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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. FUQUA AND DAVIS, INC., 89-001714 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001714 Latest Update: Nov. 20, 1989

The Issue Whether the respondents or some of them erected and maintained outdoor advertising signs in violation of Rule 14-10.006(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, because more than two advertisements or "messages" were visible to motorists at the same location?

Findings Of Fact Visible to west-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 are two billboards both of the same, concededly lawful size, mounted on a single structure, one on top of the other, 1.75 miles east of State Road 69 in Jackson County. The upper sign advertises a Holiday Inn in Marianna. The bottom sign advertises a Best Western motel (yellow logo against black background) and a McDonald's restaurant (golden arches and white lettering against a red background.) Between the two businesses's names on the bottom sign board appears "11 MI EXIT 21" against a white background. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89-1716T). Also visible to west-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 are two billboards of the same size mounted on the same structure, one on top of the other, 2.4 miles east of State Road 77 in Washington County. The upper sign advertises the Chipley Motel. Over the words "THIS EXIT," the central portion of the lower sign advertises a Stuckey's store. Flanking this central portion, both ends of the billboard are taken up with advertisements featuring petroleum trademarks (a scallop shell and a star.) Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89-1714T). Visible to east-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 are two billboards of the same size mounted one on top of the other on the same poles, 1.2 miles west of State Road 77 in Washington County. The upper sign advertises a single business establishment. Underneath, half the sign is devoted to advertising the Washington Motor Inn and half to touting The Outlet Center. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89-1923T). Visible to west-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 are two billboards of the same size mounted on the same structure one on top of the other, 2.7 miles east of State Road 77 in Washington County. The upper sign advises motorists of the proximity of a motel. The lower sign advertises both a Chevron filling station and a Western Sizzlin restaurant, devoting half the panel to each. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89-1921T). Also visible to west-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 is a pair of billboards mounted one over the other at a site 1.3 miles west of State Road 77 in Washington County. The upper panel is devoted exclusively to informing the driving public of a nearby motel. The lower billboard, like the lower billboard located 1.7 miles east of State Road 69, advertises a McDonald's restaurant and a Best Western motel, and does so in a similar bipartite manner. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89- 1922T) Finally, also visible to west-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 is another pair of billboards mounted on top of one another on the same poles, a mile east of State Road 77 in Washington County. The upper sign advertises a McDonald's restaurant. Like the lower sign located 2.4 miles east of State Road 77, the lower sign located a mile east advertises not only Stuckey's, but also Shell and Texaco gasolines. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89-1924T). A handbook DOT employees use depicts three billboards at one location, over the caption: "One of the three faces is illegal if erected after January 28, 1972. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. DOT has not promulgated the handbook as a rule. The evidence did not establish when the billboards in question here were erected. But for Milford C. Truette's perspicacity, these cases might never have arisen. As acting outdoor advertising supervisor for DOT's District II, he told Elsie Myrick, a property and outdoor advertising inspector for DOT, that she "might want to check into ... [the signs involved here] and see that they were in violation." Myrick deposition p. 8. In the subsequently formed opinion of Ms. Myrick, it is unlawful for an outdoor advertising sign to advertise three or more locations at which the same advertiser does business or three or more businesses at the same location, although the proprietor of a single store might lawfully advertise three or more products for sale at the store, and a motel owner is free to advertise a restaurant and a cocktail lounge, at least if they are under the same roof. Respondent's signs are in violation, in Ms. Myrick's view, because, "You're getting across more messages than what you're allowed in a space." Myrick deposition, p. 15. Ms. Myrick thought a sign advertising several stores housed in a single mall would be illegal, but Mr. Truette and Mr. Kissinger, DOT motorist information services coordinator, disagreed. Ms. Myrick rejected the suggestion that common ownership of advertisers would make a difference, but Mr. Kissinger's views on this point were less clear. T.52-3. Mr. Kissinger believes that an outdoor advertising sign can advertise multiple locations at which an enterprise conducts business, or even multiple business entities, if they are all located on the same parcel of real estate.

Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the notices to show cause issued in each of these consolidated cases. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 89-1714T, 89-1716T, 89-1921T, 89-1922T, 89-1923T, 89-1924 Except for the last sentence in proposed finding of fact No. 4, petitioner's proposed findings of fact 1 through 5 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact were not numbered, but have been treated fully in the recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (1) 479.01 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-10.006
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs DERON`S CUSTOM SCREEN PRINTING, 98-002680 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Jun. 10, 1998 Number: 98-002680 Latest Update: May 06, 1999

The Issue Did the Department of Transportation properly issue Notice of Violation No. 10B LJM 1997 197 to Respondent pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes?

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Deron's owns the property located at 4212 Hammond Drive (State Road 542) which is on the east side of Hammond Drive. Deron's business establishment is located at 4212 Hammond Drive. Deron's primary business activities such as screen printing, embroidery, and sales are conducted at 4212 Hammond Drive. Eastwood Self-Storage (Eastwood) is located at 4207 Hammond Drive, which is on the west side of Hammond Drive. Eastwood is in the business of leasing storage spaces to the public for self-storage. Deron's currently leases three self-storage spaces from Eastwood where Deron's primarily stores its excess inventory and supplies. Deron's does not have a business office located at 4207 Hammond Drive and does not conduct any of its business activities such as screen printing, embroidery, and sales at the self-storage units located at 4207 Hammond Drive. The sign subject to this proceeding (sign) is located at 4207 Hammond Drive on property owned by Eastwood. Deron's paid Eastwood to erect the subject sign which sits on top of an on-premise sign owned by Eastwood. Deron's does not pay any rent for the use of the sign to Eastwood or anyone else. The sign advertises Deron's business and the business activities performed by Deron's at its establishment located at 4212 Hammond Drive. Hammond Drive separates the property owned by Eastwood where the sign is located (4207 Hammond Drive) from the property owned by Deron's at 4212 Hammond Drive upon which Deron's business establishment is located. The sign is located within 660 feet of, and is visible to, State Road 542, a jurisdictional highway for purposes of enforcing outdoor advertising. Because of the location of the subject sign (within a 1000 feet of another permitted sign on the same side of Hammond Drive), it does not meet the permitting requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order finding the subject sign to be in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes; and it is further recommended that Deron's be required to remove the sign from its location. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 John G. Wood, Jr., Esquire 3601 Cypress Gardens Road Suite A Winter Haven, Florida 33884

Florida Laws (6) 120.57479.01479.07479.105479.11479.16
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LAMAR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING-LAKELAND vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 07-004734 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 12, 2007 Number: 07-004734 Latest Update: May 18, 2009

The Issue At issue in these consolidated proceedings is whether the permits for signs bearing tag numbers BT339, AE862, and AX116 should be revoked, pursuant to Section 479.08, Florida Statutes (2007).

Findings Of Fact Lamar owns and maintains outdoor advertising signs in the State of Florida. Pursuant to the permitting requirements of Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, the Department issues permits and tags to outdoor advertising signs along interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems. Signs that met permitting criteria at the time they were erected, but that do not comply with subsequently enacted laws or that no longer comply with the law due to changed conditions, may nonetheless be permitted and maintained as "nonconforming signs."1 In compliance with Subsection 479.02(8), Florida Statutes, the Department in 1997 and 1998 conducted a statewide inventory of all signs on the state interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems. This inventory became the database for all signs permitted at the time it was completed. The Department sent the inventory results to all sign owners in order to provide them an opportunity to confirm or challenge the accuracy of the results. The database includes the location of the sign; the dates the sign was permitted and constructed; its date and method of construction; the height, including the Height Above Ground Level ("HAGL"); the height, width, and square footage of the sign facing; the number and type of support structures used; whether the sign is lighted or not; the status of the sign as a conforming, nonconforming, or illegal sign; and other identifying information. Subsection 479.02(8), Florida Statutes, provides that the inventory of signs is to be updated no less than every two years. The Department in fact performs the update every year. In 2004, a series of hurricanes passed through Florida, destroying or damaging thousands of outdoor advertising signs. The Department issued notices of intent to revoke the permits of nonconforming signs that appeared to have been destroyed by the storms. In February 2005, the Department and Lamar entered into a settlement agreement that allowed Lamar to rebuild some signs and required the removal of others. The signs at issue in this proceeding were among those allowed to remain standing with repair. As to these signs, the settlement agreement provided: The outdoor advertising signs referenced above remain lawfully erected nonconforming signs and LAMAR may repair said signs, provided that said repair shall be at the pre-storm location and to pre-storm specifications, including configuration, type of materials, height, size, area of face and lighting. Exceptions to pre-storm specifications will be allowed to the extent required to comply with local building codes. Such repairs shall be completed within 270 days of entry of a Final Order approving this Joint Stipulation of Settlement. The referenced Final Order was entered on March 15, 2005. The Department issued permit numbers 13778 and 137790 and tag numbers BT339 (replaced by tag number CF221 at the time of the hearing) and AE862 to a nonconforming, back-to-back sign located along U.S. 1 in Martin County, .08 miles north of Constitution Boulevard in Hobe Sound. At the time of the 1997 inventory, the Martin County sign was a five-pole wooden structure. The Martin County sign sustained heavy damage during the 2004 hurricanes. After the storms, Lamar sent a work crew to the sign's location to rebuild the sign. The work crew replaced the sign with a four-pole wooden structure. Dave Henry, the real estate leasing manager for Lamar, testified that he gave the crew no particular instruction on how to rebuild the sign. During the rebuilding process, Mr. Henry gave his crews the locations, and told them to rebuild the signs as they had been before the storms. Mr. Henry stated that the crew probably looked at the remains of the damaged sign, saw only four stumps in the ground, and assumed that the original sign had only four supports. On March 21, 2006, the Department issued a Notice to Lamar, stating that the sign bearing tag numbers BT339 and AE862 "has been structurally changed and is no longer substantially the same as it was on the date it became nonconforming, in violation of s. [sic] 14-10.007(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code Rule." On February 20, 2007, a Recommended Order was entered in Lamar South Florida v. Department of Transportation, Case No. 06-3281 (DOAH February 20, 2007). In that case, Judge R. Bruce McKibben recommended that the Department withdraw a Notice issued to Lamar South Florida because the Notice failed to specify exactly which changes to the sign in question caused the sign to be in violation of the Department's rules. Rather, the Notice merely provided a citation to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.007(2)(a). In a final order dated May 21, 2007, the Department accepted Judge McKibben's recommendation, and acknowledged the "apparent confusion" regarding the running of the 30-day notice period and the nature of the notice required to trigger the running of that period. As a result of the Lamar South Florida case, the Department began to issue Notices that contained more specific information regarding the alleged violations. On July 31, 2007, the Department sent Lamar a replacement Notice for the Martin County sign, adding a more specific description of the violation, which stated that the sign "has been structurally modified in violation of s. [sic] 14-10.007(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code Rule: the number of supports has changed."2 The replacement notice also added the following provision: REVOCATION OF THE PERMIT(S) WILL BECOME FINAL thirty (30) days from your receipt of this notice unless you provide information to the Department showing the Notice was issued in error OR you correct the violation within 30 days of your receipt of this Notice, and provide evidence of the correction to the Department. For nonconforming signs, while you may correct the violation, you may not exceed the allowable maintenance standards as stated in s. 14-10.007(2), F.A.C. Lamar did not act within 30 days of the Notice to correct the violation and restore the Martin County sign to a five-pole structure. Mr. Henry testified that a fifth pole was added to the structure on November 16, 2007. The Department issued permit number 7359 and tag number AX116 to a nonconforming, single-faced sign in Polk County along U.S. 27, .141 miles east of Heatherwood Boulevard in Lake Wales. On November 22, 1997, the Polk County sign was inventoried and photographed as a seven-pole wooden structure. Lamar did not own the sign at the time the 2004 hurricanes damaged it. Lamar acquired the Polk county sign in 2005, after it had been rebuilt as a six-pole structure. On March 21, 2006, the Department issued a Notice to Lamar, stating that the sign bearing tag number AX116 "has been structurally changed and is no longer substantially the same as it was on the date it became nonconforming, in violation of s. [sic] 14-10.007(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code." On July 31, 2007, the Department sent Lamar a replacement Notice for the Polk County sign, adding a more specific description of the violation which stated that the sign "has been structurally modified in violation of s. [sic] 14- 10.007(2), Florida Administrative Code: the number of supports has changed. . .".3 The replacement notice also contained the language quoted at finding of fact 14, supra. Lamar did not act within 30 days of the Notice to correct the violation and restore the Polk County sign to a seven-pole structure.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation revoking the permits for the nonconforming signs bearing tag numbers BT339, AE862, and AX116. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2008.

CFR (1) 23 CFR 750.707(d) Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57479.01479.02479.07479.08479.107
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KATHRYN HOGAN PEREDA AND MARGARET HOGAN MARKER, D/B/A HFT ADVERTISING vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 15-000733 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Feb. 13, 2015 Number: 15-000733 Latest Update: Nov. 30, 2015

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Transportation (“Department”) properly issued a Notice of Denied Outdoor Advertising Permit Application for the eastward face of the Monument Sign owned by Kathryn Hogan Pereda and Margaret Hogan Marker, d/b/a/ HFT Advertising (“Petitioner” or “HFT”).

Findings Of Fact In 1979, Petitioner’s family acquired the property at 2930 Southwest 30th Avenue, Pembroke Park, Florida. The family’s parcel is part of a subdivision of several smaller parcels, which houses a number of different businesses. Subsequently, Petitioner’s grandparents purchased the sign parcel, which was conveyed to Petitioner in 1989. The original sign on the sign parcel was the Coral Base Sign (“Coral Base Sign”). The Department is the state agency responsible, inter alia, for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of, and visible from, interstate highways. In approximately 1991, Petitioner replaced the Coral Base Sign. HFT retained a contractor to construct the new sign (“Marquee Sign”). HFT made sign space available to other Southwest 30th Avenue businesses on the Marquee Sign. The Marquee Sign was built as a free-standing sign that was 10 feet wide and 15 feet high and was permitted through the Town of Pembroke Park. When the contractor built the Marquee Sign, he did not remove the footings from the original Coral Base Sign to build the new sign. Instead, footings for the new sign were placed immediately contiguous to the Coral Base Sign footings on the CSX railroad property. In 1994, HFT went back before the Town of Pembroke Park and obtained approval through a variance proceeding for a permit to add another section to the Marquee Sign and made it with two faces 15 feet high and 20 feet wide. The expansion allowed more businesses in the subdivision to advertise. In 2010, the Department notified Petitioner that the Marquee Sign was located within the Department’s right-of-way. By letter dated May 28, 2010, the Department informed Petitioner “per Florida Statutes, signs are prohibited to be within the right-of-way and will need to be relocated onto property owned by Margaret Claire Hogan and Kathryn Anne Hogan.” Petitioner believed the Marquee Sign was on their family’s sign parcel but found out after a survey that the sign was not on their property but on the right-of-way. In 2011, Petitioner complied with the Department’s request to relocate the sign. HFT obtained another permit from the Town of Pembroke Park and removed the Marquee Sign from the Department’s right-of-way. Petitioner spent approximately $50,000.00 permitting, designing, and erecting the current HFT Monument Sign (“Monument Sign”) back in the location east of the sign parcel where the Coral Base Sign had stood originally. The only viable use of the parcel on which the Monument Sign is located is the operation and maintenance of the Monument Sign. Space on the Monument Sign is leased by Petitioner to the owners/operators of the Southwest 30th Avenue businesses for the purpose of identifying the location of their respective businesses to their customers and potential customers. The Monument Sign does not identify any businesses other than the Southwest 30th Avenue businesses. The Monument Sign is located within the controlled area of both Hallandale Beach Boulevard and I-95. I-95 is part of the interstate highway system. The eastward face of the Monument Sign is visible from the main-traveled way of I-95. A Clear Channel Sign is on the same side of I-95 as the Monument Sign. The Clear Channel Sign was permitted by the Department in 1984. It is located approximately 250 feet to the south of the Monument Sign. On August 2, 2013, Mark Johnson (“Johnson”), a Regional Outdoor Advertising Inspector with the Department, performed an inspection of the Monument Sign and determined that it is an illegal and unpermitted sign. Johnson posted a Notice of Violation on the Monument Sign stating the sign was in violation of the permitting requirements of section 479.07, Florida Statutes (2015). On August 5, 2013, the Department issued four Notices of Violation-Illegally Erected Sign to the Town of Pembroke Park and the four businesses advertised on the Monument Sign. The Notices of Violation apprised the owners that the Monument Sign was in violation of section 479.105 and that within 30 days the sign either needed to be removed or an outdoor advertising permit application needed to be filed with the Department. Administrative hearing rights and permit application instructions were also made available in the Notices of Violation. However, no request for an administrative hearing was received by the Department. On September 4, 2013, HFT submitted two outdoor advertising permit applications numbers 59865 and 59866 for the eastward and westward faces of the Monument Sign, which was erected in 2011. On September 6, 2013, the Department returned HFT’s applications as incomplete. On October 15, 2013, HFT submitted two outdoor advertising permit applications numbers 60016 and 60017 for the eastward and westward faces of the Monument Sign. On November 12, 2013, the Department denied Petitioner’s applications for permit. The Notice of Denied Outdoor Advertising Permit Application provided the following basis for denial: Sign does not meet spacing requirements (1500’ for interstates, 1000” for FAP). In conflict with permitted sign(s), tag#(s): CG242/243. Held by: Clear Channel Outdoor- South Florida Division. [s. 479.07(9)(a), 1.,& 2, FS] On December 17, 2013, HFT timely filed a Request for Formal Administrative Hearing contesting the Department’s exercise of permitting jurisdiction and the denial notice. HFT does not dispute that: (i) I-95 is an interstate highway within the Department’s permitting jurisdiction; (ii) the HFT Monument Sign is within 660 feet of the nearest edge of I-95; or (iii) the HFT Monument Sign is located within 1500 feet of another permitted sign on the same side of I-95. On January 6, 2014, the Department determined the westward face of the Monument Sign was not visible from I-95 and met the spacing requirement for Hallandale Beach Boulevard. The Department issued permit number 56688 for the westward face of the Monument Sign but did not permit the eastward face.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order upholding Petitioner HFT’s Notice of Denied Outdoor Advertising Permit Application for the eastward face of the Monument Sign. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2015.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57479.01479.07479.105479.1679.01 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.217
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY (WPB), 84-002248 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002248 Latest Update: Dec. 11, 1986

Findings Of Fact In May, 1982, Respondent entered into a 10 year lease with the owner of certain real estate on the East side of I-95, a federal highway now and at the time in issue, in Palm Beach County, Florida, for the erection of an advertising signboard. The site in question was located 850 feet more or less north of the intersection of I-95 with State Road 710. In order to get both state and county permits for this sign, Respondent had a survey made of the area to determine if the site of the proposed sign was more that 1,000 feet from the closest sign on the same side of the highway so as to conform to the requirements of the pertinent statute and DOT rules. This survey, completed in June, 1982, indicated that the proposed site for Respondent's sign was 1040 feet from the closest billboard on the same side of the highway. This survey, however, was not done in such a manner as to accurately indicate the distance in question because the base lines for measurement were not perpendicular to the edge of the pavement. The sign was not erected immediately, however, and to be sure that the siting was accurate, Respondent again, in July, 1983, had another survey performed by a different surveyor which reflected that the distance between the Respondent's sign and that next north of it was in excess of 1000 feet. The Respondent was issued two permits for the sign in question and has received annual renewals of those permits in 1984, 1985, and 1986. The permits in question are AH 297-12 and AH 298-12. At no time has Petitioner indicated any intention to revoke either of these permits. The billboard next north of the sign in issue here was erected by Respondent on property leased in May, 1977. This earlier dual-sided sign was issued permits number 2721 and 2722. Apparently, the tags for these permits were lost as on April 24, 1980, DOT issued new tag numbers to Respondent, AC 133-12 for 2721, and AC 134-12 for 2722. Later on, in May, 1984, Mr. Fred J. Harper, District Administrator for Petitioner, having reason to believe the two signs were too close, measured the distance between the southern and northern signs involved here. He took three separate measurements; one with an electronic odometer, one with a walking wheel belonging to DOT, and the third with a walking wheel belonging to Respondent's representative. In each of the three measurements, Mr. Harper attempted to measure from a baseline to endline each of which was perpendicular running from the post to the edge of the pavement. Though his perpendiculars were not measured by instruments, he is satisfied from his eight years of experience in his current position that his eye is accurate enough to minimize error. The three measurements made along the edge of the roadway, reflected distances of 884, 888, and 886 feet, respectively. To confirm these measurements, Mr. Harper contacted the District Surveyor, Mr. McCarthy, and requested a survey be done to establish the distance. Though he did not personally go to the site with the surveyor, he did point it out on maps and aerial surveys of the area. The survey by DOT surveyors was done by or under the supervision of Mr. McCarthy. The measurements were based on a starting point at the center line of the I-95 right of way down a line perpendicular to each pole with a 90 degree turn at the pole toward the other pole. The distance between the two poles, determined by an electronic distance measuring device, was no more than 894.4 feet. The Department notified Respondent of this in writing. This distance was not measured along the edge of the pavement, as called for in Rule 14-10.06(1)(b)4b, Florida Administrative Code, but, according to Mr. McCarthy, even if it had been, the distance in this case would have been only about 20 feet more than the 894.4 feet measured due to the slight curve in the road. In any case, the total distance would have remained under 1,000 feet.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED That: Petitioner, Department of Transportation enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's sign permits AH 297-12 and AH 298-12, and directing the signs be removed. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of December, 1986 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 84-2248T The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Covered in Findings of Fact 1, 3, 4 and 7. Incorporated in Findings of Fact 5 and 6. Incorporated in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Incorporated in Findings of Fact 2 and 7. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent Incorporated in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 3. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 3. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 3. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 5. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 1. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 7. Paragraph 1 - approved. Paragraph 2 - approved. Paragraph 3 - approved. Approved. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 3. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected as conjecture after the fact. Rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Drawdy, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151

Florida Laws (3) 120.57479.02479.08
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. DOLPHIN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 89-001898 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001898 Latest Update: Jun. 05, 1989

The Issue Whether the application contains knowingly false or misleading information; or Whether the Department is estopped to revoke the permits.

Findings Of Fact By application for outdoor advertising sign permits dated December 19, 1989 (Exhibit 1), Dolphin Outdoor Advertising requested permits for a sign to be located along I-4 in Polk County, Florida 100 feet west of Kraft Road. The application stated that the proposed sign was 1600 feet from the nearest permitted sign. The District DOT sign inspector to whom this application was referred for processing checked the records for signs located within 1000 feet of the proposed location under the mistaken understanding that the minimum spacing requirement for signs along interstate highways was 1000 feet. After determining there were no valid conflicting signs, the inspector, who had been employed by the department approximately six months, approved the application and tags numbered AY 108-35 and AY 109-35 were issued on February 24, 1989. In the interim, the applicant, upon learning that his application would be approved, contacted the landowner and entered into a lease for the property and on February 17, 1989, paid Florida Log and Timber $5000 for the first year's lease (Exhibit 11) on this property. The applicant also paid the finder of the site some $4300 for services and expenses in November, 1988. (Exhibits 7 and 8) In mid-March 1989, while discussing these permits with her supervisor, the inspector who had issued the permit to Respondent learned that the required spacing between signs along interstate highways is 1500 feet instead of 1000 feet which is the minimum spacing along federal-aid primary highways. By letter dated March 17, 1989 (Exhibit 3) the Department advised Respondent that permits AY 108-35 and AY 109-35 were issued in error because of a valid existing permit for a sign located 1056 feet west of Respondent's proposed sign. The permits were therefore stated to be no longer valid, and these proceedings followed. Petitioner's letter of March 17, 1989 was received by Respondent before construction on the sign started but after Respondent received a building permit from Polk County dated February 27, 1989 at a cost to Respondent of $101.20.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued revoking permits AY 108-35 and AY 109-35 issued to Dolphin Outdoor Advertising for a sign along I-4 100 feet west of Kraft Road in Polk County. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Scott Hill, Pro Se 1718 Golfside Drive Winter Park, Florida 32972 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 =================================================================

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.6835.22479.07479.08
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs JOY STEEN, 91-003808 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Jun. 20, 1991 Number: 91-003808 Latest Update: May 27, 1992

The Issue Whether respondent has erected or maintained a sign on State Road 40 at the intersection with North East 49th Terrace in Marion County without the requisite permit and in violation of spacing requirements?

Findings Of Fact Respondent Arthur Steen owns an outdoor advertising sign located at the intersection of State Road 40 and Northeast 49th Terrace, within 660 feet of the right of way of State Road 40, which "has continued as Federal-Aid Primary highway [from October 24, 1955] up to the present date." Joint Stipulation. Mr. Steen's sign, which is visible from the main travelled way of State Road 40, proclaims on east and west faces: Marion Pines Senior Mobile Home Community Model Homes Turn Here Arrows point toward "Marion Pines," the new name of the first trailer park in Marion County. A subdivision lies between State Road 40 and the trailer park where Mr. Steen rents lots to mobile home owners. Mr. Steen's sign stands 599 feet west of another outdoor advertising sign, on the same side of the highway. DOT has issued permits to Harry Moody Signs for the other sign, which has two sign boards. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. Mr. Steen's sign stands on land that, like the trailer park and the subdivision, once belonged to Ross Allen. Mr. Steen and Mr. Allen originally paved what is now North East 49th Terrace (until recently known as North East 50th Avenue) and Mr. Steen maintained the road thereafter. Now the county has posted street signs. The sign at issue does not stand on premises Mr. Steen owns. The sign has stood within the right of way of the road leading to the trailer park since 1969 (although the copy was changed in 1983 and again in 1991; and the sign was enlarged in 1983.) At one time, Ross Allen offered to convey what has become North East 49th Terrace to Mr. Steen, Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, but Mr. Steen never accepted the offer.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: The DOT declare respondent's sign in violation. DONE and ENTERED this 31 day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31 day of March, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED TO: Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Frank C. Amatea, Esquire 500 N.E. 8th Avenue Ocala, FL 32670 Ben G. Watts, Secretary ATTN: Eleanor Hunter Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458

Florida Laws (4) 120.68479.07479.105479.16
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. WILLIAM E. BEAL, D/B/A BEAL SIGN SERVICE, 78-000642 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000642 Latest Update: May 25, 1979

The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Transportation, is entitled to remove a certain sign allegedly owned by the Respondent and allegedly located on State Read 814, 800 feet east of Powerline Road in Pompano Reach, Florida. The stated grounds for this removal are for the failure to have a permit under the terms and conditions of Subsection 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.04(1), Florida Administrative Code, and the alleged improper spacing of this sign, vis-a-vis, other signs in the vicinity, in violation of Section 479.025, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.06(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Code. Whether or not the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Transportation, is entitled to remove a certain sign allegedly owned by the Respondent and allegedly located on State Road 84, 600 feet east of U.S. 441 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The stated grounds for this removal are for the failure to have a permit under the terms and conditions of Subsection 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.04(1), Florida Administrative Code, and the alleged improper spacing of this sign, vis-a-vis, other signs in the vicinity, in violation of Section 479.025, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.06(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Transportation's allegations against the Respondent, William E. Beal, d/b/a Beal Sign Service, which allegations charged the Respondent Beal with violations of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Transportation, is an agency of State Government charged with the function of carrying out the conditions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and such rules as have been promulgated to effect that charge. The Respondent, William E. Beal, d/b/a Beal Sign Service, is a business enterprise licensed under Section 479.04, Florida Statutes, to do business as an outdoor advertiser in the State of Florida. The Petitioner, through its form statement letter of violation and attached bill of particulars has accused the Respondent of violations pertaining to two signs. The stated violations alleged against each sign are common, in that the Respondent is accused in both instances of not having a permit as required by Subsection 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.04(1), Florida Administrative Cede, and is additionally charged in the case of both signs with maintaining improper spacing in violation of Section 479.025, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.06(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Code. The facts of the case reveal that the first sign in contention is located on State Road 814, which is also known as Atlantic Boulevard, in Broward County, Florida. The copy of that sign contains the language, World Famous Restaurant, Kapok Tree Inn." This sign is depicted in the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence, which is a photograph of the sign. The second sign in contention is located on State Road 84 and is depicted in the photograph which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence, and it carries the copy, "Villas of Arista Park." This particular sign is located in Broward County, Florida. Both of the signs in question are owned by the Respondent, Beal, and have been constructed by his business concern. The sign located on State Road 814 faces east and is 330 feet away from the nearest sign, which faces east; the latter sign has a permit and is owned by the Respondent. The disputed sign is part of a double-faced construction with the second side facing west. The sign on State Road 84 also faces east and is 292 feet away from the next sign, which faces east. The next nearest east-facing sign is permitted and is owned by the Respondent. Again, the disputed sign on State Road 84 is part of a double-faced apparatus whose second face is located in a westerly direction. The west faces of the signs have the proper State permits; however, the east faces, which are in dispute in this proceeding, do not have the proper State permits required by Subsection 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. That provision reads: "479.07 Individual device permits; fees; tags.-- Except as in this chapter otherwise provided, no person shall construct, erect, operate, use, maintain, or cause or permit to be constructed, erected, operated, used or maintained any outdoor advertising structure, outdoor advertising sign or outdoor advertisement, outside any incorporated city or town, without first obtaining a permit therefor from the department, and paying the annual fee therefor, as herein provided. Any person who shall construct, erect, operate, use, or maintain, or cause or permit to be constructed, erected, operated, used, or maintained, any outdoor advertising structure, outdoor advertising sign, or outdoor advertisement along any federal aid primary highway or interstate highway within any incorporated city or town shall apply for a permit on a form provided by the department. A permanent permit tag of the kind hereinafter provided shall be issued by the department without charge and shall be affixed to the sign in the manner provided in subsection (4). The department shall not issue such a permit to any person in the business of outdoor advertising who has not obtained the license provided for in s.479.04." The sign at State Road 814 which is in dispute is neither a federal- aid primary highway nor interstate highway. It is a part of the state road system in the State of Florida. Nonetheless, it is outside any incorporated city or town and would require a permit. The sign at State Road 84, which has been referred to through the statement of violation, is in an unincorporated area of Broward County and would require a permit. In addition, it is a sign located on a federal-aid primary highway. The conclusion reached on the necessity of the Respondent to have the subject signs permitted is reached through an examination of the history of the two signs in question and the west-faced construction at the location of the two signs which are in controversy. In 1971 the Respondent applied to the Broward County Building and Zoning Department to he granted a permit to construct a single-faced, non- illuminated sign at the location, State Road 814. That request was granted and a single sign was constructed, which is the west-faced sign at the location. That sign remains today. A copy of the application for that sign permit may he found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Some time in January, 1978, and as indicated by the document for application, January 6, 1978, the Respondent filed a request with the Petitioner for a permit for the east face that is disputed in the course of this hearing pertaining to the location on State Road 814, with the copy, Kapok Tree Inn. No prior permit had been issued for the construction of that east face through the offices of the Petitioner, nor to the knowledge of the Petitioner's employees had any permit been granted by Broward County for such a sign. A couple of days after the application was made for the permit for the east face of the sign on State Road 814, the sign structure itself was built. That structure was constructed at a time when the permit request had not been approved. Subsequent to the construction, an employee of the petitioner informed the Respondent that the permit request had not been approved and in August, 1978, the fees for such a permit were returned to the Respondent. The explanation for not approving the request for permit was due to the failure to comply with the Rule 14- 10.06(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Code, pertaining to spacing between signs. (In addition, it was established in the hearing that the Petitioner was reluctant to approve the applications for either the State Road 814 or the State Road 84 signs in view of a certain action on the part of Broward County against the Respondent's east-facing signs on State Road 814 and State Road 84 for alleged non-compliance with the Broward County Ordinance, Section 39-946 and Chapter 42-4203.I, South Florida Building Code. The action with Broward County is still pending.) The permit application for the east-faced sign on State Road 84, which is the subject of this controversy, was made as notarized January 5, 1978. The history of the Respondent's signs located at this particular position is traced through an examination of the Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, which is a copy of the permit application filed with the Broward County Building and Zoning Department in 1974, requesting the right to construct and be permitted for a double-faced sign. That permit was granted and the west face was constructed and utilized by the Respondent and a proper permit still remains in effect. It is unclear from the record at what point the easternmost face of the double-faced sign was constructed, but it is clear that the east face was existent with the aforementioned copy in place when an employee of the Petitioner inspected the sign as a prerequisite to issuing the permit and on an inspection discovered that the sign was only 292 feet away from the next sign which faced east located on the road. The import of the Respondent's testimony did, however, seem to suggest that the west face of the double-faced sign was constructed at a time before the east face. Moreover, the Respondent by asking for the permit appeared to be of the opinion that the permit for the west face was insufficient in itself to meet permitting requirements for the east face. The east face of the sign at State Road 84 aid not have a state permit when it was inspected by the Petitioner's employee and to the knowledge of the Petitioner never had been permitted. Petitioner notified the Respondent that the sign at State Road 84, which is under consideration in this case, purportedly violated the provision in Section 479.025, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.06(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Code, pertaining to spacing. This notification was through the Notice of Violation of February 15, 1978, and was tantamount to informing the Respondent that the permit application had been rejected. Even though a double-faced sign application was made with Broward County in 1974 for the sign apparatus to be located in the position on State Road 84, the requested utilization of the east face did not come about until January, 1978, and the Broward County permission to construct a double-faced sign did not grant the Respondent license which would allay the necessity of gaining a permit from the Petitioner to utilize the east face of that sign. Having established that no permit existed for the two signs in question at the time the Notice of Violation was filed on February 15, 1978, and having established the need for such a permit, there remains to be determined the question of whether or not the signs violated requirements for spacing purportedly found in Section 479.025, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14- 10.06(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Cede. (Section 479.025, Florida Statutes, does not apply because it was repealed by Chapter 77-104, Laws of Florida, effective August 2, 1977.) Rule 14-10.06(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Code, establishes the requirement that "no two structures shall be spaced less than five hundred (500) feet apart on the same side of the highway facing the same direction." This requirement only applies to federal-aid primary highway; therefore, it would not have application to State Road 814, which is not a federal-aid primary highway. Consequently, the spacing requirements could not stand as a basis for denying the permit application as it pertains to the sign on State Road 814. Rule 14-.0.06(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Code, would have application to State Road 84, which is a federal-aid primary highway. In view of the fact that the next east-facing sign on State Road 84, which is most adjacent to the sign on State Road 84 in dispute, is 292 feet from the structure on State Road 84, the disputed sign violates Rule 14-10.06(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Code, as being less than five hundred (500) feet from the next adjacent sign on the same side of the highway and facing the same direction, and a permit should not be issued because of this violation of the spacing requirement. It should be mentioned that the Respondent has claimed the theory of estoppel in the course of the hearing on the question of the right to obtain permits for the signs and to avoid their removal. The theory of that claim of estoppel is that the Petitioner has failed to comply with Rule 14-10.04(1), Florida Administrative Code, on the requirements for permit approval and is estopped from denying the permit application. That provision states: "14-10.04 Permits. Permit Approval Upon receipt of Form 178-501 from an outdoor advertiser, the District will record the date received in the lower right hand corner of the form. Within fifteen days of the receipt the application must be approved and forwarded to the Central Office or returned to the applicant. The sign site must be inspected by an outdoor advertising inspector, to assure that the sign(s) will not be in violation of the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, Title 23, Section 131, U.S. Code and local governmental regulations. If all these requirements are met and the measurements are correct, the inspector stamps the application 'Approved', signs it and dates his signature. Where two applications from different advertisers conflict with each other or are competing for the same site the first application received by the district office will be the first considered for approval. If the first one received is approved the second application will be disapproved and returned to the advertiser. Although the facts show that the Petitioner did not approve and forward the permit application to the Central Office or return it to the applicant within fifteen days as required, the Respondent went forward with his construction and/or utilization of the signs in question without receiving a permit which allowed for such construction and/or utilization. In the case of the sign at State Road 814, the sign was constructed before the expiration of the fifteen day period within which time the Petitioner could respond to the application. Furthermore, Rule 14-10.04(2), Florida Administrative Code, clearly indicates that no permit exists until the permit tag is issued, and the permit tag is not issued unless the District Office approves the permit application request. In both instances, the permit application request was not approved and a permit tag was not issued; and there being no entitlement to a default permit upon the expiration of a fixed period of time, and the Respondent having acted without permission to construct and/or utilize the signs and there being no facts proven which established the necessary reliance condition as a prerequisite to a claim of estoppel, estoppel does not pertain. That provision of Rule 14-10.04(2), Florida Administrative Code, states: "14-10.04 Permits. Permits Issued Upon Approval: Upon receipt of the approved application with payment of the permit fee, the Outdoor Advertising Section, Central Office, issues the permit tag. The tag will be issued within 30 days of receipt in the District Office. The advertiser shall attach the permit tag to the face of the advertising structure, advertising sign or advertisement on the end nearest the highway in a manner that shall cause it to be plainly visible but not readily accessible by the general public." At best, the Respondent could have inquired of the Petitioner at a time thirty (30) days from the receipt of the two applications to determine why the applications had not been approved or returned to the Respondent. And in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, moved in the appropriate forum to mandate compliance with Rule 14-10.04, Florida Administrative Code. Instead, the Respondent moved at his own jeopardy to construct and/or utilize the two subject signs, which are indicated in the Notice of Violation, and by doing so ran the risk that he would not gain the necessary permits and would stand to have the signs removed under the provision of Section 479.17, Florida Statutes. Under these circumstances, the Petitioner is not estopped from requesting the removal of those signs.

Recommendation It is recommended that the signs located at State Road 814 and State Road 84 that are the subject matter of this dispute be removed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nancy Severs, Esquire Miller, Squire & Braverman 500 Northeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (3) 479.04479.07479.15
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, 99-005381 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Deland, Florida Dec. 29, 1999 Number: 99-005381 Latest Update: Jul. 24, 2000

The Issue Whether Respondent's outdoor sign permit should be revoked because the original sign has been destroyed by an Act of God, as alleged by Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this controversy, Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), seeks to revoke a permit (No. BP844) for an off-premise outdoor advertising sign owned by Respondent, National Advertising Company (Respondent), an entity now known as "Infinity Outdoor," on the grounds that the original sign was destroyed by a hurricane in October 1999, the sign has lost its nonconforming status, and Respondent cannot lawfully rebuild the structure. In response to these charges, Respondent contends that after the sign was damaged, unknown persons stole the damaged structural pieces that were going to be used in part to rebuild the sign. Under a theory first disclosed at hearing, Respondent went on to contend that if those materials were still available, it could qualify for a seldom, if ever, used exception found in Rule 14-10.007(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, which would otherwise allow it to reconstruct the sign. That rule provides in part that a sign will not be considered destroyed if the owner can demonstrate that "the replacement material costs to reerect the sign would not exceed [fifty percent] of the value of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction." Using that provision, Respondent argues that much of the sign's structure could have been rebuilt with the now- stolen materials, and the remaining "replacement material costs" would not exceed the threshold in the rule. The sign was erected in 1968 before spacing requirements for signs were first adopted in 1972; therefore, unless it is destroyed, the sign can continue to qualify for nonconforming status as long as it remains substantially the same as it was as of the date it became nonconforming. Because the sign is situated on U.S. Highway 1 in Brevard County, a federal-aid primary highway, and another permitted sign lies approximately 200 feet away, under current spacing requirements, a sign cannot be rebuilt on the same site. This is because current spacing requirements prohibit two signs from being closer than 1,000 feet apart on a federal-aid primary roadway. The sign in question is located adjacent to U.S. Highway 1, 0.341 miles north of Florida Memorial Gardens in Brevard County, Florida. In October 1999, Hurricane Irene tracked northward along the eastern coast of Florida causing extensive wind damage, including substantial damage to Respondent's sign. Photographs received in evidence as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3 show the condition of the sign on October 26, 1999, or shortly after it was damaged by the hurricane. Among other things, two of the five support poles (which were buried to a depth of eight feet) were "splintered" approximately two to three feet above ground level, while the other three were "knocked over" and "broken" at ground level. The wooden facing of the sign "had been knocked up against a pine tree" and the wooden plywood "panels [on which the sign message is printed] were split." The "stringers," whose numbers were variously described in the record as nine and sixteen, and which measure 2 x 4 x 20 feet and support the backside of the structure between the poles, were also damaged. The condition of the sign is corroborated by similar photographs taken on October 18 and 22, 1999, by a code enforcement officer of Brevard County. In the judgment of the DOT inspector who visited the site shortly after the hurricane, none of the damaged structural materials (poles and stringers) could be reused due to the amount of damage caused by the hurricane's winds. However, the inspector was unable to assign a replacement cost for any of those structural materials, or the replacement value of the sign immediately prior to its destruction. On an unknown date, but after the photographs were taken by DOT on October 26, 1999, Respondent's operations manager, Billy Nichols (Nichols), instructed a subcontracting crew to inspect each of the company's signs and to drop off at each sign location "what they thought we may have needed" to repair the signs. After inspecting the sign in question, the crew deposited five brand new poles at the site. Respondent takes the position that it always intended to use a combination of old and new materials, rather than all new materials, to repair the damaged sign. The date on which this decision was made by Respondent is not apparent in the record. In addition, despite a lack of clarity in the record, in its post-hearing filing, Respondent represents that the new poles were deposited at the site before the damaged materials were removed. However, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that based on the subcontractor's actions, Respondent originally intended to replace virtually the entire structure since five new poles were dropped off at the site of the sign; after a Citation was issued, Respondent apparently decided to reerect the sign under the theory proposed at hearing. Sometime after November 8, 1999, when DOT issued its Citation, Respondent maintains that much of the debris from the site, including the damaged poles and stringers, was unlawfully removed by unknown persons, resulting in Respondent being forced to rebuild the sign with all new materials. The new poles, however, were not removed and remained at the site. Because of the Citation, no work has occurred pending the outcome of this proceeding. In applying the terms of the rule relied upon by Respondent, DOT ascertains the cost of the sign and the replacement materials by utilizing cost data from retail stores, such as Home Depot or Lowe's, on a date as close to the date of destruction as is possible. In this case, that date would fall in September or October 1999. In addition, even if a sign owner decides to repair his sign with used or recycled materials, those materials would still be valued as if they were new. Further, only items such as supporting braces (stringers) or members of the sign structure (support poles) qualify as structural materials. This means that the sign facing would not be considered a structural component within the meaning of the rule. Finally, any old materials from the original sign that were reused would not be a part of the overall cost. Apart from the cost issue, in reconstructing the sign, the owner must return the sign to substantially the same configuration as before the damage. Thus, any change in the height or width of the sign facing, the number of feet that the sign sits above the ground, the structural safety of the sign, or the size of the replacement materials, might constitute a substantial change and prohibit reerection. In the case at bar, the testimony establishes that if Respondent proposes to change the height of the sign, the type of structural materials used, or the number of support poles, this would constitute a substantial change in the sign and disqualify Respondent from utilizing the exception in the rule. Although the rule does not specifically require such information, to prove that materials were stolen by unknown persons, historically DOT has required that the owner submit a police report confirming that materials were stolen. In this case, no police report was ever filed by Respondent, nor did it file a claim with its insurance company for the value of the materials allegedly stolen. Respondent submitted cost data from three local "supplier[s]" confirming that the value of the structural components of the sign just prior to its being damaged was not greater than $1202.00. This figure was derived by taking the cost of five new poles at $202.00 per pole, or $1010.00, and sixteen new stringers at a cost of $12.00 per stringer, or $192.00. Respondent's suggestion that the cost of plywood for the new sign facing ($636.00) should also be counted as a structural material has been rejected since that component does not qualify as such a material under the rule. Respondent's operation supervisor (Nichols) offered two alternatives for repairing the sign. First, he suggested that by lowering the structure below its previous height, he could reerect the sign using only two new poles. This alternative, however, would substantially change the sign's configuration and violate the terms of the rule. Second, in order to keep the sign at its original height, Nichols stated that he would purchase three new poles and "stub" two of the damaged poles by adding two more stringers. The second option would cost only $630.00, but under this alternative, the value of the replacement materials would exceed fifty percent of the cost of the structure ($1202.00) just prior to the sign being damaged. Then, too, the record shows that by making this type of repair, the sign facing would be weaker, making it less safe; its wind load would be changed; and the sign height would be lower. Thus, these modifications would constitute a substantial change.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order confirming that the outdoor advertising sign maintained by National Advertising Company under Permit No. BP844 has been destroyed, is nonconforming, and cannot be reerected. The permit should also be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 12th of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Attn: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Jodi B. Jennings, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57479.01 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-10.007
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. DAVID GROVER (SR A1A), 81-001983 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001983 Latest Update: May 21, 1990

The Issue Whether the subject sign of Respondent is a lawful sign for which Respondent should be compensated upon its removal.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, David Grover, owns a V-shaped billboard with a north face and a south face located outside any incorporated city or town 0.14 mile south of State Road 518 on Highway A1A, a federal-aid primary highway, advertising "Sun Harbor Nursery" on both faces of the sign. The nursery advertised on the billboard is a business owned by Respondent located approximately one half mile from the subject sign. (Transcript, page 53.) A violation notice dated July 15, 1981 was Served on Respondent alleging that the subject sign is in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.04(1), Florida Administrative Code, because it was erected without a permit; and that it is also in violation of Section 479.02, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.06(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code, because it is located within 500 feet of a permitted sign. Respondent's father, David Grover, Sr., erected the V-shaped billboard in 1961 without a permit and maintained it until he sold the land on which it is located to his son in 1974. (Transcript, pages 31-35.) No application for a permit from the Petitioner Department was made during the time David Grover, Sr. owned the land and sign or since Respondent owned the property until 1981, when an application was denied because permits had previously been issued for other nearby signs. (Transcript, pages 43 and 46.) There is a distance of approximately 118 feet between the south face of the subject sign and a billboard which bears a permit issued by the Petitioner Department in 1974. There is also a distance of approximately 118 feet between the north face of the subject sign and a billboard which bears a permit issued by the Petitioner Department in 1974. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1; Transcript, pages 14, 15 and 41.) Subsequent to the hearing Respondent admitted that his sign is in violation of the statutes and rules requiring a space of 500 feet from a permitted sign but contends the sign is a lawful sign having been grandfathered by the passage of time since its erection in 1961 and therefore he is entitled to compensation upon its removal. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact, memoranda of law and proposed recommended orders, which were considered in the writing of this order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in or are inconsistent with factual findings in this order, they have been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.

Recommendation Based upon the testimony adduced, the evidence admitted and after consideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation enter its final order directing the removal of the subject sign within thirty (30) days from the date hereof and without compensation to the sign owner. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Peirce Wood, Esquire 542 Hammock Road Melbourne, Florida 32901 Paul N. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.57479.02479.07479.24
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