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GAMESTOP, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 09-005759RX (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 20, 2009 Number: 09-005759RX Latest Update: Mar. 04, 2011

The Issue Whether subsections (1) and (2) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.074 enlarge, modify or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented, or are arbitrary or capricious, and thus constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts and the uncontested affidavit of H. French Brown, IV, the following findings of facts are made. The rule provisions at issue in this proceeding are subsections (1) and (2) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A- 1.074, hereinafter referenced as "the Rule." The Rule provides: 12A-1.074 Trade-Ins. Where used articles of tangible personal property, accepted and intended for resale, are taken in trade, or a series of trades, at the time of sale, as a credit or part payment on the sale of new articles of tangible personal property, the tax levied by Chapter 212, F.S., shall be paid on the sales price of the new article of tangible personal property, less credit for the used article of tangible personal property taken in trade. A separate or independent sale of tangible personal property is not a trade- in, even if the proceeds from the sale are immediately applied by the seller to a purchase of new articles of tangible personal property. Where used articles of tangible personal property, accepted and intended for resale, are taken in trade, or a series of trades, at the time of sale, as a credit or part payment on the sale of used articles, the tax levied by Chapter 212, F.S., shall be paid on the sales price of the used article of tangible personal property, less credit for the used articles of tangible personal property taken in trade. A separate or independent sale of tangible personal property is not a trade-in, even if the proceeds from the sale are immediately applied by the seller to a purchase of new articles of tangible personal property.1/ The Rule states that it is intended to implement the following statutory provisions: Sections 212.02(15), 212.02(16), 212.07(2), 212.07(3), and 212.09, Florida Statutes. Section 212.02, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: 212.02 Definitions -- The following terms and phrases when used in this chapter have the meanings ascribed to them in this section, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning: * * * "Sale" means and includes: (a) Any transfer of title or possession, or both, exchange, barter, license, lease, or rental, conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of tangible personal property for a consideration. . . . "Sales price" means the total amount paid for tangible personal property, including any services that are a part of the sale, valued in money, whether paid in money or otherwise, and includes any amount for which credit is given to the purchaser by the seller, without any deduction therefrom on account of the cost of the property sold, the cost of materials used, labor or service cost, interest charged, losses, or any other expense whatsoever. . . Trade-ins or discounts allowed and taken at the time of sale shall not be included within the purview of this subsection. . . Section 212.07(2), Florida Statutes, set forth the method and manner by which a dealer is to charge and collect sales tax. Section 212.07(3), Florida Statutes, sets forth penalties for a dealer who fails to collect sales tax. Neither of these provisions affects the matters at issue in this proceeding. part: Section 212.09, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant 212.09 Trade-ins deducted; exception.-- Where used articles, accepted and intended for resale, are taken in trade, or a series of trades, as a credit or part payment on the sale of new articles, the tax levied by this chapter shall be paid on the sales price of the new article, less the credit for the used article taken in trade. Where used articles, accepted and intended for resale, are taken in trade, or a series of trades, as a credit or part payment on the sale of used articles, the tax levied by this chapter shall be paid on the sales price of the used article less the credit for the used article taken in trade. [2/] GameStop is a Minnesota corporation that is authorized to do business in the State of Florida, and a registered dealer for purposes of collecting and remitting sales and use tax to the Department. GameStop is a publicly held international retailer of new and used video game hardware, software, and accessories, with over 6,000 stores worldwide, including stores in Florida. One of GameStop's customary business practices is to accept from its customers used gaming software, hardware, and accessories that the GameStop store manager determines is in resalable or re-furbishable condition. In return for the used articles, a GameStop customer may choose among three options: Option 1: The customer may receive cash in exchange for the used items. Option 2: The customer may apply the value assigned to the item by the store manager as part payment toward the immediate purchase of another new or used item from GameStop. Option 3: The customer may receive a credit for the value of the used item, which may be used only toward the purchase of new or used items from GameStop at some time in the future. If the GameStop customer elects Option 1, he receives 20 percent less value in the cash exchange than he would have received pursuant to the part payment offered by Option 2 or the credit toward a future purchase offered by Option 3. For a customer who chooses Option 3, GameStop tracks outstanding credits by issuing to the customer an "EdgeCard." When the customer returns to a GameStop store and requests to apply credits toward the purchase of a new or used item, the GameStop salesperson can swipe the electronic strip on the back of the EdgeCard and learn the credit amount available to the customer. The EdgeCard system merely tracks the amount of ongoing credits available to the customer. It does not record any request made by the customer to reserve or identify a specific item toward which the credits will later be used. The credits on an EdgeCard never expire. Once the customer has chosen Option 3, he may go to a GameStop store or access the GameStop website at any time thereafter and apply the credit on his account toward the purchase of new or used items from GameStop. GameStop also offers traditional gift cards that are purchased via cash or credit card rather than in exchange for used articles. Purchases made using a gift card or gift certificate are taxable for the full purchase price.3/ When a customer uses a gift card to purchase an item at a GameStop store, GameStop does not reduce the taxable sales price by the amount of the credit or value stored on the gift card and used in the purchase. GameStop assigns no redeemable cash value to the EdgeCard or to traditional gift cards. GameStop does not allow a gift card to be used to store credits obtained through the exchange of used items, reserving that function exclusively to the EdgeCard. The value of a GameStop gift card can be redeemed only through the purchase of new or used items from GameStop. Credits can be added to an EdgeCard only by turning over used articles to GameStop. A customer may not purchase credits. A credit on an EdgeCard can only be redeemed by the subsequent purchase of new or used items from GameStop. The GameStop customer who selects Option 3 first submits his used game or item of hardware to the GameStop store, which assigns it a dollar value and credits that amount to the customer's EdgeCard account in exchange for the item. At some later date, the customer returns to the GameStop store and trades the credit stored on the EdgeCard for some used or new item. The customer may build up credits on the EdgeCard with any number of transactions over any length of time before trading in the credits for an item from GameStop. The customer is not required to identify the item toward which he wishes to apply his EdgeCard credits until the time he actually trades the credits for the item. The Edge Card system replaced GameStop's former practice of requiring a customer who chose to obtain a credit for the submission of used articles to retain a cash register receipt showing the amount of the credit. This "paper credit" would then be redeemable toward the purchase of another item at a later date. There is no expiration date on an EdgeCard, a gift card, or a paper credit. GameStop does not replace the credits on a lost EdgeCard or a lost gift card. For purposes of accounting, GameStop carries unredeemed EdgeCard credits on its books for a period of three years as customer liabilities. GameStop does the same for unredeemed value on gift cards. GameStop continues to honor unredeemed EdgeCard credits and gift card values that are more than three years old, but no longer carries them on its books as customer liabilities. Prior to 2007, for the purpose of collecting sales tax from its customers, GameStop deducted the value of EdgeCard or any paper credits used in the purchase of new or used items from the purchase price for the purpose of calculating sales tax due. GameStop has remitted to the Department tax for the entire sales price of new or used items purchased from approximately January 2007 through August 31, 2007, in response to an audit by the Department, without reducing the taxable sales price by the value of any EdgeCard or paper credits used. GameStop has a return policy that allows a customer who is not satisfied with an item purchased from GameStop to return the item within a certain period of time and under certain conditions. When a customer returns an item in compliance with GameStop's return policy, the customer receives full retail value back, including the amount of the tax paid on the original purchase. A customer who returns an item in compliance with GameStop's return policy can elect to receive the return value in the form of cash, as a reimbursement to the customer's credit card, or as value stored on a GameStop merchandise card. The GameStop merchandise card does not record credits received via the return of used articles. The Department states that its historical administration and interpretation of the Rule and the statutes it implements do not strictly limit trade-in credits to a simultaneous exchange situation, or to transactions occurring within any particular time frame. However, the Department states that it does require the customer to identify the merchandise to be purchased with the EdgeCard credits at the time the credits are acquired. The Department does not consider the transaction to constitute a "trade-in" unless the item to be purchased with the EdgeCard credits has been specifically identified by the customer at the time the customer first returned a used item to GameStop.

Florida Laws (7) 120.52120.56120.68212.02212.07212.0972.011 Florida Administrative Code (3) 12A-1.01812A-1.07412A-1.089
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs PERSONAL INVESTMENTS, INC., D/B/A PERSONAL INVESTMENTS, 98-004606 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 16, 1998 Number: 98-004606 Latest Update: Jul. 06, 1999

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent set up, promoted or conducted a lottery for money or other thing of value in violation of Section 849.09, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact On August 26, 1998, the Respondent, Personal Investments, Inc., d/b/a Personal Investments (Respondent) held license no. 77-00008, Series 2-COP, authorizing it to sell alcoholic beverages. On that date Mr. Stockton Hess was a corporate officer (Vice President). Mr. Hess was also a corporate officer of the Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. (WCKC) on the above date (President). The Respondent is a business regulated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division) because it sells alcohol. The Washington County Kennel Club (Club) is regulated by the same Department's Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering, because it operates a pari-mutuel wagering facility at the Ebro Greyhound Park Dog Track. The Ebro Greyhound Park is owned and operated by the Club. The Club is in the business of selling pari-mutuel tickets, programs and tip sheets. Personal Investments, Inc., sold alcohol at its concession stands and in the lounge and restaurant at Ebro Greyhound Park, located in Ebro, Washington County, Florida. The Respondent served as concessionaire for food and beverage services through its contract with the Club. The Club has held its pari-mutuel wagering permit and annual pari-mutuel licenses continuously for some forty years. They authorize greyhound racing operations at the Ebro track facility. On August 26, 1998, the Club conducted a game promotion at its greyhound track in which any person entering the facility, regardless of whether he or she paid an admission fee, was provided a split-ticket free of charge. One half of the ticket went into a drum located by the entrance way and the other half of the ticket was retained by the patron. Located next to the drum, and on the Club premises, was a wheel which contained representations of prizes such as t-shirts, magnets, key chains and so forth. Subsequent to the tenth race a Club employee, the front gate hostess, would draw a ticket and another employee, the track announcer, would announce the number drawn. The patron holding the other half of the selected ticket would then present himself to the front gate hostess to verify the number. The patron would then spin the wheel and win whatever prize was reflected at the point where the wheel stopped. The Club bought the wheel, paid for the prizes and its employees operated the game in question. Mr. Hess, an officer of both the Club and the Respondent corporation had knowledge of and intentionally participated in the running of the above-described game. On August 26, 1998, a drawing was conducted after the tenth, twelfth and thirteenth races. No patron responded to the number called out following the tenth race, but patrons responded after their announced numbers were called after the twelfth and thirteenth races. Each of those patrons presented a ticket, spun the wheel, and each won a T-shirt. The Division offered no evidence and was unaware, on August 26, 1998, or thereafter, including at hearing, whether those patrons entered the dog track premises by paying an admission ticket price. On August 26, 1998, three hundred ninety-one patrons attended the track. Two hundred eighty-eight of those patrons or approximately 75% attended the track for free, utilizing free passes made widely available by the Club throughout its market area. On a typical racing day or night in excess of 60% to 70% of the patrons entering the Ebro Greyhound Track facility enter utilizing such free passes, the availability of which is a matter of fairly common knowledge in the track's market area. In accordance with the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering requirements, the Club maintains a separate turnstile for patrons entering daily with free passes from those paying an admission fee. Respondent's Exhibit B in evidence is a daily report, submitted to the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, of patrons entering for free as opposed to those who paid an admission fee, including the report for August 26, 1998. It was further the Club's policy that any patron who asks for a free pass at the cashier's window is given one and permitted to enter the track premises free. On August 26, 1998, Division Agent Lee went to the Ebro Greyhound Track, paid a $2.00 admission fee, and used his split- ticket to enter the game promotion. He observed the two patrons who had each won a T-shirt following the twelfth and thirteenth races. He made no attempt to obtain a free admission nor did he inquire as to whether the two patrons who won T-shirts had entered for free. Agent Lee testified that he was unaware at the time he visited the greyhound track on that date that the Club owned the track and conducted the Pari-Mutuel Wagering permit and license, despite the fact that the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, a part of the same department, as the Division, was the source of the request to review the game promotion. Agent Lee thought that the Respondent, Personal Investments, Inc., was conducting the game promotion. In fact, that was not the case, the game promotion was conducted solely by the Club and its employees. Agent Lee testified that on August 26, 1998, as well as on the date of hearing, he had no knowledge or evidence that any agent, servant or employee of the Respondent had set up, promoted or conducted the game promotion or a lottery for money or "other thing of value." Agent Lee also testified that on August 26, 1998, and on the date of the hearing, he had no knowledge or evidence to offer to the effect that Personal Investments, Inc., or its agents, servants or employees attempted to operate, conduct or advertise any lottery scheme or device. Agent Lee was unaware of Division Training Bulletin 93-18 concerning game promotions. This was a memorandum to all District Supervisors of each district office of the Division noting that Section 849.094, Florida Statutes, authorizes game promotions in which the patron must be present to win, provided that the game promotion does not require an entry fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition for entering the game promotion. Tickets to enter the game promotion are given away without charge by the Club to any patron attending the facility. It is the Division's apparent position that, since Agent Lee paid a $2.00 admission fee to the track and thereafter received his game promotion ticket, that such admission fee constitutes a fee, payment or proof of purchase required as a condition precedent to entering into the subject game promotion. Since almost 75% of the patrons attending the track on the date in question entered free, and since every person entering the track on that date received, without charge, a game promotion ticket, the game promotion ticket cannot be determined to have, as a condition precedent, any fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition for entry into the game promotion. The "Bud Bowl '99 Sweepstakes" is a common type of game promotion used as an exemplar by the Respondent, the rules of which are depicted in Respondent's Exhibit C, in evidence. That game promotion is approved by the Florida Department of State pursuant to its authority in Section 849.094, Florida Statutes. It is a game promotion in which some but not all participants in fact pay a purchase price and, as part of the purchase, receive a game promotion ticket or piece. The rules of the game contained in Respondent's Exhibit C, reflect that of the 4,429,350, entry forms made available, approximately half are contained within specially marked packages of Anheuser-Busch beer products, which can only be obtained through purchases at stores holding alcoholic beverage licenses. However, one may also enter the "Bud Bowl '99" contest without a purchase and thus in accordance with Section 849.094(2)(e), Florida Statutes, the game promotion does not require, as a condition of entry into it, a fee, payment or proof of purchase. The Ebro game promotion did not award prizes greater than $5,000.00. Thus, unlike the "Bud Bowl '99" game promotion, it did not have to meet applicable requirements for a game promotion offering prizes in excess of such value, including registration with the Florida Secretary of State. It did, however, share the same common requirements as the "Bud Bowl '99" promotion, which is that any entry fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition of entering the game promotion was not required. Mr. Hess, who testified at hearing for the Respondent, paid $7.48 for a twelve-pack of Anheuser-Busch beer, which contained a "Bud Bowl '99" sweepstakes game promotion ticket therein. He did so without that game promotion being in violation of Section 849.094, Florida Statutes, as determined by the Secretary of State in registration of that promotion. Similarly, Agenct Lee paid $2.00 to enter the Ebro Greyhound Track, and in doing so acquired no more or no less right and opportunity to participate in the Ebro game promotion than did the majority of patrons who entered without having to pay an admission fee. The rules of the "Bud Bowl '99" sweepstakes game promotion submitted to or approved by the Department of State clearly reflect that approximately 50% of entry fees would be contained within Anheuser-Busch product packages which can only be obtained by purchase. The remaining 50% of the entries were made available without a purchase requirement.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a final order dismissing the amended administrative action against Personal Investments, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire 210 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bart Schneider, Esquire Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Deborah R. Miller, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages And Tobacco Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Lynda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007

USC (2) 15 U.S.C 205215 U.S.C 2301 Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.68501.603561.29849.01849.08849.09849.094 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61A-1.010
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. ALBERT PARRISH, T/A RED HONEY, 79-002225 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002225 Latest Update: Jan. 04, 1980

The Issue Whether or not on or about May 11, 1979, on his licensed premises, Albert Parrish, while being directly in charge of these premises, did unlawfully permit persons to play games of dice and cards for money, in violation of Section 849.01, Florida Statutes, and Section 561.29, Florida Statutes. Whether or not on or about June 1, 1979, in his licensed premises, the Petitioner, Albert Parrish, did unlawfully maintain a house, booth, tent, shelter or other place, to wit: The Red Honey, 835 East Brownlee Street, Starke, Bradford County, Florida, for the purpose of gaming or gambling, in violation of Section 849.01, Florida Statutes, and Section 561.29, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon a Notice to Show Cause (Administrative Complaint) filed by the State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, against Albert Parrish who trades as the Red Honey in a licensed premises located at 835 East Brownlee Street, Starke, Bradford County, Florida. The Respondent, Albert Parrish, is the holder of license No. 14-69, Series 2-COP, which allows the Respondent to sell beer and wine at the aforementioned premises. The State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty to regulate those persons and other entities who hold beverage licenses within this state and it is in keeping with that charge that the Notice to Show Cause (Administrative Complaint) has been brought against the Petitioner, Albert Parrish, for the offenses as set out in the Issues statement of this Recommended Order. The Respondent has contested those allegations and the case has been considered in accordance with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. On May 11, 1979, Beverage Officer Phyllis Williams, in the company of Columbia County, Florida, Sheriff's Officer Oliver Lake went to the licensed premises in Starke, Florida. After entering the licensed premises, they stayed for a period of one to one and one-half hours, during which time the Respondent, Albert Parrish, was present. In this sequence of time Albert Parrish was located at a pool table found in the licensed premises and a number of other persons were at the pool table rolling dice, which is a game of chance. Money was being placed on the table by the players and Parrish was picking up money from the table and placing it in a box which was in his custody and control. Parrish was in charge of the dice game to the extent of being an active participant and receiving financial benefit and to the extent of allowing other persons to play the dice game. While Officers Williams and Lake were in the licensed premises on May 11, 1979, they also observed a card game being played and this went on for some forty-five minutes. The game being played was a game known as "Tunk" which on this occasion was being played with wagered money pieced on the table. The Respondent, Parrish, was not directly participating in the card game, in that he was running the dice game at a separate location within the licensed premises; however, the person who appeared to be in charge of the "Tunk" card game was seen to pass an item to Parrish during the course of the time in which the officers were in the licensed premises. Therefore, although Parrish did not actively participate in the card game, he did unlawfully permit other persons to participate in the card game in his licensed premises. On June 1, 1979, Beverage Officer James Bates went back to the licensed premises in Starke, Florida. On this occasion, Bates observed a number of persons around a pool table and Parrish standing next to the pool table and a dice game being played. Two dice were being thrown and money was being wagered. Parrish was in charge of the dice game to the extent that wagers of money would be placed and Parrish would put a playing card on top of the money and then when a winner had prevailed, Parrish would pay off that winner. Bates observed the fact of this activity for approximately two hours and Parrish remained at the pool table for the entire period of time. Bates also observed an individual who was acting as a lookout and when police cars would pass by, the lockout would give a warning and all of those persons in the licensed premises would step away from the pool table until the police car had left the area of the licensed premises, at which time the game would be resumed.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Albert Parrish, have his beverage license No. 14-69, Series 2-COP, suspended for a period of ninety (90) days. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Albert Parrish t/a Red Honey 835 East Brownlee Street Starke, Florida ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================

Florida Laws (4) 120.57561.15561.29849.01
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CALDER RACE COURSE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND DANIA JAI ALAI, A DIVISION OF THE ARAGON GROUP, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, 04-002950RX (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 18, 2004 Number: 04-002950RX Latest Update: Nov. 16, 2005

The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 61D-11.001(8) and (13), 61D-11.002(1), 61D-11.005(2) and (9), and 61D- 11.027(1)(b), (1)(e), (2)(a) and (2)(b), are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2004).

Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Petitioner, Calder Race Course, Inc., a Florida Corporation, is a pari-mutuel permitholder permitted and licensed by the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division) pursuant to Chapter 550 and Section 849.086, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Dania Jai Alai, a division of The Aragon Group, a Florida Corporation, is a pari-mutuel permitholder permitted and licensed by the Division pursuant to Chapter 550, and Section 849.086, Florida Statutes. As cardroom operators, Florida Administrative Code Chapter 61D-11 governs the activities of Petitioners in the operation of their respective cardrooms, pursuant to their cardroom licenses at their pari-mutuel facilities. The challenged rules have the effect of directly regulating the operation of Petitioners' cardrooms. Petitioners are substantially affected by the challenged rules and have standing to bring this rule challenge. A tournament is a series of games. Multi-table tournaments eliminate players until there are only enough remaining players to play at one table before the tournament concludes. Tournaments which consist of nine players at a single table, often referred to as mini-tournaments, are commonly used by Florida Native-American cardrooms as a form of poker tournament play. Pari-mutuel pools, operated by pari-mutuel permitholders and the rules regulating pari-mutuel wagering, currently allow jackpots. Facts based upon the evidence of record History of the Rules The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is the state agency responsible for administering Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, and regulating the operation of cardrooms in the state. In 1996, the Florida Legislature created Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, authorizing cardrooms to be located at licensed pari-mutuel facilities. § 20, Chap. 96-364, Laws of Florida. In response to this legislation, Florida Administrative Code Chapter 61D-11 was adopted, governing the operation of cardrooms at pari-mutuel facilities. Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, was amended in 2003 by Section 4, Chapter 2003-295, Laws of Florida. Of particular significance to this case, the 2003 amendments eliminated a $10.00 limit on winnings and imposed a $2.00 bet limitation, with a maximum of three raises per round of betting. In response to this legislation, the Division began the process of amending Florida Administrative Code Chapter 61D-11. During this rule amendment process, the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) sent two letters to the Division expressing concerns with respect to provisions of the proposed rules regarding the Division's approval of authorized games and lack of criteria for such approval, a requirement for submission of a form, the Division's authority to approve a series of games (tournaments), and the Division's authority to prohibit jackpots. As part of the rule adoption process, the Division responded to these letters and informed JAPC that the Division was filing a Notice of Change regarding certain adjustments to the proposed rules. As part of the rule adoption process, the Division also conducted a rule development workshop on September 16, 2003, and a public hearing on January 7, 2004. The amendments were adopted May 9, 2004. Some of these rules amendments are the subject matter of the instant proceeding. Concerns of the Division Royal Logan is the chief operations officer for the Division. He has held that position for a total of approximately ten years. He was a member of a committee established in the Division as part of the process of amending Florida Administrative Code Chapter 61D-11 as a result of the 2003 amendments. According to Mr. Logan, the committee was concerned with several issues including compliance with the legislative intent of strict regulation of gambling, the Division's manpower in regulating cardrooms, and tax reporting concerns relating to auditing. More specifically, the Division was concerned that jackpots and re-buys have the potential of violating the $2.00 bet and raise limitations, the potential opportunity for collusion in single-game tournaments, and pose difficulties for accurate tax reporting. The Division does not have a group of employees specifically devoted to cardrooms. The Division has employees designated as chief inspectors at racetracks. The chief inspector has many duties including monitoring cardrooms to ensure compliance with statutes and rules. Monitoring cardroom compliance comprises no more than 10 to 12 percent of their time, as that person is the primary licensing official at the site. Not all racetracks have chief inspectors. The Game of Poker Poker is a card game using a single deck of 52 cards. Poker consists of a ranking system. The person holding the highest-ranking hand at the end of the game wins the pot. The traditional ranking system consists of the highest-ranking hand to the lowest. Hoyle’s Modern Encyclopedia of Card Games, by Walter B. Gibson, April 1974 Edition, contains an accurate description of the traditional ranking system in poker. Stanley Sludikoff is an expert in the game of poker, the rules of the game, and how poker is played in the United States. Mr. Sludikoff considers Hoyle's not to be the most authoritative book on the game of poker and that it applies primarily to home games as opposed to games played in gamerooms. Hoyle's does not address the subjects of tournaments or jackpots. Because Hoyle's contains an accurate description of the traditional ranking system in poker, the undersigned is not persuaded that the reference to Hoyle's in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-11.002(1) is inappropriate or arbitrary. In Mr. Sludikoff's opinion, tournaments are appealing because there is a low fixed risk with the potential for higher gain. They allow participants to build up to a higher limit game and potentially win entry into larger tournaments, such as the World Series of Poker. Single table tournaments are common in the United States in both large and small properties. Multi-table tournaments eliminate players until there are only enough remaining players to play at one table before the tournament concludes. Regular (non- tournament) games are played at single tables. According to Mr. Logan, the Division determined that the entry fee for a tournament should be calculated based upon the $2.00, three-raise limitation. The Division determined that "re-buys" are not consistent with the wagering limitations of Section 849.086, Florida Statutes. In Mr. Sludikoff's opinion, when the rules of the tournament allow, a re-buy is available to all players during a specified period of time. The rules are set by the cardroom operators, and each player in a tournament is aware of the ability to re-buy, how much the re-buys cost, and when it may be exercised. Re-buys are not the same thing as re-entering a tournament because participants are not permitted to re-buy unless he or she is a participant in the tournament at the time such re-buy is made available. A participant is not out of a tournament unless he or she is out of chips and there is no re-buy available to such participant. Allowing players to re-buy additional chips is a common practice in poker tournaments. Re-buys are easily recorded as a type of revenue received, thereby not presenting an accounting or auditing problem. Mr. Sludikoff's opinion in this regard persuades the undersigned that the agency's rationale regarding the entry fee and re-buy limitations are not supported by the necessary facts and are arbitrary. Most cardrooms in the United States have jackpots. Florida's statutory limitation of a $2.00 bet and raise limitation is a restrictive form of wagering. Under this limitation, the most that a participant can bet is $8.00 in any round. "Pari-mutuel" is a French term meaning wagering among ourselves, in that the participants are not wagering against the "house." Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, characterizes games authorized pursuant to that section to be "pari-mutuel style" games. Playing a game in a non-banking manner means that the "house", the cardroom operator, does not participate in the game at all and that the game participants are not playing against the house.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.56120.595120.68550.0251849.086
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LEROY WISE, JR. vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, AND DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, 89-006731 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 06, 1989 Number: 89-006731 Latest Update: Feb. 21, 1990

Findings Of Fact Leroy Wise, Jr.'s Mother purchased lottery ticket number 1888-3620-9444 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ticket") on approximately July 6, 1989. The Ticket was a Fantasy 5 ticket with four correct numbers. The Ticket winnings amounted to $805.00. Mr. Wise took his Mother to the Department of the Lottery's offices in Tallahassee, Florida on July 10, 1989. Mr. Wise's Mother did not have proper identification required by the Department of the Lottery to cash in the Ticket. Therefore, she allowed Mr. Wise to present the ticket for collection because Mr. Wise had proper identification. On July 10, 1989, Mr. Wise completed a Florida Lottery Winner Claim Form (hereinafter referred to as the "Form") and submitted the Form and the Ticket to the Lottery. On the back of the Ticket Mr. Wise listed his name and address on the spaces provided for the person claiming the prize and signed the Ticket. Mr. Wise listed his name, Social Security Number, address and phone number on the Form. Mr. Wise signed the Form as the "Claimant." In a letter dated July 10, 1989, the DHRS notified the Lottery that Mr. Wise owed $4,690.00 in Title IV-D child support arrearages as of July 10, 1989.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued providing for payment of the $805.00 prize attributable to the Ticket owed by Mr. Wise as child support arrearages as of the date of the Final Order to DHRS. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1990. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-4 2 6. 3 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Petitioner's did not offer any evidence at the formal hearing concerning these proposed findings of fact. Mr. Wise's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph Number in Recommended Order Sentence in Letter of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1, 13-20 Not proposed findings of fact. 2-3 6. 4-6, 11-12 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 7-10 Not relevant to this proceeding. Copies Furnished To: Jo Ann Levin Senior Attorney Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Louisa E. Hargrett Senior Attorney Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chriss Walker Senior Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Leroy Wise, Jr. 1526-A Patrick Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (3) 120.5724.10524.115
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DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING vs FLORIDA GAMING CENTERS, INC., D/B/A TAMPA JAI ALAI, 98-003063 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jul. 14, 1998 Number: 98-003063 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is authorized to charge and collect interest from Respondent, Florida Gaming Centers, Inc., on the unpaid value of the outsbook for the 1995-1996 meet from August 29, 1997, the date payment of the value of the outsbook was due, to September 8, 1998, the date payment was received by Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, the Respondent held a permit to conduct jai alai pari-mutuel wagering, under License No. 2909-D Amended, issued by the Department. Between July 1, 1995, and June 30, 1996, inclusive, Respondent held jai alai games for the purpose of conducting pari-mutuel wagering on those games. Respondent's meet for the relevant time period ended on June 30, 1996. One year and sixty days after the end of the State of Florida's (State) fiscal year of June 30, 1996, any "out" tickets that remained uncashed escheated to the State pursuant to Section 550.1645(2), Florida Statutes. Once these tickets or the value thereof escheated to the State, Respondent was required to pay the value of such tickets, as reflected on its outsbook, to the Department no later than August 29, 1997. Pursuant to the outsbook prepared by Respondent, the value of the outs for the 1995-1996 meet was $108,221.20. Nonetheless, Respondent failed to submit to the Department the value of the balance of the outsbook within the prescribed time frame and instead held these funds. On June 2, 1998, the Department served an Administrative Complaint on Respondent, alleging that Respondent had failed to timely submit the value of the outsbook to Petitioner. By letter dated September 4, 1998, Respondent submitted to the Department a check for $109,128.60 as payment for the unpaid value of Respondent's outsbook for the 1995-1996 meet. The Department received Respondent's payment on September 8, 1998. Of the total amount Respondent paid over to the Department, $108,221.20 was credited against the unpaid value of the outsbook for the 1995-1996 meet, resulting in full payment of the outstanding outsbook value. The remaining $907.40 paid by Respondent to Petitioner was an overpayment. Petitioner alleges that Respondent is responsible for interest accrued on the unpaid value of the outsbook for the period of time that amount remained unpaid. According to the Department, the interest owed by Respondent as a result of its failure to timely remit the value of the outsbook, "shall be determined at a rate per annum . . . equal to the State's average investment rate for the preceding month to the month for which interest is being calculated." The average interest rate earned on the investment of State funds as determined by the State Treasurer and/or Comptroller" for the time period of August 1997 through August 1998, was 6.73 percent. The Department determined that the interest "shall accrue on the unpaid aggregate principal amount due the State for the month(s) from the respective due date." Based on its calculations and after deducting Respondent's overpayment of $907.40, the Department asserts that Respondent owes the Department approximately $6,573.85 in accrued interest. Respondent disputes that the Department has authority to collect interest on the unpaid amount of the outsbook and alleges the powers of the Department under Section 550.0251, Florida Statutes, do not include such authority.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that (1) an administrative fine of $1,000.00 be imposed against the Respondent for the violation Section 550.1645, Florida Statutes; and, (2) Respondent shall receive a credit of $907.40 toward payment of the administrative fine. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah R. Miller, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William P. Cagney, III, Esquire 3400 Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Eric H. Miller, Esquire Chief Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Woodyard Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (7) 120.57550.0251550.1645717.102717.119717.132717.134 Florida Administrative Code (2) 61D-7.00161D-7.022
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