The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a retail installment seller should be granted.
Findings Of Fact John K. Moyant is the president and secretary of Petitioner Lifestyle Builders, Inc. He has also been a licensed general contractor in the state of Florida since 1973. He was formerly licensed by the state of Florida as a real estate broker. In July of 1986, the Florida Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, filed an Administrative Complaint against Moyant and others. Moyant subsequently decided that he would voluntarily surrender his real estate broker license rather than defend the administrative action filed against him. On November 12, 1987, he executed an Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License for Revocation. That Affidavit read, in part, as follows: That in lieu of further investigation and prosecution of the pending complaint(s) and case(s) received and filed with the Department of Professional Regulation, I do hereby consent to and authorize the Florida Real Estate Commis- sion of the Department of Professional Regulation to issue a Final Order revoking any and all licenses and permits issued to or held by the undersigned. That effective date of the revocation shall be 11-12-87. That I will not apply for nor otherwise seek any real estate license or permit in the State of Florida for a period of not less than ten (10) years from the effective date of the revocation. * * * 8. That I waive any right to appeal or other- wise seek judicial review of the Final Order of revocation to be rendered. The Florida Real Estate Commission entered a Final Order on December 10, 1987, ordering that Moyant's license "be revoked, effective November 12, 1987." On May 16, 1994, Moyant completed, on behalf of Petitioner, an Application for Retail Installment Seller License. That application identified Moyant as one of the principals in the business in that he is the president and secretary and further listed Moyant as the corporation's resident agent. Question numbered three on that application reads as follows: 3. Has the applicant, any of the persons listed herein, or any person with power to direct the management or policies of the applicant had a license, registration, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against? Moyant answered that question in the negative. Respondent received the application of Lifestyle Builders, Inc., on May 19, 1994. In reviewing that application, Respondent checked Moyant's name in the Department's computer system known as CREAMS. The computer check revealed that Moyant had been the subject of a Final Order of Revocation by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Respondent verified the accuracy of that information by obtaining from the Commission a copy of the Administrative Complaint, the Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License for Revocation, and the Final Order. Based upon that information, Respondent advised Petitioner that its application was denied. Moyant's answer to question numbered three was a material misstatement of fact.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a retail installment seller. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of April, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order did not contain any clearly- identified proposed findings of fact. It is assumed that the un-numbered paragraphs contained in the section entitled "Preliminary Statement" are intended to be Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Rulings on those un- numbered paragraphs are as follows: Petitioner's first through third un-numbered paragraphs in the Preliminary Statement portion of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order have been adopted in substance. Petitioner's fourth un-numbered paragraph in the Preliminary Statement portion of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order has been rejected as not being supported by the credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Lettman, Esquire 8010 North University Drive, Second Floor Tamarac, Florida 33321-2118 Tobi C. Pam, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance 201 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 302 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1885 Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Harry Hooper, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether the Respondents violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by inducing a seller to enter in a contract for sale of real estate, based on a $50,000.00 earnest money deposit that was never made.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Fred Marberry, Jr. is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker-salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0369879 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent Bernon Earl Thomas is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0433736 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Fred Marberry was President of Marberry and Mack Development, Inc., and maintained an office in Altamonte Springs, Florida. James Mack was the Vice-president, Secretary and Treasurer of the company. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Bernon Thomas was a real estate salesman with General Realty Management Corporation. His office was in Kissimmee, Florida. In 1985, the two Respondents had worked together on the potential sale and development of a multi-family project in Kissimmee. Thomas was aware of the availability of some commercial property in Kissimmee known as Cross Creek that he felt would be a good deal and shared that information with Marberry. Thomas got his information on Cross Creek from Larry Heninger, who was working with the owner, R. S. Futch, in putting together a development package to present to potential buyers and developers. Heninger had expended considerable effort in working with an engineer and permit agencies and had made contacts with a number of businesses interested in locating on the property. The engineering reports, correspondence and figures supplied to Marberry by Thomas indicated that the parcel comprised 14.75 usable acres. There were letters from the City saying that sewage capacity, utilities and similar public services would be based on this amount. Marberry told Thomas that the development package looked good and to continue working on it. Some time in mid-July 1985, Larry Heninger informed Thomas that some third parties were also interested in the Cross Creek property and that if Marberry and Mack, Inc., wanted to present an offer, they would need to do so immediately as Mr. Futch was leaving on a vacation for several weeks. Thomas called Marberry to relay this information. The details of the conversation are in dispute, but it is uncontroverted that Thomas was made a Vice-president of Marberry and Mack, Inc., for the sole purpose of executing a sales contract immediately. Arrangements were made for Thomas to draw up the contract/offer and have it taken to the Orlando airport where R. S. Futch was either leaving or was en route on his vacation. Marberry and Thomas disagree on what was discussed with regard to an escrow deposit. Thomas contends that Marberry authorized him to provide for a $50,000.00 escrow deposit to be held by Fred Marberry, licensed real estate broker upon acceptance of contract. Marberry denies this and claims that he never maintained an escrow account, that escrow funds were always handled by his (Marberry's) attorney. Marberry claims that the day after signing, when he actually saw the contract, he said something to Thomas about his failure to delete the escrow language on the contract form. Thomas denies this. Both Marberry and Thomas agree that all parties should have known that the deposit could not be escrowed upon acceptance, since Marberry was not there for the signing. The contract was prepared and signed by Thomas in Thomas' Kissimmee office and was taken to the Orlando airport. The contract, prepared on the standard Florida Bar and Association of Realtors approved form, provided a purchase price of $1,600,000.00, the $50,000.00 escrow deposit, and closing on August 25, 1985. The contract provided that closing could be extended by the buyer for 30 days with an additional $50,000.00 deposit. The contract contained the following special clauses: Contingent upon financing. Above described property of [sic] being viable to building Comm. Prop. with all necessary zoning and available utilities. [Pet. Ex. #5] At the airport, R. S. Futch accepted the offer by Marberry and Mack, made a few changes on the contract, initialled them and signed the contract; the changes were also initialled by Bernon Thomas. Later Thomas called Marberry and told him about the changes. The morning after the contract was signed, Marberry and Thomas visited Heninger's engineer to review the project. They reviewed the engineering plans and learned that the property was in a floodplain. Drainage was a problem and parking was a problem and it appeared that only 4.3 acres was actually buildable. On leaving the engineer's office Marberry told Thomas that there was no way the project could work; they could never get financing for a $1.6 million parcel of 14.75 acres, with only 4.3 buildable acres. Marberry felt the contingencies in the contract could not be met and the contract was off. Thomas still believed in the project, and since he had already put so much time and effort in it, he wanted to keep working on pulling it together. Marberry did not dissuade him, but said only to keep him informed on what was going on. Thomas told Heninger that Marberry didn't want the contract. Heninger said he wanted the contract to stay intact and encouraged Thomas to keep working on it. He also tried to get Thomas to do the deal himself, but Thomas told him he did not have the funds. Thomas claims that Heninger told him not to worry about the $50,000.00; Heninger denies this. Nothing was communicated in writing regarding the contract being terminated. The $50,000.00 deposit was never made. The deadline for closing passed, and sometime in September 1985, Larry Heninger arranged a meeting between R. S. Futch and Fred Marberry in a motel in Orlando. The purpose of the meeting was to either extend the contract entered in July (according to R. S. Futch), or to negotiate a new contract for the property (according to Fred Marberry). During the meeting Futch was told that no $50,000.00 deposit had been made on the original contract. The meeting apparently terminated and shortly later Futch filed suit for the $50,000.00. The testimony of the principal witnesses in this case: Marberry, Thomas, Futch and Heninger, establish a picture of lack of communication, misunderstanding, bungling, and unprofessionalism. It is impossible to determine from the rambling and disjointed stories of these witnesses, that either Fred Marberry or Bernon Thomas, individually or together, engaged in "fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, and breach of trust..."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against both Fred Marberry and Bernon Thomas, be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Robert D. Gatton, Esquire Maitland Center 1051 Winderley Place Maitland, Florida 32751 Bernon Earl Thomas 4226 Match Point Drive Augusta, Georgia 30909 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.426(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(a), (b), and (e), Florida Statutes, 1/ by: acting as a broker; failing to deposit money in escrow; committing fraud, deceit, or dishonesty; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate sales person under license number 0585127. In September, 1992, Respondent's real estate license had lapsed. It was renewed on October 22, 1992. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a sales person at 457 Loma Bonita Drive, Davenport, Florida. Respondent is a British citizen doing business in Florida. Respondent owns 50 percent of the outstanding stock of Newbay Florida Associates ("Newbay") and Newbay Properties of Central Florida, Inc ("Newbay Properties"). Mr. Paul Chandler is a British citizen confined to a wheelchair by osteogenesis imperfecta, a bone disease. Mr. Chandler was injured in an automobile accident by a drunken driver in 1989. As a result, Mr. Chandler was awarded a jury verdict of $600,000. From the net proceeds of the jury verdict, Mr. Chandler purchased four houses in Florida from Respondent. The houses were for Mr. Chandler and members of his family who have disabilities similar to Mr. Chandler's. 2/ Mr. Chandler paid the remainder of his jury award, approximately $225,000, to Respondent to purchase a furniture franchise. The franchise was to be operated as Flamingo Interiors, Inc. ("Flamingo"), in Kissimmee, Florida. In September, 1992, Respondent and Mr. Chandler negotiated and executed a Franchise Rights Agreement (the "agreement"). The agreement identifies Mr. Chandler as the "franchisee" but otherwise conceals material facts and contains misrepresentations, false promises, false pretenses, and amounts to dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device. The agreement illustrates Respondent's fraud and breach of trust in a business transaction. The agreement contains the name "NEWBAY FLORIDA ASSOCIATES" across the top of the front page of the document. However, the agreement identifies the "franchisor" as Flamingo Interiors of Wells, Somerset, England. The agreement requires Flamingo Interiors to perform numerous obligations. The obligations include: setting up a retail store; providing all necessary training, licensing, qualifications, visas, and inventory; conveying an exclusive area of operation within an "eight (8) miles radius from the Newbay office;" and establishing the location and size of the retail store at the discretion of Newbay. The agreement represents that Newbay owns 25 percent of the outstanding stock in Flamingo Interiors. However, the agreement conceals Flamingo Interiors' place of formation, organization, and current status, and conceals Newbay's authority, or lack of authority, to bind Flamingo Interiors to the obligations of the franchisor in the agreement. Respondent is the only signatory to the agreement other than Mr. Chandler. Respondent signed the agreement on behalf of Newbay. No one from Flamingo Interiors is a signatory to the agreement. The purchase price under the agreement requires Mr. Chandler to deposit $45,000 upon execution of the agreement. The balance of $180,000 is to be paid by December 31, 1992. Mr. Chandler paid the $225,000 required under the agreement in three checks made payable to "Newbay Clients Account." Respondent represented that the amounts paid by Mr. Chandler would be held in the escrow account of Newbay Properties until the obligations of the franchisor were completed in accordance with the terms of the agreement. All negotiations were conducted in the offices of Newbay Properties. Newbay Properties had no escrow account. Respondent failed to place the $225,000 paid to him by Mr. Chandler into any escrow account. The obligations of the franchisor were never satisfied, in whole or in part. Neither Respondent, Newbay, nor Flamingo Interiors made any attempt to obtain performance of the obligations of the franchisor. After repeated efforts and requests by Mr. Chandler, Respondent failed to account for or return Mr. Chandler's money. Respondent never explained his failure to return the money deposited with Respondent by Mr. Chandler.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(k), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.42(1)(a); guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b); and revoking Respondent's real estate sales license. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February 1995.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute licensees under Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondents, Al and Catherine Kravchuk, respectively, hold Florida real estate licenses 0420576 and 0436106. Both licenses are sales licenses. The license of Respondent, Al Kravchuck, became inactive sometime between June 24, 1991, and October 1, 1991. From July 8, 1991, to January 4, 1993, Respondent, Catherine Kravchuck, was licensed as a salesperson with Davis Land Company, Inc. ("Davis Land Company"). From 1979 through 1993, Davis Land Company was engaged in the development of single family subdivisions in the area of Orlando, Florida. Mr. Joel C. Davis was the president of Davis Land Company. Mr. Davis was a nonlicensed owner-developer. Flamingo Lakes Subdivision in Kissimmee, Florida ("Flamingo Lakes") was one of the developments undertaken by Davis Land Company. Davis Land Company employed four sales people at Flamingo Lakes. Respondent, Catherine Kravchuck, was one of the four sales people on staff at Flamingo Lakes. When a contract for sale was generated at Flamingo Lakes, it was turned in at the regular Monday sales meeting. Mr. Davis reviewed the contract to determine the cost of the sale including "extras" and commissions. A cover sheet was attached to each contract to apprise Mr. Davis of the cost of each sale. Respondent, Al Kravchuck, was the U.S. representative for Mr. Christopher Williams and Mr. Jack Dawson. Mr. Williams and Mr. Dawson are residents of Great Britain. Respondent, Al Kravchuck, performed services for Mr. Williams and Mr. Dawson, including services in connection with the purchase of property in the United States. Respondent, Al Kravchuck, represented Mr. Williams and Mr. Dawson in connection with the purchase of Lot 45 in Flamingo Lakes. On January 13, 1992, Respondent, Catherine Kravchuck, prepared a contract between Davis Land Company and Messrs. Williams and Dawson for the sale and purchase of Lot 45. The contract was signed by the purchasers and presented to Mr. Davis at the regular Monday meeting along with the cover sheet. Respondent, Al Kravchuck, was listed on the cover sheet as the cooperating realtor and on the contract as the co-broker. The amount of the commission due the cooperating realtor under the terms of the contract was $5,477.50. Respondents disclosed to Mr. Davis that the commission due Respondent, Al Kravchuck, under the terms of the contract was intended for Mr. Williams. This arrangement was consistent with the understanding that Mr. Williams would refer other customers to Davis Land Company in exchange for the co-broker commission. The contract for the sale and purchase of Lot 45 closed on or about August 28, 1992. The closing statement disclosed that a check in the amount of $5,477.50 was to be paid at closing to Respondent, Al Kravchuck, from the funds due Davis Land Company. Mr. Davis was present at the closing and discussed the prospect of future business referrals with Mr. Williams. Mr. Davis signed the closing statement and accepted the proceeds of closing. The closing agent issued a check for $5,477.50 to Respondent, Al Kravchuck, on September 11, 1992. A memo of the check was sent to Davis Land Company. Pursuant to the agreement of Mr. Williams, Respondent, Al Kravchuck, kept a substantial portion of the $5,477.50 in payment for services rendered to Mr. Williams.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondents be found not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that Respondent, Al Kravchuck, be found guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(a) and (e) and 475.42(1)(b) and (d), reprimanded, placed on probation for one year, and required to complete 30 hours of professional education courses within a reasonable period not less than the period of probation. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-6 Accepted in substance Accepted as to broker status but not as to employer. Compare statement of agency in proposed finding 8. Accepted in substance First two sentences rejected as recited testimony. Remainder accepted in substance Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact 4-9 Accepted in substance (The proposed findings are numbered para. 4-9) COPIES FURNISHED: Al Emil Kravchuk Catherine L. Kravchuk 3099 Bridgehampton Lane Orlando, FL 32812-5951 Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street, North Tower Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0729
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, a Florida-licensed yacht salesman, should be disciplined for violation of Rule 61B- 60.006(2), Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated May 10, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, DBPR, through its Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (the Division) was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and discipline of yacht salespersons and brokers in this state and the regulation of the yacht-brokering profession. Respondent, Justo Lamar (Lamar), has been licensed as a yacht salesperson since November 1976. Prior to this action, Lamar has never been the subject of disciplinary action arising out of the practice of his profession. This action was precipitated by a yacht owner, Juan A. Galan (Galan), who unsuccessfully attempted to sell his yacht to a client of Lamar's. In July 1998, Galan listed his yacht, the Caliente, for sale through Ardell Yacht and Ship Brokers (Ardell). The listing resulted in negotiations for the purchase of the Caliente by one Larry Griggs (Griggs), a prospective customer represented by Lamar. At all times relevant to this case, Lamar was acting as a sales agent for Allied Marine and its broker, Dwight Tracy (Tracy). As set forth in more detail below, the negotiations between Galan and Griggs took place over a three-month period from October 1998 through December 1998 with no meeting of the minds. On July 12, 1999, some seven months after negotiations between Griggs and Galan terminated, Galan lodged a complaint with DBPR. Although the complaint was ostensibly directed against salesman Lamar and broker Tracy, each and every allegation in the complaint was directed to the broker's conduct, not Lamar's. Galan, who did not testify at final hearing, alleged in his complaint that "Broker presented a contract representing that deposit had been received/deposited (upon acceptance). In fact, broker never deposited check and we wasted our time and money on survey/sea trial as buyer was not (at that time or any time later) financially capable of buying boat @ $1.75 million." Galan provided some, but by no means all, of the documents which revealed the details of the prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations between Galan and Griggs. In the narrative portion of his complaint, Galan asserted that he lost money on sea trials and implied, without actually stating, that the Caliente had been taken off the market during the pendency of negotiations with Griggs. For reasons which remain unclear, the Division did not focus its investigation on Tracy, who was the obvious target of Galan's complaint. Instead, it targeted Lamar, who was an obvious add-on target of Galan's ire. The exhibits reveal a complex series of offers and counteroffers and jockeying for negotiating advantage, not just between Galan and Griggs as prospective Seller and Buyer of the Caliente, but also between Lamar and the two brokers, all three of whom stood to profit if the transaction were consummated. Negotiations for the Caliente began in late October 1998. On October 30, 1998, Lamar's client Griggs, through a corporation he controlled, issued a $150,000 check for "Deposit, 72' (sic) Caliente Sportfisherman." This check accompanied a Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement dated October 29, 1998, offering to purchase the Caliente for $1,500,000. That same day, Galan's representatives faxed Lamar to advise that Griggs' offer was insufficient. Lamar forthwith provided the check to his broker, Tracy. Negotiations between Galan and Griggs continued in November. Galan chose to by-pass his own Broker and negotiate directly with Lamar over lunch on November 18, 1998. Lamar wrote Galan's demands on the back of a restaurant placemat. The primary sticking point was Galan's insistence on a "bottom line" of $1,665,000 to him, after all commissions and other expenses, if any, were paid. Griggs nevertheless persevered in his effort to buy the Caliente for $1,500,000. On November 24, 2000, Griggs executed another Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement in which he offered an entity called Majua, Inc., of which Galan was President, the opportunity to sell the Caliente to Griggs for $1,500,000. Galan signed the November 24 agreement, but added an addendum which materially changed the terms. The addendum unilaterally purported to raise the sales prices to Galan's previously stated "bottom line" of $1,665,000. Thanksgiving passed, and negotiations wore on. On December 4, 1998, Griggs executed a third Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement, raising his offer to $1,755,000. The new offer expressly stipulated that Griggs' $150,000 earnest money check could be deposited when and if all parties executed this new proposed agreement. Like the October 29 and November 24 brokerage purchase and sale agreements, the December 4 document never ripened into a contract. The December 4 document was a clear and unembarrassed reminder from Griggs that an earnest money check had been written by Griggs, but was not on deposit, and was not going to be on deposit until such time as Galan had signed off on the contract as written by Griggs. Galan nevertheless permitted a sea trial of the Caliente in furtherance of negotiations, now in their fifth week. Also as part of the negotiating process, Galan permitted some, but not all, of the inspections requested by Griggs. Expenses for the sea trial and inspections were borne entirely by Griggs. By Christmas Eve, relations between the parties had deteriorated to the point where Lamar retrieved the check from the Allied Marine corporate files and returned it to Griggs. At no time did negotiations with Lamar's client Griggs preclude or interfere with efforts by Galan to negotiate with and sell the Caliente to any other prospective purchaser.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DBPR enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2001.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(e) and (1)(m), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is 58 years old. He is employed full-time as a real estate sales associate. Respondent holds an active real estate sales associate license. His license number is SL706350. The license was issued to Respondent based upon his sworn application for licensure submitted on or about March 14, 2001. Question No. 9 on the license application asked whether Respondent had “ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if [he] received a withhold of adjudication.” The following explanation is provided as part of the question: This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including felony, misdemeanor and traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer “NO” because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing prior to answering “NO.” (Emphasis supplied) Immediately following Question No. 9 is the following statement in all capital letters: YOUR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WILL BE CHECKED AGAINST LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL RECORDS. FAILURE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION ACCURATELY MAY RESULT IN THE REVOCATION OF YOUR LICENSE OR THE DENIAL OF A REAL ESTATE LICENSE. IF YOU DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS QUESTION, CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY OR THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE. Respondent checked the box marked “NO” for Question No. 9 on the application that he submitted. Respondent’s negative answer to Question No. 9 was a material misstatement of his criminal record. On March 27, 1972, Respondent pled guilty to attempted robbery in the third degree in the Erie County Court in New York. The offense was a felony. On May 5, 1972, Respondent was sentenced to five years of probation for that offense. Respondent’s probation was revoked on January 14, 1974, and he was sentenced to “the care and custody of the NY State Narcotic Addiction Control Commission for an indefinite period of 60 months.” The latter sentence ran concurrently with a sentence imposed for another offense, the substance of which is not reflected in the record. On August 3, 1992, the Erie County Court issued a Certificate of Relief From Disabilities to Respondent, which relieved him of “all disabilities and bars to employment, excluding the right to be eligible for public office.” The certificate expressly states that it “shall NOT be deemed nor construed to be a pardon,” and it is limited to the “crime or offense specified [t]herein.” The Certificate of Relief From Disabilities makes no mention of expungement or sealing of the records related to the enumerated offense. The only offense enumerated in the Certificate of Relief From Disabilities is the third degree attempted robbery conviction with a sentence date of May 5, 1972. No other offenses are mentioned. On February 18, 1993, the New York Executive Department, Board of Parole, issued a Certificate of Good Conduct to Respondent. The certificate referenced three offenses: the third degree attempted robbery conviction discussed above; a second degree robbery conviction with a sentence date of May 8, 1975; and a federal distribution of heroine conviction with a sentence date of May 1, 1978. The purpose of the Certificate of Good Conduct was to “remove all legal bars and disabilities to employment, license and privilege except those pertaining to firearms . . . and except the right to be eligible for public office.” The certificate states that it “shall be considered permanent.” The Certificate of Good Conduct makes no mention of expungement or sealing of the records related to the enumerated offenses. Respondent testified that his negative answer to Question No. 9 was based upon his understanding of the legal effect of the Certificate of Relief from Disabilities and the Certificate of Good Conduct. Specifically, Respondent testified that although he understood that the certificates did not “remove” his criminal history or expunge his records, it was his understanding that the certificates provided him a “safe harbor” to answer “no” to Question No. 9 because all legal bars to employment had been removed by the certificates. Respondent’s understanding regarding the legal effect of the certificates and his obligation to disclose his prior offenses based upon the certificates was based, in part, on advice he received from an attorney in New York. Respondent knew that the Department would learn of his criminal history through the background check based upon the fingerprint card that he submitted with his license application, and he credibly testified that he did not intend to mislead the Department regarding his criminal history through his negative answer to Question No. 9. Respondent was unaware at the time he submitted his license application that the Department and/or the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) processed applications in which no criminal history was disclosed differently than applications in which a criminal history is disclosed.2 Respondent’s understanding regarding the legal effect of the certificates was erroneous. Respondent acknowledged as much in his testimony at the final hearing (Tr. 54) and in his PRO (at ¶29). The record does not establish precise legal effect of the certificates,3 but it is inferred that the certificates restore the civil rights that Respondent lost due to his felony convictions. It is also inferred that the reason that the Certificate of Good Conduct does not mention Respondent’s misdemeanor offenses (See Endnote 5) even though it was issued after those offenses is because misdemeanor convictions typically do not result is the loss of civil rights as is the case with felony convictions.4 Neither of the certificates expunge or seal any of Respondent’s criminal records and, contrary to his understanding at the time, the certificates did not excuse Respondent from disclosing his criminal offenses in response to Question No. 9 on the license application. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Respondent was convicted of third degree attempted robbery, a felony, in 1972; that the offense was not sealed or expunged; and that Respondent failed to disclose that conviction on his license application when he answered “no” to Question No. 9.5 The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent intentionally misrepresented or fraudulently concealed his criminal history from the Department by answering “no” to Question No. 9.6 To contrary, the evidence establishes that Respondent’s negative answer to Question No. 9 was based upon his good faith, albeit erroneous belief, that he was not required to disclose his prior criminal offenses in light of the Certificate of Relief from Disabilities and/or the Certificate of Good Conduct. It has been 34 years since Respondent’s third degree attempted robbery conviction, which is the basis of the Administrative Complaint. It has been more than 18 years since Respondent’s last criminal offense, which was a misdemeanor petit larceny offense. All of Respondent’s criminal offenses occurred in the state of New York. He has remained out of trouble with the law since he came to Florida in 2000. Respondent has not been the subject of any disciplinary action, other than this proceeding, since receiving his license. Respondent did not present the testimony of any character witnesses, but he credibly testified that he has completely turned his life around since the time of his criminal offenses in New York. Respondent served in the U.S. Air Force Security Service in Viet Nam. He was honorably discharged. Respondent was licensed as a mental health counselor in New York and Virginia prior to coming to Florida and obtaining his real estate sales associate license. Respondent testified that he was required to disclose his criminal background and undergo a background check in order to obtain those licenses; that he did not disclose his criminal background on the license applications based upon his understanding of the certificates described above; that his criminal background was not an issue to the licensing agencies in New York and Virginia, even though it was not disclosed on his license applications; and that this experience (along with the advice he received from the attorney in New York) led him to believe that his criminal records were sealed and need not be disclosed. Respondent offered no evidence to corroborate this self-serving testimony, and it is given very little weight because it is unknown how, if at all, the disclosure requirements and licensure regimes for mental health counselors in New York and Virginia compare with the disclosure requirements and licensure regime for real estate sales associates in Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order that: finds Respondent not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (Count I of the Administrative Complaint); finds Respondent guilty of violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2) and, hence, Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Count II of the Administrative Complaint); imposes an administrative fine of $1,000; suspends Respondent’s license for 30 days; places Respondent on probation for one year after the end of the suspension period; and imposes the costs related to the investigation and prosecution of this case, excluding costs associated with an attorney’s time. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st of December, 2006.
