The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of discrimination based on her sex or handicap in leasing her apartment from Respondent in violation of Sections 804d and 804d or f of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, Chapter 760.23(2) (4), Florida Statutes (2006).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resided at Respondent’s Thacker I property for at least a year prior to her move to Respondent’s Pinewoods Place Apartments located at 5929 Pinewoods Place, Milton, Florida 32570. Petitioner moved to Pinewoods, Apartment 25, around March or April of 2003. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent had any material problems with each other during her residency at Thacker I. Her move to Pinewoods resulted from her request to move to a larger apartment. Pinewoods is a large complex managed by Respondent. Some of the units are subsidized by HUD. A list of tenants in the Pinewood complex reflect 58 tenants. Of the 58 tenants, 34 are female. Eleven of the tenants have a disability. In fact, Respondent contracts with providers who serve the disabled to provide apartments to their clients and provides such apartments regularly. Respondent accommodated Petitioner’s request to move to Pinewoods by not requiring a full year’s lease since she had already completed a year at Thacker I and by allowing Petitioner to transfer her deposit from the Thacker I apartment to the Pinewoods apartment. Because of these accommodations, Petitioner was permitted to lease her Pinewoods apartment on a month-to-month lease with an additional deposit of $95. Respondent also accommodated Petitioner in her move by leaving her rent amount the same as it was at Thacker I. Thus, Petitioner paid $400 a month rent instead of the normal $450 a month rent paid by other tenants in comparable apartments. Petitioner did not visit Unit 25 prior to her move to Pinewoods because it was occupied. No other units were available for her to inspect prior to her move. Additionally, HUD inspected the Unit 25 prior to Petitioner’s move and found no violations and that the apartment met HUD standards for being mechanically sound and safe. There was no evidence of any representations made by Respondent to Petitioner regarding Unit 25, and Petitioner did not introduce any evidence of such misrepresentations. Clearly, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions of misrepresentations about her apartment or her assertion that she looked at her Unit or a model, her apartment was not misrepresented to her prior to her move to Pinewoods, and no discrimination on the basis of sex or handicap occurred. Sometime after her move, Petitioner began to complain about her apartment. The evidence was vague regarding most of her complaints, and Petitioner declined to testify about many of her allegations. For instance, there was a vague complaint about leaves being blown into her yard from the sidewalk when the maintenance crew would clear the sidewalk of leaves. However, this method of clearing the sidewalk occurred throughout the complex and was not directed toward Petitioner. Likewise, there was a vague complaint about the trash lady disturbing Petitioner’s morning coffee by performing her assigned duty of picking up trash around the apartment complex. Again, there was no evidence of any activity being directed at Petitioner based on her sex or handicap. At some point, Petitioner complained to Respondent about her dryer vent not working properly. After several complaints and in an effort to resolve Petitioner’s complaint, Respondent’s maintenance person put an interior box-style lint trap, in her Unit. Respondent stated he felt this was the best solution because a member of the maintenance staff used the same type lint trap at his home. Petitioner, for a variety of reasons, was not satisfied with Respondent’s solution and vented the dryer to the outside herself. There is some dispute over whether Petitioner’s repair was safe or done correctly. There is no evidence that indicates Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of sex or handicap. Petitioner also complained about the sliding glass doors being fogged and wanted them replaced. Respondent explained that the doors were safe and that 55 other residents have fogged glass doors. Respondent refused to replace the glass doors. The next day Petitioner complained to HUD about the fogged glass door being “non-operable.” Because of the complaint, Robert Youngblood from the HUD office in Milton met Respondent’s maintenance staff at Petitioner’s apartment and discovered that the slider had been knocked off its track. Mr. Youngblood reported to Respondent that it was very clear the door had been sabotaged because he had just inspected that same door just days before because of a prior complaint. Respondent fixed Petitioner’s door again. Additionally, the sliding glass door that Petitioner complained about was inspected by both Santa Rosa Glass and Milton Glass. Petitioner also kept an untagged vehicle in the parking lot and threatened to sue if it were towed. All the Pinewoods’ leases contain a provision that untagged vehicles are not permitted on the premises and will be towed. In order to avoid the vehicle being towed, Petitioner switched the tag from her tagged vehicle to her untagged vehicle and back again as notice was given to her. Petitioner again felt this action was discrimination. Again there was no evidence to support Petitioner’s claim. On January 5, 2006, a little more than two years after she moved to Pinewoods, Petitioner complained, when she came to the office to pay her rent, that her garbage disposal did not work. The staff person who took Petitioner’s rent sent a maintenance person that day to look at Petitioner’s garbage disposal. The maintenance person looked at the alleged disposal location and discovered that Petitioner did not have a garbage disposal. There was no plumbing for one. The evidence showed that many units did not have a garbage disposal and that disposals were removed from each unit as they broke down. Petitioner insisted that she should have a garbage disposal since there was a switch on the wall for one. Because of her actions concerning the garbage disposal, Petitioner was given a Notice of Non-Renewal, dated January 6, 2006. Petitioner refused to pay any rent and refused to vacate the apartment based on her belief that Respondent had discriminated against her based on her sex and handicap. She maintained this belief even though she testified that “everybody had problems getting things fixed.” Indeed, her only witness corroborated that men and women, handicapped and non-handicapped have trouble getting things fixed. No reason was given for the non-renewal. Respondent testified that he was tired of Petitioner’s actions and deceitfulness. Petitioner chose to withhold her rent when it was due in February 2006, so that Respondent would bring eviction proceedings against her. Respondent eventually brought eviction proceedings against Petitioner. At the eviction hearing, Petitioner told the judge she wanted to be evicted so it would become public record. Respondent was awarded possession of the premises. After Respondent was given possession, the next morning he received a copy of a letter to the judge requesting that he rescind his decision and requesting another judge. Petitioner has since moved to another apartment. As with the other incidents described above, the evidence did not demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her sex or handicap. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, M. Betty Murray, currently holds Florida Real Estate Broker's License number 62943. At all times material to this proceeding, the license was in full force and effect. The Respondent represented L. O. Huckaby and Sarah Huckaby in the sale of property located at 363 Boylston Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida, to Elizabeth T. Stein, the complainant in this proceeding. Pursuant to her representation of the Huckaby's, the Respondent, on or about June 18, 1979, prepared a proposed contract for the sale and purchase of the subject property. Prior to signing the contract and tendering a deposit thereunder, Ms. Stein reviewed the contract with her attorney, Berrien Becks, Sr. When reviewing the contract with Mr. Becks, Ms. Stein failed to inform either Mr. Becks or his secretary, Sylvia Van De Mark, that she intended to use the property as either a duplex or a triplex. Had Ms. Stein indicated such an intent, a provision to that effect would have been included in paragraph VIII of the contract for sale and purchase. This was the normal procedure utilized in the ordinary course of business by the Becks' law firm. The contract for sale, Respondents Exhibit 1, shows no such provision or notation. The sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Huckaby, were represented by Charles E. Booth, Esquire. On behalf of Ms. Stein, Mr. Becks requested that certain repairs be made to the property. Mr. Booth rejected these demands by letter dated July 24, 1979. Although the contract does not state that the property was intended to be used as a duplex, the property is in fact recognized as a de facto duplex under the nonconforming use provisions of the city's zoning ordinance. Had Ms. Stein elected to proceed with the sale, she would have been permitted to utilize the property as a two unit property so long as she lived in one of the units which was her expressed intent. Prior to paying the balance of the deposit due on the contract, Ms. Stein and the Respondent went to Mr. Booth's office where Mr. Booth confirmed by telephone conversation with city officials and in the presence of both Ms. Stein and the Respondent, the lawful use of the property as a single family residence with attached rental unit. Following this information, Ms. Stein paid the balance into the Respondent's escrow account. On August 20, 1979, Ms. Stein demanded return of the $9,000.00 deposit from the Respondent. Upon receipt of this demand, the Respondent contacted Mr. Booth who instructed her to retain the deposit in her escrow account. Mr. Booth and Mr. Becks negotiated a release which was signed by the Sellers on August 28, 1979 and by Ms. Stein on September 11, 1979. The release authorized disbursements to be made including $500.00 to the Respondent, $150.00 to Mr. Booth, $43.00 to Lawyers Title Services, Inc. and the remaining $8,307.00 to Ms. Stein. On August 20, 1979, prior to signing the release, Ms. Stein sent a complaint to the Board concerning the return of her $9,000.00. On September 7, 1979, Ms. Stein sent another letter to the Board indicating that she had not agreed to the disbursements set forth in paragraph 8 above notwithstanding her agreement to sign the release. Ms. Stein's attorney, Mr. Becks, witnessed the release and explained the legal implications of the release in detail to her prior to her signing. Mr. Stein did not inform Mr. Becks of her correspondence with the Board which attempted to disclaim the release. At no time did the Respondent represent the property as a triplex, but only as a single family residence with a single attached rental unit, which was a permissible use under the city zoning ordinance. In fact, Ms. Stein defaulted on the contract and under its express terms could have forfeited the entire $9,000.00. The release negotiated between Mr. Becks and Mr. Booth which returned $8,307.00 to Ms. Stein was generous and demonstrated good faith efforts on the part of the Sellers to settle this matter amicably. The Respondent has maintained her registered office at 231 Gradview, Daytona Beach, Florida. The office consists of a room where she maintains her business files and which can be closed for privacy. The allegations of Ms. Stein against the Respondent were untrue and were made with knowledge that neither the Huckaby's nor the Respondent had engaged in any illegal or unethical activities regarding this transactions. The testimony of Mr. Becks, attorney for Ms. Stein and the affidavit of Mr. Booth, attorney for the Huckaby's, corroborates the Respondent's testimony and contradicts the allegations made in the complaint filed by Ms. Stein and the administrative complaint filed by the Board which was based entirely upon Ms. Stein's allegations. Ms. Stein's failure to appear at the final hearing supports the conclusion that she knew the allegations made by her could not be proved at the hearing. Any equitable or legal rights which Ms. Stein may have had to pursue this matter ended when she knowingly and voluntarily signed a release in order to secure the return of a substantial portion of her deposit monies. In effect, the only misrepresentation in this case was that made by Ms. Stein when she represented that the release would extinguish all responsibilities, obligations and rights arising from the contract in return for the $8,307.00 and then effectively requested the Board to proceed against the Respondent.
The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner seeks to suspend or revoke the Respondents' licenses, or take other disciplinary action against the Respondents, for reasons which are alleged in a five-count Administrative Complaint. All of the allegations of the Administrative Complaint arise from two transactions; a rental agreement involving property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Capraro and another rental agreement involving property owned by Ms. Supino. The Administrative Complaint alleges that as a result of the Respondents' actions in connection with these two transactions the Respondents have violated Section 475.25(1)(b), (d), and (k) Florida Statutes. The Respondents dispute some of the factual allegations and deny that there was any violation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact: 2/ At all times relevant and material, Robert H. Karn has been licensed as a real estate broker, having been issued license number 0122138. At all times relevant and material, Robert H. Karn, Inc., has been a corporation licensed as a real estate broker, having been issued license number 0214562. The street address of both Respondents is 5211 Southwest 91 Terrace, Cooper City, Florida 33328. (Tr. 6-7) Findings regarding the transaction involving the Capraro property During May of 1983, Robert H. Karn was the listing broker for the rental of a residence owned by Joseph A. Capraro and Vita M. Capraro. (T. 51, 156) Letitia Daugherty was interested in renting a residence and another broker, Lois Rutkin, showed the Capraro property to Daugherty. Negotiations followed and thereafter, on May 13, 1983, Letitia Daugherty, as prospective tenant, and Joseph A. Capraro and Vita M. Capraro, as landlords, signed a document titled Agreement To Enter Into A Lease. The Agreement required that Daugherty pay the amount of $950.00 "as an earnest money deposit and as a part of the rental price on account of offer to rent the property . . . ." The Agreement provided that the rent would be $475.00 per month, that the "pre- payments" would be $475.00 for the last month's rent, and that a security deposit in the amount of $475.00 would be paid as follows: $150.00 on June 14, 1983, $150.00 on July 14, 1983, and $175.00 on August 14, 1983. The agreement also provided that rent would be due on the 14th of each month. (Pet. Ex. #1; Tr. 21, 22, 24, 97-98) During the negotiations which led up to the agreement to enter into a lease, Daugherty was represented by Lois Rutkin, a real estate broker associated with Drew Realty, and the Capraros were represented by Robert H. Karn. All of the terms of the agreement to enter into a lease were agreed to by all parties prior to that document being signed. It was also specifically understood that the $950.00 paid by Daugherty represented the first and last month's rent. The cashier's check for the $950.00 was made payable to the order of Robert H. Karn because he specifically requested that it be made payable to him. (Tr. 21, 23- 26, 33, 49, 54, 57, 171) If a formal lease had been entered into pursuant to the terms of the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease, Daugherty's $950.00 deposit would have been applied as follows: $475.00 for the first month's rent from May 14 to June 13, 1983, and $475.00 for the last month's rent. Further, if such a lease had been entered into consistent with the Agreement, Daugherty would not have been obligated to pay any further amounts until June 14, 1983, at which time she would have been obligated to pay $475.00 for one month's rent from June 14 through August 13, 1983, plus a $150.00 payment towards the security deposit. (Pet. Ex. #1) Consistent with her obligation under the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease, and at the specific request of Robert H. Karn, Daugherty obtained a cashier's check in the amount of $950.00 payable to the order of Robert H. Karn and delivered the cashier's check to Robert H. Karn. The cashier's check was thereafter cashed by Robert H. Karn without being deposited in any trust or escrow account. (Pet. Ex. #2) Robert H. Karn prepared a formal written lease for the rental of the Capraro property by Daugherty. The lease prepared by Robert H. Karn contained several provisions which were materially different from the terms contained in the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease. Among the changes were a provision that the rent would be due on the first of each month, that the security deposit would be $950.00, that $285.00 of the money previously paid by Daugherty would be applied as rent from May 14 to May 31, 1983, that $665.00 of the money previously paid by Daugherty would be applied towards the security deposit, that additional payments of $142.50 each would be due towards the security deposit on July 1, 1983, and August 1, 1983, and that the next month's rent in the amount of $475.00 would be due on June 1, 1983. (Pet. Ex. #3, Tr. 55, 60) The written lease prepared by Robert H. Karn also contained the following provisions: Tentant (sic) will have first option to Buy said property at the end of this lease. Drew Realty will receive $142.50 on July 1, 983, for renting this property to the "Tentant (sic). Drew Realty will receive a 3 percent Real Estate Commission if Tentant (sic) buys the property. Robert H. Karn, Inc. will receive $142.50 on August 1, 1983 for the rental listing. Robert H. Karn, Inc. will receive a 3 percent Real Estate Commission if Tentant (sic) buys the property. The written lease which was prepared by Robert H. Karn was given to Daugherty on the evening of May 16, 1983. When Daugherty read the lease and saw that it contained provisions different from the provisions in the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease, she refused to sign it. That same evening she told Lois Rutkin, Dan Drew, and Robert H. Karn that she refused to sign the lease because it was different from what she had agreed to, and she demanded the return of her $950.00 deposit. The $950.00 deposit has never been returned to her. (Tr. 27- 30) On the evening of May 16, 1983, extensive discussions took place between Daugherty, Lois Rutkin, Dan Drew, and Robert H. Karn in an effort to resolve the problem. Robert H. Karn's excuse for changing the terms in the lease was that Daugherty had two dogs, but Robert H. Karn had known about the dogs before the parties signed the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease. During the discussions on the evening of May 16, 1983, Lois Rutkin told Robert H. Karn she wanted him to return the cashier's check he had received from Daugherty and Dan Drew told Robert H. Karn not to disburse the funds from that cashier's check, but to return the money to Daugherty. Robert H. Karn did not return the cashier's check nor did he otherwise make any reimbursement to Daugherty. (Tr. 40, 58-59, 85-86) By the time Lois Rutkin, Dan Drew, and Daugherty asked for the return of the $950.00 cashier's check, Robert H. Karn had already cashed the check and had spent the money. Most, if not all, of the money was spent on behalf of the Capraros to pay for such things as mortgage payments and painting on the Capraro's rental property. After Daugherty refused to sign the lease, Robert H. Karn told the Capraros to treat Daugherty's $950.00 deposit as "default money." Actually, the default was by the Capraros who, through their agent Robert H. Karn, tried to change the terms of the agreement. (Tr. 42, 84, 100, 105, 160- 161, 167, 170, 173-175) Subsequently, Daugherty sued Robert H. Karn in County Court in an attempt to collect her 950.00 deposit. On September 12, 1983, a Default And Final Judgment gas entered in Case No. 83-2532-SPH in County Court in Broward County against Robert H. Karn and in favor of Letitia Daugherty in the sum of $950.00, plus court costs in the amount of $42.00. After the judgment was entered against Robert H. Karn, Daugherty again demanded payment of the $950.00. Robert H. Karn has never paid anything to Daugherty. (Pet. Ex. #4, Tr. 30-31, 45, 47-48) Robert H. Karn never asked the Florida Real Estate Commission for an escrow disbursement order regarding the transaction involving the Capraro rental property. (Tr. 169-170) Findings regarding the transaction involving the Supino property In about the middle of July of 1983, Lucy Supino entered into an oral agreement with Robert H. Karn pursuant to which Robert H. Karn was to attempt to locate a tenant for one or more of Lucy Supino's rental units. During August of 1983 Robert H. Karn rented one of Lucy Supino's rental units to Marilyn McKelvey. Thereafter, Karn, Supino, and McKelvey had various disagreements about the transaction. (Tr. 113-116, 121, 138, 141-142) 3/
Recommendation For all the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order which would (a) find the Respondents guilty of the violations charged in Counts I, II, and III, of the Administrative Complaint, (b) dismiss counts IV and V of the Administrative Complaint, (c) fine the Respondents a total of $950.00, and (d) suspend the licenses of the Respondents for a period of ninety (90) days or until such time as the judgment in Case Number 83-2532, Broward County Court, has been satisfied, whichever is later; provided that in any event the period of suspension shall not exceed ten (10) years. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of January, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1985.
Findings Of Fact In November and December, 1974 John T. Halkowich was a registered real estate salesman with the brokerage office of Ayers F. Egan. Exhibit 2, Return Receipt for Registered Mail, was admitted into evidence to show that Halkowich acknowledged receipt of the Notice of Hearing. When Halkowich applied for registration as a real estate salesman, Egan was one of his sponsors. Upon his successful completion of the requirements for registration Egan agreed to hold Halkowich's license for him in Egan's office, but because business was slow he could not allow Halkowich any floor days. He agreed to allow him to sit on houses that neither Egan nor Egan's associate wanted to hold open. During the period of 1974, when little real estate was selling on the Florida Keys, the housing development project owned by Vogler and Snowman was running on hard tines and the developers were anxious to "get out from under" the property. John Vogler, Jr., the father of the Vogler partner in the project, went to Egan to seek help with the sales. Since Egan had no work for Halkowich he suggested that perhaps the developers could make a deal with Halkowich. The developers needed someone on the property at all times to act as watchman, show prospective buyers around, keep the grass trimmed, and supervise the completion of the project. Halkowich was provided an apartent on the site to live in, complete with utilities, in consideration for performing those services. For each unit of the project that was sold the developers agreed to pay Halkowich $2,000. One of the purchasers who appeared at the hearing had stopped by the development, was shown around by Halkowich, and thereafter made an offer directly to the developers to purchase a unit. A contract was subsequently executed between the developers and the buyer and referred to the developers' attorney who performed the closing. After the closing Halkowich was paid $2,000. When Egan learned that sales had been made and that Halkowich had received compensation from the developers he demanded his commission from Halkowich. When the latter advised Egan he couldn't pay him Egan told him he was in violation of the real estate license law and that he, Egan, would report him to the Florida Real Estate Commission if he didn't pay. Thereafter Egan piously reported Halkowich's transgressions to the Commission and this Administrative Complaint ultimately followed.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Ameron Homes, Inc., discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact On March 12, 2015, Petitioner entered into a contract with Ameron to build a new home in Micco, Florida. Petitioner selected Ameron because of the reasonable price it offered to construct her house, as well as the fact that Ameron could immediately begin work. The total contract price for Petitioner’s new house was $198,052. This figure included a base price of $170,000, plus “extras” that Petitioner requested in the amount of $27,552. Ameron completed construction of Petitioner’s house in September 2015. Petitioner moved into her home on September 25, 2015. She paid her final bill to Ameron on September 29, 2015. Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to construct her home using the required standard of care. She also maintains that Ameron overcharged her for certain building materials. Petitioner specifically alleges that the house Ameron built for her did not include several of the details, features, or “extras” that she specifically requested. Petitioner further asserts that she paid approximately $8,500 for items that should have been covered in her “extra” charges. Petitioner claims that she found a number of deficiencies when she moved in. Petitioner’s issues include: Storm shutters: Ameron provided storm shutters for Petitioner’s exterior windows as part of its standard contract. Petitioner represented that the shutters delivered to her home were made of steel. Petitioner explained that steel shutters are much too heavy for her to hang over her windows. Petitioner insisted that she should have been given aluminum shutters instead of steel shutters. Petitioner complained that Mr. Brognano never discussed the different types of shutters that Ameron could have offered with her contract. Flooring: Petitioner disliked the laminate flooring Ameron installed in her home as part of its standard contract. Therefore, she purchased wood-like, tile flooring on her own. Petitioner was upset that she had to pay an additional cost (above the “extras”) for the tile she selected (approximately $2,000). Kitchen cabinets: Petitioner was upset at the poor quality of her cabinets. Petitioner asserts that under her contract, she was entitled to select the cabinets for her kitchen. Instead, Petitioner declared that Ameron installed cabinets with a very cheap exterior coating. Petitioner testified that the finish on her cabinets is beginning to peel. Front door: Petitioner complains that her front door does not fit tightly into the doorframe. In addition, the front door needs to be adjusted to eliminate a gap at the bottom of the doorway. Sod and soil: Petitioner is upset that she had to pay extra for part of the sod laid around her home (approximately $1,000). Furthermore, after rain eroded soil away from her home, Petitioner believes that Ameron should have corrected the situation. General construction complaints: Petitioner complained about the general quality of her home, as well as its condition upon completion. Petitioner asserted that she found dust, nails, and gobs of plaster scattered throughout her house. Petitioner claims that she has plumbing and sewer issues. In addition, a ceiling register is broken and some grout and cement is cracked and worn away. Finally, Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to make several modifications she requested as she moved into her home. Petitioner alleges that Ameron inadequately or failed to include handicap accessible features in her bathroom. These features most notably included grab bars in her shower. Petitioner also asserted that Ameron failed to account for her disability when it installed the soap dish and fixtures in her shower. They are positioned too high for her to safely reach or adjust. (As explained below, at Petitioner’s request, Ameron hired and paid a third party to install grab bars in Petitioner’s shower. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that, at this time, the grab bar is broken.) Petitioner believes that Ameron took advantage of her because she is a woman, elderly, alone, and handicapped. Petitioner asserts that when she expressed her frustration at the manner in which her house was built, Ameron never listened to her. Petitioner also believes that Ameron overcharged her for the inferior “extras” it added to her home. Petitioner asserts that Ameron would not have ignored her complaints if she was a man. Petitioner was 87 years old at the time of the final hearing. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner suffers from a physical disability.4/ Petitioner testified that she sent her initial complaint to the Commission alleging a discriminatory housing practice by Ameron on October 31, 2016.5/ Ameron is owned by William and Todd Brognano. At the final hearing, William Brognano testified on Ameron’s behalf. Mr. Brognano relayed that Ameron has been building homes since 1981. Mr. Brognano asserted that Ameron has a fine reputation for the quality of the homes it constructs. Mr. Brognano expressed that Ameron builds between 100 and 170 homes a year. Ameron has built many homes for women and handicapped persons. Mr. Brognano denied building Petitioner’s home in a faulty manner. He further denied that Ameron discriminated against Petitioner in any way. Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner contracted with Ameron to construct a single-family home for the base price of $170,000. In addition, Petitioner requested “extras” to her home in the amount of $27,552. These “extras” included certain enhancements and modifications, such as a two-foot addition to her bedroom, different laminate and tile for certain floors, walls, and countertops, additional lighting, a tile roof, and the relocation of several palm trees in her yard. Mr. Brognano asserted that all the standard features of Petitioner’s home, as well as each “extra” that Petitioner requested, were clearly itemized in her contract. In response to Petitioner’s specific complaints, Mr. Brognano offered the following: Windows: Mr. Brognano commented that all standard homes are built with windows and shutters that meet Florida Building Code requirements. Ameron could have installed impact windows on Petitioner’s house for an additional charge. However, Petitioner specifically declined impact windows because of the cost. Storm shutters: Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner’s contract did not specify the type of storm shutters to include with her home. In addition, Petitioner specifically declined upgraded shutters because of the cost. Therefore, Mr. Brognano believed that Ameron initially provided steel shutters, which are standard. (Steel shutters are heavier, but stronger, than aluminum shutters.) However, Mr. Brognano testified that after Petitioner notified Ameron of her desire for aluminum shutters, Ameron agreed to arrange for a third-party shutter company to deliver aluminum shutters to Petitioner’s home at no extra charge. (The bill from the company that supplied the shutters referenced “aluminum” shutters. However, Petitioner maintains that the storm shutters she received were steel.) Flooring: Ameron installed floor coverings, including carpeted bedrooms, vinyl kitchen flooring, and tile, as standard features in Petitioner’s home. Petitioner, however, wanted to use laminated wood flooring in parts of her home. Therefore, in June 2015, on her own, Petitioner bought wood tile flooring from a third-party tile company. The additional tile cost Petitioner $2,331.29. Ameron agreed to pay a subcontractor to install the tile Petitioner purchased. Kitchen cabinets: Mr. Brognano refuted Petitioner’s assertion that her cabinets were made of cheap material. Mr. Brognano relayed that, not only did Petitioner select the cabinets that Ameron installed, but they were of nice quality. Sod and soil: Per the specific terms of Petitioner’s contract, Ameron provided 8,000 square feet of Bahia sod for Petitioner’s property. However, Petitioner’s lawn required a total of 10,625 square feet of sod. Mr. Brognano asserted that Petitioner was obligated to pay the additional cost. Mr. Brognano further testified that Ameron fixed the parts of Petitioner’s lawn affected by erosion at no additional cost. General construction complaints: Mr. Brognano commented that Petitioner’s complaints reveal that she does not understand how home construction works. The presence of sawdust, nails, and construction materials is common in most homes during, or immediately after, construction. Just before Petitioner moved in, Ameron paid to have her house professionally cleaned (as is its common practice). Mr. Brognano further testified that everything in Petitioner’s home meets building code standards. Mr. Brognano also claimed that Ameron addressed a number of Petitioner’s complaints. Finally, upon completion, Petitioner’s home was inspected, and no construction issues were found. Regarding Petitioner’s shower, Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner first notified Ameron about the issues in her shower just after Ameron had completed her home, but before she took occupancy on September 25, 2015. Mr. Brognano relayed that Petitioner’s contract did not contain any provisions regarding grab bars. Instead, Petitioner personally bought grab bars and requested Ameron install them. (Petitioner produced a purchase receipt from Lowe’s showing that two grab bars were purchased on September 10, 2015.) Mr. Brognano testified that Ameron agreed to pay for the installation of both the grab bars and the soap dish at no extra charge to Petitioner. (At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that she personally paid the individual Ameron hired to install the grab bars.) Ameron hired Chuck Velek, who has worked as a carpenter for over 30 years, to install the grab bars. At the final hearing, Mr. Velek testified that when he reported to Petitioner’s home, she provided him with a grab bar and instructed him to place it in her shower. Mr. Velek declared that he installed one grab bar in Petitioner’s shower. Mr. Velek stated that Petitioner’s friend directed him where to position the grab bar in the shower. Mr. Brognano testified that, when she moved into her home on September 25, 2015, Petitioner did not alert Ameron to any issues with her shower. On the contrary, Petitioner told Mr. Brognano that she loved her house. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ameron discriminated against her based on her age, sex, (aloneness) or handicap in violation of the FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, for lack of jurisdiction based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file her petition under the Florida Fair Housing Act. Alternatively, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a file order concluding that Respondent, Ameron, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner and dismiss her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2018.
The Issue Whether Cindy Cammarota and Quail Oaks Apartments violated the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance (Ord. 88-9 as amended) by discriminating on grounds of race and religion against Petitioners, Reverends William and Jacqueline Caractor with respect to an attempted eviction action.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Cammarota is the resident manager of Quail Oak Apartments. Respondent Quail Oak is an apartment complex in Hillsborough County which is subject to the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance. Petitioners, who are black, are husband and wife. They are ordained ministers, who reside in Quail Oaks. They have used the community center at the apartment complex for services and frequently pray with other residents. They wear clerical garb and read their Bible in common areas at the complex. At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent Cammarota knew Petitioners were ministers at Mt. Carmel African Methodist Espiscopal Church. On July 30, 1990, a written rental agreement was entered into between Quail Oaks, lessor, and Petitioners, lessees, for an apartment at the complex. The term of the lease was from September 1, 1990 through August 31, 1991. At the option of Quail Oaks, payment of rent could be accepted conditionally by means of a personal check from the lessees. If the check was rejected for insufficient funds, Quail Oaks could require rent plus late charges to be paid by cashier's check, certified check or money order. In addition, Quail Oaks could terminate the lease for nonpayment of rent. Prior to leaving for vacation in November 1990, Petitioner Jacqueline Caractor issued a check in the amount of $645.00 for the November rent. The check was drawn upon the personal checking account belonging to her and her husband at Citizens and Southern National Bank (C & S). It was payable upon demand to Quail Oaks. Although a C & S counter check was used, all of the information on the check was correct. This check was accepted by Respondent Cammarota on behalf of Quail Oaks. It was presented to Barnett Bank of Tampa (Barnett) for collection and the bank was instructed to deposit the funds in Quail Oaks' account at the bank. Barnett Bank did not exercise ordinary care in regard to the check as required by the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead of collecting the funds from the payor bank, Barnett returned the check unpaid to Quail Oaks on November 5, 1990. Notice of the bank's dishonor was sent to Quail Oaks in a notice of debit with respect to the instrument together with the check itself. No reason was given by the bank for the dishonor. The provisional settlement of the check made by Barnett with Quail Oaks was revoked and the amount of credit given was charged back to Quail Oaks' account. Respondent Cammarota, who managed the Quail Oaks account with Barnett, misinterpreted this activity in the account as nonpayment of rent. A "three day notice" was issued by Quail Oaks to Petitioners for payment of rent or possession of the premises on November 7, 1990. The deadline for payment was November 13, 1990. Petitioners received actual notice on November 16, 1990, when they returned from vacation and found the notice posted on the front door of their apartment. A message concerning the matter was also on their answering machine. The message advised them that their check had been returned for insufficient funds. Petitioners went to their bank to determine why their check had not been honored. They had always paid their rent on time and they were concerned about the current state of affairs. The C & S Bank investigated the matter and discovered the check had never been submitted to it for payment. While Petitioners were present, a representative of the bank telephoned Respondent Cammarota and told her a bank error must have occurred as sufficient funds had always been available in Petitioners' account to cover the check, which had never been submitted to C & S for collection. Once Petitioners established that insufficient funds was not the basis for a dishonor of their personal check, they went to Respondent Cammarota to discuss the resolution of the problem. Respondent Cammarota was asked to resubmit the personal check for payment. She refused and requested a money order that included additional charges for the costs Quail Oaks incurred as a result of Barnett Bank's dishonor of the check. Respondent did not believe Petitioners' claim that the original check was a good check. Petitioners advised that they would not pay additional charges because they had complied with all of their responsibilities. They asked for the return of the original check and offered to pay the rent only by money order. Respondent Cammarota refused this potential solution of the problem. Respondent Cammarota did not believe Petitioners were at the office in order to make the check good. She did not believe that Petitioners were merely asserting their legal rights under the lease and negotiable instruments law. As a result, she was suspicious and unyielding during the discussion. She wanted them to pay late fees in order to remain in possession of their apartment. Petitioners, who were tired from their journey and surprised by Respondent Cammarota's lack of receptiveness to very reasonable requests, became somewhat excited by the fact that the process to remove them from their home had begun and they were being told to pay more money than they legally owed to remain in possession. In their response to the situation, Petitioners reminded Respondent Cammarota that they were Reverends. A suggestion that Respondent Cammarota should listen to God was construed by her as "preaching". The excited utterances from Petitioners caused the leasing agent in the office to ask them to leave, which they refused to do until they had read the notice of debit Respondent had received from Barnett Bank about their check. After the notice of debit was read and returned to Quail Oaks, Petitioners began to take their leave. At this point, Respondent Cammarota said something like, "And you people call yourself ministers". On November 20, 1990, Petitioner Jacqueline Caractor gave Quail Oaks a second November 1990 rent payment in the form of a money order. A letter dated the same day from Quail Oaks advised Petitioners that the money order could not be accepted because their account had already been turned over to Quail Oaks' attorney for eviction proceedings. On November 21, 1990, eviction proceedings were filed against Petitioners by Respondent Quail Oaks for nonpayment of rent. On November 28, 1990, Petitioners filed a housing discrimination complaint against Respondents. Attempts to resolve the housing discrimination complaint through conciliation was unsuccessful. Respondent Cammarota uses the term "you people" in conversation whenever she refers to two or more people in her presence. Ordinarily, it is not used to differentiate blacks from whites. In her conversation with the Petitioners, however, the term referred to their race or religion or both. It is Respondent Cammarota's opinion that ministers should behave differently than the Petitioners were behaving when they were asserting their legal rights in her office on November 16, 1990. Respondents did not articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the eviction action for non-payment of rent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of County Commissioners enter a Final Order finding that an unlawful discriminatory housing practice occurred when Respondent Cammarota, agent for Respondent Quail Oaks, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners because of race or color and religion. That Respondents be required to pay a $500 fine to Hillsborough County. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See See HO HO #2. #11. 4. Accepted. See HO #3. 5. Accepted. See HO #5. 6. Accepted. See HO #10. 7. Accepted. See HO #11. 8. Accepted. See HO #12. 9. Accepted. See HO #13. 10. Accepted. See HO #14. 11. Accepted. See HO #14. 12. Accepted. See HO #14. 13. Accepted. See HO #18. 14. Accepted. See HO #20. 15. Accepted. See HO #21. 16. Accepted. 17. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Docket speaks for itself. See HO #22. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #22. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact and loose agreements. Rejected. Inconclusive evidence. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #16. Rejected. Argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. #17. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. Redundant. 49.-57. Rejected. Irrelevant. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #5, #7 and #8. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. See HO #12. Accepted. See HO #13-#14. Rejected. Self serving. Accepted. See HO #21. Accepted. See HO #22. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to lease. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact and legal test for unlawful discrimination. COPIES FURNISHED: Cretta Johnson, Director Hillsborough County Equal Opportunity and Human Relations Department P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, FL 33601 John McMillan, Esquire Levin & McMillan 9385 N. 56th Street, #200 Temple Terrace, FL 33617-5594 Catherine P. Teti, Esquire Assistant County Attorney P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, FL 33601 Reverend William Caractor Qualified Representative 4747 W. Waters Avenue #3807 Tampa, FL 33614
Findings Of Fact In August, 1987, the Petitioner, Charles Eugene Rutledge, sat for the real estate salesman examination given by the Department of Professional Regulation for the Florida Real Estate Commission. On the examination, the Petitioner's grade was 74. Passing is 75. Question 21 on the examination, worth 1 grade point, read: Which of the following would not be considered a potential determinant of housing demand? Natural increases in the population. Migration patterns of household. Net households formation. All off the above would be considered potential determinants of housing demand. The correct answer, based on the reference material that the Department of Professional Regulation told examinees and schools for examination preparation courses could be covered on the examination, is "d." The Petitioner answered "c." Question 21 is not unfairly ambiguous. The negative phrasing of the question is perhaps somewhat tricky on first reading, especially in relation to answer "d." Does selection of "d" mean the examinee believes that all of "a" through "c" are potential determinants, or does it mean the applicant believes that none of "a" through "c" are potential determinants? But reasonable exercise of logic would lead one to the former conclusion. In any event, it is clear, and the Petitioner agrees, that at least "a" and "b" are potential determinants. Use of the word "formation" in answer "c" is not unfairly ambiguous, either. It reasonably does not lead examinees to believe that household "formation" refers to a federally prohibited race or ethnic origin factor, as the Petitioner suggested in his testimony. Nor does it make any significant difference bearing on the Petitioner's selection of answer "c" whether "potential determinant of housing demand" is looked at from the perspective of a buyer or a contractor, as the Petitioner also suggested in testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's appeal and establishing his grade on the August, 1987, real estate salesman examination as 74. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles E. Rutledge 707 Jean Ct. Tampa, Florida 33634 H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Alan D. Katz, filed an application for licensure as a real estate salesman on April 10, 1981, with Respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Hoard of Real Estate. Question six of the application requires the applicant to answer whether he had ever been arrested without regard to whether he was convicted, sentenced, pardoned or paroled. Petitioner responded in the affirmative and attached a list of six prior arrests. All arrests occurred between the years 1958 and 1969. They included possession of marijuana (less than one gram) -1958; attempted petty larceny (misdemeanor) -1962; vagrancy- 1964; embezzlement and larceny-1965; flight to avoid prosecution-1965; and improperly filling out an application for a work card-1969. All charges were dismissed or dropped except the possession of marijuana and attempted petty larceny. For these offenses Katz was fined $50 and placed on probation, respectively. Petitioner has had no arrests since 1969. 1/ After reviewing the application, Respondent concluded that by virtue of the response to question six Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that be was "honest, truthful, trustworthy and of good character, and (had) a good reputation for fair dealing." It denied the application by letter dated July 23, 1981. The denial precipitated the instant hearing. Petitioner, 46-years old, is currently unemployed. He now considers Hallandale, Florida, to be his permanent home. He has worked in various phases of the real estate business since 1964. For the last eight years, his specialty has been vacation time sharing. Most recently, he was employed in Europe by Royal Aloha Vacation Club where he was responsible for investing 100,000 pounds (approximately $225,000 U.S. currency) on behalf of his employer to establish its European time-sharing operations, and in "setting-up" sales for its broker. Prior to that he was employed in Las Vegas, Nevada, by Passport to Pleasure in the unit acquistion phase of its operations. In that capacity, he was entrusted with dealing in small amounts of cash (less than $5,000) and making deposits on behalf of his employer. Before that, he worked in real estate sales for one of Nevada's largest developers. If the application is granted, Petitioner will associate with a broker and specialize in resort time sharing. He has been offered other real estate employment opportunities (e.g., General Development Corporation) but wishes to restrict his activities to the time-sharing field. Letters offered into evidence as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 attest to Katz's honesty, integrity and ability. Although Petitioner has been arrested on at least six occasions, all cases were dismissed except for two minor misdemeanor charges, the last occurring in 1963. He attributes those arrests to immaturity during the early part of his adulthood. His conduct since 1969 is unblemished and sufficient time has lapsed to rehabilitate himself and gain the necessary maturity to operate successfully and honestly in the real estate profession.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Alan D. Katz for licensure as a real estate salesman be GRANTED. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1982
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of housing discrimination against Respondent based on her race and disabilities, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is African-American, although the record fails to disclose any physical or mental disability. Due to her pending eviction at an apartment complex known as the Tennis Club in Fort Lauderdale, Petitioner visited the Venice Cove apartment complex, also in Fort Lauderdale, in the summer of 2002. Deciding that she liked Venice Cove, Petitioner applied for a one bedroom apartment on September 16, 2002. In accordance with its customary practice, Respondent obtained a credit report and learned that Petitioner owed a utility payment, possibly a cable television box. Respondent advised Petitioner that she would have to satisfy this debt to rent an apartment, and Petitioner did so. At some point, Petitioner decided that she wanted a two bedroom/two bathroom apartment, and Respondent tentatively assigned her a unit of this type, pending final approval of her application to lease. Petitioner changed her preferences for type of apartment several times. Respondent was able to accommodate immediately all but one of these preferences. In early December, Petitioner mentioned to Respondent's representative that she was being evicted from the Tennis Club. This is the first time that Petitioner disclosed any eviction to Respondent. Examining the file, Respondent's representative realized that she had failed to order the more thorough credit report that Respondent had been using since November 2002. This report would reveal evictions, among other things. Respondent's representative ordered the more thorough credit report, which revealed that Respondent had been evicted three times. Respondent's policy precluded renting to a person with this rental history, and Respondent's representative promptly informed Petitioner that she was denying Petitioner's application. There is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent denied Petitioner's application on the basis of Petitioner's race or any disability from which she may suffer.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Elvira Williams 1515 Northwest 2nd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Kristine A. Sawyers Law Offices of Lowenhaupt & Sawyers 7765 Southwest 87th Avenue Suite 201 Miami, Florida 33173
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a real estate salesman's license should be approved?
Findings Of Fact Sometime in late February or early March, 1988, Petitioner submitted an application for licensure as a real estate salesman. Petitioner's answers to questions 6 and 7 of the application reflected that in June or July 1987, he had pled guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and was sentenced to serve 2 years on probation and assessed a $5,000 fine. Based on Petitioner's answers to questions 6 and 7 of the application, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for licensure. Petitioner's conviction for conspiring to defraud the United States was due to his involvement with two Farmers Home Administration projects to build low-income housing in Michigan. In 1983, the Farmers Home Administration had allotted approximately $500,000 to fund each of 2 low-income housing projects consisting of 18 units each. The funding had been committed to a developer other than Petitioner. The developer had been unable to arrange for the projects to be built. The developer had let out bids on both projects. The bid on one project came back under the amount allotted; however, the bid for the other project came back at approximately $105,000 over the amount allotted. At this point, Petitioner was contacted by the developer and became a partner in the development of the two projects. Petitioner's job was to get the projects built. Petitioner determined that it might be possible to construct the two projects for the total amount allotted, $1,000,000, if both projects were bid out together, since efficiencies should be achieved by bidding both projects as one. Petitioner let out a bid for the construction of both projects. The bid came back at a slightly higher amount than that allotted. However, after some negotiations with the Farmers Home Administration the two projects were allowed to proceed. However, the fact still remained that one project was more expensive than the other to build, and that the costs of the more expensive project exceeded the amount allotted by the Farmer's Home Administration. In order to resolve this problem, Petitioner falsified some documents to make the accounting for each project show that both projects came in under the amount allotted even though this was not true. In effect, Petitioner used money allotted to the less expensive project to pay for the more expensive project. In 1985, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began an investigation of all Farmers Home Administration projects in Michigan. Out of this investigation, Petitioner's involvement with the two projects was uncovered, and his subsequent plea of guilty and conviction were due to his falsifying the documents. Petitioner held a real estate salesman's license in Michigan from 1975 to 1978. From 1978 to the present time, Petitioner has held a real estate broker's license in Michigan. No disciplinary action has been taken by the State of Michigan on account of Petitioner's actions which led to his conviction. Also, no action has ever been brought in Michigan arising out of Petitioner's activities representing buyers and sellers of real estate. Petitioner has paid $150.00 of the $5,000.00 fine imposed by the Federal government. He has paid when he has had work. Petitioner is in the process of filing for Chapter 11 reorganization in order to facilitate the payment of some debts.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order approving Petitioner's application for license as a real estate salesman. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-3479 The parties submitted proposed findings of fact which are addressed below. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding of Fact Number Ruling and RO Paragraph Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as not a finding of fact. Accepted. Rejected as not a finding of fact, but see Conclusions of Law section of RO. Rejected as not a finding of fact. Respondent's PRO posed Findings of Fact PRO posed Finding of Fact Number Ruling and RO Paragraph Accepted as modified in RO 1. Accepted as modified in RO 3. Subordinate. Accepted as modified in RO 2, 4 and 12. Accepted as modified in RO 11 and 12. Accepted as modified in RO 16 and 17. First 7 words are not a finding of fact; remainder of sentence is Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: George Joseph Laufersky 7 Oak Lane Lady Lake, Florida 32659 Lawrence S. Gendzier Assistant Attorney General 400 West Robinson Room 212 Orlando, Florida 32801 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Orlando, Florida 32801 Bruce D. Lamb General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
