whether Respondent Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) properly issued its proposed verification of an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) exemption, dated March 23, 2018, for the installation of nine pilings off of Respondent Larry Lynn’s residential property, in the direction of Petitioner MarineMax, Inc.’s commercial property (MarineMax), pursuant to section 373.406(6), Florida Statutes, commonly known as the “de minimus” exemption.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Lynn has owned the real property located at 111 Placid Drive, Fort Myers, Florida, since 1994. Mr. Lynn’s residential property is a corner lot that fronts a canal on two of the four sides of his property, and also contains his home. MarineMax is a national boat dealer with approximately 65 locations throughout the United States and the British Virgin Islands. MarineMax has approximately 16 locations in Florida. MarineMax, through subsidiary companies, acquired the property at 14030 McGregor Boulevard, Fort Myers, Florida, in December 2014 (MarineMax Property). Prior to MarineMax’s acquisition, this property had been an active marina for more than 30 years. MarineMax continues to operate this property as a marina. The MarineMax Property is a 26-acre contiguous parcel that runs north-south and that is surrounded by canals and a larger waterway that connects to the Gulf of Mexico. The “northern” parcel of the MarineMax Property is surrounded by two canals and the larger waterway that connects to the Gulf of Mexico. The “southern” parcel is a separate peninsula that, while contiguous to the northern parcel, is surrounded by a canal that it shares with the northern parcel, along with another canal that separates it from residential properties. Mr. Lynn’s property is located directly south of the northern parcel of the MarineMax Property, and the canal that runs east-west. As his property is a corner lot, it also fronts an eastern canal that is directly across from the southern parcel of the MarineMax Property. The eastern canal described above also serves as a border between MarineMax and a residential community that includes Mr. Lynn’s residential property. Mr. Lynn has moored a boat to an existing dock on the eastern canal described in paragraphs 5 and 6 for many years. MarineMax holds ERPs for the business it conducts at its MarineMax Property, including the canal between the northern parcel of the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s property. For example, these ERPs permit: (a) the docking of boats up to 85 feet in length with a 23-foot beam; (b) boat slips up to 70 feet in length; (c) up to 480 boats on the MarineMax Property; and (d) a boatlift and boat storage barn (located on the southern parcel). The MarineMax Property also contains a fueling facility that is available for internal and public use. It is located on the northern parcel of the MarineMax Property, directly across the east-west canal from Mr. Lynn’s property. The prior owner of the marina constructed this fueling facility prior to 2003. Request for Verification of Exemption from an ERP Mr. Lynn testified that after MarineMax took over the property from the prior owner, he noticed larger boats moving through the canal that separates his property from the MarineMax Property. Concerned about the potential impact to his property, including his personal boat, Mr. Lynn contracted with Hickox Brothers Marine, Inc. (Hickox), to erect pilings off of his property in this canal.2/ On March 8, 2018, Hickox, on behalf of Mr. Lynn, submitted electronically a Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit to DEP. The “Project Description” stated, “INSTALL NINE 10 INCH DIAMETER PILINGS AS PER ATTACHED DRAWING FOR SAFETY OF HOMEOWNER’S BOAT.” The attached drawing for this project depicted the installation of these nine pilings 16 and 1/2 feet from Mr. Lynn’s seawall, spaced 15 feet apart. On March 23, 2018, DEP approved Mr. Lynn’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit, stating that the activity, as proposed, was exempt under section 373.406(6) from the need to obtain a regulatory permit under part IV of chapter 373. The Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit further stated: This determination is made because the activity, in consideration of its type, size, nature, location, use and operation, is expected to have only minimal or insignificant or cumulative adverse impacts on the water resources. The Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit further stated that DEP did not require further authorization under chapter 253, Florida Statutes, to engage in proprietary review of the activity because it was not to take place on sovereign submerged lands. The Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit also stated that DEP approved an authorization pursuant to the State Programmatic General Permit V, which precluded the need for Mr. Lynn to seek a separate permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Megan Mills, the environmental specialist and program administrator with DEP’s South District Office, testified that DEP’s granting of Mr. Lynn’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit was routine, and that his Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit met the statutory criteria. After DEP granted the Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit, Hickox, on behalf of Mr. Lynn, installed the nine pilings in the canal at various distances approximately 19 feet from Mr. Lynn’s seawall and in the canal that divides Mr. Lynn’s property from the MarineMax Property (and the fueling facility).3/ MarineMax timely challenged DEP’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit. Impact on Water Resources MarineMax presented the testimony of Sam Lowrey, its corporate vice president of real estate, who had detailed knowledge of the layout of the MarineMax Property. Mr. Lowrey testified that the canal between the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s residential property is active with boating activity, noting that MarineMax’s ERP allows up to 480 vessels on-site. With the installation of the pilings, he testified that he was concerned that MarineMax customers “will be uncomfortable navigating their boats through this portion of the canal[,]” which would be detrimental to MarineMax’s business. Mr. Lowery testified that he had no personal knowledge of whether MarineMax has lost any business since the installation of the pilings. MarineMax also presented the testimony of Captain Ralph S. Robinson III, who the undersigned accepted as an expert in marine navigation, without objection.4/ Captain Robinson has been a boat captain, licensed by the U.S. Coast Guard, since 1991. He has extensive experience captaining a variety of vessels throughout the United States and the Bahamas. He is an independent contractor and works for MarineMax and other marine businesses. Captain Robinson is also a retired law enforcement officer. Captain Robinson testified that he was familiar with the waterways surrounding the MarineMax Property, as he has captained boats in those waterways several times a month for the past 15 years. Captain Robinson testified that he has observed a number of boats with varying lengths and beams navigate these waterways, and particularly, the canal between the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s property. Captain Robinson estimated that the beam of these boats range from eight to 22 feet. He also testified that the most common boats have a beam between eight and 10 feet. Captain Robinson’s first experience with the pilings in the canal occurred in April 2018, when he was captaining a 42- foot boat through the canal. He testified that an 85-foot boat was fueling on the fuel dock, and when he cleared the fueling boat and pilings, he had approximately one and a half feet on each side of his boat. He testified that “[i]t was very concerning.” Captain Robinson testified that since this experience in April 2018, he calls ahead to MarineMax to determine the number and size of boats in the portion of this canal that contains the pilings. On behalf of MarineMax, in December 2018, Captain Robinson directed the recording of himself captaining a 59-foot Sea Ray boat with an approximately 15- to 16-foot beam through the canal separating the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s residential property, with another boat of the same size parked at MarineMax’s fueling dock.5/ Captain Robinson testified that these two boats were typical of the boats that he would operate at the MarineMax Property and surrounding waterway. The video demonstration, and Captain Robinson’s commentary, showed that when he passed through the canal between the fuel dock (with the boat docked) and Mr. Lynn’s residential property (with the pilings), there was approximately four to five feet on either side of his boat. Captain Robinson stated: This is not an ideal situation for a boat operator. Yes, it can be done. Should it be done? Um, I wasn’t happy or comfortable in this depiction. Captain Robinson testified that his “personal comfort zone” of distance between a boat he captains and obstacles in the water is five or six feet. Ultimately, Captain Robinson testified that he believed the pilings in the canal between the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s property were a “navigational hazard.” Specifically, Captain Robinson stated: Q: In your expert opinion, has Mr. Lynn’s pilings had more than a minimal, or insignificant impact on navigation in the canal, in which they are placed? A: I believe they’re a navigational hazard. The impact, to me personally, and I’m sure there’s other yacht captains that move their boat through there, or a yacht owner, not a licensed captain, um, that has to take a different approach in their operation and diligence, um, taking due care that they can safely go through. It’s been an impact. Q: Is a navigational hazard a higher standard for you as a boat captain, being more than minimal or insignificant? A: Yes. A navigational hazard is, in my opinion, something that its position could be a low bridge or something hanging off a bridge, a bridge being painted, it could be a marker, it could be a sandbar, anything that is going to cause harm to a boat by its position of normal operation that would cause injury to your boat, or harm an occupant or driver of that boat. Ms. Mills, the environmental specialist and program administrator with DEP’s South District Office, testified that after MarineMax filed the instant Petition, she and another DEP employee visited Mr. Lynn’s residential property. Although not qualified as an expert in marine navigation, Ms. Mills testified that, even after observing the placement of the pilings and the boating activity the day she visited, the pilings qualified for an exemption from the ERP.6/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned recommends that DEP enter a final order dismissing MarineMax’s challenge to the determination that Mr. Lynn’s pilings qualify for an exemption from an environmental resources permit pursuant to its March 23, 2018, approval of Mr. Lynn’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resources Permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Swiss national, who resides in Jamaica. His business in Jamaica involves water sports and vacation tours, primarily for European tourists. Petitioner attended a boat show in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in order to locate a suitable boat for entertainment and tour purposes for use by his business in Jamaica. There, he saw The Lady, a vessel being brokered by Anchorline Yacht and Ship Brokerage, Inc., of St. Petersburg, Florida. On February 28, 1980, Petitioner purchased The Lady from Anchorline for $120,000. Prior to that date, a survey was conducted by Wilkinson Company, marine surveyors, and repairs indicated by that survey were completed at South Pasadena Marina, Inc. At the time that Petitioner purchased The Lady from Anchorline, he advised the broker that he was taking the vessel out of the country. Accordingly, the broker required Petitioner to sign an affidavit that Petitioner had read the provisions of Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, and no tax was collected on the sale and purchase of The Lady. As The Lady was journeying from St. Petersburg across the State of Florida to West Palm Beach in order to reach Jamaica, she started taking on water. She was taken to Lantana Boatyard, where another marine survey was conducted. That survey concluded that The Lady was not seaworthy and, therefore, could not be taken to Jamaica at that time. As one of the required repairs, her engines needed to be overhauled by Cummins in Miami. Accordingly, after the repairs to be made at the Lantana Boatyard were completed, The Lady was taken to the Keystone Point Marina in North Miami, Florida, so that the work on her Cummins engines could be undertaken. During this time, Petitioner attempted to register The Lady in Jamaica; however, the Jamaican Government refused to license or register the vessel since she was not in Jamaica but was still physically located within the State of Florida. As a result of discussion between Petitioner and a Mr. Mathews at Anchorline, on September 18, 1980, the Petitioner made application for a Florida boat Certificate of Title at a tag agency. He reported the purchase price as ten dollars and, accordingly, paid forty cents tax on the transaction. Cummins started the repair work necessary on The Lady's engines while she had been docked at the Keystone Point Marina. On occasion, Petitioner has stayed overnight on The Lady for security purposes. He has had a telephone attached to the vessel for his personal use while on board. On January 7, 1981, Respondent Department of Revenue issued a Warrant for Collection of Delinquent Sales and Use Tax against the Petitioner in the total amount of $9,967.37, representing the follows: Tax $4,799.60 Penalty 4,799.60 Interest 350.17 Filing Fee 18.00 $9,967.37 On January 19, 1981, Petitioner made payment to Respondent Department of Revenue in the amount of $5,167.77, which payment was made under protest and which payment represents the amount of tax, interest, and filing fees, but does not include the amount of penalty. Pursuant to its warrant, the Department of Revenue has chained The Lady to the dock at the Keystone Point Marina. Accordingly, the work being performed by Cummins on her engines has not been completed, and no sea trial can be conducted. As stipulated by the parties, since the Petitioner purchased The Lady, she has been under repair and has never left Florida waters.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered denying Petitioner's claim for a refund, finding the Petitioner liable for a sales tax equal to four percent of the purchase price, together with interest and filing fees, but finding the penalty assessed against Petitioner to be erroneous and therefore invalid. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Lechtman, Esquire 801 N.E. 167th Street, Suite 301 North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 John Browdy, III, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether Petitioner has standing to bring this action and, if so, whether Respondent Stuart Yacht Corporation is entitled to the General Permit which the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) intends to issue.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns Lot 4 in St. Lucie Settlement, a subdivision in Stuart, Florida. The subdivision has one border along the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. The subdivision has a finger fill that extends to the South Fork with canals on both sides. There are four lots on the finger fill, Lots 1 through 4 of the subdivision. Lot 4 is farthest from the river. On the north side of Petitioner’s property he has a dock where he keeps a boat. The dispute in this case involves the canal on the south side of Petitioner’s property. All references to “the canal” hereafter, unless otherwise noted, will be to the canal on the south side of Lot 4. Between Lots 2, 3, and 4 and the canal is a road which provides access to the lots on the finger fill. Between the road and the canal is a narrow strip of land. Petitioner owns this narrow strip of land where it corresponds with his lot lines. In other words, the southern boundary of his Lot 4 abuts the canal. However, because the canal is artificial, having been created by dredging, Petitioner has no riparian rights associated with the canal. That was the holding of the circuit court for Martin County in the litigation between Stuart Yacht Corporation and Petitioner. It was also established in the circuit court litigation that St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., which is the homeowner's association for the subdivision, owns the northern half of the canal and Stuart Yacht Corporation owns the southern half of the canal. No subdivision documents were presented to show the extent of rights granted to homeowners within St. Lucie Settlement related to the construction of docks or other uses of water bottoms that are included within the subdivision. Petitioner testified that he terminated his membership in the homeowners association three-and-a-half years ago. Stuart Yacht Corporation owns and operates a marina on the south side of the canal which includes docks over the water. At some point in the past, but before Petitioner purchased Lot 4 in 1995, Stuart Yacht Corporation constructed a dock along the north side of the canal, over the water bottom owned by St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. The dock along the north side of the canal has been used for mooring large yachts. The portion of the dock that ran along the boundary of Lot 4 was recently removed by Stuart Yacht Corporation following the rulings in the circuit court. The balance of the dock along the north side of the canal would be removed as a part of the proposed permit that Petitioner has challenged. In addition to removing the dock along the north side of the canal, the proposed permit authorizes Stuart Yacht Corporation to construct a new dock that is four feet wide and runs 150 feet along the property boundary in the center of the canal. No part of the proposed new dock would be on the property of St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., did not challenge the proposed permit. In his petition for hearing, Petitioner alleged that the proposed new dock would cause the following injuries to his interests: interference with ingress and egress to Petitioner’s shoreline; interference with Petitioner’s desire to obtain a permit in the future to construct a dock or to “harden” the southern shoreline; and interference with Petitioner’s riparian rights. Petitioner’s testimony about his past use of the canal was inconsistent. He said he moored his boat in the canal once in 1995. He said he boated into the canal to fish on several occasions. He said that (at least twice) when he attempted to enter the canal by boat, he was denied access by representatives of Stuart Yacht Corporation. However, in a deposition taken before the hearing, Petitioner said he had never attempted to use the canal. The only testimony presented by Petitioner to support his claim that the proposed permit would interfere with his navigation, fishing, and desire to obtain a dock permit in the canal was the following: I couldn’t get a boat in there with that proposed dock in the center line of the canal right on their side of the canal. It would be 150 feet long. It would be a huge Wall of China. My neighbor and I couldn’t get to our shoreline. The evidence presented was insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to navigate into the canal in a small boat or to fish in the canal if the proposed dock is constructed. The evidence was also insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to construct any kind of dock for any kind of watercraft if the proposed dock is constructed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department dismiss the petition for hearing based on Petitioner's failure to prove standing, and issue the proposed permit to Stuart Yacht Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Beason, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael W. Sole, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Paul B. Erickson, Esquire Alley, Maass, Rogers & Lindsay, P.A. 340 Royal Poinciana Way, Suite 321 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Amanda Gayle Bush, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Office of the General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Stop 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Guy Bennett Rubin, Esquire Rubin & Rubin Post Office Box 395 Stuart, Florida 34995
The Issue The issues presented for consideration by the hearing officer were as follows: Whether the project would adversely the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project would adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project would adversely affect navigation; Whether the project would adversely affect the fishing or recreational values in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project would be of a temporary or permanent nature; and Whether the project would adversely affect the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.
Findings Of Fact On February 21, 1985, the Respondent, John Spang, applied to the Department of Environmental Regulations, Department of natural Resources and the Army Corp. of Engineers for permits necessary to construct two docking facilities, one on each side of the east end of Coronado Bridge, commonly known as the "North Bridge" on the Indian River, north in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Sections 55 and 9, Township 17 South, Range 34 East. The proposed docks include a total of 24 boat slips. The proposed docks are within 25 feet of the right-of-way of the Coronado Bridge on both the north and south sides. The proposed docks consist of four piers. The piers, from south to north, are 101 feet, 102 feet, 122 feet and 122 feet in length respectively. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. The piers south of the bridge are 75 to 80 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The piers north of the bridge are 60 to 65 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The proposed docking facilities shall service commercially zoned properties `to which they shall be attached and, in particular, the Riverview Hotel and Charlie's Blue Crab Restaurant, at the Riverview. The Petitioners, Grover Ryan and Margaret Ryan, own the commercially zoned property adjacent to the subject property to the south, located at 100 West Columbus Avenue, New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The Ryans operate a commercial business. On March 17, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. Panet E. and Jerrie L. Peterson of 200 Canova Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida own the real property located on the river adjacent to the Ryans but not adjoining the proposed docking area or the property of the applicant. On April 15, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. On February 14, 1986, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued Permit Number 64-099806-4, to construct the proposed docking facilities, subject to specific modifications and conditions to those applications. Issuance of the permit was based upon the following: The Army Corp. of Engineers assessed the proposed docking facilities and determined that the project will not impede navigation or otherwise cause danger to the health, safety or welfare of vessels and persons traveling in the Intracoastal Waterway. On April 18, 1986, the Army Corp. of Engineers issued Permit No. 85IPL-20644 for construction of piers pursuant to the applicant's proposal for docking facilities. The harbor and dockmaster for the City of New Smyrna Beach determined that the proposed docking facilities would not impede or endanger navigation of the river and Intracoastal Waterway, if pilots entering and leaving the docking area carefully follow the rules of road. Actual testing of the proposed site by the Department of Environmental Regulation revealed no seagrasses or rooted macrophytes which might be destroyed by the proposed docks. Flushing in the river was found to be excellent and would alleviate any short-term turbidity problems and would further mitigate against any pollutants from the docking areas to the extent that no water quality violations were anticipated. The United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the area of the proposed docking facility would not have an adverse affect on the manatee otherwise endanger them. Although the dock will restrict fishing from the bridge between the shore and channel, it will not significantly affect adversely the recreational uses. Generally, bridge fishing is being restricted in Florida due to the hazards to fishermen from traffic. The fishing from boats will be unaffected. There is no marine production in the area. The boat traffic in the vicinity of the proposed docking facility is considered heavy, and there are no restrictions on boating speed. The bridge is raised frequently, but heavy traffic requires boats to wait on weekends. The bridge fenders and concrete abutments of the bridge block the lateral view of boaters as they approach, pass under and leave the Coronado Bridge, and likewise obscures the boats in the bridge area from boaters in the proposed dock area. The closest dock to the south of the proposed docks is owned by the Ryans. Mr. Ryan has used his dock for forty-seven (47) years and uses it to dock his large commercial shrimp boat. Mr. Ryan operates a wholesale/retail seafood store on the property which he owns adjoining the Spang's property. As originally proposed, the southernmost dock sought by the Spang's would interfere with Ryan docking his boat at Ryan's dock. The next dock to the south of the proposed docks and Mr. Ryan's dock is owned by the Petersons. This a forty (40) foot dock which is used for noncommercial purposes. Because it does not protrude as far into the water as Ryan's dock, there is no hazard created by the proposed docks. A conditioned modification to the application was the reduction in size of the southernmost docking facility by 15 feet and the construction of handrails on the outer edges of each dock to prevent mooring of boats along the outer edges. The reduction of the southernmost dock by 15 feet, together with handrails and prevention of mooring of boats on the outside of the docks provided reasonable assurance that there was no impediment to navigation, to include Ryan docking his boat. However, the design of the exits to the two proposed docking areas promotes direct entry at right angles into the Intracoastal Waterway. This is potentially hazardous. Petitioner Ryan has an easement over the Spang property to permit public access to Ryan's property from the right-of-way of the bridge and highway. Spang's restaurant, which has already been built at the site, actually traverses the easement, not the proposed docking facility. The proposed facility does not interfere with the easement the Ryans hold landward of the mean high waterline from the highway right-of-way south to the Ryan's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue Permit No. 64-099806-4 with the size limitation and requirements for handrails established by the agency and that the layout of the docks be modified as drawn in Appendix B to discourage exiting the docking areas at right angles to the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 86-0992 The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of John Spang: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 2. Rejected. Paragraph 5 of Ryan's proposed findings of fact adopted as more complete and accurate. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 6. 5,6. Adopted and combined as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted substantially as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 8. 10,11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (b). Irrelevant. Effect on the persons named is not a basis for review. The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of the Ryans and Petersons: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Rejected because the applicants' finding cited 24 which was adopted thereby binding the applicant to the lower number. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 3. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 4. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 5. Adopted in part and included in Recommended Order paragraph 12. 7,8. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 11. 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. 10,12. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 13. 11,13. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 12. Rejected as a list of actors without any conclusion stated. 18,19. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 10 which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding fishing. 20,21,22. Rejected in favor of paragraph 9(d) which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding danger to manatees. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. The following action was taken with regard to the Agency's proposed findings of facts. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16 and in part in Recommended Order paragraph 10. 1st sentence: Rejected as irrelevant in light of the Agency's subsequent issuance. Remainder: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(c). Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 16. 5,6. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 15. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(b). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William F. Hathaway, Esquire Post Office Drawer H New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1586 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hal Spence, Esquire 221 N. Causeway Post Office Box 1266 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1266
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Paul L. Crowder first registered with petitioner as a general contractor on April 4, 1980. He held license No. RG 0035515 at least until July 1, 1987, when it "was placed on a delinquent status for non-renewal." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12. Respondent's license "is considered invalid for the 1991-93 licensing period." Id. On February 20, 1990, the late Dorothy Regoski accepted respondent's written proposal to construct a seawall 276 feet long to a height of four feet above mean high water on Santa Rosa Sound around the edge of her yard. She lived at 232 Brooks Street in Fort Walton Beach with her mother (to whom the house belonged). By signing the proposal, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, Miss Regoski obligated herself to pay $10,227.00 for the seawall, which everybody agreed was needed to replace an existing seawall that had begun to fail. She gave respondent a check for $6,600 on February 20, 1990, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, and agreed to pay the rest when the project was completed. Respondent Crowder testified he was too busy to begin work in February or March but he found time on April 17, 1990, to apply to the City of Fort Walton Beach for a building permit. Sometime thereafter he spent part of a day removing sand just landward of the existing seawall and severing the "tie backs" with which the top of the existing seawall had been anchored to "dead men" further landward. It was necessary to break the "tie backs" in order to install the replacement seawall against the landward side of the existing seawall. Fortunately, removal of the sand diminished or eliminated the pressure or moment tending to tip the top of the existing seawall seaward. But, perhaps mainly because of salt water "cut worms" at work on the existing wall, only some sixty percent of the existing wall remained vertical by the time Mr. Lancaster inspected it in June of 1990. On two or three occasions after the initial excavation, although never for more than a day at a time, respondent or his employees returned to the Regoski home, put in piles, and joined many of them with horizontal 3" x 6" stringers or "whalers." In mid-June, after they had failed to appear for over a month, Ms. Regoski engaged Wayne Lancaster to finish the job. Mother and daughter were understandably alarmed at the rate of erosion boat wakes, the southeast wind and the jetting action of tides created. Mr. Lancaster supplied additional whalers and repositioned others, then installed two courses of 1" x 8" planks separated by filter cloth, and tied back the new seawall to its own deadman. He charged $6200, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11, and he and his men finished the job in a week and a half. The evidence put respondent's work at approximately two-fifths of the whole. Mr. Pelham, a professional engineer who has designed and supervised the erection of at least 100 seawalls (and who remembers the day respondent was born), put the fraction at 41%. Respondent claimed about 40%. The successor contractor testified it might have been as little as 30%. Once respondent excavated, exposing the old seawall and tie backs, acceptable construction practice required staying with the job until it was finished. Respondent's handling of this project was closely analogous to a roofer's taking a roof off and leaving the roof uncovered. Respondent conceded that the delay was not standard practice and that normally such a project should not be interrupted. He also testified that he knew the existing seawall was damaged and "fixing to go." The project should have been completed in a continuous operation, both to protect the upland against erosion and to avoid siltation of waters of the state.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, and in keeping with Rule 21E-17.002, Florida Administrative Code, RECOMMENDED: That the CILB suspend respondent's license for thirty (30) days, and thereafter until he has paid Ms. Regoski's estate two thousand five hundred seventy-three dollars ($2,573). DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1992. Copies furnished to: William S. Cummins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Paul L. Crowder 521 Shrewbury Road Mary Esther, FL 32569 Daniel O'Brien, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Wayne Zimmet's proposed single-family boat dock and lift project is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) from the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) under Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(c).1
Findings Of Fact Both Wayne Zimmet and Scott Rosenblum own property in Tequesta, Florida, in a community known as North Passage, which has a man-made navigation and drainage easement canal that terminates at its eastern end at Mr. Rosenblum's property, which is Lot 74, at 8738 Riverfront Terrace. Mr. Zimmet's property, which is Lot 75, at 8750 Riverfront Terrace, is south of the eastern terminus of the canal. The Rosenblum and Zimmet properties are adjacent and share a common boundary. There is an existing dock extending from Mr. Rosenblum's property into the canal. The existing dock is perpendicular to, and extends west from the middle of, the shore of the eastern terminus of the canal. There is a wooden walkway leading from the residence on Mr. Rosenblum's property to the existing dock. However, there also has been a wooden walkway leading from Mr. Zimmet's property to the existing dock. As indicated in the Preliminary Statement, there is a dispute between Mr. Zimmet and Mr. Rosenblum as to who is entitled to access and use the existing dock--and in particular the south side of the existing dock. That dispute will be resolved in state circuit court.2 For purposes of this proceeding, it will be assumed that Mr. Rosenblum has the right to use the existing dock. On or about May 25, 2006, Mr. Zimmet filed an application requesting an ERP exemption to install an eight-foot by twenty-foot (160-square feet) marginal dock with a two-pile elevator lift to designed to accommodate his boat, which is approximately 24.5 feet long (22 feet at the waterline) and eight feet wide. According to documentation submitted with the application, the proposed dock would be centered along the waterfront of his property and extend approximately four feet into the canal. The proposed boat lift would be skewed toward the western end of the proposed marginal dock with the intent being to dock his boat with the bow facing the west so that proposed dock could be used to enter and load the boat from the stern. This positioning of the proposed lift and boat at the proposed dock would skew a boat on the lift at the proposed dock about three feet to the west, away from the existing dock. Based on the evidence, it is found that Mr. Zimmet did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his proposed boat dock and lift, even if skewed to the west as indicated in the application drawings, would not "impede navigation" to and from the south side of the existing dock. (Otherwise, Mr. Zimmet's proposed dock and lift would not "impede navigation" in the canal.) This impediment to navigation to and from the south side of the existing dock is not a mere inconvenience. Although Mr. Rosenblum now only owns and uses a raft at the existing dock, he testified that he plans on purchasing and using a boat. Boats in the range of approximately 24.5 feet in length with a beam of 8 to 8.5 feet are common in the North Passage canal. A boat of that size docked at the south side of the existing dock would barely fit alongside Mr. Zimmet's boat, whether docked or on the lift, and there would not be a reasonable amount of clearance for navigating a boat of that size commonly to or from the south side of the existing dock if Mr. Zimmet's boat were docked at the proposed dock or on the proposed lift. (Likewise, if a boat of that size were docked on the south side of the existing dock, there would not be a reasonable amount of clearance for Mr. Zimmet to use his proposed dock and lift.) There was no evidence of any impediment to navigation to and from the north side of the existing dock.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order concluding that, absent a circuit court determination that Mr. Rosenblum does not have the right to access and use the south side of the existing dock, Mr. Zimmet's proposed dock and lift project is not exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2007.
The Issue Whether a vessel is owned by Petitioner, Jonathan Selby, and is a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2020), and City of Riviera Beach Derelict Vessel Policy, No. 4.2., and therefore, subject to the provisions of section 705.103, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of the 1987 Wellcraft marine vessel, Florida Boat Registration Number FL5632FV (HIN: WELC24661687)(the “vessel”), that sunk on the north side of the Riviera Beach Marina. Riviera Beach Marina is in the City of Riviera Beach. The vessel broke free from a mooring in a storm and is now in a wrecked, junked, or substantially dismantled condition. Therefore, the vessel is a “derelict vessel” as defined in section 823.11(1)(b)1., and the City of Riviera Beach Derelict Vessel Policy, No. 4.2. There was no evidence presented that the vessel became derelict because of the negligence of Petitioner.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent was a licensed yacht broker.1 She is the yacht broker for Yachting Consultants, Inc. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In April 1999, Respondent was the listing broker of record regarding the sale of a 43-foot Pilgrim yacht. The selling broker was Mark Lipkus, a licensed yacht broker. John Pribik, a licensed salesperson, was Respondent's representative in the sale of the Pilgrim yacht. Mr. Pribik was under the supervision and control of Respondent and Respondent was responsible for his actions. Respondent had a buyer for the Pilgrim yacht, and the closing for the sale of the yacht was scheduled for April 13, 1999. The buyer was financing the purchase of the yacht. In a sale situation, a buyer and a seller have different responsibilities. The seller is responsible for providing all of the documents needed for a sale. The buyer is responsible for providing the funds for a sale. In the sale of the Pilgrim yacht, the responsibilities of the Seller and the Buyer did not change. There is a commission from the sale of a yacht, which is paid by the seller and, in accordance with standard industry practice, paid at closing. By standard industry practice, the commission split is 70/30, but can differ upon agreement. Mr. Lipkus received a down payment of $15,000.00 from the Buyer and placed the down payment in his escrow account. Mr. Lipkus was of the mistaken belief that the commission was payable by the Buyer, not the Seller. No co-broker agreement was entered into between Respondent or Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus regarding commission. There was no discussion regarding the split of the commission between them. On a prior sale involving Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus, the commission split was 60/40. Mr. Pribik and Respondent assumed the commission split of the sale of the Pilgrim yacht would again be 60/40. Considering the prior sale, it was not unreasonable for Respondent and Mr. Pribik to assume a 60/40 split of the commission. Mr. Lipkus assumed the commission split would be 70/30. A power of attorney had been prepared by the Seller who was unavailable for closing due to being in a remote area in the Philippine Islands. Mr. Pribik provided the power of attorney to the documenting agent who reviewed the power of attorney and found it to be satisfactory. The mortgage broker received a copy of the power of attorney prior to closing and forward a copy to the lending institution. The lending institution notified the mortgage broker at some point before closing that the power of attorney was unacceptable. In turn, the mortgage broker contacted the documenting agent regarding the unacceptability of the power of attorney and informed the documenting agent that a new power of attorney was required before closing could take place. Mr. Pribik was notified by the mortgage broker that a new power of attorney was required. The responsibility to obtain the new power of attorney was the responsibility of the listing broker, who was Respondent via Mr. Pribik. As far as Mr. Pribik was concerned, with the time remaining before closing2 and with the Seller being in the Philippine Islands, he believed that it was virtually impossible to obtain a new power of attorney by the time of closing. The mortgage broker, taking the position that he should do whatever he could to effectuate a closing, encouraged Mr. Pribik to attempt to contact the Seller. Complying, Mr. Pribik was able to make telephonic contact with the Seller and Mr. Pribik and the mortgage broker spoke with the Seller, who agreed to provide a new power of attorney. Based on the verbal assurance by the Seller to provide the new power of attorney, the lending institution agreed to proceed with the closing, which was re- scheduled for April 14, 1999. A new power of attorney was faxed to the Seller, and the Seller executed it and faxed it back. According to industry standard, all commissions are paid at closing when a seller receives the funds. Also, according to industry standard, closing is not delayed until a commission is paid. Mr. Lipkus mistakenly believed that the commission was paid by a buyer, coming out of a buyer's deposit. As a result, he expected to take the commission out of the Buyer's down payment, which was held in Mr. Lipkus' escrow account. After obtaining his commission, Mr. Lipkus was going to forward the remaining monies. On April 13, 1999, the original date for the closing, the closing could not take place because the financing from the lending institution was not available, based upon the absence of a new power of attorney. Also, Mr. Lipkus had not made arrangements for the deposit monies to be at closing or forwarded a settlement statement to closing, which were both needed for the closing. Respondent contacted Mr. Lipkus by fax regarding the commission monies and the settlement statement, demanding both items in order for closing to take place. The evidence is not clear and convincing as to whether Respondent demanded the monies held by Mr. Lipkus prior to closing or whether Respondent was threatening to delay the closing unless she had the monies prior to closing. The evidence suggests that Respondent was demanding the monies to be in place at closing. Additionally, on the original closing date, closing was to take place at the office of the mortgage broker. Mr. Pribik, the Buyer, and the mortgage broker were present for the closing. Mr. Lipkus did not intend to attend, and did not attend, the closing. Since the commission monies were not available at closing, Mr. Pribik telephoned Mr. Lipkus and demanded that the commission monies be available and, told him that if not made available, the closing could not take place. In Mr. Pribik's opinion, the monies were needed for closing. The evidence is not clear and convincing as to whether Mr. Pribik demanded the monies held by Mr. Lipkus prior to closing or whether Mr. Pribik was threatening to delay the closing if he did not have the monies prior to closing. The evidence suggests that Mr. Pribik was demanding the monies to be in place at closing. Furthermore, for the first time, Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus, during the telephone conversation, became aware of their disagreement as to the proper commission split, whether 60/40 or 70/30. Believing that Mr. Pribik would prevent a timely closing, Mr. Lipkus agreed to Mr. Pribik's split of 60/40. Closing occurred on April 14, 1999. The necessary documents and finances were present. At the final hearing, Respondent expressed with sincerity that, if she did anything wrong, she wanted to know exactly what it was, so that she would not engage in the same conduct again. Furthermore, Respondent expressed the frustration that, prior to hearing, no one had explicitly told her what she had done wrong and that, at hearing, she continued to be unsure what she had done wrong because she had not been explicitly told what she had done wrong. Respondent has no prior disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order: Finding that Giovanna Gallottini did not violate Rule 61B-60.008(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Not sustaining the Notice to Show Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2001.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated sections 489.129(1)(i), 489.129(1)(o), and 489.1425, Florida Statutes (2007 & 2009),1/ and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the administrative complaints, Mr. Organo was licensed as a certified general contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CGC 1512005. At all times material to the administrative complaints, Mr. Organo was the primary qualifying agent for Bennett Marine Contracting and Construction, Inc. (Bennett Marine). On or about September 29, 2007, Jean Walker (Ms. Walker) entered into a contract with Bennett Marine to construct a dock and a tiki hut at 12305 Boat Shell Drive. The contract (the Walker contract) provided that the contractor would make application for a permit from Lee County, Florida. Mr. Organo signed the Walker contract for Bennett Marine. It is undisputed that the Walker contract did not include a written statement explaining Ms. Walker's rights under the Florida Homeowners' Construction Recovery Fund. On October 24, 2007, Bennett Marine applied for a permit to construct the dock. The application was denied October 29, 2007, because the site plan contained the tiki hut. When the tiki hut was removed from the application, the dock permit was approved. Ms. Walker paid Bennett Marine draws on the construction project. The payments were given to Mr. Organo. The payments totaled $9,200. By February 2008, a tiki hut had been constructed on Ms. Walker's property without a permit. Because the tiki hut was built without a permit, and it was in an illegal location, Lee County required that the tiki hut be removed. By April 2008, the tiki hut had been removed, and another tiki hut had been built in its place. Again, no permit was pulled for the tiki hut, and it was placed in an illegal location. Again, Lee County required that the tiki hut be removed. Mr. Organo subcontracted the construction of the tiki hut to Rick Fewell Chickees. Mr. Fewell of Rick Fewell Chickees, a Seminole Indian,2/ applied for a permit to build a tiki hut, but the application was rejected because the plot plan was not to scale, and the tiki hut did not meet the setback requirements from the water. Another tiki hut was built, and, in March 2009, Lee County again cited Ms. Walker for not having a permit for the tiki hut and for not meeting the setback requirements. In 2010, a permit was finally issued for the construction of a tiki hut on Ms. Walker's property. The permit was issued to Ms. Walker. Bennett Marine commenced work on the tiki hut without obtaining a building permit. On January 5, 2010, Bennett Marine entered into a contract with Chris Bevan (Mr. Bevan) to remove an existing dock, uninstall an existing boatlift, construct a dock, construct a tiki hut, and to reinstall the boatlift. The contract (the Bevan contract) required that the contractor obtain a City of Cape Coral building permit. The Bevan contract was signed by Mr. Organo for Bennett Marine. It is undisputed that the Bevan contract did not contain a written statement explaining Mr. Bevan's rights under the Florida Homeowners' Construction Recovery Fund. On March 17, 2010, Bennett Marine showed up on Mr. Bevan's property and commenced work, by knocking down a cantilever dock that was hanging over a seawall, removing old decking from the boatlift, and rough-framing part of the new dock. Bennett Marine worked until approximately March 25, 2010. That was the last that Mr. Bevan heard from Mr. Organo or Bennett Marine. Mr. Organo applied for a building permit for the Bevan contract on April 1, 2010. The permit was approved on April 13, 2010, but it was not issued. On May 14, 2010, the City of Cape Coral placed a stop-work order on the Bevan project. Mr. Bevan applied for an owner-builder permit for the dock construction, and the permit was issued on June 9, 2010. Mr. Bevan completed the dock construction at additional expense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Mr. Organo violated sections 489.129(1)(i), 489.129(o), and 489.1425; imposing a fine of $250 each for the Walker contract and the Bevan contract for a total of $500, for failure to advise the owners of the recovery fund; imposing a fine of $3,000 and placing Mr. Organo on probation for two years for beginning work without a permit for the Walker contract; and imposing a fine of $1,000 and placing Mr. Organo on probation for one year for beginning work on the Bevan contract without a permit with the one-year probation to run concurrently with the probation imposed for the Walker contract. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Sunset Company of Wilton, Incorporated, is the record title owner of a parcel of real property in Government Lot 1, Section 5, Township 66 South, Range 33 East, on Crawl Key No. 3 also known as Fat Deer Key, Monroe County, Florida. A portion of that parcel has been conveyed by Sunset Company to Whaler's Plaza, Incorporated, although that deed may not have been recorded. Petitioner Fred Roth owns and controls both corporations and exerts ownership and control over the entire parcel. The submerged lands in Tarpon Creek which are waterward of the line of mean high water contiguous to the parcel are sovereignty submerged lands. Roth received "major development" approval from Monroe County to develop the parcel by constructing a commercial/retail development known as "Whaler's Plaza.' The major development plan submitted to and approved by Monroe County includes a docking facility. In 1979 Roth filed an application with the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation for a private dock facility at Whaler's Plaza. The Department of Environmental Regulation approved that application and issued to Roth Permit/Certification No. 44-18542-5E. Roth never constructed that docking facility, and the permit expired on August 1, 1980. One of the agencies involved in reviewing that permit application was the Respondent. On June 26, 1979, Respondent notified Roth that upon review of the application in DER File No. 44-18542-5E, it had determined that the submerged lands were state-owned but that no lease agreement with Respondent would be required. After Permit No. 44-18542-5E expired on August 1, 1980, the Department of Environmental Regulation directed a letter to Petitioner advising him that the permit had expired and further advising him that if he wished to pursue the project he would have to obtain a new permit. in October 1983 Roth sought new authorization from the Department of Environmental Regulation and Respondent to construct a docking facility at Whaler's Plaza. His application was assigned DER File No. 440774875. On December 29, 1983, Respondent notified Roth that a lease would be required for the use of state-owned lands contiguous to Whaler's Plaza, relative to DER File No. 440774875. Respondent's rules changed in 1982 so that Roth's docking facility would be required to meet new criteria. The docking facility proposed by Roth in 1983 was similar to the docking facility proposed in 1979. The 1983 proposed modified docking facility was still represented to the Department of Environmental Regulation to be a private boat dock. The Department of Environmental Regulation issued an intent to deny the 1983 application under its then-existing rules, and Roth requested a formal hearing on that preliminary denial. Before a final hearing could be conducted, Roth again modified the proposed docking facility so that he qualified for a dredge and fill permit exemption from DER, so that no DER permit was needed for his project. A final order was entered by the Department of Environmental Regulation on August 27, 1985. While Roth's 1983 application was pending before the Department of Environmental Regulation, Roth was processing his application with Respondent for a submerged land lease for the docking facility. The documents he filed with Respondent, however, indicated that the docking facility was not intended to be a private dock but rather was a dock related to the commercial development at Whaler's Plaza. Roth represented to Respondent that the proposed docking facility would be for the convenience of patrons of the stores and restaurant at Whaler's Plaza and for his own personal use. Specifically, on June 3, 1985, Roth directed a letter to Respondent pursuant to Respondent's request for additional information. He described the Whaler's Plaza docking facility as follows: The wood dock will be used for arriving and departing customers of the restaurant and stores and my own personal use. The upland land use and activities of the property--will be developed into a shopping center. At the present time, the first phase is completed which is a one-story building containing four units, housing six retail stores, plus offices. The next phase will consist of three more buildings having five units each, 1,0000 [sic] sq. ft. each unit which will be for retail stores and offices, and the final phase will be a 200 seat restaurant, a miniature [sic] petting zoo and possibly a miniature golf course. ... 70 percent of the slips will be open to the general public for their convenience In patronizing the restaurant and stores; the remaining 30 percent of the slips will be for my own personal use. Roth never completed the lease application he filed with Respondent, and he failed to obtain approval for the use of the sovereignty submerged lands preempted by the docking facility proposed in DER File No. 440774875. Eventually, his pending application with Respondent was deactivated, and the file was closed. In late 1986, Roth initiated construction of his docking facility on sovereignty submerged lands, and he caused 30 pilings with cross-bracing to be placed into the submerged lands. On September 1, 1986, Grant Gelhardt, one of Respondent's enforcement officers, discovered the dock being constructed and verbally instructed Roth, through Mrs. Roth, to immediately cease construction activity. No further construction has taken place. Despite the verbal notification, a subsequent warning notice sent by certified mail, and Respondent's Notice of Violation and Order for Corrective Action, Roth has failed to remove the pilings and/or to take corrective measures regarding the partially completed docking facility. Roth has allowed vessels to be moored at the partially completed docking facility, has moored his own vessels at the partially completed docking facility, and has failed to prevent other persons from mooring at the partially completed docking facility. Roth's actions have resulted in damage to a benthic seagrass community on the adjacent sovereignty submerged lands over which Roth's partially completed docking facility is located, and over which vessels using the facility have been and would be moored. Those submerged lands constitute a benthic community of seagrass which supports various fauna and which would be adversely affected by completion and operation of the docking facility. The water depths in the area are shallow, with areas of less than -4 feet mean low water. The width of Tarpon Creek in the project area is approximately 100 feet. The length of the partially completed docking facility is approximately 150 feet. Although the dock extends parallel to the shore, the distance the dock extends into Tarpon Creek, as measured from the shoreline, is approximately 35 feet. Roth knowingly trespassed on sovereignty submerged lands by initiating construction of the docking facility, and he has willfully damaged those lands by drilling holes and placing pilings, and by allowing moored vessels to shade the seagrass. Although Roth ceased construction of the docking facility when told to stop, he has failed to attempt to resolve the violation, to remove the pilings, to seek an after-the-fact approval, or to cease all mooring of vessels on sovereignty submerged lands adjacent to the uplands, even subsequent to receiving the Notice of Violation and Order for Corrective Action. Respondent's June 26, 1979 letter to Roth authorized the activities described in DER Permit No. 44-18542-5E, for the period authorized by that permit. Roth knew that the DEP permit, and therefore Respondent's approval to engage in the activity authorized by that permit, had expired. Roth further knew that his new application filed in 1983, DER File No. 440774875, which was approved by DER after Roth further modified it in order to qualify for an exemption, did not exempt him from obtaining authorization from Respondent to use sovereignty submerged lands for the project and further knew that when he commenced construction of the docking facility in 1986 that he had not obtained approval from Respondent to use state-owned submerged lands. Roth offered no evidence to demonstrate any detrimental reliance upon the June 26, 1979, DNR letter, and the letter did not create a vested right for Roth to construct a different docking facility at a later time without authorization from Respondent. The uplands at the Whaler's Plaza commercial/retail development are owned by for-profit corporations which Roth controls and which derive income from the business and commercial activities at Whaler's Plaza. The docking facility intended primarily for the use of customers of Whaler's Plaza would therefore constitute a revenue generating/income related activity.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring petitioner to: Remove the unauthorized structure within 20 days from the date on which the Final Order is entered and in accordance with Respondent's supervision of that removal; Immediately cease all mooring of vessels on sovereignty submerged lands adjacent to the uplands of the parcel known as Whaler's Plaza until authorized to use state-owned lands; and Pay a fine of $2500 within 15 days of receipt of a certified letter from the Executive Director of the Department of Natural Resources demanding payment to the internal improvement Trust Fund. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of October, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Manz, Esquire Post Office Box 177 Marathon Florida 33050 Ross S. Burnaman, Esquire Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Tom Gardner, Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303
