Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
DASTHA CREWS vs GREEN OAKS TAMPA, LLC, 20-000888 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 19, 2020 Number: 20-000888 Latest Update: May 26, 2020

The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling; or provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”), section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2019).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female residing in Tallahassee, Florida, who purports to have diagnoses of depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and a learning disability. Petitioner offered no evidence regarding how her diagnoses affect her daily life. Petitioner originally signed a lease with Respondent to rent apartment F201 at Sabal Court Apartments, 2125 Jackson Bluff Road, Tallahassee, Florida, from November 1, 2017, to October 31, 2018. Petitioner moved into the apartment with her two minor children on November 2, 2017. Petitioner testified her two minor children also have ADHD. On October 24, 2018, Petitioner renewed her lease for the apartment for the term of November 1, 2018, through October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that, during the term of both leases, she experienced problems with the apartment; including mold in the bathroom, bed bugs, ants, roaches, spiders, and cracked flooring. Most distressing to Petitioner was the air conditioning unit, which Petitioner alleges was filthy and failed to cool the apartment. Petitioner testified she submitted several requests for the unit to be serviced, but it was never repaired to good working condition. Petitioner complained that the apartment was too hot—frequently reaching temperatures in excess of 80 degrees—for her and her children to sleep at night. On August 7, 2019, Petitioner executed a lease renewal form, requesting to renew her lease for an additional 12 months—through October 31, 2020. On September 23, 2019, Respondent posted a Notice of Non-Renewal of Lease (“Notice”) on Petitioner’s apartment door. The Notice notified Petitioner that her tenancy would not be renewed and that she was expected to vacate the premises on or before October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that she did not know why her lease was non- renewed, but believed it to be additional mistreatment of her and her family by Respondent. In response to the undersigned’s question why Petitioner believed Respondent’s treatment of her to be related to her handicap, or that of her children, Petitioner replied that she does not believe that the non-renewal of her lease, or other issues with Respondent’s management, was based on either her handicap or that of her children.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202021115. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Dastha L. Crews Apartment A 2125 Pecan Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) Joni Henley, Assistant Manager Sabal Court Apartments 2125 Jackson Bluff Road Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Todd A. Ruderman Green Oaks Tampa, LLC Suite 218 3201 West Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.22760.23760.34 DOAH Case (2) 12-323720-0888
# 1
CATHERINE PRICE vs RIVER OAK REALTY, INC., 18-002861 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jun. 05, 2018 Number: 18-002861 Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024
# 2
DONALD TRAVIS AND LISA HARRELL vs ANNE AND JOHN CUTLER, 09-003577 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jul. 08, 2009 Number: 09-003577 Latest Update: Feb. 17, 2010

The Issue The issue for determination in this matter is whether Respondents engaged in acts of housing discrimination against Petitioners on the basis of race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Donald Travis and Lisa Harrell, are a bi-racial couple (Mr. Travis is African-American and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons subject to protection under Florida's Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, and Ms. Harrell is white). They have two sons who are bi-racial (one is African-American and white, the other is white and Asian). Petitioners lived in Apartment 163 at 10075 West Highway 98, Pensacola, Florida 32506. Respondents, John and Anne Cutler, are the owners of two four-plex apartments at 10075 West Highway 98, Pensacola, Florida 32506, including the unit occupied by Petitioners that gave rise to this matter. They are both retired educators who own and operate their apartment rental business in their retirement. In their teaching and professional careers, both have instructed students of various races and national origins. Petitioner, Donald Travis, is a veteran of Desert Storm and has been treated for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. He regularly takes medications to treat anxiety and depression. On April 4, 2008, Petitioners moved into Apartment 163, which had been recently painted, carpeted, and had a new ceiling fan and light installed in the living room. Everything went smoothly between Petitioners and Respondents for several months. Mr. Cutler had to unplug the downstairs toilet with a plunger a few times, but everything else seemed to be in working order. Both Mr. and Ms. Cutler considered Petitioners to be good tenants. As summer approached, Mr. Travis asked Mr. Cutler about installing a screen door for the sliding glass doors. This could not be done without replacing the entire sliding glass doors. When Apartment 131 became vacant, its screen door was moved to Petitioners' apartment. The screen door had a slit in it, which Ms. Cutler repaired with tape. When Apartment 132 became vacant, the good screen door from that apartment was used to replace the taped one in Petitioners' apartment. Respondents tried to keep everything in working order in Petitioners' apartment. When Petitioners' refrigerator door would not close, Respondents replaced the refrigerator. Respondents thought Petitioners were happy with their apartment. Petitioners called Respondents about a plumbing leak and said feces was running down the wall. The leak and pipe were fixed by B & G Plumbing. Petitioners were shown the water shut-off valve in case of future leaks. Petitioners believe that Respondents treated them differently from other tenants in the apartment buildings. Petitioners believe that other tenants were allowed to keep pets in their apartments while they were not. Respondents allowed tenants who had pets when they purchased the apartments to keep them, but banned pets on all future rentals. The rent for Petitioners' apartment, including water, sewer, and garbage, was $650.00. Petitioners always paid their rent on time. Petitioners asked to be moved into a better unit since they believed their unit was inferior to others in the complex. Petitioners wanted to move into Apartment 162 which, in their opinion, was in much better shape than their unit. Respondents offered to put new carpet into Apartment 162 before Petitioners moved in, but they refused. Petitioners decided to leave the apartment because they believed the maintenance was not properly performed. On December 5, 2008, the day Petitioners made known their desire to leave the apartment, Mr. Travis confronted Mr. Cutler. Mr. Cutler offered Apartment 132 to Petitioners because it was ready for occupancy after its occupants had moved out. Apartment 133 would soon be ready, and was also offered to Petitioners. Mr. Travis angrily refused to move into any apartments in the two four-plexes. He yelled at Mr. Cutler and told him he hated him. This exchange was witnessed by a neighbor, Gary Denton. Mr. Cutler offered to let Petitioners move out without penalty, and agreed to return their $650.00 deposit. Petitioners accepted the offer and received the deposit in full as well as a waiver of the first five days' rent for December and an additional four days of rent to allow them time to pack and move. Petitioners accused Respondents of renting one four-plex to whites only and the other to minorities. At the time Petitioners moved out, both four-plexes had tenants of different races. As of the date of the hearing, five of the six total units rented were to non-white tenants. Only one was rented to a white couple.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: John Cutler Anne Cutler 5970 Limestone Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Donald Travis Lisa Harrell 1008 West Young Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57760.20760.23760.35760.37
# 3
CHARLENE CINTRON vs DELAND HOUSING AUTHORITY, 15-007307 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Deland, Florida Dec. 22, 2015 Number: 15-007307 Latest Update: Aug. 14, 2017

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an act of discrimination against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Deland Housing Authority, is a “public housing authority” as defined by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, serving the City of Deland, Florida, and surrounding areas, which is where Petitioner resides and receives housing benefits. Petitioner, Charlene Cintron, is a recipient of housing benefits from Respondent, in the form of a housing choice voucher, which allows her to receive housing at a reduced or subsidized rate, also known as “Section 8 Housing.” On July 30, 2015, Petitioner filed a complaint with FCHR, alleging that a discriminatory housing practice had been committed by Respondent through its denial of an accommodation for Petitioner’s nine-year-old daughter’s disability. On November 16, 2015, FCHR issued a Notice of Determination of No Cause dismissing the complaint of discrimination. Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief dated December 2, 2015, alleging that Respondent had failed to provide her daughter, Chevonne Barton, a reasonable accommodation in the form of a housing voucher for a four-bedroom unit. After the matter had been referred to DOAH, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Relief in which she specified that the discriminatory act committed by Respondent was “the DELAY for not issuing a four-bedroom voucher in regards to a Reasonable Accommodation for my minor daughter C.E.B. [Chevonne E. Barton].” Petitioner alleged that Respondent was responsible for discriminatory terms, conditions, privileges, or services and facilities, including the failure to make reasonable accommodation for her minor daughter as the result of a handicap. She alleged that the discrimination began on October 23, 2014, and is continuing. Petitioner alleged that Respondent’s actions would constitute a violation of sections 804(b) or (f) and 804(f)(3)(B) of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988. The evidence showed that Respondent received three separate requests from Petitioner: on December 16, 2013, requesting her own bedroom due to her disabilities; on September 4, 2014, requesting an additional bedroom, as medically needed for her disabled daughter, Chevonne Barton; and on November 1, 2014, requesting a separate bedroom for her adult daughter, Jolene Barton, based upon her needing privacy following a sexual battery she suffered while she was still in high school. Following these requests, on November 25, 2014, Respondent wrote Petitioner a letter stating, “This letter is to notify you that you have been approved for an additional bedroom for Jolene Barton; however, this approval will only benefit you when and/or if you move to a four bedroom unit.” Neither party disputes or denies that Petitioner provided the three written requests for reasonable accommodations, including the request that Petitioner’s daughter, Chevonne Barton, have an additional bedroom as “medically needed” to provide her sufficient room for her exercise and physical therapy equipment. The evidence revealed that Respondent granted each of Petitioner’s requests for reasonable accommodation. On December 1, 2013, Petitioner moved into a three-bedroom unit located at 613 Anderson Drive, Deltona, Florida. At the time, Petitioner’s household consisted of four people: herself; her 18-year-old daughter, Jolene Barton; her eight-year-old daughter, Chevonne Barton; and her five-year-old daughter, Janessa Barton. Prior to moving into the three-bedroom unit, Petitioner had been given the option of moving into either a three- or four-bedroom unit. Petitioner chose the three-bedroom unit “as that is all my family requires to live on section 8 a room for myself a disabled adult, a room for my 18 year old adult daughter, and one room for my two children ages 8 and 5 years old.” Pursuant to section 5-II.B of Respondent’s Housing Choice Voucher Administrative Plan (the Plan), Respondent determines the appropriate number of bedrooms under the subsidy standards and enters the family unit size on the voucher that is issued to the family. However, “[t]he family unit size does not dictate the size of unit the family must actually lease, nor does it determine who within the household will share a bedroom/sleeping room.” Nonetheless, when determining the family unit size, the “subsidy standards must provide for the smallest number of bedrooms needed to house a family without overcrowding. The living room considered [sic] a sleeping room per 24 CFR 982.402.” Respondent “will assign one bedroom for each two persons within a household. . . . Two heartbeats per bedroom/sleeping area. 24 CFR 982.402.” Petitioner was expressly notified of the “two heartbeats per bedroom” in an email dated December 18, 2013. The Plan also provides that Respondent must use the “Voucher Size” chart when determining the appropriate voucher size. That chart provides that when four persons are in the household, the appropriate voucher size is two bedrooms. Despite the policies established by the Plan, a family may request a reasonable accommodation in writing. The evidence shows that Petitioner made several requests for reasonable accommodations, all of which were granted by Respondent. Soon after Petitioner and her daughters moved into the three-bedroom unit on Anderson Drive, Petitioner requested a reasonable accommodation on December 16, 2013. Specifically, Petitioner requested her own bedroom due to her statement that she suffered from “back issues; I am bipolar. I require my own bedroom – not to be shared with my 18-year-old daughter.” Shortly thereafter, on January 3, 2014, Respondent approved Petitioner’s request for her own bedroom. In that approval letter, Respondent stated that Petitioner was approved for an “additional bedroom.” The letter noted that Petitioner was already receiving credit for a three-bedroom unit and, accordingly, would not have to move to benefit from Respondent’s approval. Petitioner now had a bedroom for herself, and her three daughters had two bedrooms to share, which complied with Respondent’s policy of “two heartbeats per bedroom,” not taking the living area into consideration. Thereafter, on September 9, 2014, Petitioner requested a reasonable accommodation for her minor daughter, Chevonne Barton. Specifically, Petitioner requested a “bedroom (extra) for Chevonne.” That same day, Respondent issued its approval for an “Additional Bedroom – Medically Needed for Chevonne E. Barton.” Petitioner now had a bedroom for herself, a bedroom for Chevonne, and a bedroom for her two other daughters to share pursuant to the “two heartbeats per bedroom” (again not taking into consideration the living area that also was available to Petitioner). Based upon an email dated October 18, 2014, Petitioner informed Respondent she was looking for a four-bedroom unit. She further stated that she was aware of the moving process, that she understood she must let Respondent know of her intent to move, and that she must give her landlord 30-days’ notice. She also asked how much the four-bedroom voucher would pay. Respondent replied to the October 18 email on October 23, 2014, by stating “[y]ou only have a 3 bedroom voucher. Reasonable Accommodation for you and Chevonne. Then a bedroom for Jolene and Janessa. A 3 bedroom voucher is about $875.00.” Petitioner responded that same day, confirming she has a three-bedroom voucher; however, she believed that the reasonable accommodation for Chevonne would provide her with a four-bedroom unit. This email exchange is the basis for Petitioner’s claim that her reasonable accommodation for Chevonne had not been honored. Shortly after this email exchange, on November 1, 2014, Petitioner requested reasonable accommodation for her adult daughter, Jolene Barton. Specifically, Petitioner requested that Jolene be provided with her own bedroom due to her status as a victim of sexual battery. On November 25, 2014, Respondent approved the request for an “Additional Bedroom” for Jolene Barton. Upon the approval of the request for reasonable accommodation for Jolene Barton, the testimony is undisputed, and the parties agree that Respondent at that time had approved Petitioner for a four-bedroom unit as the result of the reasonable accommodations that had been given to Petitioner, her minor disabled daughter (Chevonne Barton), and her adult daughter (Jolene Barton), which left the youngest daughter, Janessa Barton, in a room by herself. In order to further clarify matters, Respondent wrote to Petitioner, on November 25, 2014, explaining what Petitioner must do in order to receive the benefit of the four-bedroom voucher while she was still living in the three-bedroom unit. The letter stated, in relevant part: [Y]ou have been approved for an additional bedroom for Jolene Barton; however, this approval will only benefit you when and/or if you move to a four bedroom unit. If you wish to move (since the extension of the lease shows it is month to month, copy provided 9/11/2014 from Benjamin Pinson shows you both agreed to this), you must give a proper 30-day notice and provide us a copy. You will be required to come to the office (with an appointment) to complete and sign forms needed to process a unit transfer. If you wish to move out of our jurisdiction, you will need to complete a request for portability form stating the agency name and contact information. As of the date of the hearing, and despite the clear direction provided by Respondent in the November 25, 2014, letter, Petitioner voluntarily continues to remain in the three-bedroom unit at 613 Anderson Drive. Respondent has made clear the fact that it will not issue a voucher for a four- bedroom unit until Petitioner fully complies with the requirements of the Plan as reiterated in the November 25, 2014, letter. At hearing, Respondent confirmed that it remains willing to move Petitioner to a four-bedroom unit upon completion of the documentation necessary for transfer. In fact, Petitioner disclosed at the hearing that she had requested the paperwork for a transfer to a property within the jurisdiction of the Ormond Beach Housing Authority. Upon receiving the request to transfer from Petitioner, Respondent sent the moving paperwork to Petitioner, asking her to complete that paperwork in order to move to a new four-bedroom unit. At hearing, Petitioner admitted she had neither completed the required paperwork to move to Ormond Beach, nor had she notified her landlord of her intent to move in 30 days. By not having taken the required steps to move from a three-bedroom unit to a four-bedroom unit, Petitioner has voluntarily chosen to remain in her three-bedroom unit. The credible evidence does not support her contention that Respondent has prevented Petitioner and her family from moving to a four-bedroom unit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order determining that no act of housing discrimination was committed by Respondent and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Charlene Cintron 613 Anderson Drive Deltona, Florida 32725 (eServed) Rachael Spring Loukonen, Director Cohen & Grigsby, P.C. 9110 Strada Place, Suite 6200 Naples, Florida 34108 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)

CFR (1) 24 CFR 982.402 Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.68760.20760.23760.37
# 4
GERARDO VILLAMIZAR AND RODICA VILLAMIZAR vs EDDIE GOMEZ, 03-002470 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 08, 2003 Number: 03-002470 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 2006

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the provisions of Florida’s Fair Housing Act, Section 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes (2002) (the Fair Housing Act), by evicting Petitioners and thereby allegedly breaching a rental agreement, as more fully described in the Petition for Relief. (References to statutory sections and chapters are to Florida Statutes (2002.)

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are Hispanic. The parties agree that Mrs. Villamizar is handicapped by a mental disability of an undocumented nature. Respondent works full-time as a fireman, and he has managed real estate on a part-time basis for over 15 years. Sometime in August, 2001, Petitioners rented an apartment from Respondent pursuant to a verbal rental agreement. The apartment is identified in the record as Apartment 5 (the apartment). The apartment is one of several in a building located at 1484 Northwest 15th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33125 (the building). Petitioners rented the apartment in conjunction with a rent subsidy program administered by Volunteers of America. Petitioners resided in the apartment as their primary residence until approximately February 23, 2003. At that time, Respondent evicted Petitioners pursuant to a court order issued by the County Court In and For Dade County, Florida (the County Court). Respondent evicted Petitioners for nondiscriminatory reasons. Mr. Villamizar threatened Respondent, abused alcohol and drugs, and was involved in approximately 12 police incident reports at the building. After Respondent painted the outside of the building, Mr. Villamizar painted the apartment door, the railing, and an exterior wall with a different color. Mr. Villamizar also painted, "Fuck the fire department" on the outside of the apartment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michelle Jackson, Acting Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gerardo and Rodica Villamizar Post Office Box 010461 Miami, Florida 33130 Eddie Gomez 17835 Southwest 10th Court Pembroke Pines, Florida 33029

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.20760.23760.37
# 5
SHELLEY M. WRIGHT vs SERVITAS MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC, 17-002512 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 26, 2017 Number: 17-002512 Latest Update: Jan. 16, 2018

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner because of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner Shelley M. Wright ("Wright") was a graduate student at Florida International University ("FIU") in Miami, Florida. Wright has a physical disability that affects her mobility, and, as a result, she uses a wheelchair or scooter to get around. There is no dispute that Wright falls within a class of persons protected against discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"). Respondent Servitas Management Group, LLC ("SMG"), manages Bayview Student Living ("Bayview"), a privately owned student housing community located on FIU's campus. Bayview's owner, NCCD — Biscayne Properties, LLC, leases (from FIU) the real estate on which the project is situated. Bayview is a recently built apartment complex, which first opened its doors to students for the 2016-2017 school year. On November 20, 2015, Wright submitted a rental application for a single occupancy efficiency apartment in Bayview, fitted out for residents with disabilities. She was charged an application fee of $100.00, as were all applicants, plus a "convenience fee" of $6.45. Much later, Wright would request that SMG refund the application fee, and SMG would deny her request, although it would give her a credit of $6.45 to erase the convenience fee on the grounds that it had been charged in error. Wright complains that this transaction was tainted with unlawful discrimination, but there is no evidence of such, and thus the fees will not be discussed further. Wright's application was approved, and, accordingly, she soon executed a Student Housing Lease Contract ("First Lease") for a term commencing on August 20, 2016, and ending on July 31, 2017. The First Lease stated that her rent would be $1,153.00 per month, and that the total rent for the lease term would be $12,683.00. Because Wright was one of the first students to sign a lease, she won some incentives, namely $500.00 in Visa gift cards and an iPad Pro. The First Lease provided that she would receive a $200.00 gift card upon lease execution and the balance of $300.00 upon moving in. As it happened, Wright did not receive the gift cards in two installments, but instead accepted five cards worth $500.00, in the aggregate, on August 20, 2016. There were two reasons for this. One was that SMG required lease holders to appear in-person to take possession of the gift cards and sign a receipt acknowledging delivery. Wright was unable (or unwilling) to travel to SMG's office until she moved to Miami in August 2016 to attend FIU. The other was that SMG decided not to use gift cards as the means of paying this particular incentive after integrating its rent collection operation with FIU's student accounts. Instead, SMG would issue a credit to the lease holders' student accounts in the amount of $500.00. Wright, however, insisted upon the gift cards, and so she was given them rather than the $500.00 credit. Wright has alleged that the untimely (or inconvenient) delivery of the gift cards constituted unlawful discrimination, but the evidence fails to sustain the allegation, which merits no further discussion. In May 2016, SMG asked Wright (and all other Bayview lease holders) to sign an amended lease. The revised lease made several changes that SMG called "improvements," most of which stemmed from SMG's entering into a closer working relationship with FIU. (One such change was the aforementioned substitution of a $500.00 credit for gift cards.) The amended lease, however, specified that Wright's total rent for the term would be $13,836.00——an increase of $1,153.00 over the amount stated in the First Lease. The explanation was that, in the First Lease, the total rent had been calculated by multiplying the monthly installment ($1,153.00) by 11, which did not account for the 12 days in August 2016 included in the lease term. SMG claimed that the intent all along had been to charge 12 monthly installments of $1,153.00 without proration (even though the tenant would not have possession of the premises for a full 12 months) and thus that the First Lease had erroneously shown the total rent as $12,683.00. As SMG saw it, the revised lease simply fixed this mistake. Wright executed the amended lease on or about May 10, 2016 (the "Second Lease"). Wright alleges that this rent "increase" was the product of unlawful discrimination, retaliation, or both. There is, however, no persuasive evidence supporting this allegation. The same rental amount was charged to all occupants of the efficiency apartments, regardless of their disabilities or lack thereof, and each of them signed the same amended lease document that Wright executed. To be sure, Wright had reason to be upset about SMG's revision of the total rent amount, which was not an improvement from her standpoint, and perhaps she had (or has) legal or equitable remedies available for breach of lease. But this administrative proceeding is not the forum for redressing such wrongs (if any). Relatedly, some tenants received a rent reduction through the amended leases SMG presented in May 2016, because the rates were reduced therein for two- and four-bedroom apartments. As was made clear at the time, however, rates were not reduced on the one-bedroom studios due to their popularity. Wright alleges that she subsequently requested an "accommodation" in the form of a rent reduction, which she argues was necessary because she leased a more expensive studio apartment, not by choice, but of necessity (since only the one- bedroom unit met her needs in light of her disabilities). This claim fails because allowing Wright to pay less for her apartment than every other tenant is charged for the same type of apartment would amount to preferential treatment, which the law does not require. Wright makes two claims of alleged discrimination that, unlike her other charges, are facially plausible. She asserts that the handicapped parking spaces at Bayview are unreasonably far away for her, given her limited mobility. She further asserts that the main entrance doors (and others in the building) do not afford two-way automatic entry, and that as a result, she has difficulty exiting through these doors. The undersigned believes it is possible, even likely, that the refusal to offer Wright a reasonable and necessary accommodation with regard to the alleged parking situation, her problems with ingress and egress, or both, if properly requested, might afford grounds for relief under the FFHA. The shortcoming in Wright's current case is the absence of persuasive proof that she ever presented an actual request for such an accommodation, explaining the necessity thereof, for SMG's consideration. There is evidence suggesting that Wright complained about the parking and the doors, perhaps even to SMG employees, but a gripe, without more, is not equivalent to a request for reasonable accommodation. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of SMG's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Wright, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Wright. There is no persuasive evidence that SMG denied a request of Wright's for a reasonable accommodation at Bayview. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that SMG did not commit any prohibited act.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding SMG not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Wright no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2017.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.20760.23760.37
# 6
YVONNE MALONE vs BEACON HILL, LTD, 13-003703 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 24, 2013 Number: 13-003703 Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2014

The Issue The issue is this case is whether the Respondent, Beacon Hill, Ltd., discriminated against Yvonne Malone (Petitioner) based on her religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act).

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a resident at an apartment complex owned and operated by the Respondent. At the hearing, the Petitioner recited a litany of complaints related to her apartment unit and to the services she has received from the Respondent's staff. Although the Petitioner has previously asserted that the Respondent has discriminated against her based on her religion, the Petitioner testified at the hearing that she had been "harassed" and "abused" by the Respondent's employees and that she did not know the basis for her treatment. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has discriminated against the Petitioner based on her religion. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has treated the Petitioner any differently than any other resident of the apartment complex has been treated. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has "harassed" or "abused" the Petitioner in any manner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Yvonne Malone. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2014.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.37
# 7
LISA CARDWELL vs CHARLESTON CAY LTD, ET AL., 11-003387 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port Charlotte, Florida Jul. 12, 2011 Number: 11-003387 Latest Update: Jan. 25, 2012

The Issue Whether Respondents, Charleston Cay, Ltd., et al. (Charleston Cay), violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2010).1/

Findings Of Fact Ms. Cardwell is an African-American woman who rented an apartment from Charleston Cay. Ms. Cardwell and Charleston Cay entered into a written lease beginning on December 23, 2009, and ending on November 30, 2010. The lease required Ms. Cardwell to pay her rent on the first of each month and that the rent would be delinquent by the third of each month. Furthermore, the lease provided that non-payment of rent shall result in a breach of the lease and eviction. The initial monthly rent for Ms. Cardwell's apartment was $663.00, a month and was subsequently increased to $669.00, a month. Ms. Cardwell credibly testified that she had not read the lease or the Housing Addendum which she signed when entering into the lease and that she had not subsequently read either document. On November 1, 2010, Ms. Cardwell failed to pay her rent. On November 4, 2010, Ms. Jaster, manager of Charleston Cay apartments, posted a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate the premises. On November 9, 2010, Ms. Jaster posted another notice for Ms. Cardwell about non-payment and requesting that Ms. Cardwell call or come to the office. Ms. Cardwell paid $100.00, of the rent on November 17, 2010. Again, Ms. Jaster posted a three-day notice seeking payment of the remaining November 2010, rent in the amount of $569.00. On November 24, 2010, Ms. Cardwell paid an additional $200.00, of the $569.00, owed, leaving a balance of $369.00 for November 2010. Because Ms. Cardwell's written lease was to expire at the end of November, she requested that Charleston Cay enter into a month- to-month lease, but Ms. Jaster informed Ms. Cardwell that Charleston Cay was not interested in entering into a month-to- month tenancy. On December 1, 2010, Ms. Jaster posted another three- day notice requiring Ms. Cardwell to pay the $369.00, owed in November, or to vacate the premises. The facts also showed that Ms. Cardwell did not pay the $669.00, owed by December 1, 2010, or anytime thereafter. On December 8, 2010, Charleston Cay filed an eviction and damages complaint against Ms. Cardwell based on non-payment of the rent. Some time in December 2010, Ms. Cardwell contacted Ms. Tina Figliulo of the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition, seeking financial assistance to avoid being evicted. Ms. Figliulo credibly testified that the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition administers grant money to help prevent a person from being evicted and helps individuals find affordable housing. A provision of the grant, however, prevents the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition from paying money into a court registry if an eviction process has begun. Ms. Figliulo credibly testified that she contacted Ms. Jaster about making a payment on Ms. Cardwell's behalf. Ms. Jaster informed Ms. Figliulo that Charleston Cay had already begun eviction proceedings. Consequently, Ms. Figliulo was unable to use grant money to pay for Ms. Cardwell's back rent. Based on the eviction proceedings, Ms. Cardwell vacated the premises sometime in December 2010, and turned in her key for the apartment. The initial hearing on the eviction was set for January 5, 2011. On December 28, 2010, the hearing was cancelled based on Ms. Cardwell's vacating the premises. On January 13, 2011, Ms. Cardwell filed a Motion to Dismiss the case in county court indicating that she had given up possession of the premises. On January 31, 2011, the Charlotte County Court issued an Order dismissing the case effective March 1, 2011, unless Charleston Cay set a hearing on damages. The record credibly showed through the exhibits and Ms. Jaster's testimony that Ms. Cardwell was evicted from her apartment based on her non-payment of rent. There was no evidence that other individuals, who were not in Ms. Cardwell's protected class, were treated more favorably or differently, than she was in the proceedings. There was no evidence, either direct or indirect, supporting Ms. Cardwell's claim of racial discrimination. Ms. Cardwell testified that she felt that Ms. Jaster had acted based on race, because of Ms. Jaster's perceived attitude. Ms. Cardwell did not bring forward any evidence showing a specific example of any comment or action that was discriminatory. Ms. Jaster credibly testified that she did not base the eviction process on race, but only on non-payment. Ms. Cardwell specifically stated during the hearing that she was not addressing the retaliation claim or seeking to present evidence in support of the FCHR determination concerning the retaliation claim. Consequently, the undersigned does not make any finding concerning that issue. There was testimony concerning whether or not Ms. Cardwell had properly provided employment information required by the written lease in relation to a tax credit. The facts showed that Charleston Cay apartments participated in a Low Income Tax Credit Housing Program under section 42, of the Internal Revenue Code. On entering the lease, Ms. Cardwell had signed a Housing Credit Lease Addendum which acknowledged her participation in the tax credit, and agreement to furnish information concerning her income and eligibility for compliance with the tax credit. Failure to provide information for the tax credit would result in a breach of the rental agreement. As early of August 2011, Ms. Jaster, manager for Charleston Cay Apartments, contacted Ms. Cardwell about providing information concerning her income and continued eligibility for the program. Ms. Cardwell provided information that was incomplete as to her income, because it failed to demonstrate commissions that she earned. Again, in November 2010, Ms. Jaster contacted Ms. Cardwell about providing information to recertification for the tax credit. Finally, on November 11, 2010, Ms. Jaster left a seven-day notice of non-compliance, with an opportunity to cure, seeking Ms. Cardwell to provide information concerning her income. Ms. Cardwell provided information concerning her salary, but did not have information concerning commissions that she earned from sales. This information was deemed by Ms. Jaster to be incomplete and not in compliance for the low income housing tax credit. The record shows, however, that Ms. Cardwell's failure to provide the required income information was not a basis for her eviction.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order of dismissal of the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2011.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.23760.34760.37
# 8
FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, ON BEHALF OF STEVEN AND JAMIE TERRY vs HOYT AND NANCY DAVIS, FLORIDA COASTAL JACKSONVILLE REALTY, INC., AND JOHN MCMENAMY, 11-002270 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida May 05, 2011 Number: 11-002270 Latest Update: Aug. 15, 2012

The Issue Whether Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2011)1/.

Findings Of Fact Background Respondents Hoyt and Nancy Davis (the Davises) own a residential property located at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, Florida (the Property). The Property is utilized exclusively as a rental. Respondent Florida Coastal Jacksonville Realty, Inc. ("Florida Coastal") and its principal John McMenamy ("McMenamy") acted as listing agents for the Property (collectively, the "Broker Respondents"). Mr. McMenamy and his company have managed the rental of the Property for approximately six years. In association with their listing of the Property, the Broker Respondents were responsible for advertising, showing, accepting applications for and assisting in the selection of tenants for the Property. At the time of the events in question, the Property was being offered for lease at a rate of $1,450 per month. Generally, due to its location within a St. Johns County golf community and proximity to good schools, the Property rents easily and quickly. The Rental Applications On May 14, 2010, Petitioner Jaime Terry (Mrs. Terry) contacted McMenamy regarding the Property. McMenamy instructed Mrs. Terry on the rental application process. On the afternoon of Sunday, May 16, 2010, Petitioners submitted via e-mail their rental application, dated May 15, 2010. On their application, the Petitioners disclosed that they had previously declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy was entered in December 2007 and discharged in January 2009. Petitioners also disclosed that they were currently living with Mrs. Terry's parents. The application included a statement of the Terrys' monthly income, and also disclosed that they had three children residing with them -- aged eleven, five and two at the time. A memo attached to the application elaborated on the bankruptcy and other details of their employment and financial situation. Mrs. Terry testified that during the application process the Respondents did not solicit additional information concerning her employment history. On May 18, 2010, McMenamy ran a credit check on the Terrys using the "Online Rental Exchange." The credit report for Jaime Terry reflected a credit score of 664, while Steven Terry's assigned score was 649. However, both reports noted "conditional" approval because of the bankruptcy filing. Although the exact date is unknown, at approximately the same time that the Terrys submitted their application, another couple, Rick and Jessica Egger (the Eggers) contacted McMenamy regarding their interest in possibly renting the Property. On the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010, the Eggers formally submitted an application to rent the Property. The Eggers' application disclosed that, unlike the Terrys', they did not have a bankruptcy in their history. In addition, the Eggers' combined monthly income was higher than the Terrys'2/ and the younger of their two children was nine years old. The credit report obtained for the Eggers reflected a credit score of 672 for Jessica Egger and 696 for Rick Egger, with an unconditional approval rating. Respondents' Tenant Selection Process McMenamy testified that in evaluating applications, potential tenants must meet certain minimum criteria. Factors he considers in assessing applicants include credit checks, criminal background checks, employment status, and rental history. However, he agreed that the evaluation process he uses is subjective. McMenamy acknowledged that bankruptcy would not automatically disqualify a potential tenant, and in fact, confirmed that he has rented to tenants who have a bankruptcy in their history. With regard to credit scores, McMenamy testified that he considered a score below 500 to be unacceptable. Mrs. Davis testified that McMenamy manages the entire process of renting the Property on behalf of herself and her husband. Once McMenamy determines the suitability of a prospective tenant, he discusses that tenant with the Davises. McMenamy does not discuss applicants with the Davises that he does not consider eligible. The Davises do not participate in the background screening process and they do not review applicants' credit ratings. However, Mrs. Davis was aware of McMenamy's process for selecting tenants, and she confirmed her understanding that applicants must meet certain minimum requirements. In selecting a tenant, McMenamy looks not only for a candidate that is financially qualified, but also one who will rent the property for a significant period of time, will take good care of the property, and will make monthly rent payments in a timely manner, according to Mrs. Davis. Denial of Petitioners' Lease Application Mr. Davis testified that he and Mrs. Davis discussed the Petitioners' application with McMenamy. At hearing, Mr. Davis recounted that conversation as follows: Cross-examination by Mr. Organes: Q. Mr. Davis, you stated that you had discussed with Mr. McMenamy the application of Steven and Jaime Terry? A. Yes. Q. And that’s a common practice with Mr. McMenamy as when he receives reasonably qualified applicants, he discusses them with you? A. Yes. Q. And that’s what he did with the Terrys? A. Yes. Q. And you said you did not tell him not to rent to them because of their children? A. That is true, we did not tell him. Q. The issue of children wasn’t discussed at all? A. No. Q. What reason did you give him to tell them why their application was being denied? A. Because of their past rental history and their bankruptcy foreclosure. Q. In general if you don’t approve of an applicant, what reason would you give for denying that applicant? A. I would give that reason, that we didn’t feel that, you know, we probably would get a better applicant and the reason we turned them down is because we didn’t feel that they were suitable for our rental. There is no evidence in this record as to precisely when the above conversation between the Respondents took place, although based upon Mr. Davis's statement that "we probably would get a better applicant" it is reasonable to infer that it was prior to the Eggers submitting their application on the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010.3/ Early on the morning of Friday, May 21, 2010, McMenamy sent an e-mail to Ms. Terry, which read: Jaime I left a message yesterday but did not hear from you. I spoke to the owner about the application and she was concerned about not really having any rental history and the number of small children. She is a perfectionist and just had the home professionally painted. The one family who lived there had small children and there were handprints all over the walls so that it needed to be repainted. So this was her main concern and therefore does not want to rent to you and the family. If you have any questions please call. Sincerely, John At hearing, Mrs. Davis maintained that the Petitioners' children were not the determining factor in the decision to deny their application. Rather, it was based on their finances and lack of rental history. Consistent with Mr. Davis's testimony, Mrs. Davis also testified that she and her husband did not instruct McMenamy to reject the Petitioners' application because of their children. After being informed that their application was denied, Petitioners immediately began searching for alternate housing. Mrs. Terry testified that their primary concern was to locate a rental in a high quality school district. Within a couple of weeks of receiving the denial e-mail from McMenamy, the Terrys located a home at 983 Lilac Loop, St. Johns, Florida. Petitioners entered into a lease for this property on June 6, 2010; the rent was $ 1,200 per month. Although the Lilac Loop home was acceptable, the Terrys considered it to be inferior to the Property, and Petitioners paid to have the home repainted and wired for cable access. The cable installation fee was $150.00. On September 22, 2010, Petitioners were notified that the Lilac Loop house was in foreclosure. Petitioners appealed to a default-law organization in an attempt to enforce their one-year lease, but were ultimately unsuccessful. As a result of the foreclosure, Petitioners were forced to seek alternative housing within the same school district, and in November 2010, leased a property at 1528 Summerdown Way, Fruit Cove, Florida, 32259. The monthly rent at 1528 Summerdown Way was $1,600 monthly. Petitioners also incurred additional expenses necessitated by hiring a moving service, in the amount of $773.50. At of the hearing, Petitioners continued to reside in the Summerdown Way rental. The Commission Investigation On August 16, 2010, the Terrys filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with HUD alleging they had been unlawfully discriminated against by Respondents based upon their familial status. Thereafter, the Commission opened an investigation of the allegation. As part of that investigation, Respondents were invited to submit written statements setting forth their version of the events at issue, and any defenses to the allegation they wished to raise. On August 19, 2010, the Davises submitted a written statement to the FCHR. In the first paragraph of that submittal the Davises stated: To Whom it May Concern: We enlisted realtor John MaMenamy to find a new tenant for our rental house at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, FL 32092. Mr. McMenamy was told that we preferred not to rent to someone with more than one, if any, very small children at this particular time. The reason being we just had to have the interior of the house professionally repainted and repairs made to several areas, the walls in particular. Additionally, in light of the fact there were several highly qualified persons interested in and looking at the house concurrently. The submittal continued by identifying four former tenants of the Property, as well as the current tenants (the Eggers), all of whom had children living with them. It is found that McMenamy's e-mail of May 21, 2010, and the Davises' letter of August 19, 2010, constitute direct evidence that Respondents' decision not to rent to Petitioners was based upon their familial status. The testimony of McMenamy and the Davises that familial status was not the reason for refusing to rent to Petitioners is rejected as not credible.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against the Terrys in violation of section 760.23(1) and (2), and prohibiting further unlawful housing practices by Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2012.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.22760.23760.35760.37
# 9
JOAN C. KIRWAN vs BERMUDA WALK HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, ET AL, 10-005860 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Jul. 19, 2010 Number: 10-005860 Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer