The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment action based on Petitioner's race.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Maderazo is of the Asian race. Davis, Inc., is a corporation doing business in Florida and employed from 200 to 240 persons, during times pertinent, in four restaurants in Okaloosa County, Florida. Charles W. Davis is the owner and president of Davis, Inc. Mr. Maderazo was employed by Davis, Inc., for a total of about 12 years. He was first hired as a crew person in Mary Esther, Florida in 1993. It was during his employment as a crew person that Davis, Inc., management became aware of him. In 1994 Mr. Maderazo terminated his employment with Davis, Inc., and moved to California. Davis, Inc., rehired him when he returned in 1996. Mr. Maderazo was promoted several times within the Davis, Inc., organization until he reached the position of store manager in Niceville, at McDonalds No. 26203. During the course of this upward mobility, he was sent to various schools by Davis, Inc., which the corporation funded, including a course at McDonald Corporation's Hamburger University in Chicago, Illinois. A store manager at a McDonalds restaurant is charged with supervising workers; ordering supplies; maintaining a clean and orderly operation; keeping track of cash; filing invoices; and generally ensuring that the store is profitable. Mike Smith, a Davis, Inc., an employee for 24 years, and who appears to be an African-American, and C. W. Davis, the principal of C. W. Davis, Inc., who appears to be of the Caucasian race, were intimately aware of Mr. Maderazo's capabilities as a McDonalds employee. Indeed, they had known him personally as an employee for at least 12 years. After Mr. Maderazo's promotion to store manager, both Mr. Smith and Mr. Davis visited his store on a frequent basis and observed his performance. Although Mr. Davis has the ultimate power to promote an employee to a position of high responsibility, such as store manager, Mr. Davis and Mr. Smith confer prior to making promotional decisions and other decisions involving personnel. Both Mr. Davis and Mr. Smith agreed that, at least until May 3, 2004, Mr. Maderazo was a capable and hard-working employee who deserved to be a store manager. In April 2004 a meeting was held which the store managers, including Mr. Maderazo, attended. The meeting was hosted by Mr. Davis and Mr. Smith. At the meeting management issues were discussed in general but a substantial part of the meeting specifically addressed the handling of cash and the necessity for store managers to ensure that two bank deposits were accomplished each day. It was a policy of Davis, Inc., that no more than one deposit bag should be in a store at one time. An exception to the deposit rule could be made if a law enforcement escort was not available during the hours of darkness. In that case, the deposit could be deferred until the following morning. This policy has been in effect since about 1980. There was a great concern about cash management at the stores because of a previous incident where a portion of daily receipts went missing. Frequent deposits are an important part of cash management. During the meeting in April 2004, Mr. Davis told each store manager that their failure to abide by the requirement to make two deposits each day, subject to the exception noted, would result in serious consequences to them. Mr. Davis ensured that each of the attending store managers told him specifically that he understood the guidance provided. Mr. Maderazo, specifically, looked in the direction of Mr. Davis and nodded in the affirmative, indicating that he understood. At times pertinent, the McDonalds stores owned by Davis, Inc., conducted almost all transactions in cash. Therefore, cash would accumulate if deposits were not made on a daily basis. The accumulation of large amounts of cash, which could amount to $20,000 or more over a weekend in a single store, could result in losses through "mysterious disappearance." Insurance policies maintained by Davis, Inc., did not cover losses through "mysterious disappearance." The excess accumulation of cash is also a safety issue. A person harboring a criminal inclination, who would not commit larceny or robbery at a McDonalds for a few thousand dollars, might conclude that the risk was worth the reward if the stake was $20,000 or more. Additionally, Davis, Inc. had suppliers to pay and without receipts being timely deposited, the business could experience cash flow disruption. The deposit policy was grounded in reasons that were obvious to any store manager, and this had to have been obvious to Mr. Maderazo. Despite the instructions given to Mr. Maderazo at the April meeting of managers, and despite the fact that Mr. Maderazo was undoubtedly aware of the downside of cash accumulation, he failed, during the weekend preceding May 3, 2004, to ensure that he or his assistant managers made deposits on a daily basis. On May 3, 2004, a Monday, Mr. Maderazo arrived at the store early in the morning and checked the deposit bags that had accumulated over the weekend. Five deposit bags should have been present that morning in the store safe. One bag, however, had gone missing. Mr. Maderazo followed many of the procedures for lost cash by conducting a search of the store and calling the bank that would have been the recipient of the deposit and calling the assistant managers. He did not immediately inform Mr. Davis or Mr. Smith of the loss, which was contrary to company policy. Around noon, Mr. Smith entered the store and inquired why the store was in a state of disarray. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Maderazo revealed to Mr. Smith that a deposit bag with approximately $3,000 had gone missing. Mr. Smith informed Mr. Davis of the loss. The local police department was informed, interviews of employees were conducted, and surveillance tapes were reviewed. These activities did not result in explaining the disappearance of approximately $3,000 in cash. Mr. Smith asked Mr. Maderazo why the deposits had not been made over the weekend. Mr. Maderazo informed him that he had been keeping the weekend deposits in the safe and then having Mollie Jimmerson, one of the assistant managers, take the weekend deposits to the bank on Sunday evenings. Neither Mr. Davis, Mr. Smith, nor law enforcement authorities considered Mr. Maderazo to be criminally involved in the loss. Mr. Smith and Mr. Davis discussed on several occasions, following these events, whether or not Mr. Maderazo should be terminated or given a chance to continue working for Davis, Inc. They determined that he should be retained but should be demoted to assistant store manager and transferred to another store. Mr. Maderazo was informed of this decision in a meeting between him, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Smith, on May 10, 2004. In a letter dated May 11, 2004, Mr. Maderazo provided Mr. Davis with a letter of resignation, effective May 11, 2004. In the letter he stated that he believed that the demotion and transfer were unfair. He also stated, "You've been great to me and it is part of the reason why I stayed and as [sic] been as loyal to your organization." In the letter he also thanked Mr. Davis for the opportunities provided to him for almost 12 years. In response, Mr. Davis provided Mr. Maderazo, on that same day, a written acceptance of his resignation. Subsequently, although he was under no obligation to do so, Mr. Davis directed Davis, Inc., to provide Mr. Maderazo with a severance payment in the amount of $700. Mr. Maderazo's position was eventually filled by a person named Billy Jordan who is of the Caucasian race. Once, several years prior to this incident, it was reported to Mr. Maderazo that Mr. Smith had referred to him as a "Filipino Jew." This is the sole reference to race that was produced by Mr. Maderazo and was in the form of hearsay which is accorded minimal weight. Mr. Maderazo's salary with Davis, Inc., at the time he resigned was net $1163 biweekly. After his resignation he was unemployed for one week. Thereafter he went to work for another McDonalds (which was not owned by Davis, Inc.) and received $1,000 net biweekly.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Romeo C. Maderazo 605 McKinney Street Niceville, Florida 32578 Paul J. Scheck, Esquire Shutts & Bowen, LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Post Office Box 4956 Orlando, Florida 32802-4956 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an act of discrimination in employment based on age, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born on December 11, 1951. She was employed by Respondent from 1977 until December 27, 1999, at which time Respondent terminated her. During the entire term of her employment, Petitioner has served as an outside sales representative. As an outside sales representative, Petitioner was typically assigned a territory within which she was to serve existing advertisers and develop new advertisers. Petitioner often helped customers prepare their advertisements and plan and budget their advertising campaigns. While employed with Respondent, Petitioner helped train Mr. Fine, who has been employed with Respondent for nearly 13 years. Mr. Fine is currently the National Advertising Director, but, during the time in question, served as the Broward Advertising Sales Manager, and, as such, he supervised Petitioner. He served as the Broward Advertising Sales Manager from September 1998 through February or March 2000. While Broward Advertising Sales Manager, Mr. Fine supervised eight sales representatives. Mr. Fine found that Petitioner was strong in persuasiveness, but weak at times when she displayed a negative attitude and sense of entitlement to her job and her way of doing her job. She also treated customers inconsistently. In February 1999, Mr. Fine disciplined Petitioner for her handling of an internal fax that the Broward office received from an employee of Respondent in another office. The fax was addressed to a member of management and contained salary information about five persons in the office. Petitioner happened to find the fax and revealed its contents to her coworkers before delivering it to the addressee. When Mr. Fine reprimanded Petitioner for her actions, she denied any wrongdoing. Next, Mr. Fine began receiving complaints from various of Petitioner's customers, mostly over a relatively short period of time. A marketing person at the Swap Shop complained that Petitioner was brusque in dealing with her. Another customer representative mentioned that Petitioner had criticized one of her coworkers in suggesting that the customer place all of its business with Petitioner. A similar situation arose with another customer, to whom Petitioner claimed that its outside sales representative handled only smaller accounts. A representative of the Florida Philharmonic Orchestra requested that Mr. Fine assign it a new outside sales representative because Petitioner raised her voice and talked down to its young, inexperienced marketing person. On June 29, 1999, Mr. Fine sent a memorandum to his supervisor, Donna Sasser, who was then Advertising Director. The memorandum describes Petitioner as "dynamite" and expresses concern as to when she "will blow and who she will hurt." At the time, Mr. Fine was concerned that Petitioner's actions might undermine morale among the other staff for whom he was responsible. Ms. Sasser advised Mr. Fine to communicate to Petitioner specific expectations in terms of job performance and customer interaction in particular. Mr. Fine met with Petitioner and detailed his problems with her job performance and his expectations for improvement. By memorandum dated July 30, 1999, Mr. Fine memorialized the meeting, including specific customer complaints, and warned that Petitioner's job "will end, even within the next few weeks, if you are unable to achieve the following: no additional customer complaints, monthly goals [met] on a consistent basis; positive, collaborative attitude with co-workers, customers, and managers; [and] acceptance of responsibility for what goes well and what does not go well." Petitioner resisted Mr. Fine's criticism. By memorandum dated August 22, 1999, she defended her actions by pointing to shortcomings elsewhere within Respondent. Significantly, the memorandum does not address the complaints about brusque, discourteous treatment of employees of customers. At this point, Mr. Fine, who was a young manager, was legitimately concerned about whether Petitioner's attitude would undermine his ability to do his job. Mr. Fine resolved to assess over the next three to six months whether Petitioner met the goals that he stated in the July 30 memorandum. In late October 1999, a representative of the Cleveland Clinic complained about Petitioner's handling of its account. The complaints included Petitioner's "flip attitude" and "lack of professionalism." Two months later, Mr. Fine received a more serious complaint because it involved a loss of revenue to Respondent and the advertiser. Due to some miscommunication, Respondent published the wrong advertisement for a customer. When the customer's representative telephoned Petitioner and complained, she blamed someone at the Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel, who had supplied her the wrong advertisement for publication. When she did not call him back on the day that she had promised, the customer representative called Respondent, complained about the poor handling of the account, noted the reduction in advertising from his company over the past year as compared to the prior year, and requested a different outside sales representative. Mr. Fine consulted with Ms. Sasser and Janet Stone, the Human Relations specialist assigned to advertising. The three agreed that Respondent should terminate Petitioner. Their decision was submitted through four levels of management--up to the level of Publisher--and each level approved the decision before it was implemented. On December 27, 1999--six days after the receipt of the last complaint--Mr. Fine and Ms. Stone met with Petitioner and told her that she had been terminated. At the hearing, Petitioner presented evidence of a contemporaneous complaint about age discrimination that she had made to a Human Relations specialist who had since left the employment of Respondent. Respondent contested this assertion, but Petitioner's August 22 memorandum states that, as a "female over 40 I feel the harassment and stress that you have been putting on me is totally unnecessary." Although not a formal complaint concerning age discrimination, this memorandum is an early mention of Petitioner's age within the context of harassment. Based on the testimony of coworkers, Mr. Fine was a high-pressure manager, given to yelling, but he did not make age-related comments to Petitioner. Even if Petitioner had timely made comprehensive complaints about age discrimination, the record in this case does not support her claim that her termination was due to age discrimination. Mr. Fine hired two outside sales representatives over 40 years old, and the only other outside sales representative whom he fired was under 40 years old. More importantly, he treated employees the same without regard to age. Most importantly, Petitioner's job performance provided Mr. Fine with ample reason to fire her. Without regard to the quality of the support that Petitioner received, customer satisfaction is paramount in advertising. In a competitive environment, Mr. Fine justifiably sought satisfaction of all customers, not just favored customers. Mr. Fine could not reasonably allow Petitioner to continue to treat discourteously representatives of advertisers, regardless of the merits of her claims of inadequate support. Past evaluations suggest that interpersonal relations was never Petitioner's strength. Despite an obvious talent at advertising sales and considerable experience, Petitioner's frustrations with the perceived incompetence of her coworkers and customers' employees weakened her interpersonal skills beyond a critical point, so that her other strengths no longer offset this important deficit.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jan Hall-Szugye 3834 Panther Creek Road Clyde, North Carolina 28721 Ellen M. Leibovitch Adorno & Yoss, P.A. 700 South Federal Highway, Suite 200 Boca Raton, Florida 33432
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated section 760.08, Florida Statutes, of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”), by denying Petitioner the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation on the basis of Petitioner’s handicap.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Smith is an adult male who resides in Sunrise, Florida. Respondent 7-Eleven is a Texas corporation, with its headquarters located at 3200 Hackberry Road, Irving, Texas. Respondent owns, operates, and franchises convenience stores in Florida under the trademarked name “7-Eleven.” Procedural Background On or about March 28, 2018, Smith filed a Public Accommodation Complaint of Discrimination with FCHR, alleging that 7-Eleven, Inc., through its agent, violated section 760.80 by denying him full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation on the basis of handicap. After conducting an investigation, FCHR issued a Determination: Reasonable Cause on or about September 19, 2018, finding reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful practice occurred. Smith timely filed a Petition for Relief on October 16, 2018, asserting that 7-Eleven had discriminated against him in a place of public accommodation on the basis of handicap. This charge, as set forth in the Petition for Relief, is the subject of this de novo proceeding. Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding On September 16, 2017, Smith arrived at the Store to purchase gasoline. He was accompanied by Mrs. Smith and his daughter, Rochelle Smith. At that time, the Store was a franchised 7-Eleven convenience store and gas station. HA&A Enterprises, Inc. (“HA&A”), owned by Sumera Shahzadi (“Shahzadi”), was the franchisee. Immediately upon arriving at the Store, Smith went inside to use the restroom, while Mrs. Smith remained outside to pump gas. Smith testified, credibly, that he had a stroke and, as a result, walks slowly with a visible limp. He testified that he sometimes, but not always, uses a cane to assist him in walking. He was not using a cane when he entered the Store on September 16, 2017. Upon entering the Store, Smith discovered that the restroom was locked. Smith asked Shahzada Hussain (“Hussain”), who was working behind the counter, for the restroom key so that he could use the restroom. Hussain told him that the restroom was out of order and did not give him the key. The evidence does not establish that Hussain was aware of any disability or handicap that Smith may have.4/ Because Smith was unable to use the restroom, he was forced to urinate outside, in the front of the Store. Smith had difficulty pulling down his pants, and he urinated on himself. He testified, credibly, that other persons were present at the Store and saw him urinate on himself. Mrs. Smith assisted Smith in pulling up his pants, then went inside the Store and asked Hussain for the key to the restroom. Hussain gave her the key. She went into the restroom and found it to be in working order. She also noticed that no “out of order” sign was posted on the restroom door. Mrs. Smith then took numerous photographs of various documents on the wall of the Store. These documents included: a Broward County Local Business Tax Receipt for the period of October 1, 2016, to September 30, 2017, showing the business name as “7-Eleven #35031” and the business owner as “7-Eleven Inc. & HA&A Enterprises, Inc.”; the 2016 Florida Annual Resale Certificate for Sales Tax issued to 7-Eleven Store #35031, HA&A Enterprises, Inc.; a Florida Department of Environmental Protection Storage Tank Registration Placard, 2015-2016, issued to 7-Eleven, Inc., Store #35031; a National Registry of Food Safety Professionalism certificate issued to Shahzada Hussain; a Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Temporary License/Permit; a document titled “Notice,” with the name “7-Eleven” handwritten as the business authorized to engage in the money transmission business; a Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Liquefied Petroleum Gas License issued to 7-Eleven Store #35031; and a ServSafe Certification issued to Sumera Shahzadi. The photographs, along with a written description of each document depicted in the photographs, were admitted into evidence at the final hearing. At that time, Mrs. Smith also photographed the Store’s restroom door, on which signs reading “MEN” and “WOMEN” were hung. Each of these signs depicted a wheelchair symbol, presumably indicating that the restroom was handicapped- accessible. The restroom door did not have a sign posted indicating that it was out of order. Mrs. Smith also photographed Shazhadi and Hussain as they were working behind the counter of the Store. Mrs. Smith referred to Shazhadi and Hussain as “the owners” of the Store in her testimony at the final hearing regarding the September 16, 2017, incident.5/ Shortly after the incident, the police arrived at the Store on an unrelated matter. At the direction of the police officer investigating the unrelated matter, the Smiths did not purchase gasoline at the Store that day, and went to another store to purchase gas. Mrs. Smith testified that she frequently patronized the Store, both before and after the September 16, 2017, incident. As noted above, Smith credibly testified that other persons present at the Store saw him urinate on himself. Smith is a member of the clergy of a local church and, thus, is a well-known person in his neighborhood, where the Store is located. The credible evidence establishes that Smith was extremely embarrassed and humiliated, and experienced emotional distress as a result of having urinated on himself in public view. He testified that this incident so embarrassed him that he may move from the community or from the state. No evidence regarding any quantified or quantifiable injury or damages that Smith may have incurred as a result of the incident was presented. On or about November 14, 2017, the Smiths filed a complaint regarding their September 16, 2017, experience at the Store through 7-Eleven’s complaint hotline. Mrs. Smith testified that in one of the telephone conversations with the 7-Eleven corporate office, they were given an incident claim number. On or about November 19, 2017, Mavis Steffan, the 7-Eleven corporate field consultant for the subgroup of 7-Eleven stores that includes the Store, contacted the Smiths and spoke to them regarding the September 16, 2017, incident at the Store. Mrs. Smith testified that when the Smiths spoke with Steffan on November 19, 2017, she (Steffan) told them that on the date of the incident, the Store was a private franchise, and that on October 23, 2017, the Store “became corporate”——meaning that 7- Eleven, Inc., began operating the Store. Steffan apologized for the incident, invited the Smiths to patronize the Store again, and told them that Smith was free to use the restroom at the Store. Relationship between the Store and 7-Eleven Steffan testified at the final hearing regarding the relationship between the Store and 7-Eleven, as it existed on September 19, 2017. 7-Eleven and HA&A entered into a 7-Eleven, Inc. Florida Individual Store Franchise Agreement (hereafter, “Franchise Agreement” or “Agreement”), effective March 23, 2016, regarding the Store. The Franchise Agreement terminated on October 23, 2017, and, as of that date, 7-Eleven, Inc., began operating the Store.6/ Therefore, the Store was a franchised store on September 19, 2017, the date of the incident. As discussed above, HA&A was the franchisee. Pursuant to the Franchise Agreement, HA&A was an independent contractor. The Agreement provided that the franchisee——here, HA&A——controlled the manner and means of the operation of the franchised store, and exercised complete control over and responsibility for the conduct of its agents and employees, including the day-to-day operations of the franchised store. The Agreement expressly provided that the franchisee’s agents and employees could not be considered or held out to be agents or employees of 7-Eleven, and could not incur any liability in the name of, or on behalf of, 7-Eleven. The Agreement further provided that all employees of the franchised store were solely those of the franchisee, and that no actions taken by the franchisee, its agents, or its employees would be attributable to 7-Eleven. As part of the Franchise Agreement, HA&A also agreed to comply with 7-Eleven’s Operations Manual (“Manual”). Provisions in the Manual stated that the franchisee was solely responsible for setting the policies and procedures to operate his or her store in accordance with the laws of the legal jurisdiction in which the store was located, and that the franchisee was solely responsible for the actions of its employees while on the job. Additionally, training materials provided by 7-Eleven to franchisees for use in training franchisee employees expressly informed those employees that they were not “in any way considered to be an employee, agent[,] or independent contractor of 7-Eleven, Inc.,” and that 7-Eleven did not “assume any liability for providing you these training materials.” Consistent with these provisions, Steffan testified that the franchisee——here, HA&A——was solely responsible for the overall operations of the Store, including supervising, hiring, firing, promoting, and disciplining Store employees. HA&A also was solely responsible for enforcing workplace rules, policies, and procedures for the Store. Based on this evidence, it is determined that HA&A was solely responsible for the actions of its employees and agents, including Hussain’s actions on September 16, 2017, toward Smith. Stated another way, the evidence establishes that 7-Eleven was not responsible for Hussain’s actions in the Store, including his actions on September 16, 2017, toward Smith while he (Smith) was in the Store.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a part-time store clerk from January 11, 1983 until January 14, 1986 at Respondent's 7-Eleven Store No. 1413-25564 located at 2990-16th Street, North, St. Petersburg, Florida. Respondent is an employer within the terms of the Human Rights Act of 1977, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Upon employment by Respondent, employees must sign an Awareness Form which provides, in pertinent part, that "consumption or possession of alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs while on company property (this includes the parking lot and rear of the store)" is grounds for dismissal. Petitioner signed this Awareness Form, and thereby acknowledged having been informed of Respondent's disciplinary policies set forth on said form. On December 25, 1985, at approximately 1:15 a.m. Petitioner and coworker Debbie Meany consumed one bottle of champagne in 7-Eleven Store 1413- 25564 after closing-up the store at 1:00 a.m. Meany had purchased the champagne during their shift on the evening of December 24, and then drank it with Petitioner "because it was Christmas Eve." Meany testified that she became drunk while she and Petitioner drank the bottle of champagne. Petitioner's testimony at hearing that the champagne he drank with Meany was nonalcoholic is specifically rejected based upon Meany's testimony, the fact that nonalcoholic champagne was not sold in this 7-Eleven store at the time, and the fact that he referred to the champagne as "booze" in a letter written to Fred Nichols, Respondent's personnel manager, on January 10, 1986. Meany was fired along with Petitioner for consumption of alcoholic beverages on the premises, and has no apparent motive to be untruthful in her contention that the champagne was alcoholic. Due to an audit of 7-Eleven Store 1413-25564 which revealed a merchandise shortage of approximately $1300, polygraphs were ordered for all store employees. Meany's polygraph was on January 6, 1986, and it was during her examination by Robert Rathbun that she admitted to consuming the bottle of champagne with Petitioner. She signed a statement, which she confirmed at hearing, indicating Petitioner opened the bottle, and they drank the champagne together. Petitioner was polygraphed on January 10, 1986, after executing a consent form, and during the course of his examination, he showed deception in his answers to questions about the use of alcohol on the job. When he was confronted with this indication of deception and with Meany's statement, he admitted to drinking champagne with Meany in 7-Eleven Store 1413- 25564 after they had closed at 1:00 a.m. on December 25, 1987. Thereafter, Petitioner met with Mike McKenzie, field manager, and Larry Good, district manager, on January 13, 1986 to discuss the results of the polygraph. McKenzie and Good also met with Meany. Petitioner was terminated on January 14, 1986 for consumption of an alcoholic beverage in the 7-Eleven store at which he worked. Petitioner did not disclose any handicap or physical condition which would prevent him from performing the job of store clerk on his initial application for employment, or on an application he completed and submitted to Respondent on May 27, 1986, subsequent to his termination. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever informed McKenzie or Good of his handicap. However, Petitioner's immediate supervisors Watley and Egge, store managers, did know of his handicap, and did not require him to "front shelves." This is a normal part of a store clerk's duties by which merchandise is brought forward to the front of a shelf to take the place of products that have been purchased. It has been established that Petitioner is physically handicapped due to the injury of both his knees while in the Army. He was discharged from the Army due to his disability. This handicap makes it very difficult for him to bend down, and therefore the accommodation which Watley and Egge provided was reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances. Respondent does hold Christmas parties at which alcoholic beverages are consumed in its district office. However, the district office is a separate office building and there is no 7-Eleven store located at said office. Since the district office is not a store licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, the consumption of alcohol at that location is not a violation of Respondent's policy about the consumption of alcohol set forth on the Awareness Form. A review of Petitioner's personnel file indicates prior warnings for writing bad checks, and making unacceptable advances on a female coworker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and as simply a summation of testimony which is not persuasive. Rejected in Findings of Fact 4, 6, 7 and 12. Rejected in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 5 and 6. Rejected in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3-5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 6-7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 8-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 11-13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 6. 14-15. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 7. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 18-19. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 22-24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 25. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. COPIES FURNISHED: WINSTON S. MCCLINTOCK 475 - 41ST AVENUE, NORTH ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA 33703 E. JOHN DINKEL, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 1531 TAMPA, FLORIDA 33601 DONALD A. GRIFFIN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BLDG. F, SUITE 240 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1925 SHERRY B. RICE, CLERK HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BLDG. F, SUITE 240 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1925
The Issue Did Respondent, Ricoh Americas Corporation, (Ricoh), discriminate against Petitioner, Tamara Gleason (Ms. Gleason), because of her gender by demoting her? Did Ricoh retaliate against Ms. Gleason for complaining about gender discrimination?
Findings Of Fact Ricoh is in the business of selling and servicing document imaging and output equipment, including copiers, fax machines, printers, and related supplies and services such as software, paper, and toner. Ricoh has locations across the United States. Ms. Gleason worked for Ricoh from August 2008 until she resigned on March 31, 2010. She worked in its East Florida Marketplace. That area covers the eastern part of Florida from Jacksonville to Miami. In 2008, and at all times relevant to this proceeding, Al Hines (Mr. Hines) was the East Florida Marketplace manager. His responsibilities included supervising sales personnel and meeting sales quotas. Mr. Hines has worked for Ricoh in various positions for over 31 years. He is based in Ricoh's Maitland, Florida, office near Orlando. In 2008, the organizational structure of the East Florida Marketplace consisted of two group sales managers, one in Central Florida and one in South Florida. These group sales managers reported directly to the Marketplace Manager Mr. Hines. They oversaw sales managers who in turn supervised the various account executives. Also, one sales manager in Jacksonville reported directly to Mr. Hines. The group sales managers and sales managers were responsible for supervising the sales personnel, consisting of major account executives, senior account executives, and account executives. Ricoh assigned major account executives to work with specific large client accounts. Senior account executives were more experienced sales representatives. Senior account executives and account executives were assigned territories. Daytona Beach or a series of zip codes are examples of territories. Ricoh also assigned "vertical markets" for a specific industry, such as "faith-based" institutions to an Account Executive. Ms. Gleason applied and interviewed for an account executive position in the central Florida area of the East Florida Marketplace in August 2008. Mr. Hines, General Sales Manager Cecil Harrelson, and Sales Manager Anthony Arritt interviewed Ms. Gleason. On her resume and in her interview, Ms. Gleason represented that she had 20 years of experience as a sales representative in the office equipment field. Her resume stated that she was "[p]roficient in all areas relating to sales and leasing of copiers, printers, scanners, fax machines and various software solutions. Consistently exceeded sales quota." After the interview, Mr. Hines decided to hire Ms. Gleason for Mr. Harrelson's team. Ricoh hired Ms. Gleason as a senior account executive on August 11, 2008. Mr. Hines initially assigned her to work in the vertical "faith-based" market. In September 2008, a sales manager position for the Daytona Beach/Melbourne territories, overseen by Mr. Hines, opened. Three males applied for the position. Ms. Gleason did not apply. Mr. Hines asked Ms. Gleason if she would be interested in being considered for promotion to sales manager. Although Ms. Gleason had no prior management experience and had only worked for Ricoh for two months, Mr. Hines believed that she would be good in the position and asked her to consider it. Ms. Gleason accepted Mr. Hines' proposal. On September 30, 2008, Mr. Hines promoted her to sales manager. Ricoh provided Ms. Gleason manager training. In April and May of 2009, Ricoh restructured its sales positions. Ricoh changed group sales manager positions to strategic account sales manager positions. It removed all major account executives from teams supervised by sales managers and placed them on the teams supervised by the strategic account sales managers. In central Florida, the reorganization resulted in Cecil Harrelson being moved from general sales manager to strategic account sales manager. The major account executives on Ms. Gleason's team (Mary Cobb, David Norman, and Patrick Mull) and Arritt's team (Todd Anderson and Lynn Kent) were moved onto the new team supervised by Harrelson. All of the major account executives in the East Florida Market supervised by Mr. Hines were transferred to strategic account sales manager teams. On average, the sales managers in the East Florida Marketplace each lost two major account executives due to the reorganization. Mr. Hines required all of the sales managers to hire new sales personnel to bring the number of sales personnel on their teams to expected levels. This is known as maintaining "headcount." Ms. Gleason knew of this requirement. Also it was not new. The responsibility to maintain headcount pre-existed the reorganization. From the time of her hire until early 2009, around the time that the Company reorganized its sales positions, Ms. Gleason had no issues with Mr. Hines or complaints about his management. As a sales manager, Ms. Gleason bore responsibility for supervising a team of sales personnel and for ensuring that her team members met their monthly sales quotas. In addition, Ms. Gleason was responsible for maintaining the headcount on her team. Mr. Hines assigned monthly sales quotas for sales managers. He based the quotas on the types of sales representatives on each team. The monthly quota for major account executives was $75,000. For senior account executives, the monthly quota was $40,000. The monthly quota for account executives was $30,000. Mr. Hines conducted bi-monthly two-day sales meetings with all of the sales managers and office administrators to discuss their sales progress. Managers were expected to discuss their completed and forecast sales. Mr. Hines required managers to stand before the group to report on their progress and discuss any issues with quotas or goals based on month-to-date, quarter-to-date, and year-to-date expectations. Mr. Hines also considered "sales in the pipeline," or anticipated sales, to help determine sales trends for the next 90 days and in evaluating sales personnel. In addition, Mr. Hines conducted weekly sales calls with the sales managers to review their sales progress. During the calls, sales managers were to identify which sales they believed had a strong, "95 percent chance," of closing. Mr. Hines also discussed the performance of each individual sales representative on a manager's team during the calls. The discussions included examination of reasons for non-performance. Around the time of the reorganization, Mr. Hines transferred Senior Account Executive Tina Vargas in the Ocala territory from Mr. Arritt's team to Ms. Gleason's team. Mr. Hines made this transfer, in part, to help Ms. Gleason achieve her headcount and sales quotas. At the time of the transfer, Vargas expected to complete a large, one-time $320,000 sale on which she had been working. Mr. Hines anticipated that this sale would help Ms. Gleason achieve her sales quotas. Ms. Vargas was not located in the Daytona Beach/Melbourne territory. But Mr. Hines expected that Ms. Vargas would require minimal supervision because she was an experienced sales representative. Other managers also supervised sales representatives in multiple or large territories. For example, Cecil Harrelson supervised sales representatives in four areas. They were Orlando, Melbourne, Daytona, and Gainesville. Sales Manager Derrick Stephenson supervised a substantially larger geographic area than Ms. Gleason. His area reached from Key West to West Palm Beach. After the reorganization, Ms. Gleason's sales productivity declined. She also was not maintaining her headcount. The other Sales Managers experienced the same problems initially. But they recovered from the changes. Ms. Gleason never did. For the seven-month period of April through October, Ms. Gleason's record of attaining her quota was as follows: April - 35% or $70,867 in sales May - 196% or $385,452 in sales (Due to Ms. Vargas joining the team with a pending sale; 23% without Ms. Vargas.) June - 31% or $61,136 in sales July - 8% or $12,948 in sales August - 12% or $19,521 in sales September - 11% or $18,261 in sales October - 23% or $36,811 in sales During that same period, Ms. Gleason was the lowest performing sales manager in July (19 points less than the next lowest), August (14 points less than the next lowest), September (33 points less than the next lowest), and October (6 points less than the next lowest). She was the second lowest in June when Mr. Comancho was the lowest with 25% attainment compared to Ms. Gleason's 31%. The attainment percentages for all of the sales managers varied. Each had good months and bad months. After April and May, Ms. Gleason, however, had only bad months. For the months June through October, Ms. Gleason was the only sales manager who did not achieve 50% attainment at least twice, with two exceptions. They exceptions were Mr. Comancho and Mr. Rodham. Mr. Comancho chose to return to an account executive position after Mr. Hines spoke to him about his performance. Mr. Rodham joined Ricoh in October and attained 52% of quota that month. In addition to steadily failing to meet 50% of her quota, Ms. Gleason failed to maintain a full headcount for the same period of time. No male sales managers in Ricoh's East Florida Marketplace had similar deficiencies in meeting sales quota. There is no evidence that any male sales managers in Ricoh's East Florida Marketplace had similar failures to maintain headcount. There is no evidence of sales manager productivity or headcount maintenance for any of Ricoh's other markets. Ms. Gleason tried to improve her headcount by hiring additional sales personnel. She conducted a job fair with the assistance of Ricoh's recruiter. They identified 19 applicants for further consideration and second interviews. Mr. Hines reviewed and rejected all 19. They did not meet his requirement for applicants to have outside sales experience and a history of working on a commission basis. Ms. Gleason was aware of Mr. Hines' requirements. But she interpreted them more loosely than he did. Mr. Hines helped Ms. Gleason's efforts to improve her headcount by transferring four sales representatives to her team. At Ms. Gleason's request, Mr. Hines also reconsidered his rejection of one candidate, Susan Lafue, and permitted Ms. Gleason to hire her. Still Ms. Gleason was unable to reach the expected headcount. David Herrick, one of the individuals who Mr. Hines assigned to Ms. Gleason's team, had already been counseled about poor performance. Mr. Hines directed Ms. Gleason to work with Mr. Herrick until he sold something. This was a common practice with newer sales representatives. Mr. Herrick had also been assigned to male sales managers. Mr. Hines asked Ms. Gleason and Mr. Herrick to bring him business cards from their sales visits. He often did this to verify sales efforts. After Mr. Hines reviewed the cards, he threw them in the trash. But he first confirmed that Ms. Gleason had the information she needed from the cards. Mr. Hines often threw cards away after reviewing them to prevent sales representatives providing the same card multiple times. Ricoh's Human Resources Policy establishes a series of steps for disciplinary action. The first is to provide an employee a verbal warning. The next two steps are written warnings before taking disciplinary action. Mr. Hines gave Ms. Gleason a verbal warning about her performance. He spoke to her about improving sales production and headcount. Ms. Gleason's performance did not improve despite her efforts. Later, Mr. Hines gave Ms. Gleason a written warning in a counseling document dated August 31, 2009. The document stated that her performance had not been acceptable. The counseling memorandum directed Ms. Gleason to reach 65% of her quota. It also said that she was expected to maintain a minimum of seven people on her team and work in the field with her sales representatives at least four days a week. Finally the memorandum advised that failure to perform as directed would result in "being moved to sales territory." Around the end of August 2009, Mr. Hines began counseling Israel Camacho, a male, about his performance. Mr. Comancho decided to return to an account executive position. In September Ms. Gleason achieved 11% of her quota. She also did not maintain her headcount. September 24, 2009, Mr. Hines gave Ms. Gleason a second written counseling memorandum. It too said that her performance was unacceptable. The memorandum required her to produce 80% of her quota and maintain a minimum of seven people on her team. It also cautioned that failure to meet the requirements would result in "being moved to sales territory." Ms. Gleason acknowledges that she understood that if she did not perform to the expected levels that she could be demoted. After the written warning of September 24, 2009, Ms. Gleason's performance continued to be unacceptable. For October, Ms. Gleason had $23,811 in sales for a total attainment of 23% of quota. Again, she did not maintain her team's headcount. Sometime during the June through October period, Mr. Hines criticized Ms. Gleason's management style, saying that she "coddled" her personnel too much. He also directed her to read the book "Who Moved My Cheese" and discuss it with him and consider changing her management style. Mr. Hines often recommended management books to all managers, male or female. There is no persuasive evidence that Ms. Gleason is the only person he required to read a recommended book and discuss it with him. Mr. Hines' comments and the reading requirement were efforts to help Ms. Gleason improve her performance and management. During the June through October period, Ms. Gleason yawned during a manager meeting. She maintains that Mr. Hines' statement about her yawn differed from the words he spoke to a male manager who fell asleep in a meeting. The differences, she argues, demonstrated gender discrimination. They did not. In each instance Mr. Hines sarcastically commented on the manager's behavior in front of other employees. He made no gender references. And the comments were similar. Sometime during the June through October period Mr. Hines also assigned Ms. Gleason to serve in an "Ambassador" role. "Ambassadors" were part of a Ricoh initiative to develop ways to improve the customer experience. There is no evidence that males were not also required to serve as "Ambassadors." And there is no persuasive evidence that this assignment was anything other than another effort to improve Ms. Gleason's management performance. Also during the June through October period Ms. Gleason proposed hosting a team building event at a bowling alley. Someone in management advised her that the event could not be an official company sponsored event because the bowling alley served alcohol. Again, there is no evidence that males were subjected to different requirements or that the requirement was related to Ms. Gleason's gender. During this same period, Ms. Gleason received written and oral communications from co-workers commenting on her difficulties meeting Mr. Hines' expectations. They observed that she was having a hard time and that they had seen Mr. Hines treat others similarly before discharging them. Nothing indicates that the others were female. These comments amount to typical office chatter and indicate nothing more than what the counseling documents said: Mr. Hines was unhappy with Ms. Gleason's performance and was going to take adverse action if it did not improve. On November 12, 2009, Ms. Gleason sent an email to Rhonda McIntyre, Regional Human Resources Manager. Ms. Gleason spoke to Ms. McIntyre that same day about her concerns about Hines' management style. Ms. Gleason said she was afraid that she may lose her job and that she was being set up for failure. Ms. McIntyre asked Ms. Gleason to send her concerns in writing. Ms. Gleason did so on November 13, 2009. Ms. Gleason's e-mail raised several issues about Mr. Hines' management. But Ms. Gleason did not state in her email or her conversations that she was being discriminated against or treated differently because of her gender. Ms. Gleason never complained about gender discrimination to any Ricoh representative at any time. On December 1, 2009, Mr. Hines demoted Ms. Gleason from sales manager to senior account executive. He assigned her to work on Mr. Arritt's team. Ms. Gleason had no issues with Mr. Arritt and no objection to being assigned to his team. Mr. Hines has demoted male sales managers to account executive positions for failure to attain quotas or otherwise perform at expected levels. The male employees include Ed Whipper, Kim Hughes, and Michael Kohler. In addition, Mr. Comancho was the subject of counseling before he chose to return to an account executive position. After Mr. Hines demoted Ms. Gleason, he promoted Diego Pugliese, a male, to sales manager. He assigned Mr. Pugliese the same territory that Ms. Gleason had. When Mr. Hines assigned Ms. Gleason to Mr. Arritt's team, Mr. Hines instructed Mr. Arritt to give Ms. Gleason two territories with substantial "machines in field" (MIF) to buttress Ms. Gleason's opportunity to succeed in her new position. Mr. Arritt assigned Ms. Gleason the two territories that records indicated had the most MIF. Ms. Gleason asserts that the preceding account executives maintained the records for the area poorly and that the new territories had no greater MIF than other areas. That fact does not indicate any intent to discriminate against Ms. Gleason on account of her gender. In January 2010, after Ms. Gleason's demotion, Mr. Harrelson invited Ms. Gleason to attend a non-company sponsored, employees' poker party. She had been invited to other employee poker parties and attended some. Mr. Harrelson withdrew the invitation saying that Mr. Hines was attending and that Mr. Harrelson thought Ms. Gleason's presence would be uncomfortable. Mr. Harrelson did not say that Mr. Hines had made this statement. And Mr. Harrelson was not Ms. Gleason's supervisor. Nothing about the exchange indicates that Ms. Gleason's gender had anything to do with withdrawal of the invitation. The incident seems to be based upon the natural observation that Mr. Hines might be uncomfortable socializing with someone he had recently demoted. After her demotion, Ms. Gleason asked Mr. Arritt to go with her on a "big hit" sales call. Ms. Gleason claims that Mr. Arritt told her that Mr. Hines told him not to go on sales calls with her. That may have been Mr. Arritt's interpretation of what Mr. Hines said. Mr. Hines had told Mr. Arritt that because Ms. Gleason was an experienced sales representative Mr. Arritt should focus his efforts on the less experienced sales representatives on his team. This was a reasonable observation. There is no evidence indicating that Mr. Hines treated Ms. Gleason differently in this situation than he had similarly experienced males. Ms. Gleason brought this issue to Ms. McIntyre's attention. The issue was resolved. Mr. Hines told Mr. Arritt that if Ms. Gleason wanted more assistance then Mr. Arritt should attend meetings with Gleason and provide any other assistance she believed she needed. Ms. Gleason had no other issues with Mr. Hines during the remainder of her employment. On March 31, 2010, Ms. Gleason submitted a memorandum stating that she was resigning "effective immediately." There is no evidence of derogatory or harassing comments by Mr. Hines or any other Ricoh representative toward Ms. Gleason referring to gender. There is no evidence of sexually suggestive comments or actions by a Ricoh representative. There also is no evidence of physically intimidating or harassing actions by any Ricoh representative.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations deny the Petition of Tamara A. Gleason in FCHR Case Number 2010-01263. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kimberly A. Gilmour, Esquire 4179 Davie Road, Suite 101 Davie, Florida 33314 David A. Young, Esquire Fisher & Phillips LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1250 Orlando, Florida 32801 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented for determination is whether Respondent, Dillard’s, discriminated against Petitioner, Tanya Chun, based on her age, in violation of section 760.101, Florida Statutes (2012),1/ when it did not hire her for a sales associate position.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Chun was born April 4, 1957. Ms. Chun applied for a position as a sales associate at Dillard’s Department Store No. 209 in Lakeland, Florida, on June 7, 2012. At the time, she was 55 years old. Ms. Chun completed the employment application at a kiosk in the store linked to Dillard’s personnel system. Ms. Chun’s application disclosed only two periods of employment. The most recent was with Golf Plus, Inc., as a bookkeeper handling accounts receivable and accounts payable from January 1998 to May 2012. The other was employment at Macy’s in New York City from April 1993 to October 1994 in clothing sales and customer services as a retail sales associate. At the time, the Lakeland Dillard’s store had five openings--two in cosmetics, two in ladies’ shoes, and one in men’s shoes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Walter Soto was operation sales manager at the store with authority to hire people to fill the openings. Mr. Soto interviewed Ms. Chun and seven other applicants for the five positions. During the interview and hiring process, Mr. Soto relied upon the information the applicants provided in their applications and the interviews. Mr. Soto hired five of the applicants. He did not hire Ms. Chun. During Ms. Chun’s interview, Mr. Soto asked her a number of questions about Macy’s sales procedures and common sales procedures and practices. Ms. Chun was not familiar with common concepts, such as sales per hour and items per transaction. These are concepts with which someone with retail experience and knowledge should be familiar. The five people Mr. Soto hired are Emil Pancorbo, Angelique Schoenmakers, Taylor Swallow, Ashley Thirion, and David Tilton. All were younger than Ms. Chun, although Ms. Schoenmakers was only three years younger. The information available to Mr. Soto about Emil Pancorbo, which he relied upon, indicated that Mr. Pancorbo had recent retail experience at large retailers, JCPenney from October 2008 to April 2011, and Guitar Center from April 2011 to September 2011. Mr. Soto considered this experience in deciding to hire Mr. Pancorbo, instead of Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about Angelique Schoenmakers, which he relied upon, indicated that she had recent retail experience as a counter manager for Elizabeth Arden and that she worked for Macy’s from October 2010 to April 2012. Ms. Schoenmakers was recruited to work for Dillard’s. Mr. Soto considered Ms. Schoenmakers’ employment history in deciding to hire Ms. Schoenmakers, instead of Ms. Chun. Ms. Schoenmakers was born January 15, 1960, making her only three years younger than Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about Taylor Swallow, which he relied upon, indicated she had recent retail experience, working for Kohl’s from August 2011 to June 2012. Ms. Swallow also had cosmetic experience. She had applied makeup on clients. Mr. Soto considered Ms. Swallow’s employment history in deciding to hire Ms. Swallow, instead of Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about Ashley Thirion, which he relied upon, indicated she had recent retail experience working at a Clinique cosmetics counter at Macy’s from June 2011 to November 2011. Clinique is a cosmetics line that Dillard’s also carries. Mr. Soto considered Ms. Thirion’s employment history in deciding to hire Ms. Thirion, instead of Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about David Tilton, which he relied upon, indicated that Mr. Tilton had recent retail experience at a large retailer, Bealls from May 2010 to May 2012. Mr. Tilton worked in the shoe department for Bealls. Mr. Soto considered Mr. Tilton’s employment history in deciding to hire Mr. Tilton, instead of Ms. Chun. Based on the information from the applications and interviews available to him, Mr. Soto made a fair and rational decision to hire applicants other than Ms. Chun. In particular, the fact that the retail experience of each of the applicants was more recent than that of Ms. Chun supports Mr. Soto’s decision. All of the applicants, except Ms. Swallow and Ms. Thirion, also had more retail experience than Ms. Chun. Ms. Swallow and Ms. Thirion both had cosmetics experience, and two of the positions that Mr. Soto was filling were for the cosmetics department. The Dillard’s employment procedure includes preparing an applicant summary for each individual interviewed. For the hiring cycle involved here, eight of the applicant summaries, including Ms. Chun’s, indicate the person was hired. In order for the Dillard’s system to permit obtaining a background check, Mr. Soto had to change an applicant’s status on the applicant summaries to “hired.” At the time, Mr. Soto was not following the Dillard’s procedure of only conducting a background check for an employee after the employee was hired. He did not think the procedure was fair to the applicants, who may be hired and then “un-hired” after the background check. Mr. Soto chose to conduct background checks before extending job offers. The status on Ms. Chun’s applicant summary states “hired.” But she was not hired, just as Ricky Davis and William Guadalupe, whose summaries state “hired,” were not hired. The status for all the applicants said “hired,” only because Mr. Soto changed the status in order to run a background check. If Dillard’s hires an employee, a Basic Employee Information sheet is prepared. There is no Basic Employee Sheet for Tanya Chun because she was not hired. There are Basic Employee Information sheets for Emil Pancorbo, Angelique Schoenmakers, Taylor Swallow, Ashley Thirion, and David Tilton. If an employee is hired, Mr. Soto conducts reference checks. He did not conduct a reference check for Ms. Chun because she was not hired. Ms. Chun maintains that Mr. Soto told her at the interview’s conclusion that she was hired and that they agreed to a start date and compensation of $10.00 per hour with full medical and dental insurance. She also maintains that Mr. Soto told her she would undergo a routine background check and requested that she sign a consent form and provide her identification card for the background check. Ms. Chun says that Mr. Soto stated that she did not “look that old” after he looked at her identification. She also claims he then said he had to talk to someone else and left the room for about five minutes. Mr. Soto denies Ms. Chun’s descriptions of the conversation. Ms. Chun, according to her own testimony, called for Mr. Soto a few times in the days following the interview to check on her employment status. She was correctly told that he had been transferred. On June 18, 2012, Ms. Chun sent a letter with the following text to Mr. Soto: I am writing to inquire the status of my employment application and I would like to receive your written response. Early last week, I applied for employment at Human Resources. The next day I was called in for an interview by you and when we met, before you offered a position you stated that I seemed to be a good candidate, and requested my identification and social security card, made photocopies, then stated that you will do a background check. As you reviewed my identification papers, your tenor changed and you stated that you will get back to me. I am writing to ask the status. I would like to request a copy of the documents I completed, as I do not have them for myself--both the application and the background disclosure form. And I would like to know why my identification with date of birth was requested before I was offered a position, and why my identification became the basis of your change of discussion. Thank you for your prompt attention. She did not receive a response. On February 28, 2013, Ms. Chun sent another letter, this one to the Dillard’s Human Resource Department. It states: I wrote the attached letter [June 18, 2012, letter] to your company more than six months ago, and I have received no response. My discussion with Walter at the interview, before being requested to provide my ID showing my age, was that I was going to be hired. Then, when my ID revealed my age I was told “we will get back to you” and I have requested an explanation and copies of the documents pertaining to my application, but you have totally disregarded my letter. I am writing to reiterate my request, and I request that you respond within five business days. Neither letter, both of which are specific and articulate, includes the claim Ms. Chun now makes that Mr. Soto said she did not “look that old” after seeing her identification. Dillard’s did not respond until March 11, 2013. A woman named “Arlie” called that day and told Ms. Chun it was Dillard’s policy to obtain identification and again advised that Mr. Soto had been transferred to another location. The weight of the credible, persuasive evidence does not establish Ms. Chun’s version of the events. The factors resulting in this determination include the fact that she testified that Mr. Soto told her she was hired and that they agreed upon a start date. Yet, she also testified that she called several times to check on the status of her application. Calling to check on the application’s status is inconsistent with having accepted a job and having agreed to a start date. If Ms. Chun had been offered and accepted a job, she would have reported for work, not called to check on the status of her application. In addition, Mr. Soto’s testimony about the process and the events is consistent with the documents for the applicants he interviewed. Finally, Ms. Chun did not make her very specific claim about what Mr. Soto said, “you don’t look that old,” in either of her letters or her initial Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Commission. From April to November of 2013, Mr. Soto hired at least ten individuals born in 1957, like Ms. Chun, or born earlier. This is persuasive evidence corroborating Mr. Soto’s testimony that he does not weigh an applicant’s age against the applicant when making his hiring decisions. Mr. Soto hired five applicants other than Ms. Chun because he found their qualifications superior for the open positions. Ms. Chun’s age was not a factor in Mr. Soto’s decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations deny Ms. Chun’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of handicap, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 37-year-old Caucasian male. Respondent is an insurance agency registered and licensed to do business in Florida and headquartered in Boca Raton, Florida. Respondent is a direct marketer of insured products, including health insurance policies, and non-insured products, such as lifestyle benefit programs and telemedicine. Respondent uses a call center model to market insurance products. At the call center, sales agents take calls from prospective clients and are paid a "base wage" plus commission. Since sales agents are paid a base wage, they must meet minimum sales requirements to help offset the fixed costs associated with their employment. Petitioner became employed at Respondent's Miramar call center as a sales agent starting on or about September 9, 2013. His employment duties entailed calling potential sales leads and selling non-major medical insurance policies over the telephone. The position for which Petitioner was hired did not have a specified term of employment, and Petitioner and Respondent did not execute an employment contract when Petitioner was hired.1/ Petitioner's work hours were from approximately 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., five days per week. Sales agents, including Petitioner, were paid $12.50 per hour, with a guaranteed salary of $500 per week, plus a commission on sales made. In late September 2013, Petitioner became ill. His illness manifested itself as shortness of breath and coughing. By late October 2013, his illness had progressed to the point that he was experiencing acute respiratory distress episodes. Petitioner testified that he experienced shortness of breath that, at times, made it "physically impossible" to talk on the telephone. However, he also testified that "I was on the phone doing what I was supposed to be doing, making calls and talking to potential customers, and I was doing it in a way in which other agents did it, which was normal and customary."2/ During his employment tenure with Respondent, Petitioner took time off work for medical appointments related to his condition, but he could not recall how many times, or for how long. There was no evidence presented showing that Respondent was aware of the specific reason for Petitioner's medical appointments. On October 30, 2013, the day he was terminated, Petitioner experienced a respiratory distress episode and had to use the nebulizer while at work. He also had experienced a similar episode at work approximately two days before and had had to use the nebulizer. Petitioner did not inform Respondent that he was experiencing shortness of breath, respiratory distress, or any other medical condition that interfered with his ability to perform his job. The persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent's human resources representative had witnessed the acute respiratory distress episode that Petitioner suffered the day he was terminated. However, there is no direct evidence that anyone with Respondent in a position (such as supervisors or managers) to make decisions about Petitioner's employment was made aware of his shortness of breath, acute respiratory distress episodes, or use of the nebulizer while at work. On October 30, 2013, Respondent terminated Petitioner from his employment. The evidence shows that at the time Petitioner was terminated, he was informed that it was due to inadequate sales production.3/ Petitioner testified at the hearing, on rebuttal, that when he was terminated, the manager who fired him "made a comment to me that I couldn't do my job, referring to the fact that I was short of breath on the phone, not to the——to a reference of low sales."4/ There is no other evidence in the record that Petitioner was told that he was being fired because he was physically unable to do his job. Petitioner testified that he did not recall having been informed, before his termination, that he was not meeting performance expectations. He testified that he did not know how his sales performance compared to that of other agents whose employment duties were the same as his. He testified that he did not believe he was the lowest-performing sales agent at the call center. He also testified that he believed he was the only person terminated that day. However, he did not articulate any specific factual or perceptual bases for these beliefs. At the time he was terminated, Petitioner asked to be given two extra days, until Friday of that week, to allow new medications he recently had been prescribed to be given a chance to work so that he could talk on the telephone without experiencing severe shortness of breath. Respondent declined to provide him the two extra days before terminating him. Petitioner had been employed with Respondent for approximately seven-and-a-half work weeks5/ when he was terminated. Petitioner testified that as of October 30, 2013, he was "disabled,"6/ although he did not know it at that time. He testified, persuasively, that he continued to have difficulty breathing after being terminated. Sometime after he was terminated, Petitioner was determined eligible for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits from the Social Security Administration, and eligible for vocational rehabilitation services from the Florida Department of Education, Division of Vocational Rehabilitative Services.7/ Petitioner asserts that even though he did not notify Respondent that he was disabled before he was terminated, he believes that Respondent's supervisors and managers perceived him being as disabled due to his respiratory distress episodes, shortness of breath, and use of a nebulizer while at work, and that they terminated him on that basis. However, as noted above, the evidence does not show that anyone in a position to make decisions about Petitioner's employment was aware of his health condition before Respondent terminated him. At the time of Petitioner's employment, Stephen Fingal was Respondent's director of enrollment and oversaw the sales department, including the call centers. Petitioner was among the employees Fingal supervised. Fingal testified that each call center sales agent was required to make a minimum of 12 "primary" insurance policy sales per week8/ in order to cover his or her $500 per week salary,9/ as well as the cost of "leads," which are generated through Respondent's commercial advertising programs, and break down to a fixed cost of roughly $1,500 to $2,000 per week per agent. The competent, persuasive evidence, consisting of Fingal's testimony and sales logs,10/ shows that Petitioner consistently failed to meet the minimum sales performance standard over the entire term of his employment with Respondent. During Petitioner's first week of employment, he was being trained, so made no sales. He made four total sales his second week of employment; no sales his third week of employment; one total sale his fourth week of employment; 17 sales of mostly ancillary policies his fifth week of employment; no sales his sixth week of employment; nine total sales his seventh week of employment; and no sales the week he was terminated.11/ The evidence does not establish a pattern linking Petitioner's lack of productivity to any documented episodes of shortness of breath or respiratory distress. Over Petitioner's entire tenure with Respondent, he sold a total of only 33 policies. Of these, only 15 were primary health insurance policies. By contrast, using the 12-sales-per week minimum performance standard, an agent whose sales performance level was marginally adequate would have sold at least 60 primary policies over a five-week period——approximately four times more than Petitioner sold over a six-and-a-half week period. To prove this point, Respondent presented the sales productivity information for two other sales agents, whose performance was characterized as "average," for the same time period as Petitioner's employment. These agents sold approximately two times more primary policies and three times more ancillary policies than Petitioner sold during the same period. On cross-examination, Fingal characterized Petitioner's comparative sales performance as "in the lower quadrant." When asked whether it was possible that 20 to 25 percent of the sales agents performed at a lower level than Petitioner, Fingal answered "probably not." Fingal testified, persuasively, that Respondent declined to give Petitioner the requested two additional days because he asked for them when he was terminated. By that point, Respondent already had determined, based on Petitioner's consistent failure to meet minimum performance standards over his entire employment term, that Petitioner was not going to be a productive employee.12/ Respondent does not hire part-time sales agents, and at the time Petitioner was terminated, there were no sales positions that did not involve speaking on the telephone. Additionally, at the time Petitioner was terminated, Respondent did not have any available non-sales positions into which Petitioner could transfer. Moreover, even if such positions were available, there was no evidence showing that Petitioner was qualified for them. In any event, the evidence shows that Petitioner never requested to be transferred to an alternative employment position that did not entail speaking on the telephone. Petitioner did request what he characterized as an "accommodation" of two additional days, but, as discussed above, Respondent declined because it had already decided to terminate him due to his consistently inadequate performance over the term of his employment. Petitioner posited that he was not the lowest performing sales agent, but he did not present any evidence to support that supposition. He also posited that he was the only sales agent terminated that day, but, again, did not present any evidence supporting that supposition. He did not present any evidence showing that non- disabled call center sales agents who performed at or below the same level as he performed were not terminated. He presented no evidence showing that Respondent subsequently filled his position with a non-disabled person. In fact, approximately ten months after Petitioner was terminated, Respondent substantially reduced its call center sales agent work force, closed the Miramar call center, and consolidated its call center operations at its Boca Raton location, in an effort to reduce the substantial cost associated with having call centers in multiple locations. This is consistent with Respondent's assertion that Petitioner was terminated because he was not a profitable employee and that Respondent was losing money in continuing to employ him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2016.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner in connection with Petitioner’s employment by Respondent on the basis of his national origin.
Findings Of Fact The evidence adduced at final hearing established the facts that follow. In May 1999, Winn-Dixie hired Torres to work as a bagger in one of its grocery stores. Until the event that precipitated his termination in July 2000, Torres’s job performance was generally satisfactory, although he was formally reprimanded at least once, in December 1999, for insubordination. Torres was at work bagging groceries on July 14, 2000. The store was crowded that day, and the lines were long at the cash registers. A customer checking out in one line asked Torres——who was stationed at another lane——to bag his groceries. Torres refused, and the man (according to Torres) called Torres an “asshole.” Torres retorted, “You’re the asshole.” (At hearing, Torres admitted using the epithet in front of “a whole line” of customers but explained——in effect——that, since his antagonist had used the word first, the man had it coming.) Having thus offended one another, the two men——Torres and the customer——engaged in a loud shouting match. The assistant store manager, who was in the parking lot outside when this verbal altercation began, was called inside to restore calm and order. Taking charge, he separated the disputants, apologized to the customer (who was a regular shopper at that store), and sent Torres home to cool off. When Torres reported for work the next day, he was fired. He complained, then as now, that Winn-Dixie’s decision was the result of his Puerto Rican origin. His supervisors, however, claimed——then as now——that the cause of Torres’s firing was his profanity-laced row with a customer, which had occurred in front of other customers. Ultimate Factual Determinations Winn-Dixie fired Torres, not because of his national origin, race, or ethnicity, but because Torres quarreled with a customer——angrily and loudly——before other customers. This is a legitimate reason for a grocery store to discharge a bagger. There is no credible, competent evidence that Winn- Dixie tolerated similar behavior in non-Hispanic (or non-Puerto Rican or non-minority) employees. The evidence does not support a finding that Winn-Dixie feigned disapproval of Torres’s dustup with a shopper as a pretext for discrimination. In short, Winn-Dixie did not discriminate unlawfully against Torres.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Torres’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Modesto A. Torres 25302 Southwest 127th Place Miami, Florida 33032 Maria H. Ruiz, Esquire 799 Brickell Plaza, Suite 900 Miami, Florida 33131 Denise Crawford Clerk of the Commission Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Michael’s Store, Inc. (“Michael’s”), committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner (“Mr. Hughes”) by discharging him.
Findings Of Fact Michael’s operates a store in Clermont, Florida. During all times relevant to the instant case, Amy Wsol was the manager of the Clermont store. Mr. Hughes was the Clermont store’s operations manager and subordinate to Ms. Wsol. Elisa Griffin was a cashier at the Clermont store. In April of 2015,1/ Ms. Griffin notified Michael’s human resources department that Ms. Wsol was not enforcing or not complying with Michael’s procedures regarding e-mail captures and other cashier practices.2/ Michael’s conducted an investigation during the summer of 2015 and concluded in August or September of 2015 that no action would be taken. Michael’s notified all employees interviewed during the course of the investigation that there would be no retaliation against Ms. Griffin. Nevertheless, immediately after the investigation’s conclusion, Ms. Wsol mandated that the other managers in the Clermont store document all of their interactions with Ms. Griffin and place those documents (“the allegedly retaliatory documents”) in Ms. Griffin’s personnel file. Mr. Hughes had the additional task of using an in-store surveillance system to monitor Ms. Griffin during her shifts. Mr. Hughes felt that Ms. Wsol’s orders regarding the monitoring of Ms. Griffin were contrary to Michael’s directive that Ms. Griffin was to suffer no retaliation because of the investigation. Mr. Hughes also felt that Ms. Wsol’s orders were immoral and unethical. The stress associated with complying with those orders had an adverse effect on Mr. Hughes’ health. Mr. Hughes is an insulin dependent diabetic, and his blood sugars became unmanageable. At one point, his endocrinologist advised him that hospitalization may be necessary if his condition did not improve. In December of 2015 or January of 2016, Mr. Hughes applied for an assistant manager position at a store that Michael’s was about to open in Orlando, Florida. While the position in the Orlando store would have been a lateral move for Mr. Hughes, it appealed to him because the Orlando position would be salaried, and Mr. Hughes was an hourly employee at the Clermont store. In January of 2016, Mr. Hughes reported Ms. Wsol’s orders regarding the allegedly retaliatory documents to Michael’s Human Resources Department. At this time, he also made copies of the documents so that he would have evidence that Ms. Wsol violated the directive that Ms. Griffin was to suffer no retaliation. Mr. Hughes did not have any authorization from Michael’s to copy the contents of Ms. Griffin’s personnel file. In February of 2016, Mr. Hughes met at the Clermont store with Dennis Bailey, one of Michael’s district managers, regarding Mr. Hughes’ allegations about Ms. Wsol. Mr. Bailey told Mr. Hughes that his allegations were being investigated. As for his request to be transferred, Mr. Bailey told Mr. Hughes that he would not be forced by a complaint to transfer Mr. Hughes to a different location. While Mr. Bailey did not completely rule out the possibility of transfer, he stated that Mr. Hughes would probably have to accept a demotion and a loss of benefits. In March of 2016, Ms. Wsol went on medical leave, and Mr. Hughes ran the Clermont store until April Skidmore arrived in April of 2016 to serve as acting store manager. At the end of May 2016, Ms. Griffin asked Mr. Hughes how she could obtain a copy of her personnel file. Mr. Hughes told her that she could request a copy from Ms. Skidmore or from Michael’s Human Resources Department. On June 14, 2016, Mr. Hughes received a call from Leah Frye, who worked in the Human Resources Department. Ms. Frye asked Mr. Hughes if Ms. Griffin had approached him about obtaining a copy of her personnel file. Mr. Hughes responded affirmatively and relayed that he had instructed Ms. Griffin on how she could obtain a copy of her personnel file. Mr. Hughes did not tell Ms. Frye that he had made a copy of the allegedly retaliatory documents in January of 2016. After Ms. Griffin received a copy of her personnel file, she stated to Mr. Hughes on June 15 or 16, 2016, that certain documents were missing. Ms. Griffin made that statement because she had expected to see documentation of compliments paid to her by customers. Ms. Griffin was also expecting to see documentation regarding the investigation of Ms. Wsol. However, none of those documents were in her personnel file. Mr. Hughes then examined Ms. Griffin’s personnel file, and discovered that the allegedly retaliatory documents were not there. Mr. Hughes then told Ms. Griffin about the missing documents and stated that he would transmit a copy of them to her upon receiving a request from her attorney. Mr. Hughes received such a request on June 17, 2016. At that point, Mr. Hughes elected to make a copy of his own personnel file because he was worried that its contents would be altered in an effort to retaliate against him. Accordingly, Mr. Hughes asked Mary Pearman, one of the other assistant managers at the Clermont store, to watch him copy his personnel file and sign a statement indicating that the documents he copied represented its complete contents. On June 29, 2016, Mr. Hughes received a call from Chad Romoser, the Director of Michael’s Human Resources Department. Mr. Romoser asked Mr. Hughes if he had made a copy of his personnel file and if he had asked a coworker to witness him doing so. Mr. Hughes responded affirmatively and stated that he copied the contents of his personnel file because the allegedly retaliatory documents had disappeared from Ms. Griffin’s file. Mr. Hughes then asked Mr. Romoser why the allegedly retaliatory documents were not transmitted to Ms. Griffin after she requested a copy of her personnel file. Mr. Romoser responded by stating that Michael’s Human Resources Department had no knowledge of the documents. Mr. Hughes then inquired about the status of the investigation pertaining to his report about the allegedly retaliatory documents. Mr. Romoser stated that after Mr. Bailey had met with Mr. Hughes in February of 2016, Mr. Bailey reported that Mr. Hughes was a “whiny individual” attempting to force Michael’s to give him a promotion. On June 29, 2016, Michael’s initiated an investigation of Mr. Hughes. Mr. Hughes was suspended with pay and required to relinquish his keys to the Clermont store. On July 6, 2016, Michael’s discharged Mr. Hughes. Mr. Hughes learned through a telephone conversation with Mr. Romoser that he had been discharged from Michael’s for intimidating Ms. Pearman3/ and for lying to the Human Resources Department. Mr. Hughes did not learn until filing his Charge of Discrimination with the Commission that Michael’s also discharged him for releasing personal and confidential information. Mr. Hughes was a credible witness. The undersigned finds that his testimony reflected his best recollection of the events pertinent to this case. However and as discussed below, even if all of Mr. Hughes’ testimony were to be accepted as true, Mr. Hughes has failed to present a prima facie case of retaliation under the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Thomas C. Hughes’ Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice.5/ DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2017.
