The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in employment practices in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Euretha L. Davies, is a white female, who was first employed by Respondent, Laidlaw Educational Services (Laidlaw), in 1997 as a school bus driver. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent provides pursuant to contract school bus transportation in Santa Rosa County School District. This includes all aspects of transportation: training drivers, maintaining vehicles, preparing routes and administering the system, and preparing reports to state and federal authorities. Petitioner had been an employee of the Santa Rosa County School District for nine years prior to Laidlaw contracting to provide these services in 1997. She transferred her employment to Laidlaw at that time, maintaining her senority and pay rate. On January 4, 2000, Petitioner contacted Jeffrey R. Capozzi, Driver Development and Safety Supervisor for Laidlaw at their office in Milton, Florida, about pain she was experiencing in both her wrists. She was sent to Immediate Care at West Florida Medical Center, Pensacola, Florida. There, she was seen by Kenneth Hill, M.D., an orthopedic specialist. Dr. Hill performed surgery to release the carpal tunnel in the right wrist on May 23, 2000. On August 24, 2000, a follow-up evaluation of the right had revealed that soft support of the wrist was needed, but Petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement with a one percent partial impairment. Petitioner was released to full duties. On May 2001, an annual check up was done in order to maintain Petitioner's entitlement to future workman's compensation medical treatment. This examination was performed by James St. Louis, M.D., who took over Petitioner's case when Dr. Hill moved. Dr. St. Louis ordered nerve conduction studies of the right upper extremity, which was performed on July 30, 2001, by Dr. Gerhard. Dr. Gerhard found that the transmittal of nerve impulses was normal in the right upper extremity and left median nerve. On May 2, 2002, approximately a year later and after Petitioner had had a nerve conduction study, she was sent to see Michael L. Shawbitz, M.D., a neurological specialist. Dr. Shawbitz concluded that she had tendonitis in her right wrist and recommended physical therapy. On May 15, 2002, Petitioner was given a Dexterity Test for School Bus Drivers by Lillian Barnes, which Petitioner passed. On June 5, 2002, Dr. T. F. Brown gave Petitioner a physical, which she passed. On August 6, 2002, Petitioner returned to work when school started, driving a school bus with an automatic door opener. On September 4-6, 2002, Petitioner began training to become a driver trainer. Her instructor was Zeke Zeigler, a training director for Laidlaw. From September 9 through 13, 2002, Petitioner attended classroom training presented by Stephanie Slaton, who was in charge of Driver Safety and Development at the Laidlaw office in Milton, Florida. At this time, Petitioner was driving her bus seven hours and 35 minutes each day on a regular schedule. On September 16 through 20, 2002, Petitioner completed the classroom training and was scheduled to go on the road training with the trainer who fit into her schedule. At this time, Dianne Hall, Head of Routing and Data Entry, requested that Petitioner be taken off her driving schedule to assist in preparation of the report prepared by Laidlaw for the State of Florida on bus schedules and routes for the children in the district. Petitioner was taken off her bus to assist with this report, and when it was completed, she was to continue coming into the office between the morning and afternoon bus routes to keep information in the data system updated and correct. This data entry amounted to several hours of light typing daily. On October 15, 2002, Petitioner was informed that she had an appointment to see Dr. Minoo Hollis, for Petitioner's annual checkup on her workman's compensation injury. This examination was conducted on October 17, 2002. Dr. Hollis determined that Petitioner had tenosynovitis of the right flexor, a ganglion cyst of the left wrist volar ganglion, and diffused chronic pain of the left forearm and wrist. Dr. Hollis prescribed medication and physical therapy for Petitioner and put her on light duty not driving a school bus. On October 23, 2002, Petitioner started physical therapy at Santa Rosa Medical Center three times per week for three weeks. Petitioner continued to work at the school office and to make entries into the computer system. Petitioner was assigned to the school office where she worked on various projects. She did light typing, copied documents for the school staff, and handled mail. There is a conflict in testimony regarding whether these assignments were in pursuit of assisting with the data entry or were the result of light duty because of Dr. Hollis' findings. It is found that at the point Petitioner ceased driving the bus, it was the result of the light duty assignment. These light duties continued until December 10, 2002, when Petitioner was assigned to Pace High School (PHS) where the assistant principal, Bradley Marcilliat, was delegated authority to assign her duties. Upon her assignment to PHS, Petitioner's hours per week were reduced to 30, and her typing was restricted further by her supervisors at Laidlaw. On December 12, 2002, Dr. Hollis did a follow-up examination of Petitioner after physical therapy and found that she had a two percent permanent partial impairment and prescribed the following restrictions as they relate to her bus driving duties: Can sit, stand, and walk without interruption for eight hours; Reach above shoulder level frequently Can use hands for repetitive actions such as: Simple grasping-both hands Pushing and pulling-right hand no; left hand yes Restrictions of activities involving: Unprotected heights-none Moving machinery-none Changes in temperature and humidity-none Driving automotive equipment-none Restrictions to automatic transmission-yes Fumes and gas-none On December 12, 2002, Jennifer Jack, MSN, RN, who was the case manager employed by Genex Services, Inc., for Crawford and Company, Respondent's workman's compensation insurer, reported to Stephanie Slaton that Petitioner could drive a vehicle with automatic transmission per Dr. Hollis. Ms. Jack opined, "I am not sure if driving the bus requires any repetitive pulling, but if it does not, then it looks like Ms. Davies can drive a school bus." A question existed about whether Petitioner could operate the automatic door opener on the school bus, which required the driver to pull a knob with the right hand. Ms. Jack queried Dr. Hollis, and was told Petitioner could drive a bus with an automatic door opener. On December 24, 2002, Crawford and Company informed Petitioner that she would be paid one percent as the difference between the one percent she had initially been paid, and her current permanent impairment of the body as a whole. Petitioner continued her duties at PHS until January 31, 2003. Nothing was said about her returning to her normal bus driving duties, although she had been released by her doctor to return to work with the limitations stated above. On January 31, 2003, Petitioner was advised by personnel at PHS to report to Bobbie Williams' office at Laidlaw at 10:30 that morning. When she reported to Williams, he gave her a dismissal letter, and stated that Laidlaw had been informed by the insurance company that she had reached maximum medical improvement with regard to her injury that had occurred on January 4, 2000, and that with her current restrictions she was no longer able to perform essential requirement necessary to drive a school bus. This determination was based upon the Laidlaw's determination that Petitioner could not operate the automatic door opener on the school bus. This conclusion is contrary to the evidence presented by Petitioner that she had operated the door without problem before she developed the tendonitis, and contrary to Dr. Hollis' reports and the information provided to Ms. Jack by the doctor. Although the record shows that Petitioner continued to improve as revealed in her May 2003 examination, the fact that the doctor indicated that Petitioner had a permanent impairment of two percent in December 2002 indicates that Petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement as of that date. The facts reveal that Petitioner was ready to return to work; was discharged by Respondent because of an alleged inability to open the door of the bus; that Petitioner was able to open the door of a bus equipped with an automatic door opener; and that the "inability to perform the duties of the job" asserted by Respondent were not supported by the medical restrictions communicated to Respondent's agent, who made that information known to Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that FCHR enter its final order directing that Respondent desist from discriminatory employment practices and directing Respondent to re-employ with appropriate accommodation Petitioner, promote her to a trainer-driver, and cease any further discriminatory practices. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Euretha Davies 3404 Oaktree Lane Pace, Florida 32571 Danny K. Guerdon Laidlaw Education Services 975 Cobb Place Boulevard, Suite 218 Kennesaw, Georgia 30144 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the School Board should terminate or take other disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Joe Thomas Alford, Jr., started working for the Bay County School Board in 1980, as a substitute school bus driver. His first full-time position with the School Board was as a "gasoline attendant," a position he assumed in 1981. After Larry Daniels became superintendent of transportation in July of 1985, he granted Mr. Alford's request to be permitted to resume driving a school bus. By all accounts, Mr. Alford did a good job as a full-time bus driver through the end of the school year 1986-87, except for the day he received a speeding ticket while driving a school bus. On another occasion, he exhibited great courage, even heroism, as one of the drivers in a convoy returning from an athletic contest. When the lead bus had an accident that made it impossible for students to get out of the bus in the usual way, Mr. Alford climbed in through a window and kicked out the emergency door, leaking gas tank notwithstanding. 1987-88 On the morning of October 16, 1987, Mr. Alford failed to report for work to drive school bus No. 340 on its three accustomed runs, necessitating the tardy dispatch of another driver. Later, in response to Mr. Daniels' questions, he explained that Harry Wells, a substitute school bus driver, had agreed to drive for him on the morning of the 16th (among other times), with the understanding that Mr. Alford would drive on a field trip for Mr. Wells. It was to an apparent misunderstanding that Mr. Alford attributed his absence without giving notice or arranging for a substitute on October 16, 1987. At the time, school board procedure required a bus driver who was to be absent for any reason to arrange for a substitute, as Mr. Alford apparently thought he had done, and to report the arrangement to the payroll clerk at the office of the superintendent of transportation. But the agreement went unreported, and no approval of the exchange was ever obtained. On October 26, 1987, Mr. Daniels, then superintendent of transportation, and Patricia Holland, route manager for routes including those Mr. Alford drove, Harry Wells and Mr. Alford gathered to discuss the lack of coverage on October 16, 1987. Mr. Alford told everybody present about his plan to drive on a field trip November 6, 1987, which would necessitate his missing the afternoon runs that day. He said (and Mr. Wells was there to deny it, if it had not been true) that Mr. Wells had agreed to substitute for him on the afternoon of November 6, 1987. Eventually this information reached Janet, who logged in Mr. Wells as a substitute for the afternoon runs on November 6, 1987. On the morning of November 6, however, Mr. Alford failed to appear, again without giving notice and without arranging for a substitute. Again it was necessary to make belated arrangements for another driver. Later that morning, Mr. Alford telephoned to report that his wife had locked him out of his house, and that he had lost access to his personal effects. He said that personal problems had prevented his driving that morning, and explained that, without clothes, he would be unable to drive on the field trip that afternoon, as well. In the afternoon, a substitute drove in his stead, without any report of inconvenience to anybody who went on the field trip. On Monday, February 8, 1988, somebody called from Mowat Junior High School with word that school bus No. 340 had not arrived as of quarter past two that afternoon. Ordinarily, and according to schedule, the bus arrived at the school by two o'clock, was loaded by five past, then left Mowat on the first of three runs the bus made each afternoon. When the report that school bus No. 340 had not arrived at Mowat reached the transportation office, Mr. Carter looked in the bus barn out back and saw that the bus was still there. He himself, despite his supervisory position as route manager for the Rutherford district, made two of the three runs for which Mr. Alford was responsible, while another driver drove children home from Hiland Park school. At no time on Monday afternoon did Mr. Alford communicate with the transportation office or with any of his supervisors or with anybody else employed by the school board. When he reported to work on Tuesday morning, he set out in school bus No. 340, without speaking to anybody in the transportation office. His supervisor, Patricia Holland, called Mr. Griffin, the assistant principal in charge of loading and unloading buses at Mowat and asked him to tell Mr. Alford to telephone. Later in the day Mr. Alford did call. He said he had missed work the afternoon before because, coming back from Tyndall Air Force Base, he had had a flat tire. He said he had given a hitchhiker (who he purportedly picked up just before the problem with the tire) 50 cents for a telephone call and asked him to call the school board's transportation office to say he could not get to work. He also said that he was worried about his wife and believed that she had a tumor in her arm. But nobody had telephoned the day before and, for the third time, respondent was orally reprimanded for not reporting for work and failing to give notice beforehand. At a meeting with his supervisors later in February of 1988, Mr. Alford declined to sign a document reciting these three lapses in his attendance record, although assigning the wrong date to one of them. No contemporaneous, independent, written records of counseling on October 16 and November 6 were prepared. On the morning of April 7, 1988, Mr. Tucker of Mosley High School called at half past seven to report that school bus No. 340 was late. As he spoke, it arrived, although it had been due at 6:55 a.m. Unmollified, Mr. Tucker complained that such a late arrival was disruptive because a number of the children ate breakfast at the school and had to be fed, even if they were late. Respondent's supervisors discussed these matters with him that day, and a record was made of the counseling on April 7, 1988. 1988-89 Before students returned for the next school year, all bus drivers hired for the 1988-89 term attended a meeting. In the future, the school bus drivers were told, they should report to the route manager for their district in an emergency or if, for some other reason, they would be unable to appear for work. Rather than making arrangements themselves, they were advised, they should let the route manager contact a substitute. On the morning of October 12, 1988, at quarter of seven, Clarice Rehberg, the route manager for the Bay High School District (which is not the district in which Mr. Alford's route was located) received a telephone call from Mr. Alford, who said that he was in Pensacola, and that his car had broken down. He also told her that school bus No. 340 was in the shop for repair, so that a substitute driver would need another bus. Finally, he let her know that the first scheduled pickup was to have been five minutes earlier at the cemetery on 17th Street. Despite Ms. Rehberg's prompt action, school children on all three runs to Mosley and Hiland Park were late for school that day. At all pertinent times, school bus drivers, including substitutes, were required to make a pre-trip inspection, which sometimes takes fifteen minutes, before driving a school bus in the morning. The following morning at about five o'clock Ms. Rehberg received a second telephone call from Mr. Alford, who again reported that he was calling from Pensacola. He said that he had called Harvey Childress in hopes that Harvey would substitute for him that morning, but that Harvey told him that he was already driving. As the "barn book" reflected, Ms. Rehberg had already scheduled Mr. Childress to drive Mr. Alford's route, morning and afternoon, just as he had done the day before. It was just as well Ms. Rehberg had the foresight to arrange for Mr. Childress to drive that afternoon because Mr. Alford never showed up. On Thursday, October 13, 1988, at about eight o'clock in the morning, Mr. Enterkin, who also drove a school bus for the Bay County School Board, spotted Mr. Alford and two friends in a car waiting at a stop sign. During the ensuing conversation, Mr. Alford told Mr. Enterkin that he was taking the rest of the week off. He also said something about having to go to Pensacola because he could not get the lights fixed on his new car. On Thursday afternoon, Mr. Alford telephoned Mr. Conway, the new supervisor of transportation, telling him that he was at a service station in Pensacola waiting for money to be wired to fix his car. On October 14, at about eight o'clock in the morning, Mr. Alford called and said that he was ready to go back to work. Mr. Conway asked him to come see him before he reported for any further duties as a bus driver. Missing a three o'clock appointment the following Tuesday, Mr. Alford appeared in Mr. Conway's office at three o'clock on Wednesday, saying that he must have gotten the days mixed up. The conversation between the men was short, to the point, and unpleasant. Mr. Conway suspended Mr. Alford with pay. On October 26, 1988, the school board suspended him without pay. The present proceedings followed.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner terminate respondent's employment. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-0634 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 5 and 7 through 18 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, it was not clear that he needed approval from anybody other than the substitute at that time. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 19 is properly a conclusion of law. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 4, 6 through 9, 15, 16, 23, and 26 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 5, 28 through 31, and 32 pertain to immaterial matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact No. 10, 14, 17 through 20, 22, 27, and 33 relate to subordinate matters. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 11, the evidence did not show any understanding that Mr. Wells had agreed to take the morning run on November 6, 1987. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, there was no morning route to Perry, and he supposedly stayed with the car. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 13 the respondent did not give notice he was going to be absent. The hearing officer has not seen a hearing transcript. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 21, the weight of the evidence showed he did not place a call to Ms. Holland on October 12, 1988. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 24, the route was not "covered" on time. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 25, respondent did not tell Ms. Rehberg in advance that he was not going to report for the afternoon run on October 12, 1989. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 34, the evidence demonstrated knowing, intentional disregard of instructions to let people know of impending absences far enough ahead of time for other arrangements to be made. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 35 is properly a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack W. Simonson Superintendent of Bay County Schools 5205 West Highway 98 Panama City, Florida 32401 The Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Franklin R. Harrison Sale, Smoak, Harrison, Sale McCloy & Thompson Post Office Drawer 1579 Panama City, Florida 32401 Pamela L. Cooper Meyer, Brooks and Cooper, P.A. Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether the School District of Palm Beach County properly suspended Respondent for 15 days and, subsequently, terminated his employment for an incident at the bus facility compound on December 12, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant fact: Stipulated Facts Respondent was hired by the School District of Palm Beach County (“District”) on March 9, 2007. At all times relevant to this Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as a School Bus Driver I at the Royal Palm Beach Transportation Facility (“Royal Palm Facility”) with the District. Employee and Labor Relations commenced an investigation on September 9, 2019, that was assigned Case No. 19/20-026. On October 29, 2019, Respondent was notified that the superintendent intended to recommend a 15-day suspension without pay and termination of Respondent’s employment to the Palm Beach County School Board (“School Board”) at the November 20, 2019, School Board meeting. On December 18, 2019, Respondent requested a hearing at DOAH regarding the suspension and termination of his employment. 1 Instead of recapping or summarizing the relevant and material testimony of witnesses, one of the parties submitted a Proposed Recommended Order with Findings of Fact that included and recited significant provisions of the hearing Transcript verbatim. This was not helpful and is contrary to the custom and practice at DOAH. This practice is discouraged in the future. Facts Presented At The Hearing The School Board operates, controls, and supervises the District, pursuant to Article IX, section 4(b), Florida Constitution, and section 1001.32, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has the authority to discipline employees pursuant to section 1012.22(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent was an experienced bus driver who had been trained in the proper method of interacting with supervisors, co-workers, and students, and exercising good professional judgment, and knew to follow certain rules, policies and directives. Respondent’s employment was governed by: a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the District and Service Employees International Union/Florida Public Services Union (“SEIU/FPSU”)(SB Ex. 77; Resp’t Ex. 11); School Board Policies (SB Exs. 70-74); Florida law (SB Ex. 75); and the School Bus Operators and Bus-Attendant Handbook (SB Ex. 76). Respondent was notified that he was being recommended for termination due to insubordination, ethical misconduct, and failure to follow policies, rules, or directives when he screamed and yelled at Senior Transportation Coordinator Cynthia Holloman (“Holloman”); used profanity, impolite language, and derogatory terms directed at Holloman which were heard by other employees as well; and left a school bus unattended in the middle of the bus driveway. SB Ex. 1; SB Ex. 4 at p. SB000022-35; and Pet’r Admin. Compl. Holloman testified at the hearing and her deposition transcript was filed. She was the senior coordinator at the Royal Palm Facility on December 12, 2018. However, the assignment of buses to the drivers was primarily handled by another employee, Bonnie Smith (“Smith”). As background, Holloman outlined that bus drivers would report to the facility in the morning to pick up their bus. If the driver’s regularly assigned bus was down or inoperative, the bus driver would be reassigned and take a substitute bus. The bus drivers were required to perform a pre-trip inspection each day to look for issues with their assigned bus. The pre-trip inspection would include, among other things, the drivers starting up their assigned bus. If the driver discovered an issue with the bus, the driver was required to fill out a form, bring it inside, and a mechanic would be assigned to fix the problem. If the problem could not be corrected, the driver would be assigned another bus. If another bus was not available, then Petitioner’s staff would assign an available driver a “double route” to cover the route. If a mechanic determined the bus was not safe to operate, then a bus would not be put on the road. Respondent testified that the morning of December 12, 2018, was an unusually cold morning. He had been assigned a bus that he believed did not have a working heater. His indirect concern with the heat not working was that the defroster linked to it would not function properly, creating a potential safety risk for the bus driver and the passengers. That morning, Respondent reported the problem with his assigned bus to Smith, and told her that he would not drive the bus in that condition. Marvin Jackson (“Jackson”), a bus driver at the Royal Palm Facility, also had a problem with the heater not functioning in his bus. Jackson testified that he would carry a rag or paper towels to wipe the windshield when driving. He took this action to operate his bus safely. Jackson indicated that on the morning of December 12, 2018, he also went into the office to complain about his heat not working properly. Leatrice Burroughs (“Burroughs”), another bus driver, testified that she also went to see Holloman on the morning of December 12, 2018, to complain about the heater on her bus not working properly. Holloman was in the dispatch office with Burroughs. Holloman was attempting to locate a bus with a functioning heater for Burroughs when Respondent arrived at the dispatch office. Holloman acknowledged that if the bus defroster was not working and the front windshield was fogging up, it would create a dangerous condition for the bus drivers. When Holloman was inside with Burroughs, Holloman heard Respondent outside raising his voice and cursing at Smith. Holloman agreed that Burroughs was in position where she could have heard Respondent using any profane or inappropriate language outside. Holloman heard Respondent cursing at Smith telling her he would not drive the bus without heat. Burroughs testified that she did not hear Respondent swearing or using any profanity. Holloman then spoke directly with Respondent and explained to him that there were no buses with heat available for him. He angrily responded and told her she was “full of sh_t,” in front of Burroughs. Burroughs denied hearing Respondent say that.2 Holloman related that during this same conversation Respondent, told her to “go f_ck herself” and that she instructed him to punch out and go home. Holloman also stated that Respondent called her a “b_tch,” and said he would park his bus and “sit on the clock.” When Holloman asked him if he was refusing to do his route that morning he replied “I’m not gonna do my route. I’m gonna sit here and I’m gonna get paid for it.” She responded that she was not going to pay him if there was work available and he was not willing to do the work. In response, Respondent told her “to go f_ck herself.” Notably, during this encounter with Holloman, Respondent made no mention or complaint to her about any problem with the defroster, nor did he claim that the bus was unsafe to drive. 2 It was not clear from the evidence what Burroughs’s proximity was to Holloman and Respondent during this discussion. Gary Mosley (“Mosley”), one of Holloman’s supervisors, arrived at the bus facility at some point after the heated exchange began. Respondent came back into the office. Holloman claims that, in the presence of Mosley, Respondent swore at her, at which time she stood up from her desk and told him she was not afraid of him. Mosley testified. He did not recall Louis swearing at Holloman, while he was in the office. However, when he spoke with Respondent outside, Respondent admitted that he said “f_ck you” to Holloman before Mosley arrived. Holloman also stated that Jackson was sitting in a chair right outside her office and could hear everything being said, including Respondent using profanity with her. Jackson testified that he never heard Respondent use any profanity that day. Jeanette Williams, a fellow bus driver, testified that she heard Respondent say he would not drive that “piece of sh_ t” bus. Pet’r Ex. 23. Dorinda Patterson (“Patterson”), another bus driver, provided a written statement for these proceedings. Patterson said that when Respondent left the office area she heard him say he was “not driving that piece of sh_t bus,” because it was “too f_cking cold.” Casandra Joseph (“Joseph”), who was a union steward, testified. She was contacted soon after the incident by Holloman regarding Respondent’s conduct on the morning of December 12, 2018. She was already at the Royal Palm Facility that morning. She spoke to Respondent immediately after the incident. He seemed very upset, was raising his voice, yelling and cursing, and used the word “sh_t.” However, Joseph did not hear what Respondent had said to Holloman earlier. Jose Pacheco (“Pacheco”), the bus shop foreman at the facility, testified. He was responsible for maintenance of the school buses. He testified that bus drivers are supposed to conduct pre- and post-trip inspections of their buses. If a bus driver has an issue during the pre-trip inspection they are required to contact dispatch, and dispatch will contact maintenance to see if they can resolve the matter. If maintenance cannot resolve the matter, they refer the bus driver back to dispatch. Pacheco was present on December 12, 2018, when Respondent complained about the heat not working on his bus. Pacheco testified clearly and distinctly that Respondent was yelling and using profanity. Respondent drove his bus in an area of the bus driveway and left it there, obstructing other bus traffic. His testimony was consistent with the testimony of other employees and was uncontroverted. The undersigned found his recollection of the incident to be particularly unbiased, credible, and persuasive. Of significance, Louis never mentioned to Pacheco that he would not drive his bus because the bus windows would fog up making the bus unsafe. Rather, it was Pacheco’s opinion that Louis was upset because it was too cold and his bus heater did not work properly. Smith, a transportation coordinator, also testified. Smith’s responsibilities included helping bus drivers get their buses on the road, helping with directions, and assisting bus drivers with their paperwork. Smith was assigned to the Royal Palm Facility. Prior to becoming a transportation coordinator, she was a bus driver. Smith testified that on December 12, 2018, she witnessed Respondent screaming at Holloman, stating that he did not want to drive his assigned bus because it was too cold. She overheard Holloman advise Respondent that if he was not going to drive his assigned bus, then he would need to clock out. Smith testified that during his heated exchange with Holloman, Respondent said “he was not driving a f_ cking cold bus.” And then he told her to go and “f_ck herself.” She related that Respondent then said that the administration did not know “how to treat the f_ cking drivers” and that is why he was acting the way he was acting. Because Respondent refused to drive the cold bus, Smith was asked to cover Respondent’s route. However, Respondent never gave Smith any paperwork to document or support his alleged concern with the heater or defroster. Carol Bello, a bus driver assigned to the Royal Palm Facility, also testified. Although she was not certain about the date, she recalled an incident approximately two years ago. Respondent was upset, loud, verbally abusive, and calling people names. She specifically recalled him stating, “F_ck you guys, I’m not driving that piece of sh_t.” She also saw him point his finger at Smith and call her “a bitch,” while ranting and raving in the bus compound around other workers and supervisors. She acknowledged that while some occasional profanity was used by bus drivers while clowning around, people did not talk to their supervisors like that. Joseph, another bus driver, testified that she had been a bus driver for fourteen years. On December 12, 2018, she observed Respondent come out of the office yelling and cursing at Holloman in the dispatch office. Respondent went on and on, cursing at Holloman and being very disrespectful to her. Respondent, Bernard Jean Louis, testified. While he admitted that he was upset that day, he essentially denied all allegations that he cursed at Holloman, or that he refused to follow his supervisor’s instruction. The undersigned did not find this self-serving testimony to be credible or persuasive, particularly considering the contrary and distinct recollection of events by several other trustworthy and more credible witnesses. The undersigned finds that Respondent’s profanity-laced tirade went on for some time and was done in different areas of the dispatch office and the outside areas of the bus compound. It is not surprising that some employees heard parts of Respondent’s outburst, while other employees heard other parts. Nonetheless, what clearly and convincingly emerged from the incident on December 12, 2018, is that Respondent was extremely upset because it was cold and he felt that the heater in his bus did not work properly. As a result of his uncontrollable and growing anger and frustration, he resorted to yelling, arguing, and cursing at his supervisor, Holloman, and failed to follow her directions. The undersigned credits and accepts the testimony of several witnesses on these points. Upon questions from the undersigned to clarify his testimony, Respondent admitted that he had not actually tested or inspected his assigned bus that morning before confronting Holloman about the problem. Rather, he concluded that his bus had an inoperable heater based on how this same bus had operated in the past. While there was a good deal of evidence relating to questions about a drug test taken by Respondent and second-hand evidence regarding the investigative role of other school board employees, this evidence was not particularly useful or relevant in this case.3 Despite no objection by either party to this broad array of other less relevant evidence, the issues in this case are framed and limited to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner, to wit: whether Respondent’s conduct or behavior on December 12, 2018, at the bus facility violated the law or school board rules or policies. Christian v. Dep’t of Health, Bd. of Chiropractic Med., 161 So. 3d. 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) and cases cited therein. 3 More directly, the School Board abandoned and did not pursue the drug test as a basis for the termination. Respondent acknowledged this in the Amended Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation. See Joint Pre-Hr’g Stip, § B., p. 2. To the extent other issues need to be resolved, the undersigned finds that the matter is properly before DOAH. Further, there was no persuasive evidence presented to prove that Petitioner failed to exhaust any administrative remedies, violated Respondent’s due process, or that Respondent failed to receive proper or sufficient notice of the conduct being relied upon by the School Board for his proposed suspension or termination. See generally, Fla. Bd. of Massage v. Thrall, 164 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1964).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Palm Beach County School Board enter a final order suspending Respondent without pay and terminating his employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Jean Marie Middleton, Esquire V. Danielle Williams, Esquire School District of Palm Beach County Office of the General Counsel 3300 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-331 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Donald E. Fennoy, II, Ed.D. Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3300 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-316 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 Richard Corcoran Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Charles D. Thomas, Esquire Thompson & Thomas, PA 1801 Indian Road, Suite 100 West Palm Beach, Florida 33409
The Issue The issues presented are whether Petitioner J. Ruiz School Bus Service, Inc., submitted the lowest responsive bid for school bus route 4606 and whether Petitioner A. Oliveros Transportation, Inc., submitted the lowest responsive bid for school bus route 7602.
Findings Of Fact Respondent School Board of Miami-Dade County issued its invitation to bid No. 053-ZZ07 seeking bids from private school bus companies for the School Board's school bus routes for the 1999-2000 school year, renewable for two additional one-year periods by agreement. Bid opening occurred on August 12, 1999. Twenty-one vendors responded to the School Board's invitation to bid. Four bids, including those of Petitioners, were rejected as non-responsive because they failed to include the required UCT-6 form. Petitioner Ruiz submitted the lowest bid for school bus route 4606, and Petitioner Oliveros submitted the lowest bid for school bus route 7602. At the School Board meeting on August 25, 1999, Ruiz' bid and Oliveros' bid were declared non-responsive to the bid specifications for failure to include the UCT-6 form and were rejected. School bus route 4606 was awarded to the next lowest bidder M & M Marroquin School Bus Services, Inc., and school bus route 7602 was awarded to the next lowest bidder Bestway Bus Service, Inc. (hereinafter "Bestway"). Those two vendors had submitted UCT-6 forms with their bids. Petitioners timely filed their notices of protest challenging the School Board's decisions. Rather than stopping the award process, the School Board entered into contracts with M & M and Bestway. The bid specifications contained the following provision under special condition numbered 3: The vendor will be required to submit, with the bid, the most recent copy of their [sic] Florida Division of Unemployment Compensation Employer's Quarterly Report Form UCT 6, showing current employees and payroll amount. In lieu of the June 30, 1999, Florida Division of Unemployment Compensation Employer's Quarterly Report Form UCT 6, a blank copy of the UCT 6 Form is provided and attached hereto for those vendors who do not have the June 30, 1999 quarterly report. This form must be completed in its entirety, with a copy being submitted with the bid and the original retained by the vendor for filing with the state. Failure to submit this report/form will cause the vendor to be considered non-responsive. Effective September 30, 1999, UCT 6 forms will be required to be submitted to Mr. Robert Newell, at the Office of Risk and Benefits Management on a quarterly basis. The UCT 6 form shall reflect all drivers currently certified and on file with the Department of Transportation. Failure to do so shall result in fourteen (14) months loss of route. Special condition numbered 4 provided that the School Board reserved the right to reject any and all bids and to waive irregularities. Special condition numbered 5 required that a copy of the occupational license be submitted with the bid and further provided that: "The information on the occupational license (name, address, etc.) shall be identical to the information submitted on the Bidder Qualification Form." A number of bidders who were not declared non- responsive submitted occupational licenses and bidder qualification forms where the names on the licenses and forms were reversed, technically a violation of special condition numbered 5. Further, one bidder not declared non-responsive submitted an occupational license in the name of an individual but submitted a bid in the name of a corporation, a violation of that special condition. Another bidder not declared non- responsive submitted a bidder qualification form and an occupational license with different addresses, and one more submitted a bidder qualification form and occupational license with different corporate names. The reasons for requiring vendors to file a UCT-6 form were to verify the vendor's current number of employees, to ascertain if the named employees were certified by the School Board's transportation department, and to determine whether the bidder was in compliance with State of Florida requirements for unemployment compensation and worker's compensation insurance. As to the number of employees, the vendor application forms also contained questions as to the number of employees. The occupational licenses required to be submitted with the bids also advised as to the number of employees. Twelve of the seventeen bidders who were not declared non-responsive submitted conflicting information as to the number of their employees in their vendor applications, their UCT-6 forms, and their occupational licenses. As to the UCT-6 form itself, the bid specifications required submittal of the bidder's most recent form, which would normally be for the quarter ending June 30, 1999. The bid specifications, alternatively, allowed completion of a blank form for a quarter ending subsequent to bid opening and bid award, which forms might not ever be filed with the State or which might be filed with different information on them. The completion of the blank forms would not necessarily verify the information desired by the School Board. One bidder not declared non-responsive submitted a form for the quarter ending March 31, 1999, thereby not appearing to comply with either alternative. Moreover, the bid specifications required the UCT-6 forms to be completed in their entirety. Nine bidders who were not declared non-responsive submitted forms which were not completed in their entirety, missing such information as payroll amounts, dates, account numbers, and the quarter covered by the form. These bidders violated special condition numbered 3. There is no real difference between failing to submit a required form and failing to complete the form as required by the bid specifications. Failure to submit the UCT-6 form was not a material deviation from the bid specifications but rather was a minor irregularity. The School Board waived that minor irregularity by its failure to deem non-responsive those other bidders who had filed the wrong form or who had failed to complete the form. Petitioners' failure to include the UCT-6 form in their bids did not affect the price of their bids, confer upon them an economic advantage over the other bidders, or give the School Board any reason to doubt that Petitioners could perform any contract award. The School Board's acceptance of incomplete UCT-6 forms, a form for an earlier quarter, and forms containing information extending into a future time period, while rejecting Petitioners' bids for not including a form, was arbitrary and capricious. Declaring Petitioners non-responsive but accepting equally non-responsive bids was also clearly erroneous and contrary to competition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered awarding Petitioner J. Ruiz School Bus Service, Inc., school bus route 4606 and awarding to Petitioner A. Oliveros Transportation, Inc., school bus route 7602. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger C. Cuevas, Superintendent School Board of Miami-Dade County 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Jose I. Valdes, Esquire Marlow, Connell, Valerius, Abrams, Adler & Newman, P.A. 2950 Southwest 27th Avenue, Suite 200 Miami, Florida 33133-3765 Twila Hargrove-Payne, Esquire School Board of Miami-Dade County 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Carlos Garcia, Esquire Niurka R. Piedra, Esquire Garcia, Perez-Siam & Associates 265 Sevilla Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue Whether Petitioners, Renaissance Charter School, Inc., and Renaissance Charter School at Tradition, can be required by the St. Lucie County School Board ("School Board") to offer regular school busing to all eligible charter school students residing more than two miles from the charter school. Whether Petitioner, Renaissance Charter School at Tradition, breached its contract with the School Board by not providing transportation to students in accord with the parties' charter school contract and Florida Statutes. Whether School Board Policies 3.90 and 8.31 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Whether the School Board has charter busing policies which amount to illegal, unadopted rules under chapter 120, Florida Statutes (2014).
Findings Of Fact The Parties Renaissance Charter School, Inc., is a not-for-profit Florida corporation. Renaissance Charter School, Inc., currently owns and operates two charter schools in St. Lucie County: Renaissance Charter School at Tradition and Renaissance Charter School at St. Lucie. The School Board is the "sponsor" of Renaissance Charter School at Tradition within the meaning of the charter school statute, section 1002.33. The School Board's Approval of Renaissance Charter School at Tradition's Charter Application and Charter Contract On August 1, 2012, a charter school application was submitted to the School Board by Renaissance Charter School, Inc., on behalf of Renaissance Charter School at Tradition. During the charter application and approval process, the School Board consistently contended that charter schools in St. Lucie County are required by law to offer regular school busing to all eligible students residing more than two miles from their charter school.1/ On September 17, 2012, the School Board's Charter School Evaluation Team recommended approval of the Renaissance Charter School at Tradition charter school application, subject to the charter school providing "a viable transportation plan that meets statutory requirements once a school site has been finalized." On May 14, 2013, the School Board, at a regular board meeting, unanimously approved its charter contract with Renaissance Charter School, Inc., for Renaissance Charter School at Tradition. The Renaissance Charter School at Tradition charter contract became effective upon approval by the School Board at its May 14, 2013, meeting. The term of the charter contract is five years, commencing on the first day of the 2013-2014 school year, and ending on June 30, 2018. The School Board and Renaissance Charter School at Tradition have a valid and binding charter school contract that is still in full force and effect. Applicable Transportation Provisions of Renaissance Charter School at Tradition's Charter Contract Section 6 of the charter contract between the School Board and Renaissance Charter School at Tradition, which governs student transportation, provides as follows: SECTION 6: TRANSPORTATION Cooperation Between Sponsor and School: The School shall provide transportation to the School's students consistent with the requirements of Part I.E. of Chapter 1006, and Section 1012.45, F.S. The School may contract with the Sponsor to provide transportation service. Reasonable Distance: Transportation will not be a barrier to equal access for all students residing within the District, and the School shall provide transportation to all students residing in the District subject to the limitations in this Section 6.B. Students residing within two miles of the school will be expected to furnish their own transportation, except that certain students, as specified in Section 1006.21, F.S., for example students with disabilities and elementary grade students who are subject to specified hazardous walking conditions, must be provided transportation, regardless of the distance from the school. For students who are geographically isolated, or who are unable to be transported on a school bus due to disabilities, the School will offer reimbursement to eligible parents residing within the District. This parental reimbursement shall be equivalent to the monies provided by the Sponsor to the School for transportation of the student. At the time of student application for enrollment, the School shall be responsible for informing parents of the transportation options available, including the reimbursement amount available in lieu of provided transportation to qualifying students. Compliance with Safety Requirements: The School shall demonstrate compliance with all applicable transportation safety requirements. Unless it contracts with the Sponsor for the provision of student transportation, the School is required to ensure that each school bus transporting the School's students meets applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards and other specifications. The School agrees to monitor the status of the commercial drivers' licenses of each school bus driver employed or hired by the School (hereafter "School Bus Drivers") unless it contracts with Sponsor to provide such services. The School will provide the Sponsor, via the Charter Schools Support Department, an updated list each quarter of all School Bus Drivers providing commercial driver's license numbers, current license status and license expiration dates. Fees: The School may not charge a fee for transportation to which the student is entitled pursuant to state law. The School shall reimburse parents for parent-provided transportation costs if the student is legally entitled to transportation. Private Transportation Agreement: In the event the School will be contracting with a third party to provide transportation to its students, the School shall provide a copy of the transportation contract to the Sponsor at least sixty (60) days prior to the initial day of classes. Reimbursement for School Funded Transportation: The rate of reimbursement to the School by the Sponsor for transportation will be equivalent to the reimbursement rate provided by the State of Florida for all eligible transported students. Section 1 B) 4) of the charter contract further provides: 4) Statutory Requirements: The Parties will comply with Section 1002.33, F.S., and any regulations adopted by the State Board of Education or other state agency, or amendments thereto, pertaining to charter schools, and all applicable federal, state and local laws pertaining to civil rights and student health, safety and welfare. If any conflict exists between the provisions of the approved application or this Charter and any specific provision of law, then the provisions of the law shall prevail. The School shall be bound by amendments to applicable statutes, rules, and regulation, as any such amendments take effect. Unless specifically incorporated herein, the policies of the Sponsor do not apply to the School. However, if the School is statutorily required to have a policy and does not, the Sponsor's policy shall be deemed to apply. Students of Renaissance Charter School at Tradition and the School's Transportation Policy For a student to attend Renaissance Charter School at Tradition, their parents must apply during an open enrollment period, and a lottery system is used to determine who may attend. Parents whose child is selected through the lottery to attend Renaissance Charter School at Tradition are given a certain number of days to accept or decline the seat. Then the process starts over again until all seats are filled or there are no other students on the list. Renaissance Charter School at Tradition opened for the 2013-2014 school year as a K-6 school with 695 enrolled students. Projected enrollment for the 2013-2014 school year was 661 students. However, before the 2013-2014 school year began, projected enrollment had increased to 745 students. Renaissance Charter School at Tradition opened for the 2014-2015 school year as a K-7 school with 890 enrolled students and an enrollment cap of 945 students. For the 2015-2016 school year, Renaissance Charter School at Tradition plans to open as a K-8 school with projected enrollment of 1,075 students. For the 2016-2017 school year, Renaissance Charter School at Tradition plans to open as a K-8 school at maximum capacity of 1,145 enrolled students. The only "A" graded schools in St. Lucie County, Florida, for the 2013-2014 school year were Renaissance Charter School at Tradition and Renaissance Charter School at St. Lucie. There is a waiting list for grades K-3 at Renaissance Charter School at Tradition. Parents of students enrolled at Renaissance Charter School at Tradition recognize that Renaissance Charter School at Tradition provides their children with a unique educational opportunity. Parents of students enrolled at Renaissance Charter School at Tradition recognize that the decision to enroll their children at Renaissance Charter School at Tradition is a personal choice and not a privilege. Parents of students enrolled at Renaissance Charter School at Tradition are active partners in the education of their children. Renaissance Charter School at Tradition does not provide regular school busing to its students who reside more than two miles from the charter school. Renaissance Charter School at Tradition re-evaluates its transportation policies on a yearly basis. Parents of students are informed that Renaissance Charter School at Tradition does not offer regular school busing in informational meetings before they apply for their child to attend the school. Parents of students enrolled at Renaissance Charter School at Tradition sign a "Parent Obligation Form," contractually obligating themselves "[t]o provide transportation to and from the school for my child." Parents are required to sign the "Parent Obligation Form" every year as part of the enrollment process. The transportation policy of Renaissance Charter School at Tradition, which is given to all parents upon enrollment, apprises parents that the school does not offer regular school busing to students, but that the school agrees to provide "transportation or an equivalent reimbursement" to students in certain legally-defined circumstances. The transportation policy of Renaissance Charter School at Tradition provides as follows: Student Transportation Policy Renaissance Charter School at Tradition's [sic], is and always has been, fully committed to ensuring that transportation will not be a barrier to equal access for all students residing within the District. To date, there are more students attending our newly-opened charter school than was projected for our first year. Although our school does not presently offer busing as a means of school transportation, we are in the process of helping put together parent carpools for those parents who want their children to share rides to and from school. Moreover, transportation, or an equivalent reimbursement, will be provided to any student who falls under any of the following categories [taken from Florida State Statute 1006.21]: Any student in grades K-8 who does not otherwise have access to an adequate educational facility or opportunity. Any student in grades K-6 who are subjected to a hazardous walking condition as defined in s. 1006.23 while en route to or from school. Any student in grades K-8 who have a documented transportation need in their IEP. Any student in grades K-8 who are pregnant, student parents, and/or the children of these students if a teenage parent program is presented at the school. If you feel your child falls within one of the categories listed above, please notify the front office and we will work with you on a case-by-case basis. The School Board rejected the transportation policy of Renaissance Charter School at Tradition because it does not provide for the regular school busing of all students residing more than two miles from the charter school. Renaissance Charter School at Tradition's failure to provide regular bus transportation to all students residing more than two miles from the charter school does not constitute a barrier to equal access to all students. At the hearing, no credible and persuasive evidence was presented that any students lack equal access to an adequate educational facility or opportunity. No evidence was presented that any students are subject to hazardous walking conditions while en route to or from the charter school. There is one student who enrolled on January 20, 2015, who has a transportation need documented in their individual education plan, but the child's parent has chosen to provide transportation. No evidence was presented of any students who are pregnant or who have given birth to any children. Renaissance Charter School at Tradition opens at 6:00 a.m. and closes at 6:00 p.m. There are before-and-after- care private buses that take students off-site to other organizations, such as to karate and the Boys and Girls Clubs. Renaissance Charter School at Tradition also encourages parents' use of carpooling their children to and from school. The School Board's position is that carpooling is not a viable transportation option for the charter school. At Renaissance Charter School at Tradition, one parent has decided to run a private busing service, but no other parents have chosen to use the services of that private bus.2/ The Charter Contract and Transportation Policy Do Not Require Petitioners to Transport by Regular School Bus All Students Residing More Than Two Miles From the Charter School The parties' dispute centers on whether the School Board can require Renaissance Charter School at Tradition to offer regular school bus transportation, to and from the school, for all students residing more than two miles from the school. The interests of Petitioners are directly and substantially affected by the School Board's attempt to require that Petitioners transport by regular school bus all students residing more than two miles from the charter school. The parties unsuccessfully mediated their dispute before the Florida Department of Education. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that Renaissance Charter School at Tradition has not breached its charter contract with the School Board by not providing regular school busing to all students residing more than two miles from the charter school. The charter school contract between the School Board and Renaissance Charter School at Tradition does not require Renaissance Charter School at Tradition to provide regular school busing to all students residing more than two miles from the charter school.3/ Renaissance Charter School at Tradition's transportation policy is consistent with its charter contract with the School Board. The School Board's Inequitable Treatment of Charter Schools The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that the School Board's treatment of Petitioners is inequitable. The School Board has a "no transportation zone," which geographically encompasses approximately one-third of the county. Students of traditional public schools residing in the "no transportation zone" are not provided regular school bus transportation to and from school. The School Board also has a "limited transportation zone." Students of traditional public schools residing in the "limited transportation zone" are provided regular school bus transportation, but only if they attend a school located within the "limited transportation zone." The "no transportation zone" and "limited transportation zone" encompass approximately one-half of St. Lucie County. At the hearing, the School Board conceded that it has different policies for the transportation of traditional public school students and students at magnet schools and attractor schools. The School Board encourages the use of carpools for students of traditional public schools. The School Board's Alleged Unadopted Policy The School Board, in paragraph 20 of its counter- petition filed in Case No. 14-3267, specifically states: "The School District's adopted policy is that students who live more than two miles from their assigned school shall be provided school bus transportation." (emphasis added). The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that the School Board interprets Florida law and its adopted School Board Policies 3.90 and 8.31 to require that all existing and future charter schools within the county provide regular school bus transportation for all students residing more than two miles from the charter school. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that the School Board does not have an unadopted policy that all charter schools within the county must provide regular school busing to all students residing more than two miles from their charter school. The School Board's Adopted Policies The School Board has two adopted policies, School Board Policy 3.90 (dealing with charter schools) and School Board Policy 8.31 (dealing with student transportation). The interests of Petitioner are directly and substantially affected by these policies.4/ Both School Board Policies 3.90 and 8.31 were properly noticed pursuant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Neither School Board Policy 3.90 nor 8.31 is specifically incorporated into the charter agreement between the School Board and Renaissance Charter School at Tradition. Moreover, according to the School Board, School Board Policy 8.31 applies only in the absence of a viable charter school transportation policy. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing fails to demonstrate that the School Board and Renaissance Charter School at Tradition mutually agreed that School Board Policy 3.90, or 8.31, apply to the charter school.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether, as the district school board alleges, Respondent got into a scuffle with a student; and, if so, whether such conduct constitutes just cause for Petitioner's dismissing Respondent from his position as a bus driver.
Findings Of Fact The Palm Beach County School Board ("School Board" or "District"), Petitioner in this case, is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Palm Beach County Public School System. At all relevant times and as of the final hearing, the District employed Respondent José Lopez ("Lopez") as a bus driver, a position he has held since 2008. The events in dispute occurred on the afternoon of March 9, 2016. At the time, Lopez was working as a "spare driver," meaning that, instead of being assigned to a regular route, he drove to different locations as needed. This particular afternoon, the dispatcher directed Lopez to make a late pickup at Forest Hill Community High School ("Forest Hill") in West Palm Beach because the regular driver's bus had broken down. Lopez had some trepidation about accepting this assignment because he was familiar with the route in question and considered it dangerous due to the behavior of the students. Nevertheless, he proceeded to Forest Hill as instructed. The bus was behind schedule when Lopez arrived at the school, through no fault of his. The other busses already had pulled away, and the students waiting for Lopez's bus were standing in the road (or "bus loop" as it is called). As the bus pulled up, some students began running beside it, creating a potentially dangerous situation. The administrator on bus duty, Dr. Demetrius Permenter, ordered Lopez to drive around the loop again, so that he could get the students out of the road and under control. Lopez complied. On his second approach, Lopez parked the bus and opened the side-entry double doors, which are located at the front of the bus, opposite the driver (to his right when driving). The students jostled and pushed each other as they rushed to board the bus. Again fearing that someone might get hurt, Dr. Permenter told the students to stop boarding and——to prevent others from entering——instructed Lopez to close the doors. Lopez complied. As the doors closed, students continued to dash in, disobeying Dr. Permenter. The last student to board the bus was Michael Clark, then 17 years old. Although he had bolted inside the bus at the last second, Michael could not proceed to a seat because his arm (or the arm of his jacket) got caught between the doors as they shut, trapping him at the bottom of the interior steps. Fortunately, Michael was not hurt, which was obvious to everyone around, for he began to laugh at the somewhat comical position he had placed himself in. Others, including Dr. Permenter, chuckled too, and Lopez raised his hands, palms forward, in an exaggerated gesture of mock exasperation, before opening the doors, freeing Michael. All told, the student was stuck for about five seconds. To this point, the atmosphere had been one of energetic merriment. The students had been excited, boisterous, and generally in high spirits. But suddenly, the mood changed. As Michael climbed the steps onto the bus, he angrily demanded to know why his arm had been stuck "in the damn door so fucking long." Dr. Permenter clearly heard this disrespectful outburst and knew immediately that "some[thing] was going on." Tr. 96. Lopez thought, "Something is coming. I don't wanna do it." Tr. 335. At hearing, Dr. Permenter testified that Michael's statement could have been perceived as aggressive, Tr. 108, but he did not view it that way at the time, perhaps, in part, because he could not see Michael's face. Tr. 132. Lopez rose from his seat. Although Michael's belligerent query had not been overtly threatening, it carried an unmistakable whiff of menace——enough, clearly, to put a reasonable person on guard. Sitting behind the wheel placed Lopez in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis Michael. Therefore, rising to his feet sensibly increased Lopez's options for fight or flight, should it come to that, and reduced the risk that he would be set upon by an attacker looming over him, raining down blows. In sum, because Michael had addressed Lopez, not as an authority figure, but (at best) as a peer and possibly as prey, Lopez's decision to stand was reasonable under the circumstances. Lopez, who had stood up next to the right edge of the driver's seat, turned to his right to face Michael, who was drawing near, and asked, "What's your problem, man?" In the blink of an eye, the two began to tussle. The question at the heart of this dispute is: Who initiated the physical altercation? The District alleges that Lopez panicked and lashed out at a student merely for using foul language.1/ Lopez claims that he acted reasonably in self-defense after Michael attacked him. Accounts of the next few relevant moments differ sharply, which is par for the course. What is worse, from the fact-finder's perspective, is the thinness of the evidence. The two protagonists were the only witnesses at hearing having personal knowledge of all the relevant facts, and both were relatively inarticulate; they each gave testimony that was neither precise nor explicit. The other eyewitness, Dr. Permenter, described the events with admirable precision, as far as his testimony went, but he did not see everything and could not say whether Lopez or Michael had been the aggressor. Then there are the two surveillance videos ("3A" and "3B"), which together amount to a virtual witness who "testifies" through the sound and images recorded by the cameras mounted on the bus. Yet, while the video evidence is both captivating and seemingly unbiased, it is a mistake to assume casually that the assertive narrative of any given video is objective and unambiguous, for rarely is that true, if ever. Viewers of filmic evidence, including the undersigned, do not somehow become eyewitnesses to past events, for video merely represents, imperfectly, the real events captured on camera. Of necessity, each member of the audience projects onto the images his or her own interpretation of the scenes depicted. As the fact-finder, the undersigned must determine the significance, meaning, and story of the images preserved in videos 3A and 3B based upon a critical review of the films in conjunction with a careful consideration of all the available evidence. Michael testified that after Lopez stood up, he (Lopez) reached for Michael's neck, which initiated the tussle. Video 3A persuasively rebuts Michael's testimony in this regard. Lopez clearly did not reach for Michael's neck——not right away, anyway. Unfortunately for purposes of this case, however, video 3A does not persuasively describe the entire event, as a result of the static position of the camera. Video 3A was shot by a camera mounted at the front of the bus, over the driver's left shoulder (as he faces forward). The angle of the shot gives the viewer the perspective of looking down, from the left side of the bus, onto the front inside area of the vehicle, which encompasses the driver's seat (closest to the camera); the landing at the head of the center aisle, onto which passengers step after ascending the front steps inside the vehicle; the first few rows of passenger seats; and the side-entry double doors located to the driver's right. The disputed event took place largely within sight of this camera. A major drawback of video 3A is that when Lopez stood up, his body got between the camera and Michael, giving us a good shot of Lopez's back, but blocking our view of Michael. Thus, we cannot observe which one made the first physical contact. Despite its limitations, video 3A provides much useful information. As mentioned, there is a landing at the head of the center aisle, which is adjacent to the driver's seat. The center aisle is bordered by silver edging trim (also known as transition strips). The passenger seats and the driver's seat are outside these strips. When Lopez stood and turned to face Michael (as Michael climbed the steps and approached), the driver planted his feet mostly on "his" side of the edging trim; only the toes of his shoes touched the landing. Next to his right foot was a waste basket located on the driver's side of the trim, near the driver's seat. Lopez's calves were quite close to his seat. Simply put, when Lopez stood and faced Michael, he occupied his work station. It was Michael who walked across the landing and got into Lopez's face, while Lopez was standing——literally——in his own personal space. Facing each other, the two briefly exchanged words, but the evidence is insufficient to permit the undersigned to make a finding as to what was said. During this short verbal encounter, Lopez's arms remained at his side. Also, Lopez's feet stayed on his side of the driver's area. It should be understood that, at this moment, Lopez was basically standing his ground, for he was effectively trapped. Unlike Michael, who had the freedom to exit the bus or proceed down the aisle via unobstructed paths, Lopez could not escape except by getting past Michael. For Lopez, retreat meant falling back into his driver's seat, which would have put him at a disadvantage. Video 3A shows that, as the two talked, Lopez abruptly stepped sideways and backwards on his right foot, which bumped into the waste basket. Lopez appears to be reacting to something, and has perhaps been knocked off balance, but Michael's actions cannot be made out because Lopez's body is in the way. After regaining his footing, Lopez reached forward with his right hand while leaning slightly to the right, as if he were going to embrace Michael, and took a step forward with his left foot, raising his left hand towards Michael's waist in a motion that, again, looks like the start of a hug, except that Michael's right arm would have been pinned against his body had Lopez succeeded in getting his arm around the student. Simultaneously, Michael slipped his left hand under Lopez's right arm and grabbed the driver's left shoulder, while using his right hand to take hold of Lopez's left shirt collar. Here, Michael clearly went on the offensive, driving Lopez forcefully back and pushing him into the driver's seat. Lopez got back to his feet, and Michael slammed him hard into the steering wheel and driver's seat. Lopez used his arms in an attempt to protect himself, but Michael began to overpower the driver. At about this time, Dr. Permenter entered the bus, and he reached out immediately to restrain Michael. At the same time, Lopez bounced up and managed to push Michael back a step or two, reaching unsuccessfully for his neck. At hearing, Dr. Permenter recalled that Michael seemed to calm down and stop struggling upon the administrator's arrival. Video 3A rebuts this testimony. As it actually happened, Michael advanced on Lopez and pushed the driver backwards, nearly into the steering wheel, as Dr. Permenter tugged on Michael's arm to pull him away from Lopez. In response, Lopez lunged forward and reached again with both hands for Michael's throat. The School Board uses a screenshot from video 3B capturing this moment that appears to show Lopez choking or strangling Michael. But, though arresting, this particular still is misleading because, whereas the screenshot gives the impression that Lopez had locked his hands around the student's neck, the video shows that in real time the driver's hands were actually in that visually dramatic position for just a split second before releasing. In truth, if Lopez even made contact with Michael's throat, it was an extremely brief touch. Lopez, obviously agitated, exclaimed, "Get out of here, motherfucker!" Dr. Permenter stepped between Lopez and Michael, and said, "Uh uh, let him go, let him go." Without hesitating, Dr. Permenter then threw his body into Lopez, and knocked the driver back into his seat, separating Lopez and Michael. Michael was yelling at Lopez and Dr. Permenter, but his words, as recorded on the videos, cannot be understood. With that, the altercation was over. Shortly thereafter, Michael was escorted off the bus. The District alleges that it has just cause to fire Lopez based upon the following allegations of material fact: As [Michael] was entering the bus, Mr. Lopez closed the bus doors, thereby trapping the [student] in the doors. * * * [Later, d]uring the investigation . . . , Mr. Lopez stated that he accidently closed the bus door on [Michael]. In fact, Michael did become caught in the doors by accident——an accident for which he (Michael), having disobediently boarded the bus knowing that the doors were shutting, was 100% at fault. Lopez, who had closed the doors on Dr. Permenter's order, was blameless in connection with this mishap. After several seconds, Mr. Lopez opened the door. As [Michael] walked up the steps of the bus, [he] questioned Respondent about being caught in the doors. In fact, Michael rudely barked, "Why was my arm stuck in the damn door so fucking long?" Michael was, of course, way out of line in making this menacing remark to the driver, who reasonably rose from his seat in a self-protective maneuver. Respondent is seen [in video 3A] stepping towards the victim and using his body to make contact with [Michael]. In fact, Lopez clearly stood his ground near the driver's seat. It was plainly Michael who moved toward Lopez, not the other way around. Lopez did make contact with Michael, but it is quite possible that Michael made physical contact with Lopez first. The evidence is ambiguous as to the question of whether Lopez or Michael struck first. Mr. Lopez and [Michael] engage[d] in a physical tussle, until they [we]re separated by a school staff member that boarded the bus. Once separated, Mr. Lopez again lunged at [Michael] and made physical contact with the student, which caused a second scuffle. A school staff member got between Respondent and [Michael] and broke up the altercation. Without a doubt, there was a tussle, but there was not, in fact, a "second scuffle" for which Lopez was somehow primarily responsible. The two combatants, in fact, were not actually "separated" until Dr. Permenter threw himself into Lopez and knocked the driver down. Until then, both individuals had thrust and parried with their arms, hands, and legs. During the struggle, Michael was as, if not more, aggressive than Lopez, who was, very possibly, merely defending himself, as he maintains. During the incident, Mr. Lopez used profanity. Lopez admitted this allegation, which was proved, in any event, by clear and convincing evidence, as he can be heard calling Michael a "motherfucker" in the video. The context, however, is crucial. The bad word or words were uttered by Lopez, not gratuitously, but in the heat of battle, when emotions were high and Lopez was understandably and justifiably angry at Michael. In contrast, Michael used profanity gratuitously in the absence of conflict, without justification, when he boarded the bus——far worse conduct.2/ Lopez's use of profanity, under the circumstances, was a de minimis infraction, not just cause for dismissal. The upshot is that the District failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the essential allegation against Lopez, namely that he had initiated and escalated a physical altercation with a student. As far as establishing who the aggressor was, the evidence is ambiguous. Although Lopez did not have the burden to prove his innocence, he presented evidence sufficient to raise the genuine possibility that he had acted in self-defense, not in retaliation, using reasonable force to protect himself from harm while under attack. This genuine possibility precludes the undersigned from forming a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, that Lopez acted in an unjustifiably aggressive or retaliatory fashion, as charged.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Palm Beach County School Board enter a final order exonerating Lopez of all charges brought against him in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2017.
The Issue May Respondent's annual contract as non-instructional personnel (school bus driver) for the 1991-1992 school year be lawfully terminated by Petitioner School Board? Does Respondent retain any rights to renewal of his annual employment contract under the circumstances of this case?
Findings Of Fact Respondent, James Gravelding, was hired by Petitioner School Board in February 1989 as a school bus driver. With the exception of tenured teachers, all School Board employees, including those employees covered under the AFSCME collective bargaining agreement, are employed on an annual contract basis for a period not exceeding one year. At all times material, Respondent was an annual contract employee covered under the AFSCME agreement. Neither Respondent's employment contract nor the collective bargaining agreement provide any recourse for an employee who is not reappointed for a succeeding school year. The School Board has absolute discretion to reappoint or not reappoint any annual contract employee by a new annual contract at the end of each school year/contract term. Respondent was first employed on annual contract from February 1989 to June 1989. That annual contract and succeeding annual contracts covered the 1989-1990 school year, the 1990-1991 school year, and the 1991-1992 school year. During the course of his 1991-1992 annual contract, on November 7, 1991, Respondent was recommended for termination. The reason for the termination recommendation was Respondent's alleged violation of School Board policy with regard to the reporting of accidents. The charging document specifically stated: This action was necessitated by your failure to follow School Board Transportation Procedures in general, and Procedure (504.1)(6.B.) (Reporting of Accidents) in particular. Petitioner School Board's policy at (504.1) (6.B.) (Reporting of Accidents) is published in the "School Bus Drivers and Aides Handbook" and provides: 6.B. REPORTING OF ACCIDENTS: Drivers of school board vehicles will be required to report all accidents, violations, citations occurring in school board vehicles, suspensions, and/or revocations of driver license. Failure to report or inaccurate reporting shall be grounds for termination of employment. Accidents in a board owned vehicle must be reported at the time of the accident to the transportation department and in accordance with Florida Statute 316.065: "The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any persons or property damage, shall immediately by the quickest means of communication, give notice of the accident to the local police department, if such accident occurs within a municipality; otherwise, to the office of the county sheriff of the nearest office or station of the Florida Highway Patrol. Respondent had received a copy of and was aware of the foregoing policy. On October 21, 1991, Respondent was driving his usual morning route in a substitute school bus, starting from the New Smyrna Beach school bus terminal. He left the terminal at 6:15 a.m. to pick up and deliver approximately 51 high school students. At approximately 6:45 a.m. he had all of the high school students loaded on the bus. At that time, he made a left- hand turn at the intersection of Indian River Boulevard and Route One, hitting a child who was chasing the bus by running in the inside turn lane. Either the child's foot or leg was injured at that time. It was not yet daylight, and Respondent did not see the child before or after the accident. Respondent felt no "bump" and was unaware that the accident had occurred. However, at that time, he was aware of a number of students standing in the back of the bus, looking out the window. These students only sat down after about ten minutes. No one immediately reported the accident to Respondent. At approximately 7:00 a.m., (fifteen minutes after the accident and five minutes after the children sat down) Respondent completed delivery of the high school students to New Smyrna Beach High School. As they exited the bus, one student reported to Respondent that he thought Respondent had run over a child's foot at the Indian River Boulevard and Route One intersection. Although Respondent's testimony wobbled on whether or not other students concurred with the spokesman who made the oral accident report to Respondent, the portion of Respondent's testimony to the effect that several students concurred in the oral report and his prior admission that several students concurred in the oral report are accepted here. Respondent testified that he had assumed that the students were kidding about the accident and told them so. He made this assumption despite the fact that he had never been lied to by the students involved and despite the fact that Respondent regarded the spokesman as a pretty good kid. Respondent further admitted there were no indicators of dishonesty in the students' report. He simply felt the accident report to him by a few students when he stopped at New Smyrna Beach High School approximately fifteen minutes after the accident occurred could not be true because if it had been true, the majority of the other students should have said something to him at the precise time of the accident. After the high school students exited his bus, Respondent drove behind the high school and tried to call his supervisor, Barbara Ivey, who was based in Daytona. He overheard someone else calling her and discovered she was out that day on leave. Standard procedure was for a substitute supervisor to be on duty. Respondent made no further attempts to report the alleged accident to that supervisor or to anyone else until much later, despite the fact that at all times material he had a working radio in his bus and knew that a dispatcher was on duty to take all radioed calls from drivers. Respondent also did not go into the high school to make a report to the high school principal or to contact School Board administrators by telephone. Respondent merely went on to complete his next two bus runs. Respondent completed his pickup and delivery of elementary students at approximately 7:50 a.m. He did not go into the elementary school to make a report to the elementary school principal or contact School Board administrators by telephone. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Respondent began his pickup of middle school children. Either while still on his middle school run or after completing his middle school run and while on his way back to the New Smyrna Beach school bus terminal, a dispatcher contacted Respondent by radio and asked him to telephone Mr. Crawford, Operations Administrator for the School Board's Transportation Department. No reason for this request was given by the dispatcher to Respondent, but in fact, Mr. Crawford had heard about the alleged accident from other sources and was trying to determine which bus was involved. Respondent did not report the alleged accident to the dispatcher when he received this notice to call Mr. Crawford. Respondent never went into the middle school to make an accident report to the principal or to contact School Board administrators by telephone. After he returned to the New Smyrna Beach school bus terminal, where there were no supervisors, Respondent consulted some older bus drivers and relied on their suggestion to make out an accident report form. When he could not find an accident report form, he made a very cursory explanation of events on a "suggested complaint form." Respondent's explanation on the "suggested complaint form" read only: student told me while unloading at High School that a kid was chasing Bus thru (sic) intersection of Indian River Blvd. and Route 1. I had no knowledge of this Respondent then placed the suggested complaint form in the interoffice mail at the New Smyrna Beach school bus terminal so that the form was received by his supervisor, Mrs. Ivey, in her Daytona office the next morning when she reported back to work. It is conceivable that the form arrived in her office the afternoon of the accident, but there is no clear proof to that effect. Respondent conceded that if one were certain that an accident had actually occurred, this method would not be the quickest way to report it. Only at that point, after putting the "suggested complaint form" in the interoffice mail, at approximately 9:00 a.m., did Respondent telephone Mr. Crawford from the New Smyrna Beach school bus terminal. The entire content of this conversation is in dispute, but it is abundantly clear that Respondent never volunteered any information to Mr. Crawford to the effect that he may have accidently hit a student with his bus, injuring the student. Respondent then went home. About 10:00 a.m., the dispatcher summoned Respondent from his home to the terminal where he met with various School Board administrators, including Mr. Crawford, and an officer of the Edgewater Police Department, who informed Respondent he had been involved in a hit and run. Only after this conversation did School Board administrators have a chance to interview the Respondent or go to the hospital to interview the injured child. The purpose of the School Board's accident report policy is to ensure the safety of school children and to permit immediate response and investigation of accidents by the School Board and by law enforcement for purposes of criminal/traffic prosecutions and defense of civil liability/damages actions. The radio dispatcher system was instituted during Respondent's period of employment so there would be communication with the buses all of the time that school buses were in service. Administrators are on call 24 hours a day in the event a serious problem occurs and can be "beeped" by the bus dispatcher. Respondent was aware at all times that his bus radio was available for just the type of emergency situation as occurred on October 21, 1991. During the preceding school year (the 1990-1991 school year), while Respondent was driving a school bus, one of his child passengers was injured and another child passenger reported the injury to Respondent. On that occasion, Respondent immediately pulled the bus over and reported the accident by radio to the dispatcher. When the School Board investigated the October 21, 1991 accident, no points were assessed against Respondent either by a point system adopted under School Board policy or under a point system adopted by the State of Florida. Respondent also was not prosecuted by the authorities for any traffic infractions or for injury to the child. The record is barren of any information as to whether or not any civil liability or damages were assessed against Respondent or the School Board as a result of this accident. Subsequent to the October 21, 1991 accident, Respondent was not processed through a Safety Committee review of a graduated point system established under (505)I, (505)II, (505)IV, (505)V, (505)VI and (504.1) (6.D. and F.) of the School Board "Support Services Policies." However, it was not shown that those policies superseded policy (504.1)(6.B.) (Reporting of Accidents) which specifically requires termination of employees for failures and inadequacies of accident reporting. There is no School Board policy that mandates graduated disciplinary actions in place of mandatory termination under (504.1) (6.B.) (Reporting of Accidents). The AFSCME collective bargaining agreement does not require graduated discipline before dismissal. School Board Policy (505)II utilizes language identical to the termination policy of (504.1) (6.B.). Moreover, the job of school bus driver is one in which driving constitutes an essential part of the job duties, and Policy (505)VI B. provides, in pertinent part: When an employee of the school district is terminated as a driver, the committee shall determine whether driving constitutes an essential part of the employee's job duties. If driving is an essential part of the job duties 'termination as a driver' shall result in termination of the employee's employment with the school district. . . Prior to the 1991-1992 contract period, Respondent had not had an exemplary employment history with the School Board, even though all concerned admitted he was a technically proficient school bus driver. He almost had not been recommended for re-employment for the 1991-1992 school year due to marginal performance. The problems experienced by the administration in connection with Respondent involved a history of actual violations and of numerous unproven complaints against him for unprofessional behavior, violation of smoking, drinking, and dress policies, and a prior minor preventable accident. Respondent had conferenced repeatedly with administrators and had always promised improved behavior and policy compliance. Prior to the date of accident herein, he had cleared up all his prior deficiency points through in-service training, recertification, and riding evaluations by safety officers. However, previously, on March 28, 1991, as a condition of rehiring him on annual contract for the 1991-1992 school year, the School Board had required him to do certain things and had specifically warned him in writing that any further proven policy violations of any type would result in termination. On November 7, 1991, after investigation of the October 21, 1991 incident was completed, Respondent was terminated from his 1991-1992 annual contract. See Finding of Fact 4, supra. Respondent was not offered an annual contract for the 1992-1993 school year.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the School Board of Volusia County enter a Final Order ratifying the termination of Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of December, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 91-8269 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59 (2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF 1-4. Except as unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative, the proposals are covered in the preliminary material of the Recommended Order. 5-7. Accepted, except where unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. 8. Rejected as unnecessary. 9-10. Accepted, except where unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. 11. Substantively accepted but rephrased to more correctly reflect the record and eliminate mere argumentation. 12-14. Accepted, except where unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. Inaccuracies corrected. Accepted, except where unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. Mere argumentation is also rejected. Accepted, except where unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. Substantively accepted but rephrased to more correctly reflect the record and eliminate mere argumentation. Rejected as partially unproven and partially unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. Mere argumentation is also rejected. Accepted, except where unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. Respondent's PFOF Respondent did not submit any PFOF. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah S. Crumbley, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Thomas J. Pilacek, Esquire Maitland Green, Suite 110 601 South Lake Destiny Road Maitland, Florida 32751 Dr Joan Kowal, Superintendent Volusia County School Board P. O. Box 2118 Deland, Florida 32720
The Issue Whether Respondent's employment with petitioner should be terminated pursuant to Section 231.36, Florida Statutes, and School Board Policy No. 2.25, as set forth in Notice of Charges, dated June 12, 1979.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Vernie M. Smith commenced employment with Petitioner School Board of Leon County in 1967 as a secretary and bookkeeper in the Transportation and Maintenance Office. She served in this capacity for a period of approximately eighteen months and then obtained private employment. In 1969 she returned to the Transportation Department as a secretary and has remained there continuously since that time, except for a six-month period in 1973, when she served as a secretary at the Leonard Wesson School, Tallahassee, Florida. Since 1975, Respondent has been employed in the capacity of Routes and Operations Supervisor, which involves supervision and coordination of the activities of school bus operators and scheduling bus routes. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) During the period 1974 until March 1978, Respondent's immediate supervisor was Frank Barber, Director of Transportation. Commencing in 1975, Barber's supervisor was Cecil Hartsfield, Assistant Superintendent of Operations. During the first three years of Barber's tenure, he felt that Respondent did a good job and gave her exceptionally high performance evaluations. She received commendatory letters from school officials, including the Superintendent, concerning her work during this period. However, Barber experienced difficulties with Hartsfield during the school year 1977-78 which he partially attributed to disloyalty on the part of Respondent in providing misinformation concerning him to Hartsfield. No evidence was presented at the hearing to support Barber's perception of Respondent's disloyalty. (Testimony of Barber, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 10, Respondent's Exhibits 4-6) Upon Barber's departure in the spring of 1978, Respondent served as the acting Director of Transportation for about three months. She considered applying for the position on a permanent basis but refrained from doing so after Hartsfield advised her that it was doubtful if the School Board would approve her appointment. The job required a college degree and Respondent had only an eleventh grade education. In June 1978, Conway McGee was hired as Director of Transportation. In August, McGee learned that Respondent did not possess a state chauffeur's license although such a license was a requirement for the incumbent of her position. Respondent had an operator's license, but told McGee that her poor vision in one eye precluded her from obtaining a chauffeur's license. McGee took no action to verify this statement or to otherwise require Respondent to obtain a chauffeur's license. (Testimony of McGee, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) In February 1979, Respondent was obliged to complete a quarterly state report on operations of the county bus system. The preparation of such reports normally required that she work overtime for which she was not paid, but which could be taken as compensatory time during regular work days. During the period, she also was given an assignment by McGee to plan an extra bus route involving a large number of children. Although McGee had authorized compensatory time, if necessary, for such purposes, he later reviewed Respondent's time records and instructed the department bookkeeper to remove credit for eighteen and one-half hours of compensatory time. McGee had not checked Respondent's actual working hours, but was of the opinion that such time was excessive. He did not inform Respondent of his action in this regard and she later discovered it When she checked her leave record. (Testimony of Respondent, McGee, Driggers) Respondent went on vacation in March 1979. While she was absent, a parent called the Transportation Office and stated that she had been attempting to have a school bus stop to pick up her child since the fall of 1978, but that her request had been denied. McGee reviewed the particular route and decided that Respondent should have permitted the bus to pick up the child at an earlier date. He also noted that the routing form did not contain the name of the current driver and should have been updated in this respect. However, the request previously had been denied because there had been no place at the child's home for the bus to turn around and it was within the distance which required a student to walk to the bus stop. (Testimony of McGee, Driggers, Petitioner's Exhibit 7) Respondent's work hours were 6:00 A.M. to 2:30 P.M. On March 26, 1979, Respondent was absent from work due to illness. McGee had previously instructed her that in such instances she was to call Marjorie Conway, a coworker, in order that that employee could take over Respondent's duties at 6:00 A.M. He also had told Respondent that if she could not reach Mrs. Conway, she was to advise him of the situation. On March 26, Respondent was unaware that McGee had moved his residence. She was unable to reach him by telephone, and therefore called Reubin Brooks, the garage supervisor, at 5:00 A.M. and asked him to advise McGee of her absence. Brooks did so. Respondent had not called Mrs. Conway because she felt that there was insufficient time for her to arrive at the office from her home at Wakulla, Florida. On April 9, 1979, McGee placed a written reprimand of Respondent in her personnel file for failing to call him directly on March 26. Respondent believed that the reprimand was unjust and attempted to have it removed from her file by informal requests to school board authorities. These efforts did not succeed and therefore she instituted grievance procedures with the assistance of an attorney. After a hearing before Hartsfield, it was determined by him that the reprimand was appropriate, but that it would be removed from her personnel file in one year. During the same hearing, Respondent protested the disallowance of her compensatory time. Hartsfield reversed McGee and restored credit for the eighteen and one-half hours that McGee had previously disapproved. (Testimony of McGee, Hartsfield, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 4) On March 29, 1979, the assistant principal of Fairview Middle School called Respondent and asked her to see if McGee could attend a meeting that he was going to have on April 3 with some parents who had made a complaint about a bus driver. He planned to ascertain the parents' problem at the meeting before discussing the matter with the particular bus driver. Respondent noted the meeting on McGee's calendar. At the meeting, the parents became upset because the driver was not there, and McGee felt that Respondent should have notified the driver to be present. (Testimony of Carter, Respondent, McGee, Respondent's Exhibit 3) In the fall of 1978, McGee had installed a counter in the department office to restrict access of the bus drivers to the area in which the administrative employees performed their duties. Nevertheless, a coffee pot was located on the administrative side of the counter and the drivers frequently entered the area to obtain coffee if the clerical employees were not present or busy. Several drivers complained that another driver, Helen Smith, frequently was permitted to remain in the administrative area. McGee asked Respondent on several occasions to see that all drivers remained behind the counter. However, Hartsfield had told one of the administrative employees that the drivers could come behind the counter for coffee or to use the bathroom or telephone. (Testimony of McGee, Respondent, Driggers, Conway) On one occasion during the school year, weight restrictions placed on bridges on North Meridian Road required a study as to possible change of bus routes and drivers. McGee discussed the matter with Respondent as to changing the route of a certain driver. She advised him that prior to his tenure, this particular driver had been threatened with a weapon by a parent and that she had therefore taken him off the bus route. McGee agreed not to change the driver, but claimed at the hearing that Respondent had said it would be too much work to make so many changes. Respondent denied making such a statement at the hearing. On another occasion during the school year, Respondent forgot to assign a driver to pick up a group of school children. (Testimony of McGee, Driggers, Respondent) On April 11, 1979, a group of the bus drivers requested a meeting with Hartsfield to hear their complaints. At the meeting, attended also by McGee, the drivers were concerned about statements made by others attributed to McGee to the effect that the drivers would be fired for pulling off a road to stop at a store or for running out of gas on their routes. Although these statements had not been made to anyone by McGee, both he and Hartsfield were of the opinion that the drivers had said that Respondent had quoted McGee in those respects. Actually, however, the statements were made by other personnel of the department and not the Respondent. At the meeting, other complaints were raised against McGee by certain of the drivers concerning their working conditions and his lack of support regarding problems with other school officials. Some of these drivers complained about McGee's unfair censure of them as a result of bus accidents. (Testimony of McGee, Hartsfield, Gunn, Harvey, Harley, Tinnell, Taylor, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 5) At about 5:00 P.M. on April 19, 1979, McGee found that his private automobile which was parked in the department compound would not start. He was due to attend a meeting the next day and asked his garage supervisor, Reubin Brooks, if he would check the car the following day. It had been a long- standing practice for Brooks to assist departmental employees by performing minor repairs to their automobiles in such situations. Brooks always arrived an hour or so early for work and did not take a lunch hour or claim overtime for such period. The next day, Brooks checked the fan belt of McGee's automobile and applied jumper cables and let the motor run about five minutes. Since the compound parking area was being paved, he drove the car to the shop and ordered a new battery which he installed that day. He estimated that the entire work he performed on McGee's car took about ten minutes. Although there were dead-lined buses in his garage on April 20, this was not unusual since buses were dead- lined every day in the department and the time spent on McGee's car had not interfered with his regular work. Respondent observed Brooks working on the vehicle outside her office and thereupon secured an office camera and took photos of the scene through a window. At a subsequent meeting with Hartsfield on May 8 at which Respondent had complained about McGee's "call in" requirements, she showed Hartsfield the photographs and indicated that the car had been worked on during "company time." Hartsfield told McGee about the photographs several days thereafter. Respondent took the photographs on "impulse" because she thought such activity was a problem in the department and because she felt that her job might be in jeopardy at that time. (Testimony of McGee, Brooks, Ferguson, Hartsfield, Respondent, Driggers, Conway, Respondent's Exhibit 7) Respondent's annual performance evaluation for the period ending April 30, 1979, was completed and signed by McGee on May 5, 1979. The evaluation form provided for the entry of ratings in ten different categories as either "subnormal; frequent and repeated errors", "normal; seldom repeats errors", or "exceptionally high; rarely makes errors." Respondent was rated "subnormal" in six of the categories and "normal" in the remaining four categories of quality of work, cooperativeness, personal appearance, and tardiness. The "subnormal" ratings were for quantity of work, work attitude, reliability, health, absence, and general evaluation. As to the reliability category, McGee noted that Respondent had either been off or worked short days on over 57 work days, and as to the health category, he commented that she had lost 17 days due to illness. He also made a general comment that Respondent was capable of doing more and better work and that she was in "somewhat of a rutt [sic]; having worked in this department for many years." Respondent's absences from work during the year were authorized by her supervisor and for legitimate purposes. On May 9, McGee called the Respondent into his office and handed her a copy of the evaluation. After looking at it, Respondent crumpled it up and threw it toward McGee's desk stating "This is what I think of this and you too." She left the office and came back shortly thereafter accompanied by Driggers. At this time, she informed McGee that she thought she had been treated unfairly by him and that the evaluation was inaccurate. McGee then gave her another copy of the evaluation and she left the office. Although Respondent was upset and raised her voice somewhat during the encounters with McGee concerning her evaluation, she did not shout at him. (Testimony of McGee, Respondent, Brooks, Conway, Driggers, Petitioner's Exhibits 3, 6) On May 10, 1979, McGee sent an office memorandum to Respondent stating that she was suspended with pay immediately until a hearing could be held to decide the outcome of his recommendation to the superintendent that her employment be terminated. The memorandum further stated that the incident involving the evaluation form and other reasons which were unspecified in the memorandum were the basis for the recommendation. Thereafter, on June 26, 1979, the Leon County School Board considered charges filed against Respondent by the Superintendent of Schools, suspended Respondent without pay and referred the matter for hearing to this division. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, case pleadings) In July 1978, Respondent had moved from Leon to Gadsden County. Her two children had previously been attending Leon High School in Tallahassee. One was a special education student in the 10th-grade and the other was due to enter his senior year in the fall. In her desire to ensure that the latter child would graduate from Leon High, Respondent listed the address of a friend in Tallahassee as the residence of her children. In October, Respondent made McGee aware of the fact that she had children attending school in Leon County even though she then resided in Gadsden County. However, he took no action in this regard at the time. In May 1979, a school investigation revealed that Respondent's children had not lived at the Tallahassee address during the school year. On May 29, Respondent was informed by the Director of Student Services that her children would not be allowed to attend Leon County Schools for the 1979-80 school year unless it was shown that her primary residence was in Leon County. Thereafter, the senior student graduated from Leon High School and Respondent was granted an exception to school policy to permit the other child to remain in Leon County Schools due to the fact that he was in the exceptional student program. (Testimony of McGee, Respondent, Pla, Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 9, Respondent's Exhibit 2) Respondent's performance of duty in the school system under prior directors of transportation during the years 1966-1974 was exemplary and demonstrated her dependability and competence in the department. Her relationships with principals of Leon County Schools over the years were excellent and she was invariably cooperative and helpful in assisting such officials in solving school transportation problems. (Testimony of Sullivan, Coggins, MacElwee, Carter, Murphy, Montford, Ferrell, and Ingram, Chambers, (Stipulation))
Recommendation 1. That the School Board of Leon County reinstate Respondent Vernie M. Smith to employment within the Leon County School System under the following terms: That such reinstatement shall be without pay during the period of Respondent's prior suspension by the School Board. That Respondent be issued a written reprimand for misconduct in office and gross insubordination as set forth in paragraphs 3c and 4a of the foregoing Conclusions of Law. That Respondent be restored to her former position or transferred within the school system, as deemed appropriate by the Board. DONE and ENTERED this 21 day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles A. Johnson, Esquire 2757 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 S. Gunter Toney, Esquire 200 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. N. E. (Ed) Fenn Superintendent of Leon County Schools 2757 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
