The Issue There is little controversy as to the facts in this cause. The issue is essentially a legal issue and is stated as follows: When parties act in reliance and in conformity to a prior construction by an agency of a statute or rule, should the rights gained and positions taken by said parties be impaired by a different construction of said statute by the agency? Both parties submitted post hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed recommended orders filed March 17 and 18, 1983. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based on the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Vanguard Investment Company, is a Florida corporation with its principal offices at 440 Northeast 92nd Street, Miami Shores, Florida 33138. On or about March 3, 1981, Vanguard purchased an aircraft described as a Turbo Commander, serial number N9RN, from Thunderbird Aviation, Inc., for a purchase price of $120,000 plus $4,800 in sales tax. The sale price plus the sales tax was paid by Vanguard to Thunderbird, which remitted the $4,800 in sales tax to the Department of Revenue (DOR) less a three percent discount as authorized by law. On February 27, 1981, Vanguard had executed a lease of said aircraft to General Development Corporation for a term of two years commencing on March 1, 1981, contingent upon Vanguard's purchase of said aircraft from Thunderbird. Prior to March 1, 1981, General Development had leased said aircraft from Thunderbird, and the least terminated on February 28, 1981. Vanguard purchased said aircraft for the sole purpose and in anticipation of continuing its lease to General Development. Vanguard never took possession or control of said aircraft, which remained in General Development's possession at Opa-locka Airport in Dade County, Florida. No controversy exists that all sales tax payable under General Development's lease of the aircraft, both with Thunderbird and subsequently with Vanguard, had been remitted to DOR with no break in continuity of the lease as a result of the change in ownership of the aircraft on or about March 1, 1981. At the time Vanguard purchased the aircraft from Thunderbird, Vanguard had not applied for or received a sales and use tax registration number pursuant to Rule 12A-1.38, Florida Administrative Code. Vanguard applied for said sales and use tax registration number on or about April 2, 1981, approximately 30 days after the purchase of said aircraft. The sales and use tax registration number was granted by DOR on or about April 23, 1981. Shortly thereafter, Vanguard inquired of DOR concerning a refund of the $4,800 in sales tax paid on the aircraft plus the three percent discount taken by Thunderbird. In lieu of Vanguard's providing Thunderbird a resale certificate and having Thunderbird apply for the sales tax refund, it was suggested that Vanguard obtain an assignment of rights from Thunderbird and apply directly for the refund because Thunderbird had been dissolved immediately after the sale of the aircraft to Vanguard. Acquisition of the assignment of rights from Thunderbird by Vanguard was delayed by the dissolution of Thunderbird and the death of Thunderbird's principal officer. Vanguard received the assignment of rights from Thunderbird on or about July 1, 1982, and immediately applied for a refund of the sales tax. Said application for refund was well within the three years permitted by Florida law to apply for a sales tax refund. On November 22, 1982, the Office of Comptroller (OOC) notified Vanguard of its intent to deny Vanguard's application for the sales tax refund because Vanguard had failed to obtain a sales and use tax registration number prior to purchasing the aircraft from Thunderbird. At the time of the purchase, it was the policy of DOR to permit individuals to apply late for a sales and use tax registration number and not to deny refunds on the basis that the applicant did not have the sales and use tax registration number at the time of the taxable purchase. On or about July 1, 1982, this policy of DOR was altered to conform with the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in State Department of Revenue v. Robert N. Anderson, 403 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1981). Vanguard was aware of the DOR policy at the time of the sale, relied on that policy, and conformed to that policy. It was clearly stated that had Vanguard applied for its refund even a month earlier, in June of 1982, the refund would have been approved under the then-existing policy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the application of Vanguard Investment Company for refund of sales tax be approved, and that said refund be paid by the Office of Comptroller. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Kaplan, Esquire 907 DuPont Plaza Center Miami, Florida 33131 William G. Capko, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 203 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas L. Barnhart, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Office of Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, G. H. Johnson Construction Company, Inc., is a general contractor with an office in, and doing business in, the State of Florida. During the period from June 1, 1984, through May 31, 1987, the Petitioner did not pay State of Florida use tax on $244,916.62 of items purchased for use in the State of Florida. During the period from July 1, 1987, through July 31, 1988, the Petitioner did not pay State of Florida use tax on $4,344.88 of items purchased for use in the State of Florida. During the period from April 1, 1985, through March 31, 1987, the Petitioner did not pay Hillsborough County local option indigent health care tax and discretionary sales surtax on $37,083.77 of items purchased or used in Hillsborough County, Florida. The tax rate established by Hillsborough County for those taxes was 0.0328767 percent. The tax due was $92.71. The Petitioner did not pay State of Florida intangible tax on $622,634 of accounts receivable on the books of the company as of January 1, 1984. The Petitioner paid State of Florida intangible tax on only $516,690 of $743,865 of accounts receivable on the books of the company as of January 1, 1986. The Petitioner did not pay State of Florida intangible tax on $1,615,661 of accounts receivable and $225,000 of loans to stockholders on the books of the company as of January 1, 1987. The Petitioner did not pay State of Florida intangible tax on $942,449 of accounts receivable and $225,000 of loans to stockholders on the books of the company as of January 1, 1988. On or about March 12, 1989, the Petitioner made a partial payment in the amount of $11,394.14. The letter transmitting the payment both stated that "we wish to contest the interest and penalties which have been accrued" and also requested "that the interest and penalties be waived." The letter concluded: "It is understood that acceptance of this payment constitutes acceptance of the above proposal that the interest and penalties be waived." The DOR accepted the payment without direct comment on the closing remarks in the letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Revenue, enter a final order assessing against the Petitioner, G. H. Johnson Construction Company, Inc.: (1) sales and use tax in the amount of $5,025.05; (2) interest in the amount of $8,236.36 as of September 24, 1992, and accruing at the rate of one percent per month on the $5,025.05 of tax due from that date forward; and (3) penalty in the amount of $5,512.42. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-0285 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The DOR uses additional available information to ascertain, as best it can, where purchases are delivered and used. Those means include, but are not limited to, conferring with the taxpayer and requesting evidence showing delivery and use elsewhere. Rejected as subordinate to facts contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as not supported by any competent evidence and as subordinate to facts contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected in part as conclusion of law and in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. Subordinate clause, rejected as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. Main clause, rejected as conclusion of law. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. In part, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary; in part, rejected as paraphrasing the letter. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not supported by the evidence why the taxpayer sent the March 12, 1989, letter and check. 10.-11. Rejected in part as conclusion of law and in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. 12. Not a proposed finding of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Largely subordinate to facts found. In part, conclusion of law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 5.-8. Largely subordinate to facts found. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 9.-10. In part, conclusion of law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 11. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-13. In part, conclusion of law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. In part, argument. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. In part, argument. Otherwise, subordinate and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Matias Blanco, Jr., Esquire 701 North Franklin Street Tampa, Florida 33602 James McAuley, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Dr. James Zingale Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. (Petitioner) is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of retail sales of marine vessels. Also, Petitioner is a registered retail dealer in the State of Florida. The President of Petitioner is its only corporate officer. On or about September 2, 1993, Petitioner, in the capacity of a broker, sold a motor yacht at retail to Regency Group, Inc. (purchaser), through its representative, for $78,000. The motor yacht is described as a 1988, 41' Amerosport Chris Craft, hull Number CCHEU075E788, and called the "Motivator". At the closing of the sale, on or about September 2, 1993, the purchaser refused to pay the sales tax on the purchase, which was $4,680. However, the purchaser agreed to pay the sales tax after being informed by Petitioner that, without the payment of the sales tax, there could be no closing. The purchaser's representative submitted, at closing, a personal check in the amount of $4,680 for the sales tax. All of the necessary documents were completed for ownership and registration to be transferred to the purchaser. Subsequently, Petitioner received notice from its bank that the check for the sales tax had been dishonored by the purchaser's bank. The purchaser's representative had stopped payment on the check. In October 1993, Petitioner submitted its sales and use tax return for the month of September 1993 to Respondent in which the sale of the yacht was reported. Respondent automatically reviews sales and use tax returns. Respondent's review of Petitioner's return revealed a shortage of sales tax collected in the amount of $4,680.. In January 1994, Respondent issued a notice of tax action for assessment of additional tax in the amount of $4,710, plus interest and penalty, to Petitioner. The $4,710 included the loss of Petitioner's collection allowance of $30, which loss resulted from Petitioner's failure to timely remit all taxes due. Having received the notice of tax action, by letter dated January 20, 1994, Petitioner generally informed Respondent of the circumstances regarding the sales tax shortage, including the dishonored check. Petitioner pointed out, among other things, that Respondent had the authority and the means to collect the tax, while it (Petitioner) had limited means, and suggested, among other things, that Respondent cancel the purchaser's Florida registration of the yacht. On or about January 31, 1994, approximately three months after the check for sales tax was dishonored, Petitioner issued a notice of dishonored check to the purchaser, in which Petitioner requested payment of the sales tax. The notice provided, among other things, that Petitioner could seek criminal prosecution and civil action if the monies were not paid to Petitioner. Having not received the $4,680, Petitioner contacted the local law enforcement agency. After investigation, the law enforcement agency informed Petitioner that a civil action would have to be instituted because the purchaser, through its representative, had indicated that it was not satisfied with the yacht. Although Petitioner engaged the services of an attorney for civil action, no civil action was commenced. Additionally, Petitioner did not engage the services of a collection agency for assistance in collecting the sales tax. Subsequent to its notice of tax action, on or about March 12, 1994, Respondent issued a notice of assessment to Petitioner. The notice of assessment provided, among other things, that Petitioner was being assessed taxes in the amount of $4,710, plus penalty and interest in the amount of $2,342.61, totalling $7,052.61. Petitioner protested the assessment. On February 8, 1995, Respondent issued its notice of reconsideration in which Respondent determined, among other things, that the assessment was appropriate and affirmed the assessment of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. The interest accrues at the rate of $1.55 per day. Petitioner has not remitted any of the assessed tax, including interest and penalty, to Respondent. Petitioner has not identified on its federal tax return the noncollection of the sales tax from the purchaser as a bad debt. Sales tax is part of the total sale price for an item. Respondent considers the sales tax as collectable by a seller in the same manner as any other debt owed by a purchaser to a seller. A retail dealer, who is also a seller, is considered to be an agent for the State in the collection of sales tax. The burden of collecting the sales tax is placed upon the retail dealer by Respondent. Some of Respondent's employees have been sympathetic to Petitioner's tax assessment matter. However, none of the employees indicated to or advised Petitioner that Respondent was or is in error.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming the assessment of sales tax against High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. in the amount of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August 1996.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. (Lloyd) has requested that it be awarded $22,006.00 in attorney's fees and out-of-pocket expenses of $589.31 for a total of $22,595.31. All fees and expenses listed by Lloyd were incurred in its successful appeal of the adverse decision in its Section 120.57(1) F.S. proceeding challenging the Respondent agency's tax assessment. All fees and costs claimed were incurred during appeal after the recommended and final orders were entered against Lloyd in a formal tax assessment proceeding, Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, DOAH Case No. 92-2348. The formal tax assessment proceeding arose pursuant to Section 72.011 and Chapter 212 F.S. concerning the balance ($57,471.43) of a greater sales and use tax assessment levied against Lloyd for its alleged failure to pay sales tax on goods and services sold to customers of concession stands on Daytona Beach for an audit period before Lloyd owned and operated the stands. Because Lloyd was unable to provide records of predecessors in interest, the agency estimated tax on the basis of Lloyd's existing records after purchasing the stands. Also, Lloyd was assessed sales taxes (approximately $6,004.38 of the assessed tax liability) for all beach concession fees it had paid to Volusia County during the audit period of 11/1/85--12/31/90, pursuant to Section 212.031, F.S. [1989]. Lloyd's petition for formal hearing before DOAH was a letter previously utilized in the parties' informal negotiations. FDOR moved for a more definite statement and time to file an answer if Lloyd were required to file a more definite statement or a more definite petition. An order dated May 19, 1992 denied the agency's request for more definite statement and provided, in pertinent part, "...As Respondent's motion has observed, an answer in this type of proceeding is not mandatory. Respondent is, however, granted 10 days from the date of this order in which to file an answer should the agency elect to do so." The agency elected to stand on its prior notices of proposed assessment. Therefore, for purposes of this proceeding, the agency's "petition," as contemplated by Section 120.575(5) F.S. is the original tax assessment. The tax assessment proceeding went to formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. without any motions to dismiss or for other summary relief filed by either party. The recommended order found in favor of the agency's assessment, with some minor arithmetical adjustments required. The final order adopted the recommended order in toto. Lloyd appealed the final order. In Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 651 So. 735 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), decided upon Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, DOAH Case No. 92-2348, (RO entered by the undersigned Hearing Officer on 4/01/93; FDOR's FO entered 5/24/93), Lloyd argued that Section 212.031, F.S. [1989], had been erroneously applied to the beach concession fees charged by Volusia County and that Section 212.10 [1989] was unconstitutional as applied to Lloyd in this case and that the "projection" method used by FDOR's auditors to determine the amount of taxes due was unauthorized, unreasonable, and arbitrary. FDOR argued that the transfer and annual fees charged by the County to beach concessionaires pursuant to its Unified Beach Code and Ordinance, (Volusia County Ordinance 88-32), constituted rent payments for the various beach locations. The Fifth District Court of Appeal partially agreed with Lloyd and reversed. The court did not reach Lloyd's argument that Section 212.10 F.S. is arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, unconstitutional but did agree with Lloyd that under the facts of this case and the statutory framework, the best estimate provisions of Section 212.12(5)(b), F.S. [1989], could not be invoked to impose liability upon Lloyd as a "successor" dealer. (615 So.2d 735 at 736). The appellate court ruled with regard to the first issue raised on appeal that, The hearing officer erred in deciding it was proper to impose a sales tax on the fees Volusia County charged Lloyd for the privilege of selling and renting goods and services to the public on public beaches and that these privileges constituted taxable events under Rule 12A-10.070 F.A.C. and Section 212.031 F.S.. It ruled further that, The hearing officer arrived at this ruling simply by deferring to the Department's interpretation of the rule and by noting there was no contrary case law. The hearing officer correctly pointed out that deference should be given to an agency's interpretation of its rules and the statutes it is charged to administer. However, the agency's interpretation is subject to review and is not conclusive. (651 So.2d 735 at 736). The court went on to say, We hold that, in exercising the duties imposed on it by the Unified Beach Code, the County did not enter into the business of renting, leasing, or licensing real property. Accordingly, the tax liability assessed on the basis of the concession- aire fees being a license or lease of land is reversed. (651 So.2d 735 at 737) The appellate court also stated that, At the time Lloyd purchased the concessions, neither Lloyd nor the sellers were aware of the duties imposed by Section 212.10 [1989] which imposed on a purchasing or successor dealer the sales tax liabilities of a selling dealer under certain circumstances, and Lloyd concedes it did not comply with the statute. (651 So.2d 735 at 738). The Fifth District Court of Appeal majority opinion criticized the agency for relying solely on Lloyd's own, adequate records for the more current years after Lloyd purchased the concessions which are records not listed in Section 212.12(5)(b) F.S. as usable even if that section were applicable. It further criticized the agency for making no effort to obtain or project--or estimate--sales tax liabilities of the prior concessionaires on the basis of their own records which would have been for the relevant taxable period. However, the appellate court's ultimate ruling on the second issue raised on appeal was that the agency was not entitled to invoke Section 212.12(5)(b) F.S. without showing that Lloyd was guilty of a default listed by the statute. The opinion relies on the fact that, because there was no statutory or regulatory mechanism in place by which Lloyd could have ascertained the prior owners' tax liability, Lloyd, the taxpayer, could not be in default. The court observed the longstanding and frequently reiterated precedent that, "tax laws should be construed strongly in favor of the taxpayer and against the government with all ambiguities or doubts resolved in the taxpayer's favor." The opinion stops short of finding the statute unconstitutional as written or as applied to Lloyd. The foregoing rulings by the appellate court are res judicata for purposes of determining whether or not there was any justiciable issue of law or fact raised by the agency's initial tax assessment. The recommended and final orders appealed from did not reserve jurisdiction to determine entitlement to any fees or costs. The Petitioner made no request for fees and costs to the appellate court and none were awarded. There is no order of the appellate court requiring FDOR or DOAH to award fees or costs. Petitioner makes its claim herein only pursuant to Sections 57.111 and 120.575(5), F.S. The agency has never entered a final order on remand in accord with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, but clearly, Lloyd ultimately prevailed at the appellate level. Petitioner filed its original fees and costs petition with DOAH within 60 days of the appellate court's mandate. That petition was dismissed by an order herein dated June 28, 1995. The second paragraph of the June 28, 1995 order read, "Petitioner shall have 15 days from date of this order to amend its motion (sic=petition)." The fifteenth day was July 13, 1995. The Amended Petition was served and filed with DOAH on July 14, 1995. Respondent set forth no showing of prejudice by the one day's delay.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to certain facts, legal issues, and their respective contentions, as follow: "1. At all times pertinent to this action, Petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc., was a Florida Corporation licensed and doing business in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this action, Respondent Department of Revenue, State of Florida, was an agency of the State of Florida exercising duties relating to the assessment and collection of sales and use taxes pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Respondent conducted an audit of tran- sactions involving Petitioner for the period November 1, 1972, through October 31, 1975. As a result of that audit, Respondent claims that as of September 17, 1976, the Petitioner had a balance due to the Depart- ment of Revenue of $17,383.58 in taxes, interest and penalties. The assessment indicating the above amount is attached as Exhibit A. Petitioner is in agreement that if the assessment is upheld, Petitioner owes to the Respondent the amount of $17,383.58 plus interest calculated to date of payment to Respondent. The tax assessment in this case is based upon two factual situations: Petitioner, manufactured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities consisting of cities, towns, municipalities, counties, school boards, junior colleges and others. Petitioner also hauled the asphalt to the job cite (sic) at a fixed ton/mile rate determined by bid. Petitioner, as a subcontractor, manu- factured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities above described. The general contractor contracted with the political entities in various fashions but the Petitioner's duties were always the same and included manufacture, installation and hauling of asphaltic concrete based on a rate certain per ton and per ton mile. The issue in this case is whether the Respondent is correct in contending that the Petitioner must pay a sales and use tax on the produced asphalt which it uses in the performance of the construction contract jobs described in paragraph 6. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was remitted, by the Petitioner on the produced asphalt. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was paid by the instant customers to the Petitioner. It is Respondent's contention that, pursuant to the above-cited rules, the Peti- tioner is required to pay sales or use tax on the produced asphalt which is used to construct real property pursuant to a con- tract described in Rule 12A-1.51(2)(a), F.A.C. It is Petitioner's contention that the above-cited rules do not apply in the instant case since the customers involved in the instant fact situations are political subdivision or because the transaction was of the type described by Rule 12A-1.51(2)(d), F.A.C. Petitioner is entitled to rely on the earlier 1967 audit by Respondent because neither Petitioner's method of doing business, nor the law, has changed materially since 1967. Respondent agrees that this is an issue but fails to agree that Petitioner is so entitled to rely." All purchase orders or invitations for bid received by petitioner from political subdivisions stated that the entity was exempt from federal and state sales taxes and that such taxes should not be included in the bid. Typical bid forms entitled "Specifications for Asphaltic Concrete" called for a lump-sum price per ton for delivery and placement of the material by the vendor plus a sum per ton per mile for transportation costs. No breakdown of amounts for the cost of materials and cost of installation is reflected in the bid documents. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook, Exhibits 3, 7 (late filed)) Respondent audited petitioner's operations in 1967 and, although it had had previous transactions with governmental entities prior to that date, no assessment for back taxes was issued for failure to pay sales tax on such transactions nor was petitioner advised to do so in the future by state officials. After 1967, petitioner did not seek information from respondent concerning the subject of sales tax. As a consequence of the 1967 audit, petitioner believed that it was unnecessary to charge or pay sales tax on such transactions with political subdivisions. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook) As of April 1, 1977, Brevard County had a population of over 250,000. Although it is a large county in terms of size, respondent has only two auditors in the sales tax division to cover the entire county. (Testimony of Alberto, Cowan, Exhibit 4)
Recommendation That the petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc. be held liable for sales tax, penalty, and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as set forth in respondent's proposed assessment. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Brown, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Andrew A. Graham, Esquire Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922
The Issue Should the Department of Revenue grant Petitioner's request for a temporary tax exemption permit and request for refund of sales and use tax which has been paid under protest? See Section 212.08(5)(a) and (b)3a, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner opened a new commercial laundry facility in Pompano Beach, Florida, in 1993. Petitioner installed in the new facility machinery and equipment costing approximately $1,400,000.00 for the purposes of cleaning and processing linens used by hospitals in the south Florida area (the "Laundry Equipment"). Petitioner charges a fee to hospitals in the south Florida area for cleaning and processing the hospitals' linens with the Laundry Equipment. The new facilities are additional, not replacement, facilities. The Laundry Equipment: Qualifies as "industrial machinery and equipment", as defined by Section 212.08(5)(b) and (6)(c), Florida Statutes; Was purchased by Petitioner for use in a new business; Processes items of tangible personal property, the hospital's linens, at a fixed location; Was purchased before Petitioner first began its productive operations and delivery was made within 12 months of that date; and Has increased productive output at Petitioner's commercial laundry facility. The equipment included a tunnel washer system, conveyers, feeders/folders, ironers, a boiler, and air compressors. By application dated September 3, 1993, Petitioner applied for a temporary tax exemption permit with respect to the Laundry Equipment which it planned to purchase for use in its new business. Section 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes, requires that a taxpayer obtain that permit to receive the exemption. The Department denied Petitioner's application. On August 22, 1994, Petitioner paid to the Department, under protest, the sum of $18,095.36, which represented the tax of $16,773.98, plus interest of $1,321.38, on Petitioner's purchase of the Laundry Equipment. Petitioner timely filed its claim for refund, which the Department denied. Respondent denied Petitioner's request for a temporary tax exemption permit, and Respondent denied Petitioner's refund claim based upon Rule 12A- 1.096, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's request for a tax exemption permit and Petitioner's refund claim are based upon the exemption provided in Section 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes, which applies to a new (as opposed to an expanding) business.
Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which denies the request for a tax exemption permit and a refund in the amount of $18,095.36. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Pierce, Esquire Emily S. Waugh, Esquire MACFARLANE, AUSLEY, FERGUSON & MCMULLEN Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James McAuley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Carl R. Glass, d/b/a Osceola Forge located at 2749 North Orange Blossom Trail, Kissimmee, Florida 34744. Petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing and fabricating burglar bars, steel gates, decorative plastic ornamental castings and injection moldings. Petitioner built and erected one double sided billboard on his business property at 2749 North Orange Blossom Trail, Kissimmee, Florida. It is anchored by its owns supports into the ground as a permanent improvement to Petitioner's real property. The size of the billboard is approximately 12' x 38', plus an apron that runs along the length of the bottom of the billboard. Petitioner leases the face and apron of each side of billboard to customers who are generally required to supply their own labor and material to create an advertising message. The billboard was built to provide double-sided advertising for lanes of traffic going northbound or southbound past Petitioner's place of business. Petitioner has rented the billboard to various lessees for a monthly rental fee over the relevant period. Petitioner did not charge or collect sales and use taxes on the rental fee. Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner's entire business, for the period May 1, 1986 through April 30, 1991. There was only one item assessed as a result of the audit which was on the lease of the billboard located on Petitioner's business property. Petitioner was assessed sales and use taxes, interest and penalties totalling $6,142.38, including taxes ($4,017.76) with a per diem interest rate of $1.32 to be computed from 10/3/91 to the present. Additional interest due, as of July 1, 1993, was calculated to equal $842.16 (638 days x $1.32). The sales tax assessment was based on invoices and other information provided by the Petitioner and followed the Department of Revenue routine procedures required for all audits. From January 1987 through February 1991, Petitioner, or his secretary, made five telephone calls from Osceola Forge to the Taxpayer Assistance Number of the Department of Revenue's regional office located in Maitland, Florida, requesting assistance. On each occasion, the Department's employee advised Petitioner or his employee that they could call the Department's Tallahassee 800 taxpayer assistance number. On at least one occasion, Petitioner's secretary or Petitioner was advised that the transaction was tax exempt, and need not be collected. Petitioner was aware of the 800 taxpayer assistance number in Tallahassee and tried to call the number. However, he was unable to get through, and called the local office only. On April 9, 1992, Petitioner personally telephoned the Titusville office of the Department of Revenue. On each occasion, Petitioner inquired whether or not sales or use taxes should be collected on the rental of the billboard. A free, updated Sales and Use Tax Rules Book is available to any tax payer upon request. In addition, a taxpayer could personally appear and bring documentation relating to any questions relating to the sales and use tax at any regional office. Petitioner did not obtain an updated rules book or personally appear at a regional office. On April 30, 1992, Petitioner filed a Protest Letter with Respondent challenging the abovementioned tax assessment. Respondent issued to Petitioner a Notice of Decision dated December 1, 1992. On January 8, 1993, Petitioner filed a Request for a Formal Administrative Hearing with Respondent. To date, Petitioner has not paid any of the contested taxes, interest, and penalties to Respondent. Petitioner relied on information provided by his secretary, his accountant, and brief phone conferences with the DOR's Maitland office to determine that the rental fees were tax exempt, and did not collect the sales tax from his customers. The DOR Audit Supervisor testified that there is a clear distinction between the taxable rental of a billboard and the nontaxable services of placing an advertising message on the billboard. The rental of the face of the billboard is a taxable transaction. On the other hand, if a person rents or leases a billboard, then hires a third party to place an advertising message on the billboard, this advertising service is tax exempt.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order upholding its sales and use tax assessment, waive penalties and interest accrued prior to October 2, 1991, and assess a tax of $4,017.76, plus interst from the date due. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent are accepted except as noted below. Those proposed findings neither noted below nor included in the Hearing Officer's findings were deemed unnecessary to the conclusions reached. Rejected as argument: paragraphs 37, 38, 39 COPIES FURNISHED: Carl R. Glass 2749 North Orange Blossom Trail Kissimmee, Florida 34741 James McAuley, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact During the period covered by the tax audit, Petitioner published and distributed free of charge two Jacksonville area editions of a weekly magazine entitled TV Facts. This magazine contains substantial advertising which provides all revenues. In addition to the advertising, television schedules and feature stories are included to interest the general public in the publication. Petitioner obtained a second class postal permit for the magazine, but has never used the mails for distribution. During the period at issue, the magazine was prepared in a three step process. The rough layout without television schedules was prepared by Petitioner and forwarded to Composition Compound, Inc., a Miami company. This company obtained the television schedules and prepared the final layout. Composition Compound then photographed this layout and sent the negatives to Sun 'N' Fun Printing, a Clearwater company. Sun 'N' Fun then printed the magazine and delivered it to Petitioner. Petitioner paid Composition Compound for all services provided by that company and Sun 'N' Fun. Thus, there was no direct business relationship between Petitioner and Sun 'N' Fun. Petitioner believed it qualified for the newspaper exemption and was neither charged nor paid any sales taxes until it learned through Respondent's audit of Composition Compound that such taxes were due. Respondent seeks to assess Petitioner sales taxes in the amount of $5,830.56 with penalty of $1,457.64 plus 12 percent interest to the date of payment for the audit period December 1, 1977, through November 30, 1980. Petitioner does not contest these computations, but believes the tax due, if any, should be reduced by the amounts it paid to Composition Compound to cover the sales tax billed by Sun 'N' Fun. Petitioner submitted Sun 'N' Fun invoice (Exhibit 7) to demonstrate that Composition Compound was billed for about $2,700.00 in sales taxes by Sun 'N' Fun for printing Petitioner's magazine between December 29, 1978, and December 29, 1979. Composition Compound separately computed its costs and profits which it billed to Petitioner (Exhibit 6). However, there was no separate brochure of the sales tax shown on the Composition Compound invoices, nor was any additional tax charged on the value added by that company.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order holding Petitioner liable for $5,830.56 in taxes assessed on December 11, 1980, and for interest computed at the rate of 1 percent per month thereafter until said tax is paid to Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1981.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner's business records for the period July 1, 1985, through June 30, 1990. Respondent determined a deficiency in sales tax of $174,823.96, including penalty and interest through August 22, 1990. Petitioner objected to the deficiency. Respondent reviewed the audit, and made audit changes that are the subject of this proceeding. The audit changes determined a deficiency in use tax of $76,035.60, including tax ($47,910.10), penalty ($11,977.68), and interest through March 12, 1991 ($16,147.60). Interest accrues daily in the amount of $15.75. A First Revised Notice Of Intent To Make Sales Tax Changes, for the reduced assessment of $76,035.60, was issued on March 21, 1991. A Notice Of Proposed Assessment was issued on July 2, 1991. The Notice Of Proposed Assessment became a Final Assessment on August 31, 1991. Respondent made a prima facie showing of the factual and legal basis for the use tax assessment. Section 120.575(2), Florida Statutes. 1/ The audit and assessment are procedurally correct. Tax, interest, and penalty are correctly computed. Formation Petitioner was incorporated in Florida, in January, 1983, by Mr. B. Theodore Troy, president and sole shareholder. Petitioner's principal place of business is 101 Wymore Road, Suite 224, Altamonte Springs, Florida. Petitioner conducted business as American Advertising Distributors of Central Florida. Mr. Troy and his wife operated the business until liquidating Petitioner's assets in 1992. Operation Petitioner sold direct mail advertising to Florida businesses. Petitioner operated pursuant to a franchise agreement with American Advertising Distributors, Inc., of Mesa, Arizona ("AAD"). AAD was Petitioner's franchisor until AAD filed for bankruptcy in 1990. Petitioner solicited orders from Florida businesses 2/ for advertising coupons designed and printed by AAD in Arizona. AAD mailed the advertising coupons to addressees in Florida who were potential customers for Florida businesses. Florida businesses placed orders with Petitioner on written contracts, or sales agreements, labeled "advertising orders." AAD was not a party to advertising orders. Advertising orders identified "AAD" as American Advertising Distributors of Central Florida, and were imprinted with the name and address of "AAD" in Central Florida. Advertising orders specified the total charges, color and stock of paper, number of addressees, and areas of distribution. Petitioner assisted businesses with rough layout for art work. The rough layout was forwarded to AAD. AAD prepared finished art work and sent copies back to Petitioner for approval by Florida businesses. AAD then printed, collated, and mailed advertising coupons to addressees in Florida, without charge to addressees. Florida businesses paid non-refundable deposits when placing advertising orders. The remaining balance was paid upon approval of final art work. AAD did not submit invoices to Florida businesses. AAD submitted invoices to Petitioner for the amount due from Petitioner. 3/ Petitioner paid AAD 10 days before advertising coupons were mailed. Some advertising coupons were produced by Laberge Printers, Inc., in Orlando, Florida ("Laberge"). Coupons from Laberge were designed, printed, and distributed in the same manner as coupons from AAD. Two types of advertising coupons were provided by AAD and Laberge. The majority of coupons were distributed in coop mailings, or "bonus express" envelopes, containing coupons for up to 20 businesses. Bonus express envelopes were mailed approximately eight times a year. Advertising coupons were also distributed in "solo" mailings. A solo mailing was an individualized, custom printed coupon, or flyer, mailed to individual addressees. The total charges stated in advertising orders included the cost of services provided by Petitioner, AAD, and Laberge. Services included typesetting, art work, printing, inserting envelopes, and mailing. Florida imposed a tax on services, from July 1, 1987, through December 31, 1987. Petitioner collected and remitted tax imposed on the cost of services included in the total charges stated on advertising orders. Except for the services tax, neither Petitioner, AAD, nor Laberge collected and remitted sales or use tax to Florida or to Arizona. Petitioner never utilized resale certificates for any tax other than the tax on services. Collectibility Petitioner was financially able to pay the use tax assessment during 1990 and 1991. No later than August 22, 1990, Mr. Troy knew of the sales tax deficiency of $174,823.96. By March 21, 1991, Mr. Troy knew of the reduced use tax assessment of $76,035.60. During 1990 and 1991, Petitioner made discretionary payments to Mr. Troy of $110,389. Petitioner reported federal taxable income of $58,279 in 1990 and 1991. 4/ In arriving at taxable income, Petitioner deducted payments to Mr. Troy of $59,430 for compensation to officers, management fees, and salary. 5/ From taxable income of $58,279, Petitioner paid approximately $50,959 to Mr. Troy in nondeductible shareholder loans. 6/ Discretionary payments of $110,389, 7/ made to Mr. Troy in 1990 and 1991, were more than adequate to pay the use tax assessment of $76,036.60. At the end of 1991, Petitioner reported fixed assets with a book value of $14,933, a customer list valued at $104,447.72, and retained earnings of $102,605. The book value of intangible assets was $82,943, comprised primarily of the franchise, valued at $35,000, and goodwill of $45,000. Termination Of Operations But Continued Existence AAD petitioned for bankruptcy in 1990. Petitioner subsequently determined that its franchise and goodwill were worthless. In 1992, Petitioner reported a loss of $99,726 for federal tax purposes. All of Petitioner's assets, including its customer lists, were sold or transferred for $1,330 to Florida Mail, Inc. ("Florida Mail"). Florida Mail is a Florida corporation wholly owned by Mr. Troy. Florida Mail sells direct mail advertising; and shares Petitioner's principal place of business. Since 1992, Petitioner has been a shell corporation with $579 in assets.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order upholding the assessment of tax and interest and waive all of the penalty included in the assessment. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of June, 1994. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1994.
