The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's lottery prize is subject to an outstanding debt owed to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent applied for a student loan in the amount of $2,500 under the Florida Guaranteed Student Loan Program in an application dated August 8, 1986. Respondent needed the loan to pay the cost of her attendance at Roffler Hair Design College (school) for the period of September 1986 through January 1987. Petitioner guaranteed Respondent's loan. The loan number is 0000522112. Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association (Glendale) issued the loan proceeds in two equal disbursements. The first disbursement took place on or about September 26, 1986. The second disbursement took place on or about November 7, 1986. Glendale subsequently sold the loan to Student Loan Marketing Association/Student Loan Services (SLS). The loan accrues interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per year unless Respondent is in deferment status, i.e. attending school on a minimum part-time basis. In this case, Respondent dropped out of school for a period of time in 1987. On or about June 25, 1987, the school returned $632.52 of the Respondent's loan to the lender. This sum represented the unused portion of Respondent's loan. Respondent's account was credited accordingly. The last day that Respondent attended the school was May 27, 1988. By letter dated September 1, 1988, SLS notified Respondent of the repayment schedule for her loan. Her first payment was due on December 27, 1988. Respondent made no payments on the loan to Glendale or SLS. Accordingly, SLS declared Respondent's loan in default and filed a claim dated August 14, 1989, with Petitioner. On February 20, 1992, Petitioner, as guarantor of the loan, paid SLS for Respondent's defaulted student loan. On that date, the claim principal was $1,864.48 ($2,500 less the $635.52 credit) and the outstanding interest due was $469.95. After Petitioner acquired the loan, the outstanding interest was capitalized resulting in a balance of $2,334.43. This sum accrues interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per year. Respondent made no payment on her loan after Petitioner acquired it until a portion of her lottery winnings was applied to her account. By letter dated August 31, 1998, Petitioner notified the Department of Lottery about Respondent's outstanding defaulted loan in the amount of $3,561.89, including principal and interest. Petitioner requested the Department of the Lottery to transmit a portion of Respondent's prize money to be credited toward Respondent's debt. Thereafter, the Department of the Lottery transmitted $3,561.89 of Respondent's prize money to Petitioner. By letter dated September 14, 1998, Petitioner notified Respondent that it was in receipt of $3,561.89 of her $5,000 lottery prize. Petitioner applied Petitioner's winnings to her outstanding balance. Respondent has applied for and received at least one other loan which is held by the United States Department of Education (USDE) in the Federal Direct Consolidation Loan Program. The loan which is the subject of this proceeding is not the same loan which is held by USDE.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner was authorized to apply $3,561.89 of Respondent's lottery prize toward her outstanding debt for a student loan. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald E. Stowers, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dollie M. Tunsil 5813 Pompano Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Petitioner has defaulted on student loans and, if so, the principal amounts due on the loans, as well as accrued interest, and collection costs. Whether Petitioner's employer should be required to withhold payments from Petitioner's pay pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Johnny Martin. Petitioner's mailing address is 11431 Quailhollow Drive, Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent is the Florida Department of Education. The Department's business address is 325 West Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The Department is a guarantee agency which holds the loan account in question after paying the claim of the lender on July 28, 1994. All loans in this proceeding are Supplemental Loan(s) for Students (SLS), also known as Florida Auxiliary Loans. SLS loans are not subsidized by the federal government. Therefore, the federal government has no responsibility for payment of interest during periods of deferment or forbearance and there is no grace period for SLS loans. During any period of deferment or forbearance, such as when a borrower is unemployed, the borrower's repayment obligation may be suspended; however, interest accrues to the account for which the borrower is responsible. When the deferment or forbearance ends, the outstanding interest is capitalized on the loan. SLS loans accrue interest at the rate of 12 percent per year from the date of disbursement. Persons eligible to receive SLS loans include parents of dependent undergraduate students. As set forth below, Petitioner, as parent of an eligible dependent undergraduate student, received four SLS loans. Loan 1: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000000442 in 1983. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 1. Although the Department is the guarantor of Loan 1, the lender never declared the loan in default or sold it to the Department. Therefore, Loan 1 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 2: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000001064 in 1984. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 2. The lender declared Petitioner in default and sold Loan 2 to the Department as guarantor. Because Loan 2 was in repayment status for more than seven years, exclusive of suspensions of the repayment period, Loan 2 was discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, Loan 2 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 3: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000003767 in 1985. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 3. The lender declared Petitioner in default and transferred Loan 3 to the Department as guarantor. Because Loan 3 was in repayment status for more than seven years, exclusive of suspensions of the repayment period, Loan 3 was discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, Loan 3 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 4: On or about August 5, 1986, Petitioner executed an Auxiliary (SLS) Loan application on behalf of his daughter, Kelly Aleta Martin, an eligible dependent undergraduate student. On or about September 8, 1986, Petitioner executed the promissory note for this loan. This SLS Loan was in the amount of $3,000.00. This loan was disbursed on or about October 9, 1986. The Department guaranteed this loan. Throughout exhibits presented by the Department, the loan number for this SLS Loan is A000007005; however, for convenience, herein this loan will be referred to as Loan 4. Loan 4 is the only loan at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner's first payment for Loan 4 was due October 25, 1986. The payment due date later changed to the 20th of each month. Petitioner's last payment to the lender was made on July 17, 1990. However, as Petitioner was behind in his payments, this payment was applied to the payment due May 20, 1990. The Petitioner is considered in repayment status for 44 months, from October 1986 through May 1990. A borrower is not considered in repayment status during any suspension of the repayment period, including any period of forbearance or deferment. Petitioner applied for and received an unemployment deferment on September 18, 1990. This deferment was for the period from July 21, 1990 through December 28, 1990. Because Petitioner was not current in his payments, he requested and received a forbearance from the lender for the payments due on June 20 and July 20, 1990, in order to qualify for the unemployment deferment. The forbearance together with the unemployment deferment brought Petitioner current in his payments; however, they suspended the repayment period for Loan 4 for seven months (two months for the forbearance and five months for the deferment). Petitioner failed to make any payments following the deferment period ending December 28, 1990. Petitioner applied for and received an unemployment deferment on April 23, 1991. This deferment was for the period from February 24 through July 23, 1991. Because Petitioner failed to make any payments following the deferment ending December 28, 1990, he again requested and received a forbearance for the payments due January 20 and February 20, 1991. The forbearance and unemployment deferment brought Petitioner current in his payments; however, they again suspended the repayment period for Loan 4 by another seven months (two months for the forbearance and five months for the deferment). Following Petitioner's unemployment deferment ending July 1991, he failed to resume payment to the lender beginning August 20, 1990. Thereafter, the lender declared Petitioner in default and made application to the Department for claim payment based on the guarantee. However, the Department refused to pay the lender's claim citing due diligence violations, and as a result, Petitioner is considered in repayment status from August 20, 1991 through April 20, 1992, or nine months, even though no payments were actually received by virtue of his Fresh Start Application. Petitioner submitted a Fresh Start Application to the lender dated May 13, 1992. This document reaffirmed the student loan obligation and, when received by the lender on May 19, 1992, reinstated the Department's guarantee of Loan 4. In an application dated May 24, 1992, Petitioner requested another unemployment deferment. The lender refused Petitioner's request for an unemployment deferment due to the fact that Petitioner was working at the time. However, the lender granted Petitioner a forbearance. This forbearance covered payments due from May 20 through December 20, 1992. Thereafter, Petitioner again requested and was granted forbearance of payments due through June 20, 1993. These forbearances, from May 20, 1992 through June 20, 1993, suspended the period Loan 4 is in repayment status by 14 months. Petitioner failed to resume payments beginning July 20, 1993, the final due date at default. In 1994, the lender declared Petitioner in default on Loan 4 and made application to the Department for claim payment based on the guarantee. The Department paid the default claim on Loan 4 on July 28, 1994. Although no payments were received from July 20, 1993 through July 20, 1994, or 13 months, Petitioner is considered in repayment status for that time because there was no forbearance or deferment in place. When the Department acquired Loan 4, Petitioner owed $2,195.68 in principal and $290.19 in accrued (claim) interest. These figures were capitalized by the Department and yield the figure of $2,484.18 in capitalized principal which is subject to interest at the rate of 12 percent per year. Beginning in 1995, Petitioner entered into a voluntary wage garnishment agreement with the Department. Under this agreement and through the period Petitioner was under the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, a total of $383.95 was received by the Department and applied to Petitioner's account in accordance with Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations Section 682.404(f), relating to how borrower payments will be applied. The entire amount received was applied to outstanding interest. Prior to filing bankruptcy, Petitioner's Loan 4 was considered in repayment status from July 29, 1994 through January 5, 1995, during the time it was held by the Department. The Petitioner was credited for being in repayment status for five months, even though he made no payments. Additionally, Petitioner was credited for being in repayment status for 12 months in 1995, whether or not regular payments were received under Petitioner's voluntary wage garnishment agreement. Because Petitioner filed for bankruptcy prior to the January 20, 1996, the payment due date, the month of January 1996 cannot be counted as being in repayment status. Petitioner filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on January 11, 1996. The Department filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court for Loans 2, 3, and 4 in the principal amount of $5,571.91, the amount of capitalized principal due on the accounts. The Department filed with the court the claim of $5,647.02 due on the accounts through date of filing the case. See item 5 on page 2 of Department's Exhibit 5. This amount was the capitalized principal and interest due. On February 4, 1999, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, issued an "Order Discharging Debtor After Completion of Chapter 13 Plan" in Petitioner's case, number 96-00175-3F3. That order provides in pertinent part, "The debtor is discharged for all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under 11 U.S.C. [Section] 502, except any debt . . . for a student loan or educational benefit overpayment as specified in 11 U.S.C.[Section]523(a)(8)." In 1996, Title 11 United States Code Section 523(a) provided in pertinent part: A discharge under . . . this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-- for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an education benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless-- such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first became due more than 7 years (exclusive of an applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition . . . Pursuant to this order, Petitioner's debt to the Department for Loans 2 and 3 was discharged. The first payment for Loan 4 was due October 25, 1986. Petitioner filed for bankruptcy on January 11, 1996, nine days prior to the payment due date of January 20, 1996. There were 111 months from the month the first payment of Loan 4 was due through the month prior to the filing of bankruptcy (the month that bankruptcy was filed cannot be counted if the payment due date was after the date Petitioner filed for bankruptcy). Petitioner was in forbearance or deferment status for 28 months which suspends the period Loan 4 is considered in repayment status. Petitioner was in repayment status on Loan 4 for 83 months regardless of whether he actually made payments on the account. Therefore, Loan 4 was not discharged. Section 682.410(b)(2) of Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations, provides that the Department shall impose collection costs as follows: Collection charges. Whether or not provided for in the borrower's promissory note and subject to any limitation on the amount of those costs in that note, the guarantee agency shall charge a borrower an amount equal to reasonable costs incurred by the agency in collecting a loan on which the agency has paid a default or bankruptcy claim. These cost may include, but are not limited to, all attorneys fees, collection agency charges, and court costs. Except as provided in [Sections] 682.401(b)(27) and 682.405(b)(1)(iv), the amount charged borrower must equal the lesser of -- The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection under the formula in 34 CRF 30.60; or The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection in the loan was held by the U.S. Department of Education. The Department established that the amount of the annual collection cost mandated by Title 34 Code of Federal Regulations Section 682.410(b)(2) for the loan at issue in this proceeding should be calculated at least annually at the rate of 25 percent of the outstanding principal and accrued interest. Petitioner agreed to pay these costs in the application and promissory note he executed. Petitioner is employed by the Duval County School Board, a political subdivision of the State of Florida. As an employee of a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner is subject to the provisions of Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. These provisions pertain to employees of the State of Florida or its political subdivisions who have defaulted on an education loan made or guaranteed by the State of Florida. The Department notified Petitioner by letter dated August 13, 1999, that he had one or more student loans in default and offered him the opportunity to make voluntary payments on the loans. The letter also advised Petitioner that the Department would seek to make involuntary withholdings if he did not make voluntary payments. Petitioner elected to request the formal hearing which triggered this proceeding. As stated above, the capitalized principal due the Department for Loan 4 is $2,485.87. This amount reflects the principal due and the outstanding interest accrued on the account at the time the Department acquired the loan from the lender. All payments received by the Department were applied to outstanding interest which accrued on the account after the loan was bought by the Department, and no payment was applied to the capitalized principal. The capitalized principal accrues interest at the rate of 12 percent per year of $.82 per day. As of February 4, 1999, after taking into consideration the $383.95 received by the Department, the unpaid accrued interest for Loan 4 was $881.74. Pursuant to federal regulations collection costs assessed at the rate of 25 percent of principal and interest due as of February 4, 1999, were $867.08. Therefore, as of February 4, 1999, the total principal, interest, and collection costs due for Loan 4 totaled $4,234.69. Interest continues to accrue to the account as provided by law and collection costs may be reassessed as provided by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein, finds that Petitioner, as of February 4, 1999, owes the sum of $4,234.69, and orders the involuntary wage withholding of Petitioner's pay through his employer, Duval County School Board, pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Johnny Martin 11431 Quailhollow Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32218-3621 Ronald G. Stowers Assistant General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to any funding, under the Florida Education Finance Program, for those full-time equivalent students whom Petitioner enrolled, taught, and initially reported, in a dropout prevention program, but whom Petitioner later reported in a lower-funded basic program after discovering that these full-time equivalent students exceeded the legislatively imposed enrollment ceiling applicable to the program group of which the dropout-prevention program is a part.
Findings Of Fact On average, Florida school districts receive about 50 percent of their financial support from state sources, 43 percent from local sources, and 7 percent from federal sources. In 1993-94, the Legislature appropriated $4,526,812,758 under the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP) and required local funding of $3,109,579,079. Two parts of the FEFP funding process are relevant to this case: setting weighted enrollment ceilings (caps) and reporting full-time equivalent students (FTEs). This case arose when the Auditor General discovered that Petitioner reported Dropout Prevention FTEs as lower-funded, basic education FTEs. Petitioner reported these FTEs in this fashion due to its concern that it would receive no FEFP funding for these FTEs, if reported as Dropout Prevention FTEs, because they were over the cap set for the program group of which the Dropout Prevention program was a part. Setting caps takes place in two stages. The first and generally more important stage starts with the preparation by each school district of projections, for the following school year, of FTEs by program. The second stage of setting caps requires that Respondent make complicated, technical adjustments when actual FTEs, by program group, exceed the cap for that program group. The terms, "program" and "program group," are important. For 1993-94, Section 236.012(1), Florida Statutes (1993) (all references to "Section" shall be to the 1993 Florida Statutes), identifies the following program groups and their constituent programs: Basic programs.-- Kindergarten and grades 1, 2, and 3. Grades 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Grades 9, 10, 11, and 12. Special programs for exceptional students.-- [list of 15 exceptional student education programs, such as specific learning disability and emotionally handicapped] Special adult general education programs.-- * * * Special vocational-technical programs job-preparatory.-- * * * Special vocational-technical-adult supplemental.-- * * * Students-at-risk programs.-- Dropout prevention. Kindergarten through grade 3 ESOL [English Speakers of Other Languages]. Grades 4 through 8 ESOL. Grades 9 through 12 ESOL. Each district initially submits its FTE projections to Respondent where various persons with programmatic and funding expertise examine and review the projections for accuracy. The cap-setting process continues when, pursuant to Section 216.136(4), Respondent forwards the FTE projections to the Public Schools Education Estimating Conference (Estimating Conference), which consists of representatives of the House and Senate staffs, the Governor's Office, and the Joint Legislative Committee. The Estimating Conference accepts, increases, or decreases the FTE projections and sends its projections to the Florida Legislature, which, in deciding upon FEFP appropriations for the next school year, may accept, increase, or decrease the Estimating Conference's FTE projections. This marks the end of the first stage of the cap-setting process. Both stages of the cap-setting process reveal a finely tuned funding process that weighs the need for predictability in funding, so that the Legislature can know how much it is sending to the districts and each district can know how much it will have to spend, against the need for flexibility, so that, for instance, if Hurricane Andrew sends numerous ESOL students from Dade County to Hillsborough County, after the first stage of the cap-setting process is completed, the receiving school district can obtain the funds properly to educate these children. The second stage of the cap-setting process is described in Section 236.081(1)(d). Section 236.081(1)(d)1 authorizes Respondent to calculate a "maximum total weighted full-time equivalent student enrollment for each district." Of course, Section 236.081(1)(d)2 directs Respondent to begin the second stage of the cap-setting process by starting with the FTEs set at the end of the first stage, or, in other words, the "enrollment estimates used by the Legislature to calculate the FEFP." Section 236.081(1)(d)3 directs Respondent to calculate caps by groups of program groups. Referring back to the above- cited statute listing program groups, Group 1 is the first of the six listed groups, which is nearly all of basic education. Group 2 includes the second and sixth groups, which are, respectively, exceptional student education (ESE) and students-at-risk programs (At-Risk), including Dropout Prevention. The rest of Group 2 is minor parts of basic education and all vocational education programs in grades seven thorough twelve. Group 3 consists of all adult education programs. The most complicated part of the second stage of setting caps is described in Section 236.081(1)(d)3.a-c. This section first makes clear that this part of the cap-setting process does not involve Group 1, which, as noted above, is nearly all of the basic education programs. Two provisions make this clear. First, Subsection 236.081(1)(d)3.a and b apply only to Groups 2 and 3. Second, the last sentence of Section 236.081(1)(d)3.b.(IV) states: "For any calculation of the FEFP, the enrollment ceiling [i.e., cap] for [G]roup 1 shall be calculated by multiplying the actual enrollment for each program in the program group by its appropriate program weight." Section 236.081(1)(c) directs the Legislature to establish annually in its General Appropriations Act a cost factor for each of the listed programs under the six program groups. This adjustment reflects, for instance, the greater cost of educating ESE students versus basic-education students. The remainder of this recommended order will ignore Group 3 because it plays no role in this case and its mention unnecessarily complicates the presentation of information. Section 236.081(1)(d)3.a describes the caps for Group 2 as the sum of the weighted caps (i.e., stage-one FTEs for each program times a cost factor for each program) for each program contained in Group 2. The resulting cap must be increased by the receipt of FTEs from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (now Department of Juvenile Justice), but this adjustment is irrelevant to this case. Section 236.081(1)(d)3.b addresses the possibility of over-enrollment. (The discussion of reporting FTEs takes place later in this recommended order.) Section 236.081(1)(d)3.b directs Respondent, "for any calculation of the FEFP," to follow a specific procedure when actual enrollments exceed the cap for Group 2; the purpose of the procedure is to reduce the "weighted [actual] enrollment for that group to equal the enrollment ceiling [i.e., cap]." Section 236.081(1)(d)3.b(I) directs Respondent first to subtract the weighted cap for each program from the weighted actual enrollment for that program. If the result is greater than zero for any program, Section 236.081(1)(d)3.b(II) directs Respondent to calculate a reduction proportion "for the program" by dividing the net amount by which the weighted actual enrollment in the program group exceeds the weighted cap for the group by the gross amount by which the weighted actual enrollments in over-the-cap individual programs exceed the weighted caps for each of these groups. An illustration is useful. Assume a hypothetical group subject to capping that contains only four programs with caps of 100, 100, 300, and 500 FTEs. Assume actual enrollments, respectively, of 100, 100, 380, and 490 FTEs. The reduction proportion for the third program, which is the only over-the-cap program, would contain a numerator of 70 (because of the netting of the 10 under-the-cap FTEs in the fourth group) and a denominator of 80. Section 236.081(1)(d)3.b(III) directs Respondent to multiply the resulting reduction proportion by the total amount by which the program group's enrollment exceeds the cap. The first sentence of Section 236.081(1)(d)3.b(IV) directs Respondent to subtract the resulting prorated reduction amount from the program's weighted enrollment. An important principle emerges at this point: the over-the-cap issues are determined on the basis of the program group. Over-the-cap FTEs in programs within a group are offset by unused FTEs from under-the-cap programs in the same group. As already noted, the last sentence of Section 236.081(1)(d)3.b(IV) directs Respondent to calculate the cap for Group 1 by multiplying the actual enrollment in each program by its cost factor. In the same vein, Section 236.081(1)(d)3.c limits the maximum reduction for Group 2 (and Group 3) by stipulating that the weighted enrollment shall be not less than the sum of the following two numbers. For programs with cost factors of 1.0 or more, such as ESE and At-Risk programs, Respondent must, as required by Section 236.081(1)(d)3.c(I), multiply the "reported FTE" by 1.0. For programs with cost factors of less than 1.0, Respondent must, as required by Section 236.081(1)(d)3.d(II), multiply the "projected FTE" by the actual cost factor. Thus, the effect of Section 236.081(1)(d)3.c(I) is to provide that the weighted cap for Group 2 is never less than the amount yielded by multiplying the "reported FTE[s]" for all programs in the group with a cost factor of 1.0 or more by 1.0. However, it is important to note that the minimal funding guaranteed by Section 236.081(1)(d)3.c(I) does not ensure that all over-the-cap FTEs in, say, Dropout Prevention or Specific Learning Disabilities, will receive a cost factor of no less than 1.0, even if over the cap; instead, the statute guarantees only that, after all adjustments, no district will receive less than a cost factor of 1.0 for all reported FTEs in Group 2. Turning to the reporting of FTEs, Section 236.081(1)(a) requires each school district to conduct no more than nine week- long surveys for the purpose of reporting actual FTEs. This statute also requires that each district compute its FTEs "in accordance with the regulations of the state board." For 1993-94, Respondent issued a document entitled "Standard Procedures for Reporting FTE Earned, Course and Other Issues Regarding the Florida Education Finance Program 1993-94" (Standard Procedures). Standard Procedures requires districts to use the cited procedures "for reporting unweighted FTE by student by course, for allocating residual FTE to courses funded through the Basic Program categories after special program by student by course FTE is allocated, and for maintaining audit documentation for FTE reporting procedures and elements." Standard Procedures, page 1. Standard Procedures requires districts to sort their course records into "rank order" with all so-called "special" programs, which includes all programs in the ESE and At-Risk program groups, in the first group to be reported, and all basic programs in the second group to be reported. Standard Procedures, page 11. However, each district may choose in which order the special program category courses will, in fact, receive consideration. That is, if a student has course records with FEFP Program Numbers in two special program categories and one Basic Program, the district may chose [sic] which of the special program categories gets selected for consideration first for determination of FTE Earned, Course, except that BOTH special program categories are considered and FUNDED before any time for the Basic Program is considered for funding. . . . Standard Procedures, pages 11-12. Prior to submitting its FTEs on the approved form, each district must edit its data so that, among other things, "[a]ll courses with special program FEFP Program Numbers must be considered and funded prior to considering courses with Basic program numbers [subject to two exceptions irrelevant to this case]." Standard Procedures, page 20. For reporting FTEs in a Dropout Prevention program, Standard Procedures provides: Section 228.041(29), Florida Statutes as amended, provides the definition of a dropout student. However, a student meeting this definition must also meet the eligibility and program requirements as set forth in Section 230.2316(4), Florida Statutes. Finally, only those students who meet the eligibility criteria, are admitted to the program according to the admission procedures, and participate in instruction specified in any one of the eligible dropout prevention programs under operating procedures in an approved district dropout plan, as approved by the Department of Education for 1993-94, may be reported as FTE in FEFP Program Number 120 [Dropout Prevention Program]. . . . All students who are reported as participating in the Dropout Prevention Program must be properly shown as being in one of the Dropout Prevention Program categories. Failure to properly identify the program will result in the FTE Earned, Course, being nulled for the record submitted. Standard Procedures, page 27. After each district reports its FTEs, Respondent calculates the proper FEFP funding by multiplying the appropriate FTEs by the appropriate base student allocation, which, under Section 236.081(1)(b), the Legislature must set annually in its General Appropriations Act. Under Section 236.081(1)(c), Respondent then multiplies applies the cost factor for each program before undertaking the second stage of the cap-setting described above and in Section 236.081(1)(d). In 1993-94, the base student allocation was $2501.05, the cost factor for grades 4-8 basic education was 1.0, the cost factor for grades 9-12 basic education was 1.224, and the cost factor for dropout prevention was 1.615. In 1993-94, the funding allocated for basic-education students was $1000-$1500 less per student than the funding allocated for dropout prevention. During 1993-94, Respondent reported 15,166.04 full-time equivalent students (FTEs) in nine elementary schools, four middle schools, three high schools, one adult education center, one area vocational-technical school, two exceptional centers, and two other educational centers. Rule 6A-1.0451, Florida Administrative Code, provides that the Commissioner of Education shall prescribe the dates for FTE surveys. ( All references to Rules are to the Florida Administrative Code.) For 1993-94, the FTE surveys took place July 12-16, 1993; October 4-8, 1993; February 7-11, 1994; and June 20-24, 1994. Rule 6A-1.0451(7) provides that districts shall report the FTEs in all special programs in the special program cost factor prescribed in Section 236.08(1)(c), "when the student is eligible and is attending a class, course, or program which has met all of the criteria for the special program cost factor." By memorandum dated March 9, 1994, in connection with the February FTE survey, one of Petitioner's deputy superintendents directed Petitioner's Director of Management Information Services to change 127 unweighted FTEs from the Dropout Prevention program to a basic program to "prevent us from exceeding our caps in Category [Group] 2 programs." Petitioner later reported these FTEs by reporting them as basic education FTEs when they were eligible for, enrolled in, and previously reported in the Dropout Prevention program. By Audit Report issued October 20, 1995, the Office of the Auditor General determined that Petitioner misreported 86.52 unweighted FTEs as basic education FTEs, when it should have reported them as Dropout Prevention FTEs. The Audit Report also reclassified one student, at 0.4165 unweighted FTEs, from the Dropout Prevention program to a basic education program due to the absence of adequate documentation. Rule 6A-1.0453(2) authorizes the Auditor General to conduct audits of districts receiving FEFP funding. Rule 6A-1.0453(3) requires the audit report to identify: Errors in the reported full-time equivalent membership by program category; Improper classification or placement of individual students assigned to educational alternative or exceptional student programs; and Failure of classes or programs to meet criteria established by the State Board [citations omitted] for basic or special programs. Rule 6A-1.0453(4) provides: Upon receipt of an official audit report, the Deputy Commissioner for Planning, Budgeting and Management shall compute the amount of adjustment to the district's allocation of state funds necessary to compensate for the errors or deficiencies noted in subsection (2). In those instances where a student has been improperly classified or placed in an exceptional student program, and in those instances were a special program fails to meet the prescribed criteria, the adjustment shall be computed on the basis of the basic program cost factor for which each student qualifies. Except for adjustments made during the fiscal year in which the discrepancies occurred[,] adjustments shall be limited to fund allocations and no changes shall be made in full-time equivalent membership data. By letter dated February 28, 1996, Respondent advised Petitioner of a reduction in FEFP funding for the 1993-94 school year, resulting from the findings of the Audit Report, of $346,428. A letter dated February 12, 1999, from counsel for Respondent to counsel for Petitioner, identifies the portion of this sum attributable to the misreporting of Dropout Prevention FTEs as $267,715. Rule 6A-1.0453(5) requires Respondent to provide official notice to Petitioner of all adjustments following the issuance of the audit report. This notice must include a "statement citing the specific law or rule upon which the finding of each discrepancy is based, and the authority under which the adjustment is to be made " The parties participated in an informal conference, as provided by Rule 6A-1.0453(6). The parties have largely framed the issue in the informal conference as whether Petitioner is free to report Dropout Prevention FTEs as basic education FTEs. The parties were unable to resolve this issue. Attempting to find a basis for compromise, Respondent's representatives reviewed Petitioner's Dropout Prevention records in the hope of finding grounds for determinations of ineligibility, so as to permit a reclassification of over-the-cap Dropout Prevention FTEs as basic education FTEs and allow some funding, as the Audit Report did in the case of the one student improperly classified for the Dropout Prevention program. However, Respondent's representatives were unable to find such documentation errors. Thus, Respondent has maintained its position that the Dropout Prevention FTEs in excess of the enrollment cap are funded at zero, not even at the lesser basic education rate. (Sometimes, Respondent's witnesses express the zero funding differently by saying that the over-the-cap Dropout Prevention FTEs do not generate their own FEFP funds, but participate pro rata in the FEFP funds generated by the under-the-cap Dropout Prevention FTEs. However, this amounts to the same thing: no more FEFP funding for enrolling and teaching over-the-cap Dropout Prevention FTEs. All references in this recommended order to zero funding thus include prorate funding.) Nothing in the record cites the authority by which Respondent zero-funded the over-the-cap Dropout Prevention FTEs, whom Petitioner reported as basic education FTEs. Interestingly, six of Respondent's employees cited the "law" that over-the-cap FTEs, presumably by group rather than individual program, receive zero funding, but not one of them could cite to the authority for this "law." (Eggers, page 17; Stewart, page 11; Goff, page 11; Pierson, page 10; Butler, page 30; and Jarrett, pages 20 and 22.) Section 236.012(2) states in part that the purpose of the FEFP is: (2) To increase the authority and responsibility of districts for deciding matters of instructional organization and method and to encourage district initiative in seeking more effective and efficient means of achieving the goals of the various programs. The material provisions of the above-described laws remain in effect today. The issue of funding over-the-cap FTEs in At-Risk programs is not unique to this case. Another case involving Putnam County is reportedly pending. Also, an Audit Report issued June 15, 1995, involving FEFP funding for the Hillsborough County School District found intentional misreporting of over-the-cap ESOL FTEs as basic education FTEs to avoid zero funding. Respondent's Policy Director, Link Jarrett introduced a much-needed perspective when he alluded to the necessity of balancing the educational needs of children against the complex funding considerations that have dominated this dispute. Mr. Jarrett testified: . . . we are making a good faith effort to the parent and to the child to place the student in the program, regardless of what the funding is. That's easy for me to maybe say at the State level. * * * . . . the basic [tenet] on equal education opportunity in serving these children is you place them in the programs that they need to be served in. And to some extent, you might take a risk in exceeding your cap. And is that worth not placing a student in a program and not giving him the appropriate--I would say no. . . . [If I were a District Finance Officer], I would be saying serve the kids, and where they fall--I would give you my best estimate of the children to be served, and I would serve them in those programs, and I would let the chips fall where they may. Transcript of Link Jarrett deposition, pages 39-40.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Education enter a final order declaring that Petitioner is entitled to: a) funding at the Dropout Prevention cost factor for any FTEs that qualified to be reported as Dropout Prevention FTEs and that were not over the Group 2 cap; and b) funding at the basic education cost factor for any remaining FTEs that qualified to be reported as Dropout Prevention FTEs, but were over the Group 2 cap. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Anne Longman Edwin A. Steinmeyer Lewis, Longman & Walker, P.A. Post Office Box 10788 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0788 Dean Andrews Deputy General Counsel Department of Education 1701 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Petitioner, who is employed as an occupational therapist by a local school board, is considered a “teacher” eligible for the 2015 State of Florida Best and Brightest Scholarship Program.
Findings Of Fact The 2015 Florida Legislature Appropriations Act created the Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program, chapter 2015- 232, p. 27, Item 99A. The eligibility pre-requisites for applying to and being awarded the Scholarship (up to $10,000) were established in the Scholarship. The Scholarship provides as follows: Funds in Specific Appropriation 99A are provided to implement Florida's Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. The funds shall be used to award a maximum of 4,402 teachers with a $10,000 scholarship based on high academic achievement on the SAT or ACT. To be eligible for a scholarship, a teacher must have scored at or above the 80th percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment and have been evaluated as highly effective pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, or if the teacher is a first-year teacher who has not been evaluated pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, must have scored at or above the 80th percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment. In order to demonstrate eligibility for an award, an eligible teacher must submit to the school district, no later than October 1, 2015, an official record of his or her SAT or ACT score demonstrating that the teacher scored at or above the 80th percentile based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment. By December 1, 2015, each school district, charter school governing board, and the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind shall submit to the department the number of eligible teachers who qualify for the scholarship. By February 1, 2016, the department shall disburse scholarship funds to each school district for each eligible teacher to receive a scholarship. By April 1, 2016, each school district, charter school governing board, and the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind shall provide payment of the scholarship to each eligible teacher. If the number of eligible teachers exceeds the total the department shall prorate the per teacher scholarship amount. The Scholarship does not define the word “teacher.” Petitioner, who timely filed an application for the Scholarship, contends that she is a “teacher” and is therefore eligible for the award. Respondent and Intervenor contend that Petitioner is an occupational therapist, and, as such, she is not considered a “classroom teacher,” which is the target group that the Legislature intended for the teacher scholarship program to cover. Petitioner contends that even if the Scholarship is limited to “classroom teachers,” she meets the statutory definition of a “classroom teacher” and is therefore eligible to receive the Scholarship. It is undisputed that the 2015 Scholarship language is vague as to whether the Scholarship is limited to classroom teachers. In 2016, the Legislature made it clear that the award is intended to only cover “classroom teachers.” Legislation enacted in subsequent legislative sessions may be examined to ascertain legislative intent. See Crews v. Fla. Pub. Emp’rs Council 79, AFSCME, 113 So. 3d 1063, 1073 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)(citing Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d 1216, 1230 (Fla. 2006)). Recently, the Governor signed chapter 2016-62, Laws of Florida. Section 25 of chapter 2016-62 enacts section 1012.731, Florida Statutes, the Florida Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program.1/ Section 1012.731(2) provides that the “scholarship program shall provide categorical funding for scholarships to be awarded to classroom teachers, as defined in s. 1012.01(2)(a), who have demonstrated a high level of academic success.” The Legislature's amendment of the language, just a year after the first appropriation, confirms that the Legislature intended the award to go to "classroom teachers," as defined in chapter 1012. Petitioner was hired by Respondent as an occupational therapist. She has worked as an occupational therapist for Respondent for approximately 17 years. Petitioner does not hold a Florida teaching certificate and her position as an occupational therapist does not require a Florida teaching certificate. Instead, Petitioner is licensed by the Florida Department of Health, which has jurisdiction over ethical violations committed by occupational therapists licensed in Florida. In her position as an occupational therapist, Petitioner reports to Respondent’s director of Pupil Support Services, who supervises all therapists within Sarasota County Public Schools. Petitioner’s stated job goal is “[t]o facilitate the handicapped student’s independent functioning in the school setting.” Petitioner’s performance responsibilities, as set forth in her job description, are to: Conduct appropriate evaluation of students referred for possible exceptional student education needs and prepare reports of the evaluation and findings. Plan intervention and service delivery programs to meet student’s individual needs. Implement and direct interventions essential to meeting targeted students’ needs. Provide information and consultative services to appropriate personnel in support of students with disabilities. * * * Establish schedules for meeting with students, conferencing with parents and assisting in rehabilitation techniques. Provide resources to all stakeholders involved in the evaluation, identification of student needs and rehabilitation of students. Petitioner delivers therapeutic services individually or in a small group setting, in a room assigned to her, or in a classroom, usually at the same time a teacher is delivering instruction to the entire class. Petitioner completes “lesson plans,” which are referred to in the therapy setting as “plans of care.” Plans of care differ in substance from lesson plans prepared by teachers because lesson plans set out a teaching plan for the entire class, whereas plans of care set out therapeutic goals and activities directed to one student that complies with the goals set forth in a student's Individualized Education Plan (IEP). As an occupational therapist, Petitioner is responsible for maintaining a “class roster,” which is referred to in the therapy setting as a “caseload.” Occupational therapists maintain a caseload for student accountability purposes and for Medicaid billing purposes. Petitioner’s therapy sessions are assigned a “700” course code, which correlates in the Florida Department of Education's course directory to “related services.” Joint Exhibit O is an example of courses offered to students by Respondent. The course list includes math, language arts, physical education, science, social studies, art, Chinese, music, and occupational therapy. Petitioner is listed as the “teacher” for the occupational therapy course. Unlike the other listed “teachers,” Petitioner is not instructing students in a subject area; she is delivering a service. See § 468.203(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). Succinctly stated, the difference, in this context, between “occupational therapy” and the other listed “courses,” is that occupational therapy is not a subject area that a student learns about; it is a service that a student receives to help them to achieve independent functioning. Although listed as “course” by Respondent, occupational therapy, as compared to the other listed “courses,” is not a “course” within the meaning of section 1012.01(2)(a).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Sarasota County enter a final order finding Petitioner ineligible for the Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 2016.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner won $2,500 in Florida Lottery prize. By Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County Family Law Division, Case Number 86-3999, dated June 20, 1986, the Petitioner was ordered to pay $100 weekly for the support of three minor children. By Order on Arrears in the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Putnam County, Case Number 91-6412-FD-57, dated November 7, 1996, the court found the following facts: Respondent was ordered to pay $100.00 per week for the support of his 3 children by the Circuit Court in Hillsborough County. Respondent never made a payment on this obligation. Arrears totaling $33,200.00 accrued until this Court's order in November 1992. This Court reduced the support obligation to $35.00 per week effective November 9, 1992, in view of two of the three children reaching the age of majority. Support was suspended effective July 1, 1996 Based on the calculation of unpaid support which was somewhat offset by Social Security benefits paid to the mother of the children, the court calculated the total arrears as $22,509. The Order on Arrears concludes that the "Department of Revenue may apply funds withheld from the [Petitioner's] lottery winnings in satisfaction" of the unpaid child support.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Office of Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance, enter a Final Order transferring the Petitioner's lottery prize winnings to the Department of Revenue as partial satisfaction of the Petitioner's unpaid child support obligation. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry Hooper General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Ken Hart General Counsel Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dr. Marcia Mann, Secretary Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 John I. Chandler, Pro Se 6216 50th Street Tampa, Florida 33610 Josephine A. Schultz, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance The Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chris Walker, Esquire Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Post Office Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether or not the Department of Banking and Finance is required by law to transmit $2,159.41 to the State of Florida Department of Education or $2500.00 to the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact DOE, through its Office of Student Financial Assistance, functions as a guarantee agency for purposes of the guaranteed student loan programs. In this capacity, DOE issues a loan guarantee to a participating lender, such as a bank, when the lender has applied for the guarantee in connection with making a student loan to a student borrower. If the student borrower defaults on repaying the loan to the lender, the lender submits to DOE a claim for DOE to repay the loan to the lender. When DOE repays the loan to the lender, the promissory note evidencing the debt is assigned to DOE which then pursues collection of the loan against the defaulting student borrower. On or about November 18, 1988, Petitioner Leonard K. Williams applied for a guaranteed student loan to be made by the Florida National Bank. On or about December 11, 1988, DOE issued its guarantee and the loan was made by the bank to Petitioner. Petitioner's first payment to repay the loan was due on February 1, 1990. He made no payments then or thereafter. On July 1, 1990 he was in default. DOE, as the guarantee agency, paid the bank's claim on December 27, 1990 and the bank assigned the promissory note evidencing Petitioner's indebtedness to DOE. Petitioner purchased a winning Florida Lottery ticket for the Play 4 drawing of November 19, 1991. On November 26, 1991, Petitioner submitted his claim to DOL to claim the prize of $2,500.00. On November 26, 1991, DOE certified to DOL that Petitioner had an outstanding defaulted student loan and requested that the lottery prize money won by Petitioner be transmitted to the Comptroller to be credited toward the Petitioner's student loan debt. The total principal and interest accrued on that debt as of December 11, 1991 was $2,159.41. On December 4, 1991, Petitioner requested from DOE a form captioned, "Physician's Certification of Borrower's Total and Permanent Disability." On January 3, 1992, DOE received the completed form signed by Petitioner's physician, Anne L. Rottman, M.D. Dr. Rottman treated Petitioner from August 18, 1986 through July 19, 1990, treating him for chronic cervical and lumbar spinal pain. She was unable to state when Petitioner's condition began or when he became unable to work, as the condition and disability commenced prior to the date she first saw him on August 18, 1986. Petitioner's condition was static during the time she treated him. Petitioner was unable to work during the time she treated him.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order which withholds $2,159.41 from Petitioner's lottery winnings and transmits that sum to the Department of Education and which also transmits the balance of $340.59 to Petitioner. Since the money has already been effectively transmitted as recommended, the Final Order could simply ratify those prior transmittals. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott C. Wright ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17 day of September, 1992. Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Leonard K. Williams 1425 NE 13th Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Leonard K. Williams Post Office Box 490955 College Park, Georgia 30349 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles S. Ruberg Assistant General Counsel State Board of Education The Capitol, Suite PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue How should the remainder of Petitioner's lottery prize winnings, which are currently held by the Department of Banking and Finance, be distributed in light of the provisions of Section 24.115, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On or about November 28, 1995, Petitioner presented for payment a lottery ticket that had a prize value of $1,560.00. By letter dated November 29, 1995, DOR certified to the Department of the Lottery (hereinafter referred to as "DOL") that Petitioner "owe[d] $1,319.88 in Title IV-D child support arrearages" as of the date of the letter. After receiving the letter, DOL transmitted the prize money to DBF. On or about December 26, 1995, DBF sent Petitioner a check in the amount of $240.12, along with a letter advising Petitioner that it was DBF's intention to give the balance ($1,319.88) of Petitioner's $1,560.00 lottery prize to DOR "in payment of [Petitioner's] debt." Petitioner disputed that he owed $1,319.88 in child support and requested an administrative hearing on the matter. In a Marital Settlement Agreement that Petitioner executed on May 10, 1991, he agreed to pay, through the State of Florida, $52.00 per week for the support of his and his wife's minor daughter. This Marital Settlement Agreement was approved and incorporated in a Final Judgement of Dissolution of [Petitioner's] Marriage, which was entered on July 29, 1991, in the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Okeechobee County. DOR's records reflect that, as of December 26, 1995, Petitioner owed $1,319.88 in past-due, court-ordered child support, and that, as of May 24, 1996 (the most recent date for which records were provided at the May 28, 1996, hearing in this case), Petitioner owed $1,436.72 in past-due, court-ordered child support. These records, however, do not reflect that, in March of 1994, the State of Florida received from the Internal Revenue Service, a $628.00 tax refund (for the 1993 tax year) owed Petitioner that should have been (but was not) credited to Petitioner's child support payment account. Accordingly, as of December 26, 1995, and May 24, 1996, Petitioner actually owed $691.88 and $808.72, respectively, in past-due, court-ordered child support.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Comptroller disburse the $1,319.88 that remains of Petitioner's lottery prize by issuing a state warrant to Petitioner in the amount of $511.16 and transferring the remaining $808.72 to DOR. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of June, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SC 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 96-0396 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the "findings of facts" proposed by Respondents in their joint proposed recommended order: 1-5. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. Not incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. First sentence: Not incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Second sentence: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Not incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Second sentence: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. 9-10. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry Hooper, General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Josephine Schultz, Chief Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chriss Walker, Esquire Child Support Enforcement Department of Revenue Post Office Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Nurrudin Alomgir 927 South "G" Street, Apartment 3 Lake Worth, Florida 33460
