The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Department of Revenue (Respondent or Department), may levy on the Petitioner’s bank account in order to satisfy a tax liability owed to the Respondent. The Respondent asserts the Petitioner, Business Depot-Accounting and Tax Center, Inc. (Petitioner), owes the Department for delinquent sales tax, interest, and penalties.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of collecting sales and use tax owed to the State of Florida. See § 213.05, Fla. Stat. (2006). At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was responsible for collecting and remitting to the Department sales and use tax. The return forms itemizing information for these payments require the taxpayer, Petitioner, to represent gross sales, exempt sales, as well as other data that the Department uses to compute the amount that must be remitted to the state. In this case, after extensive communications with the Petitioner, the Department determined that $10,524.20 was owed for taxes, penalties, and interest. This amount was calculated based on estimates of the delinquency. A Notice of Final Assessment dated August 28, 2006, was issued by the Department to the Petitioner that outlined the amounts claimed to be owed. On or about September 27, 2006, the Petitioner responded to the notice and, under oath, represented that the tax returns were filed. The Department took the Petitioner’s representations into consideration and re-calculated the tax liability owed by the Petitioner. Currently, the Department asserts that the Petitioner’s delinquent amount is $278.46. Accordingly, when that amount remained unpaid, the Department sought a tax warrant, gave notice of its intent to levy on the assets of the Petitioner, and provided notice that it intended to collect monies against the Petitioner’s bank account at Regent Bank. The Department issued a Notice of Freeze to the Regent Bank that instructed it not to transfer, dispose of, or return assets belonging to the Petitioner. The Department also gave notice to the Petitioner of its intent to levy on the bank account with a formal Notice of Intent to Levy. The Petitioner challenged the notice by seeking an administrative hearing. The Petitioner did not appear at the hearing and did not offer any evidence in support of its challenge. The Petitioner’s letter dated September 28, 2006, was not submitted within twenty days of the issuance of the Notice of Final Assessment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order sustaining the Notice of Intent to Levy against the Petitioner’s assets in the amount of $278.46 to satisfy the liability owed by the Petitioner to the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: S. G. Ross Business Depot-Accounting & Tax Center, Inc. 4611 South University Drive, Suite 455 Davie, Florida 33328 John Mika, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street The Carlton Building, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street The Carlton Building, Room 104 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Is the purchase or use of tangible personal property by a contractor who purchases material and supplies for use in performing non-public works contracts taxable under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and Rule 12A-1.051, Florida Administrative Code?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Petitioner is a Florida Corporation having its principal place of business located at 560 Highway 27 North, Sebring, Florida 33820, and is subject to the taxes imposed under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The Department is the agency authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. The Department is authorized to prescribe the records to be kept by all persons subject to taxes under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Such persons have a duty to keep and preserve their records, and the records shall be open to examination by the Department or its authorized agents at all reasonable hours pursuant to Section 212.12(6), Florida Statutes. The Department is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers and to request information to ascertain their tax liability, if any, pursuant to Section 213.34, Florida Statutes. The Department conducted an audit of Petitioner to determine if Petitioner was properly collecting and remitting sales and use tax to the Department. The audit covers the period from November 1, 1992, through October 31, 1997. Petitioner is a retail carpet store, selling carpet and other flooring material, both installed and non-installed, in Sebring, Florida, and the surrounding areas. An invoice is prepared for each sales transaction. Petitioner rents the building in which its business is conducted and where Petitioner’s inventory and supplies are stored. Petitioner pays rent monthly. During the audit period, tax was neither paid nor collected on the rent payments. Petitioner purchases carpet samples from out-of-state vendors for use in its business. During the audit period, sales tax was not paid on all purchases. Petitioner collected tax on the price of the carpet or other flooring materials, as reflected on the invoice, where the customer was a taxpaying entity and collected tax on the total price on the invoice when the invoice specified installation. Petitioner did not collect tax on the price of the carpet or other flooring material, as reflected on the invoice, for tax-exempt entities, whether the invoice reflected the carpet or other flooring material as installed or non-installed. On May 18, 1998, a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes was presented to Petitioner. Additional sales and use tax and infrastructure surtax were determined to be due for the following taxable events: (a) rental expenses; (b) taxable purchases of samples; and, (c) sales to tax-exempt entities where the sale of carpet or other flooring materials included installation to real property. On May 18, 1998, Petitioner paid the additional tax assessed for taxable rental expenses and taxable purchases of samples and has been given credit for such payment. Petitioner protests the tax assessed on the cost price of carpeting used where the customer was a tax-exempt entity and the sales price included installation. On July 16, 1998, the Department sent to Petitioner its Notice of Proposed Assessment showing that Petitioner owed additional sales and use tax and infrastructure surtax in the amount of $13,569.15 and $2,188.01, respectively. Added to the tax owed by Petitioner were penalties in the amount of $6,730.78 and $1,085.02, respectively, and interest through July 16, 1998, in the amount of $4,627.66 and $736.95, respectively. The total assessment was $24,927.59 and $4,009.98, respectively. Credits in the amount of $8,233.87 and $1,372.30 respectively, have been applied against the taxes assessed and reflect the payments made by Petitioner on May 18, 1998. The amount of taxable rental expenses reported on the audit work paper Schedule B010 is consistent with Petitioner’s monthly reports. The amount of taxable sample expenses reported on the audit work paper Schedule B020 is consistent with Petitioner’s monthly reports. 18 The amount of exempt sales reported on the audit work paper Schedule B030 is consistent with Petitioner’s monthly reports. Petitioner timely filed a written protest of the Department’s proposed assessment. On October 25, 1998, the Department issued its Notice of Decision as to the protest of Petitioner. The proposed assessment was sustained by the Department. All invoices in the Department’s Composite Exhibit numbered 2, with the exception of invoices numbered 68, 197, 262, 432, 481, 482, 497, and 498, which are related to transactions that do not involve real property, are records of contracts between Petitioner and the tax-exempt entity to furnish and install wall-to-wall carpet or other flooring materials on real property. There is no retained title provision in any of these contracts. With the exception of invoices numbered 68, 197, 262, 432, 481, 482, 497, and 498, the invoices contained in the Department’s Composite Exhibit numbered 2 reflect an improvement being made to real property. Each of the invoices in the Department’s Composite Exhibit numbered 2 corresponds to a specific entry in Schedule B030 of the audit work papers and which is included under Tab 7a, pages 19 through 32, of the Department’s Composite Exhibit numbered 1. When Petitioner installed, or subcontracted the installation of carpet, the carpet was affixed to the floor by glue, nails, or other means and became the finished floor. Although tack strips, glue, nails, seaming tape, and other items were not listed on the invoice, these items are commonly used in the industry to complete performance of contracts such as those involved in this proceeding. In providing for the installation of carpet or other flooring materials involved in this proceeding, Petitioner engaged subcontractors and paid the subcontractor by the square yard. The square yard price included all materials and labor. With some exceptions, such as metal strips, materials used in the installation of the carpet or other flooring materials were not reflected on the invoices. Since there was no itemization of parts and labor, the invoices contained in the Department’s Composite Exhibit numbered 2, with the exception of invoices numbered 68, 197, 262, 432, 481, 482, 497, and 498, are lump-sum contracts. During his testimony at the hearing, John T. Griffin described Petitioner’s invoices as lump-sum contracts. Petitioner argued that the Department had failed to provide the proper information and training concerning the Department’s position on the imposition of the tax. However, based on the testimony of the Department’s witnesses concerning this matter it appears that sufficient information and sufficient training concerning the Department’s position on the imposition of the tax was readily available to Petitioner or its employees. The noncompliance by Petitioner with the applicable sales and use tax rules was not due to willful negligence, willful neglect, or fraud. It is the recommendation of the Department’s employees that the penalty assessed in this matter be waived. As of January 18, 2000, the total sales and use tax, penalty, and interest was $17,658.80. The local governmental infrastructure total surtax, penalty, and interest was $2,786.58. These totals do not reflect a downward adjustment for the taxes, penalty, and interest assessed against invoices numbered 68, 197, 262, 432, 481, 482, 497, and 498. For these invoices, the adjustment for taxes assessed, penalty, and interest shall be calculated from the date of each specific invoice and Petitioner given credit for any taxes, penalty, or interest charged against it for invoices numbered 68, 197, 262, 432, 481, 482, 497, and 498. The interest that has been assessed for the taxes that were not paid on the rent of the building or the carpet samples is appropriate. Petitioner does not disagree with this interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order upholding its assessments dated October 25, 1998, of sales and use tax, the local infrastructure surtax, plus applicable interest against Griffin Carpet Mart, Inc., with credit being provided for any payments made and for the assessments related to invoices numbered 68, 197, 262, 432, 481, 482, 497, and 498. It is further recommended after considering all the circumstances surrounding this case, that all penalties be waived. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James F. McCollum, Esquire Law Offices of James F. McCollum, P.A. 129 South Commerce Avenue Sebring, Florida 33870-3698 John Mika, Esquire Nicholas Bykosky, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Callagy Tires, Inc. (Petitioner), collected and remitted the correct amount of sales and use tax on its operations for the audit period.
Findings Of Fact DOR is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the tax laws of the state of Florida. In conjunction with that duty, DOR performs audits of business entities conducting sales and use transactions. At all times material to the issues of this case, Petitioner conducted business in Palm Bay, Florida, and was obligated to collect and remit sales and use tax in connection with the activities of its business enterprise. Petitioner’s Federal Identification Number is 59-2221722. Petitioner sells tires (wholesale and retail), provides tire services such as installation, and performs other repair and towing services subject to sales or use taxes. In order to properly perform its audit responsibilities, DOR requires that businesses maintain and present business records to support the collection of sales and use taxes. In this case, DOR notified Petitioner that it intended to audit the business operations for the audit period, June 1, 2004, through May 31, 2007. After the appropriate notice to Petitioner, the audit was initiated on or about July 18, 2007. Employees of DOR went to Petitioner’s place of business, requested business records, and attempted to audit and reconcile Petitioner’s reported tax payments with the amounts and types of taxes that should have been remitted, based upon the records kept by Petitioner. Theoretically, the sums remitted to the Department should match the records of the business entity. In this case, the amount remitted by Petitioner could not be reconciled with the business records maintained by the business entity. As a result of the audit, DOR sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes that claimed Callagy Tires, Inc., owed sales and use tax in the amount of $121,707.41. By letter dated August 13, 2009, Petitioner filed a protest of the audit findings. Thereafter, the parties exchanged information that Petitioner claimed should require reconsideration of the audit results. Nevertheless, the Department could not reconcile the bank and audit information based upon the documentation submitted by Petitioner. The amounts of the Notice of Reconsideration remain at issue. As of the time of the hearing in this cause, Petitioner had not provided documentation to refute the findings of the Department’s audit. At hearing, DOR maintained that Petitioner owes $173,718.66, together with accruing interest. Specifically, the audit found that there was a difference between the gross sales reported by Petitioner on its federal return and the amounts reported on its state forms. The difference between the two returns constituted unreported sales for state tax purposes. Secondly, the Department determined that certain sales were not “exempt” as maintained by Petitioner. Based upon a sample of invoices provided by Petitioner, DOR found that Petitioner did not remit the full sales tax due on certain types of services. For example, the correct sales tax was not remitted on machining brake rotors, truing brake rotors, or making repairs that included the use of tangible personal property. The taxable event required a calculation of sales tax on the entire amount, not a percentage of the cost. The third area of discrepancy identified by the audit, related to unpaid sales tax on machinery, equipment, supplies, and services purchased by Petitioner for use in the operation of its business. Throughout the audit process, and, subsequently, Petitioner never presented documentation to dispute the Department’s audit findings. DOR gave Petitioner every opportunity to present records that would establish that the correct amounts of sale and use taxes were collected and remitted. Petitioner timely challenged the audit findings, but, has not, through its principal owner or its agents, provided documentation that show the taxes were appropriately calculated and paid. Petitioner maintains that an amended federal tax return verifies the state return previously filed is accurate. Notwithstanding that assertion, Petitioner has not presented the underlying documentation to support the state or federal return. Further, Petitioner refused to allow DOR to review all of its electronically stored records, and did not make the records available to DOR.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the audit findings, and require the Petitioner to remit the unpaid sales and use taxes in the amount of $173,718.66, together with accrued interest, as provided by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Eugene M. Callagy, Jr. Callagy Tires, Inc. 6625 Babcock Street, Southeast Malabar, Florida 32950 Patrick Hanley, Esquire 185 Forest Road Troy, Montana 59935-9572 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Lisa Vickers, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined. Background Petitioner, Gator Coin Machine Company, Inc. (petitioner or Gator), is a Florida corporation engaged in the vending machine business throughout the northern part of the State extending from Leon County eastward to Duval County. Gator places coin-operated cigarette vending machines in various business locations, such as lounges, package stores, motels and restaurants. In return for allowing the machines to be placed on the premises, the location owner receives a fee for each pack of cigarettes sold from the machine. This fee is paid to the location owner and is considered a commission or rent for allowing Gator to "lease" the real property on which the machines are placed. All such commissions are subject to the sales tax, which rate may vary depending on the sales tax rate in a particular county. The sales tax is included with the commission (rent) paid to the location owner, and the location owner then has the obligation of remitting the tax to the state. However, the burden of showing that the tax has been paid to the location owner rests upon the vending machine owner. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. Among other things, DOR performs audits on taxpayers to insure that all taxes due have been correctly paid. To this end, in 1990 a routine audit was performed on Gator covering the audit period from June 1, 1985, through April 30, 1989. After the results of the audit were obtained and an initial assessment made, on January 22, 1991, DOR issued a revised notice of intent to make sales and use tax audit changes wherein it proposed to assess Gator $35,561.67 in unpaid sales taxes, $8,887.82 in delinquent penalties, and $12,934.34 in accrued interest on the unpaid taxes through the date of the revised notice, or a total of $57,383.83. The unpaid taxes related to taxes allegedly due on commissions paid to location owners during the audit period and were assessed against Gator on the grounds the taxpayer had not separately stated the tax on its evidence of sale and failed to provide internal documentation to verify that the taxes had actually been paid. On April 19, 1991, a third revision of the proposed assessment was issued which decreased slightly the unpaid taxes and corresponding penalties but increased the size of the assessment to $57,945.10 due to the continuing accrual of interest. On July 1, 1991, Gator was offered the opportunity to informally contest the assessment. A letter of protest was filed on July 29, 1991, wherein Gator generally contended that (a) its records conformed with the industry practice and that an adequate audit trail existed to substantiate the payment of taxes, and (b) the responsibility for payment of the taxes ultimately rested with the location owner rather than Gator. On February 10, 1992, DOR issued its notice of decision rejecting Gator's position but offering to reduce the penalty on the unpaid sales taxes to 5%. At the same time, and although Gator had not challenged the auditor's method of computing the amount of sales tax, DOR upheld the auditor's determination on that point. After a petition for reconsideration was filed by Gator on March 10, 1992, in which Gator raised for the first time a claim that it was due a refund of $11,015 for overpayment of taxes on cigarette sales during the audit period, DOR issued its notice of reconsideration on June 12, 1992, denying the petition and offering Gator a point of entry on these issues. Such a request was timely filed and this proceeding ensued. The Tax The tax for which petitioner has been assessed became effective on July 1, 1986, and is found in Section 212.031, Florida Statutes. On an undisclosed date, DOR mailed each vending machine company in the state a flier which summarized the new changes in the tax law. The flier noted that the sales tax would be levied on each "license to use or occupy property" and specifically included "an agreement by the owner of real property granting one permission to install and maintain full-service coin-operated vending machines on the premises." Because the vending machine owner is considered to have been granted a license to use the real property of the location owner, the fee (rent) paid by the vending machine owner to the location owner was thus subject to the new sales tax. The notice further provided that the tax "must be collected by the person granting the privilege to use or occupy any real property from the person paying the license fee and is due and payable at the time of receipt." This flier constituted the only notice by DOR concerning the imposition of the new tax. There was no notice to the vending machine owners that they must separately state the sales tax from the commission when paying the commission to the location owner. This was because the flier's main purpose was to put the taxpayers on notice that they were subject to the new tax. Sometime after the tax became effective, DOR developed a rule to implement the new law. Specifically, it amended Rule 12A-1.044, Florida Adminstrative Code, to provide guidance to taxpayers in the coin-operated industry as to who had the taxpaying and collecting responsibility. However, the rule simply stated that the owner of the vending machine was responsible for paying the tax on the rental fee paid to the location owner and did not state how this payment was to be documented or recorded by the lessee. In the absence of any guidance from DOR, the Florida Amusement Association, of which Gator is a member, held meetings around the state to inform the members of their responsibilities under the new law. One method thought to be acceptable to establish payment of the sales tax was to keep internal documentation as to commission rate and tax paid to the various locations. As will be discussed hereinafter, Gator and other vending machine owners began following this practice. On May 11, 1992, or three years after the audit period had ended, and almost six years after the imposition of the tax, DOR adopted an amendment to rule 12A-1.044(10) to provide that "the tax must be separately stated from the amount of the lease or license payment." This constituted the first notice to vending machine owners that they were required to state separately on the check remitted to their locations each month the commission plus tax. It should also be noted that DOR has never specified the exact type of documentation required by this rule or the format in which the information should be submitted. The Industry Practice Petitioner is one of many coin-operated vending machine companies doing business in the state of Florida. The evidence shows that of some twenty representative companies doing business in the state, including Gator, all operate in the same manner. Generally, the vending machine owner has a low investment in equipment which is easily relocated from one place of business to another. Because it is not unusual for the businesses in which equipment is placed to frequently change ownership, and often times the location owner can shop around and obtain a better commission from another vending machine company, it is fairly common to have machines placed in a location for as few as six or seven months. Therefore, it is a common practice in the industry to do business on a handshake and without a formal written agreement. In other words, the agreement to allow the machines to be placed on the premises and the amount of commission (rent) to be paid for leasing that space is based largely on a handshake between the two owners. This accounts in part for the lack of documentation such as a charge ticket, sales slip or invoice between the two owners concerning the amount of sales tax associated with the rent since such documents or evidence of sale are not practicable. The lack of documentation is also attributable to the fact that until May 1992 DOR never advised the vending machine companies that some type of "evidence of sale" was needed. In determining the commission rate to be paid to the various locations, the vending machine owner must first ascertain what the market will bear in terms of selling a pack of cigarettes in the machine. After calculating his overhead, the vending machine owner then bargains with the location owner as to how much of the remaining difference between the cost of cigarettes and overhead and the selling price should be paid to the location owner. This amount of money agreed upon by the vending machine and location owners, and expressed in a per pack rate, is commonly known as the commission expense and includes the total sum of rent plus sales tax. For example, if the total commission is twenty cents per pack of cigarettes sold from each machine, the rent would be approximately 18.2 cents while the sales tax would make up the remainder of that amount. All vending machine owners, including Gator, made it explicitly clear to the location owner that the commission check was tax inclusive. During the audit period, it was standard industry practice for the vending machine owner to write a tax inclusive check to the location owner each month. In other words, a check for the amount due the location owner, including rent and tax, is paid to the location owner each month without any notation on the check as to what portion represents the rent and what portion represents the tax. In the case of Gator, its checks carried only the stamped notation "CIG- COM", which represented the words "cigarette commissions." The record shows that except for one small company with relatively few clients, all representative vending machine companies operated in this manner. Gator's Recordkeeping Like other vending machine companies, Gator's records consisted only of hand-written records on index cards. Indeed, Gator kept no computerized records at the time of the audit. More specifically, all calcuations as to taxes owed, the price of cigarettes, tax calculated on cigarettes vended through any given machine, and any additional information pertaining to the individual machines were kept on 8 x 10 white and pink index cards. These cards were commonly referred to as location cards and were updated each time the machine was moved from one location to another and when the price of cigarettes was changed. At the time of the audit, more than 99% of the original white and pink cards from the sample time period requested by the auditor were available for her inspection. The only documentation existing between the location and vending machine owners was the machine or route ticket, which is no different than merchandising tickets showing the number of units sold. This document reflected the amount of packs sold and the amount of money received from each machine but did not contain a separation of commission plus tax. This information was used by Gator to determine the number of packs sold from each machine during the month. The number of packs was then multiplied by the "rate" for that machine to ascertain the commission due the location owner. Although route tickets were contemporaneously prepared by a route (service) man, they were discarded before the audit began. This is probably because in a prior audit conducted in 1983 or 1984 DOR auditors expressed no interest in reviewing the route tickets. In any event, the route tickets are not essential to a resolution of the issues. A pink card was generated by Gator for each machine placed in a lessor's place of business. The card contained information, all written in pencil and amended as necessary, regarding inventory, location of machine, selling price of cigarettes, the negotiated commission rate to be paid to the location owner, and the tax computed on the license fee. The latter item was recorded in the top right hand side of the index card and, when coupled with the independent accounting firm's representation as to the integrity of the accounting system, provides reliable evidence that the commission paid to the location owner was tax inclusive. For example, petitioner's exhibit 2 received in evidence, which contains representative pink cards, reveals that on November 7, 1986, machine number 175 was installed at "River Walk Cruises #1" in Jacksonville and the location owner was thereafter paid a per pack commission of fourteen cents, of which 13.15 cents represented the rent while the remainder represented the sales tax. It is noted again that more than 99% of these cards from the sample period audited were available for inspection. A white card was also prepared for each machine and listed the number of packs sold, the per pack rate, and the amount paid to the location owner. However, it did not contain a breakdown between commission expense and the related tax. In addition, Gator maintained what was known as a monthly report, which was a summation and accumulation of sales information derived from the white cards. The report listed the rate and number of packs sold for each machine. Like the white card, the monthly report did not contain a breakdown between the rent and sales tax. Finally, journals and ledgers were prepared containing summaries of information taken from the machine cards. Expert testimony by two certified public accountants (CPAs) and a longtime industry representative established that petitioner's records (general accounting records, route tickets, location cards and ledgers) were in conformity with good accounting practice and the industry norm. If anything, Gator's records were more comprehensive than most other vending machine companies and satisfied the requirements of applicable rules and statutes. More specifically, by maintaining location cards which show the sales price per pack of cigarettes with a breakdown between the tax and rent, Gator's records were consistent with good accounting practices and the type of recordkeeping maintained by the industry. It was further established that the industry practice is to conduct business on a "tax inclusive" basis, that is, to issue checks without separately stating what portion of the amount is taxes. In addition, cancelled checks, bank statements, journals and ledgers were available to verify commissions paid to various locations. DOR did not challenge the accuracy of this supporting documentation and agreed, for example, that the month-end commission summaries tied into petitioner's journals and checks. Both financial experts concluded, and the undersigned so finds, that the records establish that the taxes were paid. During final hearing, and for the first time during the administrative hearing process, DOR challenged both the testimony of the experts and the reliability of petitioner's records on the ground the CPAs who testified were not present when the checks were written and thus had no personal knowledge that the checks were tax inclusive. However, the CPAs established the integrity of petitioner's recordkeeping and accounting system and the fact that the system used by Gator produces accurate information that can be relied upon by third party users. This was not credibly contradicted. It can be reasonably inferred from these facts that the hand-written notations on the pink cards concerning the sales tax computed on the license fee were accurate and that the corresponding checks paid to the location owners were tax inclusive. DOR also suggested that the penciled entries on the pink cards pertaining to the tax may have been prepared solely for purposes of this litigation and were not contemporaneous. For the reason stated above, this assertion is also rejected. It should be noted further that except for the allegations themselves, DOR did not challenge the authenticity of the records nor produce any evidence of circumstances that would show the records lacked trustworthiness. DOR further contended that because there was no written contract or other tangible evidence of sale between the two owners where the tax was separately stated, there was insufficient evidence to support petitioner's claim that the taxes were paid. Put another way, DOR contended that Gator needed not only internal documents (such as location cards) to verify the payment of taxes, it also needed documents submitted to the location owner reflecting the separation of tax and commission. However, prior to the 1992 amendment to rule 12A-1.044(10), there was no formal or informal requirement to do so nor had DOR given notice of such a need, and since the internal documentation confirms the payment of the taxes, no other evidence is required. Finally, the evidence shows that a vending machine company has never been considered a "dealer" within the meaning of Subsection 212.07(2), Florida Statutes, as asserted by DOR, and thus the requirement in that subsection that a dealer separately state the amount of tax on the evidence of sale is not applicable. Indeed, this interpretation of the statute is consistent with the language in Rule 12A-1.086, Florida Administrative Code, which characterizes the lessor (location owner) rather than the lessee as the dealer. Refund Issue Gator contends that using an error rate of two or three percent, a recomputation of its taxes paid during the audit period reveals that it is owed a refund of $11,015 occasioned by its bookkeeper incorrectly computing the tax due on the gross sales price of cigarettes rather than on the net price. Since the alleged overpayment of taxes occurred during the period from June 1, 1985, through April 30, 1989, the last alleged overpayment of taxes would have occurred shortly after April 30, 1989. Prior to March 10, 1992, when Gator filed its petition for reconsideration with DOR, Gator had not filed a request for a refund on DOR Form 26 (DR-26), which is the form on which refunds must be requested. In its petition for reconsideration, Gator noted that "a Petition for Refund will be filed in the immediate future if this has not previously been accomplished." As of the date of hearing, which was more than three years after the last alleged overpayment of taxes was made, no DR-26 had been filed. Therefore, the request for refund is deemed to be untimely.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order granting the petition of Gator Coin Machine Company, Inc. and rescinding (withdrawing) the assessment set forth in the notice of reconsideration dated June 12, 1992, but denying petitioner's request for a refund of $11,015 for sales taxes allegedly overpaid during the audit period. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4806 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 8-9. Rejected as being unnecessary. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 12-14. Rejected to the extent they are inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. 15-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 18-20. Rejected as being irrelevant. 21-22. Rejected as being unnecessary. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 25. Rejected as being unnecessary. 26. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13 and 14. 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 28-29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 30-33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 34-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 36. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 37. Rejected as being unnecessary. 38-39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 40-41. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 42. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 15. 43-45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 46-49. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 50-51. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 52. Rejected as being unnecessary. 53-54. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 55-56. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Rejected as being a conclusion of law. Rejected as being a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 61-63. Rejected to the extent they are inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. 64-65. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 66-68. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 69. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 70-75. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected to the extent it is inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 79-81. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 82. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13 and 14. 83-84. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected to the extent it is inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 87-88. Rejected to the extent they are inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Rejected as being irrelevant since the collection of taxes from Jax Liquors occurred after the audit period. 93-95. Rejected as being unnecessary. Respondent: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 3-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 6-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 10. Rejected as being unnecessary. 11a. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 11b. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10, 13 and 15. 11c. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 11d. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 12-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, subordinate, irrelevant, not supported by the more credible and persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Mr. Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 William A. Friedlander, Esquire Marie A. Mattox, Esquire 3045 Tower Court Tallahassee, FL 32303 Eric J. Taylor, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to certain facts, legal issues, and their respective contentions, as follow: "1. At all times pertinent to this action, Petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc., was a Florida Corporation licensed and doing business in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this action, Respondent Department of Revenue, State of Florida, was an agency of the State of Florida exercising duties relating to the assessment and collection of sales and use taxes pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Respondent conducted an audit of tran- sactions involving Petitioner for the period November 1, 1972, through October 31, 1975. As a result of that audit, Respondent claims that as of September 17, 1976, the Petitioner had a balance due to the Depart- ment of Revenue of $17,383.58 in taxes, interest and penalties. The assessment indicating the above amount is attached as Exhibit A. Petitioner is in agreement that if the assessment is upheld, Petitioner owes to the Respondent the amount of $17,383.58 plus interest calculated to date of payment to Respondent. The tax assessment in this case is based upon two factual situations: Petitioner, manufactured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities consisting of cities, towns, municipalities, counties, school boards, junior colleges and others. Petitioner also hauled the asphalt to the job cite (sic) at a fixed ton/mile rate determined by bid. Petitioner, as a subcontractor, manu- factured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities above described. The general contractor contracted with the political entities in various fashions but the Petitioner's duties were always the same and included manufacture, installation and hauling of asphaltic concrete based on a rate certain per ton and per ton mile. The issue in this case is whether the Respondent is correct in contending that the Petitioner must pay a sales and use tax on the produced asphalt which it uses in the performance of the construction contract jobs described in paragraph 6. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was remitted, by the Petitioner on the produced asphalt. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was paid by the instant customers to the Petitioner. It is Respondent's contention that, pursuant to the above-cited rules, the Peti- tioner is required to pay sales or use tax on the produced asphalt which is used to construct real property pursuant to a con- tract described in Rule 12A-1.51(2)(a), F.A.C. It is Petitioner's contention that the above-cited rules do not apply in the instant case since the customers involved in the instant fact situations are political subdivision or because the transaction was of the type described by Rule 12A-1.51(2)(d), F.A.C. Petitioner is entitled to rely on the earlier 1967 audit by Respondent because neither Petitioner's method of doing business, nor the law, has changed materially since 1967. Respondent agrees that this is an issue but fails to agree that Petitioner is so entitled to rely." All purchase orders or invitations for bid received by petitioner from political subdivisions stated that the entity was exempt from federal and state sales taxes and that such taxes should not be included in the bid. Typical bid forms entitled "Specifications for Asphaltic Concrete" called for a lump-sum price per ton for delivery and placement of the material by the vendor plus a sum per ton per mile for transportation costs. No breakdown of amounts for the cost of materials and cost of installation is reflected in the bid documents. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook, Exhibits 3, 7 (late filed)) Respondent audited petitioner's operations in 1967 and, although it had had previous transactions with governmental entities prior to that date, no assessment for back taxes was issued for failure to pay sales tax on such transactions nor was petitioner advised to do so in the future by state officials. After 1967, petitioner did not seek information from respondent concerning the subject of sales tax. As a consequence of the 1967 audit, petitioner believed that it was unnecessary to charge or pay sales tax on such transactions with political subdivisions. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook) As of April 1, 1977, Brevard County had a population of over 250,000. Although it is a large county in terms of size, respondent has only two auditors in the sales tax division to cover the entire county. (Testimony of Alberto, Cowan, Exhibit 4)
Recommendation That the petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc. be held liable for sales tax, penalty, and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as set forth in respondent's proposed assessment. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Brown, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Andrew A. Graham, Esquire Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922
Findings Of Fact Petitioner purchased a used car in Florida in May of 1983 and paid 5 percent sales tax. Petitioner did not title said car in the State of Florida. When Petitioner returned to Maryland, his state of residence, Maryland imposed a 5 percent tax on said car when Petitioner titled said car. Petitioner applied for a sales tax refund to the Department of Revenue in the amount of $225.00. Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to deny said refund application on December 1, 1983. From the exhibits to which the parties stipulated, additional facts are found by the Hearing Officer. A bill of sale indicates that Petitioner purchased a 1979 Buick Regal from Eddy Auto Sales on May 14, 1983. A temporary registration and receipt issued by the State of Maryland on June 17, 1983, shows that Petitioner paid a "title tax" of $222.50 to the State of Maryland. By letter dated January 27, 1984, Agnes Stoicos of the Maryland Department of Transportation indicates that the Maryland tax is a 5 percent excise tax upon the issuance of all original and subsequent certificates of title, and the tax is used primarily for the construction and the maintenance of the Maryland highway system.
The Issue The parties stipulated that the following legal issues were presented on the facts: When the taxpayer fails to claim the tax credit for sales tax on bad debts charged off during the month for which the return is filed as permitted by Section 212.17(8) Florida Statutes, may the taxpayer claim a refund of the overpayment pursuant to Section 215.26, Florida Statutes? Does claiming a bad debt credit on a return for a month later than the month in which the charge-offs were made constitute an "application for refund" within the meaning of Section 215.26(2), Florida Statutes? STIPULATIONS The parties entered into a written stipulation of the issues, of the facts, and stipulated to the introduction into evidence of the attachments to the written stipulation of facts and the Exhibits 1 through 6. The following are the pertinent findings of fact in this case.
Findings Of Fact Causeway Lumber Company, Inc., (Causeway) is a Florida corporation engaged in the sale of lumber and building materials. During the years 1973- 1977 it operated two yards; one at 2701 South Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, and one and 400 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Boca Raton, Palm Beach County. Because it operated in two counties, separate tax returns were filed for the Fort Lauderdale yard and the Boca Raton yard. Causeway uses the accrual method of accounting, the specific charge-off method of writing off bad debts, and its fiscal year ends March 31. Causeway did not collect the sales tax on credit sales at the time such sales were made, but billed sales tax to its customers as part of the credit sales. Although the sales taxes were not received by Causeway at the time the credit sales were made, Causeway reported and paid the sales tax on credit sales on the return for the month in which the sale was made as required in Section 212.06, Florida Statutes. In March of 1974, 1975, and 1976 the accounts receivable were reviewed and the account deemed worthless were written off as uncollectable and so reported on the corporation's income tax returns for those years. Causeway attempted to take as a credit in September of 1976 all of the bad debts written off in March of 1974, 1975 and 1976. The taking of this credit was questioned by the Comptroller, and Causeway paid the taxes due on the September 1976 sales tax remittance and then filed an application for refund on January 20, 1978, pursuant to provisions of Section 215.26, Florida Statutes. The Comptroller denied the application for refund stating as the grounds that there was no authority in Section 212.17, Florida Statutes, for a refund. Causeway's two outlets overpaid sales taxes in the following amounts in the years indicated: 1974 1975 1976 Boca Raton $ 1,072.51 $ 9,208.17 $ 30,477.11 Ft. Lauderdale 3,323.15 10,237.33 10,004.22 $ 4,395.66 $ 19,445.50 $ 40,481.33
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends to the Comptroller that the taxpayer be refunded the taxes overpaid in 1975, and 1976, in the total amount of $59,926.83. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of October, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard W. Roe 2900 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Harold F. X. Purnell Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Eugene J. Cella General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 =================================================================
The Issue As to DOAH Case No. 18-4475RX, whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.044(5)(a) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.1/ As to DOAH Case No. 18-4992RU, whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") Standard Audit Plan, Vending and Amusement Machines--Industry Specific, section 1.1.3.3 ("SAP") is an unadopted rule in violation of sections 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Audit Period GBR is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Miami, Florida. Gilda Rosenberg is the owner of GBR and a related entity, Gilly Vending, Inc. ("Gilly"). GBR and Gilly are in the vending machine business. At all times material hereto, Amit Biegun served as the chief financial officer of the two entities. The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida's sales tax laws pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes. This case concerns the audit period of January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2014. GBR's Provision of Vending Machine Services Prior to the audit period, the school boards of Broward and Palm Beach County issued written solicitations through invitations to bid ("ITB"), seeking vendors to furnish, install, stock, and maintain vending machines on school property. The bids required a "full turn-key operation." The stated objectives were to obtain the best vending service and percentage commission rates that will be most advantageous to the school boards, and to provide a contract that will be most profitable to the awarded vendor. The stated goal was that student choices from beverage and snack vending machines closely align with federal dietary guidelines. GBR operates approximately 700 snack and beverage vending machines situated at 65 schools in Broward, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade Counties. Of these 65 schools, 43 are in Broward County, 21 are in Palm Beach County, and one is in Miami-Dade County. The snack vending machines are all owned by GBR. Beverage vending machines are owned by bottling companies, such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Of the 700 vending machines, approximately 60 percent of the machines are for beverages and the remaining 40 percent are for snacks. GBR has written vending agreements with some schools. In these agreements, GBR is designated as a licensee, the school is designated as the licensor, and GBR is granted a license to install vending machines on school property in exchange for a commission. Furthermore, GBR is solely responsible to pay all federal, state, and local taxes in connection with the operation of the vending machines. Ownership of the vending machines does not transfer to the schools. However, in some cases the schools have keys to the machines. In addition, designated school board employees have access to the inside of the machines in order to review the meter, monitor all transactions, and reconcile the revenue from the machines. GBR places the vending machines on school property. However, the schools control the locations of the vending machines. The schools also require timers on the machines so that the schools can control the times during the day when the machines are operational and accessible to students. The schools also control the types of products to be placed in the machines to ensure that the products closely align with the federal dietary guidelines. The schools also control pricing strategies. GBR stocks, maintains, and services the vending machines. However, Coca-Cola and Pepsi may repair the beverage machines they own. GBR is solely responsible for repairing the machines it owns. The schools require that any vendor service workers seeking access to the vending machines during school hours pass background checks. GBR route drivers collect the revenue from all of the vending machines and the revenues are deposited into GBR's bank accounts. In exchange for GBR's services, the schools receive from GBR, as a commission, a percentage of the gross receipts. However, neither GBR nor the schools are guaranteed any revenue unless sales occur from the machines. On its federal income tax returns, GBR reports all sales revenue from the vending machines. For the tax year 2012, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $5,952,270. Of this amount, GBR paid the schools $1,363,207, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. For the tax year 2013, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $6,535,362. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $1,122,211, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. For the tax year 2014, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $6,076,255. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $1,279,682, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. Thus, for the audit period, and according to the federal tax returns and general ledgers, GBR's gross receipts or sales were $18,563,887. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $3,765,100, as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. The Department's Audit and Assessment On January 27, 2015, the Department, through its tax auditor, Mary Gray, sent written notice to GBR of its intent to conduct the audit. This was Ms. Gray's first audit involving vending machines at schools. Thereafter, GBR provided Ms. Gray with its general ledger, federal returns, and bid documents. On October 28, 2015, Ms. Gray issued a draft assessment to GBR. The email transmittal by Ms. Gray to GBR's representative states that "[t]he case is being forwarded for supervisory review." In the draft, Ms. Gray determined that GBR owed additional tax in the amount of $28,589.65, but there was no mention of any purported tax on the monies paid by GBR to the schools as a license fee to use real property. However, very close to the end of the audit, within one week after issuing the draft, and after Ms. Gray did further research and conferred with her supervisor, Ms. Gray's supervisor advised her to issue the B03 assessment pursuant to section 212.031 and rule 12A-1.044, and tax the monies paid by GBR to the schools as a license fee to use real property. Thus, according to the Department, GBR was now responsible for tax in the amount of $246,230.93, plus applicable interest. Of this alleged amount, $1,218.48 was for additional sales tax (A01); $4,181.41 was for purchase expenses (B02); $13,790 was for untaxed rent (B02); and $227.041.04 was for the purported license to use real property (B03). Ms. Gray then prepared a Standard Audit Report detailing her position of the audit and forwarded the report to the Department's dispute resolution division. On January 19, 2016, the Department issued the Notice of Proposed Assessment ("NOPA") against GBR for additional tax and interest due of $288,993.31. The Department does not seek a penalty against GBR. At hearing, Ms. Gray testified that the Department's SAP is an audit planning tool or checklist which she used in conducting GBR's audit. Employees of the Department are not bound to follow the SAP, and the SAP can be modified by the auditors on a word document. The SAP was utilized by Ms. Gray during the audit, but it was not relied on in the NOD.4/
The Issue The issues in this bid protest are, first, whether, as Petitioner alleges, Intervenor's failure to attach copies of "occupational licenses" to its proposal was a deviation from the requirements of the Request for Proposal; second, whether any such deviation was material; and third, whether Respondent's preliminary decision to award Intervenor the contract at issue was clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact On September 18, 2009, Respondent Department of Transportation ("Department") issued Request for Proposal No. RFP-DOT-09/10-4007FS (the "RFP"). Through the RFP, which is entitled, "Treasure Coast Road Ranger Service Patrol," the Department solicited written proposals from qualified providers who would be willing and able to perform towing and emergency roadside services on Interstate 95 in Martin County, St. Lucie County, and Indian River County. The Department intended to award a three-year contract to the "responsive and responsible Proposer whose proposal is determined to be the most advantageous to the Department." The Department anticipated that the contract would have a term beginning on December 1, 2009, and ending on November 31, 2012. The annual contract price was not to exceed $1.59 million. Proposals were due on October 13, 2009. Four firms timely submitted proposals in response to the RFP, including Petitioner Sunshine Towing @ Broward, Inc. ("Sunshine") and Intervenor Anchor Towing and Marine of Broward, Inc. ("Anchor"). An evaluation ensued, pursuant to a process described in the RFP, during which the Department rejected two of the four proposals for failing to meet minimum requirements relating to technical aspects of the project. As a result, Sunshine and Anchor emerged as the only competitors eligible for the award. Sunshine offered to perform the contractual services for an annual price of $1,531,548. This sum was less than the price that Anchor proposed by $46,980 per year. Despite Sunshine's lower cost, Anchor nevertheless edged Sunshine in the final score, receiving 92.86 points (out of 100) from the Department's evaluators, to Sunshine's 87.75. On November 30, 2009, the Department duly notified the public of its intent to award the contract to Anchor. Sunshine promptly initiated the instant protest, whereby Sunshine seeks to have Anchor's proposal disqualified as nonresponsive, in hopes that the Department will then award the contract to Sunshine as the highest-ranked (indeed the sole) responsive proposer. Sunshine alleges that Anchor's proposal failed to conform strictly to the specifications of the RFP, principally because Anchor did not attach copies of its "occupational licenses" to the proposal. Anchor insists that its proposal was responsive but argues, alternatively, that if its proposal deviated from the specifications, the deviation was merely a minor irregularity which the Department could waive. Anchor further contends that Sunshine's proposal contains material deviations for which it should be deemed nonresponsive. The Department takes the position that Anchor's failure to attach "occupational licenses" was a minor irregularity that could be (and was) waived.1 The RFP includes a "Special Conditions" section wherein the specifications at the heart of this dispute are located. Of particular interest is Special Condition No. 8, which specifies the qualifications a provider must have to be considered qualified to perform the services called for under the contract to be awarded. Special Condition No. 8 provides as follows: QUALIFICATIONS General The Department will determine whether the Proposer is qualified to perform the services being contracted based upon their proposal demonstrating satisfactory experience and capability in the work area. The Proposer shall identify necessary experienced personnel and facilities to support the activities associated with this proposal. Qualifications of Key Personnel Those individuals who will be directly involved in the project should have demonstrated experience in the areas delineated in the scope of work. Individuals whose qualifications are presented will be committed to the project for its duration unless otherwise excepted by the Department's Project Manager. Where State of Florida registration or certification is deemed appropriate, a copy of the registration or certificate should be included in the proposal package. Authorized To Do Business in the State of Florida In accordance with sections 607.1501, 608.501, and 620.169, Florida Statutes, foreign corporations, foreign limited liability companies, and foreign limited partnerships must be authorized to do business in the State of Florida. Such authorization should be obtained by the proposal due date and time, but in any case, must be obtained prior to the posting of the intended award of the contact. For authorization, [contact the Florida Department of State].[2] Licensed to Conduct Business in the State of Florida If the business being provided requires that individuals be licensed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, such licenses should be obtained by the proposal due date and time, but in any case, must be obtained prior to the posting of the intended award of the contract. For licensing, [contact the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation]. References and experience must entail a minimum of three (3) years of experience in the towing industry in Florida. NOTE: Copies of occupational licenses must also be attached to the back of Form 'F'. (Boldface in original.) Special Condition No. 19, which defines the term "responsive proposal," provides as follows: RESPONSIVENESS OF PROPOSALS Responsiveness of Proposals Proposals will not be considered if not received by the Department on or before the date and time specified as the due date for submission. All proposals must be typed or printed in ink. A responsive proposal is an offer to perform the scope of services called for in this Request for Proposal in accordance with all the requirements of this Request for Proposal and receiving fifty (50) points or more on the Technical Proposal.[3] Proposals found to be non-responsive shall not be considered. Proposals may be rejected if found to be irregular or not in conformance with the requirements and instructions herein contained. A proposal may be found to be irregular or non-responsive by reasons that include, but are not limited to, failure to utilize or complete prescribed forms, conditional proposals, incomplete proposals, indefinite or ambiguous proposals, and improper and/or undated signatures. (Emphasis and boldface in original.) In the "General Instructions to Respondents" section of the RFP there appears the following reservation of rights: 16. Minor Irregularities/Right to Reject. The Buyer reserves the right to accept or reject any and all bids, or separable portions thereof, and to waive any minor irregularity, technicality, or omission if the Buyer determines that doing so will serve the State's best interests. The Buyer may reject any response not submitted in the manner specified by the solicitation documents. Anchor did not attach copies of any "occupational licenses" to the back of Form 'F' in its proposal. Anchor contends that it did not need to attach such licenses because none exists. This position is based on two undisputed facts: (1) The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("DBPR") does not regulate the business of providing towing and emergency roadside assistance; therefore, neither Anchor nor Sunshine held (or could hold) a state-issued license to operate, and neither company fell under DBPR's regulatory jurisdiction. (2) The instrument formerly known as an "occupational license," which local governments had issued for decades, not for regulatory purposes but as a means of raising revenue, is presently called (at least formally) a "business tax receipt," after the Florida Legislature, in 2006, amended Chapter 205 of the Florida Statutes, changing the name of that law from the "Local Occupational License Tax Act" to the "Local Business Tax Act." See 2006 Fla. Laws ch. 152. Sunshine asserts that the terms "occupational license" and "business tax receipt" are synonymous and interchangeable, and that the RFP required each offeror to attach copies of its occupational licenses/business tax receipts to the proposal. Sunshine insists that Anchor's failure to do so constituted a material deviation from the specifications because, without such documentation, the Department could not be sure whether an offeror was authorized to do business in any given locality. Sunshine presses this argument a step further based on some additional undisputed facts. As it happened, at the time the proposals were opened, Anchor held a local business tax receipt from the City of Pembroke Pines, which is the municipality in which Anchor maintains its principal place of business. Anchor had not, however, paid local business taxes to Broward County when they became due, respectively, on July 1, 2008, and July 1, 2009. Anchor corrected this problem on December 14, 2009, which was about two weeks after the Department had posted notice of its intent to award Anchor the contract, paying Broward County a grand total of $248.45 in back taxes, collection costs, and late penalties. As of this writing, all of Anchor's local business tax obligations are paid in full. Sunshine contends, however, that during the period of time that Anchor's Broward County business taxes were delinquent, Anchor was not authorized to do business in Broward County and hence was not a "responsible" proposer eligible for award of the contract. In support of this proposition, Sunshine relies upon Section 20-15 of the Broward County, Florida, Code of Ordinances ("Broward Code"), which states: Pursuant to the authority granted by Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, no person shall engage in or manage any business, profession or occupation, as the same are contemplated by Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, unless such person first obtains a business tax receipt as required by this article, unless other exempt from this requirement . . . . On this latter point regarding Anchor's authority to operate in Broward County, Sunshine appears to be correct, at least in a narrow legal sense. It is abundantly clear, however, and the undersigned finds, that, as a matter of fact, Anchor was never in any danger of being shut down by the county. Indeed, even under the strict letter of the local law, Anchor was entitled to continue operating in Broward County unless and until the county took steps to compel the payment of the delinquent taxes. Broward Code Section 20-22, which deals with the enforcement of the business tax provisions, provides: Whenever any person who is subject to the payment of a business tax or privilege tax provided by this article shall fail to pay the same when due, the tax collector, within three (3) years from the due date of the tax, may issue a warrant directed to the Broward County Sheriff, commanding him/her to levy upon and sell any real or personal property of such person liable for said tax for the amount thereof and the cost of executing the warrant and to return such warrant to the tax collector and to pay him/her the money collected by virtue thereof within sixty (60) days from the date of the warrant. . . . The tax collector may file a copy of the warrant with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Broward County[, which shall be recorded in the public records and thereby] become a lien for seven (7) years from the due date of the tax. . . . Any person subject to, and who fails to pay, a business tax or privilege tax required by this article, shall, on petition of the tax collector, be enjoined by the Circuit Court from engaging in the business for which he/she has failed to pay said business tax, until such time as he/she shall pay the same with costs of such action. There is no evidence suggesting that the county ever sought to enjoin, or that a court ever issued an injunction prohibiting, Anchor from engaging in business, nor does it appear, based on the evidence, that a tax warrant ever was issued, filed, or executed to force Anchor to pay its back taxes. Given the relatively small amount of tax due, the likelihood of such enforcement actions being taken must reasonably be reckoned as slim to none. While paying taxes when due is certainly the obligation of a good corporate citizen, it would not be reasonable, based on the facts established in this case, to infer that Anchor is a scofflaw for failing to timely pay a local tax amounting to about $80 per year. Anchor, in short, was a responsible proposer. Sunshine's other argument has more going for it. The RFP clearly and unambiguously mandated that "occupational licenses" be attached to a proposal. If, as Sunshine maintains, the terms "occupational license" and "business tax receipt" are clearly synonymous, then Anchor's proposal was noncompliant. For reasons that will be explained below, however, the undersigned has concluded, as a matter of law, that the term "occupational license" does not unambiguously denote a "business tax receipt"——at least not in the context of Special Condition No. 8. The specification, in other words, is ambiguous. No one protested the specification or otherwise sought clarification of the Department's intent. The evidence shows, and the undersigned finds, that the Department understood and intended the term "occupational license" to mean the instrument now known as a "business tax receipt." The Department simply used the outdated name, as many others probably still do, owing to that facet of human nature captured by the expression, "old habits die hard." The Department's interpretation of the ambiguous specification is not clearly erroneous and therefore should not be disturbed in this proceeding. Based on the Department's interpretation of Special Condition No. 8, the undersigned finds that Anchor's failure to attach copies of its occupational licenses was a deviation from the requirements of the RFP. That is not the end of the matter, however, for a deviation is not necessarily disqualifying unless it is found to be material. The letting authority may, in the exercise of discretion, choose to waive a minor irregularity if doing so will not compromise the integrity and fairness of the competition. There is no persuasive direct evidence in the record that the Department made a conscious decision to waive the irregularity in Anchor's proposal. Documents in the Department's procurement file show, however, that the Department knew that Anchor's proposal lacked copies of occupational licenses, and in any event this was a patent defect, inasmuch as nothing was attached to the back of Anchor's Form 'F'. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the Department elected to waive the irregularity, and the undersigned so finds. Necessarily implicit in the Department's action (waiving the deficiency) is an agency determination that that the irregularity was a minor one. The question of whether or not Anchor's noncompliance with Special Condition No. 8 was material is fairly debatable. Ultimately, however, the undersigned is unable to find, for reasons more fully developed below, that the Department's determination in this regard was clearly erroneous. Because the Department's determination was not clearly erroneous, the undersigned accepts that Anchor's failure to submit occupational licenses was a minor irregularity, which the Department could waive. The Department's decision to waive the minor irregularity is entitled to great deference and should be upheld unless it was arbitrary or capricious. The undersigned cannot say that waiving the deficiency in question was illogical, despotic, thoughtless, or otherwise an abuse of discretion; to the contrary, once it has been concluded that the irregularity is minor and immaterial, as the Department not incorrectly did here, waiver seems the reasonable and logical course of action. The upshot is that the proposed award to Anchor should be allowed to stand. The foregoing determination renders moot the disputed issues of fact arising from Anchor's allegation that Sunshine's proposal was nonresponsive. It is unnecessary, therefore, for the undersigned to make additional findings on that subject.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order consistent with its preliminary decision to award Anchor the contract at issue. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2010.
