Findings Of Fact Richard K. Stander is the owner of Tom's Harbor Key located in the Florida Keys between Duck Key and Grassy Key. Petitioner seeks a permit to construct a private, non-income producing fishing camp for personal acquaintances and guests. The construction includes a wood dock 80 feet long by six feet wide with nine finger piers two feet wide and 15 feet long running from this dock to provide boat slips, and 1350 linear feet of elevated walkway six feet wide running from the dock area across the mangrove area to seven cottages to be constructed on the upland area of Tom's Harbor Key. Piling across the mangrove area will be implanted by hand auger or water-jetted in. If jetted, appropriate turbidity screens will be used. The pilings for the dock will be driven or implanted with a mechanical auger. The Department of Natural Resources reviewed the application and determined that since the proposed project is a private, non-income producing facility, a lease [from DNR] is not presently required. (Exhibit 3) The submerged lands where the dock and boat slips are to be constructed contain patchy turtle grass growth on an open sandy bottom. (Exhibit 4) Construction of the dock and finger pier boat slips as proposed will have no adverse impact on the flora or fauna in the area. The proposed walkway will cover approximately 2400 square feet (0.06A) of wetlands consisting primarily of red and black mangroves. Constructing this walkway over these wetlands will have no adverse effect on the plants other than the pruning which will be needed to keep the walkway clear. The proposed caretaker's house will be built over the wetlands area and it, like the walkway, will be elevated and will have no adverse effect on the plant or animal life. The cottages will be built on the upland area, and they, too, will be built on pilings with the bottom of the structures some ten feet above mean sea level. Petitioner proposes to use dry toilets in these cottages and remove all wastes to the mainland. Accordingly, no waste will be discharged into the waters adjacent to Tom's Harbor Key. Intervenor contends the proposed project is commercial in nature rather than private but presented no evidence to support this contention. Objections to Intervenor's attempts to infer error in the DNR determination made in Exhibit 3 were sustained as not relevant to the issue before this tribunal. Intervenor also inferred that the application was false because Petitioner stated in the application that the pilings would be implanted using a hand auger or water jet, while at the hearing it was learned the dock piling would be driven or implanted with a mechanical auger. This difference was satisfactorily explained by the testimony of the individual who prepared the application. Moreover, the harm to the environment by implanting the dock pilings by driving or mechanical auger would be less than if these pilings were jetted. It is Intervenor's position that because Petitioner erred in stating in the application how the pilings were to be implanted perhaps he erred in other parts of the application, and therefore the application should be returned to Petitioner for resubmission. Tom's Harbor Key is a pristine area accessible only by water. The wetlands adjacent to this site consist of flourishing mangrove forests, and the area is highly productive. Those opposing the permit applied for are residents of Duck Key, a larger key adjacent to Tom's Harbor which is accessible by land, and which, before its development and occupancy, was also a pristine wetland habitat. Although these witnesses opined that the proposed development would have an adverse impact on the marine habitat and on the birds at the site, no factual evidence to support those conclusions was presented.
The Issue Whether the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission ("FWC," "Respondent," or "Commission") properly determined that two (2) vessels owned by Jeffrey Sundwall ("Petitioner" or "Sundwall") were derelict or abandoned upon the waters of the state of Florida ("State") in violation of section 823.11, Florida Statutes (2018),1/ and, therefore, subject to the provisions of sections 823.11, 705.101(3), and 705.103, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant fact: Following the aftermath of Hurricane Irma in September 2017, law enforcement officers from FWC investigated what were categorized as "displaced vessels" found around the State that had been impacted and dislocated by the hurricane. Many had been ripped from their moorings, slips, or docks and floated away, driven by the winds and tides. Vessels displaced by Hurricane Irma included those that were either wrecked or sunken in waters of the State. Vessels that were left on the waters of the State in a wrecked or sunken state by Hurricane Irma were considered "derelict vessels" by FWC under section 823.11(1)(b). Following Hurricane Irma, derelict and displaced vessels were dealt with differently by FWC than derelict vessels would ordinarily be handled. For instance, ordinarily, derelict vessels would be left on the waters of the State while the owner was determined, located, and notified and the investigation process was completed. In the wake of Hurricane Irma, however, since there were so many derelict vessels that littered the waters of the State, particularly in South Florida and the Florida Keys, the State authorities chose to be more proactive and remove the derelict vessels from the State waters and store them for 30 days. After the hurricane in September 2017, FWC attempted to locate and notify owners that their derelict vessel had been located, removed from the waters of the State, and stored. The owner could either (1) retrieve the vessel during a 30-day window following notification, (2) waive their interests in the vessel and allow the State to destroy the vessel sooner than 30 days, or (3) do nothing. If the owner had not recovered the vessel or challenged the derelict determination after 30 days, Respondent would proceed with destruction of the derelict vessel. Ordinarily, the private owner of a derelict vessel is responsible for all costs associated with its removal and destruction. Despite this, after Hurricane Irma, the State assumed those costs. The law enforcement officers who testified at the hearing received training at the law enforcement academy to identify derelict vessels as defined by State law. Facts Relating to the Vessel, Cuki Following Hurricane Irma, FWC personnel determined that a vessel named Cuki was displaced following Hurricane Irma. It was found grounded and partially imbedded on the beach just south of Spessard Holland Beach Park in the unincorporated area of Melbourne Beach in Brevard County. The Cuki, is a 1974 Columbia 45-foot, two-masted sailboat. Depending on the level of the ocean tide, this area of the beach was rather wide and flat, and frequented by members of the public and other beachgoers.3/ An Incident Summary Report was prepared by Kelsey Grenz on November 21, 2017. The Cuki was first reported to FWC as grounded on the beach in Brevard County on September 19, 2017. Resp. Ex. 1. The facts, and reasonable inferences from the facts, indicate that when it was first reported to FWC on September 19, 2017, the Cuki was in reasonably decent condition.4/ See Pet. Exs. N and X. Respondent investigated ownership of the Cuki and identified Petitioner as the last documented owner of the Cuki.5/ Resp. Ex. 2, pp. 1-2. On November 15, 2017, Grenz and her supervisor provided written notice to Petitioner that his vessel, the Cuki (documented vessel DO564929), was wrecked and grounded off the coast of Brevard County, Florida, following Hurricane Irma. Resp. Exs. 1 and 2. The notice was hand-delivered to Petitioner by Grenz while he was in custody and incarcerated at the Monroe County Detention Center on several unrelated criminal charges.6/ Resp. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2. In addition to the written notice informing Petitioner that the Cuki had been displaced following Hurricane Irma, Grenz also provided Petitioner with a waiver document that would have allowed Petitioner to waive his interests in the Cuki, and allowed the State to remove and destroy the vessel at no cost to him. Resp. Ex. 1, p. 2. Petitioner was unwilling to sign the waiver.7/ By November 15, 2017, the vessel, although derelict and grounded on the beach in Brevard County, was still considered physically in the waters of the State. Resp. Exs. 5a and 5b. More specifically, it was below the high-tide watermark on the beach, and, at times, the normal tidal flows of the Atlantic Ocean washed up against and around it. Resp. Ex. 5. On January 16, 2018, Respondent, Law Enforcement Officer Bob Wehner, went to the location of the Cuki and recorded the vessel’s condition as he personally observed it then. In a short report, Wehner described the Cuki as follows: Vessel "CUKI" is a 1974 45’ Columbia Fiberglass sailboat that is beached on the Atlantic coast in the unincorporated area of Brevard County (N28.0454 W80.5462). The portside of the vessel is partially imbedded in the sand below the high-water tidemark on the beach. The vessel is equipped with an inboard motor, however, there is no shaft or propeller present. The vessel has no rudder, or steering wheel at the helm and no other means of steerage. The vessel is equipped with two masts. The mast at the stern of the vessel is broken at the base and suspended only by a single cable. There are no sails and the sail rigging is either missing or in disarray. The hatches at the topside of the cabin and windows on the portside have no covers leaving the interior open to the rain and wave activity. Resp. Ex. 3, p. 2. A detailed series of daylight pictures of the Cuki were taken by Wehner on January 16, 2018. The pictures generally reveal and show that the vessel: Was grounded on the beach in waters of the State. Resp. Ex. 4(a). The Cuki had cables attached to the sail that were tangled up, or in disarray. Resp. Exs. 4(a) and 4(h). Some of these cables and other riggings were supposed to be attached to the masts and were broken off. Resp. Ex. 4(d). The Cuki had seven (7) or eight (8) open hatches or doors on the top side of the vessel that were subject to wind, rain, ocean spray, and other natural elements. Resp. Exs. 4(c), 4(d), and 4(g). The Cuki was lying on its port side, pointing generally north with the bottom/keel area facing out towards the Atlantic Ocean. It was partially imbedded in the beach sand all the way up to the gunwale on the port side of the vessel. Resp. Exs. 4(d) and 4(e). Its rear mast was broken at the base, making the mast unusable. Resp. Exs. 4(f) and 4(g). It had no rudder or steering wheel to navigate the vessel when it was under power. The drive shaft and propeller were missing and were not connected to the inboard motor used to power the vessel when it was not under sail. Resp. Exs. 4(i), 4(j), and 4(k). The Cuki’s keel, necessary for stabilizing the vessel, was imbedded in the sand and was cracking and rusting where it was affixed to the hull. Resp. Exs. 4(l), 4(m), and 4(n). The vessel had no skeg to protect the rudder. Resp. Exs. 4(i) and 4(j). FWC hand-delivered a supplementary written notice to Petitioner on January 17, 2018. The notice provided Petitioner with additional details of the specific condition of the Cuki, as detailed above on January 17, 2018. Resp. Ex. 6. At present, the Cuki is still located on the beach in Brevard County, Florida. At some point in time when Respondent was prepared to remove the Cuki from the Brevard County beach as a derelict vessel, it determined that an order had been entered by the Monroe County Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. It ordered FWC, and other state entities, not to destroy, remove, alter, move, or otherwise dispose of the Cuki until certain that misdemeanor criminal charges filed against Petitioner were resolved.8/ Resp. Ex. 10. Apparently, this July 24, 2017, order was lifted when an Amended Order Granting State’s Motion to Reconsider was entered on January 8, 2018. Resp. Ex. 12. This second order specifically stated that FWC "may remove the [vessel] or the vessel may be removed by the post-Irma federal grant program." Resp. Ex. 12. It further stated that Petitioner, as the defendant in that criminal case, could "make arrangements, prior to the local, State, and/or Federal government removing the vessel, to have the vessel removed and stored on private property with the consent of the property owner." Resp. Ex. 12. Neither party did so.9/ Petitioner does not contest that the Cuki is "destroyed" or "abandoned." Sundwall also characterized the Cuki as a "carcass at this point." Rather he argues, in part, that FWC had a duty to maintain or protect the Cuki after it grounded in Brevard County. Facts Relating to the Vessel, Sea Myst Following Hurricane Irma, FWC personnel determined that another vessel, named the Sea Myst (documented vessel FL6220JX), registered to Petitioner, was displaced following Hurricane Irma. The Sea Myst is a 15-foot, fiber-glassed open motorboat. The Sea Myst was wrecked and substantially dismantled in the waters of the State in Monroe County. Resp. Ex. 8. When it was found, a visible water line stain and barnacle growth on the outside of the hull indicated that the vessel had been partially submerged or sunken in the sea water. The barnacles attached to the hull indicated to the officers that it had been submerged in sea water for an extended period of time.10/ Resp. Exs. 9(a), 9(b), 9(c), and 9(d). When it was first discovered, it appeared that approximately 75 percent of the Sea Myst vessel was underwater at the bow. Resp. Ex. 9(a). There was no outboard motor or other means of propulsion on the vessel. There was also no steering linkage with which to steer the vessel. Resp. Ex. 9(d). When it was first found, the Sea Myst was lodged alongside other derelict vessels, which were lying "stacked up" against the shore. Pet. Ex. W. To determine if a vessel is substantially dismantled, FWC commonly looks to three categories: propulsion, steerage, and hull integrity. Since the Sea Myst was missing both propulsion and steerage, it was substantially dismantled, given the conditions under which it was recovered following Hurricane Irma.11/ Post-Hurricane Irma Investigation and Collection of Derelict Vessels Following Hurricane Irma, the U.S. Coast Guard removed displaced and derelict vessels from the waters of the State that were not able to be retrieved by their owners, including the Sea Myst. Neither FWC nor the U.S. Coast Guard removed any vessels from the waters of the State following Hurricane Irma, unless they were left on the waters of the State in a wrecked or derelict condition. This included vessels that were submerged, partially submerged, beached, or grounded in a position where they could not be moved under their own power without mechanical assistance. All the vessels removed by the U.S. Coast Guard or the Commission were on waters of the State. Removal of these vessels was also necessary to prevent hazards to navigation. Following removal from the waters of the State, the Sea Myst, like other vessels, was put in a storage location that was monitored by FWC. This was to allow Sundwall, identified as the registered owner, an opportunity to receive notice of the vessel’s condition and to retrieve the vessel from the storage location, without incurring the costs of removal from the waters of the State. Resp. Ex. 8, pp. 1-2. On January 19, 2018, David Bellville hand-delivered written notice to Petitioner that his vessel, the Sea Myst, was damaged and displaced by Hurricane Irma. Resp. Ex. 7. In addition to this notice, Bellville also provided Petitioner with a waiver document that would have allowed Petitioner to waive his interests in the Sea Myst, and allowed the State to remove and destroy the vessel at no cost to him. Petitioner did not agree to sign the vessel over to the State. Petitioner testified that he is not the owner of the Sea Myst and that the Sea Myst had been bought and paid for by an un-named person and never collected. Petitioner further stated that he filed a Petition for an Administrative Hearing regarding the Sea Myst in error and that he felt the vessel should be destroyed with federal disaster/FEMA funds. Nonetheless, the more credible evidence indicates that Petitioner is still the titled owner of the Sea Myst, which is a derelict vessel.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner’s vessels, the Cuki and the Sea Myst, derelict vessels under section 823.11, Florida Statutes, and abandoned property pursuant to chapter 705, Florida Statutes; that Petitioner was obligated to remove his derelict vessels from the waters of the State and has not done so; that Respondent did not violate any responsibility or duty to protect, maintain, or preserve the vessels; that appropriate costs be recovered upon proper application and proof; and that Respondent may dispose of both vessels as authorized by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed yacht broker, committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994, and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been a licensed Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent resides in and has his principal place of business in Martin County, Florida. Respondent's corporation, Rampage of Stuart, Inc., has been licensed by Petitioner at all times pertinent to this proceeding. The parties stipulated that Respondent's corporation was, at times pertinent to this proceeding, doing business as Stuart Cay Marina, a fictitious name that had not been registered with the Petitioner. The parties stipulated that Respondent was guilty of violating the provisions of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994. The parties also stipulated that the appropriate penalty for this violation is an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00. James Withers began working for Respondent at Stuart Cay Marina in January 1994. At the time he began working at Stuart Cay Marina, Mr. Withers was not licensed under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Respondent knew or should have known that Mr. Withers was not licensed when he first became employed at Stuart Cay Marina. On January 27, 1994, Mr. Withers attended an educational seminar sponsored by Petitioner where the attendees received instruction as to the requirements for licensure as a salesman or a broker under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. The successful applicant must submit a completed application form, a completed fingerprint card, the proper application fee, and a surety bond. The Petitioner's processing of the application includes having the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) run a fingerprint check on the applicant. The attendees of the educational seminar were told that the application fee had increased from $538.00 to $539.00 as of December 20, 1993, due to a $1.00 increase in the fee charged by the FBI to process fingerprint cards. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers could not act as a salesman until after his license had been issued. In late January 1994, Mr. Withers applied for licensure as a salesman pursuant to the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Because the application form used by Mr. Withers reflected the old application fee, Mr. Withers submitted a check in the amount of $538.00 with his application and fingerprint card. There was no evidence as to where Mr. Withers had obtained this application form. Mr. Wither's application package was received by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office on February 4, 1994. The check for the application was deposited and the application forwarded for further processing. On February 7, 1995, Mr. Withers was advised by mail that his application was deficient since the application fee was short by $1.00. This letter, from the Petitioner's Yacht and Ship Section, advised Mr. Withers that the $1.00 was needed to continue the application process. Mr. Withers forwarded his $1.00 check, dated February 9, 1994, to the Petitioner to correct this deficiency. This check was received and deposited by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office, which is located in the John's Building in Tallahassee, on February 17, 1994. The Finance and Accounting Office released the application package for further processing on February 18, 1994. From the Finance and Accounting Office, the application package went to the Division Director's Office located in the Warren Building in Tallahassee. From that office the application package was sent to the Yacht and Ship Section located in the Bloxham Building in Tallahassee, where it was received February 21, 1994. Licenses are not completely processed until after the Yacht and Ship Section receives notification that the entire application fee has been paid. Processing of Mr. Withers' application was completed by the Yacht and Ship Section and his license was issued on February 21, 1994. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers had not received his license from the Petitioner as of February 18, 1994. 1/ There was no evidence that either man had reason to believe as of February 18, 1994, that the license had been issued and was being forwarded by mail. Both men correctly believed that Mr. Withers had substantially complied with the licensure requirements as of February 18, 1994, and that the license would be issued at some juncture since the only deficiency had been corrected. Mr. Withers represented Respondent at the Sixth Annual Miami Brokerage Yacht Show on February 18, 1994, where he acted as a salesman within the meaning of the Yacht and Ship Brokers's Act. Respondent permitted Mr. Withers to use his company name at this show. On Friday, February 18, 1994, James Courchaine and Peter Butler, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, located Mr. Withers at the boat show and inquired as to whether he was licensed. Mr. Withers told them that he had completed his application package and was merely waiting to receive his license in the mail. Mr. Butler thereafter called his office in Tallahassee and learned that Mr. Withers' check for $1.00 may have been received, but that the application had not been received by the Yacht and Ship Section and that the license had not been issued. Mr. Butler informed Mr. Withers that the earliest his license could be issued was Monday, February 21, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions contained herein, that imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, and that imposes an additional administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.06(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January 1996.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Harriet Stokes purchased the Largo Motel during August of 1967. The motel consisted of six (6) units with a boat basin and dock which adjoined the site. When the property was purchased, the boat basin was navigable from the motel to the open waters of Tarpon Bay. Tarpon Bay is a Class III water body. A representative number of Ms. Stokes' residents and patrons bring in trailered boats ranging in size, approximately fourteen (14) to eighteen (18) feet. Since approximately 1974, silting has occurred in the basin in the immediate area approaching the dock area. The silting has rendered the dock virtually unnavigable except in cases where boat owners are able to access the open waters by poling". Evidence reveals that a number of boat owners have broken their propellers attempting to gain access to the open waters of Tarpon Bay. Based thereon, residents are cautioned against attempting to launch boats from the dock area, which has resulted in a decline of Respondent's fish and pleasure boating guests (Testimony of Harriet Stokes). Johnny DeBrule, the Heavy Construction Superintendent for the Upper Keys Marine Construction Company, Key Largo, Florida, was consulted by Respondent Stokes for completion of the dredging work called for in the subject application. Mr. DeBrule gave his opinion that the subject project could be excavated with a backhoe equipped with a material handling bucket with minimal interruption to the adjacent waters. Richard Dumas, an Environmental Specialist employed by the Department since approximately November, 1977, conducted the initial field site inspection which resulted in the Department's first report recommending issuance of the permit application (Respondent's Exhibit 1). Mr. Dumas testified that he failed to consider the proper standards when he initially issued his first site inspection report which recommended approval of the project as applied for. Dumas was part of the inspection team which included Messrs. Michael Nowicki, Curtis Kruer, and Attorney Ray Allen. After the second field inspection survey was made during December, 1979, the team unanimously concurred that the project as applied for did not entail maintenance dredging and, further, that based upon an in-depth inspection during the second visit, the project, as applied for, was not permittable. Mr. Dumas's earlier recommendation which favored the approval of the subject project was prompted in large part by the policy consideration of the economic viability of Mrs. Stokes' motel enterprise. Michael Nowicki (Nowicki), a Dredge and Fill Supervisor employed by the Department in its Punta Gorda office, is in charge of processing short form dredge and fill applications. As part of his employment duties, Nowicki makes recommendations to the District Manager on short form applications and as part of this review process has reviewed and appraised approximately three thousand (3,000) dredge and fill applications. Nowicki was involved with the formulation and review process of the subject application. During the inspection on this project on December 10, 1979, the dredging was determined not to be "maintenance dredging" since the dredging "would occur in an area of exposed caprock bottoms situated approximately six (6) to nine (9) inches below the surface waters and would result in the destruction and elimination of the thriving benthic community" (Testimony of Kruer, Nowicki and Dumas). In this regard, during May of 1979, Dumas conducted water samplings in the immediate areas of the proposed project and noted that there was a very diverse and productive benthic algal community which was surviving on the nursery and feeding grounds supplied by the grass flats and natural shorelines (Testimony of Dumas and DER Exhibits 10 and 11). Subsequent inspections by Curtis Kruer corroborate this fact. Curtis Kruer, an Environmental Specialist received as a marine biology expert in this proceeding, performed an on-site inspection of the proposed project on December 6, 1979. Kruer made several probings in the area and found that natural caprock was present in the very shallow areas of the bay bottoms. He found that approximately 70 percent of the area was very diverse and highly vegetated. For example he found that the bay bottom is composed of approximately 30 percent benthic algae, 30 percent silt and organic detritus, and approximately 40 percent sea grasses. The most abundant seagrasses were turtle grass with a small amount of Cuban shoalgrass near the boat ramp. Kruer noted that the vegetated bottoms serve as nursery grounds for the area's marine community which consisted of several varieties of juvenile commercial and recreational fish and shellfish (DER Exhibit 11). Kruer noted that adjoining dredged areas immediately adjoining the proposed project have not revegetated and that there are thick layers of silt and organic materials on this site. He further noted that the project would conflict with the natural shoreline and that there were reasonable alternatives which would provide favorable and less destructive uses for the Petitioner's boat basin. Among the alternatives suggested by Kruer was a boat dock with piers supported by pilings of adequate depth in the project's bay bottoms (DER Exhibit 11). Finally, Kruer noted that the proposed dredged area contains productive vegetated benthic communities which will only revegetate, if at all, over extended periods of time (DER Exhibit II).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter its final order denying the application for a permit to dredge approximately 5,400 square feet of silt from the boat basin at Largo Lodge, Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Lucile Keely 5797 La Luneta Avenue Miami Florida 33155 Michael Egan, Esquire ROBERTS & EGAN, P.A. Post Office 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Ray Allen, Esquire William W. Deane, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jacob R. Varn, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether petitioners' development is entitled to a favorable determination by respondent under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes (1989), and thus is exempt from development of regional impact review.
Findings Of Fact PETITIONERS' EXCEPTIONS In its Exception No. 1., Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's determination that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that Lee County Sheriff's Office, or any other local law enforcement officials strictly enforce Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51. Petitioners' exception is not supported by the record. Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51, requires that a vessel must proceed at idle speed, no wake, within five hundred feet of a water oriented structure, such as a seawall or dock. If enforced, the ordinance would require that boaters on the channel who venture closer than five hundred feet to the seawall which fronts a part of the island's shoreline or a dock located several hundred yards south of the collector canal, which is the site of Petitioners' proposed project, be obliged to travel no faster than idle speed, no wake in those areas. The Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced was based on the testimony of Lt. Graylish of the Florida Marine Patrol. Lt. Graylish appeared as a witness for Respondent and testified as to his opinion as a law enforcement officer on the impact of Lee County Vessel Control Ordinance No. 90-51 on vessel speeds in Estero Bay. During Lt. Graylish's direct examination when asked whether the Marine Patrol enforced the ordinance he replied: Well, we have the power to do it. The hardest problem for us is what in fact is that 500 foot distance. It's really hard on the water to come up with that, and then we've got a lot of transient traffic that goes through that area from out of state during season and part-time residents, and it's very difficult to enforce that when you don't have an actual sign placement indicating what in fact the condition is. [Tr. p. 118, Ins. 15-24] The lieutenant's testimony was uncontroverted. Petitioners produced no competent substantial evidence to refute Lt. Graylish's testimony. Likewise in its exceptions, Petitioners have failed to present competent substantial evidence to demonstrate why the Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced should be rejected. Accordingly, Petitioners' Exception No. 1. is therefore rejected as being contrary to the evidence presented. In its Exception No. 2, Petitioners object to the Hearing Officer's determination that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel (i.e., Coon Key Pass). Petitioners state that the parties only stipulated that "Estero Bay is an area that is, at least, frequented by manatees" and cites to the Transcript in support of its position. [See Petitioners' Exceptions] However, a review of the statement in the record which Petitioners rely on and which was made by Petitioners' own attorney at the hearing demonstrates that the Hearing Officer was correct in finding that the parties stipulated that manatees frequent the channel. In pertinent part the passage states: At this time I would like to stipulate to one thing that was omitted in here [i e., prehearing stipulation], is that we do stipulate that the areas are Outstanding Florida Waters and Class II waters, Estero Bay, and they are waters that are at least frequented by manatees . . . (emphasis added)[Tr. p. 8, Ins. 18-24] The Hearing Officer's finding that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel, which is part of Estero Bay, is consistent with the parties' stipulation. The exception is therefore rejected as unnecessary. In its Exception No. 3, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that since there was no evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced, DNR could not reasonably determine that Petitioners' project would not have an adverse impact on manatees. The issue in this case was whether Petitioners were entitled to a favorable determination under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, that their proposed project was located so that it would not adversely impact Outstanding Florida Waters or Class II waters an would not contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. It was Petitioners' burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were entitled to a favorable determination. It was therefore incumbent upon Petitioners to present competent evidence regarding the enforcement of Ordinance No. 90-51. This Petitioners did not do. Therefore, Petitioners' Exception No. 3 is rejected as either irrelevant or not being based on competent substantial evidence. In its Exception No. 4, Petitioners allege that Respondent's committed two discovery violations. These allegations are beyond the scope of what is permitted under the rules which deal with exceptions to recommended orders; however they will be addressed. Petitioners claim they were prejudiced by improper testimony from the Respondent's expert witnesses, Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. Petitioners state that these witnesses "allegedly re-examine Petitioners' project area on the afternoon prior to the hearing and alleged the discovery of new observations and conclusions at the hearings." [See Petitioners' Exceptions] Petitioners claim that this alleged re-examination precluded any opportunity for discovery and that therefore, "no testimony relating to this site visit should have been admitted into the record." However, Petitioners raised no such objection at the hearing and by not doing so have waived any right to do so now. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure that would preclude an expert witness from engaging in a review of information to be relied on at the hearing prior to the hearing. Additionally, for clarification only, it should be noted that there is no evidence in the record which would have led Petitioner to believe that Pat Rose visited the site prior to the hearing. In Exception No. 4, Petitioner further alleged that the Hearing Officer should have disallowed the testimony of Lt. Graylish, because his name "first appeared on the prehearing stipulation (not signed by Petitioners) approximately 48 hours before the hearing . . . ." However, Petitioners' did not object at the hearing to the testimony of Lt. Graylish and furthermore, stated on the record in reference to signing the prehearing stipulation: due to our, I guess you would say our geographic differences, the prehearing stipulation was submitted . . . without my signature; and at this time I would like to on the record confirm that I stipulate to that prehearinq stipulation that was jointly prepared and finally submitted by the Department. (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 4, Ins. 21- 25] In addition to having stipulated to Respondent's witnesses, which included Lt. Graylish, Petitioners had raised this very objection prior to the hearing and the Hearing Officer had conducted a telephonic hearing on the matter. The Hearing Officer ruled that the witness would be allowed to testify at the hearing subject to Petitioners' objections at that time. A review of the record of the hearing indicates that Petitioners made no further objections to the lieutenant's testimony. Exceptions as to alleged discovery violations are improper pursuant to the rules and in this case there is no competent substantial evidence to demonstrate the existence of any discovery violations. Exception No. 4 is therefore rejected as being improper. Finally, at Exception No. 5, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's application of law to the findings of fact to support a determination that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating that their proposed project would riot "contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees." Petitioners allegation that this conclusion be rejected is based upon Petitioners' argument, discussed above, that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced. As stated in Paragraphs Nos. 1. and 3., any such rejection of the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Petitioners allege that the Hearing Officer's "sole conclusion of possible manatee impacts from this project was based on what he determined to be a lack of evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced. Petitioners have narrowly construed the Hearing Officer's ruling. There is ample evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Petitioners had not met their burden. In fact, the Recommended Order demonstrates that the ruling was also based on competent substantial evidence presented by Respondent that this proposed project demonstrated a potential for harm to manatees. In that regard, the Hearing Officer's conclusion was based on testimony from both Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. It was their testimony which led the Hearing Officer to conclude that a "favorable determination for Petitioners would not lie." The record is replete with evidence the Hearing Officer could have reasonably relied upon to conclude that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof. [See Tr. p. 118, Ins. 6-9; p. 156 p. 1; p. 158, Ins. 4-6; p. 158. In. 9; p. 159, In.18; p. 176, Ins. 20-23; ; p. 218, Ins. 20-24; p. 219, In. 40p. 316, Ins. 22-23; DNR Exh. 17J Accordingly, Petitioners' exceptions to Conclusion of Law No. 5., is rejected as being contrary to Florida law and the evidence presented. RESPONDENT' S EXCEPTIONS Respondent alleges that Finding of Fact No. 15., should be rejected in its entirety inasmuch as it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. At finding of fact No. 15, the Hearing Officer implies that the Petitioners were "somehow surprised" on June 7, 1991, while the parties were preparing the Prehearing Stipulation to be filed at hearing on June Il, 1991, to learn that DNR intended to take the position at hearing that the proposed project would likely contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area frequented by manatees. In support of this finding the Hearing Officer refers to a comment made by DNR employee David Trimble at his June 5, 1990, deposition, during which he advised Petitioners that based upon the October 17, 1990 memorandum from the Division of Marine Resources he assumed that the manatee issue was "resolved" in Petitioners' favor. However, a review of the record reveals that at no time subsequent to November 8, 1990 or the date on which the unfavorable letter of determination was issued, could Petitioners reasonably claim they believed the issue regarding manatees was resolved. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is not based on competent substantial evidence and is rejected. At his deposition Mr. Trimble was asked who was responsible for making the final determination decision, to which he replied: I evaluate them and make a staff recommendation to my superiors. (emphasis added) [Tr. 22, Ins. 24-25] Q. So you go with your feeling - from what the letters say and - A. Not from my feeling, I go with what the letters say. [Tr. p. 23, Ins. 8-11] Furthermore, Trimble's statement at the deposition that he believed the manatee issue was resolved was given only after Petitioners specifically asked Mr. Trimble his opinion on the matter. Furthermore, Trimble was qualified to give only his opinion as to whether the manatee issue was resolved, not the agency's position which was memorialized in the November 8, 1991, letter of determination. Petitioners' claim that they believed the manatee issue was resolved and the Hearing Officer's subsequent finding that Petitioners' claim was meritious can not be supported on the basis of Trimble's answer to the following question: Q. Was, in your opinion - - and this is your opinion as the reviewer of the request - - was the manatee issue resolved . . . (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 26, Ins. 8-10] Further, the letter that was issued under the Executive Director's signature did not indicate that the manatee issue was resolved, quite the contrary. In fact, the Prehearing Stipulation at page 17, stipulated to by both parties after, the deposition of Trimble listed the following disputed issue for determination at the hearing: 2. Whether the DNR correctly determined that the proposed 132 wetslips in conjunction with the existing 161 slips, will contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. In order to find that Petitioners were somehow surprised by this "newly discovered revelation" (i.e., that manatees were going to be an issue at hearing) the Hearing Officer improperly attributed more weight to the deposition testimony of Trimble thanit was due. Trimble was merely the conduit through which information on the manatee issue from the Division of Marine Resources passed. As he himself stated, he was the reviewer of the information - - he was not the final decisionmaker. Once having reviewed the material sent to him from the other divisions, he merely drafted the unfavorable letter of determination for the Executive Director's consideration. The Executive Director then reviewed the material and issued the letter of determination under his signature.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent enter a final order confirming its earlier determination of November 8, 1990, under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of August 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Facts admitted by all parties The water quality standards contained in Rule 17-3.111, Florida Administrative Code will not be violated by this project. There are no aquatic macrophytes located in the area of the proposed project. The proposed project is located within 500 feet of the incorporated municipality of Horseshoe Beach, Florida. The proposed project is located within Class II waters of the State not approved for shellfish harvesting. The project will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. The proposed project will be of a permanent nature. The project will not adversely affect or will not enhance significant historical or acheological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061, Florida Statutes. The rest of the findings The Applicant, Dixie County, applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock which would expand the existing public dock at Horseshoe Beach. In accordance with the revised plans dated October 23, 1986, the proposed facility would consist of a pier 6 feet wide and 120 feet long designed to accommodate six boat slips, each 30 feet wide and 40 feet long. The boundaries of the boat slips will be demarcated by pilings set 10 feet apart. Four of the boat slips would be primarily for the use of commercial fishing boats and commercial shrimping boats. The other two boat slips (the two slips closest to the land) would be reserved for the exclusive use of recreational and other small vessels. By adding a catwalk 3 or 4 feet wide down the middle of the two slips reserved for recreational vessels, the usefulness of those slips to recreational vessels would be greatly enhanced and the narrowness of the resulting slips would preclude their use by large vessels. Adding the two catwalks would be a minor addition to the proposed project which would greatly enhance the usefulness of the project and at the same time avoid the possibility that large vessels in the two slips closest to the land would impede ingress and egress at the nearby boat lift, boat fueling facility, and boat ramp. Adding a reasonable number of permanent trash or garbage containers would also enhance the usefulness of the proposed project and minimize the possibility of improper disposal of trash and garbage which is generated by the normal use of a dock by fishermen and boaters. The proposed project site is located in the Gulf of Mexico at Horseshoe Beach, Florida, and would extend into the waters of the Gulf, which is a tidally influenced water body adjacent to Dixie County, Florida. The water along the shoreline of the area is shallow for a considerable distance waterward, except where basins and channels have been dredged. The Horseshoe Beach area is relatively unpolluted. The existing public dock at Horseshoe Beach is used primarily by recreational vessels, but there is also extensive commercial fishing and Shrimping boat activity in the area. The project is located at the mouth of a canal with direct access to the Gulf. Several commercial fishhouses operate from the canal bank, which generates extensive commercial boat traffic past the proposed project site. Large numbers of commercial shrimp boats presently dock along the canal that ends near the proposed project site. The proposed project requires no dredging. The only filling required by the proposed project is the placement of pilings into the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico. Even though the plans do not specify whether concrete or wooden pilings will be used, this lack of specificity in the plans is irrelevant. Regardless of what types of pilings are used on this project, the filling activity will not violate the water quality criteria contained in Rule 17- 3.051(1), Florida Administrative Code. The placement of the pilings will not adversely affect the public health, safety, and welfare. Further, the proposed project will not adversely affect any property interests of the Petitioners within the scope of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The Gulf bottom in the area of the proposed project has already been disturbed. The presently existing suspension of particulate material in the water column, a natural occurrence in the area of the project, results in low visibility which means that seagrass beds and other marine vegetation, which provide shelter and detrital deposits for fish and other marine resources, will not grow. Coast Guard regulations prohibit commercial fishing vessels from depositing materials into the water within three miles of the coast line. Commercial fishing vessels must prominently display a sticker reciting that regulation and it is the practice of commercial fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of Horseshoe Beach to comply with this Coast Guard no discharge requirement by cleaning nets and scrubbing decks outside the three mile limit. It is not the practice of Commercial fishing vessels to deliberately discharge diesel fuel, fish parts or other material into the water while docked. Further, the limited number of commercial fishing vessels which could dock at the proposed facility at the same time cannot reasonably be expected to create discharges in amounts creating a nuisance, posing any danger to the public health safety or welfare, or violating the water quality criteria contained in Rule 17-3.051(1), Florida Statutes. Although small amounts of diesel fuel can become mixed with bilge water and be discharged by automatic bilge pumps while commercial fishing vessels are docked, there is no evidence that this would be in amounts Sufficient to create a nuisance or violate water quality criteria. To the contrary, notwithstanding a large amount of commercial boat traffic past the proposed site and notwithstanding the fact that large numbers of shrimp boats dock up the canal from the proposed site, the water in the area of the proposed site has remained relatively unpolluted. The proposed project will not affect the normal wind and wave action in the area of the proposed project. Such wind and wave action presently results in free exchange between the waters of the open Gulf and the waters near the shore. This free exchange of waters means that any pollutant discharges in the area of the proposed project will be diluted and rapidly dispersed into the Gulf of Mexico. There will be no measurable difference in the wind and wave action, or in the water exchange, after the proposed project is built. No harmful shoaling or erosion is expected to result from construction of the proposed project. Any docking structure extending out into the Gulf of Mexico will obviously have some effect on navigation in the area of the dock, but there is no evidence that the proposed dock will present a hazard to navigation or any significant interference with customary navigation patterns. The distance between the nearest channel marker and the waterward end of the proposed project is more than 200 feet. The angle of the proposed dock and its Spatial relation to the main Horseshoe Beach turning basin cause no impediment to navigation. The placement of Coast Guard Safety lights on the dock would minimize any potential for impeding navigation or posing a danger to the public health or safety during hours of darkness.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a Final Order in this case granting the permit applied for by Dixie County. It is also recommended that the permit be made subject to the following additional conditions: That one or more Coast Guard safety lights be placed on the proposed expansion to the dock; That catwalks be added down the middle of the two most landward of the proposed boat slips; and That a reasonable number of trash or garbage receptacles be permanently located on the proposed expansion to the dock to minimize the possibility of trash and garbage being thrown overboard. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1448 The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. The paragraph numbers referred to below are references to the paragraph numbers in the parties' respective proposed recommended orders. Ruling on findings proposed by the Petitioners: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: First sentence is rejected as appearing to be more in the nature of an introduction to a discussion of legal issues than a proposed finding of fact. Second and third sentences are rejected as repetitious Paragraph 5: Entire paragraph rejected as unnecessary speculative generalizations in light of the other evidence in this case. Paragraph 6: Entire paragraph rejected as unnecessary speculative generalizations in light of the other evidence in this case. Paragraph 7: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 8: Entire paragraph is rejected as appearing to be more in the nature of an introduction to a discussion of legal issues than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 9: Entire paragraph rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; construction of the dock may be expected to bring about some changes in the nature of the boat traffic in the immediate area, but nothing of the nature or magnitude suggested by these proposed findings. Paragraph 10: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 11: First sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence is accepted in part and rejected in part. Rejected portion is irrelevant. Third sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Fourth Sentence is accepted. Fifth sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as repetitious Sixth sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 12: Entire paragraph rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rulings on findings Proposed by the Respondent: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted. Paragraph 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected as unnecessary recitation of opposing party's contentions and not proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Accepted. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence accepted in part and rejected in part; rejected portion concerns riparian rights, which are irrelevant to whether this permit should be issued. Paragraph 14: Entire paragraph rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Accepted. Paragraph 17: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick M. Bryant, Esquire Moore, Williams & Bryant, P.A. Post Office Box 1169 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. Doyle Thomas, Esquire County Attorney Post Office Box 339 Cross City, Florida 32628 Ann Cowles-Fewox, Legal Intern Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Karen Brodeen, Esquire 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the City of Naples's (City) Waterway Marker Permit Application should be granted, given the requirements of Section 327.40, Florida Statutes (2005) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 68-23.105(1)(b)(3) through (6).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Eric Alexander, is a resident of Collier County and a licensed boat captain. He is the owner of a charter boat business operating in Naples Bay, in Collier County waters. The Petitioner, Douglas Finlay is also a resident of the City of Naples and a recreational boater. He operates power boats and a kayak on the waters of Naples Bay involved in this proceeding. The Petitioner, James Pergola is also a resident of Naples and resident of Collier County. He is a recreational boater and uses the waters of Naples Bay for recreational boating purposes. He is also a homeowner, owning a home adjacent to Naples Bay. The Petitioner, Allen Walburn is a resident of Collier County and a licensed boat captain. He owns a charter boat business which operates in the waters of Naples Bay and Collier County. The Petitioner, Collier County, is a political subdivision of the government of the State of Florida. It operates a boat ramp and county park area on the waters of Naples Bay for use by its citizens and other members of the public. Its Sheriff Department employees patrol the waters of Naples Bay seeking to enforce relevant boating safety and other laws and ordinances. The Petitioner, Marine Industries Association of Collier County, Inc. (MIACC), is a non-profit association of businesses which are directly or indirectly involved in the marine industry on, or near the waters of Naples Bay. The members of the association and/or its customers use the waters of Naples Bay in the conduct of their businesses, employment, and for recreational boating and recreational and commercial fishing purposes. The City of Naples (City) is a unit of local government. It has authority to adopt the ordinance which triggered the dispute involved in this proceeding, based upon Section 327.60, Florida Statutes (2005). The City thus has authority to adopt ordinances regulating the operation of vessels on waterways within the jurisdiction of the City, so long as such ordinances or local laws do not conflict with the provisions of Chapter 327, Florida Statutes, and any regulations promulgated thereunder, or with other state or federal law. The City thus adopted the relevant slow speed, minimum wake boating restricted areas (slow speed zones) at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent, FWC, is an administrative agency of the State of Florida charged in pertinent part with managing the navigable waters of the state and with the consideration of waterway marker permit applications filed and arising under Chapter 327, Florida Statutes, and the related rules promulgated in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 68. The Intervenor, Conservancy of Southwest Florida (Conservancy), is a Florida non-profit corporation. Its purpose is the protection of the natural environment of Southwest Florida, including advocacy, education and research. The Intervenor, Citizens to Preserve Naples Bay (Citizens), is also a Florida non-profit corporation. Its organizational purpose is to preserve and protect the bay by actively supporting efforts it believes will further that mission. In arriving at its positions on issues affecting Naples Bay, Citizens considers questions of physical, chemical, biological, and navigational safety. The Waterway Marker Permit Application Naples Bay is a water body located within the boundaries of Collier County and the City of Naples. It is an inland water body connected to the Gulf of Mexico at "Gordon Pass." Near the seaward end of Naples Bay on its southerly margin is a connection with Dollar Bay, which extends southward of Naples Bay in the direction of Marco Island. Naples Bay contains a federally-maintained channel used for navigation and commerce. Naples Bay is both a destination and a transit waterway used by local businesses, citizens, and tourists for recreational, business, and commercial purposes. It is used for a wide variety of boating purposes and interests, including commercial fishing, commercial charter boat operations, recreational boating, and recreational fishing purposes, as well as by institutional/scientific users. There are already vessel speed zones established on portions of Naples Bay. The City of Naples, however, adopted ordinance number 04-10664 (the ordinance) creating the additional slow speed zones at issue in this proceeding. The ordinance, adopted on November 17, 2004, establishes new slow speed zones or minimum wake zones in portions of Naples Bay, Dollar Bay, and Gordon Pass. The ordinance was adopted under the authority of Section 327.60, Florida Statutes (2004), which allows a city to adopt ordinances regarding vessel operations on waterways so long as such ordinances or local laws do not conflict with the provisions of Chapter 327, Florida Statutes, or rules promulgated under that chapter. In order to implement the newly adopted slow speed zones the city applied for a Uniform Waterway Marker Permit (Permit) from the FWC on December 23, 2004, in accordance with Sections 327.40 and 327.41, Florida Statutes (2004), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 68D-23. Section 327.40, Florida Statutes, provides that: Waterways in Florida which need marking for safety or navigational purposes shall be marked [uniformly]. . . . (2)(a) application for marking . . . navigable water under concurrent jurisdiction of the Coast Guard and the division shall be made to the division. . . ." (Emphasis supplied). Section 327.40, Florida Statutes, was amended in 2000 to provide FWC with the authority to adopt regulations to implement that statutory section. Florida Administrative Code Rule 68D-23.105 was amended by the FWC in 2001, pursuant to the statutory purpose of determining which waterways need marking for safety or navigational purposes. Since the time of that amendment the Rule (Florida Administrative Code Rule 68D-23.105(1)(b)), concerning the criteria for approval of regulatory markers, now provides that a valid vessel traffic safety or public safety purpose exists for "slow speed minimum wake" speed zones under the following facts and circumstances: The Division shall find a valid vessel traffic safety or public safety purpose is presented for ordinances adopted pursuant to Section 327.60, Florida Statutes, under the following facts and circumstances: * * * (b) For a slow speed minimum wake boating restricted area if the area is: * * * Subject to unsafe levels of vessel traffic congestion. Subject to hazardous water levels or currents, or containing other navigational hazards. An area that accident reports, uniform boating citations, vessel traffic studies, or other creditable data demonstrate to present a significant risk of collision or a significant threat to public safety. * * * Fla. Admin. Code R. 68D-23.105(1)(b). The previous rules, prior to 2001, contained no similar factual criteria to those now found in the above-quoted rule. There are actually six factual criteria in the Rule, but only criteria four, five, and six, quoted above, are at issue in this proceeding, as stipulated by the parties. The FWC issued a Notice of Intent to grant the permit stating that the FWC's Boating and Waterways Section found that the criteria in their referenced rule had been met. See City Exhibit 26 in evidence. In arriving at this Notice of Intent to grant the permit application the FWC did not, however, independently make a determination or confirm that any of the factual circumstances referenced in the above Rule, and, specifically, subsections four through six of the Rule, actually existed. Rather, FWC assumed that all the statements in the application were true and issued the Notice of Intent to grant the permit. Standing Collier County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. It expends county funds to provide for the patrol and regulation of safety on the waters of Naples Bay. It regulates Naples Bay through the patrolling of the Collier County Sheriff's Office. Section 125.01(j), Florida Statutes, grants the powers and duties to counties to "establish and administer programs of . . . navigation . . . and to cooperate with governmental agencies and private enterprises in the development and operation of such programs." Collier County also owns and operates the only county- owned boat launching facility on Naples Bay. Collier County citizens have the right to access and enjoy Naples Bay and the waters beyond Naples Bay through that access, including the Gulf of Mexico. Collier County has concurrent jurisdiction over Naples Bay and, like the other Petitioners, is concerned with recreation and enjoyment of use of the waterways of Naples Bay, including access to the Bay and adjacent waterways through traverse of the bay. The Petitioner, Eric Alexander is a resident of Collier County and has been for over 18 years. He is a licensed boat captain. He owns a charter boat business which operates in the waters of Naples Bay and adjacent waters in Collier County. He has recreational, commercial, navigational, and economic interests personal to him invested in the use of Naples Bay for both recreational and commercial purposes, as well as the access it provides to additional waterways. Naples Bay provides Mr. Alexander his only access to the Gulf of Mexico, where he takes his fishing charter parties in the conduct of his business. The proposed speed zones will have a substantial effect on his business and possibly his livelihood because the long transit times involved in the enactment of all the slow speed zones will tend to make his customers use charter boat businesses in other nearby areas that do not have to transit Naples Bay to reach fishing grounds, etc. His testimony of the substantial effect on his charter boat operations posed by the more pervasive slow speed zones was not refuted in the record. He established that his business will be substantially affected by the slow speed zones. The Petitioner, Douglas Finlay has resided in Collier County and Naples for over 10 years. He has been a recreational boater for that period of time. He has recreational and navigational boating interests in Naples Bay, including the access it provides to the Gulf and to additional waterways. He is particularly concerned that the proposed speed zone being moved from the protected area, out to the entrance to the Gulf at Gordon Pass, will adversely impact boating safety. The slow speed zone at that point will adversely impact safe boating operation because sufficient power and steerage provided by higher speed must be maintained to safely navigate the sometimes difficult wave, current, and wind conditions at the entrance to the Gulf. Mr. Finlay is directly affected in terms of his recreational boating and navigational interests by the imposition of the slow speed zones at issue. In terms of this concern, as well as, generally, the resultant long transit times through Naples Bay. The Petitioner, James Pergola resides on the waters of Naples Bay by owning a home on a canal that communicates with the bay. He has been a resident of Collier County for more than 29 years and is a recreational boater. He uses the waters of Naples Bay for all purposes related to recreational boating, including simply operating his boat on and traversing the bay when bound to other locations, as well as for fishing. The proposed speed zones will adversely affect the recreational boating use and trips Mr. Pergola takes on the waters of Naples Bay by substantially increasing transit times through the waters of the bay, a restriction he deems unnecessary from a safety standpoint. The Petitioner, Allen Walburn is a licensed boat captain and owns and operates a charter boat business. He conducts his charter boat operation in Naples Bay and adjacent waters of Collier County and the Gulf of Mexico. He has been a resident of Collier County since 1977. Mr. Walburn has commercial and economic interests which are intertwined with his navigational interests in operating his vessels in the waters of the bay. The restrictions at issue would adversely affect his access and the time of access through the waters of the bay, to additional water ways and to the Gulf. The proposed speed zones, and their adverse effect on transit times through the bay will adversely affect Mr. Walburn's charter boat business. Some days he will not be able to operate two charters in one day, which will substantially reduce his revenue. Additionally, his charter boat customers over time will tend to migrate to charter boat businesses that operate in areas other than Naples Bay and which don't have the attendant long transit times in reaching fishing grounds caused by the proposed speed zones. Thus, the Petitioner Walburn is substantially affected by the proposed permit regarding the slow speed zones, in terms of both his recreational and commercial navigational interests and economic interests related to vessel operations in the waters of Naples Bay. The MIACC is a non-profit trade association. Its members are made up of businesses which directly or indirectly operate in or are related to the marine industry in the vicinity of Naples Bay. Membership in the MIACC includes 60 or more businesses or persons located in Collier County. The members consist of recreational boaters, marina operators, yacht brokers, boat dealers, boat yards, marine construction contractors, marine professionals and charter boat businesses. The association members rely upon reasonable access and reasonable transit times to and through Florida waters and, in particular, Naples Bay. This is important to their engagement in commerce, including the selling, servicing, and maintenance of boats, marine contracting, charter fishing and general recreational boating. The members' market for their products and services, their revenues and the costs of their doing business depends substantially on reasonable public access, transit and safe use of the navigable waters in Naples Bay and the use of adjacent waters, which requires Naples Bay transit. Members of MIACC have lost some business in potential sales of boats and boat slip rentals, from customers who have elected not to locate boats or operate boats in Naples Bay because of the inconvenience caused by the speed zones. These additional speed zones have had the effect of discouraging recreational boating members or potential recreational boaters from boating on Naples Bay. At least one MIACC member has experienced several previous boaters placing their vessels with him for sale, ending their Naples Bay boating activities in the belief that the slow speed zones are, or soon will be, placed into effect. The members of MIACC will incur additional time and costs in conducting sea trials of boats they are placing into service or repairing. The proposed slow speed zones leave only a small area of Naples Bay where boats are allowed to exceed slow speed. Consequently, the proposed slow speed zone will force all boat testing to occur in one small area of Naples Bay. That fact alone will create more congestion and possibly a safety issue in that more confined small area of the bay. It will render more difficult the operation of the members' businesses, which are involved in testing boats and boat engines, and other operational systems of boats, when placed into service as part of a new vessel or when performing repair work on vessels. MIACC and its members' ability to navigate and conduct commerce in Naples Bay will be impeded by the proposed slow speed zones. They will substantially increase the time for fishing charter members to navigate to, from, and between fishing locations and will increase the time for recreational fishermen members of the association to navigate to and between their fishing grounds as well. The proposed slow speed zones will affect MIACC members by causing additional vessel congestion caused by excessively slow speeds over a longer distance, thereby potentially creating a safety issue. An additional and somewhat different safety issue will occur because the slow speed zones will reduce the maneuverability of the vessels moving at slow speeds, a different kind of safety issue than caused by vessels moving at excessive speeds, in terms of steerageway on slow moving vessels and the vessels ability to avoid collisions. The proposed speed zones will affect the members traversing Naples Bay by slow speeds increasing the risk of dangerous weather conditions. The corporate purpose of MIACC is to: represent and educate recreational boating citizens and members of the marine industry and its workforce in the promotion and protection of recreational boating as a traditional family and business past- time and element of commerce. It seeks to promote boating both commercially and recreationally as a source of business activity and tourism. It seeks to protect and enhance the environmental circumstances of Florida waterways. See MIACC Exhibit 26 in evidence. Its purposes are further to promote improved conditions on the waterways of Collier County generally, and improved operating conditions for recreational boating and the commercial boating industries as well. The interest of MIACC and its members in both commercial and recreational boating pursuits will be substantially affected if the relevant slow speed zones are enacted which would pose a significant restriction beyond the limitation already prescribed by state and local law. This is because access to fishing and recreational areas will require longer travel time, with more areas of interest to the boating public eliminated from reasonable use. This will have a negative effect on the manufacture, sale, chartering, docketing, equipping, servicing, maintenance, and operation of boats on the bay and adjacent waterways. The Intervenor, the Conservancy, is a Florida non- profit corporation organized in 1966 headquartered in Naples, Florida. Its purpose is the protection of the natural environment of Southwest Florida, including through environmental advocacy, education, and research. The Conservancy has approximately 4,100 members in Collier County. The Conservancy has conducted scientific research in Naples Bay for more than 20 years in support of its mission. It published the Naples Bay study in 1979, which was one of the first comprehensive studies of that estuary system. That study, and the research conducted by the Conservancy since, involves sampling of water in Naples Bay, primarily to monitor the water quality. Those samples are taken throughout the bay by the Conservancy staff, as well as volunteers. They usually employ a 14-foot Carolina Skiff type fishing boat to perform this work. During the course of its boating experience, conducting its sampling efforts in the bay, the Conservancy staff has encountered boat wake conditions which it believes threaten the safety of the small boat and its occupants which it uses for water sampling. It attributes those threatening boat wakes to the currently permitted boat speeds on Naples Bay and believes that slower boat speeds on the bay would make its research on the bay safer. The Intervenor, Citizens, was incorporated in 1988 as a Florida non-profit corporation. Its primary mission is to preserve and protect Naples Bay by actively opposing any projects or efforts which it believes will adversely affect the bay and by actively supporting projects or efforts it believes will help to preserve or improve the bay. Citizens considers the physical, chemical, biological, and navigational safety questions involved, in matters concerning the bay, upon which it decides to take a position. Citizens has been involved in issues regarding Naples Bay over many years, including the Naples Bay Project Committee upon which its president, Harry Timmons, sat by appointment. That committee investigated Naples Bay safety and made recommendations to the Naples City Council regarding vessel traffic congestion and vessel speed zones. Some 352 citizens members own homes on Naples Bay or on channels or canals connected to the bay. Both Mr. Timmins and Kirk Materne, members of Citizens, have taken positions before the Naples City Council on a number of occasions concerning issues regarding vessel speeds on Naples Bay. Affidavits, introduced into evidence as corroborative hearsay, support the testimony adduced by Citizens to the effect that there are members in addition to Mr. Timmins who own and operate boats on Naples Bay and are affected in some way by the issues concerning boating safety and boating speeds on Naples Bay. Both Mr. Timmins and Mr. Materne are boaters and have operated their boats on Naples Bay for many years. Levels of Vessel Traffic Congestion (Florida Administrative Code Rule 68D-23.105(1)(b)(4)) The applicant City presented the testimony of expert witness Andrew Anderson. Mr. Anderson is a Marine Consultant. Mr. Anderson is a graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and retired from the Coast Guard with the rank of Commander. He served as a boating and safety officer while in the Coast Guard and was certified as a 1,600 ton vessel master. He has captained vessels of varying sizes during his Coast Guard tenure. He has published articles and lectured on boating safety and has been recognized as an expert in boating safety, seamanship, and boating accidents in state and federal courts. He reviewed the City's exhibits, the depositions in this case, boating citations, accident reports, and Coast Guard commission records in preparing for his testimony. Mr. Anderson believes congestion is any situation with a sufficient number of vessels within a certain geographic area and, given the speeds at which they are operating, that there will be a risk of collision if any operator makes a mistake. He described an example he believed constituted congestion around marker 18, where four boats were coming into close proximity of each other, creating an "unsafe condition." Naples Bay's configuration more resembles a wide river than a bay. It is approximately 4.4 miles from marker seven, at the Gulf entrance to the bay, east and northeast to U.S. 41, the most inland extent of the bay. The bay is approximately one- quarter mile wide at its widest point. When Mr. Anderson observed conditions in Naples Bay by traversing it or a portion of it, he observed only approximately 20 to 30 boats. This was on a Tuesday afternoon for approximately two hours, some two weeks prior to the hearing; not as active a day for boating as would be a weekend day or a holiday. Mr. Anderson opined that he felt, "there is a problem with vessel traffic congestion, particularly at speed of 30 miles per hour." He believes that "the higher the speed, the fewer the vessels it takes to have a congested situation." Thus Mr. Anderson expressed the view that Naples Bay was subject to unsafe levels of vessel traffic congestion. The basis for his opinion, however, was a mere two hours he spent on Naples Bay on that Tuesday afternoon shortly prior to the hearing. Although he has a great deal of boat safety and operation expertise, as described above, he had not previously navigated Naples Bay for over 30 years until retained as an expert witness by the City. During his two-hour tour of the bay, he found the bay to be congested and yet only saw 20 or 30 boats. Mr. Anderson conceded that the limited question that he was hired by the City to answer for this proceeding was "would the ordinance improve the safety of the boating public on Naples Bay?" He stated that it was his opinion that the ordinance would improve public boating safety. He also conceded that an idle speed zone on the entire Naples Bay (not proposed by the City in the ordinance or the permit application) would also improve safety, implicitly even more. He did not concede, however, that such an idle speed zone restriction for the entire bay would be appropriate. Other subjective testimony, offered by the Petitioners, concerning assessment of vessel traffic congestion was provided by a number of witnesses who collectively have spent thousands of hours in navigation of Naples Bay at various times of the day, week, and year. Those witnesses, such as Captain Alexander, with more than 1000 hours per year navigation of Naples Bay; Captain Walburn, with more than 30 years operating on Naples Bay; Police Officer Ayers, who patrolled the bay five days a week for the last three years; and the Petitioners Pergola and Finlay, collectively testified that it was their opinion that the bay was not subject to unsafe levels of vessel traffic congestion. Objective evidence concerning vessel traffic congestion and representing an objective standard therefor, was presented by Petitioner MIACC's expert witness, Dr. Ed Baker. Dr. Baker has extensive site-specific knowledge of Naples Bay as he has previously conducted two vessel traffic surveys of the bay. These surveys analyze traffic patterns, numbers of vessels navigating the bay, and the inventory of vessels with access to the bay. His previous two studies were based on the level of service methodology (LOS) similar to that used with studies of automobile traffic. The LOS methodology was first employed and used in Naples Bay in a study by Heniger and Ray, Inc., a consulting firm commissioned by the City of Naples to measure boat capacity on Naples Bay. The LOS methodology is used to measure the capacity of a system, in this case Naples Bay, and the demand for its use of that system. The LOS for any particular system is an "indicator of the extent or degree of service provided by a system," and it indicates the capacity per unit of demand for the facilities. This methodology showed the carrying capacity of Naples Bay to be 528 vessels per hour (this is aside from the question of what level of congestion that represents). In a roadway transportation system, the relationship between road capacity and the number of vehicles on the road is described by letters A to F. Each letter represents a range of vehicles using the road in comparison to the road capacity. The A through F LOS categories are based on several operating conditions, such as traffic flow, number of vehicles, speed, and maneuverability. See MIACC Exhibit two in evidence. The Heniger and Ray study applied the same LOS methodology to boat traffic on Naples Bay. The Heniger and Ray study, as well as Dr. Baker's studies, defined A to F LOS categories as follows: Level A - represents a free flow condition in which there is little to no restriction on speed or maneuverability; Level B - a zone of stable flow but the presence of other boats begins to be noticeable. Freedom to select speed is relatively unaffected; Level C - a zone of stable flow; speed and maneuverability becomes affected at this level as a result of other boats; Level D - usually a stable flow of traffic, but a high density of boats cause significant restriction on speed and maneuverability; Level E - traffic in an unstable flow representing conditions at or near capacity of the system with speeds and maneuverability severely reduced because of congestion; Level F - traffic in an unstable flow with speed and maneuverability extremely limited by severe congestion; frequent occasions of no forward progress. Each level of service category is defined by increasing values of the volume to capacity ratio, such that LOS A described the situation where up to 15 percent of Naples Bay's carrying capacity is using Naples Bay. Therefore, under LOS A, up to 79 boats per hour would be using Naples Bay. LOS B would describe a situation where up to 27 percent of Naples Bay's carrying capacity LOS is using Naples Bay or 143 boats per hour. LOS C would describe a situation where up to 43 percent of Naples Bay's carrying capacity LOS is using Naples Bay or 228 boats per hour. LOS D would describe up to 64 percent of the carrying capacity, or 338 boats per hour using Naples Bay. LOS E would then equate up to 100 percent of the carrying capacity or up to 528 boats per hour using the bay, and LOS F would describe a situation where boats would exceed the carrying capacity or more than 528 boats per hour resulting in gridlock. The LOS methodology is an objective method by which to analyze vessel traffic on the bay established by the testimony and evidence elicited through Dr. Baker, as well as Dr. Staiger. Dr. Baker's initial Boat Traffic Studies and Models conducted in 1999 and 2002 concluded that at peak times Naples Bay is at an LOS A or B level on 10 out of 13 segments of the bay. Of the remaining three segments, at those times, the LOS level was C. Prior to the hearing in this case, Dr. Baker again conducted a study and survey of the bay to assess the current boat traffic situation. He described that his recent 2005-2006 analysis showed that the LOS for the bay during a weekend in September 2005, and a holiday weekend in January 2006, was at an LOS A or B level. It is noteworthy that the Collier County Manatee Protection Plan adopts LOS C as the acceptable level of service for Naples Bay. The Naples Bay boat traffic studies and Dr. Baker's testimony indicate that there is no unsafe level of vessel traffic congestion on Naples Bay. Major Paul Ouellette of the FWC, testified as to his finding that the permit application with its supporting documentation, and additional data, was insufficient to allow him to conclude that the new speed zones were warranted based upon an unsafe level of vessel traffic congestion. The City of Naples Marine Unit Officer who testified, Russ Ayers, has over three years of daily patrolling experience on Naples Bay. He found that Naples Bay is not subject to unsafe levels of vessel traffic congestion. The Naples Bay traffic studies, including those of Dr. Baker and Dr. Baker's testimony, are more objective in terms of applying an objective standard and methodology. The methodology is deemed to be acceptable for practioners and by practioners in Dr. Baker's field of expertise. Because of the more extensive opportunity for observation of Naples Bay and its boat traffic and boat numbers, this testimony and evidence and that of Major Ouellette, Officer Ayers and the Petitioners Alexander and Walburn, is deemed more compelling, credible, and persuasive, than that offered by Mr. Anderson, Mr. Timmins and other evidence offered by the City or Intervenors. Safety concerns caused by boat wakes, boat speeds, and careless, discourteous or illegal operation by boat operators, which cause safety hazards, or fears of safety hazards, do not equate to unsafe levels of vessel traffic congestion. The preponderance of the persuasive evidence establishes that Naples Bay is not subject to "unsafe levels of vessel traffic congestion." Hazardous Water Levels, Currents or Other Navigational Hazards (Florida Administrative Code Rule 68D-23.105(1)(b)(5)) The Respondents and Intervenors contend that the proposed slow speed zones are needed in the Naples Bay area because of hazardous water levels, currents or that the area contains other navigational hazards. The City seems to contend that boats which are accelerating or decelerating upon leaving or entering the existing slow speed zones themselves constitute "navigational hazards." While the term "navigational hazard" is not defined in the statutes or rules at issue, it has been defined by the U.S. Coast Guard in terms of "hazard to navigation" as "an obstruction, usually sunken, that presents sufficient danger to navigation so as to require expeditious, affirmative action such as marking, removal, or re-definition of a designated waterway to provide for navigational safety." 33 C.F.R. § 64.06 (2005). A "navigational hazard" within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 68D-23.105(1)(b)(5) equates in meaning to be the same as a "hazard to navigation" treated in the above federal rule related to the Coast Guard's jurisdiction. While boats operating under power might, under certain circumstances, (chiefly improper, careless, discourteous, or illegal operation,) be dangerous to the safety of other boaters or users of a waterway, they do not comport with the generally accepted sense of what "navigational hazard" means. It means a fixed object which poses a hazard to navigation of any or all boats operating under power or sail or human propulsion; examples being a sunken vessel, an oyster bar, a shoal, a stump or any other object which might pose a danger if struck by a moving vessel. Some witnesses, such as Captain Walburn, Dr. Staiger, witness Davis, and witness Timmins described such factors as a dock in the channel (encroaching somewhat apparently) between marker 21 and marker 23, narrow or serpentine portions of the Naples Bay Channel, and strong tidal currents in several areas, There is no persuasive evidence, however, to show these are anything other than normal physical complications to be contended with by a reasonably prudent mariner, operating a vessel in the areas in question. They do not pose hazardous conditions, in terms of water levels, currents, or navigational hazards. Thus, there is no preponderant, persuasive evidence that the area of the proposed slow speed zones includes any areas that are subject to hazardous water levels, currents, or contains other navigational hazards. This is established by the testimony of Officer Ayers, among others. Major Ouellette established with his testimony that the permit application with supporting documentation and additional data he reviewed was not sufficient for him to be able to conclude that the new speed zones were warranted because of the area being subject to hazardous water levels, currents, or because it contains other navigational hazards. Thus the preponderant evidence demonstrates that the proposed slow speed zones are not for areas that are subject to these hazardous factors. Whether there is a Significant Risk of Collision or a Significant Threat to Public Safety as Demonstrated by Accident Reports, Boating Citations, Vessel Traffic Studies, or Other Creditable Data Florida Administrative Code Rule 68D-23.105(1)(b)(6) The City adduced testimony from its expert witness, Mr. Anderson, as well as its other witnesses, as did the Intervenors, to the general effect that slowing of boat speeds on Naples Bay would render the bay safer for boat operation and traffic. Such testimony from Mr. Timmins and others, recounted anecdotal incidents where boating accidents occurred. Several of these caused injuries, boat damages, threw boating passengers out of their seats, on one occasion swamped a small boat, and caused another boat to take on water, due to excessive boat wakes of passing vessels. Mr. Timmins has boated on the bay for many years and does not feel safe or comfortable at certain times and in several areas in the bay. He described two places where the channel is significantly narrow and where he described what he felt were unsafe conditions caused by converging boat traffic, such as at the convergence of the Naples Bay channel with the channel entering into Dollar Bay. It is logical to assume that if boat speeds could effectively be substantially reduced or possibly the horsepower of boats or the size of boats using Naples Bay could be drastically reduced, or the numbers of boats using the bay substantially decreased, that Naples Bay could be rendered "safer." However, rendering Naples Bay simply "safer" is not the factual showing required by the above-referenced rule (or the legal standard imposed by it in order for the FWC to issue the waterway marker permit). Rather, the above-referenced sources of information, described in the rule, must demonstrate a significant risk of collision or a significant threat to public safety in order to demonstrate a need for the imposition of the slow speed zones. Accident Reports The MIACC entered its Exhibit 31 into evidence. Exhibit 31 is a summary chart analyzing vessel accidents occurring in Naples Bay between the years 2000-2004. It was prepared by the FWC. Major Ouellette of the FWC, in his expert opinion, concluded that while a total of 17 vessel accidents occurred over that approximate five year period, only four of them could be relevantly linked in their cause and effect to the boat speeds involved, such that new slow speed zones might have prevented those four accidents (assuming the operators involved were complying with the regulation). Indeed, most accidents occurred with vessels already operating in existing slow or idle speed zones or attempting to dock. The evidence adduced by the City and the Intervenors referenced individual reports of some eight accidents occurring over the five-year period, which they maintain are relevant, such that new slow speed zones might have prevented the accidents. Dr. Baker performed an analysis correlating the number of accidents to the number of vessel trips taken in Naples Bay, however. Dr. Baker's analysis using the eight accidents contended to be relevant by the City and the Intervenors, rather than Major Ouelette's finding of four relevant accidents, determined that there was one boat accident for every 67,500 boat trips in Naples Bay during that period of time. One accident per 67,500 boat trips does not establish a significant risk of collision or significant threat to public safety in Naples Bay predicated on the accident reports. Eight accidents over a five-year period is not a "significant risk of collision or significant risk to public safety." The City of Naples Police Department's Marine Unit is charged with enforcing regulations on Naples Bay. It monitors and compiles reports of boating accidents and makes yearly summaries thereof. If the Marine Unit identifies or experiences a significant risk of collision or threat to public safety due to accidents, then additional enforcement action will be taken such as dispatching additional officers to patrol the bay, changes in their schedules or other efforts to reduce the risk or threat concerning collision or public safety. No such action has been taken by the Marine Unit in terms of additional enforcement efforts because, as established by Lt. Traczyk, it experienced no significant risk of collisions or treats to public safety. If such additional enforcement actions were taken and they did not successfully reduce the risk of collision or threats to public safety, the police department's Marine Unit would inform its superiors, such as the chief of police or other officials, that additional measures, such as more stringent regulations, were needed. The City police department, through Chief Moore, however, has not informed or notified the City manager, City counsel or other City officials that additional regulations were needed to address any safety issues on Naples Bay. It did not deem such issues to be significant enough. No Marine Unit Officers have informed their commanders that safety issues existed on the bay because of accidents or congestion of boats. The police department therefore has never suggested or recommended additional speed zones because of accidents or vessel traffic congestion or significant risk of collision or threats to public safety. Major Ouellette established, with his expert testimony, that the accident data did not demonstrate "a significant risk of collision or significant threat to public safety." Thus, the preponderance of persuasive evidence regarding accident data and experience on Naples Bay does not demonstrate that a significant risk of collision or significant threat to public safety exists on the bay. Boating Citations An analysis of the boating citations found approximately 180 citations issued per calendar year for the bay. The vast majority of these citations were issued for vessels violating existing slow speed or idle speed zones. Since the vast majority of citations are issued for violators operating their vessels in existing slow speed, minimal wake or idle speed zones it cannot logically be concluded that the addition of speed zones would reduce boat operators' violations of boating speed limits, whether of the present ones or those proposed. Thus, it has not been established how the fact of the boating citations, in evidence, served to demonstrate a significant risk of collision or a significant threat to public safety, implicating a need for additional speed zones. The fact of the boating citations may demonstrate an enforcement issue or a boat operator education issue, but they do not demonstrate a need for additional speed zones. In fact, to the contrary, Major Ouelette, in his expert opinion, which is accepted, established that boating citations were insufficient to support a conclusion that new slow speed zones were needed. Vessel Traffic Studies As found above, Dr. Baker's testimony and his vessel traffic studies and analysis demonstrate that Naples Bay is operating below its capacity and essentially at LOS A and B. Thus the vessel traffic studies in evidence do not demonstrate "a significant risk of collision or significant treat to public safety" on Naples Bay. Whether "Other Creditable Data" Represents a "Significant Risk of Collision or a Significant Threat to Public Safety" The City's expert witness, Andrew Anderson, opined, based upon his review of the permit application and its supporting data, coupled with only a two-hour observation and experience of conditions on Naples Bay, that the areas proposed for the pertinent speed zones did present a significant risk of collision or significant threat to public safety. The City's own Marine Unit police officer, Russ Ayers, has had more than three years' experience of daily patrols on the water on Naples Bay. He found no significant safety issues on Naples Bay, nor any significant risk of collision or threat to public safety on the bay. Additionally, the Petitioner's witnesses, Police Chief Moore and Lt. Traczyck, determined that there were no significant safety issues on Naples Bay and that a significant risk of collision or of a threat to public safety did not exist. These witnesses established that if the Police Department Marine Unit personnel identify or observe a significant risk of collision or threat to public safety then additional enforcement action or additional regulation would be taken, as found above, in order to alleviate the risk. The Marine Unit has not seen fit, due to its observances, to embark on such additional enforcement actions. Additionally, two Collier County Sheriff's Department Marine Unit Deputies, Rocco Marion and Joe Scalora have extensive experience operating and observing boat traffic and Marine conditions on Naples Bay. They have found no significant risk of collision or significant threat to public safety on Naples Bay. Because it was based upon thousands of hours operating vessels on Naples Bay, at all times of the day, week and year, the testimony of Capt. Alexander established that the bay does not experience a significant risk of collision or threat to public safety. His testimony is corroborated by that of Major Ouelette, as found above. In summary, the testimony and evidence adduced by the Petitioners is more credible, persuasive, and compelling than that of the Respondents and Intervenors. It is accepted as the most "creditable data" in establishing that the proposed slow speed zones are not in areas where accident reports, uniform boating citations, vessel traffic studies, or other creditable data demonstrate a significant risk of collision or significant risk to public safety.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: that a final order be entered by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission denying the subject waterway marker permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2006 Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Elise M. Matthes, Esquire Captain Allen Richards, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Frank E. Matthews, Esquire Kent Safriet, Esquire Hopping, Green & Sams, P.A. 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6526 Douglas Finlay 3430 Gulf Shore Boulevard North, No. 5H Naples, Florida 34103-3681 Jeffrey A. Klatzkow, Esquire Colleen M. Greene, Esquire Collier County Attorney's Office 3301 East Tamiami Trail Naples, Florida 34112-4902 Allen Walburn 678 14th Avenue South Naples, Florida 34102-7116 Eric Alexander 654 Squire Circle Naples, Florida 34101-8352 Jack Hall 2675 Bayview Drive Naples, Florida 34112-5825 James Pergola 1830 Kingfish Road Naples, Florida 34102-1533 Dave Sirkos 750 River Point Drive Naples, Florida 34102-1400 Mimi S. Wolok, Esquire 1112 Trial Terrace Drive Naples, Florida 34103-2306 Robert G. Menzies, Esquire James D. Fox, Esquire Roetzel & Andress 850 Park Shore Drive, Suite 300 Naples, Florida 34103 Ralf G. Brookes, Esquire 1217 East Cape Coral Parkway, Suite 107 Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Michael R.N. McDonnell, Esquire McDonnell Trial Lawyers 5150 Tamiami Trial North, Suite 501 Naples, Florida 34103 Ken Haddad, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 James V. Antista, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, George E. Feld, held certified general contractor license number CG C021801 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. Feld has been a licensed contractor in Florida since June 1982. He has qualified George E. Feld and Associates, Inc. under his license and operates the business at 2131 Northeast 205th Street, North Miami Beach, Florida. After submitting the low bid, on or about March 1, 1985 George Feld and Associates, Inc. entered into a contract with the City of Tamarac to construct a 5,500 square foot recreation building for the City. The negotiated contract price was $195,950. The contract called for commencement of the project within ten days after the contract was signed and completion by July 27, 1985. Sometime prior to March 20, 1985, Feld met one David P. McCall and Marvin Weiss at a motel in North Miami. McCall was interested in doing work on the Tamarac project. He gave Feld a business card with the name "Arrow Head Development Corporation, Inc." printed on it, and which stated the firm was "state certified" and "licensed" as a general contractor. Feld also noted that Weiss held a general contractor's license, and he assumed that McCall and Weiss were working together. Relying on McCall's card, and later representations by McCall, but without checking with petitioner's office to verify if McCall or Arrow Head were licensed or qualified, Feld agreed to subcontract out the shell and sewer work on the Tamarac project to Arrow Head. To this end, Feld and Arrow Head entered into two contracts on March 20, 1985, for Arrow Head to perform the shell and sewer work. On June 21, 1985 McCall submitted a written "proposal" to Feld for the shell work on the job. The proposal had the following words and numbers typed on its face: "State License Number: #CGC 05961." It was not disclosed whose license number this was. Although McCall denied typing this document (because he does not personally know how to type), he did not deny that it was placed on the document at his direction or with his knowledge. It was not until sometime later that Feld learned that Arrow Head was not qualified by any licensee. Because of his mistaken belief that Arrow Head was qualified, Feld had never qualified that firm. Even so, there was no evidence that Feld intended to allow an unqualified firm to perform the work. Work proceeded on a timely basis as required by the contract. Feld visited the job site daily, and supervised all activities, including those performed by McCall. He routinely inspected the work, verified that it was being done according to specifications, and made corrections where needed. The job specifications called for trusses that were over forty feet in length. Because of this, and pursuant to the South Florida Building Code (Code), it was necessary for the City to hire an engineer to oversee their installation. The City hired one George Fink as engineer to supervise this phase of the project. However, Fink's responsibility was limited to just that, and once the installation was completed, Feld resumed responsibility for the remainder of the job. Trusses are a manufactured roof member and may vary in length, height and pitch. In this case, they were designed in the form of a cathedral roof, and were in excess of forty-seven feet in length. Further, because of the building's design, there were a number of trusses to be installed. The installation of the trusses was begun around 9:00 a.m. on Friday, June 27, 1985 and finished by 2:00 p.m. that same day. As required by the Code, Fink was present and supervised the installation of the trusses on the top of the shell. He confirmed at hearing that they were properly installed. The problem herein arose early that day when Fink had noticed that the building plans did not provide for lateral bracing of the trusses. However, according to Fink, this was not unusual since plans do not normally provide for lateral bracing. Even so, Fink told an unnamed person who "appeared to be the fellow running the erection crew" that lateral bracing should be added to the center and two side core members and that the four trusses on each end needed additional bracing. Fink also suggested to this unnamed individual that sheathing be added "as soon as possible" to the top and outside of the trusses to give added stability and protect them from wind damage and the like. In this regard, at hearing Fink conceded that it was "reasonable" for a contractor to erect trusses one day, and to place sheathing on them the following work day. Fink thought sheathing to be particularly necessary on this job since the trusses were high pitched," "long in length," and there were "no gables or anything in between to ... add any other support." By the end of the work day, the crew had placed the proper bracing on the trusses. However, no sheathing was applied. According to Fink, who was accepted as an expert in this proceeding, a prudent and competent contractor would be aware of the need for sheathing and added bracing because of the potential hazard of high winds caused by late afternoon thunderstorms in South Florida. By failing to place sheathing on the roof, Fink opined that Feld was grossly negligent and incompetent in the practice of construction on the Tamarac project. Sometime on late Sunday night or early Monday morning, most of the trusses on the roof collapsed. Some fell on an electrical wire running to the building. However, no injuries occurred. Only five trusses on the north side of the building remained in place. The City of Tamarac then filed a complaint with petitioner against Feld. The cause of the collapse was not disclosed, and even Fink was unable to state that the lack of sheathing was the cause of the accident. There was no evidence that strong winds or thunderstorms occurred on the night the trusses fell, or that bad weather was predicted when the work day ended on Friday afternoon. Feld acknowledged that no sheathing was placed on the trusses. He attributed this to the fact that the construction crew stopped work at 3:30 on Friday afternoon, and did not return to the job site until the following Monday morning. He intended to install the sheathing the following Monday but by then it was too late. This was in accord with the standard enunciated by Fink that it was not unreasonable for a contractor to erect trusses one day, and to place sheathing on them the following work day. Feld also stated that he was well aware of the need for bracing and sheathing on trusses by virtue of his long experience in the construction business. Feld hinted, but did not prove, that McCall may have been responsible for the accident because of bad blood between the two. In any event, he doubted that wind would have caused the trusses in question to fall. Finally, Feld pointed out that, even though city inspectors were present, no one had come to him on Friday afternoon and said the trusses might collapse over the weekend without sheathing. Feld is a graduate of the University of Buenos Aires with a degree in architecture, and has been engaged in the construction/architecture business for twenty-two years. He presently is an instructor of construction at Miami-Dade Community College. There is no evidence he has ever been the subject of a disciplinary action by the Board on any other occasion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint against George E. Feld be DISMISSED, with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of April, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1987.
