The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his age and handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Harold Asher (Asher), was born on January 13, 1929, and as of April 1, 1992, he was 63 years old. Respondent, Barnett Banks, Inc. (BBI), is a holding company that owns and controls numerous banks in Florida and Georgia. The banks in Florida owned by BBI are located in three geographical regions: the north region, the central region, and the south region. In the south region there are nine banks: Barnett Bank of Key West, Barnett Bank of South Florida (Miami), Barnett Bank of Broward (Fort Lauderdale), Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Barnett Bank of Martin County, Barnett Bank of Treasure Coast, Barnett Bank of Lake Okeechobee, Barnett Bank of Naples, and Barnett Bank of Lee County (Fort Myers). Each bank has branches. Barnett Banks, Inc. is an employer subject to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Harold Asher was hired by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County in 1983, at the age of 54 as a loan review officer and was later promoted to Vice President/Loan Review. His job responsibility was to review loans which had been granted by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. A loan review is an evaluation of the portfolio after a loan is made to insure that the loan was properly approved, that the analysis done to support the sources of repayment was adequate, that the loan is collectible, that the risk factors associated with the loan is in line with policy and regulatory standards, and that the loan is properly underwritten. The loan review is memorialized on a line or summary sheet. While employed by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Asher had several supervisors, including Ken Parrish, Art Kite, James Kammert, Noel Coan, and Martin Streischek. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County used a rating system of one to five in evaluating its employees, which equated as follows: 1.0 to 1.49 means fails to meet minimum position accountabilities; 1.5 to 2.49 means with few exceptions, meets position accountabilities; 2.5 to 3.49 means meets position accountabilities; 3.5 to 4.49 means exceeds position accountabilities; and 4.5 to 5.0 means significantly exceeds position accountabilities. In March, 1988, James Kammert rated Asher's performance as 3.0. On January 1, 1989, Art Kite rated Asher's performance for 1988 as 3.70. In June, 1989, Art Kite rated Asher as meeting or exceeding in the key result areas (KRAs) of Asher's position. On January 1, 1990, Art Kite performed an evaluation of Asher's performance for 1989 and rated him 3.45. On January 18, 1991, Neal Coan rated Asher's performance for 1990 as 3.0. While working for Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Asher was never disciplined. Prior to 1991, BBI and its banks had a dual system for loan reviews. Some of the banks such as Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, had set up loan review sections which operated at the bank level only. The staff of these sections would report directly to the bank. BBI had a loan review section for each of its regions. The BBI regional loan review sections would review loans in each of the banks located in that particular region. In January, 1991 a decision was made by BBI to consolidate the loan reviews at the holding company level. On-site teams were established in Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and Palm Beach. A travel team reviewed loans at all the banks including the banks which had on-site teams. As a result of the consolidation, the local banks eliminated their loan review departments and the staff comprising those particular departments were terminated from their positions. At the time of the decision to consolidate, Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County's loan review section consisted of one secretary and three loan officers, one of whom was Asher. The three loan officers interviewed for positions with BBI. Asher and Steven Clapp were hired by BBI. Asher was 61 years of age when he was hired by BBI on January 1, 1991, as the on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. His office was located on Datura Street in West Palm Beach. Part of Asher's duties included supervising Mr. Clapp. The BBI on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at Barnett Bank of South Florida (Miami) was Barry Goldberg, who was born on September 24, 1962. The BBI on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Broward County was Mark Tavoletti, who was born on December 19, 1961. Although the same methods were used to review loans for BBI as were used to review loans for Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, there were some changes. Computers were used more at BBI. Instead of traveling to the 45 branches of Barnett Bank of Palm Beach to review loans, Asher received the files through the interoffice mail. BBI loan reviews focused more on a loan instead of the work of the loan officer. Monthly reports were required by BBI. BBI report formats differed from those of Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. Asher no longer selected the loans to be reviewed. BBI selected the loans using specific criteria established by BBI. Asher reported to Scott Bechtle. While working with Mr. Bechtle, Asher did not receive any criticism or disciplinary action. In July, 1991, Edward Angulo (Angulo) took over Mr. Bechtle's position as the Regional Credit Review Director for the south region. Asher, Mr. Goldberg, and Mr. Tavoletti began reporting to Angulo. Angulo's primary duty was to review the line sheets that were generated by the on-site groups and the travel team. From July, 1991 to the end of December, 1991, Angulo met with Asher approximately three to five times and talked with Asher numerous times on the telephone. Angulo reviewed all the line sheets that were generated by Asher and Clapp during that six-month period. In reviewing the work done by the Palm Beach on-site group, Angulo noted that generally the line sheets did not have sufficient quantifiable information, did not contain information supported by an independent evaluation, and contained deficiencies regarding underwriting. He would make comments concerning these problems and call Asher to discuss them. Some times Asher would not provide additional information requested by Angulo or would provide it in an unsatisfactory manner. During the last six months in 1991, Angulo spent more time in connection with the Palm Beach loan reviews than he did with the other loan review teams because of the problems the Palm Beach team was having. Angulo sat in with Asher during an exit meeting with bank management wherein Asher appeared indecisive and unprepared, forcing Angulo to take over and conduct the meeting in its entirety. Angulo completed a performance evaluation on Asher for the period 1/91 to 12/91. Asher was evaluated on nine KRAs: 1) supervise staff, 2) analyze specific loans, 3) determine quality of credit analyses, 4) evaluate underwriting standards, 5) insure accuracy of CSS, 6) evaluate overall credit administration, 7) evaluate loan approval process, 8) prepare reports and exit meetings, and 9) train junior officers. Each KRA was weighted and rated on a scale of one to five, with one being the lowest rating and five being the highest. For KRAs 1, 5, and 9, Asher was rated as 3, which meant that his performance met expectations. For KRAs 2, 3, 7, and 8, Asher received a rating of 2, which stood for approaches expectations. In the KRA concerning evaluating underwriting standards, Asher received a rating of 1, which meant that Asher's performance failed to meet expectations. Angulo noted on the evaluation that Asher needed to improve his performance in the following areas: technical/analytical, independent/inquisitive attitudes, and judgement/decisiveness. Asher's total weighted rating was 2.25, which equates to an overall rating of 2. At the time of the evaluation, Asher and Angulo understood that Asher's position was a Review Officer III. Asher had been performing the work of a Review Officer III. Accordingly, Angulo evaluated his work using the standards for Review Officer III, and evaluated the work actually performed by Asher. However, at the hearing it was revealed that Asher had been a Review Officer II at the time of his employment with BBI and held that position until his termination. On or about April 1, 1992, Angulo met with Asher and discussed Asher's performance since January, 1992. Angulo cited a problem that had occurred concerning a review of Southside Investors which had been done by Asher's subordinate, Steven Clapp. Angulo had discussed with Asher several inconsistencies or omissions in the report relating to potential underwriting problems and asked Asher to have the deficiencies cleared up. As of April 1, 1992, the deficiencies had not been resolved. Angulo also discussed with Asher problems dealing with the adequacy of supervision of report preparation and the conduct of exit meetings with bank management. Deficiencies in these areas had been pointed out in Asher's 1991 annual performance evaluation. Since that evaluation, a monthly report by Steven Clapp had to be amended because of his erroneous conclusion that the bank's overall underwriting and lending practices were inadequate. The incorrect finding was not corrected until a draft of the report was reviewed by the regional office. As the on-site manager, Asher should have reviewed Mr. Clapp's report and caught the error before it was sent to the regional office. Angulo also pointed out to Asher that his performance at exit meetings with bank management still lacked decisiveness, resulting in the need for frequent changes in reports. As a result of the continued deficiencies in Asher's performance since his 1991 performance evaluation, Angulo felt that Asher needed technical training, improvement in supervisory skills, and familiarization with BBI policies and procedures. To assist Asher in reaching an acceptable level of performance, Asher was moved from his on-site manager position to Barnett Banks, Inc.'s Credit Review Office travel team on or about April 1, 1992. There was no decrease in salary, benefits, or pay grade. Additionally, Asher was placed on a 90-day probationary period. In mid-April, 1992, Asher wrote Ken Veniard, a Senior Vice President, stating that he disagreed with Angulo's evaluation and felt that the negative comments were "based on factors totally unrelated to performance, such as age, personality, or simply the lack of complete information." Asher requested to be considered for a transfer. Veniard received the memorandum on April 29, 1992. On or about April 1, 1992, Jack Shoben, a credit review officer with BBI since 1989, was moved into the position of on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County at the Datura Street location. Jack Shoben was born on October 1, 1947, and as of April 1, 1992, he was 44 years old. Angulo chose Shoben as the on-site manager because of Mr. Shoben's qualifications and experience. After Mr. Shoben became on-site manager, the work product from the on-site team at Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County began to improve; thus Angulo did not have to spend as much time on the Palm Beach site as he had when Asher was on-site manager. William Westland, who was born on October 26, 1927, was Asher's supervisor on the travel team. During Asher's first two weeks on the travel team, he worked in Broward County. His performance was satisfactory. The third week on the travel team was spent in Miami, where Asher was required to review real estate loans. Mr. Westland noted that Asher needed some training in the real estate loan area. On May 10, 1992, shortly after Asher returned from Miami, he suffered a brain seizure and was hospitalized for two days. Six weeks after his seizure, Asher returned to work. As a result of Asher's seizure, his doctors prohibited Asher from driving for at least six months and possibly longer and required his work-related travel to be kept to an absolute minimum, which included avoiding long travel trips of any type. An essential requirement for the position that Asher held on the travel team was that he be able to travel to the different banks in the south region to conduct loan reviews. Asher was aware that extensive travel was a requirement of his job and so advised his doctor by letter dated July 3, 1992. When Asher returned to work, he was temporarily placed on the on-site review team at Palm Beach under the supervision of Jack Shoben. Steven Clapp who had been at Palm Beach on the on-site review team was transferred to the travel team. Asher's probationary period was extended to August 7, 1992. The temporary placement was to accommodate Asher's non-travel status until December 31, 1992, and after such time Asher's continued employment was contingent upon his satisfactory completion of the probationary period and his ability to meet the requirements of all credit review officers of his level, which included travel. During June 1992 until Mr. Asher's termination, Jeff Asher, his son, often drove Asher to Barnett Bank's offices on Datura Street in West Palm Beach. He also drove him home from that location during the same time. Jeff Asher also drove Asher to and from branch locations within Palm Beach County during the same period. A memorandum dated July 28, 1992, was sent from Ken Veniard, Angulo's supervisor, to BBI Credit Quality Staff, stating that although BBI was committed to maintain the on-site loan review teams, that all on-site staff would be required to travel and assist the travel team as necessary. On August 7, 1992, Asher's probationary period lapsed. There was no evaluation of Asher's performance at that time. In August, 1992, Steven Clapp was transferred to the BBI office in Jacksonville to fill a position for which he had posted. The position on the travel team that Mr. Clapp had filled in Asher's absence was held open for Asher in the event that his travel restrictions would be lifted in January, 1993, thereby enabling him to return to his position on the travel. In November, 1992, Asher, Sarah Ketchum, Jack Shoben, and Angulo participated in a teleconference, at which time Angulo advised Asher that if Asher's doctor did not approve a full time travel schedule in January, 1993, Asher's employment with BBI would be terminated effective as of December 31, 1992. On December 28, 1992, Asher visited his doctor, who continued the travel restrictions. On December 30, 1992, Asher, Jack Shoben, Joan Slaughenhaupt, and Angulo participated in a teleconference. Asher stated that his travel restrictions had not changed. Angulo advised Asher that his employment would be terminated effective December 31 due to his inability to travel. Mr. Asher's employment ended on December 31, 1992. On January 1, 1992, the on-site teams in Miami and Fort Lauderdale were each reduced from three to two on-site personnel. The Palm Beach on-site team was reduced to one one-site person, Jack Shoben, who was the only loan review officer there from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1993. In January, 1994, all on-site positions were eliminated. Mr. Asher's salary at the time of his termination was $47,339.96 annually. In the spring of 1993, Asher and his wife went to Huntsville, Alabama, traveling by automobile two days each way. In June, 1993, all Asher's travel restrictions were lifted. Prior to his driving restrictions being lifted, Asher began driving short distances in his neighborhood. In January, 1994, BBI made an offer of reinstatement to Asher, whereby he would have been reinstated as a Credit Review Officer II on the regional travel team with the same salary, same seniority, and same salary grade level as when he was terminated on December 31, 1992. In addition, a procedure was implemented whereby Asher could report directly to Janice Gurny, Director of Human Resources for BBI in the Jacksonville office, any complaints regarding harassment on the part of his supervisors. Asher received the offer but did not contact anyone at BBI regarding the offer of reinstatement. Asher did not take the offer because it was a Credit Review Officer II position (he was under the impression he was a Credit Review Officer III at the time of his termination); he felt the environment was hostile; and he had his house on the market to sell.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-5815 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraphs 3: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The third sentence is accepted to the extent that Petitioner received two letters which advised him of his increase in salary and thanked him for his hard work and professionalism and advised him that the bank was glad that he was on the team. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: The first three sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is accepted to the extent that the methods to review loans were basically the same but rejected to the extent that the only changes were in the format of the loan review reporting process. Paragraphs 6-7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: The third, fourth, and fifth sentences are rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: The last sentence is rejected to the extent that it implies that Asher was rated on work for which he was not performing. He was doing the job of a level III but his personnel file reflected that he officially was placed in a level II position. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 14-16: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is rejected as recitation of testimony. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 18: The first, second, sixth, and tenth sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The third, fourth, fifth, eighth and ninth sentences are accepted in substance except as to the reference to the placement on the travel team as a demotion. The seventh sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The second sentence is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 20-23: Rejected as recitation of testimony and constituting argument. Paragraph 24: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 25: The first, second, third, and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The eight sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The ninth sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence in that the charge against Asher was his failure to catch Mr. Clapp's errors before the report left the Palm Beach office. The last sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 26: The first sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by any evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: The first, third, and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The second and fifth sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 29: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 30: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 31: Rejected as mere recitation of testimony. Paragraph 32: Rejected as mere recitation of testimony. Paragraph 33: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 36: The first and second sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 37: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 38: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 39: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 40: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 41: Accepted. Paragraphs 42: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 43: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as it applies to the time period from June, 1992 to June, 1993. The second sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 44: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2-13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 17-18: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 21: The sixth sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 22-24: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 25: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The third sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 26-27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 29: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 30-34: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 35-39: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: James E. Moye, Esquire Patrick J. Kennedy, Esquire 201 East Pine Street, Suite 710 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard Tannenbaum, Esquire Shea & Tannenbaum 204 Brazilian Avenue, Suite 210 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner was subject to a discriminatory housing practice based on her race, age, and gender, or any of the foregoing, when her application for a loan was denied by Respondents.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses and documentary evidence presented, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Janice Buchanan, is an African-American female who was 44 years old at the time she applied for the home loan which is the subject of this claim. She had served on active duty in the United States Air Force and, as a result of her service, was eligible for a home loan guarantee by the federal Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") if she met other financial criteria established by the VA. At all times material to the claim herein, Town & Country Mortgage Company ("Town & Country") was a correspondent mortgage lender. A correspondent mortgage lender originates a loan application for an individual seeking a loan, locates an investor, and, if the investor approves the applicant, assigns the file to the investor. As a correspondent mortgage lender, Town & Country did not make loans or make the decision whether or not to approve a loan application. The decision whether to approve the loan is made by an underwriter employed by the investor. The investor's underwriter, not Town & Country, decides whether an application for a VA home loan guarantee meets the criteria established by the VA. A Town & Country loan application commences with the "pre-qualification" interview. During this interview, the loan officer will obtain the applicant's income information, asset information, and look at a quick "snapshot" of the applicant's credit history, which is obtained from a credit reporting agency. Once the loan officer believes sufficient information has been obtained during the pre-qualification interview, the loan application is actually filled out by the applicant and the loan officer, and the applicant provides the loan officer with documents such as bank statements and income verification documents. While processing the loan application, the loan officer attempts verification of the information provided by the applicant during the initial interview. Once the loan application is completed, a loan processor with Town & Country will begin a more detailed verification of financial information which includes calling the applicant's employer, ordering a "full factual credit report," and verifying all financial information the applicant has provided. If the loan applicant has a complex financial history, the verification process may take a considerable amount of time. In the instant case, the "full factual credit report" was obtained from Stateswide Credit Bureau Services, Inc. ("Stateswide"). Stateswide assembles credit information on the loan applicant from the three main credit information repositories in the United States (Equifax, TransUnion, and TRW). The "full factual credit report" is known as a "tri- merge," i.e., credit information from all three credit information repositories is combined into one document. A "tri- merge" report is used because one credit information repository may not have all of the information another repository has. As a result, even if an applicant produced a satisfactory credit report from one credit information repository, it would be insufficient to overcome an unsatisfactory report on a "tri- merge." Petitioner's "full factual credit report" included at least nine negative credit references. A negative credit reference may be a delinquent account, a past due account, late payments or other activities considered inappropriate by a credit provider and reported to a credit information repository. The Stateswide "full factual credit report" was prepared by Laura Aguayo on November 2, 1999. In compiling the report, Ms. Aguayo telephoned each creditor which had provided negative credit information. Each creditor verified the negative information by social security number, in addition to name. If a creditor did not accept Ms. Aguayo's telephone call, she wrote the creditor. Petitioner was advised of the negative credit information; she provided Town & Country with additional information in an effort to explain the negative information on her credit report. After the verification process is completed, Town & Country's loan processor forwards the information obtained during the loan application and verification process to the investor. This information includes the loan application completed by the applicant and a credit package consisting of the applicant's credit report, income, assets, property, collateral, and additional information, e.g., the loan applicant's explanation of negative credit information, which was forwarded in the instant case. The investor's underwriter reviews the loan application and related information and makes a decision as to whether or not the investor will provide the loan. Town & Country would not forward a loan package to an investor if Town & Country did not want the application to be approved by the investor. There is an economic incentive for Town & Country to want a loan application to be approved by an investor; if an investor approves a loan, Town & Country receives a commission; if an investor does not approve a loan, Town & Country receives no income from the investor. The investor in the instant case was Irwin Mortgage Corporation ("Irwin"); the underwriter at Irwin who reviewed Petitioner's application was Ms. Christine Ross who, like her employer, has no affiliation with Town & Country. Ms. Ross has 15 or 16 years of underwriting experience. Ms. Ross reviewed Petitioner's income and assets and assessed whether she has the ability to make the payments and reviewed her credit history to determine if Petitioner had, in the past, made payments in a timely fashion. Ms. Ross determined that Petitioner was not credit worthy because of a poor credit history and insufficient funds to close the loan. In addition, Ms. Ross considered that Petitioner had several checks returned because of insufficient funds. She reviewed all of the information provided and opined that the application would not meet VA guidelines. If the loan is not approved by an investor, Town & Country's loan officer will work with the applicant to determine what can be done to have the loan approved. When dealing with a VA loan, as in this case, the loan application and related information can be forwarded to the VA for review even though it has not been approved by an investor. The benefit of having the package forwarded to the VA is that the VA might see something the investor missed, and provides the applicant with a second chance to have the loan approved. Town & Country would not request that the investor forward the loan file to the VA if it did not want the loan application to be approved. If the VA denies the loan, there is no purpose in trying to find another investor for the loan because by denying the loan application, the VA is indicating it will not accept the loan application from any investor. When Irwin advised Town & Country that Petitioner's loan application had been denied, Town & Country requested that Irwin forward the application directly to the VA. Upon Town & Country's request, Ms. Ross sent the loan package to the VA. If the VA had decided to guarantee the loan, Irwin would have no risk and would approve the loan. The VA also denied Petitioner's loan application. The reason the VA denied the loan was because "[t]he present income of the borrower(s) was not shown to be sufficient." Ultimately, Ms. Aguayo of Stateswide was able to remove one negative entry from Petitioner's credit report, but she was unable to remove any others. This deletion of one negative entry is evidenced by a December 17, 1999, Stateswide "full factual credit report." Had Ms. Ross been in possession of the December 17, 1999, credit report from Stateswide, this would not have affected her decision to deny Petitioner's loan application, because the report still showed a credit history that did not meet VA guidelines. Additionally, the VA denied the loan because of insufficient income, not poor credit. No credible evidence was presented that Town & Country caused a delay in seeking financing or provided false information as alleged in Petitioner's Petition For Relief. Steve Pilchick, President of Town & Country, had no direct involvement with Petitioner's loan application and did not discriminate against her. No evidence was offered regarding any discrimination against Petitioner based on her age. No evidence was presented that Town & Country was responsible for the denial of Petitioner's loan application. Nor was any evidence presented that Town & Country had approved loans for any particular person or persons of any race or gender who had loan qualifications similar to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice finding that neither Town & Country Mortgage Company nor Steve Pilchick unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Janice Buchanan 4266 Cloverleaf Place Casselberry, Florida 32707 Janice Buchanan Teamesha Leyva 14901 Newland Street, Apartment C Midway City, California 92655 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Daniel P. O'Gorman, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether employees of Production Credit Associations and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida may be licensed to sell insurance by the Florida Department of Insurance. (a) Whether the affidavit by C. W. S. Horne offered by Intervenors Production Credit Associations of Florida and Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida is relevant and material to the issues. Whether the Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida are financial institutions as defined in Section 636.9_8 of the Florida Statutes. Whether the Department of Insurance, in its licensing proceedings, should consider or must consider the Federal laws, rules and regulations.
Findings Of Fact Facts stipulated by the parties on the record: "The Petitioners, the Florida Association of Insurance Agents, representing the Association and its members individually and collectively, is a representative party in interest for these proceedings and any review thereof. And its members will be effected by any decision of the Department of Insurance in licensing insurance agents to be employed by, retained by, or associated with Production Credit Associations in the State of Florida. For the purposes of this proceeding, and any review thereof, no member of the Association may take a position contrary to or in opposition to that taken herein by the Petitioner. "The Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida have an interest in the decisions of the Department of Insurance with respect to the licensing of insurance agents to sell insurance on their behalf. And the decisions of the Department in licensing of such insurance agents will substantially effect the interest of the Production Credit Associations and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida, and they are therefore proper parties to the Administrative Proceedings. "Florida Farm Bureau Federation, L.A.A., (Limited Agricultural Association) is a non-profit voluntary general farm membership organization comprised of approximately 65,000 member families. The Florida Farm Bureau offers comprehensive insurance services to their members, and if the Department licenses insurance agents to be employed by or associated with the Production Credit Associations of Florida, they will be offering similar services that are already offered by the Florida Farm Bureau. "The Department of Insurance has licensed two insurance agents with type 2-20 general lines insurance licenses, which licenses since their issuance have been utilized by the holders thereof. The Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida have retained such licensed agents and have entered into the insurance business through the process of having such agents solicit and sell insurance to persons, including those who borrow from either the Production Credit Associations or the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida. "The Intervenors, Production Credit Associations of Florida, may offer into evidence an affidavit concerning the operations of the Associations and their affiliates in Florida. The other parties hereto will not object to the form of the evidence, but reserve the right to object to its introduction on the grounds that it is irrelevant and immaterial. ". . .there are Federal rules and regulations under the Farm Credit Administration Act. The Hearing Officer may take judicial knowledge of such rules and regulations and any amendments thereto. ". . .it is stipulated that Mr. Field has witnesses that would testify to these items, and the other parties waive cross examination of such witnesses and agree to these facts without necessarily stipulating that such facts are true. ". . .Mr. Bob Taylor, Vice President for Underwriting of Farm Bureau Insurance Companies, would testify that Farm Bureau, through its related insurance companies and other competitive companies are currently offering cost, qualitatively and availability, similar insurance services to those being sought in rural communities. ". . .Mr. Doug Oswald, President of Sun Bank, Ocala, would testify as to the availability of farm loans during the last 24 years in the Ocala, Marion County, Florida area. He would testify that such loans are currently available through current commercial sources and have been available, and such loans, including both mortgage and production type loans, are presently available in Marion County. And that insurance related services in connection with the farm type loans in his community have been available through the Farm Bureau and other companies during this period of time. ". . .Mr. Bob Taylor, Vice President of Underwriting, Farm Bureau Insurance Companies, would also testify that similar insurance services proposed to be offered to the Production Credit Association and the Land Bank are presently being and have been offered by the Farm Bureau Insurance Companies in the rural communities on a competitive form from both cost, qualitatively and availability. The Hearing Officer further finds: The Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida are chartered by the Farm Credit Administration [a federal agency in the executive branch of the government subject to regulation and supervision by the Farm Credit Administration, Title 12, Chapter IV, United States Code] upon application of local persons eligible to borrow money from the Farm Credit System. There are nine (9) Production Credit Associations and seven (7) Federal Land Bank Associations in Florida. Two licenses have been approved by the Respondent for two employees or associates of the Production Credit Association. The following affidavit of C. W. S. Horne, Executive Vice President of Federal Land Banks of Columbia and the Federal Land Bank of Columbia, is admissible for the purpose of describing the operations and functions of the associations and their affiliates in Florida: "PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME C. W. S. Horne, being duly sworn deposes and says that he is the Executive Vice President of the Federal Land Bank of Columbia, and the Federal Credit Bank of Columbia, and that if called upon to testify in the above captioned matter he would state that according to his knowledge and belief the Farm Credit Act of 1971 does in fact provide in Section 1.4(11) as follows: "Accept deposits of securities or of current funds"; and that neither the Federal Land Bank nor the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank accepts any deposits from members of the general public in any form such as is common with commercial banks and that it accepts no deposits either for time or checking accounts or issue certificates of deposit or other similar evidences of indebtedness; and that pursuant to Section 1.4(11) of the Farm Credit Act of 1971, the Federal Land Bank of Columbia does retain certain funds belonging to Federal land bank Associations and that it issues an advice of indebtedness to the associations and pays interest thereon based upon the cost of money to the Federal Land Bank of Columbia and that in practice these transactions amount to loans by certain associations to the Federal Land Bank of Columbia. Further the deponent sayeth not." The Florida Farm Bureau Federation, a limited agricultural association is a non-profit, voluntary general farm membership organization. Members may, and many do, borrow from the Production Credit Associations and the Federal Land Bank Associations, associations which are a part of the Farm credit Systems. The Florida Farm Bureau offers comprehensive insurance to its members through individual agents licensed by the Respondent Department of Insurance.
Recommendation Deny applications for licensure from the Production credit Associations of Florida and for the federal Land Bank Associations of Florida and revoke any licenses that have been issued. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of December, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred B. Karl, Esquire Post Office Drawer 229 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Edward L. Kutter, Esquire Room 268 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 E. Harper Field, Esquire Post Office Box 1879 Tallahassee, Florida Joseph C. Jacobs, Esquire Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. R. Lowry, Esquire Bevin Ritch, Esquire Post Office Box 1025 Gainesville, Florida
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the pleadings and the evidence adduced at the hearings in this cause, the following pertinent facts are found: On November 25, 1974, H. M. Harmes, then Director of the School Service Center, notified respondent by letter of his appointment to teach ED 598, "Crucial Issues in Education", during Quarter II, 1975. The letter of appointment explained respondent's salary and the materials and consultants available to him. The letter further stated: "This is a credit bearing contract short course; therefore all college and university regulations pertaining to credit courses must be observed. In addition, you should read the enclosed description of instructor's procedures and follow them carefully." The letter noted that it had an enclosure. It was the practice of the Division of Continuing education to include a copy of a document entitled "Credit Institute Instructor's Procedures" with each letter of appointment. Respondent accepted the appointment on November 26, 1974, by signing the letter and returning it to the Division of Continuing Education. The course in question was a continuing education offering for teachers and administrators. The course was to begin on February 7, 1975 and meet for ten hours (three hours on Friday evening and seven hours on Saturday) on each of five weekends, the student earning five quarter credit hours upon successful completion. The "Credit Institute Instructor's Procedures" contains several provisions regarding the registration of students. It provides that: "For programs which will meet fewer than ten times, this (registration) must be done at the first meeting. If the program will have ten or more meetings, registration may continue to the second meeting, but no later." Other provisions are "under no circumstances are you to accept or handle money from students. . . for payment of fees . . ." and "students may register only during the open registration period. Therefore, all students will appear on the first class roll. None will be added." A flyer prepared by respondent to advertise the course provided for preregistration and stated that checks were to be made payable to Florida Atlantic University. On or before the date the class first met on February 7, 1975, twenty students were properly registered. On the third class meeting (Friday, February 14, 1976), three additional students appeared and inquired of respondent if they could register at that time. These three persons had wives or friends already registered in the class, and it was convenient for them to travel to and from class with those already registered. Respondent allowed these three persons to register and instructed them to date their application February 7, 1975; and to make their checks payable to respondent. Respondent informed them that he would register them for the course if possible. If not, he would register them for the same course to be offered by respondent the following quarter. This arrangement was agreeable to the three students. At that time, respondent had not been appointed to teach the course for the following quarter. He was subsequently appointed to teach the same course for Quarters III and IV. On February 14, 1975, the three late students filled out the application forms, dated them February 7th, and wrote checks payable to respondent. On February 18, 1975, respondent deposited the three checks in his personal checking account. He did not feel that the administration would permit the late applicants to register and therefore, without making inquiry, he did not register the three students for the winter quarter and the students did not receive credit for completing the course. Respondent misplaced somewhere in his office the application forms completed by the three students in question. Although requests were received by respondent from each of the three students as to their receipt of credit for the course, respondent took no steps to register these students during the following two quarters in which he taught the course. Sometime during the summer of 1975, respondent found the applications in his office. However, it was not until the University intervened on behalf of one of the three students - in September of 1975 - that respondent turned in the applications and paid the University $300.00 for their registration fees. The three students were then given credit and grades for the course. By a complaint dated October 2, 1975, petitioner charged respondent with misconduct and sought to terminate his employment contract for cause. Respondent requested a hearing on the compliant and petitioner's President requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing. The undersigned was assigned as the Hearing Officer.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that respondent's contract of employment be immediately terminated for cause. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 10th day of March, 1976. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Glenwood L. Creech President Florida Atlantic University Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Leonard H. Klatt, Esquire University Attorney Florida Atlantic University Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Frank A. Kriedler, Esquire Attorney for Respondent 141 S.E. Avenue C P. O. Box 881 Belle Glade, Florida 33430
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the methodology that Respondent uses to determine the amounts payable to pharmacies for prescription drugs dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground that the methodology in question, which is incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.250, enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program in which Florida participates in partnership with the national government. Medicaid provides medically necessary health care—— including, relevantly, prescription drugs——to lower income persons. In addition to shouldering administrative and regulatory responsibilities, Florida partially funds the Florida Medicaid Program, contributing about 42 percent of the money budgeted for the program's operation in this state. Federal funds make up the balance. Respondent Agency for Health Care Administration (the "Agency") is the state agency charged with administering the Medicaid Program in Florida. (At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, known collectively as "CMS," is the agency authorized to administer Medicaid.) Among other things, the Agency is responsible for reimbursing Medicaid providers in accordance with state and federal law, subject to specific appropriations. In this connection, the Agency is authorized and required to prescribe, by rule, reimbursement methodologies. The Agency is permitted to publish such methodologies in policy manuals and handbooks, provided the latter are incorporated by reference in duly promulgated rules. Petitioner, The Florida Retail Federation, Inc. (the "Federation"), is a trade association whose members include all or most of the major drugstore chains doing business in Florida. These drugstore chains, which include Walgreen's, CVS, Eckerd's, Albertson's, Publix, Winn-Dixie, Target, and Wal-Mart, participate in the Federation's Chain Drugstore Council, which is the only organization in this state representing the interests of drugstore chains. Members of the Federation's Chain Drugstore Council operate more than 2,500 separate pharmacies, each of which is an enrolled Medicaid provider of prescription drugs. Given that there are approximately 4,000 pharmacy-providers participating in the Florida Medicaid Program, the Federation represents a significant percentage of the enrolled pharmacies. The Federation advocates on behalf of its members before the Florida Legislature and the state regulatory agencies. Medicaid funding is one of the organization's top priorities. The Federation brought the instant proceeding because it believes that the Medicaid Program has been under- reimbursing its members based on a methodology that contravenes the applicable Florida statutes. The Disputed Rule The Medicaid reimbursement methodology for prescribed drugs is set forth in the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drugs Services Coverage, Limitations, and Reimbursement Handbook, July 2001 (the "Handbook), which Handbook was incorporated by reference in, and hence adopted via Section 120.54(1)(i)1., Florida Statutes, as, Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G- 4.250. The methodology, which will be referred to hereafter as the "Reimbursement Rule," limits the amount that the Medicaid Program will pay for prescription drugs, as follows: Reimbursement for covered drugs dispensed by a licensed pharmacy that has been approved to be an eligible provider, or a physician filling his own prescriptions if there is no licensed pharmacy within a ten mile radius of his office, shall not exceed the lowest of: Average Wholesale Price (AWP) minus 13.25 per cent of the drug, (also known as the Estimated Acquisition Cost or EAC) plus the dispensing fee; Wholesaler Acquisition Cost (WAC) plus 7 per cent plus the dispensing fee; Federal Upper Limit (FUL) price plus the dispensing fee; The State Maximum Allowable Cost (SMAC) plus a dispensing fee established by the state on certain categories of drugs not reviewed by CMS (formerly HCFA); or Amount billed by the pharmacy, which cannot exceed the pharmacy’s average charge to the public (non-Medicaid) in any calendar quarter, for the same drug, quality, and strength. This average is known as the pharmacy’s usual and customary charge for the prescription. By its plain terms, the Reimbursement Rule (a) requires that five separate methods for determining reimbursement be applied with respect to each prescription and (b) mandates that the maximum allowable payment for each prescription be the lowest dollar amount resulting from the application of these five methods to the claim at hand.1 For ease of reference, the five separate methods enumerated in the Reimbursement Rule will be referred to collectively as the "Limits." Individually, the Limits will be called the "First Limit," "Second Limit," etc., with the numerical adjective corresponding to the order in which the Reimbursement Rule lists the respective Limits. (Thus, for example, the First Limit is the one based on average wholesale price; the Fourth Limit references the state maximum allowable cost.)2 The Reimbursement Rule was promulgated to implement two statutes in particular. One of these was Section 409.908, Florida Statutes, which provided in pertinent part as follows: A provider of prescribed drugs shall be reimbursed the least of the amount billed by the provider, the provider's usual and customary charge, or the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency, plus a dispensing fee. § 409.908(14), Fla. Stat. (2003). The other was Section 409.912, Florida Statute, which directed, in relevant part, that "[r]eimbursement to pharmacies for Medicaid prescribed drugs shall be set at the average wholesale price less 13.25 percent." § 409.912(40)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2003). The Challenge The Federation filed its Petition for Invalidity of Rule ("Petition") on May 19, 2004, initiating the instant proceeding. The Petition describes a straightforward objection to the Reimbursement Rule, namely that the prescribed Limits include methods for determining reimbursement in addition to "average wholesale cost less 13.25 percent," which latter, according to the Petition, constitutes the exclusive method for reimbursing pharmacies, pursuant to Section 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2003). Thus, the Federation alleged, only the First Limit is permissible; the rest are unauthorized, and the Reimbursement Rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes Section 409.912(40)(a)2. for using them, making the Reimbursement Rule an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes. As this proceeding progressed, the Federation's position became a bit more complicated. Forced to deal with Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2003), which was not mentioned in the Petition, the Federation effectively conceded (assuming it ever disputed) that "amount billed" and "usual and customary charge" are statutorily authorized methods for calculating reimbursement, in addition to discounted average wholesale price. Unable as a result to argue that the Fifth Limit should be rejected in toto, the Federation claimed instead that the Reimbursement Rule's definition of "usual and customary charge" enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the use of that term in Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2003). On this point, the Federation presented expert testimony at hearing that "usual and customary charge" is a term of art used in the industry to mean the amount a pharmacy charges cash paying customers who have no insurance coverage for the prescription in question. The Reimbursement Rule's definition, in contrast, does not restrict the scope of "usual and customary charge" to uninsured customers, but rather requires that charges to all non-Medicaid customers be taken into account in determining the average charge that equals "usual and customary charge." Because private insurers and HMOs typically negotiate discounts not available to uninsured consumers, the inclusion of amounts charged to insured customers in the equation for calculating "usual and customary charge," à la the Reimbursement Rule, is likely to produce, in most instances, a lower "usual and customary charge" than would obtain were charges to insured customers excluded from the calculation. The Federation argues that the legislature intended "usual and customary charge" to have the more generous technical meaning that the industry ascribes to it, and therefore that the Reimbursement Rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific law implemented by giving the term a different, more parsimonious meaning. Confronting Section 409.908(14) also compelled the Federation to argue that, while the section imposes (and hence enables the Agency to implement) limits on reimbursement in addition to discounted average wholesale price, the reference therein to "the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency" as an alternative reimbursement limit nevertheless cannot be construed as authority for the adoption of a methodology that would result in reimbursement at less than the least of (a) the amount billed by the provider, (b) the provider's "usual and customary charge" (as the Federation would define that term), or (c) average wholesale cost less 13.25 percent. In this regard, the Federation asserts that Section 409.908(14) and Section 409.912(40)(a)2.——which might at first blush appear to be inconsistent with one another——can easily be harmonized by construing "Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency" to mean "average wholesale price less 13.25 percent." The Agency's Defense of Reimbursement Rule The Agency's arguments in support of the Reimbursement Rule can be reduced to two principal propositions. First, the Agency insists that if it were to reimburse pharmacies for all prescribed drugs at average wholesale price less 13.25 percent, the resulting payments, in the aggregate, would exceed federal limits on reimbursement, for reasons that need not detain us here. Exceeding federal limits, the Agency asserts, could cause CMS to take adverse action against the Florida Medicaid Program, perhaps putting at risk Florida's continued receipt of federal matching funds. Second, the Agency contends that Section 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2003), which requires that reimbursement be set at the average wholesale price less 13.25 percent, does not establish a floor (as the Federation maintains) but rather, when read in conjunction with Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2003), prescribes another potential ceiling in addition to the pharmacy's actual charge, "usual and customary charge," and "the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency," which are the other potential ceilings pursuant to Section 409.908(14). Under this interpretation of the statutes, application of the Reimbursement Rule always produces the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the Agency——a statutorily authorized limit——and if that fee happens in a given situation to be less than the discounted average wholesale price, so be it. The New Statutory Methodology The 2004 Legislature amended Sections 409.908(14) and 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2003), enacting a bill (House Bill No. 1843) that was signed by the governor while this case was pending, on May 28, 2004. See Laws of Florida, Ch. 2004-270, §§ 12 and 17. The relevant statutory amendments took effect on July 1, 2004, id. at § 25, which was shortly after the final hearing in this case——and prior to the date of this Final Order. As amended, Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2004), reads in relevant part as follows, with the recently added language underlined: A provider of prescribed drugs shall be reimbursed the least of the amount billed by the provider, the provider's usual and customary charge, or the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency, plus a dispensing fee. The Medicaid maximum allowable fee for ingredient cost will be based upon the lower of: average wholesale price (AWP) minus 15.4 percent, wholesaler acquisition cost (WAC) plus 5.75 percent, the federal upper limit (FUL), the state maximum allowable cost (SMAC), or the usual and customary (UAC) charge billed by the provider. As amended, Section 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2004), provides in pertinent part as follows, with the newly added language underlined and recently deleted language stricken through: Reimbursement to pharmacies for Medicaid prescribed drugs shall be set at the lesser of: the average wholesale price (AWP) minus 15.4 percent, the wholesaler acquisition cost (WAC) plus 5.75 percent, the federal upper limit (FUL), the state maximum allowable cost (SMAC), or the usual and customary (UAC) charge billed by the provider the average wholesale price less 13.25 percent. Collectively, Sections 409.908(4) and 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2004), will be referred to hereafter as the "New Statutory Methodology."
Findings Of Fact Based upon the parties' factual stipulations, the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On August 28, 1992, Petitioner submitted to the Department its application for licensure as a mortgage lender. 1/ On October 28, 1992, the Department sent Petitioner a letter announcing its intent to deny Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage lender. The text of the letter read as follows: This is to inform you that your Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Lender for Citifirst Mortgage Corp. is hereby denied. The denial is based on Section 494.0072(2)(k), Florida Statutes. Section 494.0072(2), Florida Statutes, "Each of the following acts constitutes a ground for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection may be taken: . . . (k) Acting as a mortgage lender or correspondent mortgage lender without a current active license issued under ss. 494.006-494.0077." The Department's investigation revealed Citifirst Mortgage Corp. has acted as a mortgage lender without a current, active license. Please be advised that you may request a hearing concerning this denial to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Requests for such a hearing must comply with the provisions of Rule 3-7.002, Florida Administrative Code (attached hereto) and must be filed in duplicate with: Clerk Division of Finance Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 (904) 487-2583 within twenty-one (21) days after receipt of this notice. Failure to respond within twenty-one days of receipt of this notice shall be deemed to be a waiver of all rights to a hearing. Should you request such a hearing, you are further advised that at such a hearing, you will have the right to be represented by counsel or other qualified representative; to offer testimony, either oral or written; to call and cross examine witnesses; and to have subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum issued on your behalf. Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing on the proposed denial of its application. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, where it is still pending.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Eric Kachnycz, LLC d/b/a Done Right Irrigation and Lighting (“Done Right”), should have a penalty assessed against it by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (the “Department”), and, if so, the amount of such penalty or assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the State agency responsible for, inter alia, ensuring that all businesses operating in this State have workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Done Right is a duly-formed and validly-existing limited liability company in the State of Florida. It was formed on July 27, 2004, for the purpose of conducting any and all lawful business. At the time of its formation, Eric Kachnycz was the only listed manager or managing member of the company. His address was listed as 9 Twin River Drive, Ormond Beach, Florida. The registered agent for the company was listed as Betty C. Kachnycz, at the same address. In 2011, Daniel Dupuis was added as a managing member of the company. His address was listed as a post office box in Ormond Beach, Florida. By way of a document filed with the Secretary of State, Division of Corporations, on March 1, 2016, Daniel Dupuis was withdrawn as a managing member of the company. On January 14, 2016, Kent Howe, a compliance investigator with the Department, conducted an investigation at 316 Ocean Dunes Road in Daytona Beach, Florida. Upon arrival at the site at around 11:00 a.m., Mr. Howe noted the presence of a large white truck and work trailer parked in front of the residence. The truck and trailer were imprinted with the name and contact information for Done Right. Mr. Howe saw a person (later identified as Daniel Dupuis) engaged in repair work on a sprinkler or irrigation system in the front yard of the residence. After about ten minutes observing Mr. Dupuis, Mr. Howe approached and asked him for whom he worked. Mr. Dupuis responded that he worked for Done Right and that Mr. Kachnycz owned and operated the business. There was another person at the job site who Mr. Dupuis identified as the owner of the residence. That person, with whom Mr. Howe did not converse, was observed walking into and out of the house and, just before Mr. Howe left the site at 1:00 p.m., was seen using a shovel to back-fill some of the irrigation ditches that had been dug.1/ Mr. Howe tracked down and called Mr. Kachnycz to inquire as to the existence of workers’ compensation insurance for his employees, including Mr. Dupuis. Mr. Kachnycz said that the only two persons associated with Done Right, he and Mr. Dupuis, had existing exemptions from workers’ compensation coverage. Further, Mr. Kachnycz said the he had personally applied for the exemptions himself. Mr. Howe checked the Department’s compliance and coverage automated system (CCAS) to verify the exemptions. He found that Mr. Kachnycz had a current exemption, but Mr. Dupuis’ exemption had expired on April 26, 2015, approximately nine months previous. Exemptions have a two-year term once granted, but may be renewed on-line prior to their expiration. Mr. Kachnycz obtained an exemption in 2004 and has renewed it every two years thereafter. Mr. Dupuis obtained his first exemption in February 2011, but did not timely renew it before it expired two years later. He then obtained an exemption in April 2013, but it expired in 2015. He did not have an exemption in place on January 14, 2016, while working at the job site. He did, however, apply for an exemption just two days later, i.e., on January 16, 2016. After verifying the corporate information for Done Right and checking CCAS to see if any other insurance coverage was in place, Mr. Howe determined that Done Right was not in compliance with workers’ compensation insurance requirements. The information gathered by Mr. Howe was presented to his area district manager, who approved the issuance of a stop work order. Mr. Howe prepared the SWO (along with a request for business records) and hand-delivered the documents to Mr. Dupuis at the job site. Mr. Howe attempted to serve the registered agent of Done Right, Betty C. Kachnycz, at her residence but Mr. Kachnycz said she was working out of town at her job as a registered nurse. So, instead of hand-delivery, Mr. Howe sent a copy of the SWO and request for business records to Mrs. Kachnycz via certified mail. The documents were delivered and signed as accepted by Mrs. Kachnycz on January 23, 2016. Subsequently, Mr. Howe had a conversation with Mr. Kachnycz concerning the possibility of Mr. Kachnycz signing a Conditional Agreed Release from the SWO. A blank copy of that agreement was provided for Mr. Kachnycz’ review, but he never signed the agreement. Mr. Howe later had another conversation with Mr. Kachnycz during which the latter inquired about the “criminal” charges against him related to the SWO. Mr. Howe knew nothing of any criminal charges and no evidence of such was offered at final hearing. Mr. Howe had no further contact with Mr. Kachnycz. Mr. Kachnycz ultimately asked for a formal administrative hearing to contest the SWO and penalty assessment, resulting in the instant case. During the preparation phase prior to final hearing, the Department continued to attempt to obtain the business records for Done Right. The Department served interlocking discovery on Done Right to obtain the business records along with other information. Mr. Kachnycz, however, steadfastly refused to provide the records unless, in his words, “[the records are] not used against me in a court of law.” During his deposition in this matter, Mr. Kachnycz reiterated his demand that his business records not be used against him in this proceeding, a clear indication of Mr. Kachnycz’ lack of understanding of the administrative process. There is no basis in law for such a demand by a party to an administrative proceeding. Mr. Kachnycz also invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and otherwise refused to answer questions posed to him during the deposition.2/ Review of an entity’s business records by the Department allows it to assess the amount of workers’ compensation insurance coverage for the business. A review also allows the Department to determine whether a penalty should be imposed at all. Had Done Right provided its business records in the instant case, it may have resolved the dispute without the necessity of a final administrative hearing. We shall never know. Based upon the absence of business records for Done Right, the Department used its existing rule constructs to formulate the amount of the penalty to be assessed. Anita Proano, an employee in the Department’s bureau of compliance, established a penalty using standard guidelines. Since Done Right did not provide business records for review, the imputed method was employed.3/ First, the payroll was calculated by using the average weekly wage in effect at the time of the issuance of the SWO and, per statute, multiplying by two. Class Code 5183-–under the construction umbrella, but specifically including irrigation and lawn sprinkler systems-– was assigned to the work being done by Done Right. The period of non-compliance was set at September 3, 2015, through December 31, 2015, and January 1, 2016, through January 14, 2016. Those are the dates within the Department’s two-year audit period that Done Right was deemed to be out of compliance. The imputed gross payroll amount was $29,571.77 for the first period of non-compliance and $3,450.04 for the second period. Those figures, divided by 100, resulted in the amounts of $295.72 and $34.50, respectively. The approved manual rate set for the two periods was $5.46 and $5.11, reflecting the rates for Class Code 5183. The premium owed by the employer for the first period was calculated at $1,614.62 and the premium it should have paid for the second period was $176.30. Those amounts, multiplied by two, resulted in assessed penalties of $3,229.24 and $352.60, for a total penalty of $3,581.84. Done Right presented no evidence to contest the amount of the penalty or the calculation thereof. Instead, Mr. Kachnycz inquired of the Department’s witnesses whether they had signed loyalty oaths and, if so, if they remembered what was in the oath. He expressed his displeasure at the process for penalizing small businesses and invoked his Constitutional rights (State and Federal), but provided no evidence germane to the issues of this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered assessing a penalty of $3,581.84 against Respondent, Eric Kachnycz, LLC, d/b/a Done Right Irrigation and Lighting. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2016
