The Issue The primary issues for determination are whether Respondent committed a myriad of violations of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, which provides certain requirements applicable to motor vehicle dealers. The violations alleged to have been committed by Respondent are inclusive of failures to display a consumer sales window form, to keep certain records of purchases and sales, to keep proper records of temporary tags, and not possessing required proper proof of ownership of two vehicles. In the event that Respondent committed these violations, an additional issue is what administrative penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the business of buying, selling, or dealing in motor vehicles or offering or displaying motor vehicles for sale. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida, having been issued license number VI-13051. Petitioner issued the license based upon an application signed by Sudarshan Kuthiala, as President. Respondent's address of record is 5895 St. Augustine Road, Suite No. 8, Jacksonville, Florida 32207. Respondent's president is Sudarshan Kuthiala. On or about March 12, 2004, Petitioner's compliance examiner conducted an annual records inspection of Respondent's dealership. The purpose of that inspection was to determine whether the dealership was complying with statutory and rule requirements. Arrangements to conduct the inspection were made at least a week ahead of time. At the time of the March 12, 2004 inspection, the compliance examiner found that Respondent did not have the "Buyer's Guide" required by federal law and known as a “consumer sales window form,” properly displayed on a vehicle, a 1995 Nissan, Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) 1N6SD16S25C386012, being offered for sale by Respondent. Also, during the March 12, 2004 inspection, the compliance examiner reviewed five purchases and sales of motor vehicles made by Respondent. The examiner discovered that records of two of the vehicles involved did not contain any documentation of the method or proof of purchase or the required odometer disclosure statement at time of acquisition. Another of the vehicles did not have the odometer disclosure statement upon its disposition. An examination during the March 12, 2004 inspection of Respondent's temporary tag log found that the log was incomplete. Respondent's temporary tag log did not include the name and address of the person to whom a temporary tag for a vehicle had been assigned. A follow-up inspection of Respondent's dealership was conducted on June 23, 2004. An appointment for that inspection was made at least one week ahead of time. In the course of that June 23, 2004 inspection, Petitioner's examiner discovered Respondent did not display the required "Buyer's Guide" or “consumer sales window form” required by federal law on a 1992 Mercury automobile with VIN 1MEPM6043NH616615, being offered by Respondent for sale. Further, Respondent's records did not contain the odometer disclosure statement of that vehicle when it was acquired. Additionally, Respondent did not have a title or other proof of ownership of the 1992 Mercury automobile. During the June 23, 2004 inspection, Petitioner's examiner also discovered that records of three purchases and sales of motor vehicles made by Respondent were deficient. Records for two of the vehicles did not have the method or proof of purchase or odometer disclosure statement upon acquisition. Records for one of the vehicles did not have the required odometer disclosure statement upon disposition of the vehicle. The June 23, 2004 inspection also revealed that Respondent's temporary tag log was incomplete. The log did not reveal the name and address of a person to whom a temporary tag was issued or the vehicle identification number of the vehicle for which the temporary tag was issued. Following both of the inspections recounted above, neither Sudarshan Kuthiala nor anyone else on behalf of Respondent offered to provide the missing records or account for them. In the course of attendance at training school for dealers, Sudarshan Kuthiala was informed of the required forms and the process for their preparation. Also, Respondent's records have been inspected in the past and recordkeeping requirements further explained to Kuthiala.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order revoking Respondent’s license. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Sudarshan K. Kuthiala 2961 Bernice Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Fred O. Dickinson, III, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, respondent T.A.S. Auto Sales held independent motor vehicle license #6VI-2652, with a licensed place of business at 117 1/2 Central Avenue in Brandon, Florida. The owner of T.A.S. Auto Sales is Donald Hunt. On May 1, 1985, the Division of Motor Vehicles issued license number 5VI-003620A to T.A.S. Auto Sales for a supplemental location at 312 East Brandon Boulevard in Brandon, Florida. The expiration date on this license was April 30, 1986. Donald Hunt leased the property at 312 East Brand on Boulevard and operated a retail car sales business there until approximately mid-June of 1985. He then decided to sell the business to Clarence W. Jenkins, and entered into an Assignment of Lease on July 1, 1985. According to Mr. Hunt, it was his intent to allow Mr. Jenkins to operate under the supplemental license of T.A.S. Auto Sales while Mr. Jenkins, doing business as Brandon Auto Brokers, obtained his own Florida Dealers License. However, according to Mr. Hunt, said arrangement was to terminate no later than July 28, 1985. A letter setting forth this agreement was received into evidence as respondent's Exhibit 4. From July 1, 1985, through July 28, 1985, Donald Hunt did supervise all title work performed through Brandon Auto Brokers and/or Mr. Jenkins. During July and early August, 1985, Brandon Auto Brokers secured a County occupational license, a Department of Revenue Certificate of Registration to collect sales and use taxes, a reassignment of telephone numbers, an insurance binder, a surety bond and membership in the Florida Independent Automobile Dealers Association. Signage indicating either Brandon Auto Brokers or "under new management" was also placed on the premises, but the date upon which such signage was erected was not established. Lois Jarvis, an inspector with the Division of Motor Vehicles, testified that she spoke on the telephone with Mr. Hunt and Mr. Jenkins on August 9, 1985, and thereafter mailed to Mr. Jenkins an application form for a dealer's license. It was Inspector Jarvis' understanding that Mr. Hunt was allowing Jenkins to operate under Mr. Hunt's supplemental license until such time as Jenkins obtained his own license. On September 4, 1985, she visited the supplemental lot to check on Mr. Jenkins' incomplete application. Her next visit with either Mr. Hunt or Mr. Jenkins occurred on September 23, 1985. At that time, while at Mr. Hunt's lot on Central Avenue, Mr. Hunt informed her that he had nothing more to do with the supplemental lot on Brand on Boulevard, and gave Ms. Jarvis his license for that location. Inspector Jarvis then went over to the supplemental lot and issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Jenkins/Brandon Auto Brokers for offering, displaying for sale and selling motor vehicles without a license. On September 24, 1985, Ms. Jarvis requested the Department to cancel dealer license 5VI-3620A on the ground that "dealer closed lot and surrendered license." Mrs. Jarvis testified that she did not visit either the supplemental lot or the main lot in July or August of 1985. Her work records for July and August do not reflect a visit to either location. Mr. Hunt, and several witnesses testifying in respondent's behalf, testified that he told Inspector Jarvis in early July that he would have nothing more to do with the supplemental lot beyond July 28, 1985. It was their testimony that Mrs. Jarvis' response was that "there was no way Mr. Jenkins could be issued a license by July 28th, to which Mr. Hunt responded, "that's not my problem." Mr. Hunt admits that he did not specifically request Mrs. Jarvis to cancel his license for the supplemental lot as of July 28th, and that he did not deliver that license to Mrs. Jarvis until September 23, 1985. Based upon the demeanor and possible motives of the witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence received into evidence, it is concluded that Inspector Jarvis did not visit either the supplemental lot or the main lot for which T.A.S. held licenses in June, July or August of 1985. It is further found that Inspector Jarvis did not become aware that Mr. Hunt intended to cease all relationships with the supplemental lot until he delivered the license for those premises to her on September 23, 1985. By statute, an independent motor vehicle license period is from May 1 to April 30 of the following year. Licenses expire annually, "unless revoked or suspended prior to that date." Section 320.27(4), Florida Statutes. The Department has no rule, regulation, policy or established procedure for a licensee to surrender or cancel a license prior to the expiration date. On July 30, 1985, Bruce Reich purchased a 1980 Chevrolet Camero from the Jenkins at the supplemental lot. His checks were made payable to Brandon Auto Brokers. He did not think he was buying a car from T.A.S. or from Don Hunt. On or about September 30, 1985, Mr. Reich filed a Complaint Affidavit against Brandon Auto Brokers regarding this transaction. As of the date of the hearing, Mr. Reich had still not received title to the vehicle he purchased. On August 26, 1985, William S. Ryder purchased a 1981 Van from the Jenkins at the supplemental lot. On or about October 2, 1985, Mr. Ryder filed a Complaint Affidavit against T.A.S. Auto Sales on the ground that he had not received a clear title or plates for this vehicle. He had previously attempted to locate Mr. Jenkins, but was unable to find him.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the respondent be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 31st day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0471 The proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties have been fully considered and have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner 8. Rejected; the evidence demonstrates that respondent intended that its responsibilities with regard to the supplemental lot would terminate on July 28, 1985. Respondent 1 - 3. Rejected in part as improper findings of fact. 4 - 9A. Rejected; not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 9H. Accepted, except that the evidence demonstrates that the Ryder complaint named T.A.S. Auto Sales as the dealer. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Neil Kirkman Building Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Michael N. Kavouklis, Esquire 419 West Platt Street Tampa, Florida 33606 Leonard R. Mellon, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue Whether General Motors' decision not to renew its franchise agreement with Gallman Pontiac was "unfair" as the term is defined by Section 320.641(3), Florida statutes.
Findings Of Fact Background On or about October 28, 1988, (general Motors Corporation, Pontiac Division (General Motors) notified it franchisee, Bill Gallman Pontiac, GMC Truck, Inc. (Gallman Pontiac), a licensed motor vehicle dealer in the State of Florida, of its election not to renew the franchise agreement, effective ninety days from the date of the delivery of the notice of its decision. Because the franchise agreement was scheduled to expire on November 20, 1988, Bill Gallman would have the option to void the nonrenewal due to General Motor's failure to notify the motor vehicle dealer ninety days in advance of the proposed nonrenewal. To avoid this result and to comply with the franchise agreement, General Motors informed the dealer in the same notification that the current agreement was being extended for the same ninety day period in which the dealer had been given notice of the proposed nonrenewal. General Motors' extension of the term of the franchise agreement was a unilateral proposed novation that was accepted by Gallman Pontiac when he relied upon the modification and continued to do business under the novation. Gallman Pontiac's acceptance of the novation is clearly demonstrated by the timing of the verified complaint in this proceeding, which was filed on January 12, 1989. The specific reason stated by General Motors for its decision not to renew its franchise agreement beyond the ninety-day period was that Gallman Pontiac failed to fulfill its minimum sales performance responsibilities pursuant to its contractual obligations as set forth in the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. Gallman Pontiac subsequently filed a verified complaint, pursuant to Section 320.641, Florida Statutes, to contest the proposed nonrenewal of the franchise agreement. The complaint alleges that the proposed nonrenewal is unfair and that the grounds asserted for the nonrenewal were factually untrue and/or legally insufficient for the intended purpose. The Mathematical Formula for Sales Effectiveness The manufacturer's primary purpose for entering into a franchise agreement with a dealer is to have its automobiles sold. To determine whether a dealer is meeting its responsibilities in this regard, the franchise agreement contains a mathematical formula which is used to evaluate the sales performance of all dealers who sell Pontiacs. Pursuant to the formula, which is expressed in the agreement and tide annual sales performance evaluation form, a dealer's sales ratio and registration ratio must be calculated. A dealer's sales ratio is determined by dividing the dealer's actual unit sales of new motor vehicles, wherever registered, by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. A dealer's registration ratio is determined by dividing new motor vehicle unit registrations by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. After these ratios are recorded, the dealer's sales and registration ratios are compared to zone and national registration ratio levels to determine sales and registration effectiveness. If the individual dealer's sales and registration performances reach a comparative level of 85 percent effectiveness to the zone and national levels, the dealer's performance is considered effective by General Motors. When the comparisons were made in this case, the dealer's sales effectiveness was 53.6 percent in 1987 and 68.5 percent in 1988. Registration effectiveness was 56.5 percent in 1987 and 74.1 percent in 1988. These levels of performance do not meet the minimum levels required by the franchise agreement. Other Considerations Under the Agreement In addition to the mathematical formula, the franchise agreement states that General Motors will consider other relevant factors in its sales evaluation, including the following factors: the trend over a reasonable period of time of dealer's sales performance; the manner in which dealer has conducted the sales operations, including advertising, sales promotion and treatment of customers; sales to fleet customers if they have affected registrations; the manner in which dealer has submitted orders for new motor vehicles to the Pontiac Division; the availability of new motor vehicles to dealer; and significant local conditions that may have directly affected dealer's performance. If the mathematical formulas regarding sales and registration effectiveness set forth in the franchise agreement were the sole measure used to determine Gallman Pontiac's sales performance through January 1989, it is clear that the dealer was not meeting its contractual obligations to General Motors in this area of responsibility. However, under the terms of the agreement, General Motors must look to other relevant factors that may have directly affected dealer's performance before a final determination can be made regarding an individual dealer's sales effectiveness. Contrary to the terms of the agreement, the annual evaluation forms show that Gallman Pontiac's performance was evaluated on retail sales only. The other relevant factors in the franchise agreement were not reviewed before the decision not to renew the franchise agreement was made. Other Relative Factors in the Agreement Which Should Have Been Considered in the Dealers Evaluation When the trend of the Gallman Pontiac's sales performance is reviewed, the evidence shows that Gallman Pontiac's sales performance over the life of the franchise agreement has improved relative to market growth by a small percentage (7.51%). This slight upward trend does not demonstrate an effective performance as the sales were below an acceptable standard before the increase in sales, and the improvement barely exceeded the local market growth. The time period over which the trend evaluation occurred is reasonable in this case because both parties agreed to a two-year term in the franchise agreement, which was subject to an overall evaluation prior to a renewal of the agreement. Although there was opinion testimony from a former sales manager from the dealership that Gaillman Pontiac did not order sufficient quantities and mix of vehicles, and imprudently focused the advertising towards the limited, younger group of buyers in Naples, this testimony was not found to be credible by the Hearing Officer. All of the other evidence presented by both sides regarding the manner in which the dealer conducted sales operations demonstrates that Gallman Pontiac met or exceeded his contractual obligations in this area of responsibility. Sales to fleet customers did not affect registrations in 1988. The dealer chose not to compete in the fleet market because the later resale of these vehicles interferes with the sale of new vehicles at this dealership. The manner in which the dealer submitted orders to the Pontiac Division was not criticized by General Motors. The dealer's procedures were continuously reviewed and evaluated through the Dealer Assistance Program. There was no showing that the dealer's ordering procedures directly affected its sales performance. The allocation procedures were applied to Gallman Pontiac in the same manner they were applied to other dealers. The evidence did not show that imprudent selections were made by the dealer in the ordering process, nor was it sufficiently established that manufacturer delays or the unavailability of certain products interfered with the dealer's sales in Naples. A significant local condition that may have directly affected the dealer's sales performance was the lack of receptivity in the Naples market area for linemakes in the class of automobiles offered by Pontiac. Actual sales performance data for all new car registrations in the area show that the Naples market prefers to purchase automobiles from the high group of automobiles such as Cadillac, Lincoln, BMW, Mercedes Benz, and Porsche. Pontiac does not have a linemake designed to compete in this market segment. Application of the Other Relevant Factors To The Decision Not To Renew Because the franchise agreement and the annual sales evaluation form have not made provisions for any adjustments to the original statistical formula based upon the additional considerations mentioned in paragraphs 9-13, these factors are to be considered independently from the initial mathematical calculation. The purpose of the review of these factors is to determine if the statistical analysis is a reliable indicator of the sales performance of the dealer who is being evaluated before General Motors makes its final decision regarding termination. There has been no showing that General Motors ever used the additional considerations for any other purpose in its course of dealings with other dealers in the past or that any other interpretation has been given to these factors. In this case, when the additional relevant factors are reviewed in addition to the ineffective sales and registration performance statistics, the mathematical formula continues to be a reliable indicator that the sales performance at the Gallman Pontiac dealership does not meet required standards. The additional considerations set forth in the franchise agreement which are relevant to this case, do not seriously undermine the fairness of the application of the initial mathematical calculation to the sales performance of Gallman Pontiac. While the local market's lack of receptivity directly affects Gallman Pontiac's performance, the statistical formula takes this into account to a large degree when a dealer is required to meet eighty-five percent of the zone or national average to demonstrate minimum performance. If yet another mathematical formula was created to give additional weight to this local condition beyond the provision in the minimum standards formula, the manufacturer could be harmed by a individual dealer's lack of market penetration efforts. Because it is difficult to determine the primary cause and effect of poor market penetration in a specific area, the statistical formula is generally fair to both sides in most situations. It does not unfairly accuse either the dealer or the manufacturer as being responsible for the lack of sales. One indicator of the fairness involved in the application of the formula as designed can be found in Mr. Anderson's comparative analysis of the Naples automobile market and the Sarasota market. Mr. Anderson is the expert in automobile marketing analysis presented by General Motors. This analysis refutes the opinion of Dr. Ostlund, the expert presented by Gallman Pontiac during the hearing regarding automobile marketing analysis. It is Dr. Ostlund's opinion that Naples is a unique market in which the usual statistical formula becomes unfair if it is applied to all registrations in the Dealer's Area of Responsibility. Based upon this analysis, Dr. Ostlund suggests that a weighted average be applied in the standard formula to all of the sales made by Gallman Pontiac during the franchise period. However, even if this were done, Gallman Pontiac's performance would have been 84.7 percent, which is still below the required standard of 85 percent. Contrary to Dr. Ostlund's analysis, the Naples-Sarasota comparison conducted by Mr. Anderson demonstrates that Pontiac can compete in a high income area with similar demographics to Naples within the same zone along the same Florida coast. Therefore, the usual statistical formula remains a reliable indicator of the sales effectiveness of a Pontiac dealer in Naples, Florida, and should be applied without any further weighting of averages in the statistical analysis required by the franchise agreement. Application of Additional Factors Relevant to the Decision Not to Renew Pursuant to Statute A nonrenewal of the franchise agreement is clearly permitted by the franchise agreement. The nonrenewal has been undertaken in good faith and good cause. The manufacturer has continuously encouraged the dealer to meet sales performance standards and has worked with Gallman Pontiac in an effort to achieve this goal within the time frame agreed to by the parties. Because franchise dealers are the major outlet the manufacturer has for the sale of new automobiles, it is essential that minimum levels of sales performance are achieved on a regular basis. Failure to meet the minimum sales performance over the term of this agreement by Gallman Pontiac is a material and substantial breach of the contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order dismissing Gallman Pontiac's complaint with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 28 day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28 day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0505 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #3. Reject all but last sentence. Conclusions of Law. Accept the last sentence. Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Accepted. Reject that the dealer code problem can be attri- buted to the conduct of the manufacturer. Insufficient proof. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Reject the weighted average basis. See HO #14 and #15.. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Speculative. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Attempt to shift evidentiary burden. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Rejected. See HO #15. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. Accept that additional factor's need to be considered. Rejected Dr. Ostlund's interpretation. See HO #9 through #15. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted, except for the last sentence which is an opinion or closing argument as opposed to a finding of fact. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted, except for Nissan. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Closing argument as opposed to finding of fact. Rejected. Irrelevant and contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Rejected. Conclusionary. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. See HO #10. Rejected. See HO #17. Rejected. See HO #15 and #17. Rejected. See HO #17. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #17. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO 415. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Redundant. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Rejected. Unreliable conclusion. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Outside the reasons given for nonrenewal. See HO #8. Rejected. Same reason as given in above. Rejected. Same reason as 49 and 50. Also contrary to fact. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Redundant and argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Improper argument. Rejected. The use of "sales reported" was allowed by the Hearing Officer at hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant in these proceedings. Rejected. Irrelevant and unreliable speculation. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Dr. Ostlund was very credible. Mr. Anderson's analysis, based upon y~he Sarasota- Naples comparison, which tended to refute the testimony of Dr. Ostlund, was given greater weight by the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Adams, Esquire Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Feaman, Adams, Harris, Department of Highway Fernandez & Deutch, P.A. Safety And Motor Vehicles Corporate Plaza, Fourth Floor Neil Kirkman Building 4700 N.W. Second Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 S. William Fuller, Jr., Esq. Vasilis C. Katsafanas, Esquire Fuller Johnson & Farrell Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Post Office Box 1739 Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler Tallahassee, Florida 32302 11 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motors Vehicles William J. Whalen, Esquire Department of Highway Office of General Counsel Safety and Motor Vehicles General Motors Corporation B439 Neil Kirkman Building New Center One Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48232 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire General Counsel S. Thomas Wienner, Esquire Departments of Highway Dykema Gossett Safety and Motor Vehicles 35th Floor Neil Kirklan Building 400 Renaissance Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Detroit, Michigan 48243
The Issue Whether Petitioner has standing under section 320.642, Florida Statutes, to file a petition with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) protesting the establishment of an additional dealership at a proposed location.
Findings Of Fact As defined in section 320.60(11)(a), Recovery Racing is an existing motor vehicle dealer, and is a party to a Maserati franchise agreement. Recovery Racing sells Maserati vehicles from a licensed franchise located at 5750 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. As defined in section 320.60(8), Maserati is a licensee. Rick Case is the additional Maserati dealer that Maserati seeks to establish at 3500 Weston Road, Davie, Florida (proposed location). The Proposed Location is approximately 18 miles from Recovery Racing’s dealership located at 5750 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Recovery Racing is not within a radius of 12.5 miles of the proposed Rick Case location; accordingly, Recovery Racing is not claiming standing pursuant to section 320.642(3)(b)1. Recovery Racing relies on section 320.642(3)(b)2., to establish standing. Mr. Stockton, the expert presented by Recovery Racing, opined that Recovery Racing has standing to protest because it made more than 25 percent of its retail sales to persons with registered household addresses within a 12.5 mile radius of the proposed location. Mr. Stockton’s opinion is based on his assumption that “registered household address,” as set forth in section 320.642(3)(b)2., means the address where the persons who use or drive the vehicle reside, regardless of the household addresses where the purchased vehicles are registered. Mr. Stockton explained that in making his calculation, he did not rely on vehicle registration data; rather, he relied on the dealership sales files for each sale, and information provided to him by Mr. Hayim, the general manager for Recovery Racing. Mr. Stockton’s opinion on standing was also based on his definition of “retail sales” as set forth in section 320.642(3)(b)2. According to Mr. Stockton, sales to businesses are included as retail sales where the business is an “instrument” of the transaction, and the person using the car is a “beneficiary.” In contrast, he explained that a sale to a business is excluded as a retail sale when the business is the “beneficiary” of the transaction. Turning to the time periods referenced in section 320.642(3)(b)2., Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-7.004(9) sets forth the manner in which the 36-month period within which the 12-month period for standing is calculated. The period ends on the last day of the month preceding the month in which notice is published, running through the end of the month prior to the date of publication of the notice. Given the date of the notice in this case, which is May 12, 2014, the relevant period in the instant case ends on April 30, 2014, and begins 36 months before that date on May 1, 2011. In calculating the time periods detailed in section 320.642(3)(b)2., Mr. Stockton was unaware of the Florida Administrative Code rule addressing the calculation of the 12-month period within a 36-month period. Accordingly, he began and ended his calculations mid-month, on May 19, 2011. He explained that there were approximately 730 possible 12-month periods to review; each one starting on a different day, going forward 12 months. Mr. Stockton’s method of reviewing the statutory time periods does not comply with the standards set forth in the Florida Administrative Code. In making a standing calculation, the automotive industry calculates the percentage using the following fraction: the denominator is the total number of retail sales, and the numerator reflects the number of retail sales that are within the geographic radius required by the statute (referred to as “the ring”). The records attached to Mr. Stockton’s reports, which are tabs 6 through 128 (although not consecutively numbered) in Exhibit 1, contain the documents that Mr. Stockton relied upon in making his standing calculation. Mr. Stockton calculated the fraction at least two different times; both calculations were presented to the undersigned. The first calculations were reported as follows: Date range Sales within ring Nationwide sales Percent within ring 5/19/2011-5/18/2012 32 127 25.20% 5/20/2011-5/19/2012 32 127 25.20% 5/21/2011-5/20/2012 32 127 25.20% 5/22/2011-5/21/2012 32 126 25.40% 5/23/2011-5/22/2012 33 127 25.98% Mr. Stockton’s revised calculations, after receiving more information about some of the sales, were reported as follows: Date range Sales within ring Nationwide sales Percent within ring 5/19/2011-5/18/2012 34 127 26.77% 5/20/2011-5/19/2012 34 127 26.77% 5/21/2011-5/20/2012 34 127 26.77% 5/22/2011-5/21/2012 34 126 26.98% 5/23/2011-5/22/2012 35 127 27.56% Sixteen of the sales included in the “sales within ring” (using either of the two reports detailed above) are not supported by any vehicle registration data. Those 16 sales are, as enumerated by the tabs attached to Mr. Stockton’s report, the following: 18, 19, 24, 34, 37, 43, 51, 61, 68, 76, 109, 112, 117, 118, 119, and 122. Interestingly, for two of the sales, tab 37 and tab 43, Mr. Stockton knew that the cars were registered in New Hampshire and Orlando, Florida, respectively. He included them, however, in the sales within the ring because he had knowledge that the vehicles were being used by persons with household addresses within the ring. Mr. Stockton’s method of reviewing the “end user” of a vehicle sale is wholly dependent on documents that vary from sales file to sales file and on information given to him by the general manager of the dealership. This methodology is subjective and easily manipulated by an interested party. Mr. Stockton also included two sales, tabs 24 and 122, that were sold to non-retail buyers, who purchase the vehicle wholesale. He included both because he had acquired information that the “end users” of the vehicles were persons with household addresses within the ring. Maserati’s expert, Mr. Farhat, opined that Recovery Racing did not have standing to protest because Recovery Racing did not meet the 25 percent requirement of retail sales within the 12.5 mile radius, within the time period mandated by the statute. Mr. Farhat’s calculations were based on the assumption that the statutory term “registered household addresses” means the household addresses to which vehicles are registered with the Department. Given this assumption, he reviewed the vehicle registration data for each retail sale. Mr. Farhat obtained the data from two authoritative sources in the automotive industry: Experian and IHS. Both of these entities obtain their vehicle registration data from state departments of motor vehicles. Mr. Farhat defined the term “retail sale” as sales to individuals, and to businesses that purchase less than 10 vehicles in a year. He explained that this definition is used industry-wide. Mr. Farhat ultimately opined that Recovery Racing never got close to reaching the 25 percent requirement, in any of the potential rolling 12-month periods in the preceding 36- months. Mr. Farhat’s testimony as to the definition of “registered household addresses” is found credible, as it gives meaning to all of the language contained in the statute. Mr. Stockton’s definition is not supported by the statutory language, is unreliable, subject to manipulation, fails to give any meaning to the word “registered” as used in the statute, and inserts the term “end user” into the statute. Mr. Farhat’s testimony as to the definition of “retail sales” is also found credible, as it is an objective standard used by the automotive industry. Mr. Stockton’s definition of “retail sales” is suspect in that it requires investigation into whether a business is a “beneficiary” or an “instrument”—-again, information that is highly subjective and easily manipulated. The plain meaning of the words “registered household addresses,” as used in section 320.642(3)(b)2., is the household address to which a vehicle is registered with the Department. Given that 16 of the sales included in the ring by Mr. Stockton had no vehicle registration data, they cannot be included in the numerator. Two of those 16 sales were also not retail sales, as defined by the automotive industry. Recovery Racing failed to meet its burden of proving that it has standing to protest the proposed Rick Case dealership location, as it did not establish that 25 percent of its retail sales, sold during the defined statutory timeframe, were within the 12.5 mile radius set forth in section 320.642(3)(b)2.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing Recovery Racing’s protest of the proposed establishment of an additional dealer for lack of standing. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Clark, Agency Clerk Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A430 2900 Apalachee Parkway, MS 61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) J. Andrew Bertron, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley, and Scarborough, LLP Suite 202 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Robert E. Sickles, Esquire Hinshaw and Culbertson, LLP Suite 500 100 South Ashley Drive Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Elias C. Schwartz, Esquire Schwartz and Englander, P.A. 1900 Glades Road, Suite 102 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 (eServed) Robert D. Cultice, Esquire Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Door, LLP 60 State Street Boston, Massachusetts 02109 (eServed) Richard N. Sox, Esquire Jason T. Allen, Esquire Bass Sox Mercer, P.A. 2822 Remington Green Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Terry L. Rhodes, Executive Director Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-443 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 (eServed) Steve Hurm, General Counsel Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a motor vehicle dealer license should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Global Express, LLC. (Global Express), is a limited liability company which has submitted to Respondent an application for a license as a motor vehicle dealer under the fictitious name of Auto Zone Auto Sales (the subject application). Johnny Romero and Rosangela Romero, who are husband and wife, are the members and managers of Global Express. Mr. Romero is also known as Johnny Guillermo Romero Peguero.1 Both Mr. and Mrs. Romero signed the subject application on behalf of Global Express before a notary public on May 4, 2009. The following language is contained above the signature lines: Under penalty of perjury, I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this application is true and correct . . . Part 5 of the application form requires that the “applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director” answer yes or no to certain questions (the Certifications). Each dealership officer is required to answer these questions under penalties of perjury. Relevant to this proceeding, both Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the negative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever had a surety bond cancelled? Relevant to this proceeding, both Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the negative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever been denied or had a dealer license suspended or revoked in Florida or any other jurisdiction? In addition to the foregoing, Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the affirmative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever been a licensed dealer in Florida or any other jurisdiction? Under their affirmative response Mr. and Mrs. Romero inserted information reflecting that they had previously been licensed dealers under the license numbered VI/1018283. Pursuant to application executed by Mr. and Mrs. Romero on January 11, 2007, Respondent issued motor vehicle dealer license numbered VI/1018283 to Pronto Cars Corp. (Pronto). Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license bond was cancelled by its surety, Nova Casualty Company, by notice dated December 18, 2007. Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license was suspended by Respondent by Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint dated March 20, 2008. That case was assigned the following case number by Respondent: DMV-08-479. The Order suspended Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license because Pronto’s surety had cancelled its bond. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Romero ever received a copy of the Emergency Final Order and Administrative Complaint in case DMV-08-479. That conflict is resolved by finding that Ms. Pierre-Lys, acting in her capacity as a compliance officer for Respondent, served a copy of the Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint on Mr. Romero on April 16, 2008. Mr. Romero, on behalf of Pronto, signed and submitted an election of rights form dated May 5, 2008, which provided, in relevant part, as follows: “I have read the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter [DMV-08-479] and understand my options.” Immediately before Mr. Romero’s signature is a check in a box indicating that Mr. Romero was exercising the following option: “I have not obtained a surety bond and wish to voluntarily relinquish my motor vehicle license. I have completed and am returning the Voluntary Relinquishment of License form within 21 days from the date of my receipt of this administrative complaint.” On May 23, 2008,2 Respondent issued its Final Order in its case number DMV-08-479, thereby canceling Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer’s license. The Final Order directed Pronto to surrender its license and all dealer and temporary tags in its possession. The Final Order also contained the following: It is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint filed herein is DISMISSED and this case is hereby CLOSED. Mr. Romero called Respondent’s compliance officer, Luz Irizarry, on March 6, 2009, told her that he wanted to obtain a motor vehicle dealer license, and asked whether he would have to go to a school for new dealers. Ms. Irizarry referred the inquiry to Ms. Buck, who determined that Mr. Romero would have to attend the school because Pronto had received consumer complaints, Pronto’s surety had cancelled its bond, and Pronto’s license had been suspended and subsequently revoked. On March 9, 2009, Ms. Irizarry informed Mr. Romero of the reasons he would have to go to dealer school, and specifically discussed with him the fact that Pronto’s operations had been suspended. When he signed the Certifications on May 4, 2009, Mr. Romero had actual knowledge that Pronto’s surety bond had been revoked and that Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license had been suspended. Mr. Romero’s contends that he was confused about his answers because he thought he had bought the surety bond for its full term and because he thought the Final Order entered by Respondent dismissed the suspension of his license. Those contentions are rejected. It is clear from his answer pertaining to the license that had been issued to Pronto that Mr. Romero understood as a principal of Pronto he would have to disclose the revocation of Pronto’s surety bond and the suspension of Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license on the subject application. Mr. and Mr. Romero’s Certifications under section 5 of the subject application pertaining to the revocation of a surety bond and the suspension of a motor vehicle dealer license are willful, material misrepresentations of fact. On February 26, 2008, Respondent discovered that Pronto had moved its business location and was doing business at a location that had not been approved by Respondent. On April 1, 2009, Mrs. Romero drove a motor vehicle displaying a “For Sale” sign. The vehicle had a temporary tag on it that had been issued to Pronto. The possession of that temporary tag violated the Final Order entered in Respondent’s case number DMV-08-479, which ordered Pronto to immediately surrender all temporary tags to Respondent. On April 27, 2009, Mrs. Romero displayed, or acquiesced in the display of, another car with a “For Sale” sign on it parked in front of Global Express’s proposed, but unlicensed, location. That car had a temporary tag on it that had been issued to Pronto. The temporary tag was filled out to show the name of another dealer. The possession of that temporary tag violated the Final Order entered in Respondent’s case number DMV-08-479, which ordered Pronto to immediately surrender all temporary tags to Respondent. On April 2, 2009, Mr. Romero had 13 motor vehicles titled in his name. Although he asserts that some of the motor vehicles were bought in conjunction with a taxi service he operated, he admitted that some of these vehicles had been purchased for resale. Mr. Romero acquired a 1966 Ford motor vehicle on May 9, 209, and sold the vehicle on May 21, 2009. Mr. Romero acquired a 1999 Chevrolet motor vehicle on May 18, 2009, and sold the vehicle on May 25, 2009. Mr. Romero acquired another Chevrolet motor vehicle on May 20, 2008, and sold the vehicle on May 31, 2009. Respondent established that during April and May 2009, Mr. Romero engaged in the business of dealing in motor vehicles without a license. On March 30, 2009, Mr. Romero paid Respondent for the registrations of ten motor vehicles with worthless checks.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order deny the subject application. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2009.
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to the specific exemption in Section 320.642(5), Florida Statutes, from the general notice and protest provisions in Section 320.642.
Findings Of Fact Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., d/b/a A1 Mandel Chevrolet ("Landmark") operated a Chevrolet dealership located at 15455 West Dixie Highway, North Miami Beach, Dade County, Florida until August 2, 1989. Landmark operated the dealership pursuant to: (a) a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (the "Dealer Agreement") between Landmark and Petitioner; and (b) a Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer License from Respondent, License Number 9VF-10574. On August 2, 1989, Landmark ceased customary sales and service business operations. Respondent revoked Landmark's license on October 12, 1989. The license revocation resulted from an independent investigation conducted by Respondent. Petitioner notified Landmark on August 17, 1989, of Petitioner's intent to terminate the Dealer Agreement pursuant to Section 320.641, Florida Statutes. A copy of the notice of intent to terminate was furnished to Respondent in accordance with the requirements of Section 320.641. Landmark filed a Complaint with Respondent on November 15, 1989, contesting Petitioner's termination of the Dealer Agreement. The Complaint invoked the protection of Section 320.641, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 320.641(7), Petitioner was prohibited from terminating the Dealer Agreement prior to a final adjudication in the franchise cancellation proceeding. Landmark's Complaint was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 6, 1989. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint. Petitioner's motion to dismiss was granted in a recommended order entered by Hearing Officer Michael Parrish on January 22, 1990. A final order dismissing Landmark's Complaint was entered by Respondent on April 30, 1990. The time for appealing the final order expired on May 30, 1990, without appeal. Petitioner notified Respondent on December 5, 1990, of Petitioner's intent to open a successor dealer for Landmark. Respondent determined in a letter dated December 19, 1990, that the proposed opening of the successor dealer was not exempt from the notice and protest provisions of Section 320.642, Florida Statutes. Respondent determined that the 12 month period of exemption began to run on October 12, 1989, when Landmark's license was revoked and expired prior to the date of the proposed opening of the successor dealer. Petitioner had no prior notice of either Respondent's intent to revoke Landmark's license or the actual revocation of Landmark's license. Petitioner first learned of Respondent's revocation of Landmark's license on December 19, 1990. At that time, Respondent notified Petitioner that the 12 month period of exemption from protest had expired for purposes of the proposed opening of the successor dealer in North Miami Beach. Respondent's determination that the 12 month period of exemption in Section 320.642(5), Florida Statutes, began on the date that Landmark's license was revoked constituted incipient agency action. The incipient agency action taken by Respondent deviated from Respondent's prior practice. Respondent's action determined the substantial interests of Petitioner. Petitioner was prohibited by Section 320.641(7), Florida Statutes, from opening a successor dealer pursuant to Section 320.642(5) until a final adjudication was entered in the franchise cancellation proceeding under Section 320.641. Landmark's license was revoked on October 12, 1989. The franchise cancellation proceeding began on November 15, 1989, when the Landmark filed its complaint. A final order was entered in the franchise cancellation proceeding on April 30, 1990. The time for appeal expired on May 30, 1990. Petitioner did not notify Respondent of Petitioner's intent to open a successor dealer until December 5, 1990. Proposed Rule 15C-7.004 was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Vol. 17, No. 16, at page 1721, on April 19, 1991. Proposed Rule 15C-7.004(4)(a) provides: Application for Reopening or Successor Dealership, or for Relocation of Existing Dealership. If the license of an existing franchised motor vehicle dealer-is revoked for any reason, or surrendered, an application for a license to permit the reopening of the same dealer or a successor dealer within twelve months of the license revocation or surrender shall not be considered the establishment of an additional dealership if one of the conditions set forth in Section 320.642(5) is met by the proposed dealer. (emphasis added)4 Proposed Rule 15C-7.004(4)(a) was published prior to the formal hearing but will not become effective until after the formal hearing.5 Respondent's determination in this proceeding, that a closing occurs upon the revocation or surrender of a dealer's license, is consistent with Proposed Rule 15C-7.004(4) (a).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order should be entered denying Petitioner's request for an exemption from protest under Section 320.642(5), Florida Statues, for the proposed opening of a successor dealership. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of July, 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1991.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by June C. McKinney, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Notice of Dismissal, a copy of which is attached, and incorporated by reference, in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondent, Rick Case Sunrise, LLC d/b/a Rick Case Kia, be granted a license to sell vehicles manufactured by Kia (KIA) at 1650 Sawgrass Corporate Parkway, Sunrise, (Broward County), Florida 33323, upon compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. Filed February 6, 2013 12:50 PM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this day of Febery 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, bil bo Baker, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Florida. Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services thi Ue d f-Janauty. 03. is say ofa NOTICE OF XPPEAL: RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must ’be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jc Copies furnished: Andy Bertron, Esquire Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Andy.bertron@nelsonmullins.com Robert E. Sickles, Esquire Hinshaw & Bulbertson, LLP 100 South Ashley Drive, Suite 500 Tampa, Florida 33602 Rsickle@hinshawlaw.com Colm Moran, Esquire Hogan Lovells US, LLP 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400 Los Angeles, California 90067 Colm.moran@hoganlovells.com R. Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin Forehand Brandes, LLP 800 North Calhoun Street, Suite 1B Tallahassee, Florida 3203 cspickard@flb-law.com June C. McKinney Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue The issue in the case is whether an application for a motor vehicle dealer license filed by Lambretta International, LLC, and Retro Unlimited, Inc., should be approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order denying the application for establishment of the motor vehicle dealer franchise at issue in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Caroline Khurana Lambretta International, LLC 14339 Lake City Way Northeast Seattle, Washington 98125 Chris Densmore Scooter Escapes, LLC, d/b/a Scooter Escapes 1450 1st Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33705 Edward G. Dreyer, III Retro Unlimited, Inc. 3200 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33704 Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-439 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Robin Lotane, General Counsel Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Respondent’s Notice of Withdrawal of Request for Hearing based on Respondent’s relinquishment of its motor vehicle dealer license, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. Filed June 9, 2010 8:49 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE AND ORDERED this pi G. of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. RL A. FORD, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this day of June, 2010. Ce ™ NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: R. Lee Dorough Dorough Calzada & Soto, LLP 419 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert Hartman Seminole Scooters, Inc. 6227 Park Boulevard Pinellas Park, Florida 33781 James K. Fisher, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A308 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602
