The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin or race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Manuel Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") is a middle- aged white man of (in his words) "Spanish and Italian" descent who at all times relevant lived in Vero Beach, Florida. Respondent Indian River County Habitat for Humanity, Inc. ("Habitat"), is a nonprofit charitable corporation that makes interest-free loans to qualified applicants for the purchase of affordable housing, which the buyers, in return, must help build or renovate. In or around December 2018, Rodriguez submitted a "pre- screening" application for a Habitat home. By letter dated January 3, 2019, Habitat informed Rodriguez that, according to the information he had provided, he fell "within the income guidelines." This meant that Rodriguez could progress to the next step (group orientation) of the multi-step application process. As it happened, however, he did not make it all the way. In a letter dated February 19, 2019, Habitat told Rodriguez that his application could not be approved because his monthly income was insufficient to cover the estimated debt service. Rodriguez presented no evidence at hearing suggesting that Habitat had denied his application for any reason other than the one given to him, namely that "you [Rodriguez] do not earn enough to support a mortgage." Rodriguez was not satisfied with this rationale and arranged to meet with a Habitat employee named David Willis to discuss the matter. Rodriguez believes that Mr. Willis was rude and disrespectful to him. Further, Rodriguez testified that, during their conversation, Mr. Willis used the phrase, "you people." Clearly, this is a potentially offensive remark, and Rodriguez was, in fact, offended by it. When pressed, however, Rodriguez admitted that he did not consider the comment to have been a slur against Spanish or Italian people; rather, he took it as a more focused insult——against, for example, disputatious people. In any event, there is no evidence that Mr. Willis intended to disparage an ethnic or racial group. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of Habitat's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Rodriguez, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus. Thus, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Habitat did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Habitat not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Rodriguez no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2019.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner in violation of the Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that Ms. Ndimbie is handicapped for purposes of the Fair Housing Act. She has more than one mental illness diagnosis, including Schizoid Personality Disorder, Schizotypal Personality Disorder, Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder, with two of her symptoms being that she “relates poorly with others” and that she “lacks insight into the feelings of others and when she feels accosted, she becomes angry and reacts, often inappropriately.” BCCD was a Florida not-for-profit organization. Its mission was to provide affordable housing for individuals with mental illnesses. BCCD acts as a landlord for its tenants, who have difficulty finding affordable housing due to having a mental illness. A prerequisite to being a tenant at BCCD was to have a mental illness, and, therefore, all of BCCD’s tenants had a mental illness. On an annual basis, BCCD contracted with and received funds from the Florida Department of Children and Families, hereinafter DCF. The funding from DCF supplements rent received from the tenants. On June 29, 2001, the Executive Director of BCCD, Nancy Merolla, entered into an annual contract with DCF for the period of July 1, 2001, through June 30, 2002, hereinafter Annual Contract. Exhibit A of the Annual Contract provided in pertinent part: The [BCCD] will provide housing stipends to ensure safe, accessible and affordable housing opportunities to low income individuals of Broward County, who are disabled with a mental illness and/or co- occurring disorders. . . . Each tenant, who resided in housing provided by BCCD, was required to receive case management. However, BCCD did not provide case management services for its tenants. The tenants received case management services from sources outside of BCCD. DCF assigned case managers and, therefore, assigned case managers for Ms. Ndimbie. Case management services were provided to Ms. Ndimbie by Henderson Mental Health Clinic Even though Ms. Ndimbie maintains that BCCD was required to provide case management services, the evidence demonstrates that BCCD was not required to provide such services. DCF was having difficulty finding housing for Ms. Ndimbie due to her mental challenges and requested the assistance of BCCD. On October 30, 2001, Ms. Ndimbie and Ms. Merolla, on behalf of BCCD, executed a month-to-month lease agreement, hereinafter Lease, for an apartment unit at 334 Northwest 43rd Street, Oakland Park, Florida. The Lease provided, among other things, that the total rent payable was $570 per month; that Ms. Ndimbie’s portion of the rent was $115 per month; and that the portion paid by the Public Housing Agency, under the Shelter Plus Care Program of HUD was $455. The Lease, which identified Ms. Ndimbie as the Tenant and BCCD as the Landlord, was effective November 28, 2001. An addendum to the Lease was a Tenant Agreement. Ms. Ndimbie was under the Shelter Plus Program, which provided for a single occupant to be entitled to a one-bedroom unit. However, BCCD only had a two-bedroom unit available. The Tenant Agreement provided, among other things, that Ms. Ndimbie was “being temporarily allowed to stay in [a two-bedroom unit] until a one bedroom unit [became] available with [BCCD].” On or about November 28, 2001, Ms. Ndimbie moved into the two-bedroom unit. At some point in time after Ms. Ndimbie moved into the two-bedroom unit, BCCD and the other tenants, who were Ms. Ndimbie’s neighbors, began to have problems with her behavior. The other tenants filed complaints with BCCD regarding her behavior. In March 2002, after input from Ms. Ndimbie, her case manager, and DCF, BCCD conducted a meeting with Ms. Ndimbie and the complaining tenants in an effort to reconcile the differences. An agreement was reached regarding resolution of the differences. However, the problems, regarding Ms. Ndimbie’s behavior, continued. The tenants were filing petitions for injunctions for protection against her, and she was filing the same petitions against the tenants. In particular, the continuous problems resulted in one neighbor, Luis Colon, obtaining an injunction for protection against Ms. Ndimbie on May 2, 2002.3 A circuit court ordered, among other things, that she was not to have any contact with Mr. Colon and not to go within 15 feet of Mr. Colon’s unit (apartment). Ms. Ndimbie contends that BCCD represented Mr. Colon at the injunction hearing as his case manager. However, the evidence demonstrates that BCCD was not his case manager at the injunction hearing, but only responded to the presiding judge’s inquiries. Subsequently, on May 23, 2002, the injunction for protection was amended. The circuit court ordered, among other things, that the Ms. Ndimbie was not to go within 500 feet of Mr. Colon’s unit. The amended injunction for protection was effective on midnight, May 31, 2002. Ms. Ndimbie’s unit was less than 500 feet from Mr. Colon’s unit, and, therefore, the effect of the amended injunction for protection was to prevent Ms. Ndimbie from residing in her unit after midnight, May 31, 2002. BCCD offered Ms. Ndimbie an alternative unit at another location. Ms. Ndimbie viewed the apartment building where the alternative unit would be located and found that it was being renovated. She did not believe that it would be timely completed. Further, Ms. Ndimbie inquired of law enforcement regarding criminal activity within the surrounding geographical area of the alternative unit. It was reasonable for her to gather such information. She was informed by law enforcement that there was drug activity in the surrounding area. Based upon the construction activity at the alternative unit, coupled with her belief that the alternative unit would not be timely completed, and upon the history of drug activity in the surrounding area, Ms. Ndimbie decided that she would not accept the alternative unit. Even though the alternative unit was being renovated, the evidence demonstrates that it was to be completed before the effective date of the amended injunction for protection, i.e., midnight, May 31, 2002. Consequently, Ms. Ndimbie’s belief that the alternative unit was not going to be timely completed was not reasonable. Additionally, even though the surrounding area of the alternative unit had a history of drug activity, no evidence was presented that the alternative unit had been determined to be not suitable for leasing under the Annual Contract between DCF and BCCD. As a result, the alternative unit remained an available unit under the Annual Contract. Ms. Ndimbie refused to accept and move into the alternative unit. No other housing was found for Ms. Ndimbie by midnight, May 31, 2002. Her belongings were placed in a storage unit. Another tenant with mental illness moved into the alternative unit. Subsequently, Ms. Ndimbie moved into a hotel. With DCF’s approval, BCCD provided her with $1,000 to assist her with the cost of the hotel room.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Broward County Community Development Corporation, Inc. did not commit a discriminating housing practice against Joyce Ndimbie in violation of the Fair Housing Act. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the discriminatory housing practice alleged in Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Because no evidence was offered at the final hearing held in the instant case, no findings of fact are made.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint and Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Benjamin M. Esco, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Second Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Andrea Crump 9601 Collins Avenue, Apt. 906 Bal Harbour, Florida 33154
The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by failing to reasonably accommodate her handicap, in violation of Florida?s Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of Unit No. 710 (“Unit”) in the Sixth Moorings Condominium, located in Miami, Florida. Petitioner lived there for approximately 11 years. She is not currently living in the Unit. Respondent is the condominium association responsible for the operation and management of the Sixth Moorings Condominium. In early 2010, Petitioner suffered a stroke and underwent heart surgery. It is undisputed that as a result of her illness, Petitioner is “handicapped” for purposes of the Fair Housing Act.4/ Petitioner spent several months in hospitals and nursing homes recovering from her stroke and surgeries. When she was released from these facilities, she did not resume living in the Unit. She testified that this was because she could not go up a curb or steps, and because the condominium?s elevator frequently was out of order.5/ She moved into a ground floor apartment a few blocks away from the Sixth Moorings Condominium. Petitioner is not able to perform many basic tasks, such as grocery shopping, driving, cleaning her apartment, taking out the garbage, or retrieving her mail. Consequently, she decided to invite her nephew, Charles Alsberg, to move into the Unit, where he would be only a few minutes away from the apartment in which she was residing, and thus could serve as her caretaker. Alsberg moved into the Unit in or around August 2010. Petitioner did not reside in the Unit with Alsberg. She testified that even though he is a family member, she would not live in the Unit with him because she is “an elderly woman from a different generation and [she] would not live with a young man unless he was [her] biological son.” In late 2010, Respondent?s President, John Koble, contacted Petitioner about Alsberg living in her Unit. Petitioner asked Koble to allow Alsberg to reside in the Unit so that he could serve as her caretaker, but Koble told her that because she was not residing there, Alsberg was considered an unauthorized guest in violation of the condominium?s restrictive covenants, and that he therefore must move out. Nonetheless, Alsberg continued to reside in the Unit for several more months, until he became ill and was hospitalized. Following his release in August 2011, Alsberg returned to live in the Unit. At this point, Respondent——this time, through counsel——sent Petitioner a letter stating that she was violating the restrictive covenant prohibiting unauthorized guests, and demanding that Alsberg vacate the unit. On September 13, 2011, Petitioner?s attorney sent a response letter requesting that, due to restrictions on Alsberg?s activity as a result of his illness, he be allowed to remain in the Unit for approximately 60 days. By correspondence dated September 15, 2011, Respondent agreed to allow Alsberg to remain in the Unit through November 12, 2011. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that Respondent granted her request to allow Alsberg to stay there during his recuperation. Notwithstanding this agreement, Alsberg did not vacate the Unit until sometime in early 2012, several months after the November 12, 2011 deadline. During this time, Respondent sent numerous pieces of correspondence that Petitioner characterized as “harassing” and “threatening,” regarding enforcement of the condominium?s covenants and rules. Alsberg finally vacated the Unit after Respondent sent a “final notice” letter. Currently, Alsberg is residing in an apartment approximately four blocks from Petitioner?s apartment and is serving as her caretaker. Koble testified that he was sympathetic to Petitioner?s circumstances, but it was imperative that Respondent consistently enforce the restrictive covenants for the benefit of all unit owners. Koble noted that other unit owners also wanted to allow unauthorized guests to live in their units, and that if Respondent relaxed enforcement of the covenant for Petitioner, it would be forced to do so for others. The undersigned credits this testimony. Koble also testified, credibly, that if Petitioner were residing in her unit, Respondent would have granted an accommodation of the covenant to allow Alsberg to live there for the purpose of serving as her caretaker.6/ The evidence establishes that Petitioner did not request any accommodation from Respondent that was necessary for her equal opportunity to use and enjoy the Unit; rather, the purpose of Petitioner?s request that Respondent not enforce the restrictive covenant against her was to enable her nephew to live in the Unit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding no unlawful discrimination by Respondent and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondents, Housing Authority of Flagler County and Chris Beyrer, Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Flagler County (collectively, the Authority); and Advantage Realty and Management, Inc. and Dymitri Belkin (collectively, Advantage), discriminated against Petitioner Jennifer Nichole King (Petitioner) based on her race by engaging in discriminatory terms and conditions, discriminatory statements, and steering, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who is a participant in the Authority’s Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8 Program). On April 8, 2013, Petitioner moved from the Pinellas County Housing Authority’s Section 8 Program to the Authority’s Section 8 Program. The Authority did not transfer Petitioner into its Section 8 Program, but rather administers Petitioner’s Section 8 voucher for the Pinellas County’s Housing Authority in accordance with the federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations. The essence of Petitioner’s claim against the Authority is that, because of her race, the Authority, and its executive director, Chris Beyer, steered her away from homes in predominately white areas and told her she needed to look for homes in the “projects.” According to Petitioner, when she inquired about certain homes in nicer, predominantly white areas, Chris Beyer told her that people like her did not qualify for that type of housing. She also suggested that, because of discrimination based on her race, the Authority allowed Advantage, and/or the owners of the housing units that she rented under the Section 8 Program, to continue to receive rent and raise rental rates, even though the Authority knew that repairs required for habitability were not being made. The evidence, as outlined in the Findings of Fact below, does not support Petitioner’s claims against the Authority. During her orientation process for Section 8 services in Flagler County, Petitioner completed the Authority’s voucher briefing process, which included both an oral briefing and an information packet. The subjects covered by the briefing information and documentation included family and owner obligations and responsibilities; the housing selection process; a list of the Authority’s resources for locating housing, which included areas outside of poverty or minority concentrated areas; the Authority’s process for determining the amount of housing assistance payment for the family and maximum rent; and a list of participating realtors that manage properties for various owners participating in the Section 8 Program. After Petitioner completed the voucher briefing process, on April 18, 2013, the Authority issued Petitioner a Housing Choice Voucher. In July 2013, Petitioner independently, and voluntarily, located a potential rental unit at 49 Raintree Place, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Raintree Place unit), and submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease for the unit. The Raintree Place unit was a four bedroom, detached single-family home constructed in 2006. The proposed rent for the unit was $1,000.00 per month, with a required security deposit of $1,500.00. The Authority inspected the unit, determined that it passed the housing quality standards, and that the rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved the unit and executed a Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract with the owner, or owner’s agent, to pay housing assistance to the owner on behalf of Petitioner. On May 29, 2014, the owner of the Raintree Place unit filed an eviction action against Petitioner for nonpayment of rent. At a subsequent mediation, the parties to the eviction action entered a stipulation agreement on July 2, 2014, which required Petitioner, among other things, to vacate the unit by July 31, 2014. The stipulation agreement also provided that if Petitioner timely performed all of the terms and conditions of the stipulation agreement, then the owner agreed to dismiss the eviction case. On July 31, 2014, Petitioner timely vacated the Raintree Place unit as agreed, thereby avoiding a judgment for possession against her. Thereafter, on August 6, 2014, the Authority issued Petitioner a new Housing Choice Voucher to locate another rental unit. In August 2014, Petitioner independently, and voluntarily, located another potential unit located at 92 Ulysses Trail, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Ulysses Trail unit). Petitioner submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease. This unit was a four bedroom, detached single- family home constructed in 2002. The proposed rent for the unit was $1,200.00 per month, and the security deposit was $1,500.00. The Ulysses Trail unit was owned by Serghei Potorac. Mr. Potorac hired Advantage to manage the unit. Advantage managed the Ulysses Trail unit until September 6, 2017. The Authority inspected the Ulysses Trail unit and determined that it passed the housing quality standards and that the proposed rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved the unit and executed a HAP contract with the owner, or the owner’s agent, Advantage, to pay housing assistance to the owner on behalf of Petitioner. Petitioner and her family moved into the Ulysses Trail unit on September 1, 2014. During Petitioner’s tenancy, the owner of the Ulysses Trail unit received various notices for city code violations because of Petitioner’s failure to maintain the property in accordance with local city codes or ordinances. The alleged violations included overgrown lawn, failing to screen outside trash containers, and accumulation of trash on the property. As a result, the city assessed fines against the owner totaling over $800.00. On July 8, 2015, Advantage sent Petitioner a seven-day notice to cure, demanding that she pay the outstanding fines. Petitioner ultimately either corrected, or agreed to correct, the violations. As a result, the city waived the outstanding fines. After conferring with the owner, Petitioner and Advantage advised the Authority that the owner would not proceed against Petitioner. On July 13, 2015, the Authority conducted an annual inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. The unit passed the inspection but there were some issues that the Authority felt needed to be addressed. Therefore, on July 13, 2015, Robert Beyrer, the Petitioner’s housing counselor at the Authority, sent Advantage an email regarding those issues. The next year, on July 12, 2016, the Authority conducted its next annual inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. Because of some noted deficiencies, the unit did not initially pass inspection. The Authority sent correspondence to Advantage detailing the deficiencies that needed correction by August 12, 2016. Thereafter, Advantage provided the Authority with an invoice from VK Services showing that the deficiencies had been timely corrected. During the time period from July 2015 through October 2016, the Authority received copies of at least four three-day notices that Advantage had delivered to Petitioner for failing to timely pay rent. With respect to a three-day notice delivered to Petitioner on October 11, 2016, the owner subsequently filed an eviction action on October 20, 2016. During a court-ordered mediation, the parties entered into a Stipulation Agreement dated November 10, 2016. When Petitioner failed to comply with the November 10, 2016, Stipulation Agreement, Advantage filed an affidavit on February 2, 2017, on behalf of the owner, seeking a judgment for possession. That same day, without advising the Authority of the ongoing eviction action, Petitioner asked the Authority to conduct a special inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. During the Authority’s inspection, the Authority found that the unit failed the inspection as a result of various deficiencies attributed to both the owner and Petitioner. The next day, on February 3, 2017, the court entered a final judgment for possession against Petitioner, and the court clerk issued a writ of possession. In response, Petitioner filed a motion to stay the execution of the writ, claiming, among other things, that Advantage failed to repair items as agreed in the November 10, 2016, Stipulation Agreement. In the meantime, the unit was re-inspected by the Authority on February 27, 2017, and the inspector found that some of the deficiencies had been addressed but there remained some that still needed to be corrected. On March 14, 2017, the Authority did a final inspection of the unit and determined that the remaining deficiencies had been addressed by both Advantage and Petitioner. Following two hearings on Petitioner’s motion in the eviction case, the court granted Petitioner’s motion to stay and vacated the final judgment. The court also reduced Petitioner’s portion of the rent due for the months of January and February 2017 based on its findings regarding the outstanding repairs. Further court orders reflect that Advantage ultimately addressed the disputed repairs and that Petitioner was ordered to pay full rent for the months of March and April 2017. The Authority was not a party and did not appear in the eviction proceedings. Thereafter, the owner gave Petitioner notice and advised the Authority that Petitioner’s lease would not be renewed, and that Petitioner would need to vacate the unit by August 31, 2017. The Authority subsequently sent correspondences to Petitioner explaining what she needed to do in order to be eligible to move to another location with continued housing assistance from the Authority. Petitioner timely vacated the Ulysses Trail unit and was issued a new voucher by the Authority on September 1, 2017, that could be used for a new rental unit. On October 13, 2017, Petitioner sent Robert Beyrer an email stating: Good Morning, Can you email the list of realtors that you have. I misplaced ours with all the moving about. Also I am going to need to request an[] extension of my voucher. Do we need to sign anything? Thank, Jen King In response, Robert Beyrer sent Petitioner another copy of the list of participating realtors in Flagler County previously provided to her by the Authority during her initial voucher briefing. The Authority, through Robert Beyrer, also granted Petitioner’s request for an extension of her voucher until December 1, 2017. On October 30, 2017, Petitioner sent Robert Beyrer another email advising that she was having difficulty finding another unit. By email, Robert Beyrer responded by further extending the expiration date of her voucher until December 31, 2017, and counseling her on various sources where she might find available units, stating: There are rentals out there. I am not sure who you are speaking with. I would continue to contact the landlords on the participating realtors list, check the local newspaper weekly, and check Zillow.com for reputable property management companies. We have been leasing people up with your voucher size in your price range. I will continue to keep my eyes open for you! Petitioner independently and voluntarily located a potential rental unit located at 10 Pier Lane, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Pier Lane unit) and, on December 27, 2017, submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease for the unit. The Authority inspected the Pier Lane unit and determined that it passed the housing quality standards and that the proposed rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved the unit and executed a HAP contract with the owner, or owner’s agent, to pay housing assistance to the owner on Petitioner’s behalf. On February 1, 2018, Petitioner moved into the Pier Lane unit. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was residing at the Pier Lane unit and the Authority was paying HAP payments to the owner on behalf of Petitioner under a HAP Contract with the owner. At the hearing, Petitioner maintained that the crux of her housing discrimination complaint was actually based on racially discriminatory statements allegedly made to her by Chris Beyrer. Petitioner alleged that Chris Beyrer said to her, among other things, “You cannot live by the canals; they do not rent to people like you.” Petitioner testified that she took Chris Beyrer’s statements to mean that she could not rent a unit by the canals because they do not rent to black people or people of color. Petitioner admitted, however, that Chris Beyrer never referenced or otherwise indicated that race was the underlying reason or motive when he made the alleged statements. Chris Beyrer denied making the alleged discriminatory statements attributed to her by Petitioner, or any other racially discriminatory statements. Ms. Beyer explained that any housing suggestions to Petitioner would have been on the type of unit Petitioner could afford to rent based on the amount of her reported household income and rental subsidy. Ms. Beyer’s testimony was credible and is accepted. Rather than showing racial discrimination against Petitioner in the Authority’s administration of the Section 8 Program, the evidence showed that, as a Section 8 participant in Flagler County, Petitioner was and is free to locate or choose an eligible rental unit anywhere in the Authority’s jurisdiction and submit the proposed rental unit to the Authority for approval. Further, at the hearing, Petitioner withdrew any claim that Advantage had unlawfully discriminated against her because of her race by failing to make requested repairs or by providing false repair records for the Ulysses Trail unit to the Authority. Specifically, Petitioner stated at the hearing that she did not believe Advantage had engaged in any discriminatory conduct towards her, and was rescinding her housing discrimination complaint against Advantage. Nevertheless, near the close of the hearing, one of Advantage’s witnesses, a repairman from VK Services, provided brief testimony confirming that he had personally made the repairs at the Ulysses Trail unit, as indicated in the various invoices provided by Advantage to the Authority. The testimony is credited. Finally, despite Petitioner’s claims that the Authority also discriminated against her by allowing Advantage to raise rents and continuing to pay HAP to the owner during the years of her tenancy at the Ulysses Trail unit while unaddressed deficiencies existed, Petitioner admitted that she voluntarily chose to accept the owner’s proposed rental increases and repeatedly renewed her lease with the owner. The evidence further showed that Petitioner was always free under the Section 8 Program to reject lease rental increases and relocate to a new unit of her choice with continued housing assistance from the Authority. In sum, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s claim that, because of racial discrimination, the Authority steered her to only certain rental units, that the Authority allowed rent increases despite lack of repairs, that there were discriminatory statements made against her, or that Advantage was complicit in the alleged discrimination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition and Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent Perry Carrell ("Respondent") failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Petitioner Jean Rath’s ("Petitioner") disability and discriminated against Petitioner because of her disability in violation of Florida’s Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief that is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact In 2005, Respondent purchased condominium unit 604 in Tiara Towers, located at 3120 North Highway A1A, Fort Pierce, Florida 34949. Respondent purchased the condominium unit as his primary residence. In 2013, Respondent decided to rent the unit to Petitioner. In May 2013, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a written residential lease agreement for Petitioner to lease the premises from Respondent from July 1, 2013, to June 30, 2015. Pursuant to the lease, Petitioner was obligated to pay monthly rent to Respondent in the amount of $1,850.00. Petitioner’s tenancy was subject to the rules and regulations of the condominium association. The association’s rules do not allow for tenants to have pets. In addition, the association requires all leases be in writing. The written lease between Petitioner and Respondent expired on June 30, 2015. A properly executed second written lease was never executed by Petitioner and submitted to the association. Nevertheless, Petitioner continued residing at the premises on a month-to-month basis. Petitioner is disabled and requires a service animal because of her disability. Over the course of the tenancy, the association became concerned about Petitioner’s violation of its rules, including the lack of documentation of Petitioner’s dog as a service animal, and the lack of a new written lease after the initial lease expired on June 30, 2015. In an effort to assist Petitioner in keeping the dog, Respondent gathered information to demonstrate the qualifications of Petitioner’s dog as a service animal and provided the documentation to the association on Petitioner’s behalf. Based on the lack of a new written lease and the absence of sufficient documentation as to the service animal, the association fined Respondent $2,000.00. Respondent provided Petitioner with a termination of lease and demand to vacate notice on May 28, 2016. The notice of termination was based on the fines by the association against Respondent for not having a timely signed lease in place, and the association’s belief that sufficient documentation had not been presented to support the dog as a service animal. Petitioner vacated the unit on or about July 1, 2017. Respondent did not re-lease the unit and sold the unit on March 22, 2017. During the appeal process, the fine of $1,000.00 related to the service animal was rescinded by the association. Respondent paid the $1,000.00 fine related to the lack of a written lease, and has not requested reimbursement from Petitioner. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged Respondent did not discriminate against her on the basis of her disability, and that Respondent advocated to the association on her behalf. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that Respondent did not fail to reasonably accommodate Petitioner’s disability or discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of her disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Jean Rath 422 Southeast Naranja Avenue Port St. Lucie, Florida 34983 Glenn J. Webber, Esquire Glenn J. Webber, P.A. 101 Southeast Ocean Boulevard, Suite 203 Stuart, Florida 34994 (eServed) Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioners, Debra Jones and John Frazier, or either of them, on the basis of his or her handicap, violating Subsections 760.23 (1), (2), or (4), Florida Statutes (2008).1 If discriminatory conduct has been proven, whether quantifiable damages, or other allowable remedies, have been proven under Subsection 760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Debra Jones, is a Caucasian female, who claims to be a disabled person under the Florida FHA. Petitioner bases her claim on the fact that she asserts that she has a tumor that causes pinched nerves in her back and lateral scoliosis, which prevents her from working and limits her activities of daily living. Petitioner Jones testified that she has been approved for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Petitioner offered no medical proof of her alleged disability, or that she was receiving Social Security benefits. At the hearing, it was not apparent that Petitioner Jones was impaired. Petitioner Jones is also the caregiver for Petitioner John Frazier. Petitioner John Frazier is speech impaired and appears to suffer from mild mental retardation. However, Petitioners failed to offer any medical evidence of Frazier’s disability, or that he was receiving Social Security benefits based on his disability, or that his physical impairments substantially limit one or more of his major life activities. Sometime during the early summer of 2007, Petitioners, who were homeless at the time, drove by a home listed as “for rent” at 1018 Canal Drive, Lakeland, Florida. Petitioner Jones approached the house and saw that Respondent Teresa Conboy was working on the repair of the house. Jones asked to see inside the house. Conboy refused, saying that the house was not ready to be shown. Jones returned to her truck and retrieved her and Petitioner Frazier’s income papers and showed them to Conboy. After a quick review, Conboy stated that Petitioners’ combined income was insufficient to rent that house because the monthly rental amount exceeded 30 percent of their combined income. Petitioners departed and took no further action to rent the house on Canal Drive. They did not complete an application or file a complaint with FCHR. Sometime during the late summer (July or August 2007), Petitioners were again looking for rental housing, drove by a house listed as “for rent” at 2440 Idlewild Street, Lakeland, Florida. Petitioner Jones approached a worker doing repairs on the house, who identified himself as Jeremy Fishbeck and asked for the name and telephone number of the contact person for the house. When Jones learned that the house was owned by Respondents, she left the area, made no attempt to contact Respondents and did not attempt to complete a rental application. Petitioners allege that the discriminatory conduct by Respondents dates back to May of 2006 when Petitioners inquired about the availability of renting a house located at 2441 Broadway Street, Lakeland, Florida, owned by Respondents. They were told and observed, that the house was under repair, but that they could submit an application to rent it. They were told that, when the work was completed, they would be contacted. Petitioners inquired regularly with Respondents about the availability of the house, and were told that it was not ready. During this period, Petitioners came to the mistaken belief that Respondents were holding the house for them. They expected that Respondents would rent the house to them when the repairs were complete. Respondents did not share that understanding. At no time did Respondents promise to rent the house to Petitioners. When the house was ready for occupancy in the spring of 2007, Respondents reviewed Petitioners rental application, along with other applications that had been submitted, and decided to rent the house to a different couple. The testimony is credible that, at the time Respondents received the applications for the rental of the house on Broadway Street, they determined that Petitioners total income was not more than $1,100 per month and that the fair rental value for the house was $800 per month. Therefore, the monthly rental amount far exceeded 30 percent of Petitioners’ combined income and that Petitioners did not qualify to rent the house. Further, Respondents were not aware that Petitioner Jones was disabled. They observed that Petitioner Frazier may have had a disability. In either case, the testimony was credible that Petitioners were not denied the opportunity to rent the house on Broadway street based on either of Petitioners’ alleged disabilities. Petitioners offered no evidence to demonstrate that Respondents’ reason for denying their rental application was a pretext for housing discrimination based on their alleged disability. Based on the testimony presented at the hearing, the preponderance of evidence demonstrates that no discriminatory housing practice has occurred. Further, since Petitioners only completed and submitted rental applications to Respondents in April 2006, and May 2007, the alleged discriminatory actions occurred more than 365 days prior to the filing of the Complaint on July 10, 2008. Therefore, the allegations in the Complaint are not timely, and cannot be considered. § 760.34(2), Fla. Stat. Petitioners presented no evidence of quantifiable damages. Their testimony was that they felt humiliation, discomfort and inconvenience because their application was turned down.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying the relief sought and dismissing the petition filed in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 2009.
