The Issue The issues are whether the Respondent should be disciplined under sections 464.204(1)(b) and 456.072(1)(z), Florida Statutes2/; and, if so, the appropriate discipline.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner regulates the practice of nursing and nursing assistants in Florida. The Respondent holds license CNA 140254, which allows her to work as a certified nursing assistant (CNA). She became licensed in 2006 and worked as a CNA at Quality Health Care Center (“Quality Health Care”) in Winter Garden from 2007 through 2016. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was aware of any concerns about the Respondent’s ability to practice as a CNA with reasonable skill and safety until May 2016. In May 2016, the Respondent sent an e-mail to the Petitioner’s Medical Quality Assurance Consumer Services Unit that said: Hi this is Francoise Utegg license # 140254 CNA. I m impossible since 2005 after I bought an house with my husband at 2004 Kruger Dr Modesto CA 95355 Since in the next day we finished repair the house I m impossible they executed me and video track me I face cults culture deaths I’m living an abandoned live people talking inside me it s not in my brain you can verify my work and I never give up to work I found out a gang tracking me to force me to give up my life. I was at work yesterday someone talk in me said I will cheats you, They pushed me down verbal harassing terracing terrified terrorize everywhere I m it s feel like I don’t have any right They say that I m assaulted to take care of children. They dissolution my married and pushed me down they wasting me in nightmares Thanks for your concern. It s can be anyone’s else The Respondent’s intent in sending this e-mail was to do a public service by alerting the Petitioner to the possibility that many other people might come under similar attacks, to the detriment of their health and safety. The result was that the Petitioner immediately began an investigation into the Respondent’s ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety due to a physical or mental illness. The investigation included an interview with the Respondent and an inquiry to the Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN), which reported that the Respondent was not a program participant. In July 2016, the Petitioner ordered the Respondent to undergo a mental and physical examination to determine her ability to practice and the need for IPN. An examination by Jamie Smolen, M.D., was scheduled for February 13, 2017. In December 2016, the Respondent was at work in the dining room at Quality Health Care when she began hearing voices telling her that she was “a domestique,” i.e., in her native Haitian patois, no more than a common house maid. This insulted and angered the Respondent, who was very proud of having passed her licensure examination and worked as a licensed nursing assistant for almost ten years. The Respondent controlled her anger while working with her patients but then began to angrily and loudly dispute what the voices were saying and angrily threw dirty dishes and utensils into a wash tub, which made loud crashing sounds. The family of one of the patients heard and saw this incident and reported it to the administration of Quality Health Care. Quality Health Care investigated the family’s report and required the Respondent to be evaluated and cleared before returning to work. Dr. Smolen examined the Respondent as scheduled on February 13, 2017. He diagnosed schizophrenia, paranoid type, continuous. Schizophrenia is a mental disorder characterized by abnormal social behavior and a failure to understand what is real. Symptoms include: delusions; hallucinations; and disorganized speech. Dr. Smolen recommended that the Respondent did not have reasonable skill and safety to return to practice as a CNA; that she should receive psychiatric medication management; that she should agree to a mental health monitoring contract with IPN; that she should not be allowed to return to work until she demonstrated full compliance with the IPN contract, including medication management and psychiatric follow-up to confirm remission in response to treatment; and that she should be evaluated at that time for recovery status and return to work. Dr. Smolen’s opinion is based in part on information provided to him by the Respondent. She is a Haitian woman, aged approximately 50, who married a Canadian and accompanied him when he returned to Canada in 1996. They moved to Modesto, California, and in 2005 they undertook to renovate a home they purchased there. They worked long and hard. As the repairs were being finished, the Respondent perceived strange things happening to her. She believed something was in the house trying to harm her. She also believed she was under video surveillance and that a remote-controlled device was implanted in her abdomen. She also began to suffer from auditory hallucinations, hearing disembodied voices speaking French creole. She believed the voices may have been spirits, a “gang cult” in the air, or a “satanic legion.” She thought she had been “voodoo-ized.” She suffered physical symptoms, such as weight loss, recurrent headaches, and abdominal pain that she attributed to the implanted device. She also imagined being hit in the face by an invisible hand and an invisible tightening around her hands. The Respondent’s husband did not believe she was cursed, but instead believed she suffered from schizophrenia, and he took her to a doctor for treatment. The Respondent called the doctor a “witch psychologist” who prescribed Risperdal, an anti- psychotic medication. The Respondent thought the dosage she received caused her to “float as though she did not exist” and feel “limp like a snake.” In the Respondent’s mind, this confirmed that she was cursed, not schizophrenic. The Respondent had blood drawn for her examination by the “witch psychologist.” She later saw marks, possibly hematomas, where the blood was drawn. The Respondent interpreted the marks as signs that something evil was happening to her. After what happened to her in Modesto, the Respondent and her husband divorced, and she moved to Orlando, Florida. In Orlando, the Respondent’s abdominal pain persisted. When the Respondent sought medical advice, she was referred to mental health specialists, and the Respondent refused treatment. Not only did she not believe she had a mental illness, she seemed to believe the mental health professionals were part of the “attack” against her by the evil spirits, or whoever or whatever was tormenting her. In 2006, despite her troubles, the Respondent somehow managed to become licensed as a nursing assistant, and managed to get a job as a CNA at Quality Health Care Center. It appears that she held the job for approximately ten years. The Respondent proudly reports that she frequently was asked to work overtime. No testimony or evidence was presented from anyone other than the Respondent concerning her job performance during those ten years. It is possible that her work was uninterrupted by her torments, but not likely, given the Respondent’s self- reporting of some of the incidents during those ten years. The Respondent testified that she has called the police more than ten times over the years to report the harassing voices she hears because she thinks they could harm others, too. The usual police response has been to handcuff the Respondent and transport her to a mental health facility for observation and treatment. Typically, the Respondent refuses treatment or discontinues it after a period of compliance, and the pattern repeats itself. On February 22, 2017, the Respondent was admitted to Aspire Healthcare on an inpatient status. She stayed for five days and was discharged on Zyprexa, an anti-psychotic medication, with clearance to return to work. She returned to work at Quality Health Care shortly after that and was compliant with her medication for a time. There was no evidence of any incidents at work after that. In April 2017, the Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against the Respondent alleging her inability to practice as a nursing assistant with reasonable skill and safety by reason of her mental illness and her intentional refusal to comply with recommended treatment. At some point, Quality Health Care was informed about the Administrative Complaint and placed the Respondent on leave from her employment. When the Respondent received the Administrative Complaint in June 2017, she disputed the charges and asked for a hearing. All of this greatly upset the Respondent, who stopped taking her Zyprexa, as futile, and decompensated. A neighbor witnessed bizarre behavior in her home garden and reported her to the police, who handcuffed her and transported her to a mental health facility for observation and treatment. On November 3, 2017, Dr. Smolen re-evaluated the Respondent. His opinion as to the Respondent’s mental illness and ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety did not change. The Respondent denies that she has a mental illness. As a result, she does not recognize the need for treatment or medication or monitoring. Nonetheless, she has shown some willingness to do what is necessary to remove the restrictions on her license so she can return to work, and she claims to have tried to contact IPN, but without success. However, she has not followed through for long before she gets frustrated with how long it takes to get cleared to return to work. When that happens, she stops treatment and medication.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order: finding the Respondent to be in violation of section 456.071(1)(z); suspending her license until she enters into a mental health contract with IPN, and appears before the Board to demonstrate, through an evaluation by IPN, that she can practice as a nursing assistant with reasonable skill and safety to patients; imposing such additional conditions and/or probation at the time of reinstatement; and imposing costs of investigation and prosecution. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2018.
The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether proposed amendments to Rule 10-5.011(1)(o), and (p) F.A.C. relating to certificates of need for hospital inpatient general psychiatric services, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority, as defined in Section 120.52(8), F.S.
Findings Of Fact Metamorphosis of the Rules Prior to 1983, hospitals were not separately licensed, and certificates of need (CON) were not required for the designation of beds for psychiatric and substance abuse services. In 1983, statutory amendments to Chapter 381, F.S. addressed psychiatric beds as reviewable projects in the CON program. In 1983, HRS adopted rules establishing four new categories of beds, now found in Rules 10-5.011(1)(o), (p), and (q), F.A.C.: Short-term psychiatric, long-term psychiatric, and short and long-term substance abuse. At the time that the categories were created, HRS conducted an inventory of the hospitals, asking how many beds were designated in each category. Based on the responses, published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, future projections of need were made and applications were considered for CONs. Another category of psychiatric beds was not included in the 1983 rules. Intensive residential treatment programs for children and adolescents were created by statute in 1982, and are defined in Section 395.002(8), F.S. as: a specialty hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals which provides 24-hour care and which has the primary functions of diagnosis and treatment of patients under the age of IS having psychiatric disorders in order to restore such patients to an optimal level of functioning. These facilities, called IRTFs, may become licensed as hospitals pursuant to Section 395.003(2)(f), F.S., but as hospitals they must obtain CON approval pursuant to Sections 381.702(7) and (12), F.S. and Section 381.706(1) (b), F.S. IRTFs have no statutory or regulatory restrictions on length of stay and were approved by HRS at one time under an unwritten policy that there be one such facility available in each HRS planning district, without regard to the availability of other long or short term psychiatric programs. In 1985, HRS proposed a rule amendment which would have eliminated the short and long term distinction, as well as the distinction between psychiatric services and substance abuse services. Six months later, the proposed rule amendment was withdrawn. It was highly controversial; several challenges were filed; objections were made by various local health councils; and a new administrator took over. The agency decided to rework its proposed change~;. The agency next began the process of revision in 1987, and in 1988 convened a workshop group to review an issue paper prepared by agency staff. Another work group met in 1989 to consider the consolidation of psychiatric and substance abuse rules. HRS staff reviewed literature on the subjects of substance abuse and psychiatric services, including literature relating to access by indigent patients and the provision of services to children and adolescents. Staff prepared rule drafts which were circulated in- house, including the alcohol, drug abuse and mental health program office; and to such outside groups as the Association of Voluntary Hospitals of Florida, the Florida Hospital Association and the League of Hospitals. The proposed rule amendments which are the subject of this proceeding were filed on January 19, 1990 (substance abuse), and on January 26, 1990 (inpatient psychiatric services) in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The Parties HRS administers the CON program pursuant to Section 381.701, et seq., F.S. (1989). The CON program regulates entry into the Florida health care market by providers through review and approval of certain capital expenditures, services and beds. The petitioner, Florida League of Hospitals, Inc. is a nonprofit corporation which is organized and maintained for the benefit of investor-owned hospitals which comprise its membership. The remaining petitioners and intervenors are current providers of hospital inpatient psychiatric services, long and short term, and of inpatient substance abuse services, long and short term. The petitioners and intervenors are all substantially affected by the proposed rules and have stipulated to the standing of all parties in this proceeding. Abolishing Distinctions Between Long-Term & Short-Term Psychiatric Beds "Short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services" is defined in existing rule 10-5.011(1)(o)1, FAC, as follows: Short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services means a category of services which provides a 24-hour a day therapeutic milieu for persons suffering from mental health problems which are so severe and acute that they need intensive, full-time care. Acute psychiatric inpatient care is defined as a service not exceeding three months and averaging length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and a stay of 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. "Long term psychiatric services" is defined in existing rule 10- 5.011(1)(p)1., FAC as a category of services which provides hospital based inpatient services averaging a length of stay of 90 days. Neither rule addresses services to adults with an average length of stay (ALOS) of 30-90 days, or services to children and adolescents with a 60-90 day ALOS. Because of this, and the "averaging" process, long term hospitals legitimately serve "short term" patients and short term hospitals may serve "long term" patients. One party has calculated than a long term facility could legally provide short term services for 80% of its patients, and long term services for only 20% of its patients and still have an ALOS of 90 days. Under the existing rules a facility must file a CON application to convert from long term to short term beds, or vice versa, and is subject to sanctions for failure to comply with the designation on its CON. The proposed changes would repeal rule 10-5.011(1) (p), FAC regarding long term services, and would amend rule 10- 5.011(1) (o), FAC to delete the definition of short term services, thereby permitting facilities to serve patients without regard to length of stay. The proposed changes are supported by several factors upon which a reasonable person could rely. Substantial changes have occurred in the last decade in clinical practices and in third party reimbursement to reduce the ALOS for hospital inpatient psychiatric care. Prior to the 1960s, there was no distinction between long and short term care, as all hospital based care was long term with an emphasis on psychoanalytic therapy. Beginning in the 1960s, the concept of community mental health programs evolved with an emphasis on deinstitutionalization of patients in large public "asylums" and with a goal of treatment in the least restrictive environment. In more recent years the trend has spread to the private sector. Improvements in the availability and use of psychiatric drugs, the use of outpatient care or partial hospitalization, and improved follow up care have led to a dramatic decrease in ALOS. Long term care is costly, and whether third party payors have been a driving force, or are merely responding to the trends described above, long term inpatient reimbursement is virtually nonexistent. During the 19805, most insurance companies imposed a 30-day limit on psychiatric inpatient care or imposed monetary limits which would have effectively paid for less than a 90-day term. CHAMPUS, the program providing insurance to military dependents, was providing long term coverage in 1982, but by 1986 its coverage was rarely available for more than 30-60 days, and today, under CHAMPUS' case management system, 30 days is a "luxurious amount". Other large third-party payors such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield have similar limits or aggressively use case management (the close scrutiny of need on a case by case basis) to limit reimbursement for inpatient care. Of the two or three long term facilities in existence at the time that HRS' rules were originally adopted, only one, Anclote Manor still reported an ALOS of over 90 days by 1989, dropping from an ALOS of 477.9 days in 1986 to 145.4 days in 1989. At the same time its occupancy rate dropped below 50%. There is an interesting dialogue among experts as to whether there still exists a clinical distinction between long term and short term inpatient psychiatric care. Studies at the Florida Mental Health Institute found no difference in rate of rehospitalization over a 12 month period between patients who were in a nine week program and patients from Florida State Hospital with a 500 day length of stay. Some mental health practitioners are looking now at treating the chronic psychiatric patient with repeated short term hospital stays and less intensive care between episodes, rather than a single long term inpatient stay. Other practitioners maintain that a long term psychiatric problem is behavioral in nature and requires a total life readjustment and longer length of stay. Whichever practice may be preferable, the facts remain that fewer and fewer mental patients are being treated with long term hospitalization. The proposed rules would not foreclose any facility from providing long term care, if it finds the need. To the extent that a clinical distinction exists between short and long term care, the existing rules do not address that distinction, except from a wholly arbitrary length of stay perspective. The existing rules no longer serve valid health care objectives. Existing providers with short term CONs are concerned that the allowing long term facilities to convert will further glut an underutilized market and will result in an increase in vacant beds and a rise in the cost of health services, contrary to the intent of the CON program. Intensive residential treatment facilities (IRTFs), which will be folded into the need methodology for children and adolescent beds, have no current restrictions on length of stay and may already compete with impunity with the short term providers. Moreover, long term facilities are also providing substantial short term care as a result of the trends discussed above. HRS has not consistently enforced the length of stay restrictions of long term providers' CONs. Whether those CONs were improvidently granted is beside the point. The capital costs have already been incurred; the beds are available; and the beds are being used, in part, for short term services. Abolishing the distinction is a rational approach to current conditions. And in determining that all existing providers would be placed in the same position regarding length of stay, HRS avoids the regulatory nightmare of trying to enforce limitations on existing providers and approving new beds without limitations. Creating a Distinction Between Adult and Children/Adolescent Beds Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)3.c. creates a CON distinction between general psychiatric services for adults, and those services for children and adolescents. Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4., as proposed, would create separate need criteria for hospital inpatient general psychiatric services for adults and for children/adolescents. Adolescents are defined in Rule 10- 5.011(1)(o)2.a., as persons age 14 through 17 years. Persons over 17 years are adults, and under 14 years are children. There are valid clinical reasons to distinguish between programs fob the separate age groups. Although there is some overlap, differing therapies are appropriate with different ages. The types of services offered to adults are not the same as those which are offered to children. Children, for example, often receive academic educational services while being hospitalized. Adults receive career or vocational counseling and marriage counseling. The required separation by age categories would remove some flexibility from providers. However, this is offset by the Department's valid need to track for planning purposes inpatient services to children and adolescents separately from those provided to adults. Based on anecdotal evidence, HRS' Office of Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Office is concerned about the possible overutilization of hospital inpatient services for children and adolescents and the potential that when insurance reimbursement expires they are discharged without clinical bases. Taking Inventory Under the proposed rule, in order to separately regulate adult and children/adolescent beds, HRS will fix an inventory of uses as of the time that the rule takes effect. For facilities with CONs which already allocate beds between the two groups, the proposed rule will have no effect. For facilities without a designation, as long as adults and children/adolescents are kept in separate programs, the allocation can now be mixed and changed at will. The rule amendment will freeze that use in place. HRS has conducted a preliminary survey to determine the existing uses of psychiatric, substance abuse and residential treatment program beds. The survey of approximately 120 facilities is complete, but is not intended to limit those facilities unless their CON already provides a limit. A final inventory will be taken after the proposed rules become effective. The inventory will be published, and providers will be given an opportunity to contest its findings. The ultimate outcome will be amended CONs and licenses which reflect each facility's mix of adult and children/adolescent beds. The process is a fair and reasonable means of commencing separate regulation of services to these age groups. The Definitions Proposed rules 10-5.011(1)(o)2.1., 2.p., and 2.t.) define "hospital inpatient general psychiatric services", "psychiatric disorder" and "substance abuse", respectively. Each of these provisions defines the terms by reference to classifications contained in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Diseases (DSM-III-R Manual) and equivalent classifications contained- in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9 Codes). The rule as originally proposed included the phrase "or its subsequent revisions", after incorporating the manuals by reference. In testimony, and in the parties second agreement (Hearing Office exhibit 3) the phrase is deleted. However, it still appears in proposed rule 10-5.011(1) (o)2.1., perhaps inadvertently. The DSM-III-R is a generally recognized manual for the classification of mental disorders and is widely used by clinicians and medical records professionals to categorize the conditions of patients. The ICD-9 codes are broader than just mental disorders, but they have a section on mental disorders with numbers that are identical to those in the DSM-III-R. Although the manuals are complex and subject to interpretation, clinicians are accustomed to their use and they provide a reasonable guide as to the services which may be provided in an inpatient substance abuse program, as distinguished from an inpatient psychiatric program. Advertising Limited Proposed rule 10-5.011(1)(o)3.d. (as amended in the parties second agreement, Hearing Officer exhibit #3), provides: D. Advertising of services. The number of beds for adult or for children and adolescent hospital inpatient general psychiatric services shall be indicated on the face of the hospital's license. Beds in intensive residential treatment programs for children and adolescents which are licensed as specialty hospital beds will be indicated as intensive residential treatment program beds on the face of the hospital's license. Only hospitals with separately-licensed hospital inpatient general psychiatric services, including facilities with intensive residential treatment programs for children and adolescents which are licensed as specialty hospitals, can advertise to the public the availability of hospital inpatient general psychiatric services. A hospital with separately licensed hospital inpatient general psychiatric services that does not have a certificate of need for hospital inpatient substance abuse services may advertise that they [sic] provide services for patients with a principal psychiatric diagnosis excluding substance abuse and a secondary substance abuse disorder. The Department does not currently have CON, licensure, or other rules which limit the ability of a health care provider to advertise its services, and has never used advertising as a factor in conducting CON review for any proposed services. HRS included provisions regarding advertising in its proposed rules because it had evidence that existing facilities have used misleading advertisements. The evidence came from other providers, rather than consumers. However, it is the consumer whom the agency feels may be confused by advertising which implies that services are available when such services cannot be legally provided under the facility's license. The advertising provision is prospective in nature, seeking to prevent licensed providers from advertising services for which they are not licensed. The provisions do not relate to CON review, and the staff is unclear as to how the rule would be implemented. Licensing and CON review are two separate functions within the agency. Although the term is not defined in the proposed rule, advertising broadly includes word of mouth referrals and public presentations by professionals in the community, as well as traditional media and written advertisements. Properly utilized, advertising helps consumers exercise choice and gain access to needed services. Improper advertising is subject to the regulation of federal and state agencies other than the department. New Need Methodology, with Preferences Proposed Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4., deletes the existing population ratio methodology and creates a need formula based upon use rate, for adult and children/adolescent inpatient psychiatric services. Certain preferences are also described. 34. Rule 10-5.011(1) (o)4.e.(III) provides: In order to insure access to hospital inpatient general psychiatric services for Medicaid-eligible and charity care adults, forty percent of the gross bed need allocated to each district for hospital inpatient general psychiatric services for adults should be allocated to general hospitals. The same provision for children and adolescent services is found in rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4.h.(III). Medicaid reimbursement is not available for inpatient services in a specialty hospital. 35. Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4.i. provides: Preferences Among Competing Applicants for Hospital Inpatient General Psychiatric Services. In weighing and balancing statutory and rule review criteria, preference will be given to applicants who: Provide Medicaid and charity care days as a percentage of its total patient days equal to or greater than the average percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days of total patient days provided by other hospitals in the district, as determined for the most recent calendar year prior to the year of the application for which data are available from the Health Care Cost Containment Board. Propose to serve the most seriously mentally ill patients (e.g. suicidal patients; patients with acute schizophrenia; patients with severe depression) to the extent that these patients can benefit from a hospital-based organized inpatient treatment program. Propose to service Medicaid-eligible persons. Propose to service individuals without regard to their ability to pay. Provide a continuum of psychiatric services for children and adolescents, including services following discharge. The preferences are similar to those in CON rules relating to other types of health services and are intended to implement, in part, the legislative mandate that the agency consider an applicant's ". . . past and proposed provision of health care services to medicaid patients and the medically indigent." Section 381.705(1) (n), F.S. Under Medicaid reimbursement general hospitals are paid a set per diem based on a variety of services provided to all Medicaid patients, regardless of actual cost of the individual service. As psychiatric services are generally less costly than other services on a per diem basis, hospitals may recoup a greater percentage of their costs in serving Medicaid psychiatric patients. This and the fact that public hospitals receive some governmental subsidies do not obviate the need for incentives in the CON program. Not all of the charity care provided by these hospitals is funded and a large amount is written off. Although Petitioners argue that the preferences are not needed, or are too generous, none provide competent evidence that the facilities who do not enjoy the preferences are unduly prejudiced. The 40% allocation of bed need to general hospitals is a guideline, not a maximum, as applied by the agency, and presumes that there are general hospitals competing in any batch in question. It is not intended to frustrate a separate section of the rule which allows a hospital with at least an 85% occupancy rate to expand regardless of need shown in the formula and the occupancy rate district-wide. See 10- 5.011(1) (o)4.d. and g. "Evaluation of Treatment Outcomes" The proposed rules contain three provisions relating to a hospital's evaluation of its patients' treatment outcomes. Rule 10-5.011(1) (o)3.i, includes among "required services", ". . . an overall program evaluation of the treatment outcomes for discharged patients to determine program effectiveness." Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)8.j., requires in the application, A description of the methods to be used to evaluate the outcome of the treatments provided and to determine the effectiveness of the program, including any summary evaluation outcome results for hospital inpatient psychiatric services provided at other facilities owned or operated by the applicant in Florida and other states. The data shall exclude patient specific information. Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)9.e., imposes a similar additional requirement in applications from providers seeking more beds: A summary description of any treatment outcome evaluation of the hospital inpatient general psychiatric services provided at the facility for which additional beds are requested, for children, adolescents or adults as applicable to the facility for the 12-month period ending six months prior to the beginning date of the quarter of the publication of the fixed bed need pool. The purpose of these requirements, according to HRS, is to insure that hospitals will know whether its patients are better off when they leave than when they were admitted to the program. Most hospitals have such knowledge. The terms, "outcome determination", "summary evaluation outcome results", "summary description of treatment outcome evaluation" and "overall program evaluation of treatment outcomes", are nowhere defined in the proposed rules, and the department intends to leave to each applicant or provider the methodology for determining whether its patients are "better off" for having been in its program. Hospitals do not routinely evaluate their patients after discharge and such follow up would be difficult and costly. Most hospitals do, however, establish a treatment plan upon admission, continue to review and revise that plan as needed throughout treatment, and determine the patients' readiness for discharge based on the goals successfully attained. This is the process described by Florida Hospital's Center of Psychiatry Administrative Director. The rules require no more than a description similar to that provided by Florida Hospital. The rules set no standards and do not dictate that follow- up of discharged patients be accomplished, even though post discharge evaluation may be of value and is generally accepted as the best tool for measuring treatment effectiveness. The measurement of treatment outcome is an inexact process and relies on a series of subjective standards which need to be described. HRS does not intend to set those standards and, other than have its applicants demonstrate that a process is in place, the agency has no idea how the required information will impact its CON review. Without definitions and standards, the agency will have no way of comparing one applicant's information with another's. Without specificity and more guidance the rules fail to apprise the applicant of what is required and will provide no meaningful information to the agency in its CON review function. Miscellaneous Provisions The Non-Physician Director. The proposed definition of "Hospital Inpatient General Psychiatric Services" in Rule 10-5.011(1) (o)2.1. includes services provided under the direction of a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist In drafting this definition, agency staff relied on advice from experts at their workshops and on advice from the agency's own Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Office, to the effect that professionals, other than physicians, are qualified to direct the units. Interpretation and Application. It is not the intention of HRS that its rules be interpreted to override good medical practice or the sound judgement of treating physicians. Thus, the rules would not prohibit stabilization of a patient who is presented to the emergency room of a hospital without a CON for substance abuse or psychiatric services. Stabilized Alzheimers patients may be housed in nursing homes. Nor do the rules prohibit or subject to sanctions the occasional admission of a psychiatric or substance abuse patient to a non-substance abuse or psychiatric bed so long as this occurs infrequently in a hospital without psychiatric or substance abuse programs. "Scatter" beds are not eliminated. Those beds would continue to be licensed as acute-care beds, as they would not be considered part of an organized program, with staff and protocols, to provide psychiatric or substance abuse services. Proposed rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4.h.(v) provides that applicants for IRTPs for children and adolescents seeking licensing as a specialty hospital must provide documentation that the district's licensed non-hospital IRTPs do not meet the need for the proposed service. The department is not seeking specific utilization data in this regard, as such is not available. General information on the availability of alternatives to inpatient hospital services is obtainable from local health councils and mental health professionals in the community. Quarterly Reports. Proposed rule 10-5.011(1)(o)10. requires: Facilities providing licensed hospital inpatient general psychiatric services shall report to the department or its designee, within 45 days after the end of each calendar quarter, the number of hospital inpatient general psychiatric services admissions and patient days by age and primary diagnosis ICD-9 code. The Health Care Cost Containment Board (HCCCB) is already collecting similar quarterly data from providers. The reporting system is being updated and improved but in the meantime HRS is experiencing problems with the type and accuracy of the data it receives from HCCCB. One problem is that HCCCB collects its data with regard to all discharges in a psychiatric or substance abuse diagnostic category, whereas HRS is interested only in data from a psychiatric or substance abuse program. Until the system improves, HRS needs the information it seeks from the providers in order to plan and apply the need methodology. The agency intends to designate local health councils to collect the data and has already worked with them to set up a system. If reports provided to the HCCCB comply with the proposed requirement, HRS has no problem in receiving a duplicate of those reports. The Economic Impact Statement Pursuant to Section 120.54(2), F.S., HRS prepared an economic impact statement for the proposed rule. It was authored by Elfie Stamm, a Health Services and Facilities Consultant Supervisor with HRS. Ms. Stamm has a Masters degree in psychology and has completed course work for a Ph.D. in psychology. She has been employed by HRS for 13 years, including the last ten years in the Office of Comprehensive Health Planning. She is responsible for developing CON rules, portions of the state health plan, and special health care studies. It was impossible for Ms. Stamm to determine how the rule could impact the public at large. The economic impact statement addresses generally the effect of abolishing the distinction between long and short term services and acknowledges that the rule will increase competition among short term service providers. The impact statement also addresses a positive impact on current long term providers.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly reclassified Petitioner's position as a Senior Management Analyst Supervisor from career service status to selected exempt status pursuant to Sections 110.205(2)(x) and 447.203(4), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner worked for Respondent for approximately 30 years. He was a Board Certified Behavior Analyst and had training as a Risk Manager. During his state employment, Respondent became known as Respondent's expert for the Baker Act, Chapter 394, Part I, Florida Statutes (Baker Act). The Baker Act sets the standard in Florida for determining whether people can be involuntarily examined and treated within public and private mental health facilities. Petitioner's work as Respondent's Baker Act expert involved very independent work. He performed extensive research related to the laws of other states in the mental health area. He analyzed and made recommendations on subjects such as misuse of seclusion and restraints, the absence of documentation or doctor's orders, and the availability of medication upon release from a mental health facility. Petitioner's research and review of national accreditation standards led to the development of standards for state-wide Baker Act procedures and associated clinical care in state-run mental health receiving and treatment facilities. Ensuring compliance with these procedures and/or standards impacted state employees administering state facilities. Petitioner reviewed professional journals to learn federal block grant requirements. Petitioner's research and recommendations often resulted in proposed amendments to state law and associated Florida Administrative Code rules. Petitioner's assignments included answering constituent requests about the Baker Act from stakeholders on behalf of legislators and the Governor's Office. He conducted public hearings on the subject and gathered comments from a variety of sources, including but not limited to, the Florida Psychiatric Society, the Florida Psychological Society, the National Alliance on Mental Illness, the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, the Florida Council for Community Mental Health, and the Florida Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association. In other words, Respondent relied on Petitioner to answer inquiries about the Baker Act from the following: (a) families with members who have mental illness; (b) Respondent's district staff members; (c) the staff members of private provider agencies; (d) labor unions; (d) trade associations; (e) the judiciary; (f) law enforcement; and (g) legislative staff. To say the least, Petitioner's duties regarding the Baker Act were not of a routine clerical or administrative nature. Sometime after 1997, Respondent reorganized its adult mental health unit into two sections. The state mental health treatment facilities constituted one section consisting of six or seven state-operated or state-contracted facilities for people needing long-term care. The other section consisted of community mental health facilities that provided mental health services to people in communities, including people in crisis or with forensic involvement. After the reorganization, Petitioner worked primarily in the adult community mental health section with private providers. Petitioner worked with Ron Kizirian, his counterpart in the state mental health treatment facilities section. Petitioner used his Baker Act expertise, working as a team with Mr. Kizirian, to coordinate and address all issues state-wide regarding the Baker Act. Respondent's staff generally considered the adult community mental health services to be more progressive in attempting to provide patients with appropriate services. The state institution services were typically characterized as reactive, custodial, and generally, not positive. Petitioner's duties after the reorganization included explaining the things he did in the community side so that the institutional side would understand the concepts and issues. At the time of the reorganization, there were approximately 550 to 600 private, not-for-profit community mental health providers with state contracts. The adult community mental health section managed these contracts. Petitioner's duties included engaging in preliminary contract discussions with private providers, clarifying issues, and generally participating in the development of the contracts and their associated budgets and grants. He also was involved in recommending amendments to the contracts. As a contract manager, Petitioner monitored the activities of private providers. He initiated corrective action procedures. Petitioner's duties included the following: (a) making sure private contractors stayed within their budgets; (b) ensuring that private contractors agreed to performance standards; (c) pre-auditing the vouchers of vendors; and (d) submitting vouchers for payment. Petitioner's job included investigating high profile events on Respondent's behalf. For instance, Petitioner was sent to investigate alleged abuses in crisis stabilization units in Orlando, Florida. Petitioner would then draft a report for his superiors. Petitioner would often represent his superiors in meetings. Petitioner also performed as acting supervisor in the absence of his immediate supervisor. On or about October 1, 2000, Petitioner was a career service employee, serving as an Operations and Management Consultant. On March 6, 2001, Respondent changed the title of Petitioner's position to Senior Management Analyst II and then back to Operations and Management Consultant on the same day. On March 16, 2001, Petitioner's position changed again to Senior Management Analyst II. On June 27, 2001, and effective July 1, 2001, Petitioner's position title was reclassified to Senior Management Analyst Supervisor, a selected exempt service position. Petitioner was serving in that capacity when Respondent terminated his employment on December 3, 2002. Petitioner never supervised any other employees except to the extent that he served as acting supervisor in his immediate supervisor's absence. He signed a performance evaluation on March 27, 2002, indicating that critical elements involving directing leadership, staffing, performance appraisal/feedback and discipline administration did not apply to his performance for the rating period from October 30, 2001, to March 6, 2002. Petitioner performed the same duties and functions before and after reclassification from career service to selected exempt services. At the time of reclassification, Petitioner inquired of his immediate supervisor why Respondent changed his position from career service to selected exempt service. The immediate supervisor referred Petitioner's inquiry to next higher level supervisor who advised Petitioner not to challenge the determination but to "just keep his job." During the discovery phase of this proceeding, Respondent contended that Petitioner's position was reclassified for the following reason: Petitioner's position was reclassified to Select Exempt Service because his position was managerial with [sic] the meaning of Section 447.203(4), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's duties and responsibilities as Senior Management Analyst Supervisor was not of a routine, clerical or ministerial nature and required the exercise of independent judgment and the position also required the Plaintiff [sic] to develop performance guideline for the state mental health facilities, supervise adult mental health staff and facilitate resolution of complex programmatic, management, administrative or regulatory issues affecting state mental health facilities and districts. During the discovery phase of this proceeding, Respondent produced a generic selected exempt service position description for a Senior Management Analyst Supervisor. The position description contains the duties and responsibilities for senior staff in Respondent's state mental health facilities section and Respondent's adult community mental health facilities section. The position description sets forth some of Petitioner's duties relative to the Baker Act for state-wide public and private mental health institutions and/or facilities and relative to other mental health issues in adult community mental health facilities as follows: (a) provides consultation to the state mental health treatment facilities and districts on operational and programmatic mental health system issues; (b) facilitates resolution of complex programmatic, management, administrative or regulatory issues affecting state mental health treatment facilities and districts; (c) develops/coordinates development of performance guidelines for state mental health treatment facilities; (d) reviews/analyzes data and develops written reports as needed; (e) coordinates or participates as a member of various workgroups and project teams to address issues affecting provision of mental health services within the state; (f) assists with negotiating or developing contracts with private providers as needed; (g) prepares various reports and correspondence; (h) assists with the development of budget and rate amendments for mental health entities; (i) develops and utilizes consultant expertise as need in various projects; (j) researches information regarding mental health programs/systems; and (k) provides on-site visits to districts and state facilities to provide technical assistance regarding administrative and/or programmatic issues.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner's position of Senior Management Analyst Supervisor was that of a select exempt employee. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon Country, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry F. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 315 Beard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Juan Collins, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert A. Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
