The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent unlawfully conducted gambling operations at its licensed business establishment, and, if so, what penalty is warranted.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, licensing and monitoring businesses licensed under the Florida Beverage and Tobacco laws. Department headquarters are in Tallahassee, Florida. Respondent is a duly-licensed business monitored by the Department. The business, known as Tubby's, is a small bar or pub that serves alcohol pursuant to its license. The business has five video games with names such as Stone Age, Cherry Master, and Haunted House. The games allow customers to accumulate points as they play. The points are then registered on a written slip of paper printed by the video game after each period of play. There are a number of video surveillance cameras in Tubby's which are used to monitor the hallway, bathroom, and bartenders. The bar has experienced trouble in the past with drug deals and installed the cameras to prevent such activities from re-occurring. One of the video cameras, the one pointed toward the video game area, was in fact not actually a working camera according to Tubby's representative.3 On October 19, 2007, two agents employed by the Department conducted an investigation of Tubby's to ascertain whether illegal gambling was going on in the establishment. Special Agent Michael Chandler sat at one of the video machines and played approximately $5.00 worth of currency. Upon completion, he had accumulated 4 points as evidenced by a game slip which printed from the machine. The game slip had the following information printed on it: "TUBBY'S GAME 1; NO CASH VALUE; 1/20/07 01:17:37 1404."4 Chandler gave the slip to the bartender, and it was placed on a red diary or log kept behind the bar. When the slip was later recovered by Chandler, his undercover name (Mike Boone) had been written on the slip. Also written across the top of the slip were the words, "Not Paid. Same guy as last night." Special Agent Robert Baggett also played one of the games. He played $30.00 worth of coins and won 100 points as indicated on his game slips.5 Baggett says another patron told him that he could get actual money for the slips, but that testimony was not confirmed by non-hearsay evidence. Baggett gave his slips to the bartender and asked what he could receive for them. This exchange between Baggett and his counsel at final hearing addressed what happened next: Q: And did the bartender do anything with the game slips? A: He asked me my name, and I gave him my alias. And he advised me that the scores will be tabulated at the end of the week, and that if I got the highest score my name would be placed on the electronic scoreboard that hung next to the bar area. Q: To your understanding, do the game slips have any value? A: Based upon my previous education, training and experience, these points are redeemable for monetary items. Because we have conducted several investigations in the past where we actually were paid out in the form of bar tabs or actual money. There was no mention by the bartender of cash payments being available for the game slips that Baggett acquired at Tubby's. In fact, in contrast to what Baggett had experienced in other investigations, this establishment specifically applied earned points to a non-monetary function, i.e., listing the winners' names on a game board. Based on their determination that illegal gambling was occurring, Chandler and Baggett seized a number of lottery tickets, a bank bag filled with cash, and the game slips from the log book. The cash was primarily twenty-dollar bills wrapped in bundles of $1,000 each for a total of $3,049.00. Each night, the Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) was replenished with cash. The register report produced at final hearing by Respondent clearly indicates a daily deposit of cash into the ATM. Goulet's testimony that the cash in the bank bag was used to replenish the ATM on site at Tubby's is credible. The game slips from customers were shredded or otherwise disposed of at the end of each week because there was no reason to keep them. This explanation is credible. The Department’s concern and position that the slips should be maintained in case some customer questioned his or her point total is speculative and not supported by the facts. Also confiscated from the establishment by Chandler and Baggett was a hand-written list of professional football teams. The list contained the first names or nicknames of 13 individuals, along with a statement of each player's record from the prior week. This sheet was obviously representative of some sort of football pool, but there is no evidence whatsoever that it was used for gambling purposes or involved the payment or exchange of money. The video camera in the gaming area of Tubby's was, as previously discussed, not a working camera. The game area was purposely set up by Tubby's management to look like a casino gambling area. This was meant to enhance the enjoyment of playing the video machines. Goulet testified that Tubby's is an alternative lifestyle bar and that its clientele is fairly regular, i.e., they see the same people over and over. Due to its location off the main thoroughfares, there are not a lot of folks who just drop in to the bar.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation finding that Respondent, Rick's of South Florida, Inc., d/b/a Tubby's, is not guilty of conducting illegal gambling at its business site. Based upon the foregoing recommendation, it is further RECOMMENDED that Exhibits 5, 8, and 10 be returned to Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Auburn Ford, Jr., was employed by Respondent as a Lottery Investigator from November 1987 until his demotion to the position of Security Officer on August 23, 1991. Respondent admits that Petitioner was the only black Lottery Investigator and that he was replaced by a white male. Petitioner's demotion, as a disciplinary action by Respondent, was detailed in a letter dated August 23, 1991, to Petitioner from Respondent's representative. In that letter, it was asserted that Petitioner's demotion was the result of his entry into a high security area without legitimate business reasons on July 14, 1991; his entry into a high security area through use of an access card of a subordinate Security Officer, as opposed to use of his own card; his untruthful response concerning use of a telephone in the high security area; and his inaccurate reporting of hours worked in the month of June, 1991. As a Lottery Investigator, Petitioner's duties included implementation of lottery procedures and policies; maintaining controlled access where appropriate; as well as providing training, guidance and supervision of lottery Security Officers. Lottery Investigators are sworn or certified law enforcement officers while Security Officers are unsworn. At the time of his demotion, Petitioner worked the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift along with Linda Koss, another Lottery Investigator. Along with Koss, he jointly supervised the Lottery Security Officers assigned to that shift. The building housing the lottery department is a secure facility in that all persons entering the building must have access authority evidenced by an access badge. In the absence of an access badge, a temporary or visitor's badge allows access to the building in the company of an escort. Within the lottery building, there are areas which are subject to additional security. Access to these areas is limited to the individuals working in those areas and others who have a work-related need to be there. Each employee's access area is determined by the employee's supervisor. An employee's access badge is then programmed for that particular employee's approved access. Lottery Investigators and Security Officers have access to all areas within the building. Each employee is required to sign an access card receipt form upon receipt of the individual employee's access badge. The receipt states that access privileges accompanying the badge are to be used only by that particular employee and that improper or unauthorized use of the badge could subject the employee to termination or other disciplinary action. Security personnel, including Petitioner, signed such a receipt form and knew that exchanging access cards was a violation of security policies. Policies and procedures of Respondent governing access badges establish a comprehensive scheme designed to ensure lottery security through controlled access to the lottery building and areas within the building. Allen Dees was head of Respondent's Bureau of Security and supervisor of Lottery Investigators and Security Officers, during Petitioner's tenure as a Lottery Investigator. Dees orally instructed employees subject to his supervision to refrain from interfering with items on desks throughout the building. The instruction was repeated emphatically after an incident where the theft of personal employee items resulted in the resignation from employment by one Division of Security employee and termination of another's employment. Since Division of Security employees are alone in the lottery building after normal working hours, any unexplained interference with or use of employees' desks, equipment or property often results in the visitation of suspicion upon security employees. In the course of performing their duties, Lottery Investigators and Security Officers periodically conduct watch tours. These tours consist of walking through specified areas of the building to check for security or safety violations. A watch tour of the executive offices is appropriately called The Executive Watch Tour. This tour includes the entire second floor of the lottery building where the executive offices are located, as well as an area known as the On-Line Game area. Watch tours have a minimum and maximum length of time for completion. The length of allotted time for these tours is established to permit an unhurried but consistent inspection of the areas on the tour. Lottery Investigators and Security Officers conducting a tour are to proceed steadily during that activity and not dawdle. Within the On-Line Game area is located the computer system which runs and maintains the integrity of the on-line gaming system of the Lottery, as well as other sensitive and confidential information. Access to this area is controlled by an access card or badge reader which allows entry only to those persons involved in the gaming operation and to security personnel. Security personnel are instructed to use their access badges to enter the area and remain only long enough to permit a determination that there are no safety or security problems in the area. Entering and remaining in this high security area for reasons other than determining the existence of safety or security problems is unauthorized. On the night of July 14, 1991, Petitioner approached Ed Maxwell, a Security Officer subject to Petitioner's supervision, and demanded Maxwell's access badge. Maxwell, who was monitoring the security computer console at the time and saw that Petitioner's own badge was in Petitioner's shirt pocket, knew that allowing another person to use his access badge was a violation of security policy, but complied since Petitioner was his supervisor. Maxwell later observed from the computer console that his access badge was being used to open the access-controlled door to the On-Line Game Area. When Petitioner later returned his badge, Maxwell asked why Petitioner had not used his own badge. Petitioner simply responded that he was the supervisor and expected Maxwell to do what he requested. Maxwell reported the incident to Linda Koss, the other Lottery Investigator on duty in the building at the time and met later with security chief Dees on July 23, 1991. After the meeting, Maxwell filed a written report dated July 24, 1991, with Dees regarding the incident. On July 31, 1991, Frank Carter, Director of Respondent's Division of Security, wrote a memorandum to Petitioner. In the memorandum, Carter detailed several allegations of misconduct by Petitioner, including Petitioner's use of Security Officer Maxwell's card to the enter the On-Line Games Area and Petitioner's entry into the closed office of Respondent's Deputy Secretary of Marketing. Carter's memorandum requested a response from Petitioner. Petitioner's written response stated that the allegations were untrue. Petitioner's presence in the On-Line Game Area on the date in question was confirmed by a copy of a real-time print out of telephone calls made from that location. A telephone call lasting approximately 16 minutes had been made from the On-Line Game Area to Petitioner's home on July 14, 1992. On August 3, 1991, Maxwell again wrote a memorandum to Dees, complaining about what he perceived as harassment from Petitioner for reporting the previous badge borrowing incident. In the memorandum, Maxwell detailed altercations where Petitioner had called him a "dishonest honkey" and a "liar", as well as attempting to instigate a physical confrontation with Maxwell. Further, Maxwell related that Ford had called his home at midnight when Maxwell was out sick, demanding that Maxwell bring in a doctor's excuse or suffered a loss of pay for the sick time. On August 5, 1991, Koss wrote a memorandum to Dees in which she supported Maxwell's version of the events occurring on the midnight shift and voiced her concern that the effectiveness of the shift was deteriorating. On August 14, 1991, both Petitioner and Koss wrote memorandums to Dees. Each blamed the other for an escalating atmosphere of hostility between two factions on the midnight shift: One faction comprised of Koss and Maxwell, and the other faction comprised of Ford and two other Security Officers. On August 15, 1991, Carter, along with Respondent's Deputy Secretary of Operations and Director of Personnel Administration, met with the midnight shift personnel. During the course of the meeting, Petitioner admitted to use of Maxwell's card in entering the On-Line Game area as well as entry of the Deputy Secretary of Marketing's office. When asked directly if he had ever made a personal call from the On Line Game area, Petitioner stated that he had not. Later Petitioner conceded he had made the July 14, 1992 telephone call from the On-Line Game Area to his home. Petitioner began working the midnight shift in April of 1991. At that time, Koss was already working the midnight shift and was warned by another Lottery Investigator that Petitioner was not always accurate in his report of his hours worked. Koss began keeping track of Petitioner's attendance by noting his absences on her personal calendar. She had no knowledge of whether absences were approved or unauthorized. Koss observed Petitioner's June 1991 time sheet on the desk of an assistant and noticed that he reported having worked on June 12 and June 13, 1991. She had noted on her calendar that Petitioner had been absent on those days with the exception of four hours of excused absence to attend firearms training. She reported the discrepancy to Dees. Dees in turn consulted system computer records to determine if Petitioner had signed into the system on those days and determined that he had not. Consequently, it was determined that Petitioner had falsified his time sheet by recording his presence on both days. The exchange of access badges by Security Officers was a frequent occurrence even though it was known to be a security violation. The practice was frequent with the midnight shift and went unreported to the chief of security, who would have instituted disciplinary proceedings had he known of the practice. Testimony was presented by Randy Ringpfiel, a Security Officer, to the effect that the practice was also widespread among Lottery Investigators and known to management, but Ringpfiel's testimony is rejected in view of his demeanor and lack of credibility while testifying. Previously, in February of 1991, Petitioner accompanied a shipment of lottery tickets to an incinerator facility in Panama City, Florida, where lottery materials were to be destroyed in accordance with a contract between Respondent and the incinerator facility. An argument occurred with personnel at the incinerator. Petitioner perceived that the argument and disagreement with the incinerator workers resulted from the fact that they were white and he was black. Petitioner reported to Dees that the incinerator personnel were discriminating against him. A subsequent meeting was held between Respondent's management officials and management personnel from the incinerator facility. Respondent's management informed the incinerator management that racial discrimination toward its employees would not be tolerated. The attitude of incinerator personnel was not a result of racism. Instead, employees at the facility simply disliked dealing with shipments from Respondent since those shipments required special consideration in the process of destruction by burning. For instance, Respondent's security personnel were required to observe and oversee the actual destruction of all lottery materials. Often, the material from scratch off tickets complicated matters because the level of pollutants in these materials would exceed air quality and heat restrictions under which the facility was constrained to operate. Assured by incinerator management personnel that the altercations with Petitioner were not racial in nature, Respondent's management later transferred Petitioner, at his request, to the midnight shift which did not require performance of any duties associated with the incinerator facility. Carter, along with Respondent's Deputy Secretary of Operations and Respondent's General Counsel, met following the August 15, 1991 meeting with personnel of the midnight shift. The purpose of the meeting was to consider the appropriate disciplinary action to be imposed on Petitioner in view of the infractions committed by him. Since, in addition to violation of lottery security policies, the infractions involved dishonesty both in answering questions and in completing time sheets accurately, the options of termination and demotion were considered. Demotion to the position of Security Officer was determined to be the appropriate penalty after a review of Petitioner's past work performance and prior disciplinary actions. The consensus of management was that a great deal had been invested in the training of Petitioner and he had proven in the past that he could be a satisfactory employee, although not as a supervisor. It was felt that supervisors must be dependable and honest and permit upper level management to rely on their representations. This is particularly important with regard to security personnel assigned to supervisory positions on the night shift where there is no direct supervision beyond the Lottery Investigators on duty. In order to permit Petitioner to be considered for promotion back to the position of Lottery Investigator if his performance improved, the demotion of Petitioner from a sworn or certified law enforcement officer position to an unsworn position was not reported to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. An action that very likely prevented an investigation and possible removal of Petitioner's law enforcement officer certification by that agency. Prior to his demotion, Petitioner received three performance evaluations. The first of these was an evaluation covering the period of November 13, 1987 to November 13, 1988, where Petitioner received an overall rating of "achieves standards". The evaluation included individual ratings in the categories of reliability, punctuality, and technical application which were "exceeds standards". Petitioner received a "below standards" rating in the category of communication skills. The second evaluation of Petitioner's performance covered the period November 13, 1988 to November 13, 1989. He again received an overall rating of "achieves standards." The evaluation showed that he exceeded standards in the area of technical application, and was deficient or below standards in the category of reliability and punctuality. Petitioner's third evaluation covered the period November 13, 1989 to November 13, 1990. Again, he achieved overall standards and exceeded standards in the area of technical application. He was deficient or below standards in the category of reliability and punctuality, as well as a category termed "other" where his attitude was noted to be poor regarding his work. His comments that he had no incentive were also documented in the evaluation. Petitioner was placed on a performance improvement plan from January 30, 1991, through April 30, 1991, which he satisfactorily completed. Respondent's discipline policy provides that discharge is an appropriate penalty for the first offense of a security policy violation. Penalties for the first offense of falsification of documents range from a written warning to discharge. There is no listed penalty for failing to truthfully answer questions posed by a superior.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Rejected to the extent that this proposed finding seeks to establish that management had prior knowledge of a generalized practice of violation of security procedures through the exchange of access badges by employees. Such a finding is not supported by weight of the evidence. Rejected, Petitioner's entry into a restricted area and use of a telephone for non-work related purposes is undisputed. Also, the evidence supports a finding that Petitioner was untruthful when questioned regarding the matter. 3.-4. Rejected, subordinate to Hearing Officer's findings on these matters. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-22. Accepted and addressed in major part, although not verbatim. COPIES FURNISHED: Auburn Ford, Jr. 727 Circle Drive Quincy, Florida 32351 Louisa H. Warren, Esquire Department of the Lottery Capitol Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4011 Margaret Jones Clerk Florida Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925
The Issue The issue is whether the word, "internal," in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-14.041(1) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because Respondent exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority or because this word enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the law implemented, in violation of sections 120.56(3) and 120.52(8)(b) and (c). In sum, Petitioner and Intervenor challenge rule 61D-14.041(1) only to the extent that this rule requires that each slot machine contain an internal random number generator.
The Issue Whether the Respondent's Proposed Rule 61D-11.012(5)(d) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Petition Challenging the Validity of Proposed Rule 61D-11.012(5)(d) filed March 14, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the Agreed Facts included in the parties' Pre- Hearing Stipulation, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Parties The Division is authorized to administer cardrooms; to regulate the operation of cardrooms; and to adopt rules governing the operation of cardrooms. See § 849.086(4), Fla. Stat. (2007).1 Hartman and Tyner owns a pari-mutuel facility doing business as Mardi Gras Racetrack and Gaming Center, located at 831 North Federal Highway, Hallandale Beach, Florida 33009. Hartman and Tyner holds two pari-mutuel permits to conduct greyhound racing at this pari-mutuel facility, the BET Miami permit and the Mardi Gras permit. Pursuant to these permits, the Division issued Hartman and Tyner two current licenses to conduct pari-mutuel wagering at this pari-mutuel facility: License #141, which was issued under the BET Miami permit; and License #144, which was issued under the Mardi Gras permit. Pursuant to Section 849.086(5), Florida Statutes, Hartman and Tyner applied for, and the Division issued on June 28, 2007, two cardroom licenses allowing the operation of a cardroom with a maximum of 40 tables during the 2007/2008 season at its pari-mutuel facility. One cardroom license was issued in conjunction with the BET Miami permit, and the other cardroom license was issued in conjunction with the Mardi Gras permit. Hartman and Tyner computes the monthly gross receipts separately for the BET cardroom license and for the Mardi Gras cardroom license in calculating the 10 percent monthly tax imposed by Section 849.086(13)(a), Florida Statutes, and for purposes of the four percent monthly greyhound purse supplement imposed by Section 849.086(13)(b), Florida Statutes. Gulfstream Park holds two pari-mutuel permits to conduct thoroughbred and quarter horse racing at a pari-mutuel facility located in Broward County, Florida. Pursuant to Section 849.086(5), Florida Statutes, Gulfstream Park applied for, and the Division issued, a cardroom license in conjunction with its permit to conduct thoroughbred horse racing. Both Hartman and Tyner and Gulfstream Park are subject to regulation by Proposed Rule 61D-11.012(5)(d). The challenged proposed rule, relevant statutes, and legislative history. Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, which was first enacted in 1996, authorizes a person holding a pari-mutuel wagering permit to obtain a license to operate a cardroom at a pari-mutuel facility and sets forth the conditions under which such cardrooms are to operate.2 The legislative intent in enacting Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, is set forth as follows: LEGISLATIVE INTENT.--It is the intent of the Legislature to provide additional entertainment choices for the residents of and visitors to the state, promote tourism in the state, and provide additional state revenues through the authorization of the playing of certain games in the state at facilities known as cardrooms which are to be located at licensed pari-mutuel facilities. To ensure the public confidence in the integrity of authorized cardroom operations, this act is designed to strictly regulate the facilities, persons, and procedures related to cardroom operations. Furthermore, the Legislature finds that authorized games as herein defined are considered to be pari-mutuel style games and not casino gaming because the participants play against each other instead of against the house. Section 849.086(2), Florida Statutes, contains the following definitions which are pertinent to this proceeding: (c) "Cardroom" means a facility where authorized games are played for money or anything of value and to which the public is invited to participate in such games and charged a fee for participation by the operator of such facility. Authorized games and cardrooms do not constitute casino gaming operations. * * * (f) "Cardroom operator" means a licensed pari-mutuel permitholder which holds a valid permit and license issued by the division pursuant to chapter 550 and which also holds a valid cardroom license issued by the division pursuant to this section which authorizes such person to operate a cardroom and to conduct authorized games in such cardroom. Proposed Rule 61D-11.012 sets forth the duties of licensed cardroom operators at pari-mutuel facilities and is one of a number of proposed rules dealing with cardrooms at pari- mutuel facilities included in the Notice of Proposed Rule published by the Division on March 14, 2008, in Volume 34, Number 11, of the Florida Administrative Weekly. These rules were intended to implement changes to Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, enacted during the 2007 legislative session and effective July 1, 2007. Proposed Rule 61D-11.012(5), which contains the subsection that is the subject of this challenge, provides as follows:3 The cardroom operator must display the hours of operation in a conspicuous location in the cardroom subject to the following terms and conditions: Days and hours of cardroom operation shall be those set forth in the application or renewal of the cardroom operator. Changes to days and hours of cardroom operation shall be submitted to the division at least seven days prior to proposed implementation; Pursuant to Section 849.086(7)(b), F.S., a cardroom operator may operate a licensed facility any cumulative 12-hour period within the day; Activities such as the buying or cashing out of chips or tokens, seating customers, or completing tournament buy- insurance or cash-outs may be done one hour prior to or one hour after the cumulative 12-hour designated hours of operation; The playing of authorized games shall not occur for more than 12 hours within a day, regardless of the number of pari-mutuel permitholders operating at a pari-mutuel facility. Subsection(5)(d) was added to Proposed Rule 61D-11.012(5) at the end of February 2008, to "fix the Mardi Gras 24 hour cardroom issue."4 In the Notice of Proposed Rule for Proposed Rule 61D- 11.012, the Division identified its rulemaking authority as Section 550.0251(12) Florida Statutes, and Section 849.086(4) and (11), Florida Statutes. Sections 550.0251(12) and 849.086(4), Florida Statutes, both give the Division the authority to adopt rules governing, among other things, the operation of cardrooms at pari-mutuel facilities.5 These grants of rulemaking authority are sufficient to authorize the Division to promulgate Proposed Rule 61D-11.012. The Division stated in the Notice of Proposed Rule that Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, is the law implemented by Proposed Rule 61D-11.012. The only section of Proposed Rule 61D-11.012 challenged by Hartman and Tyner is Section (5)(d), which reflects the Division's interpretation of Section 849.086(7)(b), Florida Statutes. Section 849.086(7)(b), Florida Statutes, provides: "Any horserace, greyhound race, or jai alai permitholder licensed under this section may operate a cardroom at the pari- mutuel facility on any day for a cumulative amount of 12 hours if the permitholder meets the requirements under paragraph (5)(b)." Prior to the 2007 amendment, Section 849.086(7)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), provided in pertinent part: A cardroom may be operated at the facility only when the facility is authorized to accept wagers on pari-mutuel events during its authorized meet. A cardroom may operate between the hours of 12 noon and 12 midnight on any day a pari-mutuel event is conducted live as a part of its authorized meet. . . . Application to operate a cardroom under this paragraph must be made to the division as part of the annual license application. This version of the statute was enacted in 2003 and amended the original Section 849.086(7)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), which provided: A cardroom may be operated at the facility only when the facility is authorized to accept wagers on pari-mutuel events during its authorized meet. A cardroom may begin operations within 2 hours prior to the post time of the first pari-mutuel event conducted live at the pari-mutuel facility on which wagers are accepted and must cease operations within 2 hours after the conclusion of the last pari-mutuel event conducted live at the pari-mutuel facility on which wagers are accepted. Section 849.086(7)(b), Florida Statutes, requires that a pari-mutuel wagering permitholder must meet "the requirements under paragraph (5)(b)." Section 849.086(5), Florida Statutes, governs the issuance of cardroom licenses and provides that cardrooms may be operated only by persons holding valid cardroom licenses and that these licenses may be issued only to licensed pari-mutuel wagering permitholders. Section 849.086(5)(b), Florida Statutes,6 provides in pertinent part: After the initial cardroom license is granted, the application for the annual license renewal shall be made in conjunction with the applicant's annual application for its pari-mutuel license. If a permitholder has operated a cardroom during any of the 3 previous fiscal years and fails to include a renewal request for the operation of the cardroom in its annual application for license renewal, the permitholder may amend its annual application to include operation of the cardroom. In order for a cardroom license to be renewed the applicant must have requested, as part of its pari-mutuel annual license application, to conduct at least 90 percent of the total number of live performances conducted by such permitholder during either the state fiscal year in which its initial cardroom license was issued or the state fiscal year immediately prior thereto. If the application is for a harness permitholder cardroom, the applicant must have requested authorization to conduct a minimum of 140 live performances during the state fiscal year immediately prior thereto. If more than one permitholder is operating at a facility, each permitholder must have applied for a license to conduct a full schedule of live racing. Section 849.086(5)(b), Florida Statutes, was not changed by the 2007 amendments to Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, but, pertinent to this proceeding, the final sentence of the subsection was added by amendment in 2003. The effect of this amendment was described in the 2003 House of Representatives and Senate Staff Analyses as follows: "If more than one permitholder operates at a shared cardroom facility, each permitholder must apply for a license to conduct a full schedule of live racing." When introducing the bill that contained the 2007 amendment to Section 849.086(7)(b), Florida Statutes, to the Florida House of Representatives Jobs & Entrepreneurship Council, Representative Holloway, the sponsor of the House of Representatives bill, explained that the "cardroom bill . . . allows cardrooms to operate during live events, and the hours have changed from 12 hours a day . . . from a, from 12 Noon to 12 Midnight to 12 hours a day cumulative." In response to a question, Representative Holloway stated that the bill did not expand gambling in Florida, "[i]t is just re-arranging current provisions." In a similar vein, Senator Fasano, when he submitted a floor amendment to the Senate bill containing an amendment to Section 849.086(7)(b), Florida Statutes, stated that his amendment "limits the hours of operation of a cardroom to a cumulative amount equal to 12 hours in any day if the permit holder has met the requirements for licensure to operate a cardroom." Based on this legislative history and on the various iterations of the statute, the Division enacted Proposed Rule 61D-11.012(5)(d) to reflect its interpretation of the 2007 amendment to Section 849.086(7)(b), Florida Statutes, as limiting the operation of a cardroom at a pari-mutuel facility to a "cumulative amount of 12 hours." In the Division's view, the Legislature did not intend for the 2007 amendment to expand the number of hours a cardroom could operate but was intended only to allow a cardroom operator greater flexibility in setting the hours of operation. In promulgating Proposed Rule 61D- 11.012(5)(d), the Division made explicit its rejection of an interpretation of the 2007 amendment that would allow two pari- mutuel wagering permitholders licensed to operate a cardroom and sharing a pari-mutuel facility both to operate the cardroom at the pari-mutuel facility for a "cumulative amount of 12 hours" a day. The Division rejects such an interpretation because it could result in the operation of a cardroom at a pari-mutuel facility for 24 hours per day, exceeding what the Division considers the limitation on cardroom operation at a pari-mutuel facility to "a cumulative amount of 12 hours." § 849.086(7)(b), Fla. Stat.
The Issue Whether the proposed repeal of Rule 61D-11.027, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the repeal has the effect of creating or implementing a new rule or policy.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Legislature enacted Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, in 1996. The law authorized the establishment of “cardrooms” at licensed pari-mutuel facilities and dictated the parameters by which games may be conducted at such facilities. In essence, the cardrooms conduct games wherein the players compete against one another. The participants do not wager against “the house.” Instead, the house, that is, the pari-mutuel facility, conducts the games in a non-banking manner. This means the house does not have a financial interest in the outcome of the game(s). For purposes of this case, it is determined that the players who win share fractions of the “pot” created by the entry fees paid to participate in the game(s). The Petitioners in this cause are licensed facilities that have operated cardrooms. Each Petitioner holds a pari- mutuel wagering permit and a valid cardroom license. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering Section 849.086, Florida Statutes (2005). Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, was amended in 2003 by Section 4, Chapter 2003-295, Laws of Florida. The 2003 amendment imposed a $2.00 bet limitation, with a maximum of three raises per round of betting. This change to the statute required the Respondent to revisit the rules governing cardrooms and, more specifically, the concept of poker “tournaments” being conducted at pari-mutuel facilities. To that end, and after extensive rule-making proceedings, the Respondent adopted rules that were incorporated in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 61D-11. The Respondent intended for the rules to address concerns regarding the $2.00 bet and raise limitations as well as how “re-buys” might affect or potentially allow a violation of such provisions. A “re-buy” describes when a card player is allowed to purchase more chips from the house during a game(s). Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-11.027 was adopted on May 9, 2004. It was then challenged by pari-mutuel facilities who alleged the rule encompassed more than the statute authorized. Such challenge (DOAH Case No. 04-2950RX), was granted. The Final Order found that the rule (Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-11.027(2)(a)) exceeded the Agency’s grant of rulemaking authority, modified the specific law implemented, and was arbitrary. Accordingly, the Final Order (DOAH Case No. 04-2950RX) determined that the rule violated Subsections 120.52(8)(b), (c), and (e), Florida Statutes. The Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed the Final Order by a Per Curiam decision issued on October 28, 2005. Thereafter, the Respondent proceeded with the emergency repeal of the tournament rule in its entirety and issued an advisory letter to all cardroom license holders. The Respondent represented that it cannot reconcile the holding of the court with the explicit language of Section 849.086(8), Florida Statutes (2005). At the hearing, the Respondent represented that additional rulemaking will be necessary. The Respondent does not dispute that tournaments are permissible under the statute. Moreover, the parties agree that prior to the rule, repeal tournaments were conducted using tokens or chips that did not have value. Tournaments were played at licensed cardroom facilities during the period commencing in May 2004 through November 9, 2005. During that time (the period the rule was in effect) counties, cities, and the state received income from the monies remitted by the cardroom facilities. Additionally, the cardrooms employed persons to work the facilities to conduct the various games. After the repeal of the rule, revenues from the cardrooms decreased substantially. Similarly, the cardrooms did not need the number of employees as games were not being conducted. Tournaments at the St. Petersburg Kennel Club have not been conducted since January 17, 2006. From November 2005 through January 17, 2006, the tournaments at the St. Petersburg Kennel Club were conducted using chips or tokens that had “fractional value.” The “fraction” did not correspond to the entry fee charged for the tournament. It is not known whether or not re-buys during the tournaments were allowed. The Respondent issued a Memorandum to Pari-Mutuel General Managers at Cardroom Facilities and Cardroom Managers on January 12, 2006, that provided in part: In light of the recent ruling by the First District Court of Appeals, the Division’s administrative rules regarding tournaments have been repealed on an emergency basis, and are scheduled to be repealed permanently. The Division distributed a memorandum to all cardroom operators regarding Clarification of Cardroom Tournament Rules and Jackpots on November 9, 2005. The Division has also expressed on numerous occasions a serious concern of cardroom operators issuing chips in a fashion that does not represent an even value exchange for money in an attempt to circumvent the $2 bet and three raise limitation outlined in Chapter 849.086(8)(b), Florida Statutes. [Italics in original.] The November 9, 2005, Memorandum referred to in paragraph 14 above provided, in pertinent part: This memorandum is intended to clarify issues regarding the recent ruling by the First District Court of Appeals which affirmed an earlier ruling of the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). The DOAH ruling found that various cardroom rules, which were challenged by Dania Jai Alai and Calder Race Course, are invalid. These rules addressed tournaments, jackpots, the Division’s approval of games, and gifts that enable play in an authorized game. As a result of the ruling, today the Division filed emergency rules to ensure that tournaments are played in compliance with the bet limitation of Section 849.086(8)(b), Florida Statutes. * * * The Final Order that was affirmed by the First District Court of Appeals invalidated the Division’s rules regarding entry fees, re-buys and single table tournaments. The judge held that tournament play is authorized by the cardroom statute. Therefore, cardrooms may set their own entry fees and allow re-buys in tournaments and hold single table tournaments. * * * Unauthorized activity, such as conducting wagering on tournaments that does not conform with the wagering restrictions found in Section 849.086(8)(b), Florida Statutes, or offering of jackpots or gifts that do not comply with the requirements that cardrooms be operated in strict conformity with the statute as required by Section 849.086(3), Florida Statutes, may result in disciplinary action. The memorandums identified above did not change or modify the Respondent’s position regarding whether tournaments are legal or permitted by the statute. To the contrary, the memorandums merely advised the cardroom facilities that they would be held to the statutory standard regarding wagering and that jackpots and gifts would be prohibited. Prior to the appeal of the rule, the Respondent routinely approved tournaments that were based upon the following scheme: A participant paid a $32 buy-in and paid the house $13 for the fee to conduct the tournament. Then the participant received a number of no-value chips that were used to play a multiple number of games of poker. At the end of the designated time, number of games, or whenever the designated end occurred (on the same day of play), winners were announced based upon the number of chips they held. Participants were “ranked” and awarded cash prizes from the pot of entry fees. The $32 entry fee was a mathematical calculation thought to assure that no participant would violate the statute’s bet and raise limitations. Whether or not the “all in” concept violated the statute was not considered as the chips were deemed to have no value in and of themselves. This “no value” chip was a fiction that the Respondent supported as, in theory, the $32 player buy-in comported with a mathematical calculation that was within the statutory guideline. The payouts were determined based upon the number of participants and were set by percentage with the first place person receiving the largest payout. Additionally, participants under the approved scheme were not allowed re-buys. That assured that all participants started with the same number of chips and had the same “betting” potential. Finally, winners were not paid or could not receive prizes outside the “pot” created by the entry fees. A nominal gift (such as a T-shirt) was not considered a violation. Prizes such as giant television sets or vacations were not acceptable. All winnings were to be paid from the buy-in fees and all buy-in fees were to be returned to the players in winnings.
The Issue The factual issues in this unadopted-rule challenge relate to whether Respondent, in connection with the administration of the state’s gaming laws, has formulated statements of general applicability that have the effect of giving each slot machine licensee the rights (i) to maintain and operate an outdoor live gaming facility for the conduct of pari-mutuel wagering activities, wherein slot machine gaming areas could not lawfully be located, so long as its slot machines are housed elsewhere, in an enclosed building; and (ii) to locate slot machine gaming areas in a separate, stand-alone building having no integral systems, structures, or elements, provided the building is located on the same parcel, and on the same side of the street, river, or similar obstacle, as the live gaming facility. If Respondent has developed such a statement or statements, then the ultimate issue is whether such statements meet the statutory definition of an unadopted rule.
Findings Of Fact PARTIES SCF is a Florida corporation whose principal place of business is located in Marion County. SCF has been in the business of breeding thoroughbred racehorses since 1996. The company also owns racehorses and, as an owner of racing animals, holds a Pari-Mutuel Wagering Business Occupational License, #PBU476648, from the Division. See § 550.105(2), Fla. Stat. As a licensed business owning racing animals, SCF is under the regulatory jurisdiction of the Division. In the three years preceding this action, SCF’s horses won approximately $120 thousand in purses from performing in race meets held at Florida pari-mutuel facilities.1 1 Although SCF is a licensed owner of racing animals, it is not a member of the Florida Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association, Inc. (the “FHBPA”), a nonprofit corporation that advocates in support of Florida’s thoroughbred racing industry and represents the interests of the licensed owners and trainers who comprise its membership. This fact is relevant only to the question of whether SCF is precluded from maintaining this action, under the doctrine of administrative finality, by the Final Order entered in a case brought by the FHBPA in 2018 to challenge agency statements, similar to those at issue here, which the association alleged—but ultimately failed to establish—were unadopted Continued on next page... The Division is the state agency responsible for implementing and enforcing Florida’s gaming laws. It licenses and regulates pari-mutuel and slot machine gaming activities in Florida, as well as the professionals and businesses, such as SCF, that supply necessary goods and services to the gaming economy. The only places in Florida, in fact, where SCF’s thoroughbreds can legally perform in races upon which bets may be made are the several permitted pari-mutuel facilities, which are also subject to the Division’s regulatory jurisdiction; such tracks comprise the exclusive medium for live gaming activities. Calder is the holder of a pari-mutuel wagering permit and, in that capacity, owns a track called Calder Race Course, also known as Gulfstream Park West. As a permitholder, Calder must apply for an annual license to conduct pari-mutuel operations. See § 550.0115, Fla. Stat. This annual license gives the permitholder authority to conduct the pari-mutuel wagering activity authorized under its permit on the dates identified in the license. At all times relevant to this case, Calder has held a license to conduct thoroughbred horseracing performances, and SCF-owned horses have raced at Calder Race Course. In addition to its license to conduct pari-mutuel operations, Calder has held, at all times relevant hereto, a license to conduct slot machine gaming. SLOT MACHINE GAMING In 2004, voters approved an amendment to the Florida Constitution, which opened the door to the installation of slot machines at licensed pari- mutuel facilities in Miami-Dade and Broward counties. See Art. X, § 23, Fla. Const. During its next regular session, the legislature enacted chapter 551 to implement the constitutional amendment. Under the original definition of rules. For reasons discussed much later in this Final Order, the undersigned concludes that the previous Final Order, while favorable to the Division on similar issues, is not a bar to SCF’s claims in this proceeding, because SCF was neither a party to the FHBPA case, nor in privity with the FHBPA. “eligible facility” set forth in section 551.102(4), seven pari-mutuel permitholders potentially qualified for slot machine licensure; a later statutory amendment increased that number to eight. A slot machine license may be issued only to a permitted pari-mutuel facility. That is, to become and remain a slot machine licensee, an eligible facility must operate a pari-mutuel facility in accordance with the provisions of chapter 550, Florida Statutes. So, as a condition of initial slot-machine licensure, a permitholder must demonstrate its compliance with chapters 551 and, as applicable, chapter 550. § 551.104(4), Fla. Stat. To renew, which must be done annually, a slot machine licensee must “[c]ontinue to be in compliance with” chapter 551; “[c]ontinue to be in compliance with chapter 550, where applicable[;] and maintain [its] pari-mutuel permit and license in good standing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 550.” Id. In short, slot machine gaming is secondary to pari-mutuel wagering operations because it cannot exist, lawfully, in the absence of such operations. This means, among other things, that an applicant for a slot machine license is required to have a “current live gaming facility,” in which pari- mutuel wagering occurs in the physical presence of real-time races or games, and that a live gaming facility (“LGF”) must be maintained at the permitholder’s pari-mutuel facility during the life of the slot machine license, if issued. See § 551.114(4), Fla. Stat. In 2005, when chapter 551 was enacted, all seven of the facilities initially eligible for slot machine licensure had large existing grandstands or other buildings that created indoor, conditioned spaces; these “conditioned environments,” in other words, were separated from the outdoor elements and conditions (wind, rain, heat, cold, etc.) by sheltering walls and roofs. Simply put, each of these facilities had a building envelope or exterior shell and, thus, each such facility fell within the definition of a “building” under the common usage of that term. It is reasonable to infer, if not presume, that when section 551.114(4) was being written, the legislature, or at least the drafters of the legislation who coined the term “live gaming facility,” had in mind the buildings then currently in use as “live gaming facilities” at the relatively few eligible facilities that would be subject to the law. At the time chapter 551 took effect, moreover, the Division, in fact, considered these buildings to be the permitholders’ LGFs. A slot machine licensee must have a designated slot machine gaming area (“SMGA”) where “slot machine gaming may be conducted in accordance with the provisions of” chapter 551. §§ 551.102(2), 551.114, Fla. Stat. Section 551.114(4) specifies where the licensee is allowed to locate its SMGA: Designated slot machine gaming areas may be located within the current live gaming facility or in an existing building that must be contiguous and connected to the live gaming facility. If a designated slot machine gaming area is to be located in a building that is to be constructed, that new building must be contiguous and connected to the live gaming facility. For ease of reference, the term “slot machine building,” or “SMB,” will be used herein to refer to any building besides the LGF in which a licensee optionally locates its SMGA. As the statute makes clear, every SMB, whether previously existing, newly constructed, upgraded, refurbished, retrofitted, or freshly painted, must be “contiguous and connected to” the LGF. This will be called the “CCT Requirement.” THE DIVISION’S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE Over time as it implemented section 551.114(4), the Division interpreted the text in ways which SCF alleges constitute unadopted rules. The circumstances surrounding the development of these interpretations are interesting, and a good deal of evidence was adduced in this proceeding establishing them, but it is not necessary, for present purposes, to make detailed findings concerning these historical facts. Readers who would like to know more about the events leading to this rule challenge may read the Recommended Order (“Calder RO”) that the undersigned issued in The Florida Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Association, Inc. v. Calder Race Course, Inc., et al., DOAH Case No. 18-4997, 2019 Fla. Div. Admin. Hear. LEXIS 283 (Fla. DOAH May 24, 2019) (the “License Challenge”). If the undersigned were to make extensive findings of historical fact in this Final Order, such findings would be substantially the same as, if not identical to, the findings set forth in the Calder RO. The primary relevance, to the instant case, of the historical facts relating to the Division’s approvals of SMBs at Calder and another track (Pompano Park/Isle of Capri), respectively, would be to show that, despite the absence of rulemaking or other written evidence of its statutory interpretations, the agency has formulated (but not formally adopted) governing principles for making regulatory decisions—”nonrule policies,” in other words—whose existence and contents can be deduced from the agency’s actions, namely the issuance of slot machine licenses or renewals manifesting underlying determinations that this SMB or that one is compliant, as a matter of ultimate fact, with the provisions of chapter 551, including the CCT Requirement. Recently, however, on February 3, 2020, the Division issued the Calder FO, wherein the agency expressed very clearly not only its understanding of what the relevant words of section 551.114(4) mean (the semantic content), but also what law is made thereby (the legal content). It is, therefore, no longer necessary to deduce the Division’s statutory interpretations from its actions; that these statements exist, and have specific linguistic content, are matters now beyond genuine dispute, the statements having been communicated in writing by the agency itself.2 2 This is what the undersigned meant when he wrote in the Order Regarding Official Recognition that, based on the Calder FO, the Division’s interpretive statements relating to section 551.114(4) “appear to be not genuinely disputable.” In other words, to be clear, the existence and contents of the Division’s interpretive statements are now beyond reasonable Continued on next page... From the Calder FO, the Division’s interpretive statements can be fairly, accurately, and concisely described.3 The first statement of interest dispute, although there might be some relatively insignificant disagreements at the margins regarding the meaning of the agency statements. Independent of all that, the question of whether the Division’s interpretation of section 551.114(4) is the best interpretation, or even a reasonable one, is sharply disputed. While the correctness of the Division’s interpretive statements is a matter of continued conflict, that particular dispute need not be decided in this proceeding, whose focus, instead, is on whether the statements meet the definition of a rule, a question that has little to do with whether the statements reflect the best, or correct, reading of the statutory text. (A statement that expresses nothing but a literal comprehension of the statutory text, reflecting only such meaning as is readily apparent without reading between or beyond the lines of the codified language, is not a rule by definition; nor, however, is it an “interpretation,” strictly speaking. Such a literal paraphrase could be called “correct,” though, and so, to the extent a decision is required regarding whether a statement adds legal content to the underlying statute’s straightforward semantic content, some consideration must be given to the correctness, in this narrow sense, of the statement at issue.) 3 So that no one can misinterpret what the undersigned is doing here, let it be clear. First, the undersigned is not implying that the Calder FO is itself an unadopted rule. The Calder FO is, of course, an order, which determines the substantial interests of specifically named parties, subject to judicial review. The undersigned is saying, however, because it is indisputably true, that the Calder FO contains statements that communicate—expressly, unambiguously, and in specific language (not by implication or through interpretation)— the Division’s interpretation of section 551.114(4). In fact, the Calder FO includes a section titled “Interpretation of Section 551.114(4), F.S.” Thus, while the Calder FO is not, per se, an unadopted rule, it is evidence of the Division’s interpretation of a section 551.114(4); indeed, it is convincing evidence thereof. (The agency’s interpretive statements are not hearsay because what makes them relevant is their existence and contents, not the “truth” of the matters asserted. See § 90.801(1)(c), Fla Stat.) Further, the Division’s interpretation of the statute is, obviously, highly relevant because agency statements that interpret law fall within the definition of a rule when, as SCF alleges here, they do so in ways which give the law meaning not readily apparent from the raw semantic content of the statutory text being implemented. It should also be noted that it makes no difference where or how an agency communicates a statement of general applicability that meets the definition of a rule. There is no “final order immunity” that somehow shields statements contained in a final order from examination in a section 120.56(4) proceeding. We are concerned here with three basic questions: (i) does the statement exist; (ii) if so, what is the content of the statement; and (iii) does the statement’s content meet the definition of a rule? The Calder FO persuasively proves both the existence of the statements at issue and the contents of the statements issue. Second, in describing the Division’s interpretive statements, the undersigned is not attempting to summarize the entire Calder FO. Nor is he purposefully adding to, or subtracting from, the agency’s statements. This is not an exercise in straw-man argumentation. To the extent possible, the undersigned is using the agency’s exact words; his intent, again, is to express the Division’s statutory interpretation accurately and fairly. The Calder FO is available for anyone to read, and the undersigned invites everyone who is interested to do just that and decide for him or herself whether the descriptions herein of the Continued on next page... concerns the CCT Requirement. As the undersigned reads the Calder FO, the Division has interpreted the statute to mean that a licensee’s SMB is “contiguous and connected to” its LGF if the SMB and LGF: (i) “share a common boundary,” for which simply “being located on the same piece of property” is sufficient; (ii) are no more than a “short distance” from one another; (iii) are not on opposite sides of “a public roadway, waterway, or any [similar] barrier”; and (iv) are “connected” by a walkway between the two, for which an outdoor sidewalk is sufficient. In its Response in Opposition to the Order Regarding Official Recognition, however, the Division stated that and (iv) “may not be required” in every instance and, thus, are not necessary conditions. In other words, the SMB and LGF might be farther than a “short distance” from each other and still be “contiguous”; and the two structures, if respectively self-contained, might be “connected” other than by a “walkway” between them. Making this correction, the agency statement becomes: A licensee’s SMB is “contiguous and connected to” the LGF if the SMB and LGF: (i) “share a common boundary,” for which “being located on Division’s interpretive statements are accurate and fair. (The Division expressed some minor disagreements with the undersigned’s original descriptions of the agency interpretations at issue, and these disagreements will be addressed in the text above.) Third, relatedly, the undersigned emphatically disclaims any intention of using unfair descriptions of the Calder FO to turn “narrow issues” into “more general” statements having a “broader scope of applicability” than the agency intends. The fact is, however, that there is nothing “fact-specific” about the Division’s interpretation of section 551.114(4), and the Division’s insisting otherwise will not make it so. This point will be discussed further above, but let it be emphasized in this footnote that a statement’s relative applicability is determined based upon the level of generality expressed by the statement’s language, that is, by the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the semantic content of the text. The more inclusive the statement, the more generally applicable it is. A statement of general applicability, so framed, is not rendered “fact-specific” simply because it has been applied to the facts of a specific case in determining the substantial interests of a particular party. the same piece of property” is sufficient;4 and (ii) are not on opposite sides of “a public roadway, waterway, or any [similar] barrier.”5 What cannot be disputed, bottom line, is that the Division, in its own words, interprets “the plain statutory language” of section 551.114(4) as “contemplat[ing]” that the SMB may be “a stand-alone separate building” from the LGF. See Calder FO at 42. From this interpretation, it follows logically that having structural elements in common with the LGF, or sharing integrated systems therewith (e.g., exterior envelope, HVAC, electric, and plumbing), is not a necessary condition of an SMB’s satisfying the CCT Requirement; that is, even without such integration, the SMB and LGF may be deemed statutorily “contiguous and connected to” each other, according to the Division. The undersigned will call this the “nonintegration principle.” The nonintegration principle is the Division’s seminal insight regarding the meaning of section 551.114(4); if the nonintegration principle were deemed false (incorrect), such determination would guarantee the falsity (incorrectness) of the Division’s statement that “the plain statutory language” of section 551.114(4) “contemplate[s]” that the SMB may be “a stand-alone separate building” from the LGF. This is because, to state the obvious, “a stand-alone separate building” is, by that description, a self- 4 Because it is necessary that all of the permitholder’s pari-mutuel facilities be located on the property “specified in the permit,” see section 550.0115, Florida Statutes, and because slot machines must be located “within the property of the [permitholder’s] facilities,” see sections 551.101 and 551.114(1), part (i) of the agency statement makes “shar[ing] a common boundary” practically a given, and certainly a gimme. 5 It is usually unhelpful to define anything by describing what the thing being defined is not, which entails a process of elimination. Saying that being “contiguous and connected” means being not separated by a public roadway, etc., tells us nothing that we didn’t already know; it is the answer to a question that no one would ask, akin to saying that the CCT Requirement prohibits a permitholder from locating its SMB in a different city or state from the LGF. Like part (i) of the agency statement, part (ii) imposes a “requirement” that is a gimme, if not a given. Taken together, the two parts, (i) and (ii), comprising the agency statement under consideration, come very close to eliminating the CCT Requirement altogether, reducing it to the ineffectual status of “requirement in name only.” As the Division sees it, the CCT Requirement has little practical effect, if any, other than ensuring that the SMB and LGF have the same address, which is already assured. contained structure that is not integrated with another structure. So, the Division’s statement that the statute allows the use of a nonintegrated SMB is true only if SMB/LGF integration is not a necessary condition of compliance with the CCT Requirement. In its Response in Opposition to the Order Regarding Official Recognition, the Division states that the Calder FO “does not comment on whether it is ever necessary, to satisfy the [CCT] requirement, that the SMB and LGF ‘have any common structural elements or integrated systems, e.g., exterior envelope, HVAC, lighting, etc.’“ This is trivially true inasmuch as the Calder FO does not specifically describe the nonintegration principle as such. But the point is irrelevant because, as just explained, if section 551.114(4) permits locating an SMGA in a separate, stand-alone building, as the Division maintains, then the nonintegration principle must exist, and it must be true, regardless of whether the Division actually utters the words that communicate the concept. If the Division meant to say more, i.e., to imply that there might be an as-yet unrevealed exception or exceptions to the nonintegration principle, this possibility, whatever else might be said about it,6 does not negate the nonintegration principle itself. This is because the principle does not hold that nonintegration is a necessary condition of compliance with the CCT Requirement; that is, integration does not guarantee failure. Nor does it hold 6 One thing that can be said if there exists an exception to the nonintegration principle is that an SMB’s “being located on the same piece of property” as the LGF would not be a sufficient condition for finding that the two “share a common boundary,” contrary to what the Division has said elsewhere. If there were an exception, then sometimes (when the exception applies) integration would be required in order for the two structures to share a common boundary and be deemed contiguous to one another. To explain, locating a self- contained SMB on the same piece of property as the LGF guarantees compliance with the “common boundary” requirement—i.e., is a sufficient condition therefor—only if the nonintegration principle has no exceptions. (The undersigned takes for granted that integration would never be required to meet the only other identified requirement, namely that the SMB and LGF not be separated by a public roadway, waterway, or similar barrier, because that condition would be so easily met by putting the two structures on the same side of the street or river.) that nonintegration is a sufficient condition of compliance with the CCT Requirement; that is, nonintegration does not guarantee success. Rather, the nonintegration principle holds that integration is not a necessary condition of compliance with the CCT Requirement; or, put another way, that nonintegration is statutorily permissible. Why is this significant? Because if section 551.114(4) literally requires an integrated SMB/LGF in all cases where the SMGA is located outside the current LGF, then the Division’s interpretation of the CCT Requirement is not readily apparent from what is actually stated in the statutory text, even if it might conform to the legislature’s communicative intent,7 which would mean that the agency has declared what the law shall be (a legislative power), as opposed to applying the law as it is (an executive power). And, as we know, an agency is authorized to exercise delegated legislative authority only through formal rulemaking. The second statement concerns the meaning of the term LGF, which the Division defines as being any area, including an “open-aired, unenclosed place” or “space,” from which patrons can “view … and/or [be] within the physical presence of” contests occurring in real time, and at which they may engage in pari-mutuel betting on such contests using equipment designed to facilitate these “live gaming activities.” In its Response in Opposition to the Order Regarding Official Recognition, the Division asserts that the foregoing description of its definition of the term LGF is too narrow, because the Division defines LGF to include the racetrack as well. The undersigned accepts this assertion to be true, and revises his original description accordingly. 7 The legislature might have intended, for example, to communicate meaning beyond the plain semantic content of the statutory text, whose full linguistic content thus could not be understood without an appreciation of pragmatic considerations, such as programmatic goals, arguably better known to the agency than to the citizenry. If so, the necessary and proper, lawful agency response would be to take quasi legislative action and adopt a rule. The track, of course, is the “field of play” for live horse racing performances, analogous to the three-walled court (or cancha) on which jai alai players perform. Clearly, there can be no LGF without a track or cancha; this practically goes without saying. Including the live performance site, definitionally, as an element of the LGF, however, is inconsequential to this case because neither a track nor a cancha, by itself, could constitute an LGF; there must be something to accommodate patrons, who obviously cannot watch, or place wagers on, live contests while sitting or standing upon the track or jai alai court. The relevant question in this case is whether the statute literally requires that something to entail conditioned space within an enclosed building shell.8 Reduced to its undisputed essentials, the Division’s position is that while an LGF may be an enclosed building, it needn’t necessarily be. An open- air, unenclosed place or space will suffice, if properly equipped to facilitate wagering. It is this “open-air option” to which SCF objects as the instantiation of a policy that exceeds the raw semantic meaning of the term LGF and thus constitutes an unadopted rule. SCF alleges that the Division has formulated a third unadopted rule, extrinsic to the Calder FO, which is not interpretive in nature but rather is a prescriptive statement to the effect that certain ultimate facts are conclusively determinable as a matter of law if the basic facts are undisputed. To the point, SCF contends that the Division has decided that, if a hearing is requested to determine whether an SMB satisfies the CCT Requirement, the proceeding will be governed by section 120.57(2) unless the objective facts on 8 At times, the Division appears to imply that the LGF comprises entire pari-mutuel complex, so desirous is the agency to get across the idea that the term LGF must be read expansively. While warning of the dangers of defining LGF too narrowly, the Division seems unconcerned about the opposite problem, namely reading LGF so broadly that the term ceases to have relevant meaning. If the LGF is everything on the permitted premises, then it is nothing specifically identifiable. For the LGF to have discernible boundaries—a necessary condition of contiguity with another structure, by the way—there must be a limiting principle or Continued on next page... the ground are genuinely disputed. SCF contends that the Division is using this “gatekeeper mechanism” to deny SCF (and another party) the formal hearings they have requested, pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), to challenge the renewal of Calder’s slot machine license, based on allegations that Calder does not have a statutorily compliant LGF and that its SMB fails to meet the CCT Requirement. The Division has not published a notice of rulemaking under section 120.54(3)(a) relating either to the open-air option, the nonintegration principle, or the gatekeeper mechanism. Nor has the Division presented evidence or argument on the feasibility or practicability of adopting any of these alleged statements of general applicability as a de jure rule. THE DIVISION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALLEGED UNADOPTED RULES As mentioned above, the historical facts giving rise to the agency interpretations at issue are not only, for the most part, undisputed, but also, more importantly, largely irrelevant for purposes of determining the merits of this action under section 120.56(4). The Division’s implementation of the alleged unadopted rules does have some bearing, however, on the question of SCF’s standing, which is a hotly contested issue in this case. Therefore, an abridged history follows. Of the eight pari-mutuel facilities eligible for slot machine licensure, only Pompano Park/Isle of Capri (“PPI”) and Calder have chosen the option contained in section 551.114(4) to erect a new building in which to locate their respective SMGAs. All of the other eligible permitholders opted to locate their SMGAs within their current LGFs; these were buildings, enclosing conditioned environments, not open-air places exposed to the elements. Because Broward County satisfied the local referendum requirement before Miami-Dade County did, PPI’s application for slot machine licensure was the principles to delimit the definitional scope. The Division has been reluctant to commit to such limiting principles. first to require the Division’s decision as to whether an SMB that was to be constructed would meet the CCT Requirement. The physical configuration of PPI’s SMB, as planned and built, was not “contiguous” to its existing LGF under any ordinary understanding of the word “contiguous,” which denotes actual contact along a common boundary; the buildings were in “reasonably” close proximity, but they did not communicate in the sense of opening into each other. Nor was PPI’s SMB “connected to” its LGF in accord with the image that readily comes to mind when thinking about how two contiguous structures would be connected to each other. The two separate, stand-alone buildings were “connected,” not physically, through any sort of direct contact, but figuratively, by basic transport infrastructure—i.e., a covered walkway between them.9 This apparent departure from the plain meaning of section 551.114(4) resulted from the Division’s desire to give the eligible permitholders some “leeway” in satisfying the strict statutory requirement that an SMB be “contiguous and connected to” the current LGF, according to David Roberts, who headed the Division from 2001 through 2009, and who was involved in making the decision.10 After Miami-Dade County satisfied the local referendum requirement in 2009, Calder applied for its initial slot machine license. Because Calder, 9 They were connected, that is to say, in the same way Tallahassee is connected to Jacksonville via Interstate 10. 10 On October 17, 2019, the agency head of DOAH began systematically reviewing every final order and recommended order prior to, and as a prerequisite of, its issuance. Pursuant to this review, the director makes written “comments and suggested edits” on some, but not all, orders. Although the presiding officer is not required to accept the director’s suggested edits, he is not given the option of declining the director’s review. As a result, the undersigned received two comments, one on the paragraph above and the other on paragraph 30 of this Final Order, which are, at least arguably, “relative to the merits,” and hence which are, or might be, ex parte communications prohibited by section 120.66(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (no “ex parte communication relative to the merits” shall be made to the presiding officer by “[a]n agency head,” among others). Erring on the side of caution and disclosure, the undersigned hereby places on the record the director’s comment concerning paragraph 24: “This is the crux of Continued on next page... like PPI, intended to place its SMGA in a self-contained casino, which would be newly constructed, Calder sought and received the Division’s permission to build a separate, stand-alone SMB pursuant to the same informal policy that had relaxed the strict CCT Requirement for PPI. The Division’s issuance to Calder of its initial slot machine license manifested the Division’s determination that Calder’s SMB and LGF, as initially configured after construction of the new SMB, were compliant with all of the statutory requirements for slot machine gaming licensure, including the CCT Requirement. In 2016, Calder demolished its grandstand building; as of this hearing, Calder has not replaced its former LGF with a new building of any kind. The demolition of the grandstand was one of several actions taken in furtherance of a business decision by Calder to distance itself from live racing activities at Calder Race Course. Other actions included slashing the number of annual performances during the race meet, from an average of 250 performances per year to 40 performances per year; the entry into a contract with Gulfstream Park to operate and manage Calder’s abbreviated race meet; and a reduction in the number of stalls available for the stabling and training of racehorses. There is an ongoing dispute as to whether Calder, without an enclosed building for live gaming, has a legally sufficient LGF. See License Challenge. What is not disputed is that Calder lacks an LGF capable of housing an SMGA in compliance with chapter 551, because an SMGA must be housed in a building. Calder’s “LGF,” such as it is, currently consists of open-air viewing areas where patrons can watch, and place wagers on, live races. The primary viewing area is located in front of the final stretch of the racetrack, at a spot called the “apron.” There are some outdoor seats and tiki huts on the apron, and, during the race meet, Calder erects a collapsible canopy tent, your most defensible finding.” Any party desiring to rebut this communication shall be allowed to do so in accordance with section 120.66(2). which, despite the absence of walls, provides a bit of shelter for wagering machines, video screens, and, of course, patrons, for whom additional outdoor seating is provided. The casino is at least 100 yards from the temporary “big tent.” It is possible to walk from the casino to the big tent, and return, on a concrete walkway, but the walkway is only partially covered, which means, when it rains, that patrons cannot go back and forth between the SMB and the “LGF” without getting wet. The walls of the SMB do not touch or abut the areas where patrons can view the live horse races and place bets. Indeed, a patron can walk into the main entrance of the casino, play the slot machines, and then leave, without once seeing, or being within a football field’s length of, an area that allows the viewing of live horse racing. At the time of the hearing, Gulfstream Park’s general manager was William Badgett. (Gulfstream Park, recall, operates Calder’s race meet pursuant to contract.) Mr. Badgett testified as follows regarding the decline in attendance and wagering after the demolition of Calder’s grandstand: [W]hat I’ve seen is—it’s, pretty much, in black and white. The numbers over the year—year to year to year[—]have declined mostly because this is the best that we can offer at the facility without building a permanent structure. … When it rains the water comes down the hill and people just leave. And what I’ve seen from the owners is they’ll come to watch a race. After the race they’ll leave. … [I]t has declined year to year to year in the handle and the amount of people that we see there. When asked whether, based upon his many years of experience in the horseracing industry as a trainer and as a track manager, he believed that the lack of a grandstand and of any protection from the elements has negatively affected the amount of live handle at the race meets at Calder Race Course, Mr. Badgett answered, “Yes, absolutely.” Describing the experience of watching a race at ground level on the apron, Mr. Badgett testified: What we do is we put televisions in the tent because it’s not as—You, more or less, have to walk down the apron if you want to see it live. There’s a structure in the middle of the—of the in-field, which is the tote board, which doesn’t work anymore. So, it’s a little bit of an obstruction. You can see [the race], but you’re better off watching it on television. The undersigned credits Mr. Badgett’s testimony on these points. DETERMINATIONS OF ULTIMATE FACT It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that both the open-air option and the nonintegration principle have the effect of law because the Division, if unchecked, intends consistently to follow them in carrying out its responsibilities to administer chapters 550 and 551 generally, and section 551.114(4) specifically. Each statement creates rights (in the form of expanded locational options for SMBs and architectural options for LGFs) that are exercisable by slot machine licensees.11 While directly regulating the physical plant of a permitted pari-mutuel facility, these statements collaterally regulate live gaming licensees, including businesses owing racing animals such as SCF, whose licensed occupations require access to, and the use of, the permitholders’ LGFs and other pari-mutuel facilities. From the perspective of a licensed racehorse owner, the LGF (which it neither owns nor controls) is the environment for its audience, the spectators whose money (wagered on races) helps fund the purses and awards that compensate the licensee for its services. A law that allows an LGF to be an open-air place as opposed to a climate controlled 11 The undersigned hereby places on the record the director’s comment regarding paragraph 30: “Finding the agency’s future intent as a matter of fact is troubling.” Any party desiring to rebut this communication shall be allowed to do so in accordance with section 120.66(2). Continued on next page... building is detrimental to the interests of a business licensee whose success in a pari-mutuel occupation depends upon the continued presence of a large, paying audience, for the obvious reasons that an open-air place is unlikely to be as comfortable, or as amenity-rich, as a building; and, taken together, less comfort and fewer amenities, relatively speaking, are more likely to discourage potential customers from showing up.12 Similarly, the nonintegration principle negatively affects the interests of live gaming licensees such as SCF because it allows the permitholder literally to draw patrons away from the live gaming activities upon which the live gaming licensees depend, to a “nearby,” but physically separate and independent, SMB. The relative draw of the SMB, moreover, which must be an enclosed building, is enhanced if the LGF, pursuant to the open-air option, does not afford patrons a conditioned environment. That is, when the nonintegration principle works in tandem with the open-air option at the same pari-mutuel facility, the result is even more disadvantageous to live gaming licensees, because the disequilibrium in patron comfort, as between slot machine players and live game spectators, ratchets up as the LGF becomes more stripped-down. The bottom line is that the nonintegration principle and the open-air option are unadopted rules because, in the Division’s hands, they create legally protected opportunities for permitholders to design, configure, and construct their physical plants, in ways that predictably and substantially affect live gaming licensees. 12 The undersigned regards this as self-evident. Common, everyday experience informs the undersigned—who doubts that any reasonable person can genuinely deny—that an enclosed, dry, heated or cooled environment, separated from the outdoors, where a spectator can sit and watch a race without being exposed to direct sunlight, wind, or insects, is more attractive to potential customers, in the main, than an open-air place where the spectator might be uncomfortably hot or cold, windswept, and bitten by mosquitoes; thus, a building is a relatively stronger draw. Continued on next page... The gatekeeper mechanism, in contrast, while perhaps having some of the characteristics of a general principle, is primarily a quasi-judicial ruling, operative only in the context of a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding, and lacking any broad regulatory effect. While such a ruling plainly affects the interests of the party or parties to the particular proceeding, it is judicially reviewable without the mediation of yet another administrative proceeding (unlike an intended regulatory decision, which becomes final unless a hearing is requested).13 To be sure, the question of whether an agency statement to the effect that “formal hearings shall not be granted if the historical facts are undisputed, leaving for determination only the ultimate fact of compliance” (whose level of generality is somewhat higher than the gatekeeper mechanism at issue) could be deemed an unadopted rule is fairly debatable. Yet, even that apparently rule-like statement, which arguably “describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency,”14 would be actionable only as an interlocutory order in a quasi-judicial proceeding, because only such a proceeding would give the agency an opportunity to use the statement. It is hard, therefore, to distinguish between 13 In other words, if a party disagrees with the agency’s decision under section 120.569(2)(a) to deny the party’s request for a formal hearing, that party does not need to request another administrative hearing to contest the decision. The agency’s decision to deny a formal hearing and proceed under section 120.57(2) is a nonfinal order, which may be immediately appealed under section 120.68(1)(b), see United States Service Industries-Florida v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 383 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), or reviewed on plenary appeal from an adverse final order, see Spuza v. Department of Health, 838 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). If the agency refuses to discharge its duty under section 120.569(2)(a), mandamus will lie. See Cmty. Health Charities v. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs., 961 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). 14 See § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. (definition of “rule”). “policy” and “reversible error” in this instance.15 Ultimately, the undersigned determines that the gatekeeper mechanism is not a rule by definition.
The Issue abetting bookmaking on its licensed premises. If so, what disciplinary action
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges against Rickey's Restaurant and Bar, Inc., be DISMISSED. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 5th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. Caleen, Jr. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Leroy Wise, Jr.'s Mother purchased lottery ticket number 1888-3620-9444 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ticket") on approximately July 6, 1989. The Ticket was a Fantasy 5 ticket with four correct numbers. The Ticket winnings amounted to $805.00. Mr. Wise took his Mother to the Department of the Lottery's offices in Tallahassee, Florida on July 10, 1989. Mr. Wise's Mother did not have proper identification required by the Department of the Lottery to cash in the Ticket. Therefore, she allowed Mr. Wise to present the ticket for collection because Mr. Wise had proper identification. On July 10, 1989, Mr. Wise completed a Florida Lottery Winner Claim Form (hereinafter referred to as the "Form") and submitted the Form and the Ticket to the Lottery. On the back of the Ticket Mr. Wise listed his name and address on the spaces provided for the person claiming the prize and signed the Ticket. Mr. Wise listed his name, Social Security Number, address and phone number on the Form. Mr. Wise signed the Form as the "Claimant." In a letter dated July 10, 1989, the DHRS notified the Lottery that Mr. Wise owed $4,690.00 in Title IV-D child support arrearages as of July 10, 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued providing for payment of the $805.00 prize attributable to the Ticket owed by Mr. Wise as child support arrearages as of the date of the Final Order to DHRS. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1990. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-4 2 6. 3 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Petitioner's did not offer any evidence at the formal hearing concerning these proposed findings of fact. Mr. Wise's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph Number in Recommended Order Sentence in Letter of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1, 13-20 Not proposed findings of fact. 2-3 6. 4-6, 11-12 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 7-10 Not relevant to this proceeding. Copies Furnished To: Jo Ann Levin Senior Attorney Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Louisa E. Hargrett Senior Attorney Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chriss Walker Senior Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Leroy Wise, Jr. 1526-A Patrick Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondents are guilty of the violations alleged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: At all times material to the allegations in the Amended Notice to Show Cause, Respondents, Julio and Lida Diaz, d/b/a Flor-Lidita Restaurant, held alcoholic beverage license number 23-4636. This license was a 2-COP license which authorized the sale of beer and wine for the premises known as Flor-Lidita Restaurant which is located at 4762 N. W. 183rd Street, Miami, Florida. In July, 1986, the FDLE began an investigation concerning an illegal gambling lottery commonly known as "bolita" which was believed to be operating in connection with the Flor-Lidita Restaurant. The investigation undertaken involved a surveillance of the restaurant together with undercover agents who were used to frequent the restaurant for the purposes of observing activities and placing bets with the restaurant personnel. An individual identified as Rafael Rosquete was determined to be a courier who would enter the restaurant, collect the gambling paraphernalia and returns, and deliver the items to a home located in Broward County. On July 9, 1986, a police officer, Hector Zeno, working undercover in connection with the FDLE, entered the Flor-Lidita Restaurant and observed customers writing numbers on bolita slips. Officer Zeno also observed individuals placing bets with the owner, Julio Diaz. In turn, Zeno filled out a bolita slip and placed a $5.00 bet with the owner Julio Diaz. On July 16, 1986, Joyce Dawley and Jacqueline Sirven entered the Flor- Lidita Restaurant and observed customers placing bolita bets with the Respondents, Lida and Julio Diaz. These agents also observed another employee known to them as "Rolando" (later identified as Rolando Nunez) taking bets. Agents Dawley and Sirven placed $5.00 bets with Julio Diaz on this date and received carbon copies of their bolita slips. On July 22, 1986, Zeno returned to the restaurant for the purpose of observing the customers and again placed a $5.00 bet by completing a bolita slip and tendering money to Julio Diaz. During this visit Zeno observed Nunez and Lida Diaz taking money and bolita slips from other customers within the restaurant. On July 23, 1986, Dawley and Sirven returned to the restaurant and again placed two $5.00 bets with Julio Diaz. During this visit the agents observed other individuals inside the licensed premises place bets with Rolando Nunez and Lida Diaz. On July 24, 1986, Dawley and Sirven returned to the Flor-Lidita Restaurant for the purpose of picking up $70.00 in winnings which Agent Dawley was entitled to as a result of the bet she had placed the previous evening. On July 30, 1986, Dawley and Sirven went to the Flor- Lidita Restaurant and again placed two $5.00 bets. This time Lida Diaz took their money and the original bolita slips and gave them carbon copies of their bets. On July 31, 1986, Sirven entered the Flor-Lidita Restaurant for the purpose of receiving $70.00 in winnings based on the prior day's bolita bet. On August 6, 1986, Dawley entered the Flor-Lidita Restaurant, received a bolita pad from Rolando Nunez and placed a $5.00 bet with Nunez in the present of Julio Diaz. On this visit Nunez showed Dawley a ledger which contained a list of dates together with numbers which indicated the winning numbers for the dates in question. On August 11, 1986, Dawley went to the Flor-Lidita Restaurant and observed Lida and Julio Diaz receiving bolita bets from persons within the restaurant. Dawley also observed Rolando Nunez taking bets. Dawley placed a $5.00 bet with Nunez on this date. After receiving a search warrant for the Flor-Lidita Restaurant, special agents of the FDLE entered the licensed premises on August 12, 1986 and searched the restaurant. During the search, agents took possession of various items of gambling paraphernalia which included bolita betting slips, Puerto Rican lottery tickets, blank bolita pads, currency and ledger books. Over $40,000 worth of U.S. currency and gambling paraphernalia was confiscated in connection with the police raid on the restaurant and the house in Broward County. In connection with the search of the licensed premises, Joseph Ogonowski seized an open bottle of scotch whiskey which was behind the counter at the restaurant. The scotch was not listed on the menu as a designated ingredient for any of the food items available for purchase at the restaurant. During the period of surveillance of the Flor-Lidita Restaurant, Rosquete was repeatedly observed by FDLE agents. Rosquete would routinely visit the restaurant, obtain items of gambling paraphernalia including betting slips and U.S. currency, and deliver the proceeds from the restaurant to a residence located in Broward County. The gambling activities conducted on the licensed premises were open, frequent, and included the active participation of the Respondents, Julio and Lida Diaz.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a Final Order revoking license number 23-4636, series 2-COP, held by Respondents, Julio and Lida Diaz, d/b/a Flor-Lidita Restaurant. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-4620 Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted. With the exception of the last sentence paragraph 3 is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as speculation. Paragraph 4 is accepted. Paragraph 5 is accepted. Paragraphs 6-20 are accepted. With the exception of the last sentence in paragraph 21, which is rejected as speculation, paragraph 21 is accepted. Paragraphs 22-23 are accepted. The last two sentences of paragraph 24 are accepted. The first sentence is rejected as argument or a conclusion of law. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1-3 are accepted. Paragraphs 4 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Mr. Ogonowski was qualified to and did identify the substance seized as scotch whiskey. Paragraph 5 is accepted but is unnecessary to the determinations reached by this Recommended Order. Paragraph 6 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial and unsupported by the record in this cause having previously ruled the adjudications inadmissible. Paragraph 7 is rejected as unsupported by the record in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Katherine A. Emrich, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Rene Valdes 1830 N. W. 7th Street Miami, Florida 33125 Daniel Bosanko, Director Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
