vs.
Case No. 18-3532
Respondent.
J. Bruce Culpepper, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2018),1/ on September 19, 2018, by video teleconference with sites in Tallahassee and Sebastian, Florida.
For Respondent: William T. Brognano, pro se
Ameron Homes, Inc.
Whether Respondent, Ameron Homes, Inc., discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, in violation of the Florida
entitled.
On or about October 31, 2016, Petitioner submitted a housing discrimination complaint to the Florida Commission on Human Relations (the “Commission”) alleging that Respondent, Ameron Homes, Inc. (“Ameron”), violated the Florida Fair Housing Act (the “FHA”). Petitioner claimed that Ameron discriminated against her based on her age, sex, and handicap.2/
On June 18, 2018, after receiving several additional written statements from Petitioner, the Commission notified Petitioner that her complaint to the Commission was untimely filed.
Therefore, with no jurisdiction to investigate Petitioner’s claim, the Commission intended to dismiss Petitioner’s complaint.
On or about July 2, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission alleging a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the FHA.
On July 9, 2018, the Commission transmitted Petitioner’s Petition for Relief to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) to conduct a chapter 120 evidentiary hearing.
The final hearing was held on September 19, 2018. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf.
Petitioner’s Composite Exhibit 1 was admitted into evidence. William Brognano testified on behalf of Ameron. Ameron also
presented the testimony of Chuck Velek. Ameron’s Exhibits 1 and 2 were admitted into evidence.
A court reporter recorded the final hearing. A one-volume Transcript of the final hearing was filed with DOAH on
October 30, 2018. At the close of the hearing, the parties were advised of a ten-day timeframe following DOAH’s receipt of the hearing transcript to file post-hearing submittals. At the final hearing, both parties requested a ten-day extension of the filing deadline, which was granted.3/ Both parties filed post-hearing statements which were duly considered in preparing this
Recommended Order.
On March 12, 2015, Petitioner entered into a contract with Ameron to build a new home in Micco, Florida. Petitioner selected Ameron because of the reasonable price it offered to construct her house, as well as the fact that Ameron could immediately begin work.
The total contract price for Petitioner’s new house was
$198,052. This figure included a base price of $170,000, plus “extras” that Petitioner requested in the amount of $27,552.
Ameron completed construction of Petitioner’s house in September 2015. Petitioner moved into her home on September 25, 2015. She paid her final bill to Ameron on September 29, 2015.
Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to construct her home using the required standard of care. She also maintains that Ameron overcharged her for certain building materials. Petitioner specifically alleges that the house Ameron built for her did not include several of the details, features, or “extras” that she specifically requested. Petitioner further asserts that she paid approximately $8,500 for items that should have been covered in her “extra” charges.
Petitioner claims that she found a number of deficiencies when she moved in. Petitioner’s issues include:
Storm shutters: Ameron provided storm shutters for Petitioner’s exterior windows as part of its standard contract. Petitioner represented that the shutters delivered to her home were made of steel. Petitioner explained that steel shutters are much too heavy for her to hang over her windows. Petitioner insisted that she should have been given aluminum shutters instead of steel shutters. Petitioner complained that
Mr. Brognano never discussed the different types of shutters that Ameron could have offered with her contract.
Flooring: Petitioner disliked the laminate flooring Ameron installed in her home as part of its standard contract. Therefore, she purchased wood-like, tile flooring on her own. Petitioner was upset that she had to pay an additional cost
(above the “extras”) for the tile she selected (approximately
$2,000).
Kitchen cabinets: Petitioner was upset at the poor
quality of her cabinets. Petitioner asserts that under her contract, she was entitled to select the cabinets for her kitchen. Instead, Petitioner declared that Ameron installed cabinets with a very cheap exterior coating. Petitioner testified that the finish on her cabinets is beginning to peel.
Front door: Petitioner complains that her front door does not fit tightly into the doorframe. In addition, the front door needs to be adjusted to eliminate a gap at the bottom of the doorway.
Sod and soil: Petitioner is upset that she had to pay extra for part of the sod laid around her home (approximately
$1,000). Furthermore, after rain eroded soil away from her home, Petitioner believes that Ameron should have corrected the situation.
General construction complaints: Petitioner complained about the general quality of her home, as well as its condition upon completion. Petitioner asserted that she found dust, nails, and gobs of plaster scattered throughout her house. Petitioner claims that she has plumbing and sewer issues. In addition, a ceiling register is broken and some grout and cement is cracked and worn away.
Finally, Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to make several modifications she requested as she moved into her home. Petitioner alleges that Ameron inadequately or failed to include handicap accessible features in her bathroom. These features most notably included grab bars in her shower. Petitioner also asserted that Ameron failed to account for her disability when it installed the soap dish and fixtures in her shower. They are positioned too high for her to safely reach or adjust. (As explained below, at Petitioner’s request, Ameron hired and paid a third party to install grab bars in Petitioner’s shower. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that, at this time, the grab bar is broken.)
Petitioner believes that Ameron took advantage of her because she is a woman, elderly, alone, and handicapped. Petitioner asserts that when she expressed her frustration at the manner in which her house was built, Ameron never listened to her. Petitioner also believes that Ameron overcharged her for the inferior “extras” it added to her home. Petitioner asserts that Ameron would not have ignored her complaints if she was a
man.
Petitioner was 87 years old at the time of the final
hearing. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner suffers from a physical disability.4/
Petitioner testified that she sent her initial complaint to the Commission alleging a discriminatory housing practice by Ameron on October 31, 2016.5/
Ameron is owned by William and Todd Brognano. At the final hearing, William Brognano testified on Ameron’s behalf.
Mr. Brognano relayed that Ameron has been building homes since 1981. Mr. Brognano asserted that Ameron has a fine reputation for the quality of the homes it constructs.
Mr. Brognano expressed that Ameron builds between 100 and 170 homes a year. Ameron has built many homes for women and handicapped persons.
Mr. Brognano denied building Petitioner’s home in a faulty manner. He further denied that Ameron discriminated against Petitioner in any way.
Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner contracted with Ameron to construct a single-family home for the base price of
$170,000. In addition, Petitioner requested “extras” to her home in the amount of $27,552. These “extras” included certain enhancements and modifications, such as a two-foot addition to her bedroom, different laminate and tile for certain floors, walls, and countertops, additional lighting, a tile roof, and the relocation of several palm trees in her yard. Mr. Brognano asserted that all the standard features of Petitioner’s home, as
well as each “extra” that Petitioner requested, were clearly itemized in her contract.
In response to Petitioner’s specific complaints, Mr. Brognano offered the following:
Windows: Mr. Brognano commented that all standard homes
are built with windows and shutters that meet Florida Building Code requirements. Ameron could have installed impact windows on Petitioner’s house for an additional charge. However, Petitioner specifically declined impact windows because of the cost.
Storm shutters: Mr. Brognano explained that
Petitioner’s contract did not specify the type of storm shutters to include with her home. In addition, Petitioner specifically declined upgraded shutters because of the cost. Therefore,
Mr. Brognano believed that Ameron initially provided steel shutters, which are standard. (Steel shutters are heavier, but stronger, than aluminum shutters.) However, Mr. Brognano testified that after Petitioner notified Ameron of her desire for aluminum shutters, Ameron agreed to arrange for a third-party shutter company to deliver aluminum shutters to Petitioner’s home at no extra charge. (The bill from the company that supplied the shutters referenced “aluminum” shutters. However, Petitioner maintains that the storm shutters she received were steel.)
Flooring: Ameron installed floor coverings, including
carpeted bedrooms, vinyl kitchen flooring, and tile, as standard
features in Petitioner’s home. Petitioner, however, wanted to use laminated wood flooring in parts of her home. Therefore, in June 2015, on her own, Petitioner bought wood tile flooring from a third-party tile company. The additional tile cost Petitioner
$2,331.29. Ameron agreed to pay a subcontractor to install the tile Petitioner purchased.
Kitchen cabinets: Mr. Brognano refuted Petitioner’s
assertion that her cabinets were made of cheap material.
Mr. Brognano relayed that, not only did Petitioner select the cabinets that Ameron installed, but they were of nice quality.
Sod and soil: Per the specific terms of Petitioner’s contract, Ameron provided 8,000 square feet of Bahia sod for Petitioner’s property. However, Petitioner’s lawn required a total of 10,625 square feet of sod. Mr. Brognano asserted that Petitioner was obligated to pay the additional cost.
Mr. Brognano further testified that Ameron fixed the parts of Petitioner’s lawn affected by erosion at no additional cost.
General construction complaints: Mr. Brognano commented that Petitioner’s complaints reveal that she does not understand how home construction works. The presence of sawdust, nails, and construction materials is common in most homes during, or immediately after, construction. Just before Petitioner moved in, Ameron paid to have her house professionally cleaned (as is its common practice). Mr. Brognano further testified that
everything in Petitioner’s home meets building code standards. Mr. Brognano also claimed that Ameron addressed a number of Petitioner’s complaints. Finally, upon completion, Petitioner’s home was inspected, and no construction issues were found.
Regarding Petitioner’s shower, Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner first notified Ameron about the issues in her shower just after Ameron had completed her home, but before she took occupancy on September 25, 2015. Mr. Brognano relayed that Petitioner’s contract did not contain any provisions regarding grab bars. Instead, Petitioner personally bought grab bars and requested Ameron install them. (Petitioner produced a purchase receipt from Lowe’s showing that two grab bars were purchased on September 10, 2015.) Mr. Brognano testified that Ameron agreed to pay for the installation of both the grab bars and the soap dish at no extra charge to Petitioner. (At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that she personally paid the individual Ameron hired to install the grab bars.)
Ameron hired Chuck Velek, who has worked as a carpenter for over 30 years, to install the grab bars. At the final hearing, Mr. Velek testified that when he reported to Petitioner’s home, she provided him with a grab bar and instructed him to place it in her shower. Mr. Velek declared that he installed one grab bar in Petitioner’s shower. Mr. Velek
stated that Petitioner’s friend directed him where to position the grab bar in the shower.
Mr. Brognano testified that, when she moved into her home on September 25, 2015, Petitioner did not alert Ameron to any issues with her shower. On the contrary, Petitioner told Mr. Brognano that she loved her house.
Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ameron discriminated against her based on her age, sex, (aloneness) or handicap in violation of the FHA.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to sections 120.569, 120.57(1), 760.34(4), and 760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner asserts that Ameron discriminated against her in violation of the FHA. Petitioner alleges that Ameron treated her differently based on her sex, age, and handicap. Regarding her handicap, Petitioner’s complaint presents a claim that Ameron refused to provide “reasonable modifications” to her home.
The FHA is codified in sections 760.20 through 760.37 and makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person in
connection with the sale of a dwelling. Section 760.23 specifically states, in pertinent part:
(2) It is unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion.
* * *
It is unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of:
(a) That buyer or renter;
* * *
It is unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of:
(a) That buyer or renter;
* * *
For purposes of subsections (7) and (8), discrimination includes:
A refusal to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises; . . .
The FHA is patterned after the Federal Fair Housing Act found in 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. Discrimination covered under
the FHA is the same discrimination prohibited under the Federal Fair Housing Act. Savannah Club Worship Serv. v. Savannah Club Homeowners’ Ass’n, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1224 n.1 (S.D. Fla.
2005); see also Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014)(“The [Federal Fair Housing Act] and the Florida Fair Housing Act are substantively identical, and therefore the same legal analysis applies to each.”).
Accordingly, federal case law involving housing discrimination is instructive in applying and interpreting the FHA. See Loren v.
Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1300 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002).
Specifically regarding the subject matter of Petitioner’s claim, the statutory language in section 760.23 is very similar to that found in its federal counterpart in 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f).6/ When “a Florida statute is modeled after a federal law on the same subject, the Florida statute will take on the same constructions as placed on its federal prototype.” Brand v. Fla.
Power Corp., 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also
Dornbach v. Holley, 854 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002);
Milsap v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8031 (S.D. Fla. 2010); and Fla. Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant, 586
So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
In cases involving a claim under Florida’s FHA, the burden of proof is on the complainant. § 760.34(5), Fla. Stat.; see also Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. ex rel. Herron v.
Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir. 1990); and Dep’t of
Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec. & Investor Prot. v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla. 1996)(“The general rule is that a
party asserting the affirmative of an issue has the burden of presenting evidence as to that issue.”). The preponderance of the evidence standard is applicable to this matter. § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.
Discrimination may be proven by direct, statistical, or circumstantial evidence. Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC, 18 So. 3d 17, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), 18 So. 3d at 22. Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, would prove the existence of discriminatory intent behind the decision without any inference or presumption. Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d
1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997). Courts have held that “‘only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate . . .’ will constitute direct evidence of discrimination.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1999)(citations omitted).
Petitioner presented no direct evidence of housing discrimination by Ameron. No evidence or testimony shows that Ameron intentionally built Petitioner’s home in a (allegedly) defective or negligent manner based on her age, sex, or handicap.
When there is no direct evidence of discrimination, fair housing cases are analyzed under the three-part, burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See Blackwell, 908 F.2d at 870;
Savannah Club Worship Serv., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-32. Under
this three-part test, Petitioner has the initial burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-253; Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty.,
447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006); Valenzuela, 18 So. 3d at 22.
Based on the facts found in this matter, Petitioner’s most viable cause of action under the FHA is a claim that Ameron refused to permit a “reasonable modification” of her home. See
§ 760.23(9)(a), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, adapted to the facts in this case, for Petitioner to establish a prima facie case of housing discrimination, she must prove that: (1) she is “disabled” within the meaning of the FHA; (2) she requested a reasonable modification of her premises; (3) the requested modification was necessary to afford her the full enjoyment of her premises; and (4) Ameron refused to make the requested modification. See Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 12857/; and Nazarova v.
Hillcrest E. No. 22, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111990, *at 11
(S.D. Fla. July 3, 2018). See also Fitzpatrick v. City of
Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1123 (11th Cir. 1993)(“The elements of a
prima facie case are flexible and should be tailored, on a case- by-case basis, to differing factual circumstances.”).
If Petitioner proves a prima facie case, she creates a presumption of discrimination. At that point, the burden shifts to Ameron to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255; see also Blackwell, 908 F.2d at 870; Savannah Club Worship Serv., 456 F. Supp. 2d at
1231-32. The reason for Ameron’s decision should be clear, reasonably specific, and worthy of credence. See Dep’t of Corr.
v. Chandler, 582 So. 2d 1183, 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The
burden on Ameron is one of production, not persuasion, to demonstrate to the finder of fact that its action was nondiscriminatory. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). This burden of production is “exceedingly light.” Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564.
Finally, if Ameron meets its burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears. The burden then shifts back to Petitioner to prove that Ameron’s proffered reason was not the true reason but merely a “pretext” for discrimination. Combs v.
Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997);
Valenzuela, 18 So. 3d at 25.
In order to satisfy this final step in the process, Petitioner must show “either directly by persuading the court that
a discriminatory reason more likely motivated [Ameron] or indirectly by showing that [Ameron’s] proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S. Ct.
1089, 1095. Petitioner must prove that the reasons articulated were false and that the discrimination was the real reason for the
action. City of Miami v. Hervis, 65 So. 3d 1110, 1117 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2011)(citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2751 (1993), 509 U.S. at 515)(“[A] reason
cannot be proved to be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was
the real reason.”).
Despite the shifting burdens of proof, “the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the [respondent] intentionally discriminated against the [petitioner] remains at all times with the [petitioner].” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253;
Valenzuela, 18 So. 3d at 22.
As an initial procedural matter, the undersigned addresses the issue of whether Petitioner timely filed her discrimination complaint with the Commission. If Petitioner failed to submit her claim within the required statutory timeframe, then the Commission does not have jurisdiction to offer Petitioner relief from the alleged discriminatory housing practice under the FHA.
Section 760.34, entitled “Enforcement,” states, in pertinent part:
Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice
. . . may file a complaint with the commission. Complaints shall be in writing and shall contain such information and be in such form as the commission requires.
* * *
A complaint under subsection (1) must be filed within 1 year after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred.
The complaint must be in writing and shall state the facts upon which the allegations of a discriminatory housing practice are based. (emphasis added).
The alleged discriminatory practice about which Petitioner objects is the manner in which Ameron built her home. Petitioner also specifically complains about the installation of the grab bar in her shower. The facts in the record establish that Ameron completed construction of Petitioner’s home not later than September 25, 2015. The evidence also establishes that the grab bar was installed prior to this same date. Therefore, for purposes of Petitioner’s complaint, viewing the timeline most favorably to Petitioner, September 25, 2015, serves as the last possible date of an alleged discriminatory housing practice by Ameron.
In pursuit of her claim, however, Petitioner testified that she sent her written complaint to the Commission on
October 31, 2016. Accordingly, Petitioner submitted her discriminatory housing claim against Ameron more than 1 year after the last possible violation of the FHA. Consequently, Petitioner’s claim is untimely, and the Commission lacks jurisdiction to provide Petitioner any relief under the FHA. Therefore, Petitioner’s Petition to the Commission must be dismissed.
Notwithstanding the above, turning to the merits of Petitioner’s complaint against Ameron, based on the evidence in the record, Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of a discriminatory housing practice under the FHA. Initially, Ameron did not dispute that Petitioner should be considered “handicapped.” The evidence also supports Petitioner’s allegations that she requested a modification to her premises (a grab bar in her shower), and that she needed the grab bar for safety concerns.
Regarding the fourth prong of the prima facie case, however, the undisputed evidence shows that Ameron did make the requested modification by arranging for the installation of the grab bar in Petitioner’s shower. The fact that the grab bar may have been inadequately affixed to the shower wall does not, without more, sustain Petitioner’s complaint of housing discrimination. Ameron unquestionably complied with Petitioner’s request for a modification of her premises.
Furthermore, aside from the fact that Petitioner did not prove that Ameron refused her modification request, Petitioner did not demonstrate that the manner or method in which Ameron constructed her house was in some way based on her sex, age, or handicap. Petitioner did not establish that the allegedly deficient “extras” that Ameron installed in her home were somehow motivated by discrimination. Consequently, the more persuasive evidence does not support Petitioner’s claim that Ameron discriminated against her when it built her house.
At the final hearing, Petitioner expressed her extreme displeasure at what she perceived to be Ameron’s lack of craftsmanship and skill, as well as the poor quality of several features Ameron installed in her home. Petitioner clearly believes that Ameron did not build her the house she paid for. However, Petitioner did not produce any evidence that Ameron’s (allegedly) substandard performance was based on some discriminatory intent.8/ Consequently, Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving that Ameron discriminated against her in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or construction of her house.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief
filed by Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, for lack of jurisdiction based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file her petition under the Florida Fair Housing Act. Alternatively, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a file order concluding that Respondent, Ameron, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner and dismiss her Petition for Relief.
DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2018.
1/ Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the 2018 codification of the Florida Statutes.
2/ In the Commission’s DETERMINATION sent to Petitioner and Respondent on June 18, 2018, the Commission represented that it received Petitioner’s initial complaint, a Technical Assistance Questionnaire, on November 7, 2016. The Technical Assistance Questionnaire was not offered into evidence during the administrative proceeding, or otherwise provided to the
undersigned. Therefore, regarding the specific date Petitioner filed her complaint with the Commission, the undersigned’s finding is based on the competent substantial evidence presented during the final hearing, i.e., Petitioner’s testimony that she sent her complaint to the Commission on October 31, 2016.
3/ By requesting a deadline for filing post-hearing submissions beyond ten days after the final hearing, the 30-day time period for filing the recommended order was waived. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.216(2).
4/ A person has a disability under the federal Fair Housing Act if she has “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities.”
42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).
5/ See endnote 2 above.
6/ The pertinent language in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) states:
7/ Bhogaita reviewed an alleged failure to accommodate claim under section 760.23(9)(b). The present matter involves a failure to modify claim under section 760.23(9)(a).
8/ See, e.g., Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 809, (11th Cir. 2010), wherein the court observed that it is well-established that Title VII “does not prohibit harassment alone, however severe and pervasive. Instead, Title VII prohibits discrimination . . . that discriminates based on a protected category”; and Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196
F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999), where the court noted that, in a proceeding under the FCRA, it is “not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, [the court’s] sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision.”
Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk
Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110
William T. Brognano Ameron Homes, Inc.
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
