The Issue The issues presented in This case are whether the Respondents committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and whether such acts constitute a violation of the statutes. Petitioner submitted post hearing findings of fact in the form of a proposed recommended order To the extent that the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Frank R. Jansen, is a broker salesman holding license number 0317199. The Respondent, Lillian LaCrampe, now Soave, is a real estate salesperson holding license number 0137930. In June 1980, Jansen held an individual broker's license in the State of Florida. In late summer of that year, he entered into an agreement with Flora Harwood, a licensed broker in the State of Florida and owner of Select I Realty. Under this agreement, Jansen and Harwood would form a corporation and participate in a brokerage company under the name Select I Realty, in which Jansen would open and operate a branch office of Select I Realty. The exact details of the corporation and the division of shares were not worked out between the parties; however, Harwood undertook to have a corporation formed the name Jansen and Harwood, Inc., and two attempts were; made to register Jansen as a broker with Jansen and Harwood, Inc., doing business as Select I Realty. These applications were rejected by the Florida Real Estate Commission for various reasons, to include the requirement that a corporation operate only in the corporate name and the failure of the applicants to submit corporate papers. The incorporation and application to the Commission were handled by Flora Harwood's attorney. The last denial of the application was on October 22, 1980. During the period the applications were being filed with the Commission, Harwood became disenchanted with the idea of the corporation because of her perception that Jansen was not cooperating with her. Therefore, after the second application was denied, Harwood did not take action to timely file a third application. Although Jansen was aware of the denial of the application, the evidence does not show that he was aware that Harwood delayed the third application. By the end of 1980, Jansen and Harwood had both independently abrogated their agreement, and shortly thereafter Jansen left the business totally. Until he left, Jansen continued to actively manage the branch office of Select I Realty, which he had established and organized and from which he conducted his real estate business as a broker for Jansen and Harwood, Inc. The policy of the Florida Real Estate Commission with regard to applications is that the applicant may operate if a license application is not returned. If the application is returned for correction and corrected and resubmitted timely, the applicant may continue to operate. If the application is not returned in a timely fashion, the applicant may not work. The failure of Jansen and Harwood to eventually incorporate, followed by the severance of their business relationship, intensified the conflict between them, out of which several of the allegations of the Administrative Complaint arose. On September 5, 1980, the Respondent LaCrampe contracted to buy for herself Lot 3 of Ozona Shores from Preston and Grace King. On January 5, 1981, LaCrampe closed the transaction with the Kings. At that closing, a check for $825 in commissions to Select I Realty was disbursed by the closing agent to the Respondent Jansen. Jansen deposited said check to his personal account. Flora Harwood asserted a claim to a share of the commission on the purchase of the property by LaCrampe. When Harwood discovered that this sale had occurred, she checked with the closing agent and found that a commission check had been paid to Jansen. She further discovered that Jansen had deposited this check to his personal account, and because the check was made out to Select I Realty Harwood had the bank take action to collect the $825 and pay it to her, which the bank did. Harwood's claim to the $825 was based upon an office policy applicable to employees which required that commissions on real estate purchases for investment purposes by employees of Select I Realty be shared with the office. However, this contract closed on January 5, 1981, after the relationship between Jansen and LaCrampe had been severed with Harwood. The competing claims between Jansen and Harwood to the $825 in commission are part of the severance of the business relationship between two persons operating as co-brokers. Testimony was received that in the operation of the branch office Jansen had authority to receive checks, deposit checks, and write checks. On or about December 10, 1980, Jansen participated in the rental of a condominium by Eugene Donahue from Glen and Mary Mitchell. The rental contract incorporated an option to purchase. Said rental contract required that Donahue pay $400 per month, $50 of which was a maintenance fee. Jansen received the first check from Donahue in the amount of $400, negotiated the check, and received a bank check in the amount of $350 payable to Glenn Mitchell and $50 in cash. It is asserted in the Administrative Complaint that Jansen received the $50 in cash as a commission payment to which he was not entitled. However, Respondent's Exhibit numbered 4 reflects that Glenn and Mary Mitchell here in arrears on their maintenance payment in the amount of $49.75, and the policy of Coachman Creek Condominium Association was not to grant any approval of lease or sales contracts until all maintenance payments were up to date. Respondent's Exhibit numbered 4 shows that approval of the subject rental contract was granted when Jansen produced the late payment. Several allegations of the Administrative Complaint relate to real estate transactions in which the Respondents Jansen and LaCrampe were involved with Heinz Lehman and allege fraud and misrepresentation arising from failure of Jansen to identify LaCrampe as his mother to Lehman. The first occasion on which Lehman met the Respondents was when Lehman visited a store in a strip shopping center which Jansen was selling as a broker. Lehman testified that Jansen identified LaCrampe at that time as a real estate associate and his "girl Friday." Lehman's testimony revealed that he knew LaCrampe was a real estate salesperson and an associate of Jansen but did not know that LaCrampe was Jansen's mother until after their series of transactions had occurred. Lehman did not buy the strip store but later purchased a condominium through Jansen and then sold it through Jansen after fixing it up. In November 1980, Lehman contracted to purchase Lot 3 of Ozona Shores (see paragraph 8 above) from LaCrampe. On January 5, 1981, after LaCrampe had purchased the property, she in turn sold the property to Lehman on the same day. In November 1980, prior to entering into the contract for the purchase of Lot 3, Lehman had visited Ozona Shores and had looked at several pieces of property. Thereafter, Jansen presented him with the opportunity to purchase Lot The evidence is clear that Jansen never identified Lot 3 on the, ground or by plat to Lehman. Lehman purchased the property without a survey and without reference to any plat. After he had purchased the property, Lehman found that Lot 3 was not tie lot which he though it was. At a later date, after being unable to finance a house on this property for speculative purposes, Lehman let the lot, 90, back to LaCrampe. On or about January 22, 1981, Jansen visited Florence Smith, who was interested in selling a house which she owned at 1550 Laura Street, Clearwater, Florida. Without obtaining a listing contract, Jansen thereafter advised Smith that he had a potential purchaser. On January 29, 1981, Smith contracted to sell her house to LaCrampe for nothing down and a $37,000 mortgage payable to Smith. Thereafter, Smith determined that she would prefer a balloon note, and LaCrampe agreed to a balloon note if the price were reduced to $36,000, to which Smith agreed. This slightly reduced the monthly payments to Smith. On February 12, 1981, LaCrampe contracted to sell this property to Lehman for $5,000 down, assumption of the second mortgage to Smith, and payment of a $1,400 commission by Lehman to Jansen. LaCrampe obtained modification of her contract with Smith to permit LaCrampe to assign her contract to purchase. In this transaction, Jansen did not identify LaCrampe as his mother or as a real estate salesperson and his associate. Jansen did not explain to Lehman that the money which Lehman paid down was to be paid to LaCrampe. On or about March 10, 1982, Leo Huddleston, an investigator for the Department of Professional Regulation, visited Jansen's office at the address at which Jansen was registered. Huddleston did not find the required sign at the office identifying it as that of Frank Jansen, a real estate broker. At that time, Jansen had registered as broker for Suncoast Investments and Realty, Inc., and was renting office space with telephone-answering and secretarial services in an office suite complex. Although the building directory listed the suite as the office of Jansen as a real estate broker, the office suite did not have Jansen's real estate brokerage sign. When this matter was brought to Jansen's attention, an appropriate sign was provided. In November 1980, the Respondent LaCrampe was licensed as a real estate salesperson with Jansen and Harwood, Inc.
Recommendation Having Found the Respondent, Frank R. Jansen, in technical violation of Rule 2IV-10.24, Florida Administrative Code, an thereby Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that Jansen receive a cautionary letter. Having found the Respondents, Frank R. Jansen and Lillian LaCrampe, now Soave, guilty of one violation each of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that their licenses be suspended for a period of one year. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 16th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Frank R. Jansen 108 Harbor Drive Post Office Box 247 Ozona, Florida 33560 Ms. Lillian LaCrampe Soave 114 Harbor Drive Post Office Box 247 Ozona, Florida 33560 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 0013099 0017680 FRANK R. JANSEN and 0021257 LILLIAN LaCRAMPE DOAH NO. 82-2891 Respondent. /
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for registration as a real estate salesman, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner field applications for registration as a real estate salesman with respondent on October 10, 1977. Question 16 of the application reads as follows: 16. Have you, in this state, operated, attempted to operate, or held yourself out as being entitled to operate, as a real estate salesman or broker, within one year next prior to the filing of this application without then being the holder of a valid current registration certificate authorizing you to do so? The petitioner answered "no" to Question 16. On December 8, 1977, respondent Florida Real Estate Commission issued an order denying the application based on its determination that the applicant had operated, attempted to operate or held himself out as a real estate broker or salesman within the one year period prior to filing his application. Petitioner thereafter requested a hearing in the matter. (Exhibit 1) Petitioner is the president of Marketing Institute Corporation of the Americas, Ltd. of San Jose, Costa Rica. (MICA) The firm operates as a real estate sales organization under the laws of Costa Rica, and is owned by Insco S.A., a Costa Rican holding company. (Testmony of McIntire, Figueredo) In 1975, petitioner became associated with William W. Landa, president of Costa del Sol, a condominium project in Miami, Florida. His function was to produce sales of condominium units as a result of sales efforts in Latin America. Part of the informal arrangement was the petitioner occupied a rental villa at the condominium project. His success in producing sales was limited and, as a result, the association was terminated sometime in 1976. In a letter to Lands, dated January 21, 1977, petitioner sought an accounting of expenses incurred in the operation and stated that he had produced three purchasers for which commissions were payable at the rate of "10% for foreign sales and 5% on domestic sales." Although no explanation of the terms "foreign sales" and "domestic sales" was presented, Landa testified at the hearing that petitioner did not sell in Florida for Costa del Sol. (Testimony of Landa, Figueredo, Exhibits 2-3) On December 1. 1976, the receiver in bankruptcy of the estates of Grandlich Development Corporation and Fisher Development Corporation, Fred Stanton Smith, president of the Keyes Company, Miami, Florida, Wrote petitioner and offered to pay his firm a 10% commission on "all sales closed by you of all Commodore Club Condominiums sold to your prospects." The commission was to be payable to MICA through its agent in the United States, Transcontinental Properties, Inc. of Miami, Florida, a corporate broker, The Commodore Club is a condominium project located at Key Biscayn, Florida. Hemisphere Equity Investors, Inc. was the registered broker for the sales of the condominiums and kept sales agents on the premises. Smith instructed Hemisphere to cooperate with foreign brokers in the sales of the properties. Petitioner proceeded under this arrangement to obtain and refer prospective foreign purchasers to Transcontinental who arranged to show the condominium units to the clients and consummate any resulting sales. Although petitioner had desk space in the Transcontinental office from September, 1976, to August, 1977, he was not supposed to show properties to clients or be involve in any real estate sales functions. In September, 1976, the president of Transcontinental placed a telephone call to respondent's legal office at Winter Park, Florida and ascertained that commissions could be paid to a foreign broker. However, he was informed by the Commission representative that it was a "gray" area and, although the foreign representative could serve as an interpreter for foreign clients during transactions in the United States, he could not perform any of the sales functions himself in Florida. Sales were made in this manner and commission checks were paid to petitioner's firm during the period January - September, 1977. (Testimony of Smith, McIntire, Figueredo, Exhibits 4, 5, 12, 13, 15) On July 1, 1976, Alexander Sandru purchased a condominium at the Commordore Club through the Keyes Company as broker. He was a friend of petitioner's from Caracas, Venezuela, and the latter had recommended his purchase of the condominium. However, petitioner was not in the United States at the time Sandru viewed the property and purchased it. Petitioner claimed a commission on the sale and it was paid to his firm through Transcontinental's predecessor company. A dispute arose over the payment of the commission because a saleswoman of Hemisphere Equity Investors, Inc. had shown the property to Sandru and assumed that she would earn the commission on any resulting sale. (Testimony of Lundberg, Nelson, Murragy, Exhibits 8-11) On several occasions in 1976 and 1977, petitioner accompanied Latin American individuals to the Commodore Club where a representative of Hemisphere showed them various condominium units. During this time, petitioner would inquire concerning maintenance charges and the like and transmit such information to the individuals in Spanish. Several of these persons were connected with petitioner's foreign firm and were not prospective purchasers. (Testimony of Lundberg, Figueredo, Exhibit 7) On January 30, 1977, Insco S.A. entered into a purchase agreement for a Commodore Club condominium unit. Petitioner signed the agreement on behalf of his firm MICA as broker for the transaction. However, the deal was never consummated. (Testimony of Figeredo, Exhibit 14)
Recommendation That Petitioner's application for registration as a real estate salesman under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, be denied. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of March, 1978. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard J. Mandell, Esquire 748 Seybold Building Miami, Florida 33132
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Nelye Bunch, is a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0315615. The Respondent, AA Real Estate, Inc., of Kissimmee, is a licensed corporate real estate broker, having been issued license number 0214153. In December of 1980, Grace Makuch, a licensed real estate salesperson, entered into an employment agreement with the Respondents, whereby Grace Makuch became employed as a real estate salesperson in the brokerage office of the Respondents. Pursuant to this employment, Grace Makuch and the Respondents entered into an oral agreement in which Grace Makuch would be compensated by receiving 60 percent of the selling broker's commission on every real estate sale she brought into the office. On or about March 6, 1981, Grace Makuch negotiated a contract for the sale of real property on Nova Road in Osceola County, Florida, between Earl Croft and his wife, as sellers, and Larry Henninger, as buyer, for $96,200. This transaction closed in April of 1981. The Respondents received the real estate commission due, in the amount of $4,810, and paid Grace Makuch $1,154.40. Under the employment agreement, Grace Makuch should have been paid $2,886. Demand for the balance due of $1,731.60 has been made by Grace Makuch and her attorney, but nothing further has been paid by the Respondents. In February of 1981, Grace Makuch negotiated a contract for the sale of real property on Donegan Avenue in Kissimmee, Florida, between Michael F. Sweeney, Trustee, as seller, and Dominick Tattoli and his wife, as buyers, for $115,000. This transaction closed in May of 1981. The Respondents received the real estate commission due, in the amount of $5,000 and tendered to Grace Makuch a check for $250. Under the employment agreement, Grace Makuch should have been paid $3,000; thus, she refused to accept the check for $250. Demand for the full amount of her share of the commission on this transaction in the amount of $3,000 has been made by Grace Makuch and her attorney, but nothing has been paid by the Respondents.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that license number 0315615 held by Nelye Bunch, be revoked. It is further RECOMMENDED that license number 0214153 held by AA Real Estate, Inc., of Kissimmee, be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 8 day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8 day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Richard H. Hyatt, Esquire 918 North Main Street Kissimmee, Florida 32741
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are, first, whether Respondent, a certified real estate appraiser, committed various disciplinable offenses in connection with three residential appraisals; and second, if Respondent is guilty of any charges, whether she should be punished therefor.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board ("Board") is the state agency charged with regulating real estate appraisers who are, or want to become, licensed to render appraisal services in the State of Florida. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department") is the state agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting complaints against such appraisers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Elsa Cartaya ("Cartaya") was a Florida-certified residential real estate appraiser. Her conduct as an appraiser in connection with the matters presently at issue falls squarely within the Board's regulatory jurisdiction. Case No. 04-1680 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1680, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisal of a residence located at 930 East Ninth Place, Hialeah, Florida (the "Hialeah Property"). Specifically, the Department made the following allegations against Cartaya:1 Respondent developed and communicated an appraisal report (Report) for the property commonly known as 930 E. 9 Place, Hialeah, Florida 33010. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On the Report, Respondent represents that: she signed it on July 27, 2000, the Report is effective as of July 27, 2000. On or about October 26, 2001, Respondent provided a "Report History" to Petitioner's investigator. A copy of the report history is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. On the Report History, Respondent admits that she completed the report on August 7, 2000. On Report, Respondent represents that there were no prior sales of subject property within one year of the appraisal. Respondent knew that a purchase and sale transaction on subject property closed on July 28, 2000. Respondent knew that the July 28, 2000, transaction had a contract sales price of $82,000. A copy of the closing statement is attached hereto as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. Respondent knowingly refused to disclose the July 28, 2000, sale on Report. On [the] Report, Respondent represented that the current owner of subject property was Hornedo Lopez. Hornedo Lopez did not become the title- owner until on or about July 28, 2000, but before August 7, 2000. On [the] Report, Respondent represents that quality of construction of subject property is "CBS/AVG." The public records reflect that subject property is of mixed construction, CBS and poured concrete. On [the] Report, Respondent represents: "The income approach was not derived due to lack of accurately verifiable data for the mostly owner occupied area." The multiple listing brochures indicate as follows: for comparable one: "Main House 3/2 one apartment 1/1 (Rents $425) and 2 efficiencies each at $325. Live rent free with great income or bring your big family." A copy of the brochure for comparable one is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 4. for comparable three: "Great Rental . . . two 2/1 two 1/1 and one studio. Total rental income is $2,225/month if all rented." A copy of the brochure for comparable three is attached and incorporated as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 5. On or about October 23, 2001, Petitioner's investigator inspected Respondent's work file for Report. The investigation revealed that Respondent failed to maintain a true copy of Report in the work file. On [the] Report, Respondent failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180.000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits to having received a request for appraisal of subject property indicting a contract price of $195,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that the multiple listing brochure for subject property listed the property for $119,900, as a FANNIE MAE foreclosure. On [the] Report History, Respondent also admits that she had a multiple listing brochure in the file, listing subject property for $92,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that she did not report the listings in Report. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits knowledge that comparable three was "rebuilt as a 2/1 with two 1/1 & 1 studio receiving income although zoned residential." On [the] Report, Respondent failed or refused to explain or adjust for comparable three's zoning violations. On the foregoing allegations, the Department charged Cartaya under four counts, as follows: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest conduct, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes.[2] COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having accepted an appraisal assignment if the employment itself is contingent upon the appraiser reporting a predetermined result, analysis, or opinion, or if the fee to be paid for the performance of the appraisal assignment is contingent upon the opinion, conclusion, or valuation reached upon the consequent resulting from the appraisal assignment in violation of Section 475.624(17), Florida Statutes.[3] In her Answer and Affirmative Defenses, Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 5-9, 11, 13-15, 17-19, and 23-25 of the Amended Complaint. Based on Cartaya's admissions, the undersigned finds these undisputed allegations to be true. Additional findings are necessary, however, to make sense of these particular admissions and to determine whether Cartaya committed the offenses of which she stands accused. In April 2000, Southeast Financial Corporation ("Southeast") asked Cartaya to prepare an appraisal of the Hialeah Property for Southeast's use in underwriting a mortgage loan, the proceeds of which would be applied by the prospective mortgagor(s) towards the $205,000 purchase price that he/she/they had agreed to pay Hornedo Lopez ("Hornedo") for the residence in question.4 In preparing the appraisal, Cartaya discovered that the putative seller, Hornedo, was actually not the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Rather, title was held in the name of the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"). The Hialeah Property was "in foreclosure." Cartaya informed her contact at Southeast, Marianella Lopez ("Marianella"), about this problem. Marianella explained that Hornedo was in the process of closing a sale with Fannie Mae and would resell the Hialeah Property to a new buyer soon after acquiring the deed thereto. Cartaya told Marianella that, to complete the appraisal, she (Cartaya) would need to be provided a copy of the closing statement documenting the transfer of title from Fannie Mae to Hornedo. No further work was done on the appraisal for several months. Then, on July 25, 2000, Marianella ordered another appraisal of the Hialeah Property, this time for Southeast's use in evaluating a mortgage loan to Jose Granados ("Granados"), who was under contract to purchase the subject residence from Hornedo for $195,000. Once again, Cartaya quickly discovered that Fannie Mae, not Hornedo, was the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Once again, Cartaya immediately informed Marianella about the situation. Marianella responded on July 26, 2000, telling Cartaya that the Fannie Mae-Hornedo transaction was scheduled to close on July 28, 2000. On July 27, 2000, Marianella faxed to Cartaya a copy of the Settlement Statement that had been prepared for the Fannie Mae sale to Hornedo. The Settlement Statement, which confirmed that the intended closing date was indeed July 28, 2000, showed that Hornedo was under contract to pay $82,000 for the Hialeah Property——the property which he would then sell to Granados for $195,000, if all the pending transactions closed as planned. Upon receipt of this Settlement Statement, Cartaya proceeded to complete the appraisal. In the resulting Appraisal Report, which was finished on August 7, 2000,5 Cartaya estimated that the market value of the Hialeah Property, as of July 27, 2000, was $195,000. The Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the house at the Hialeah Property was, in fact, constructed from CBS and poured concrete, as alleged.6 At the time Cartaya gave the Department a copy of her workfile for this appraisal assignment, the workfile did not contain a copy of the competed Appraisal Report.7 (The workfile did, however, include a working draft of the Appraisal Report.) The allegation, set forth in paragraph 21 of the Administrative Complaint, that Cartaya "failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180,000," was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. First, there is no nonhearsay evidence in the record that "comparable one" was, in fact, listed at $145,000 and subsequently sold for $180,000. Instead, the Department offered a printout of data from the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS"), which printout was included in Cartaya's workfile. The MLS document shows a listing price of $145,550 for "comparable one" and a sales price of $180,000 for the property——but it is clearly hearsay as proof of these matters,8 and no predicate was laid for the introduction of such hearsay pursuant to a recognized exception to the hearsay rule (including Section 475.28(2)). Further, the MLS data do not supplement or explain other nonhearsay evidence.9 At best, the MLS document, which is dated July 25, 2000, establishes that Cartaya was on notice that "comparable one" might have sold for more than the asking price, but Cartaya has not been charged with overlooking MLS data. Second, in any event, in her Report History, Cartaya stated that she had analyzed the putative asking price/sales price differential with respect to "comparable one" and concluded that there was no need to make adjustments for this because available data relating to other sales persuaded her that such differentials were typical in the relevant market. Cartaya's declaration in this regard was not persuasively rebutted. Since the evidence fails persuasively to establish that Cartaya's conclusion concerning the immateriality of the putative asking price/sales price differential as a factor bearing on the value of "comparable one" was wrong; and, further, because the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that an appraiser must, in her appraisal report, not only disclose such information, even when deemed irrelevant to the appraisal, but also expound upon the grounds for rejecting the data as irrelevant, Cartaya cannot be faulted for declining to explicate her analysis of the supposed price differential in the Appraisal Report. The evidence is insufficient to prove, clearly and convincingly, that Cartaya "failed or refused to explain or adjust for "comparable three"'s zoning violations." This allegation depends upon the validity of its embedded assumption that there were, in fact, "zoning violations."10 There is, however, no convincing evidence of such violations in the instant record. Specifically, no copy of any zoning code was offered as evidence, nor was any convincing nonhearsay proof regarding the factual condition of "comparable three" offered. Cartaya cannot be found guilty of failing or refusing to explain or adjust for an underlying condition (here, alleged "zoning violations") absent convincing proof of the underlying condition's existence-in-fact. Case No. 04-1148 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1148, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisals of residences located at 1729 Northwest 18th Street, Miami, Florida ("1729 NW 18th St") and 18032 Northwest 48th Place, Miami, Florida ("18032 NW 48th Place"). These appraisals will be examined in turn. With regard to 1729 NW 18th St, the Department alleged as follows: On or about April 29, 1999, Respondent developed and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the property commonly known as 1729 NW 18th Street, Miami, Florida. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On or about March 18, 2001, David B. C. Yeomans, Jr., A.S.A., and Mark A. Cannon, A.S.A., performed a field review of the report. A copy of the review is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. The review revealed that unlike it states in the Report, the subject property’s zoning was not "Legal," but "legal noncomforming (Grandfathered use)." The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that if the improvements sustain extensive damage or demolishment or require renovation which exceeds 50% of the depreciated value, it is likely that a variance would be necessary to build a new dwelling. The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that subject property has two underground gas meters. The review further revealed that unlike Respondent states in Report, subject property’s street has gutters and storm sewers along it. The review further revealed that subject property is a part of a "sub-market" within its own neighborhood due to its construction date of 1925. Respondent applied three comparables built in 1951, 1953, and 1948, respectively, all of which reflect a different market, without adjustment. Respondent applied comparables which have much larger lots than the subject, which is of a non-conforming, grandfathered use. Respondent failed to adjust for quality of construction even though subject is frame and all three comparables are of concrete block stucco construction. Respondent failed to note on the Report that comparables 1 and 2 had river frontage. Respondent failed to adjust comparables 1 and 2 for river frontage. The review revealed that at the time of the Report there were at least five sales more closely comparable to Subject than those which Respondent applied. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Yeomans Report") that David B.C. Yeomans, Jr. prepared in March 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Yeomans Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, and Mr. Yeomans testified at hearing. Mr. Yeomans disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 1729 NW 18th St, concluding that the property's market value as of April 29, 1999, had been at the low end of the $95,000-to-$115,000 range, and not $135,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraphs 6 and 7. The form that Cartaya used for her Appraisal Report regarding 1729 NW 18th St contains the following line: Zoning compliance Legal Legal nonconforming (Grandfathered use) Illegal No zoning Cartaya checked the "legal" box. Mr. Yeomans maintains that she should have checked the box for "legal nonconforming" use because, he argues, the property's frontage and lot size are smaller than the minimums for these values as prescribed in the City of Miami's zoning code. The Department failed, however, to prove that Cartaya checked the wrong zoning compliance box. There is no convincing nonhearsay evidence regarding either the frontage or the lot size of 1729 NW 18th St.11 Thus, there are no facts against which to apply the allegedly applicable zoning code provisions. Moreover, and more important, the Department failed to introduce into evidence any provisions of Miami's zoning code. Instead, the Department elicited testimony from Mr. Yeomans regarding his understanding of the contents of the zoning code. While Mr. Yeomans' testimony about the contents of the zoning code is technically not hearsay (because the out-of-court statements, namely the purported code provisions, consisted of non-assertive declarations12 that were not offered for the "truth" of the code's provisions13), such testimony is nevertheless not clear and convincing evidence of the zoning code's terms.14 And finally, in any event, Cartaya's alleged "mistake" (which allegation was not proved) was immaterial because, as Mr. Yeomans conceded at hearing, in testimony the undersigned credits as true, the alleged "fact" (again, not proved) that 1729 NW 18th St constituted a grandfathered use would have no effect on the property's market value. Paragraphs 8 and 9. The Yeomans Report asserts that "[b]ased on a physical inspection as of March 17, 2001[,] it appears that the site has two underground gas meters and there were gutters and storm sewers along the subject's street." It is undisputed that Cartaya's Appraisal Report made no mention of underground gas meters or storm water disposal systems. While the Department alleged that Cartaya's silence regarding these matters constituted disciplinable "failures," it offered no convincing proof that Cartaya defaulted on her obligations in any way respecting these items. There was no convincing evidence that these matters were material, affected the property's value, or should have been noted pursuant to some cognizable standard of care. Paragraphs 10 and 11. The contention here is that Cartaya chose as comparables several homes that, though relatively old (average age: 48 years), were not as old as the residence at 1729 NW 18th St (74 years). Mr. Yeomans asserted that older homes should have been used as comparables, and several such homes are identified in the Yeomans Report. The undersigned is persuaded that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value with respect to 1729 NW 18th St is probably more accurate than Cartaya's. If this were a case where the value of 1729 NW 18th St were at issue, e.g. a taking under eminent domain, then Mr. Yeomans' opinion might well be credited as against Cartaya's opinion in making the ultimate factual determination. The issue in this case is not the value of 1729 NW 18th St, however, but whether Cartaya committed disciplinable offenses in appraising the property. The fact that two appraisers have different opinions regarding the market value of a property does not mean that one of them engaged in misconduct in forming his or her opinion. Based on the evidence presented, the undersigned is not convinced that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if her analysis appears to be somewhat less sophisticated than Mr. Yeomans'. Paragraphs 12 through 16. The allegations in these paragraphs constitute variations on the theme just addressed, namely that, for one reason or another, Cartaya chose inappropriate comparables. For the same reasons given in the preceding discussion, the undersigned is not convinced, based on the evidence presented, that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if he is inclined to agree that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value is the better founded of the two. With regard to 18032 NW 48th Place, the Department alleged as follows: On or about August 9, 1999, Respondent prepared and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the Property commonly known as 18032 NW 48th Place, Miami, Florida, 33055. (Report) A copy of the Report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. On the Report, Respondent incorrectly stated that the property is in a FEMA Zone X flood area. In fact, the property is in an AE Zone. In Report, Respondent states: "Above sales were approximately adjusted per market derived value influencing dissimilarities as noted." Respondent failed to state in Report, that comparables 1 and 3 have in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent represented comparable 1 had one bath, where in fact it has at least two. In [the] Report, Respondent failed to state that comparable 1 has two in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent stated that comparable 3 is a two-bath house with an additional bath in the in-law quarters. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT V Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT VI Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 18 and 20 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Marmin Report") that Frank L. Marmin prepared in May 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Marmin Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Mr. Marmin did not testify at hearing, although his supervisor, Mark A. Cannon, did. Mr. Marmin disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 18032 NW 48th Place, concluding that the property's market value as of August 9, 1999, had been $100,000, and not $128,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 19. Cartaya admitted that she erred in noting that the property is located in FEMA Flood Zone "X," when in fact (she agrees) the property is in FEMA Flood Zone "AE." She did, however, include a flood zone map with her appraisal that showed the correct flood zone designation. Cartaya's mistake was obviously unintentional——and no more blameworthy than a typographical error. Further, even the Department's expert witness conceded that this minor error had no effect on the appraiser's opinion of value. Paragraphs 20 through 24. The Department asserts that two of Cartaya's comparables were not comparable for one reason or another. The Department failed clearly and convincingly to prove that its allegations of fact concerning the two comparables in question are true. Thus, the Department failed to establish its allegations to the requisite degree of certainty. Ultimate Factual Determinations Having examined the entire record; weighed, interpreted, and judged the credibility of the evidence; drawn (or refused to draw) permissible factual inferences; resolved conflicting accounts of what occurred; and applied the applicable law to the facts, it is determined that: Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not commit culpable negligence in connection with the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not fail to exercise reasonable diligence in developing the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that, in connection with the Appraisal Report relating to the Hialeah Property, Cartaya did commit one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2- 2(b)(vi) of Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order finding that: As to Case No. 04-1148, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I through VI, inclusive; As to Case No. 04-1680, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I, II, and IV; she is, however, guilty, under Count III, of one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(vi) and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix). As punishment for the violations established, Cartaya's certificate should be suspended for 30 calendar days, and she should be placed on probation for a period of one year, a condition of such probation being the successful completion of a continuing education course in USPAP. In addition, Cartaya should be ordered to pay an administrative fine of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a real estate broker should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the amended administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Yolanda Jean Ramsey, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0012364 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). When the events herein occurred, respondent operated a real estate firm under the name of Ramsey Realty located at 19940 Gulf Boulevard, Indian Shores, Florida. Her husband, Drew Ramsey, was a condominium developer but he was not a licensed realtor. Sandra A. Hawley (Hawley) was a licensed salesperson for Ramsey Realty from April 1981 until she was terminated by respondent on January 6, 1982. She was employed by respondent pursuant to an oral agreement and was to receive a 3% commission on all closed sales. This description of Hawley's compensation arrangement was not contradicted by respondent. Drew Ramsey was then developing several condominium projects in Pinellas County, and Hawley's sales activities were focused on the sale of those condominiums through Ramsey Realty. Hawley was described by respondent as being the best salesperson in the firm. From April 1981 through December 1981, Hawley recalled that her W-2 statement reflected $76,000 in commissions actually received. By the time she was terminated, Hawley represented that she had either closed on units or had firm contracts on other units to earn an additional $279,000 in commissions. Although respondent did not agree she owed Hawley any money due to various setoffs, the $279,000 figure was not credibly contradicted, particularly since respondent's records relating to those sales were allegedly destroyed or lost by respondent at about the time certain civil litigation was begun by Hawley. On January 6, 1982, respondent was terminated by respondent for cause. According to respondent, Hawley was delinquent in making payments to her husband for several condominium units Hawley had bought for investment purposes, and on one occasion, Hawley had not turned over to Ramsey Realty a deposit on a resale of a unit. She was also accused of bouncing checks. After she left Ramsey Realty, Hawley made demand for commissions still owed. Between January and June 1982 she was paid approximately $40,000 by respondent but received nothing after that. She eventually sued respondent in circuit court for the unpaid commissions and obtained a final judgment against respondent on December 10, 1987 for $76,000 plus interest, or a total of $118,618.88. To date, Hawley has been unable to obtain payment of the judgment. At hearing respondent acknowledged that a judgment pertaining to Hawley's unpaid commissions was entered against her and that no appeal of that judgment was taken. According to Ramsey, she has refused to pay Hawley based upon her attorney's advice. Respondent's principal defense against paying the commissions is that Hawley allegedly owes her and her husband substantial amounts of money which offset the earned commissions. Testimony at hearing revealed that these matters have been the subject of extensive and lengthy civil litigation between Hawley and the Ramseys. Hawley represented that she has prevailed in all court actions, and this was not contradicted by respondent. However, none of the judgments and mandates (if an appeal was taken) were made a part of this record. The principal offset relates to a lease-purchase agreement entered into by Hawley and her son, James Monette, Jr., and Drew Ramsey in June 1981 whereby Hawley and her son agreed to lease, with an option to purchase, a restaurant/bar known as The End Zone located on Dale Mabry Avenue in Tampa, Florida. On June 18, 1981 Hawley and her son executed a promissory note in the amount of $170,000 payable to Drew Ramsey and to be secured "by an assignment of commissions of even date herewith". The note also provided that "certain commissions earned by Sandra A. Hawley as a real estate salesperson for Ramsey Realty ... shall be applied as prepayments on account hereof." This was confirmed in a letter sent by Hawley to respondent on June 18, 1981. The letter authorized Ramsey to "pay one-half of all commissions which I have earned or will earn from working as a real estate person for Ramsey Realty to Drew Ramsey on account of the indebtedness under the Note until it is paid in full." The letter further provided that if Drew felt "insecure" about the note, Yolanda was authorized to "assign such greater percentage of (her) commissions to Drew Ramsey on account of the indebtedness until it is paid in full." Hawley admitted signing the promissory note but pointed out that she had earned enough commissions to easily pay off the note. She contended that the transaction was a ploy to allow Ramsey to retain all of her commissions and thereby deprive her of adequate capital to successfully operate the restaurant. Hawley further asserted that the transaction was later declared null and void in one of the civil actions between the parties because of certain fraudulent representations made by Drew in inducing her to enter into the agreement. However, the final judgment, which is the best evidence of the outcome of the suit, is not of record. On October 1, 1981, an agreement and promissory note was executed by Hawley wherein she promised to pay Drew Ramsey and his partner, George Karpay, $58,162.90 plus 18% interest for monthly payments owed Ramsey and Karpay on five condominium units Hawley had previously purchased from them. The note was secured by Hawley's commissions earned at Ramsey Realty. Hawley acknowledged that the signature on the documents was her own but contended that the documents had been altered after she signed them. On October 1, 1981, Hawley also executed an assignment of commissions whereby she agreed to authorize Ramsey Realty to disburse all commissions earned to Drew Ramsey and Karpay until the promissory note described in finding of fact 9 was satisfied. Again, Hawley acknowledged that the signature appeared to be her own but she contended the document was altered after it was signed. According to respondent, the commissions earned by Hawley were not held in the firm's escrow account. Instead, while Hawley was still an employee, such moneys were disbursed by the title company at closing directly to Ramsey Realty, and then Ramsey wrote a check to Hawley as commission compensation. After Hawley was terminated, the manner in which Ramsey received Hawley's earned commissions and their subsequent disposition are not of record. However, respondent represented, without contradiction, that they were not held in the firm's escrow account.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating subsection 475.25(1)(d) and that her broker's license be suspended for three years. The other charge should be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 1989.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Philip Marzo was a real estate broker licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, holding license No. 0217167; and Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., was a real estate brokerage corporation licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, holding license No. 0217166. At all times material hereto, Respondent Marzo was the qualifying broker for Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc. On May 9, 1981, Gladstone Keith Russell entered into a Service Agreement with All Cities Realty, Inc. Pursuant to the terms of that Agreement, Russell paid $75 in cash to Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., as an advance rental information fee in exchange for which All Cities Realty, Inc., agreed to provide Russell with listings of available rentals. On or about May 13, 1981, Respondents provided to Russell one listing, which listing was not suitable to Russell. No other listing information was ever provided by Respondents to Russell. Russell obtained his own rental within thirty days from the date of the Service Agreement. This rental was not obtained pursuant to any information supplied to him by Respondents. Within thirty days of the date that All Cities Realty, Inc., contracted to perform real estate services for Russell, Russell telephoned Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., to demand a return of his $75 deposit. The salesman who took Russell's advance fee was no longer employed at All Cities Realty, Inc., and Russell spoke with Respondent Marzo. Although Russell demanded a refund of his money, Respondent Marzo did not make a refund to Russell. When Russell spoke with Marzo on the telephone, Marzo, instead of returning Russell's money, used delaying tactics and attempts to keep from making the refund. Since his telephone calls proved unsuccessful, Russell returned to the All Cities Realty, Inc., office to obtain a refund from Marzo. Upon arriving at the office, Russell found that All Cities Realty, Inc., had gone out of business, and he was unable to locate Respondent Marzo. Russell has never received a refund of his $75 advance fee paid to the Respondents.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: Default be entered against Respondents, Philip Marzo and All Cities Realty, Inc., and that a final order be entered finding Respondents, Philip Marzo and All Cities Realty, Inc., guilty of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaints and revoking their real estate licenses. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Philip Marzo 2920 Missionwood Avenue, West Miramar, Florida 33025 Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board was and is the state agency responsible for the licensing of real estate appraisers in Florida and for the regulation of the real estate appraisal profession in this state. Respondent was a state certified residential real estate appraiser under license number RI 0000912, who was and still is in practice as a residential appraiser in Safety Harbor, Florida. On or about April 13, 1994, William Podolsky, Jr., a state certified appraiser employed by SMS, conducted an appraisal on property located at 4934 Bayway Drive, Hillsborough County, incident to a sale of the property. As a part of the addendum to his appraisal report, Mr. Podolsky recommended an inspection of the roof on the property be made to determine its estimated remaining life, but he was unable to do it. Sometime later, Ms. Levy, an employee of the Barnett Bank, which was i nvolved in the closing on the property, contacted SMS and left a message requesting the property be reappraised to include the roof because Mr. Podolsky, who had done the original appraisal, had not had time to get back and amend the appraisal to include the roof. Ms. Levy's message was given to Respondent when he got to the office about 1:00 PM that day. Consistent with Ms. Levy's request, Respondent, who was the lead appraiser at SMS, pulled the file on the property and found that Mr. Podolsky had done the original appraisal. Respondent claims he then contacted Mr. Podolsky through his beeper and told him the bank wanted a roof inspection. Mr. Podolsky wanted to know why and asked that Respondent call the bank and clarify the request. When Respondent called the bank he spoke with Ms. Levy who indicated it was because Mr. Podolsky had originally recommended such an inspection. Respondent asserts he again contacted Mr. Podolsky to report what he had learned. At that time, Podolsky reputedly said he could not do it at that time because he had to take his son to the doctor that afternoon. Respondent claims Podolsky asked him to do it for him. Podolsky claims he merely suggested Respondent get another inspection made. The fact is that Respondent, along with someone else from his office, went out to the property, looked at the roof, and, seeing new shingles, concluded the needed roof repairs had been done. He thereupon went back to the office and notified the Barnett Bank representative that the job had been done. He then notified Mr. Podolsky. Before checking the roof himself, Respondent advised Ms. Levy at Barnett Bank that Mr. Podolsky could not do the reappraisal as quickly as the bank needed it. He asked if the bank had any objection to him doing it and was advised there was none. Ms. Levy, at hearing, confirmed this, indicating she was satisfied that Respondent did the reappraisal and the work he had done was what the bank needed and was satisfactory, and the transaction went successfully to closing. There is no indication any defect was found in the title or the property and no financial loss was incurred by any party because of Respondent's action in issue. Before leaving, Respondent went to Podolsky's computer terminal and amended the appraisal report which Podolsky had entered into the computer to indicate that the reappraisal had been done. He did not sign his own name to the change and as a result, it appeared as though Podolsky had done the reinspection. This was not so. Respondent did not advise Mr. Podolsky of the computer entry. Respondent has at no time denied adding the statement regarding the reinspection to Mr. Podolsky's Addendum. He admits he failed to put his own name in the change, utilizing only the term, "appraiser." This was, he claims, an oversight and certainly not an attempt to mislead or confuse anybody. Nonetheless, when Mr. Podolsky found out that Respondent had made a change to his Addendum and had failed to attribute the change to himself, he reported the matter to his reviewing appraiser and supervisor. Mr. Podolsky was told the complaint would be handled internally and Podolsky was not to discuss it outside the office on pain of discipline. At that point, Mr. Podolsky decided to file a complaint with the Department and did so.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Mark D. Genua, be found guilty of a culpably negligent violation of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and, thereby, of Section 475.624, Florida Statutes, and that he be reprimanded and pay an administrative fine of $500.00. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mark D. Genua 2437 Navarez Avenue Safety Harbor, Florida 34695 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Avenue Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
