The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Respondent in violation of Section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes (2005).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, an Armenian, began renting one of the units in Respondent’s Colony Apartments on August 14, 2002, The initial lease term was August 14, 2002, to August 31, 2003. The monthly rent was $340 per month. Petitioner renewed his lease beginning September 1, 2003, through March 31, 2004, for a monthly rent in the amount of $350. Petitioner renewed his lease beginning April 1, 2004, through March 31, 2005, for a monthly rent in the amount of $360. Petitioner renewed his lease in a timely manner on or about March 31, 2005. On April 1, 2005, the monthly rent for Petitioner’s apartment increased to $370. On April 4, 2005, Respondent charged Petitioner an extra $50 as a month-to-month charge because Respondent’s staff unintentionally failed to enter the lease renewal into management’s software. This clerical error resulted in Petitioner receiving one or more delinquency notices. On April 6, 2005, Petitioner paid $365 in rent. Petitioner paid $370 in rent on May 6, 2005. The rules addendum to the lease agreement at issue here provides as follows in pertinent part: LATE PAYMENTS AND RETURNED CHECKS: a. Rent paid after the first day of each month shall be deemed as late; if rent is not received by close of business on the 5th day of the month, resident agrees to pay an additional fee of $50.00. Such fees will be considered additional rent. * * * 4. TERMINATION OF LEASE: Either Resident or Landlord may terminate this Lease Agreement at the end of the term by giving the other party thirty (30) days prior written notice. If Resident vacates [or] fails to give such notice, the Lease will be renewed on a month-to-month basis for successive one-month terms at a premium of $50.00 above the current monthly market rent until either party gives thirty (30) days prior written notice to the other, as provided herein. . . . * * * 9. RIGHT OF ACCESS: Landlord shall have the right to enter the Apartment without notice, for inspection maintenance and pest control during reasonable hours. In case of emergency, Landlord may enter at any time to prevent damage to property. * * * 15. REPAIRS: Resident accepts the Apartment in its current “as is” condition. Landlord will make necessary repairs to the Apartment to render Apartment tenantable with reasonable promptness after receipt of written notice from Resident unless the repairs are required due to acts of negligence of Resident of his guests, in which case, Resident agrees to pay Landlord immediately the cost of repair. Resident agrees to make maintenance checks at regular intervals on each smoke alarm located in the Apartment and to immediately report any and all defects in writing to Landlord . . . Resident shall maintain the Apartment, including the fixtures therein, in a clean, sightly and sanitary condition . . . . * * * 23. RULES AND REGULATIONS: * * * e. Parking: Resident agrees to abide by the parking regulations established by Landlord. No trailers, campers, boats, or commercial vehicles will be allowed without the written permission of Landlord. Motor vehicles may be towed at Resident’s expense, without notice, if parked improperly or if parked on lawns. Only operating passenger vehicles with current tags and ordinary size may be parked on the Premises, motorcycles shall not be parked beside buildings, under overhangs or under stairways; disabled vehicles with flat tires shall not be parked on the Premises and all such vehicles may be towed away without notice and at the Resident’s expense. No vehicle repairs will be allowed on the Premises. * * * o. Maintenance: Service call are performed during normal weekday working hours except in cases of bona fide emergencies. All service calls must be reported by the Resident to the Landlord (i.e. office personnel). They may be reported by telephone, written message, or in person. Maintenance personnel employed by the Landlord are not authorized to take any individual calls except those that are made through the office. Service calls are performed on a “first-come, first-served” basis with priority given to those requests that would constitute a hazard or discomfort to a resident. On April 28, 2005, Petitioner requested Respondent to perform the following maintenance in his apartment after lunch: (a) repair large burner on stove; (b) repair bottom oven element; (c) repair living room blind; and (d) repair rusty kitchen drain. Respondent completed these repairs the next day. Petitioner paid $370 in rent for the month of June 2005. On June 10, 2005, Petitioner complained that his refrigerator was leaking and that he lost food in the freezer compartment. Respondent gave this complaint a high priority and changed Petitioner’s refrigerator. By letter dated June 15, 2005, Respondent advised Petitioner that his apartment was in an unsanitary condition. The letter informed Petitioner that he had seven days to correct the matter at which time, Respondent intended to inspect Petitioner’s apartment. A letter dated June 22, 2005, stated that Respondent intended to inspect Petitioner’s apartment for cleanliness on June 23, 2005 at 8:00 a.m. The letter also advised that Respondent intended to fix a leak causing damage to the apartment below Petitioner’s apartment. In the letter, Respondent demanded that Petitioner clean his bathtub so that Respondent’s maintenance men could caulk it and stop the leak. The letter warned Petitioner that if the bathtub was not cleaned, Respondent would have a housekeeper to clean it and charge Petitioner’s account $50 for the service provided. Petitioner paid $370 in rent for the month of July. On July 6, 2005, Respondent finally adjusted Petitioner’s account to correct the erroneous $50 one-time, month-to-month charge carried over since April 2005. It took three months for Respondent to verify that the $50 charge was Respondent’s clerical error and not Petitioner’s failure to pay his rent on time or his failure to timely renew his lease. The correction resulted in a zero balance on Petitioner’s account. On July 5, 2005, Petitioner requested the following maintenance in his apartment: (a) repair problem causing sink to backup; and (b) repair problem causing bathtub to have spots and an unpleasant odor. Petitioner told Respondent he believed that the maintenance men had poured a chemical in his bathtub, causing the spots and the odor. Respondent gave this complaint a high priority, sending a maintenance man to Petitioner’s apartment later that day. The maintenance man repaired the sink and inspected the bathroom. There is no credible evidence that Respondent used a chemical in the building’s plumbing system that caused the spots and bad smell in Respondent’s bathtub. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner did not keep his tub clean. In July 2005, Respondent’s staff placed a warning notice on Petitioner’s vehicle. The notice advised that the vehicle was subject to towing by a date certain due to an expired license tag as of May 2003 and a flat tire. After receiving the notice, Petitioner moved his vehicle and parked it in another area of the apartment complex. Respondent’s staff issues these warning notices to any vehicles on the apartment premises that are parked improperly, broken down and unattended, had missing or expired license tag, and/or had a flat tire. Respondent’s staff does not check to determine the ownership of the car before issuing the warning. Respondent’s staff placed a second warning notice on Petitioner’s vehicle for the same reasons. On August 23, 2005, Ace Towing & Storage, pursuant to a contract with Respondent, removed Petitioner’s car from the premises. The contract with the towing company results in five to ten cars per month being removed from the premises. Between the time that Petitioner’s car was towed in August 2005 and the hearing, Petitioner compiled a long list of vehicles that he claims violated Respondent’s rules and regulations for motor vehicles. During the hearing, Respondent presented persuasive evidence that all but two of the cars had been moved or towed from the premises. The two vehicles that remained at the apartment complex no longer violated Respondent’s rules and regulations. On August 23, 2005, Petitioner complained that the deadbolt lock on his apartment door would not move. On August 24, 2005, Petitioner complained that his kitchen blind needed to be replaced. On August 25, 2005, Petitioner would not allow Respondent’s maintenance men to enter his apartment to make repairs. On August 30, 2005, Petitioner’s downstairs neighbor filed a written complaint with Respondent. The neighbor complained that his apartment had bathroom mold for the fourth time and that he was experiencing breathing problems due to the mold. The neighbor also complained that Petitioner made noises all night long. According to the neighbor, the noises sounded like Petitioner was moving furniture. On or about August 31, 2005, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter advising him that loud noises from his apartment were disturbing other residents. The letter requested Petitioner’s cooperation in keeping noise at a minimum. At some point in time, Petitioner filed a housing complaint with the City of Jacksonville. In response to Petitioner’s complaint to the City of Jacksonville, Respondent delivered a timely letter dated September 13, 2005, to Petitioner. The letter informed Petitioner that it would be inspecting his apartment on September 14, 2005. The letter complied with the requirements of Section 83.53, Florida Statutes (2005). On September 14, 2005, Respondent and the city’s inspector attempted an inspection of Petitioner’s apartment pursuant to Chapter 518, Jacksonville Municipal Code, to determine compliance with the City’s Property Safety and Maintenance Code, a city ordinance, which sets minimum property standards. The inspector could not complete the inspection because he could not gain access to Petitioner’s apartment. By letter dated October 12, 2005, Respondent provided Petitioner with a seven-day notice of termination of tenancy with option to cure, as authorized by Section 83.56(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and rules addendum to the lease agreement. The letter states as follows in relevant part: You are hereby notified the GMC Property Management intends to terminate you tenancy, for reason of your failure to comply with the duties imposed upon tenants by law and/or with material provision of you rental agreement, to wit: It has come to our attention that you are disturbing and being a nuisance to the resident (sic). This is in violation of your lease agreement. We need you to correct this matter immediately to avoid termination of your lease agreement. Demand is hereby made that you remedy the noncompliance within seven (7) days of this notice or your lease shall be deemed terminated and you shall vacate the premises upon such termination. If this same conduct, or conduct of a similar nature is repeated within 12 months, your tenancy is subject to termination without your being given an opportunity to cure the noncompliance. Because Petitioner was not at home or would not open the door, Respondent delivered this letter to Petitioner in a timely fashion by posting it at the entrance to Petitioner’s apartment. On April 6, 2006, Petitioner renewed a lease for the term beginning April 1, 2006, to March 31, 2007, for $385 per month. On May 8, 2006, Petitioner complained that he was having problems with his plumbing because his bathroom had brown spots on the floor and wall. Petitioner would not let Respondent’s maintenance in his apartment on May 9, 2006.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based on Petitioner’s national origin. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th of November, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel Sukyasov 2705 Stardust Court, No. 10 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Gregory Simms GMC Property Management 9550 Regency Square Boulevard, Suite 902 Jacksonville, Florida 32225
The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, two, whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to acts of coercion or retaliation as a result of Petitioner's exercise, or attempted exercise, of a protected housing right.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Maria Thornhill ("Thornhill") owns and lives in a unit in the Admiral Farragut Condominium Apartments. Respondent Admiral Farragut Condominium Association, Inc. ("AFCA"), manages the property of which Thornhill's condominium is a part. This case continues a dispute between Thornhill and AFCA which began in 1997, when Thornhill——without first securing AFCA's permission——installed three wooden steps leading from her rear balcony down to a patio located about 30 inches below. AFCA disapproved of the steps and directed Thornhill to remove them, which was done long ago. In the past, Thornhill has alleged, among other things, that AFCA and its individual directors unlawfully discriminated against her in denying her many requests to reinstall the steps, which she claims are needed as a reasonable accommodation for her handicap.2 Consequently, the parties have been pitted against each other for years in one legal proceeding after another, in various forums including DOAH. Thornhill has lost many battles in this protracted litigation——and consequently been ordered to pay tens of thousands of dollars in sanctions, court costs, and attorney's fees. Still, she presses on. In this case, Thornhill argues, as she has for more than a decade, that she needs to attach steps to her rear balcony because she is physically unable to traverse the 30 inches which separate the balcony from the ground and hence would be trapped if a fire were to block both of the unit's two doors to the outside. Not for the first time, Thornhill alleges here that AFCA discriminated against her on the basis of handicap when it denied her request(s), the most recent of which was made in January 2004, for approval of the steps. In addition to her claim involving the steps, Thornhill alleges that AFCA has discriminated or retaliated against her, in some unspecified way(s), in connection with a boat slip, which she is, evidently, "next in line" to rent, once the lease expires under which another unit owner currently enjoys the right to use the slip. Finally, Thornhill contends that, in its efforts to collect the various money judgments it has been awarded, AFCA has retaliated against her unlawfully. Determinations of Ultimate Fact With regard to the steps, Thornhill presented no evidence suggesting that such a modification is reasonable, nor any proof that installation of such steps is necessary to ameliorate the effects of her particular handicap. There is no evidence that any of AFCA's decisions concerning the boat slip were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Thornhill. There is likewise no evidence that AFCA ever undertook to execute or otherwise enforce the judgments it has obtained against Thornhill because of discriminatory animus. In sum, there is not a shred of competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination, coercion, or retaliation could possibly be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that AFCA did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding AFCA not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Thornhill no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon Petitioner’s race or handicap in providing housing assistance. Whether Respondent, in providing housing assistance, failed to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner’s physical disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and his family have been in subsidized housing for many years. Most recently, housing assistance has been provided by the Alachua County Housing Authority, first through the Tenant Based Rental Assistance (TBRA) program and, currently, through Section 8 subsidized housing. At the time of the administrative hearing, Petitioner and his family were still in Section 8 housing administered by Respondent. Under the TBRA program, the Castellio family was required to meet regularly with Housing Authority staff and their affiliates. They also had to meet certain performance standards relative to employment searches and maintenance of the household. Petitioner’s family was often unable to meet those performance standards-–particularly with respect to employment and payment of electrical bills. Because of his interactions with Respondent's staff, Petitioner had earned the reputation of being loud, demanding, and physically imposing. In one incident, Petitioner tried to prevent one of Respondent's workers from mowing his yard by physically blocking the lawn mower, even though such maintenance was required under the government program and was also an issue of local code enforcement. More than one of Respondent's staff reported that Petitioner would raise his voice when he was in Respondent's Housing Authority office. Some of Respondent's staff were intimidated by Petitioner. Because of this, the director of the Alachua Housing Authority, Gail Monahan, was tasked with dealing with Petitioner and the Castellio family. The pertinent part of Petitioner's Complaint states: My name is Christopher S.A. Castellio. My wife's name is Ethelyn L. Reese-Castello. We are the proud parents of five children which ages are 5, 7, 9, 11, and 16. Our 16 year old is living in Bend, Oregon with his uncle who has more resources to provide for him. Approximately for two years now, my family and I have lived on Section 8 through the Alachua County Housing Authority here in Gainesville, Florida. We have to report to the Executive Director of the Alachua County Housing Authority, Ms. Gail Monahan, every Wednesday of every week in order to report progress of trying to become self supporting and financial independent. During this time I have been humiliated in front of my wife, Ms. Monahan's office staff, other customers and patrons and, most humiliating, in front of my own kids. Ms. Gail Monahan has absolutely no compassion, professionalism, or moral conduct. Ms. Gail Monahan has called me everything but a child of God. In front of my kids, she has called me a lying sack of s-t, a sorry son of a b--h, a con artist, a--hole, and an f--wad. One day I just walked into her office and the first thing she said was, "hay you little s--tbird, what have you done s--ted out today." I served 6 years in the United States Marine Corps during Desert Storm from 1986 until 1992. While serving I injured my knee in Kuwait. I returned to the states where I underwent knee surgery. I was honorably discharged several months later. Ms. Monahan says I'm lying about my service, despite my service and medical records. Right now I am in constant pain in both my knees and my back. I have taken two MRI's for both knees and my doctor says that I desperately need a total right knee replacement and a basic left knee operation based on my MRI's. Ms. Monahan also says that's a lie. And she refuses to look at any doctor's reports. She said I probably faked them. Ever since I've been meeting with Ms. Monahan she has always had something discrimitory [sic], degrading, intimidating, and threaten [sic] to say to me. She always threatens to take our housing away from us, like she's doing right now, if we don't do exactly what she says to do. I do believe that she is prejudice [sic] against me because I am a very, very light-skinned black man with red hair and freckles. I do look like a white man to most people and my wife is very dark skinned African American. We have done everything she has told us to do but still she says that we have done nothing. She does not take into consideration the bad economy and that jobs are very hard to come by and that more and more people are being laid off every day. So she is going to make a family with 4 small children become homeless just because I can't work because of my back and my knees and because my wife couldn't find a job in today's economy. By the way, my wife has finally found a job working at Wal-mart. We finally received a letter from Ms. Monahan informing us of the termination of tenant based rental assistance. In the allotted time of seven working days, I have answered her letter in writing, requesting a hearing to appeal her decision. As of the date of this letter, I have not received anything or any notice of any hearing from Ms. Monahan. I will fax you a copy of both letters. Our move out date has been set as December 31st, 2009. Consistent with his Complaint, Petitioner testified that Ms. Monahan, the director of the Alachua County Housing Authority treated him badly, believed he was lazy, and questioned whether he suffered from a physical disability. In further support of the allegations, Petitioner’s wife, Ms. Reese-Castellio, testified that Gail Monahan was “mean” to their family. According to Ms. Reese-Castellio, Ms. Monahan called Petitioner a liar, said that he “didn’t give a damn” about his family, and suggested to her that she should consider leaving Petitioner. At the final hearing, Ms. Monahan admitted that she did not respect Mr. Castellio because he did not appear to be making any effort to support his family. She denied, however, that she cursed at him, and testified that she never discriminated against Petitioner or his family. While it is clear that there was personal animosity between Petitioner and Ms. Monahan, the evidence was insufficient to show that either Ms. Monahan or Respondent discriminated against Petitioner or his family. On cross-examination, Ms. Reese-Castellio disclosed that Ms. Monahan's remarks were only directed toward Petitioner, and that Ms. Monahan did not use racial epithets or otherwise give any indication that she was discriminating against Petitioner or his family because of race, handicap, or any other impermissible factor. Petitioner's wife further testified that she had no complaints about any of the other staff members at the Housing Authority. Likewise, Petitioner failed to provide evidence that either Ms. Monahan or Respondent has ever acted in a discriminatory manner toward him or his family based on race, ethnicity, handicap, or any other impermissible basis. Further, the evidence presented at the final hearing did not show that either Petitioner or his family have ever been denied housing assistance by Respondent. In fact, the evidence revealed that Petitioner and his family’s housing benefits administered by Respondent have never been interrupted or denied, and that the Castellio family has been treated at least as well, if not better, than other housing clients served by Respondent. In addition to administering basic housing benefits under TBRA and the Section 8 program, Respondent arranged to pay over $1,300 to repair Petitioner’s family car, paid for utilities when the Castellios were unable to do so, and provided bus vouchers and other transportation for the family on a regular basis. Respondent’s decision to provide these additional benefits was made by Ms. Monahan. At the final hearing, both Petitioner and his wife confirmed that Respondent had provided additional assistance and that Gail Monahan had control over these additional benefits. Neither Petitioner nor Ms. Reese-Castellio offered an explanation for why Ms. Monahan would go “above and beyond” the requirements of subsidized housing in order to assist the Castellio family. Ms. Monahan, in her credible testimony, explained that she had considerable compassion for Ethelyn Castellio and the Petitioner’s children, and that her compassion led her to offer extensive support for the Castellio family beyond simple housing assistance. Although Petitioner testified that the family was rejected as potential tenants at an apartment complex known as “Eden Park” after initially being accepted by the private landlord, and said that he believed that Gail Monahan had something to do with the rejection, Petitioner offered no evidence to support that belief. Ms. Monahan stated that neither she nor anyone from the Housing Authority spoke to anyone at Eden Park regarding the Petitioner or his family. She explained that tenants are responsible for locating suitable housing which is then inspected and approved by the Housing Authority. The credible testimony of Ms. Monahan, together with Petitioner's own testimony and admissions, demonstrated that Respondent did not interfere in the Eden Park situation, and never delayed inspections or unreasonably rejected any housing benefits for the Castellio family. In addition, while indeed, as alleged in the Complaint, Respondent issued a letter informing Petitioner that his family's rental assistance was scheduled to be terminated, the evidence adduced at the final hearing showed that the letter was issued in error, and that it was withdrawn. Finally, while the Commission states on page 5 of its Determination of no cause dated February 16, 2010, that “Complainant alleged he requested a reasonable accommodation, and Respondents denied his request,” a plain reading of the Complaint, quoted in paragraph 7, above, does not reveal that Petitioner ever alleged that Respondent failed to accommodate his disability. Moreover, the applications Petitioner and his family filed in 2008 and 2009 to obtain housing assistance from the Respondent state that the family was not seeking any accommodations on account of disability and that no one in the family suffered from any physical handicap. At the final hearing, Petitioner confirmed that the family never asked Respondent for accommodation based on any physical disability and reported in their applications that no member of the family was handicapped or required an accommodation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Cambridge Management Inc., engaged in housing discriminatory practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact In 2009-2010, Ms. Elizabeth Sherlock and her nine-year-old son, Luke Sherlock, rented a home from Ms. Sheryl Whitaker. The home was located in the Wedgewood II at Pelican Strand located in Collier County, Florida. The lease was from June 1, 2008, until June 1, 2010. Cambridge Management is the Master Association for the condominium association for the Strand properties. Cambridge Management did not rent or lease the home to Ms. Sherlock. Ms. Sherlock testified that the homeowner's association cited her for violations of the homeowner's association covenants, based on her son engaging in normal childhood activities such as climbing trees, archery, playing in the street and the community clubhouse. Ms. Sherlock testified that she was told in April 2010 that her lease would not be renewed, because her son had run across a sand trap on the golf course during a rain storm. According to Ms. Sherlock, Cambridge Management discriminated against her and her son by denying them access to their rented home.2/ Further, Ms. Sherlock testified that her son suffered severe traumatic stress, based on the security officers denying them access to their home. Finally, Ms. Sherlock testified that the decision not to continue renting to her caused her to move from the home and resulted in financial hardship. Ms. Sherlock's Petition for Relief summarily states that Respondents violated the Florida Fair Housing Act through "discriminatory terms, conditions, privileges or services, and facilities." The Petition for Relief does not contain any specific factual allegation against Respondents. The record does not support Ms. Sherlock's testimony that Cambridge Management engaged in any discriminatory practice or that it retaliated against her and her son in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act. Mr. LeClaire is a security guard for the Wedgewood at Pelican Strand. Mr. LeClaire testified that on June 24, 2010, at approximately 9:00 p.m., he had stopped Ms. Sherlock at the gate because his supervisor had told him that Ms. Sherlock may not be a current resident. After confirming that she was still a current resident, Mr. LeClaire allowed Ms. Sherlock to access her home through the gate. Although Mr. LeClaire's supervisor had told him that Ms. Sherlock may not be a current resident, no one from Cambridge Management had told Mr. LeClaire to deny Ms. Sherlock access to her rented home. Mr. Weaver is also a security guard for the Wedgewood at Pelican Strand. Mr. Weaver testified that on July 2, 2010, at approximately 9:00 p.m., he stopped Ms. Sherlock at the gatehouse to determine whether or not she was a current resident. Mr. Weaver credibly testified that he stopped Ms. Sherlock because he did not recognize her as a resident. After he verified that she was a current resident, Mr. Weaver allowed Ms. Sherlock into the community. Mr. Weaver credibly testified that he delayed her at most three minutes. Mr. Charles Sherlock is Ms. Sherlock's father. Mr. Sherlock resides in Naples, Florida, during the winter. He testified about the close relationship that he enjoys with his grandson Luke. According to Mr. Sherlock, Luke felt that it was his fault that he and Ms. Sherlock had been evicted from Ms. Whitaker's home, and had to move to Minnesota. Mr. Sherlock further testified that he had to pay for Ms. Sherlock's move to Minnesota, and that he would like to be reimbursed for the costs. Ms. Rubele is an officer with Wackenhut Security, and she testified about the Wackenhut Standard Operating Procedure for the Strand, and testified that Wackenhut's contact person for security was Ms. Brandy K. Callahan of Cambridge Property Management. Prior to the final hearing, Ms. Sherlock voluntarily dismissed, with prejudice, her claims against Respondents, Wedgewood at Pelican Strand Neighborhood Association, et al., and Newell Property Management, et al., and voluntarily dismissed Respondent, Sheryl Whitaker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order of dismissal of the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether any of the respondents is guilty of unlawful discrimination against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling, in violation of section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been an individual with a disability because he is infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). He is required regularly to take medication to control the disease. At all material times, Respondent Scandinavian Properties, LLC (Respondent Scandinavian) has owned a small complex of rental units in Miami Beach consisting of one or more Airbnb units at the back of the property and two duplex units at the front of property in a two-story building. This case involves one of the two-bedroom, one-bath duplexes with the address of 7910 Byron Avenue, Unit 1 (Unit 1), which was the ground-floor duplex. At all material times, Respondent Renes has been a managing principal of Respondent Scandinavian, and Respondent Bourguigne has been an employee of a property management company retained by Respondent Scandinavian to manage the complex. In an effort to find a suitable rental unit, Petitioner employed the services of a real estate broker or associate, who contacted Respondent Renes to discuss the rental of Unit 1, which had just undergone extensive renovations of two years' duration. Petitioner was recovering from recent surgery, so, as a favor to the real estate agent, Respondent Renes agreed to rent Unit 1 to Petitioner with a background check, but not the customary face-to-face meeting that Respondent Renes required with prospective tenants. Thus, Respondent Renes had limited, if any, contact with Petitioner during the lease negotiations. Petitioner and Respondent Scandinavian entered into a 12-month lease commencing November 1, 2018 (Lease). The Lease prohibited keeping any pets, smoking "in the Premises," creating any "environmental hazards on or about the Premises," keeping any flammable items "that might increase the danger of fire or damage" on the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, destroying, defacing, damaging, impairing or removing any part of the premises belonging to Respondent Scandinavian, and making any alterations or improvements to the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, although Petitioner was allowed to hang pictures and install window treatments. The Lease required Petitioner to ensure that all persons on the premises acted in a manner that did not "unreasonably disturb any neighbors or constitute a breach of the peace" and permitted Respondent Scandinavian to adopt or modify rules for the use of the common areas and conduct on the premises. The Lease assigned to Petitioner the responsibility for maintaining smoke detectors, locks, keys, and any furniture in the unit. The Lease permitted "[o]ccasional overnight guests," who could occupy the premises for no more than seven nights per month, and required written approval for anyone else to occupy the premises. Among the rules of the complex was a prohibition against disabling smoke detectors. However, without reference to the Lease provision applicable to pets, one rule allowed one dog or one cat. Another rule assured that management would help tenants gain access to their units when locked out. Within a few weeks of the commencement of the Lease, Petitioner's visitors violated two provisions of the Lease by smoking outside and allowing a dog to run loose in the common area. Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner of the violations, which do not appear to have resulted in any penalties. Admitting to the presence of the dog, Petitioner testified only that the video of the dog violation, if not also the smoking violation, led him to believe that he was being watched. Petitioner's complaint of individual surveillance became an ongoing issue--in his mind. The minimal staffing and small area occupied by the small complex, as a practical matter, both precluded individual operation of cameras to trace the movements of Petitioner and his visitors in the common area and facilitated the surveillance of all, or nearly all, of the common area with relatively few cameras. The evidence fails to support Petitioner's claim that the respondents at any time conducted video surveillance particularly of Petitioner or his visitors. Subsequently, Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner that someone had been shouting his name outside the gate of the complex during the evening hours. This incident is not prohibited by the Lease because the person, while perhaps acquainted with Petitioner, was not his invitee onto or about the premises. Nonetheless, Petitioner's sole reported reaction to this disturbance was to demand a copy of any video--and complain when the respondents failed to comply with his demand. Another of Petitioner's visitors parked a car outside the gate in a space reserved for occupants of the Airbnbs. When, evidently in the presence of Petitioner, Respondent Bourguigne confronted the visitor, the visitor replied that he had only been parked there for 20 minutes. Respondent Bourguigne stated that she had seen the car parked in the spot for 43 minutes. Again, Petitioner's sole response was not to deal with the violation, but to complain about surveillance, evidently of the parking area. The most serious violations of the Lease were discovered on January 28, 2019, when Respondent Renes conducted an inspection of Unit 1. Respondent Renes inspected all rental units of the complex every two or three months to check for safety issues that could imperil tenants or the complex itself. In her inspection, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had disconnected the smoke alarms and encased them in plastic tape to render them inoperative. She also found that Petitioner had crowded the unit with furniture to the point of impeding egress and constituting a fire hazard. Although not involving safety issues, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had attached screws to metal doors and kitchen cabinets, damaging these new fixtures. Additionally, Respondent Renes noted the presence of a cat. As noted above, the rules conflicted with the Lease as to the presence of a single dog or cat. In any event, by this time, the respondents were aware that the cat, as well as a human, routinely shared Unit 1 with Petitioner, and the respondents had impliedly consented to these cohabitations. Again, Petitioner's reaction to the Lease violations found by Respondent Renes on January 28 was not to address the problems. Instead, he objected to the inspection as singling him out. By letter delivered to Petitioner on February 14, 2019, Respondent Scandinavian advised that he was in violation of the Lease for allowing an unauthorized person and a cat to occupy the unit, for wrapping the smoke detectors in plastic, for damaging the unit's fixtures by attaching screws into the metal doors and kitchen cabinets, and by cluttering the interior of the unit so as to impede internal movement. The letter demands that Petitioner correct the violations within seven days, or else Respondent Scandinavian would terminate the lease. Respondent Bourguigne's main involvement with this case involves an incident that occurred on the evening of February 15, 2019, when Petitioner locked his keys in his unit and was unable to unlock the door or otherwise enter the unit. Petitioner called the office, but Respondent Bourguigne, who responds to such requests during her normal working hours of Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., did not receive the call until the following morning when she listened to messages. Respondent Bourguigne promptly called Respondent Renes for guidance, and Respondent Renes directed her to summon the complex's handyman, who, as soon as he could, which was 1:00 p.m. on February 16, drove to the complex and opened Unit 1 for Petitioner. Rather than call a locksmith when the respondents failed to respond immediately to his call to the office, Petitioner and a companion attempted to break into Unit 1 with a screwdriver at about 1:30 a.m. Although unaware of the lockout, Respondent Renes learned of the attempted break-in through an automated security system, so she called the police, who reported to the scene and, after briefly interrogating Petitioner, determined that no crime had taken place. Petitioner wrongly concluded that Respondent Renes had been watching him in real time and called the police, knowing that the apparent perpetrator was really Petitioner and no crime was taking place. While locked out of his unit, Petitioner had also sent emails to Respondent Renes. In one of them sent on February 16, Petitioner advised for the first time that he was diagnosed with HIV and dependent on medication that was locked in his unit. Respondent Renes testified that she did not see these emails until days later. At minimum, it is clear that, prior to February 16, no respondent was on notice of Petitioner's disability, so the seven-day notice letter delivered two days earlier could not have been motivated by a discriminatory intent. Despite the seven-day deadline contained in the letter of February 14, by email or text dated February 21, Petitioner advised Respondent Renes that, by 2:00 p.m. on February 22, he "will have remedied each of the … listed [violations]." This was one day past the deadline. Because Petitioner failed timely to meet the conditions of the February 14 seven-day notice letter, Respondent Scandinavian commenced an eviction proceeding on February 22 and, after a hearing, obtained a judgment ordering the eviction of Petitioner. Petitioner failed to prove any discriminatory intent on the part of any of the respondents in their dealings with him, any incidental discriminatory effect in their acts and omissions, or any failure or refusal to accommodate Petitioner's disability. To the contrary, as to discrimination, Respondent Renes chose to forego eviction and instead give Petitioner a chance timely to remedy the Lease violations; when Petitioner failed to do so, Respondent Scandinavian proceeded to evict Petitioner. Nor has any act or omission of any respondent had a discriminatory incidental effect on Petitioner. Lastly, the availability of Respondents Renes and Bourguigne or other employees of Respondent Scandinavian to open units to locked-out tenants and occupants was reasonable and in no way constituted a failure to accommodate Petitioner's disability, for which Petitioner never requested or, on these facts, needed an accommodation.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the respondents not guilty of the charges set forth in the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Philip Kim, Esquire Pensky & Kim, P.A. 12550 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 401 North Miami, Florida 33181 (eServed) Jack Wilson 17560 Atlantic Boulevard, Apartment 515 Sunny Isles Beach, Florida 33160 (eServed) Cheyenne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact At times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, a female born in October 1953, received housing assistance from a federally funded assistance program referred to as the Section 8 Choice Voucher program (the Section 8 program). The Section 8 program relevant to this proceeding is administered by Respondent and has eligibility criteria that a participant must meet. A participant receives a voucher from the Section 8 program that pays part, but not all, of the participant’s rent. Petitioner has also received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) at all times relevant to this proceeding. Respondent knew that Petitioner received SSI, but it had no information as to why she qualified to receive SSI. At the times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner’s landlord was named Rupert Phipps. On May 27, 2007, Mr. Phipps issued to Petitioner a notice styled “Three-day Notice for Non- payment of Rent pursuant to Florida Statutes" (Notice). After stating the amount owed and the address of the rented premises, the Notice demanded “. . . payment of the rent or possession of the Premises within three days (excluding Saturday, Sunday and legal holidays). ” Petitioner was evicted from her apartment. The date of the eviction was not established. After being advised by Mr. Phipps that Petitioner had failed to pay her rent, Ms. Smith mailed to Petitioner a certified letter dated July 6, 2007, stating that she would be terminated from the Section 8 program effective August 6, 2007. The stated reason for the termination was Petitioner’s failure to pay rent to the landlord, which is considered a serious violation of the lease and, therefore, a violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982,511(4)(c), which prohibits a participant in the Section 8 program from committing any serious or repeated violation of the lease with the participant’s landlord. Ms. Smith’s letter also contained the following statement: . . . If you wish to appeal this decision, you have the right to an informal hearing. The request must be submitted to this agency in writing within 10 days from the date of this letter. Your request should be directed to Alex Morales, Executive Director. The ten-day period for the appeal is part of Respondent’s written policies and is consistent with the requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 982.554(a), that require an agency such as Respondent to have a written appeals process. Respondent has consistently treated the failure of a participant to pay his or her share of the rent as a serious violation of a lease. Petitioner was familiar with Respondent’s appeal process because she had successfully appealed a prior notice of termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Ms. Smith’s letter was received by Petitioner on July 7, 2007. At some undetermined time between July 7 and July 19, 2007, Ms. Tennie called Ms. Smith and told Ms. Smith that she was sick. Ms. Smith told Ms. Tennie that she would have to follow the instructions set forth in the letter and respond in writing if she wanted an informal appeal. On July 19, 2007, Petitioner sent the following letter to the attention of Ms. Smith and Mr. Morales: Would you give me Mae Tennie another hearing because I got the letter to [sic] late and I was in the hospital due to an anurism [sic] stroke at the brain their [sic] was blood on my head and I’m still rehabilitating the after affects [sic] of this serious condition. In the case of my Section 8 voucher being terminated I plead for another hearing due to the terms [sic] of my hospitalization. Respondent received Petitioner’s letter on July 23, 2007. Petitioner’s written request for an appeal was after the ten-day deadline for filing the request. By letter signed by Mr. Morales and dated July 25, 2007, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request contained in her letter dated July 19 as follows: I am in receipt of your letter requesting a hearing. Please be advised that your request for a hearing cannot be granted because your request was not made within the required 10 day period. For this reason, your case will remain closed. No further action was taken by either party to this proceeding until December 2007, when Petitioner sought the services of Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc. On December 20, 2007, Mr. Lewis, as counsel for Petitioner, sent the following letter to Mr. Morales: This office represents Ms. Mae Tennie regarding her participation in the Section 8 program administered through the Hialeah Housing Authority (“HHA”). Ms. Tennie has been a participant of Section 8 through HHA for the past 25 years. On July 6, 2007, HHA served Ms. Tennie with notice of its intent to terminate her Section 8 assistance on the basis that she violated one of her obligations under the program. The notice informed Ms. Tennie of her right to appeal the decision and to attend an informal hearing. The written request was to be submitted to HHA within 10 days of the date of the letter. Ms. Tennie faxed her written request for an appeal on July 19, 2007. A copy of Ms. Tennie’s letter is attached as “Attachment A.” In her request, she notified HHA that she was unable to submit her request within the time required because she [had] been, and still was, recovering from a brain aneurism.[2] On or about July 31, 2007, HHA notified Ms. Tennie that her request was denied because it was submitted too late. Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie with an informal hearing to appeal the termination. Ms. Tennie is an elderly woman in failing health. In June 2007, Ms. Tennie was hospitalized twice at Jackson South Community Hospital as a result of suffering an “intracranial hemorrhage.”[3] I have attached copies of supporting medical documentation as “Attachment B.” As a result of this very serious medical condition, Ms. Tennie’s cognitive abilities were significantly diminished. Ms. Tennie was bed-bound and only able to communicate under great strain. The Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibits [sic] any agency or landlord receiving federal funds to deny equal access for individuals with disabilities to housing or other program benefits and services. To ensure individuals with disabilities have equal access to those services and benefits, an agency or landlord is required to provide reasonable accommodations to that person’s disability. One form of reasonable accommodations is the modification of a program rule or policy. The right to a hearing to appeal the termination of Section 8 assistance is a benefit that Ms. Tennie, as a participant, was entitled to. Ms. Tennie made clear in her letter to HHA that she was unable to comply with HHA’s time requirement because of her disabling medical condition. Ms. Tennie also asked that the policy be modified to accommodate her disability. HHA should have reasonably accommodated Ms. Tennie’s disability by simply modifying the time period by adding 3 extra days for her to submit her request for a hearing. By failing to do so, HHA effectively denied Ms. Tennie equal access to federal benefit under the Section 8 program, that of having a hearing to appeal her termination. Ms. Tennie is therefore renewing her request to HHA for reasonable accommodations to her disability by modifying the time limit to request a hearing. For the above reasons, Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie a hearing to challenge her termination from Section 8. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or additional information at ... . [telephone number omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] By letter dated December 26, 2007, Respondent denied the request set forth in Mr. Lewis’s letter. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the complaint with HUD that culminated in this proceeding as described in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Ms. Tennie was hospitalized June 7, 2007, and discharged June 14, 2007. Mr. Lewis attached to his letter a discharge summary from Jackson Memorial Hospital, which contained the following diagnoses on discharge: Intracranial hemorrhage with intraventricular extension secondary to uncontrolled hypertension. Diabetes. The discharge summary reflects that Petitioner had fallen the Saturday before admission and had hit her head on a doorknob. The discharge summary reflects that on discharge she was awake, alert, and oriented times three. She had fluent speech and she was able to ambulate without difficulty. She was instructed to make an appointment with her primary care doctor in one week and to follow up in the Jackson Memorial’s Stroke Clinic in 4 to 8 weeks. Petitioner was discharged to home in a stable condition. Petitioner scheduled an appointment with Milton R. Bengoa, M.D., and on June 18, 2007, she kept that appointment. No finding is made as to Petitioner’s physical status as determined by Dr. Bengoa because nearly all of his notes of that meeting are illegible. In response to questions from her attorney, Petitioner testified as follows beginning at page 27, line 12: Q. And Ms. Tennie, can you please describe what your current health conditions are? A. Right now it’s not very good, because after I had the aneurism I have been having problems walking and problems breathing and I have seizures that I never had before until I had the aneurism and I take all kinds of medicines. And I just found out last week I have a brain mass and they don’t know if it is cancer or what, because the blood that was left in my head was still there so I have excruciating headaches. Q. And could you please explain what your health condition was at or about the time you suffered the stroke or shortly after you had suffered the stroke? A. Well, shortly after I suffered the stroke I had to try and walk all over again, because my memory where I had the stroke at, the neurologist said that it was so deep in my brain that they couldn’t do surgery and that it was going to mess my motor skills up. So I had to learn how to swallow. I forgot how to swallow meat and stuff, so I started eating soft food. I had problems breathing, so when I come [sic] home I had a breathing machine – oxygen machine there. My daughter had to help me try to walk all over again. Q. And so I take it you had someone helping you? A. Yes. My daughter. I moved home with my daughter, because they wanted to put me out at Purdue, it is a nursing facility, but she wanted me to come home with her, so that is what I did. I went home with my daughter and I stayed there for six months. Then I found the place down the street, close to her, which was a two bedroom. Q. Now, prior to suffering the stroke, how was your – can you describe what your health condition was. A. Before I had the stroke, I was sick too. I have congestive heart failure, so I kept going back and forth into the hospital because of my breathing. When the water built up around my heart it had [sic] me to where I can’t breathe. So I have to go in and let them pull the water off. And I was sick before I had the stroke. Petitioner also testified that she could not timely request a hearing and blamed that inability on her general medical condition. Petitioner’s testimony as to her medical condition shortly after the hospitalization is unconvincing because it contradicts the description of her medical condition as described by her treating physician in the discharge notes. The evidence established that Petitioner received Ms. Smith's letter dated July 6, 2007, and understood its contents. Petitioner’s testimony is insufficient to establish that her medical condition caused her failure to timely request an informal hearing to appeal of the termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Petitioner failed to establish that she required an extension of the expired deadline to request an informal hearing as a “reasonable accommodation” of her condition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not liable for the acts of discrimination alleged in the subject Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner for discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact In June 2016, Gaudina and Grand Lifestyle executed a document, entitled “GLC III/LLLP Lease – Basic Rental Agreement or Residential Lease” (lease), in which Gaudina leased from Grand Lifestyle a residence at 3346 East Dale Street, Leesburg, Florida, in the Lakeside Village mobile home park (premises). The lease provided that Gaudina pay to Grand Lifestyle $656.00 per month to lease the premises. The lease further provided that at the end of three consecutive years of living at the premises, Grand Lifestyle would provide Gaudina the option of purchasing the premises for $1,000.00. Gaudina testified that his primary residence is in Colorado, but that he wished to lease the premises so that he had a residence when he visited his wife, who lived nearby in Lake County, Florida. As he did not reside permanently at the premises in Leesburg, Gaudina subleased the premises to another individual, possibly in violation of the lease. That individual reported to Gaudina numerous issues with the premises, which Gaudina testified he brought to the attention of Grand Lifestyle.2/ Both parties testified that they sought various remedies in other courts concerning these issues. The undersigned finds that these issues are not relevant to Gaudina’s allegations concerning discrimination under the Florida FHA. Gaudina testified that he possesses a disability that requires use of an emotional support animal. The only evidence Gaudina submitted in support of this contention was a letter, dated February 24, 2015, from Emilia Ripoll, M.D. (Ripoll), located in Boulder, Colorado, and a “Health Care Provider Pet Accomodation Form,” also from Ripoll. This letter states: Mr. Jan Gaudina is currently my patient and has been under my care since 1998. I am intimately familiar with his history and with the functional limitations imposed by his medical condition. Due to his diagnosis of bladder cancer and bilateral ureter cancer, Jan has certain emotional limitations including stress which may cause his cancer to recur. In order to help alleviate these difficulties, and to enhance his ability to cope and live independently, I have prescribed Jan to obtain his pet for emotional support. The presence of this animal is necessary for the mental health of Jan. The Health Care Accomodation Form prescribed the use of Gaudina’s dog, a golden retriever, as an emotional support animal. Gaudina did not present the testimony of Ripoll or any other health care provider concerning his alleged disability. The letter and form, which are inadmissible hearsay that Gaudina failed to corroborate with admissible non-hearsay evidence, attempt to establish that Gaudina required an emotional support animal to prevent a recurrence of cancer. The undersigned cannot consider these documents to support a finding that Gaudina is disabled and in need of an emotional support animal. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.213(3).3/ Therefore, the undersigned finds that Gaudina has failed to establish that he suffers from a disability that requires the accommodation of his golden retriever as an emotional support animal. Principe, the owner of Grand Lifestyle, testified that the prospectus for the premises restricted pet ownership to pets that weigh less than 20 pounds. The parties acknowledged that a golden retriever weighs in excess of 20 pounds. Principe testified that, during a telephone conversation, Gaudina asked whether he could bring his golden retriever to the premises, but never mentioned his alleged disability. Principe also testified that he asked Gaudina whether Gaudina’s golden retriever was a trained service dog. Gaudina testified that his golden retriever was not a “service dog,” as defined under section 413.08, Florida Statutes.4/ Principe further testified that Gaudina rarely visited the premises. Gaudina testified that, in total, he visited the premises in Leesburg three or four times over the period of approximately one year. Gaudina presented no credible evidence that he qualifies as a person who is disabled for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Further, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Jan Gaudina, did not prove that Respondent, Grand Lifestyle Communities III/IV, LLLP, committed discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, and dismissing his Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner because of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner Shelley M. Wright ("Wright") was a graduate student at Florida International University ("FIU") in Miami, Florida. Wright has a physical disability that affects her mobility, and, as a result, she uses a wheelchair or scooter to get around. There is no dispute that Wright falls within a class of persons protected against discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"). Respondent Servitas Management Group, LLC ("SMG"), manages Bayview Student Living ("Bayview"), a privately owned student housing community located on FIU's campus. Bayview's owner, NCCD — Biscayne Properties, LLC, leases (from FIU) the real estate on which the project is situated. Bayview is a recently built apartment complex, which first opened its doors to students for the 2016-2017 school year. On November 20, 2015, Wright submitted a rental application for a single occupancy efficiency apartment in Bayview, fitted out for residents with disabilities. She was charged an application fee of $100.00, as were all applicants, plus a "convenience fee" of $6.45. Much later, Wright would request that SMG refund the application fee, and SMG would deny her request, although it would give her a credit of $6.45 to erase the convenience fee on the grounds that it had been charged in error. Wright complains that this transaction was tainted with unlawful discrimination, but there is no evidence of such, and thus the fees will not be discussed further. Wright's application was approved, and, accordingly, she soon executed a Student Housing Lease Contract ("First Lease") for a term commencing on August 20, 2016, and ending on July 31, 2017. The First Lease stated that her rent would be $1,153.00 per month, and that the total rent for the lease term would be $12,683.00. Because Wright was one of the first students to sign a lease, she won some incentives, namely $500.00 in Visa gift cards and an iPad Pro. The First Lease provided that she would receive a $200.00 gift card upon lease execution and the balance of $300.00 upon moving in. As it happened, Wright did not receive the gift cards in two installments, but instead accepted five cards worth $500.00, in the aggregate, on August 20, 2016. There were two reasons for this. One was that SMG required lease holders to appear in-person to take possession of the gift cards and sign a receipt acknowledging delivery. Wright was unable (or unwilling) to travel to SMG's office until she moved to Miami in August 2016 to attend FIU. The other was that SMG decided not to use gift cards as the means of paying this particular incentive after integrating its rent collection operation with FIU's student accounts. Instead, SMG would issue a credit to the lease holders' student accounts in the amount of $500.00. Wright, however, insisted upon the gift cards, and so she was given them rather than the $500.00 credit. Wright has alleged that the untimely (or inconvenient) delivery of the gift cards constituted unlawful discrimination, but the evidence fails to sustain the allegation, which merits no further discussion. In May 2016, SMG asked Wright (and all other Bayview lease holders) to sign an amended lease. The revised lease made several changes that SMG called "improvements," most of which stemmed from SMG's entering into a closer working relationship with FIU. (One such change was the aforementioned substitution of a $500.00 credit for gift cards.) The amended lease, however, specified that Wright's total rent for the term would be $13,836.00——an increase of $1,153.00 over the amount stated in the First Lease. The explanation was that, in the First Lease, the total rent had been calculated by multiplying the monthly installment ($1,153.00) by 11, which did not account for the 12 days in August 2016 included in the lease term. SMG claimed that the intent all along had been to charge 12 monthly installments of $1,153.00 without proration (even though the tenant would not have possession of the premises for a full 12 months) and thus that the First Lease had erroneously shown the total rent as $12,683.00. As SMG saw it, the revised lease simply fixed this mistake. Wright executed the amended lease on or about May 10, 2016 (the "Second Lease"). Wright alleges that this rent "increase" was the product of unlawful discrimination, retaliation, or both. There is, however, no persuasive evidence supporting this allegation. The same rental amount was charged to all occupants of the efficiency apartments, regardless of their disabilities or lack thereof, and each of them signed the same amended lease document that Wright executed. To be sure, Wright had reason to be upset about SMG's revision of the total rent amount, which was not an improvement from her standpoint, and perhaps she had (or has) legal or equitable remedies available for breach of lease. But this administrative proceeding is not the forum for redressing such wrongs (if any). Relatedly, some tenants received a rent reduction through the amended leases SMG presented in May 2016, because the rates were reduced therein for two- and four-bedroom apartments. As was made clear at the time, however, rates were not reduced on the one-bedroom studios due to their popularity. Wright alleges that she subsequently requested an "accommodation" in the form of a rent reduction, which she argues was necessary because she leased a more expensive studio apartment, not by choice, but of necessity (since only the one- bedroom unit met her needs in light of her disabilities). This claim fails because allowing Wright to pay less for her apartment than every other tenant is charged for the same type of apartment would amount to preferential treatment, which the law does not require. Wright makes two claims of alleged discrimination that, unlike her other charges, are facially plausible. She asserts that the handicapped parking spaces at Bayview are unreasonably far away for her, given her limited mobility. She further asserts that the main entrance doors (and others in the building) do not afford two-way automatic entry, and that as a result, she has difficulty exiting through these doors. The undersigned believes it is possible, even likely, that the refusal to offer Wright a reasonable and necessary accommodation with regard to the alleged parking situation, her problems with ingress and egress, or both, if properly requested, might afford grounds for relief under the FFHA. The shortcoming in Wright's current case is the absence of persuasive proof that she ever presented an actual request for such an accommodation, explaining the necessity thereof, for SMG's consideration. There is evidence suggesting that Wright complained about the parking and the doors, perhaps even to SMG employees, but a gripe, without more, is not equivalent to a request for reasonable accommodation. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of SMG's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Wright, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Wright. There is no persuasive evidence that SMG denied a request of Wright's for a reasonable accommodation at Bayview. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that SMG did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding SMG not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Wright no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2017.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice.
Findings Of Fact Several years prior to 2007, Petitioner, Wanda Hutcheson, leased one side of a duplex apartment from LGMS. The apartment was located on 3359 Greenbrier Circle, in Gulf Breeze, Florida. During the time that LGMS owned the property, the property manager found her to be a responsible tenant who paid her rent on time. Indeed, the manager felt that she had improved the look and value of the property because she had done extensive landscaping in her front yard. The increase in value was not shown by the evidence. At the time, Petitioner’s landlord knew that she had a mental disorder known as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). In part, the extensive yard work done by Petitioner was due to her OCD. She regularly watered her yard with the shared sprinkler system that served both apartments in the duplex. However, the electricity for the water pump that operated the sprinkler system was hooked into the electrical system for the apartment adjoining Petitioner’s apartment. The sprinkler system was operated by a switch located either by or in the electrical box for the adjoining apartment and the electrical box for her apartment. Petitioner was frequently in the area of those boxes. Respondent, Sand Dunes Property, LLC (Sand Dunes), is a limited liability company owned and operated by Respondents, Robert and Justin MacFarland. In 2006, Sand Dunes purchased several parcels of rental property from LGMS, including the apartment leased by Petitioner. In February 2006, prior to Sand Dunes’ purchase of the property, the MacFarlands visited the premises they were about to purchase and met Petitioner. At that time, Petitioner told the Respondents that she had OCD. She neither requested nor indicated the need for any special accommodations from the Respondents regarding her lease. The evidence did not show that the Respondents knew or were aware that OCD could be a disability that might significantly interfere with a person’s life activities. To them, Petitioner did not seem mentally disabled and appeared able to carry out her daily activities. She appeared to live her life as any other person might. In fact, among other things, Petitioner drove a car, occasionally worked cleaning houses, performed yard work, had the electrical part of her apartment’s sprinkler system transferred to her electrical system, paid her lease and cared for other people’s children. Around March 2006, subsequent to the purchase of the property by the Respondents, Peter Bouchard moved into the apartment next to Petitioner’s apartment. Shortly after he moved in, Petitioner was watering her yard with the sprinkler system. Mr. Bouchard saw her and turned off the sprinkler system. He told her he did not believe in watering the grass and that he did not want his yard watered. He told her that as long as the pump was hooked to his electrical box that she could not use the sprinkler system since he was paying for the electricity used in its operation. He suggested that she could have the pump transferred to her electrical box if she wanted to continue to use the system. Petitioner called Respondents and left a message about the need to transfer the electrical connection for the sprinkler system to her electrical box and to make sure it was alright for her to pay to have the system transferred. The evidence did not show that she related the details of Mr. Bouchard’s actions to Respondent’s. She did not receive a response to her message and eventually paid for the system to be transferred to her electrical box. At some point, even though she did not own the sprinkler systems components, she removed the sprinkler heads from Mr. Bouchard’s side of the yard. She capped the pipe where the heads had been and filled the hole. She did not tell anyone that she had removed the sprinkler heads, but kept the sprinkler heads in her apartment. Additionally, during March 2006, Petitioner complained to Santa Rosa Animal Control about Mr. Bouchard’s two dogs being abused by him and barking. She also complained about the two dogs of the neighbor who lived behind her, Jodi Henning. Both of these incidents were investigated by Animal Control and no abuse was discovered. In fact, the dogs never barked or only barked for a short time when the investigator visited the duplex on two occasions. Petitioner’s actions appeared to be in retaliation for Mr. Bouchard’s refusal to permit her to use the sprinkler system. Finally, at some point, Petitioner while on her front porch saw Mr. Bouchard’s son walking to his apartment. She told the boy that she would cause Mr. Bouchard’s dogs to be removed for abuse and then would have him removed for the same reason. The comment upset both the boy and Mr. Bouchard. On April 3, 2006, Sand Dunes mailed a written offer to enter into a new lease with Petitioner. The offer was made to Petitioner because her lease would terminate on May 30, 2006. The offer was conditioned upon an increase in the monthly rent on Petitioner’s apartment. The offer stated, “Please let us know by May 1st of your decision so that we may set up an appointment to review and sign your new lease agreement.” The intent of the letter’s language was to not be contractually bound until a new lease was signed by the parties. There was no evidence that Respondents treated any other potentially continuing tenant differently. Around April 4, 2006, Mr. MacFarland left a message for Petitioner regarding a maintenance check on her apartment’s air conditioner. Petitioner returned the call and left a message that she could not be present at the time suggested and asked that the work be performed at another time. Petitioner received the written offer of renewal on April 5, 2006, and attempted to accept the offer by leaving a message on Respondent’s telephone. After the first message, Petitioner left town to attend a family function out of state. Around April 6, 2006, air-conditioning maintenance checks were performed on nine of ten units owned by the Respondents in the Greenbrier area. Around April 6 or 7, 2006, Respondents were contacted by Mr. Bouchard. Mr. Bouchard complained about Petitioner to the MacFarlands. He told them that Petitioner had stolen the sprinkler heads out of his side of the yard and that she turned off the electricity to his apartment. He showed them a photograph of the unlocked electrical box to his unit. He also relayed to Respondents that Petitioner had repeatedly accused him of abusing his dogs, not properly vaccinating his dogs and had repeatedly reported him to Animal Control for animal abuse and barking dogs. Apparently, Mr. Bouchard complained enough about Petitioner to Respondents to make them believe that Respondent was a particularly disruptive and vengeful tenant. At some point, Respondents became aware of Jodi Henning’s problems with Petitioner. Ms. Henning lived in a different complex from Petitioner. However, her backyard adjoined Petitioner’s backyard. She called the Sheriff's Department on Ms. Hutcheson on a few occasions for problems she had with Petitioner. None of the incidents amounted to an arrest. During an evening in March 2005, Ms. Henning’s dogs were inside with her. They had not been outside. Ms. Henning answered the door. Petitioner, who was quite angry, complained about Ms. Henning’s dogs and told her that she had made an enemy of Petitioner and that she would make Ms. Henning’s life miserable. Ms. Henning called the Sheriff’s Department. The 911 operator asked if Petitioner was drunk. Ms. Henning said that Petitioner was not drunk, but just crazy and mean. Petitioner was told by law enforcement personnel that Santa Rosa County Animal Control should be contacted if she had an issue with a neighbor's dog. She then filed a complaint with Santa Rosa County Animal Control about Ms. Henning’s dogs. Petitioner made a similar complaint in April 2006. Neither complaint was found to have merit by the investigator for Animal Control. Additionally, Ms. Henning felt that she could not go out in her yard without Petitioner coming out to watch her. Petitioner never engaged in any physically, aggressive behavior. However, Ms. Henning felt she became threatening to the point she was afraid. Petitioner had told both Ms. Henning and Mr. Bouchard that she had OCD. However, based on their observation of her, neither thought that Petitioner was disabled by her condition. They both thought that she was simply nosy and mean. On the other hand, there were former neighbors who thought Petitioner was a nice person and a good neighbor. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that these neighbors’ opinions were known to the Respondents during the time the offer to lease was outstanding. Mr. MacFarland obtained copies of "call reports" received by Animal Control regarding Ms. Henning and Mr. Bouchard's dogs. Those reports consisted of complaints in March 2005 about Ms. Henning's two dogs, and in March 2006 concerning Ms. Henning's two dogs and Mr. Bouchard's two dogs. On April 10, 2006, Respondents sent a letter on Sand Dunes' stationary revoking the earlier offer to lease her apartment after expiration of her lease. Based on the Respondents limited knowledge about Petitioner during the time the offer to lease was outstanding, their conclusion was neither unreasonable nor discriminatory. Thereafter, the Respondents were entitled to rely on the expiration of the lease by its terms and the peaceful return of the premises. Petitioner received the revocation letter around April 12, 2007, when she returned home from out of state. No explanation was given in the letter for the withdrawal of the offer to lease. Petitioner called Mr. MacFarland on the date she received the revocation letter. She was very distraught and tearful. During the long conversation, the only explanation Respondent recalled from Mr. MacFarland as to why Respondents withdrew their offer was that he did not like her. Petitioner also was told to communicate with their lawyer, Keri Anne Schultz, Esquire. Petitioner went to Ms. Schultz's law office to discuss the situation with her. Ms. Shultz was not in the office. Petitioner was told by the receptionist that she could not wait in the office for Ms. Schultz to return. Ms. Hutcheson wanted to write Ms. Schultz a note regarding renting the duplex. Mr. Bordelon, Ms. Schultz's partner, threatened to call the police if Petitioner remained at the office. Petitioner left the office. Thereafter, the only communication from the MacFarlands or their attorney was legal notices to vacate the premises. Petitioner did attempt to send them information on OCD. The evidence was not clear whether the Respondents received the information or reviewed it. Petitioner refused to vacate the premises and an eviction action was filed in June 2006. A hearing was held in the Circuit Court in June and July of 2006. By court order dated August 17, 2006, Respondents were awarded possession of the property on August 31, 2006, at 11:59 p.m. Unfortunately, Petitioner, due to ill health, did not begin to vacate the premises until a few days prior to forcible removal. She was not finished moving on September 5, 2006, five days after the Respondents were to be put in possession of the property. The Respondents had the Sheriff’s Deputy remove Petitioner from the premises, telling her that she should have been out a long time ago. The MacFarlands, with a little help from Mr. Bouchard, removed the rest of Petitioner’s possessions to the curb. During the removal, the bottom of a box Mr. Bouchard was carrying came undone and some of the contents fell onto the pavement. One jar of food was broken. All of these events were very distressful to Petitioner. Upon learning that she would be evicted, Petitioner began seeing Dr. Bingham in May 2006. Eventually, she was involuntarily committed for a short time and has been seeing Dr. Bingham every two or three weeks for the last year. The apartment remained vacant for several months after the eviction. Eventually, Mr. Bouchard moved into the unit at a lower rate of rent than he paid for his old apartment but higher than the amount Petitioner would have paid if the new lease had taken effect. As indicated, between February 2006 and April 2006, Mr. and Mrs. MacFarland's only contact with Petitioner was a visit to her duplex apartment with the realtor selling the property and some voice mails exchanged between them concerning the sprinkler and air conditioning systems. Respondents had little knowledge regarding Petitioner. Even though the evidence demonstrates that Respondents could have acted more kindly and could have better informed themselves about the circumstances of Petitioner, there was no evidence that the withdrawal of the offer to renew was made based on an intent to discriminate against Petitioner because of her mental disability. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Melissa A. Posey, Esquire Melissa A. Posey, P.A. 201 East Government Street, Suite 36 Pensacola, Florida 32502 Robert and Justyn MacFarland Sand Dune Properties 7173 Blue Jack Drive Navarre, Florida 32566 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301