The Issue Whether the South Florida Water Management District’s (“District”) intended award of a contract for aerial spraying services, granular application services, and aerial transport services, to Coastal Air Services, Inc. (“Coastal”), is contrary to the District’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the bid specifications; and, if so, whether the decision was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The District is an independent taxing authority created pursuant to section 373.069, Florida Statutes, with the authority to contract with private entities to maintain real property controlled by the District. See § 373.1401, Fla. Stat. HAI is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 1090 Airglades Boulevard in Clewiston, Florida. Coastal is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 7424 Coastal Drive in Panama City, Florida. The RFB On February 7, 2018, the District issued the RFB, soliciting bids for qualified respondents to provide the following: [F]urnish all labor, equipment, perform data entry and perform all operations for spraying of aquatic, ditchbank and invasive vegetation by helicopter and provide aerial flight services for site inspection and plant surveys. Both HAI and Coastal submitted timely bids, which the District deemed responsive and responsible under the terms of the RFB. The District deemed Coastal the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for aerial spraying, granular application, and aerial transport services. The District deemed HAI the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for spot spraying services. On May 11, 2018, the District posted its Notice of Intent to Award the respective contracts to Coastal and HAI. HAI challenges the award to Coastal because it is not a responsible bidder under the terms of the RFB. HAI’s challenge focuses on two items required to document the bidder’s responsibility to perform the requested services. First, the RFB requires the bidder to provide at least two helicopters certified pursuant to 14 CFR Part 133, Rotocraft External-Load Operations; and 14 CFR Part 137, Agricultural Aircraft Operations (Part 137 Certificate). Second, the RFB requires the bidder to demonstrate its ability to obtain required insurance coverage. Part 137 Certificate HAI contends that Coastal’s bid does not meet the responsibility provisions of the RFB because it did not include sufficient Part 137 Certificates for its subcontractor, HMC Helicopters (“HMC”). HAI contends the Part 137 Certificates are required to expressly state that aircraft are certified to dispense economic poisons. Petitioner’s argument fails for three reasons. First, the RFB does not require the bidder’s Part 137 Certificate to expressly endorse aircraft to dispense economic poisons.3/ Second, assuming the express endorsement was required, the requirement does not apply to HMC. The RFB defines the term “Bidder” and “Respondent” as “[a]ll contractors, consultants, organizations, firms or other entities submitting a Response to this RFB as a prime contractor.” (emphasis added). In its bid, Coastal is listed as the prime contractor, and HMC as a subcontractor. The RFB requires each Respondent to list at least two aircraft which are Part 133 and 137 certified. The requirement applies to Coastal as the primary contractor, not to its subcontractor. Coastal’s bid listed five aircraft with both Part 133 and 137 Certificates, actually exceeding the requirement for two such certified aircraft. Third, assuming an express endorsement for dispensing economic poisons was required, and that the requirement applied to HMC, HMC’s Part 137 Certificate documents HMC’s authority to dispense economic poisons. Pursuant to 14 CFR 137.3, “Agricultural aircraft operation” is defined as follows: [T]he operation of an aircraft for the purpose of (1) dispensing any economic poison, (2) dispensing any other substance intended for plant nourishment, soil treatment, propagation of plant life, or pest control, or (3) engaging in dispending activities directly affecting agriculture, horticulture, or forest preservation, but not including the dispensing of live insects. To obtain a Part 137 Certificate, the operator must pass a knowledge and skills test, which includes the safe handling of economic poisons and disposal of used containers for those poisons; the general effects of those poisons on plants, animals, and persons and precautions to be observed in using those poisons; as well as the primary symptoms of poisoning in persons, appropriate emergency measures in the case of poisoning, and the location of poison control centers. See 14 CFR § 137.19. However, if the operator applies for a Part 137 Certificate which prohibits dispensing of economic poisons, the applicant is not required to demonstrate the knowledge and skills listed above. See Id. HMCs’ certificates do not contain an express prohibition against dispensing economic poisons. The authorization for HMC’s aircraft to dispense economic poisons is inherent in its Part 137 Certificate. Coastal’s bid meets the solicitation requirement for at least two aircraft with Part 137 Certificates. Insurance Requirements The RFB requires each Respondent to “provide evidence of the ability to obtain appropriate insurance coverage.” Respondents may meet the insurability requirement by having their insurance agent either (1) complete and sign an insurance certificate which meets all of the requirements of Exhibit H to the RFB; or (2) issue a letter on the insurance agency’s letterhead stating that the Respondent qualifies for the required insurance coverage levels and that an insurance certificate meeting the District’s requirements will be submitted prior to the execution of the contract. In response to this requirement, Coastal submitted a letter from Sterlingrisk Aviation, dated March 6, 2018, stating, “All required coverage amounts are available to Coastal Air Service, Inc. to fulfill the requirements of this contract.” In the Re: line, the letter refers to the specific RFB at issue in this case. Coastal also submitted a certificate of insurance from Sterlingrisk Aviation demonstrating the levels of insurance coverage in effect at the time the bid was submitted, although the coverages are less than the amounts required under the RFB.4/ HAI takes issue with Coastal’s evidence of ability to obtain the required coverage because the letter from Sterlingrisk does not state “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Based on the totality of the evidence, the undersigned infers that Sterlingrisk’s letter omits the language that a certificate “will be provided” prior to contract execution, because Sterlingrisk will issue an insurance certificate only when Coastal applies, and pays the premium, for the increased coverage limitations. The letter from Sterlingrisk substantially complies with the insurance requirements of the RFB, and constitutes competent, substantial evidence of Coastal’s ability to obtain the required insurance coverage. HAI introduced no evidence that Coastal obtained an economic advantage over HAI by failing to include language from its insurance agent that “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Instead, HAI argued that by failing to enforce that provision of the RFB, the District cannot ensure the winning bidder will be responsible to undertake the contract. HAI argued that the District’s failure to adhere to this RFB requirement may create inefficiencies that “would result in the event that Coastal were unable to obtain the required insurance coverage” before execution of the contract. Coastal’s bid documents its eligibility for insurance coverage in the amounts required by the RFB. If Coastal does not provide said certificates, it will not be qualified for final execution or issuance of the contract.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order dismissing Helicopter Applicator, Inc.’s Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2018.
The Issue The ultimate issues are whether ACT Corporation (ACT) engaged in unlawful employment practices by discriminating against Petitioners Rosa Gibson (Gibson) or Lillian Brown (Brown) on account of race. More specifically, both Petitioners allege that they were terminated based on race.
Findings Of Fact ACT Corporation is a comprehensive community mental health provider. In 1989, it had five major clinical departments and employed approximately 500 people, of whom 24% were minority employees and 18% were black. One of the clinical departments includes two residential facilities for mentally ill clients, Big Pine and Big Tree. The Petitioners herein have been employed at both facilities, but were on the staff of Big Tree at the time of their terminations. Brown began working for ACT on September 14, 1982. She worked at several different facilities, but was working at Big Pine in 1987 as a Residential Specialist or Residential Advisor (RA) under the immediate supervision of the house manager, Myra Morris, who is black. Gibson began working for ACT in November, 1987, as Residential Specialist or Residential Advisor (RA) at Big Pine under Morris. Gibson was often tardy for work and Morris counseled with her about the problem. During one discussion between Morris and Gibson about tardiness, Gibson became haughty and verbally aggressive toward Morris. Morris would have terminated Gibson for this aggression, but she knew Gibson needed the job. Instead, Morris had Gibson transferred to Big Tree. In early 1988, Morris was transferred to another position with ACT. She was replaced as house manager by Kenneth Polite, a black employee. Brown continued as an RA at Big Pine. Brown was transferred to Big Tree and promoted to House Manager on September 30, 1988. Gibson continued as an RA at Big Tree under Brown. In January, 1989, Ann Turley became the Clinical Administrator for Adult Services and the immediate supervisor over both facilities. Brown was still on probation in the House Manager position because Turley's supervisor, Chris Kennedy, had extended Brown's probation. The extension resulted from Brown's poor performance, including poor follow through on assignments, incorrect preparation of reports and paperwork, inability to communicate effectively, and inability to conceptually grasp and carry out programs. Turley kept Brown on in the House Manager position despite the poor performance because Brown told her that Kennedy and she just did not understand all that Brown was doing. Turley told Brown to keep a written record to show what she was doing. In July, 1989, Polite left employment with ACT. Turley made some organizational changes at that time. ACT and her department needed to come up with $100,000 in revenue or in expense reduction. Turley made the decision to cut back one staff person at Big Pine. The position of house manager at Big Pine was eliminated. The two facilities were reorganized to have a Team Leader at Big Pine and a Residential Coordinator at Big Tree. Turley told Brown of these changes before they were announced. Brown was promoted to the Residential Coordinator position. Donna Dooley, a white employee was made Team Leader at Big Pine. She received a 5% raise, not a raise to the salary level of House Manager. Turley made the selection for Team Leader from the five eligible employees remaining at Big Pine. All five had been employed at ACT by Turley's predecessor. Turley examined the personnel files of the five employees, including performance evaluations. The employee with the best evaluation, within the most recent evaluations made by Polite, was Dooley. Polite noted in her evaluation that Dooley had filled in for him and had done a good job at it and that the other staff at Big Pine came to Dooley for leadership and advice. Turley's decision was poorly received by some of the staff. Polite had wanted the house manager position to go to his roommate, a black employee. Other staff thought the position should have been awarded based on seniority. Staff from the various facilities of ACT asked Turley by letter to meet with them to discuss the position. Turley met with the staff, but no real discussion occurred. The staff in attendance was racially mixed. Individual staff members, including Gibson, verbally attacked Turley because they failed to understand that the house manager position had been eliminated and that the Team Leader position was not its equivalent. Turley was quite emotionally upset about the hostile tone displayed at the meeting. She was also concerned that Brown had signed the staffs' letter requesting a meeting and had attended the meeting, because Brown was a supervisor and not a member of the supporting staff. Brown also had been told before anyone else the reasons for the reorganization and she knew that she was being promoted to Residential Coordinator. Turley had made the decision to promote Brown as Residential Coordinator because the reorganization had to go through and Brown's duties would not change that dramatically. The Residential Coordinator would work closely with the Team Leader to organize and coordinate the operation of both facilities. The position of House Manager ceased to exist at either facility. Brown's inadequate performance continued while she was on probation as Residential Coordinator. The same problems were apparent and some new ones arose. One significant problem was in Brown's supervision and discipline of Gibson. Gibson was repeatedly late for work and she brought her child to work with her. Brown was told by Turley to take certain corrective and disciplinary actions with Gibson, but she failed to do so. Gibson also was rude to a case manager at medication clinic (med clinic), refused to get a client's chart for a case worker, and repeatedly yelled at, demeaned and was uncooperative with the staff at med clinic. Turley instructed Brown to give a counseling statement to Gibson for this behavior, but again Brown did not do so. Because of Brown's lack of appropriate job performance, Turley demoted her from Residential Coordinator to Residential Advisor at Big Tree on September 7, 1989. Turley assumed Brown's job duties temporarily. Brown and Gibson were very upset over this demotion. The evidence taken as a whole shows that Brown and Gibson developed an "us versus them" attitude which significantly interfered with their job performance thereafter. After Brown's demotion, Turley discovered a new fiscal problem. One option for addressing the problem was to change Big Tree from a level two to a level one facility. That change would require a change in staffing patterns such that licensed practical nurses would be required around the clock and a registered nurse as the supervisor of the LPNs. Turley rewrote the job description for the Residential Coordinator position to require a registered nurse's license. In October, 1989, Darlene Hasenkamp, who is white, was hired as the Residential Coordinator because she was an RN and had experience with mentally ill patient care. As Residential Coordinator, Hasenkamp supervised all staff at both Big Tree and Big Pine. Donna Dooley, the Team Leader at Big Pine was the person immediately below Hasenkamp in the supervisory chain. While the staff at Big Tree were not immediately responsible to Dooley, Dooley did have some supervisory responsibilities over the staff at both facilities when Hasenkamp was not there. Brown and Gibson did not like working for Hasenkamp or Dooley. Both were subtly resistant and uncooperative with Hasenkamp and Dooley. Mentho Saafir is another black Residential Advisor with ACT. Her observation is that Brown and Gibson were part of a small tight group of black employees. The group got mad because Dooley was made Team Leader. Then when Brown was demoted and Hasenkamp was hired, they became openly oppositional to any encounter with Dooley. Gibson was especially hostile and uncooperative with Dooley. On a Saturday during November, 1989, Dooley and Hasenkamp were both off work, but they were on call for their respective facilities. A client at Big Pine was suicidal. The one staff person working at Big Pine was managing the client and called Dooley for assistance in getting the van and transporting the client to the hospital. The van was parked at Big Tree because Big Tree always had two staff persons on duty and Big Pine only had one. Therefore in an emergency, one staff person could leave Big Tree to take the van to Big Pine to assist. Dooley was at home and called Big Tree to get the van delivered to Big Pine. Gibson answered the telephone at Big Tree. She was evasive and refused to answer Dooley's questions about who was working at Big Tree and where that person was. Dooley told Gibson that she needed the van for a suicidal client. Gibson kept saying that her coworker wasn't there and finally told Dooley that if she needed the van "I suggest you come and get it yourself." After much pressing by Dooley, Gibson acknowledged that her coworker was Brown and Brown was not there. Dooley called Hasenkamp and explained the problem and described Gibson's evasiveness and lack of cooperation. Hasenkamp told Dooley to meet her at Big Tree. When Dooley arrived at Big Tree, Hasenkamp was discussing with Gibson her rude and uncooperative behavior toward Dooley on the telephone. As Dooley walked in to Big Tree, Gibson jumped up, leaned over the desk and shouted that Dooley was not her supervisor and she did not have to report (or listen) to Dooley. In order to avoid a confrontation and to get the van to the client in need, Hasenkamp told Dooley to take the van. Dooley left. Hasenkamp sat down and waited for Brown to return to work. When Brown came in 45 minutes later, she had a bag of fast food. Hasenkamp asked where she had been and Brown advised that she had been getting breakfast. Brown said she had only been gone 25 to 30 minutes. Hasenkamp told Brown that it was against normal procedures to leave like that while on duty. Brown simply said she didn't know that. Hasenkamp then took Brown to Big Pine to relieve Dooley who was there alone, having sent the staff person in the van with the client. On the way, Hasenkamp stopped at her home and at her mother's home. When they arrived at Big Pine, Hasenkamp's briefcase fell open to reveal a counseling statement to Brown regarding some furniture, however, that counseling statement was administered at a later time. The counseling statement about the furniture arose from Hasenkamp's direct instructions to Brown to inspect some furniture that was to be delivered before signing the invoice. Brown did not inspect the furniture, but did sign the invoice. When the furniture was finally inspected by Hasenkamp, a tear was discovered in one chair. Brown claimed that she had told the maintenance man to look at the furniture, but that was contrary to Hasenkamp's direct instruction. Brown was "written up" for this failure to carry out her supervisor's instructions. Brown and Gibson were also written up for the incident regarding the van. Gibson was also written up regarding another matter. Hasenkamp had sent a memo to all of the staff about eating pastry in the office. She instructed all staff to initial and sign-off on the memo by a certain date. Everyone signed the memo except Gibson, who refused. The time for signing the memo passed, but rather than write Gibson up for failing to carry out her instructions, Hasenkamp called Gibson to find out why she had not signed the memo. Gibson was off work at the time and Hasenkamp called her at home. Gibson was extremely rude, told Hasenkamp that she had no business bothering her at home, and refused to discuss the memo. Gibson gave Hasenkamp no choice except to write her up again. On December 12, 1989, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Hasenkamp and Dooley drove up to Big Tree. Dooley went in for Hasenkamp because Hasenkamp was on crutches. Brown came outside to the car and told Hasenkamp she needed to come inside regarding a problem. Dooley and Hasenkamp observed Gibson holding and comforting a client, Janice, who was suffering a locked jaw and an extremely painful muscular reaction as a side effect of her psychotropic medication. The patient had to have been in severe discomfort for a couple of hours. The side effects are counteracted by another medication, Cogentin. It was obvious to Hasenkamp that the client needed emergency medical care. Hasenkamp asked if the client had been given her Cogentin. The Cogentin is to be given every day at 9:00 p.m., so Hasenkamp asked to see the medication records from December 11, 1989, to see whether the client had received her Cogentin. Gibson and Brown were the staff people for the 4 to 12 p.m. shift on both December 11 and 12, 1989. Hasenkamp asked Gibson if she had given the client the Cogentin on December 11th. Gibson said yes. Hasenkamp then looked at the medication records and found that no one had initialed to show that they had given the Cogentin on December 11th. Hasenkamp again asked Gibson, but when Gibson was shown the unsigned medication record, she admitted that she did not know if she had given the medication. Hasenkamp sent Gibson to take the client to the emergency room. The client was given an injection of Cogentin. When Gibson asked Hasenkamp if she should give the December 12th dose of Cogentin to the client, Hasenkamp told her no, because the injection would serve in place of the dose. Hasenkamp told Gibson to initial the medication record for December 12th to show that Cogentin was given. Hasenkamp also instructed Brown to hold the client back from work the next morning and to make sure the client was sent to med clinic so that the psychiatrist could review and adjust her medications. The next morning, December 13, 1989, Hasenkamp arrived at Big Tree just as the van was leaving with clients for med clinic. She flagged down the van and asked the driver, Rosario Rizzo, if that client, Janice, was on the van. Rizzo said "no" because no one had told him to take that client. Hasenkamp told Rizzo what had happened the night before, because Rizzo is a nurse. She then sent Rizzo to find the client and take her to med clinic. When Rizzo had arrived that morning, he went to the office and spoke with Brown and Nadine Banning. Banning was the person who had been on duty from midnight to 8:00 a.m. He personally asked Brown and Banning who was scheduled to go to med clinic. Brown read him the names off of a list, but did not mention Janice. At Hasenkamp's instructions, Rizzo found Janice at the bus stop, waiting to go to work. He took her to med clinic. When Hasenkamp went into Big Tree, she immediately asked Brown why she had failed to hold Janice and send her to med clinic. Brown's only reply was "It doesn't matter anyway because the psychiatrist won't see Janice without an appointment." Hasenkamp then went to look at the medication records for Janice and discovered that Gibson had gone back and filled in her initials to show that she had given the missed dose of Cogentin to Janice on December 11th. When Hasenkamp asked Gibson about this, Gibson told her that she remembered that she had given the medication on the 11th. In fact, it is not possible for the client to have had such a severe side effect reaction on December 12th if she had been given her medication on the 11th. Hasenkamp determined that Gibson and Brown had endangered the safety and health of a client and had failed to follow her direct instructions, because Gibson did not properly given the medication and Brown did not hold Janice for med clinic. Gibson's late "memory" that she had given the medication further undermined her confidence in Gibson. She felt she could no longer trust their judgment and could no longer entrust the care of patients to them. Hasenkamp recommended that both be terminated. Turley took that recommendation and did an investigation. From that investigation, she determined that they had, in fact, endangered the client. Specifically, Turley found that Gibson had failed to ensure that the medication was taken and had then tried to cover up that failure and that Brown had failed to get the client to med clinic as instructed. Turley terminated Brown and Gibson on December 14, 1989. The reason given to each in the letter of termination was "insubordination." This reason was given in writing because the personnel director of ACT recommended that they not say "endangerment of a client's health and safety" for liability reasons. Both Gibson and Brown filed a grievance with ACT's affirmative action officer, Carolyn Fleming, a black employee. Fleming did an extensive investigation of all of Gibson's and Brown's allegations of harassment and termination based on racial discrimination. Fleming determined that there was no racial discrimination in ACT's actions. Based on an observation of the candor and demeanor of all the witnesses and on a review of the contradictions in the testimony, it is determined that the testimony of Brown and Gibson is less credible than that of the witnesses for ACT. Both Brown and Gibson gave testimony that was calculated to show them in the best light. While it is not determined that their testimony was untrue, it is found that their memories of these events are skewed so as to diminish the severity of their failures.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitions for Relief filed by Rosa Gibson and Lillian Brown be DENIED and DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Margaret Jones, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Rosa Gibson 1129 Hillcrest Drive Daytona Beach, FL 32117 Reginald E. Moore Attorney at Law Post Office Box 1848 Daytona Beach, FL 32015 Mitchell A. Gordon Attorney at Law Post Office Drawer 9670 Daytona Beach, FL 32120
Findings Of Fact On April 22, 1994, Respondent, Southwest Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), published proposed amendments to Rule 40D-4.051 in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, Number 16, at page 2450. The portions which are the subject of this proceedings are as follows: * 40D-4.051 Exemptions <<(1) Exemptions are found in>> [[The following activities are exempt from permitting under this chapter: The activities specified in]] Sections 373.406, Florida Statutes. (2)-(7) No Change. * Note: In the above quotation, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. On May 13, 1994, Petitioner, Gerald A. Robbins, filed a Petition to Challenge Proposed Rule 40D-4.051. On May 20, 1994, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition to Challenge Proposed Rule 40D-4.051. In its rule challenge, Petitioner requests that 40D-4.051(1) be rewritten as follows: "Exemptions are as found in Sections 373.406 AND 403.927 Florida Statutes." On July 1, 1994, Respondent withdrew its proposed amendment to Subsection (1) of Rule 40D-4.051. The following Notice of Withdrawal appeared in Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, No. 26: Southwest Florida Water Management District RULE TITLES: RULE NOS.: Exemptions 40D-4.051(1) NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL Notice is hereby given that the above proposed rule amendment, published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, Number 16, on Page 2450, April 22, 1994, have (sic) been withdrawn. This is the sole subsection being withdrawn from rulemaking pursuant to Section 120.54(13)(b), Florida Statutes. The remainder of the proposed amendments to Section 40D-4.051, Florida Administrative Code remains subject to Section 120.54(1), Florida Statutes. By Order dated June 28, 1994, the portion of Petitioner's rule challenge relating to Rule 40D-4.051(7) was dismissed. Petitioner appealed the Order to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Gerald A. Robbins v. Southwest Florida Water Management District, Case No. 94-1717. The court denied Petitioner's Petition for Review of Non-Final Administrative Action by Order dated October 10, 1994.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority," as alleged by Petitioner.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner Cargor Partners VIII – Long Bar Pointe, LLLP (“Cargor”) is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2017).
Findings Of Fact Notice On February 17, 2017, the attorney for Cargor sent Joseph McClash a letter on law firm stationary. In the first paragraph of the letter it states, “Please allow this letter to serve as notice of Cargor’s intent to seek relief pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (the “Statute”) against you, individually as qualified representative, and the named Petitioner.” Cargor sent an email to McClash on February 28, 2017, reminding McClash that “the 57.105 deadline is March 10, 2017.” McClash referred to a motion for attorney’s fees that he received on or about March 13, 2017, but the motion was not shown to the Administrative Law Judge nor introduced into evidence. On April 5, 2017, the same day that McClash voluntarily dismissed the petition for hearing in DOAH Case No. 17-0655, Cargor filed with DOAH its motion for attorney’s fees under section 57.105. Contested Claims The renewal of a FDOW is governed by section 373.421(2), Florida Statutes, which states in relevant part that the FDOW shall be renewed “as long as physical conditions on the property have not changed, other than changes which have been authorized by a permit pursuant to this part, so as to alter the boundaries of surface waters or wetlands.” If the boundaries of wetlands or other surface waters have been altered without a permit, the FDOW cannot be renewed and an application for a new FDOW is required. The SWFWMD reviewer explained in a letter requesting additional information from Cargor: Please be advised that letters of exemption do not qualify as permits issued under Part IV of chapter 373, F.S. and therefore if work has been done on the site that has altered the wetlands or other surface water boundaries in association with a letter of exemption, a new formal determination application will be required. McClash claims Cargor did not qualify for the renewal of its FDOW because Cargor altered the boundaries of surface waters or wetlands on its property after the 2011 FDOW was issued and the some of the alterations were made pursuant to letter of exemption. In its February 17, 2017, letter to McClash, Cargor set forth six grounds for Cargor’s contention that McClash’s petition for hearing should be withdrawn. The first three grounds were described in Cargor’s letter as follows: The Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, which is the subject of this Proceeding, does not authorize any construction activity. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented. There is no injury in fact and no one is in immediate danger of a direct injury from the issuance of the Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, as of the date and time of filing the Petition in this Proceeding. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented. The Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, is not a permit, license, or authorization. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented by an association. These were issues of law and they were decided against Cargor in an Order dated February 28, 2017. The fourth and fifth grounds described in Cargor’s letter involve the central issue in the case: Changes in the land have been previously authorized by the Southwest Florida Water Management District (“SWFWMD”) pursuant to existing and final permits including (i) SWFWMD ERP No. 43040157.001, dated August 6, 2014, (ii) SWFWMD CONCEPTUAL ERP No. 49040157.002, dated September 4, 2015, (iii) SWFWMD ERP No. 4304157.003, dated March 31, 2016, and (iv) SWFWMD Notice of Qualification for Permanent Farming Exemption, dated August 30, 2016. Changes in the land are authorized by the identified permits and authorizations. All changes in the land have occurred pursuant to the identified permits and authorizations. Allegations to the contrary are simply false and are not supported by material facts. In 2015, Cargor was issued a “Conceptual ERP” permit, which describes, among other things, planned modifications to some agricultural ditches. However, the conceptual permit does not allow the commencement of construction activities. On August 30, 2016, SWFWMD issued to Cargo a Permanent Farming Exemption, pursuant to section 373.406(13), which authorized Cargor to excavate three agricultural ponds in uplands. In its application for the exemption, Cargor also proposed to modify some agricultural ditches. On March 31, 2017, SWFWMD issued Cargor an ERP Individual Construction Major Modification, which, among other things, authorized work in ditches. This permit was issued just before McClash’s voluntary dismissal and, therefore, could not have authorized the changes on Cargor’s property that McClash described in the petition for hearing. Before filing his petition, McClash consulted with a wetland scientist, Clark Hull, about the merits of McClash’s proposed challenge to the FDOW renewal. Hull gave McClash an affirmative response, but his input was speculative because it was based on assumptions and representations that Hull had not investigated. McClash consulted with another wetland scientist, Pamela Fetterman, who conducted an “aerial, desktop review of publically available Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data.” Fetterman described her initial review as an evaluation of potential undelineated wetlands and other surface waters. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the delineation approved by the 2011 FDOW became final and could not be challenged by McClash. McClash then asked Fetterman to review changes in physical conditions on the property that occurred after the FDOW was issued. Fetterman produced a report (McClash Exhibit R-6), in which she opined that the changes to physical conditions on Cargor’s property “have a high likelihood of affecting the previously delineated landward extent of wetlands and other surface waters.” She stated further: [C]hanges in physical conditions of the property took place prior to issuance of the [FDOW renewal] as purported “exempt agricultural activities”, and include ditch dredging alterations to delineated other surface waters. . . . A Permanent Farming Request for Exemption Confirmation letter was applied for on August 23, 2016 for construction of these ponds and modification of existing ditches, some of which were determined to be jurisdictional other surface waters by the subsequently re-issued [FDOW]. At the final hearing on fees, neither McClash nor Cargor made clear to the Administrative Law Judge: (1) the physical changes to the property that were alleged to be authorized by permit, (2) the physical changes that were alleged to be authorized by exemption, or (3) any physical changes that were alleged to be unauthorized. The sixth ground described in Cargor’s letter is as follows: The picture attached to the Petition as set forth in Paragraph 9, and the stop work allegation set forth in Paragraph 10 are irrelevant and have no factual relationship to any issue in the proceeding. Since any changes in the land have occurred pursuant to identified permits and authorizations, the allegations are simply false and/or intentionally misleading. It is not a basis for an award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105 that an irrelevant photograph was included in a petition for hearing. Moreover, the aerial photograph in McClash’s petition was relevant in this case because it showed the physical conditions of Cargor’s property. In the petition, McClash states that Manatee County issued a stop work order on November 16, 2016, for construction activities commenced on Cargor’s property without a County- approved erosion control plan. This allegation also pertained to physical changes to the property. All evidence about physical changes was relevant in determining whether Cargor was entitled to renewal of the FDOW. Fees Cargor claims fees based on 48.4 hours of attorney time (Edward Vogler) at an hourly rate of $410, and 3.6 hours of attorney time (Kimberly Ashton) at an hourly rate of $385, for a total of $21,230.00. The fees Cargor is seeking include the hours spent on legal issues raised by Cargor that were rejected by the Administrative Law Judge. These fees amount to at least $1,025. See Cargor Exhibit 1, Invoice entries for February 20, 2017. Cargor’s attorney testified that the fees are reasonable. Cargor did not call an expert witness to corroborate the reasonableness of the hourly rate and the reasonableness of the hours expended.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's revocation of Respondent's modified permit, authorizing a cross- fence on Petitioner's fee owned right-of-way, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The South Florida Water Management District (District) is a public corporation in the State of Florida, existing by virtue of Chapter 25270, Laws of Florida (1949), and operating pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Title 40E, Florida Administrative Code, as a multi-purpose water management district. The District's principal office is West Palm Beach, Florida. In executing its multi-purpose, the District, as local sponsor for the US Army Corps of Engineers' Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, acquired canal rights-of-way. The District's rights-of-way were acquired to enable the Corps of Engineers to construct the flood control project and to maintain the system after its construction. The District operates a proprietary-based right-of-way program to manage the various property interests of the canal rights-of-way. The purpose of the District's right-of-way program is, to the extent possible, to allow uses of the rights- of-way that do not conflict with the flood control project. The rights-of way are used by both public and private concerns, including adjacent property owners, governmental entities, and utility companies. Jesus G. Quevedo is a private individual. His address is 2615 North Federal Highway, Lake Worth, Florida. The property at this address was vacant when Mr. Quevedo purchased it, and he has owned the property for approximately ten (10) years. The District has fee simple title to a strip of land on the south side of the District's C-51 Canal, immediately west of the Federal Highway/Olive Avenue bridge (C-51 Right-of-Way). Mr. Quevedo's property is located at the side of and adjacent to the C-51 Right-of-Way. The C-51 Right-of-Way is also located within the boundaries of Spillway Park as established in the agreement between the District and the City of Lake Worth. Generally described, Spillway Park includes the District's fee simple owned right-of-way on the south side of the District's C-51 Canal, beginning at the west side of the Federal Highway/Olive Avenue bridge and continuing to the east side of the Dixie Highway bridge. Mr. Quevedo has no real property interest in the C-51 Right-of-Way. Prior to purchasing his property, Mr. Quevedo was aware that the District owned the C-51 Right-of-Way. Historically, portions of Spillway Park and the C-51 Right-of-Way, in particular, have been a unique and popular location for excellent snook fishing by the public. These areas continue to be considered as such. On February 11, 1993, Mr. Quevedo was issued SFWMD Permit No. 9801 (Permit), a right-of-way occupancy permit, by the District’s Governing Board. The Permit authorized him to make use of the District’s lands and works as follows: 20’ X 50’ BOAT DOCK WITH WALKWAY, BURIED WATER AND ELECTRICAL SERVICE, POP-UP SPRINKLERS, AND SODDING WITHIN THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY OF C-51 LOCATED IMMEDIATELY WEST OF THE OLIVE AVENUE/FEDERAL HIGHWAY BRIDGE. During the permit application process, but prior to the issuance of the Permit, Mr. Quevedo had discussed with the District's staff the erection of a cross-fence based on allegations of improper or criminal activities by members of the public. Subsequently, in November 1995, Mr. Quevedo again discussed with the District's staff erection of a cross-fence based on the same allegations but he also included a new allegation of public safety as to the C-51 seawall. Based on the concern for public safety, the District's staff recommended that Mr. Quevedo be granted a modification to the Permit for a cross-fence. On November 14, 1996, the District's Governing Board approved, as part of its consent agenda, and issued SFWMD Permit MOD No. 9801 (MOD Permit)3 authorizing the following: CHAIN LINK CROSS FENCE WITH 16’ VEHICULAR GATE ALONG THE WEST PROPERTY LINE WITHIN THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY OF C-51 LOCATED AT 2615 NORTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY. The MOD Permit, as did the Permit, provides in pertinent part on its face the following: The permittee, by acceptance of this permit, hereby agrees that he shall promptly comply with all orders of the District and shall alter, repair or remove his use solely at his expense in a timely fashion. . . . This permit is issued by the District as a license to use or occupy District works or lands. . . By acceptance of this permit, the permittee expressly acknowledges that the permittee bears all risk of loss as a result of revocation of this permit. The MOD Permit, as did the Permit, contained standard limiting conditions, as provided in Rule 40E-6.381, Florida Administrative Code, and special conditions. The limiting conditions provide in pertinent part as follows: Permittee agrees to abide by all of the terms and conditions of this permit, including any representations made on the permit application and related documents. . . . This permit does not create any vested rights, and except for governmental entities and public or private utilities, is revocable at will upon reasonable prior written notice. Permittee bears all risk of loss as to monies expended in furtherance of the permitted use. Upon revocation, the permittee shall promptly modify, relocate or remove the permitted use. In the event of failure to so comply within the specified time, the District may remove the permitted use and permittee shall be responsible for all removal costs. This permit does not convey any property rights nor any rights or privileges other than those specified herein. . . . Having been granted the MOD Permit, Mr. Quevedo erected the cross-fence within and onto the C-51 Right-of-Way. The C-51 Right-of-Way is located adjacent to Mr. Quevedo’s property, as indicated earlier, and continues westerly to the permitted cross-fence. The C-51 Right-of-Way is enclosed by the cross-fence, preventing access by the public, and is located easterly of the cross-fence. As the C-51 Right-of-Way is located within the boundaries of the Spillway Park, the cross- fence is also located within the boundaries of the Spillway Park. During the time that Mr. Quevedo has owned his home, including prior to and after erection of the cross-fence, he, his family members and/or guests have frequently fished from the C-51 seawall and used the C-51 Right-of-Way enclosed by the cross- fence. Prior to and after the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo and his family members have selectively controlled access by the public to the C-51 Right-of-Way at the C-51 seawall. Prior to the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo chased members of the public off the C-51 Right-of-Way. Mr. Quevedo and members of his family also called law enforcement officers to remove members of the public who were located on the C-51 Right-of-Way, even if the members of the public were fishing from the C-51 seawall. After the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo and his family members continued to engage in this conduct of selective access. Subsequent to the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo had a member of the public arrested for trespassing. The person allegedly jumped over or went around the cross-fence to fish from the C-51 seawall in the C-51 Right-of-Way. With the existence of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo has prevented the general public from using the C-51 Right-of-Way, including the C-51 seawall. As a result, he has acquired the exclusive, private use of the C-51 Right-of-Way at the C-51 seawall, which is publicly owned land, and has, almost doubled the size of his adjacent property without the obligations and expense of acquisition, assuming he could acquire the property through acquisition. The District's policy is that public land should be open to the public. Contrary to this policy, Mr. Quevedo's cross-fence precludes access to the District's right-of-way (C-51 Right-of-Way), including the seawall, for passive recreational use. Similar cross-fencing, although not within the boundaries of Spillway Park, have been erected behind residences on the northeast, northwest, and southeast sides of Federal Highway, along the District’s C-51 Canal bank. The cross-fencing prevents public use of the District’s C-51 Canal bank at these locations. The City of Lake Worth made improvements within the boundaries of Spillway Park; however, it made no improvements, and does not intend to make any improvements in the future, at the C-51 Right-of-Way where Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence is located or at the other private lots west of Mr. Quevedo's property. All of the improvements made at Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence at the C-51 Right-of-Way have been made by him even though the C-51 Right-of- Way is located within Spillway Park. The original public safety rationale for authorizing Mr. Quevedo to erect the cross-fence blocking public access was revisited by the District. Additional investigation by safety experts (Risk Management staff) revealed that no unreasonable danger existed by allowing public access to the C-51 seawall at the C-51 Right-of-Way. In the absence of the public safety basis for closure of the C-51 Right-of-Way, such closure was contrary to District policy. As a consequence, the District’s staff recommended to the District’s Governing Board that the MOD Permit, authorizing Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence, be revoked. After conducting two public meetings and receiving comments from Mr. Quevedo, members of the public, and the District’s staff as to the policy issue of pubic access to the C- 51 Right-of-Way, the District’s Governing Board determined that the C-51 Right-of-Way should be open to the public. Consequently, the Governing Board decided to revoke Mr. Quevedo's MOD Permit. Allegations of criminal activity within the general boundaries of Spillway Park and, specifically, in the C-51 Right- of-Way at the cross-fence area, were made by Mr. Quevedo as a basis to not revoke the MOD Permit and allow the cross-fence to remain. Such allegations have no bearing on the revocation of the MOD Permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order revoking SFWMD Permit No. MOD 981 issued to Jesus G. Quevedo. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Application No. 76-00450 is for a consumptive use permit from 10 wells located in Hillsborough County, to be used for public water supply for the City of Temple Terrace. The permit seeks to withdraw 2.028 million gallons a day average annual withdrawal and 4.564 million gallons per day maximum daily withdrawal. The sought for withdrawal may affect other wells by drawdown of an average of 1" in a surrounding well. Such a drawdown will not seriously and adversely affect the surrounding wells. The Southwest Florida Water Management District's staff recommends issuance of the permit with the following conditions: That the applicant shall install totalizing flowmeters of a type acceptable to the district on all withdrawal points covered by the permit. That the applicant shall record the pumpage on a weekly basis and shall submit a record of that pumpage to the district quarterly beginning January 15, 1977. All individual connections supplied by withdrawals permitted will be metered. Records of meter readings will be made available to the district upon request. That the permit shall expire on December 31, 1980.
The Issue Whether Honda of Bay County/Volkswagen of Panama City (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes,1 by discriminating against Maurice Hargrove (Petitioner) because of his disability and race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Maurice Hargrove, is an individual of African-American descent, who resides in Chipley, Florida. Respondent, Honda of Bay County and Volkswagen of Panama City are automobile dealerships located in Panama City, Florida. Petitioner alleges that he was not hired by Respondent because of his race and because of a disability. Petitioner’s alleged disability relates to his wearing a supportive brace on one of his legs at the time he applied for the job position with Respondent. Petitioner first made contact with Respondent’s business after seeing a “now hiring” sign in front of Respondent’s facility in Panama City. According to Petitioner, after seeing the sign, he walked into the building and filled out a job application. Petitioner could not recall when this occurred, but he believed it was sometime prior to Hurricane Michael, which struck the Panama City area in October 2018. Exact time frames and sequence of events as to what happened after Petitioner initially filled out the application are less than clear because Petitioner repeatedly changed his testimony during the final hearing. Nevertheless, the findings set forth below, derived from the combined testimonies of Petitioner and Respondent’s manager, Mr. Boatwright, detail the pertinent facts. Petitioner initially inquired about a job as a service technician working on vehicles at the dealership. When Petitioner met with Respondent’s manager, however, Mr. Boatwright told Petitioner that he did not need a service technician at the time. Further, Petitioner had no prior experience working on vehicles. Mr. Boatwright further informed Petitioner that, although he did not need a service technician, he needed a shuttle driver for the dealership. According to Petitioner, because of his conversation with Mr. Boatwright, he marked through “service tech” on the job application and wrote in “driver.” Mr. Boatwright’s testimony, and sometimes Petitioner’s testimony, was that when Mr. Boatwright first met Petitioner, Mr. Boatwright noticed a brace on Petitioner’s leg and asked Petitioner what was the situation with the brace. Petitioner told Mr. Boatwright that he had injured his leg in a workplace fall for which he received workers’ compensation, but that he was no longer on workers’ compensation. 2 Mr. Boatwright asked Petitioner to obtain a note from a doctor clearing Petitioner to work, to which Petitioner agreed. At some point, Petitioner returned to Respondent’s dealership with a doctor’s note clearing him to work with no restrictions. Mr. Boatwright interviewed Petitioner for the driver position and said he would contact 2 Petitioner’s statements regarding his leg brace were inconsistent. Petitioner testified that he wears a brace on one of his legs for support after surgery for a broken leg. Petitioner also testified that he broke his leg “just walking one day in the neighborhood, and I turned, and it just gave out on me.” According to Mr. Boatwright, Petitioner told him when he was applying for the job that Petitioner had fallen off a ladder when working as a painter and received workers’ compensation for a leg injury. Petitioner did not take issue with this version of the events during his questioning of Mr. Boatwright. Petitioner further testified that he did not remember the year he broke his leg, when he had surgery on his leg, or when his doctor advised him to wear the brace. Regardless of the origin of the leg condition, Petitioner testified that the leg did not restrict him in any way. Petitioner about the job later. Both Petitioner and Mr. Boatwright believed that the interview went well. After interviewing ten candidates for the driver position, Mr. Boatwright believed that, based upon Petitioner’s maturity level as compared to other applicants, Petitioner was the best candidate. After Petitioner was interviewed, Mr. Boatwright’s bosses decided not to fill the driver position, but, instead, decided to have the driving duties shared amongst existing employees. At the final hearing, Mr. Boatwright recalled communicating this to Petitioner, but that if he did not, he offered his apologies. Petitioner first testified that Mr. Boatwright contacted him and told him that he would not be hired, describing a conversation with Mr. Boatwright in which Petitioner expressed his sadness with Mr. Boatwright about not getting the job. Later in the hearing, Petitioner said he did not ever hear back from Mr. Boatwright, and that it was Respondent’s attorney who advised him that Respondent had decided not to fill the driver position. Regardless of when and how Petitioner was informed that the job position was not being filled, Respondent chose not to fill the shuttle driver position. As of the date of the final hearing, well over a year after Petitioner applied for the job, Respondent had still not filled the driver position, opting instead to share driving duties amongst the existing employees. Petitioner presented no evidence that his race played any part in the decision not to hire him. His sole offering on this point was the fact of his race. Petitioner’s disability discrimination claim was based on the facts that Mr. Boatwright noticed the brace on his leg and asked him to get a doctor’s note clearing him to work. Although Petitioner testified late in the hearing that Mr. Boatwright said something to him about not feeling like he would be able to do the job, Petitioner’s statement was made after several accounts of conversations with Mr. Boatwright in which Petitioner never made this allegation. When asked about this new allegation on cross-examination, Petitioner could provide no details, quickly trailed off topic, and asked “Say what?” There was no allegation in his Charge of Discrimination or his Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings that alleges that Mr. Boatwright suggested that Petitioner could not do the driver job. Considering these factors, as well as the inconsistency with Petitioner’s prior recollection that his interview with Mr. Boatwright went well, it is found that Petitioner’s late-asserted allegation that Mr. Boatwright said something to him about feeling that Petitioner could not do the job is untimely and is otherwise not credited. Further, Petitioner testified that his leg did not restrict him in any way, and failed to present evidence that he had a medical condition that substantially impaired any life activity.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S James H. Peterson, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Maurice Hargrove 1672 Sunny Hills Boulevard Chipley, Florida 32428 Russell F. Van Sickle, Esquire Beggs & Lane Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32591 (eServed) Tammy Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
