Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
CAROLYN SCHMERMUND vs. HYGROPONICS, INC., 81-002913 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002913 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact On October 23, 1978, Petitioner was hired as secretary to W. J. Crist, president of Hygroponics, Inc. On February 26, 1979, W. J. Crist evaluated Petitioner's overall job performance as "good." With respect to cooperation, the Petitioner was rated in the category of "cooperates very well," the highest rating possible for that category of performance. With respect to job knowledge, she was rated as showing "unusual capacity," also the highest rating possible for that category of performance. On March 5, 1979, Petitioner received an increase in salary from $4.18 per hour to $4.51 per hour, based in part upon her increased responsibilities and in part upon demonstrated merit. Following is Hygroponics, Inc.'s office staff organization chart dated May 2, 1979: HYGROPONICS, INC. OFFICE STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART | President | /| W. J. Crist |\ / | | \ / | \ \ \ | Purch. Agent | | Controller | \ | Technical Service | | Dick Destival | | James Jobe |" \ | Dick Jeffery | | | | | "" \ | | " / | | " "\ | " / | | " \" | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | "\ "| | Marsha | | Liz | | Nell | | Arlene | | Carolyn | | Betsy | | | | | | | | | | | | | /|\ Direct lines of authority. Answerable to this person at all times " Indirect lines of authority. Answerable for secondary duties and when direct lines are not available. The above organizational chart does not include the company's chief executive officer. On occasion, members of the company's secretarial staff went directly to the chief executive officer with employment-related problems. In September, 1979, after James Jobe, the controller referenced in the above chart, left the company's employ, W. J. Crist, the company president, advised Petitioner that she was to become office manager. After that time, Petitioner assumed many of the duties of office manager. Petitioner inquired when she would receive a raise commensurate with her increased responsibilities, and was advised that this would be accomplished after the company hired a new controller. Emmett Singleton was hired to fill the position of controller on October 29, 1979. On December 11, 1979, Petitioner formally became acting office manager. On that date Petitioner was evaluated by Emmett Singleton, who rated Petitioner highest in the areas of decision-making and ability to organize, and lowest in the areas of acceptability and responsibility. Specifically, Singleton made the following comments concerning Petitioner's job performance: "Has difficulty in establishing satisfactory relationships with people"; "Average leader, conventional in manner and enthusiasm, conveys ideas but does not motivate group"; "Has problem with admitting an error or fault"; "Reluctant to accept job responsibilities. Supervision and follow-up often required"; "Considers job an eight to five task with scheduled breaks reguardless [sic] of status of workload"; "Employee is preoccupied with the position rather than a concern for getting the job done"; and, "Employee resents being monitored or controlled. Sometimes uncooperative and slow to respond to direction." In addition, members of the company management group, other than Emmett Singleton, commented on this evaluation that Petitioner "alienates co-workers," "Has experienced confusion in the scheduling of grower school," and expressed concern with Petitioner's "attitude." The controller noted on the evaluation form that he planned ". . .to work closely with [Petitioner] for the next 60 days and make an assessment during this time as to whether on [sic] not suited for office manager." Finally, Mr. Singleton noted on Petitioner's performance review form that Petitioner ". . .is classified as Acting Office Manager and is on probation with reguard[sic] to classification. No change in rate of pay is being made at this time. Employee will be reevaluated in 60 days on or about 2/10/80." In order to improve her skills in the area of acceptability and responsibility, Petitioner requested that Mr. Singleton issue a memorandum clarifying the lines of her authority especially since her subordinates had not been advised that she had been given supervisory responsibility over them. Her request was denied at that time because Singleton wanted to first determine whether she could handle the position. On January 12, 1980, Singleton reevaluated Petitioner's job performance. According to Singleton's rating, Petitioner had improved in the areas of acceptability and responsibility, which had been her weak points in the evaluation performed one month earlier. On this same day, Petitioner was reclassified from acting office manager to office manager, and received an increase in pay to $821.60 per month, retroactive to November 1, 1979. Petitioner also assumed the duties of payroll clerk and accounts payable in addition to the duties of office manager. Shortly after receiving this promotion, Petitioner advised employees of Hygroponics, Inc., that she was pregnant. W. J. Crist and Emmett Singleton acknowledged her pregnancy, and the latter inquired concerning her intentions regarding her employment. Petitioner responded that she intended to continue working for the company, and to return to work after the birth of her child. Hygroponics, Inc., had no maternity leave policy. No other female employee had ever given notice of pregnancy and stated her intention to return to work following childbirth. However, at least two other employees had become pregnant during the term of their employment with Hygroponics, Inc. One of these employees, in fact, suffered two miscarriages during her term of employment, and continued working with the company. Another female worker became pregnant, gave birth to a child, and returned to work without ever advising the company or the company ever being aware that she had been pregnant until after she had returned to work. On January 30, 1980, Petitioner submitted a memorandum to Eugene Crist, the company's chief executive officer. The memorandum suggested changes regarding the responsibilities of certain of the office personnel under her supervision. Petitioner had previously discussed these suggested changes with Emmett Singleton, her immediate supervisor, who advised her that he thought her suggestions were a good idea. At the time the memorandum was submitted to the company's chief executive officer, W. J. Crist, the president of the company, was out of the state. On January 30, 1980, Eugene Crist showed the memorandum to Emmett Singleton. The memorandum was then returned to Petitioner by the company's chief executive officer with a notation that the matters contained in the memorandum should be handled through Singleton. Two days later, on February 1, 1980, Singleton asked Petitioner for the memorandum. When Petitioner could not locate the memorandum, and offered to discuss the details of it with Singleton, Singleton advised her that there was no basis for conversation if she could not produce the memorandum. As noted above, Singleton had seen and read the memorandum two days previously when it was shown to him by Eugene Crist. Upon W. J. Crist's return to Florida, Singleton advised him that Petitioner had submitted a memorandum directly to the company's chief executive officer, and that when Singleton asked Petitioner to see the memorandum, she advised him that she had misplaced it. On February 8, 1980, W. J. Crist circulated a memorandum to the Hygroponics, Inc., executive staff concerning Petitioner's ". . .insubordination, poor attitude [and] defiance of executive orders. This memorandum provided, in part, as follows: It is my understanding that Carolyn recently drafted a memorandum on her proposed changes in office duties for many people, changes in accounting procedures, etc. I have been informed that she: "by-passed you, her immediate superior and by-passed me, her next-in-line superior." and delivered this memo directly to Gene, our CEO. Then when Gene informed her to "discuss the memo directly with you," she advised you "she did not even have the memo anymore." I find these actions, on Carolyn's part very distressing and feel we must take disciplinary actions with her. So - what are the problems. Her "uncooperative" and "attitude" problems outlined in your personnel evaluation of her on December 11, 1979 (which she acknowledged) when you put her "on probation," the first time, still persist. She demonstrated anything but teamwork in by-passing her two immediate superiors and going directly to our CEO. This is very bad for an employee to do but even worse for her since she is suppose [sic] to be a leader of our people in her slot as Office Manager. Her disregarding Gene's directive to discuss the memo with you was corrected only by your insistance[sic] that the two of you discuss it. Her statement to you that "she no longer had the memo" is also distressing. Has she destroyed it? This additional negative certainly weakens her argument that "she went directly to Gene because he was going out.[sic] (Original emphasis.) The above-referenced memorandum solicited the views of the company's executive staff as to whether to terminate Petitioner, discipline her in some fashion, or give her an opportunity to resign. The decision was unanimous among all five members of the executive staff to terminate Petitioner. No member of the executive staff questioned Petitioner before concurring in the decision to discharge her. Such a memorandum of concurrence was not the company's standard practice in discharging employees, which generally was for the discharge decision to be made by the employee's supervisor alone. Hygroponics, Inc., was, at all times material to this proceeding, a rather small organization, numbering at the most approximately fifty employees. As a result, many of the internal functions of the company were informal in nature. For example, there were no strict lines of authority for secretarial staff to air grievances or make suggestions. There was, however, a generalized procedure for employees to approach their immediate supervisor with any employment-related problems. There is no direct substantive evidence in the record in this cause from which it can be concluded that Petitioner was terminated from her employment because she was either female or pregnant. Further, whatever circumstantial evidence there is in this record to support such a contention is overcome by Respondent's demonstration that Petitioner was at best an employee of average ability who management viewed at times to be a problem employee. It appears, therefore, that the reason for Petitioner's discharge was an accumulation of events, culminating in her memorandum of January 30, 1980, being submitted to the company chief executive officer, and not for any reason relating to her sex.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the Petition for Relief, and denying the relief requested therein, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. White, Jr., Esquire 229 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 John F. Daniel, Esquire Post Office Box 2522 Panama City, Florida 32401 Dana Baird, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard E. Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (1) 120.57
# 1
EMERALD COAST UTILITIES AUTHORITY vs OTIS PAUL WHATLEY, 09-004671 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Aug. 26, 2009 Number: 09-004671 Latest Update: Dec. 14, 2009

The Issue The issue is whether the termination of Respondent, Otis Paul Whatley, was in accordance with the personnel procedures established by the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority.

Findings Of Fact ECUA was created in 1981 pursuant to Chapter 81-376, Laws of Florida. By law, it provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida. Mr. Whatley was employed by ECUA. On October 31, 2001, Mr. Whatley signed an acknowledgement that he received the ECUA Employee Handbook. The ECUA Employee Handbook is a summary of benefits, policies, procedures, and rules, which are more fully set forth in ECUA's Human Resources Policy Manual. While on the ECUA Rotation Schedule Standby List on Sunday, July 26, 2009, Mr. Whatley, and his co-worker Jonathan Wheat, were required to be available to make repairs when summoned by ECUA customers. Mr. Whatley submitted a Daily Overtime Report dated July 26, 2009, which indicated that he worked on that day from 9:00 a.m. until 10:30 a.m. at 926 Lake Terrace, in Pensacola, Florida. The overtime report further stated that he worked from 10:30 a.m. until 11:00 a.m. at 1283 La Paz Street, in Pensacola. He further asserted that he worked at 402 West Lloyd Street, from 6:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. According to the Global Positioning System (GPS) installed on the ECUA truck assigned to Mr. Whatley, he did not depart his residence at the time he claimed to be working at 926 Lake Terrace or at 1283 La Paz Street. Moreover, the evidence provided by the GPS indicated that he was at the 402 West Lloyd Street for four hours rather than the five claimed as overtime. Mr. Whatley's co-worker, Jonathon Wheat, did work at 926 Lake Terrace and at 1283 La Paz Street, but he worked alone. Mr. Wheat joined in Mr. Whatley's prevarication with regard to the quantity of time expended at 402 West Lloyd Street. Mr. Wheat confessed to his prevarication when confronted. Mr. Whatley lied about his whereabouts when initially confronted, but eventually admitted that his timesheet contained false entries. It is found as a fact that Mr. Whatley, on his time sheet for July 26, 2009, claimed one hour and a half overtime for work at 926 Lake Terrace, one-half-hour overtime for work or at 1283 La Paz Street, and an hour more overtime than actually worked at 402 West Lloyd Street. None of the forgoing periods were worked by Mr. Whatley. Accordingly, these entries on his time sheet were false.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utility Authority, based on the findings of fact found herein, impose such penalty on Otis Paul Whatley, as he or she determines to be appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Otis Whatley 8655 Ramblewood Place Pensacola, Florida 32514 John E. Griffin, Esquire Carson & Adkins 2930 Wellington Circle, North, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32309 Stephen E. Sorrell, Executive Director Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Post Office Box 15311 Pensacola, Florida 32514-0311

# 3
RIVER TRAILS, LTD. vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 85-000329RX (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000329RX Latest Update: Apr. 08, 1985

Findings Of Fact Petitioner River Trails is the developer of a condominium community in Palm Beach County known as River Walk. River Walk is contiguous to and immediately adjacent to 2600 feet of South Florida Water Management District (hereinafter "SFWMD") property bordering Canal C-18 in Palm Beach County. The right- of-way adjacent to C-18 as well as the bottom of C-18 is owned by SFWMD. C-18 is not in an area designated as Outstanding Florida Waters. As required by Section 403.813(2), Florida Statutes, River Trails sought and obtained on January 12, 1984, a permit from the SFWMD to construct a dock and boat ramp in Canal C-18. The permit conveyed no property rights to River Trails. On October 12, 1984, River Trails asked DER to confirm that River Trails' proposed boat ramp qualified for an exemption pursuant to Section 403.813(2)(c), Florida Statutes. By letter dated December 20, 1984, DER informed River Trails that the proposed boat ramp did qualify for the exemption and, therefore did not require any permit from DER. On October 18, 1984, River Trails asked DER to confirm that River Trails' proposed dock of 1,000 square feet or less qualified for an exemption from DER's permitting authority pursuant to Section 403.813(2)(b), Florida Statutes. However, on November 30, 1984, DER informed River Trails that its proposed dock did not qualify for the exemption because there was already an existing dock on SFWMD property on Canal C-18. As authority for its position, DER cited the following sentence in DER Rule 17-4.04(9)(c), Florida Administrative Code: "A private dock is a single pier at a parcel of property." On the 2600 feet of SFWMD-owned right-of-way contiguous to River Trails, there are presently no docks. On SFWMD-owned right-of-way east of River Trails, between River Trails and the southwest fork of the Loxahatchee River, there are two docks approximately 300 feet apart located in front of single-family residences. DER contends all contiguous property owned by an individual, group or entity, including a water management district, constitutes a "parcel of property" and accordingly does not recognize River Trails' claim to an exemption because of the existence of these docks. Prior to River Trails' request that DER confirm River Trails' right to an exemption, DER had not interpreted water management district-owned right-of-ways to be a "parcel of property" within the meaning of Rule 17- 4.04(9)(c). In the past, the SFWMD has permitted numerous docks of less than 1,000 square feet on SFWMD-owned right- of-ways. Copies of these permits were routinely forwarded to DER. While these docks were and are on right-of-ways which DER now defines as a "parcel" within the meaning of Rule 17-4.04(9)(c), DER has not required permits for these docks. The DER employees who interpret the rule in question as part of their duties and whose depositions were introduced at hearing do not agree on the configuration which constitutes a single pier, on the degree of ownership or control required over a parcel of property by an applicant for an exemption, or on the definition of a parcel of property. DER has failed to adequately explain its deviation from past agency practice in interpreting SFWMD right-of- way as a parcel of property. But for DER's new interpretation of the term "parcel of property" found in Rule 17-4.04(9)(c), Florida Administrative Code, River Trails' proposed dock meets the statutory and rule requirements for an exemption from obtaining a permit from DER.

Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.54120.56120.68403.813
# 4
EMERALD COAST UTILITIES AUTHORITY vs MICHAEL J. REITER, 18-003702 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jul. 16, 2018 Number: 18-003702 Latest Update: Oct. 23, 2018

The Issue Whether Respondent violated provisions of Petitioner’s Human Resources Manual and Employee Handbook (“the Manual”) on April 20 and May 30, 2018, as charged in the agency action letter dated June 25, 2018.

Findings Of Fact Chapter 2001-324, Laws of Florida, declared the Escambia County Utilities Authority an independent special district with transferred assets and enumerated powers. Chapter 2004-398, Laws of Florida, changed the Escambia County Utilities Authority’s name to ECUA. By law, ECUA provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida, and has the power to appoint, remove and suspend its employees, and fix their compensation within the guidelines of Escambia County Civil Services Rules. ECUA’s mission statement specifies that the Board and employees of ECUA “are committed to providing the highest quality service” and that “ECUA will always provide cost-effective services.” ECUA has adopted standards set forth in the Manual in order to govern employee conduct. During all times relevant to the instant case, Mr. Reiter was a utilities service worker assigned to ECUA’s patch services division (“the patch crew”); and he acknowledged on January 4, 2017, that a copy of the Manual was available to him. The patch crew consists of eight people who normally work from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., with a 30-minute lunch break and two 15-minute breaks. A significant part of the patch crew’s work involves filling holes left after other ECUA employees have performed utility work. Mr. Reiter drives a truck that delivers sod, asphalt, and/or dirt to work areas. He begins and ends each workday at an ECUA facility on Sturdevant Street in Pensacola, Florida. ECUA’s management received information from an anonymous source alleging that the patch crew was loafing and abusing ECUA’s overtime policy. As a result, ECUA retained a private investigator, Terry Willette, to surveil the patch crew and videotape their daily activities. From April of 2018 to some point in June of 2018, Mr. Willette routinely surveilled the patch crew for 4 to 12 hours a day. Findings Regarding the Allegations from April 20, 2018 On April 20, 2018, Mr. Willette observed Mr. Reiter and a coworker leaving an ECUA facility in an ECUA truck at 4:00 p.m. and arriving at Woerner Turf on Creighton Road in Pensacola at 4:16 p.m. The preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that Mr. Reiter deliberately extended his workday by taking a circuitous route from the ECUA facility to Woerner Turf. After picking up sod, Mr. Reiter and his coworker left Woerner Turf at 4:38 p.m. and arrived at Intendencia Street in downtown Pensacola at 5:16 p.m. At this point, Mr. Willette received a call to follow another ECUA employee and discontinued his surveillance of Mr. Reiter. There was conflicting testimony regarding the shortest possible route that Mr. Reiter could have taken upon leaving Woerner Turf. Given that Mr. Reiter was driving to downtown Pensacola just before “rush hour” on a Friday afternoon, 38 minutes is not an unreasonable amount of time to drive from Creighton Road to Intendencia Street in downtown Pensacola. The preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that Mr. Reiter deliberately extended his workday by taking a circuitous route from Woerner Turf to the worksite on Intendencia Street. A “daily overtime report” for April 20, 2018, indicates Mr. Reiter worked from 3:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. and claimed three hours of overtime. To whatever extent that ECUA takes issue with the total amount of overtime claimed by Mr. Reiter on April 20, 2018, there is no evidence as to what work Mr. Reiter performed after Mr. Willette discontinued his surveillance of Mr. Reiter shortly after 5:16 p.m. that day, and thus there is no support for a finding that Mr. Reiter dragged out his workday or artificially increased his overtime hours on that date. Findings Regarding the Allegations from May 30, 2018 On May 30, 2018, Mr. Willette photographed Mr. Reiter taking PVC pipe belonging to ECUA and placing it in his personal vehicle. Mr. Reiter acknowledged during his direct testimony that he took the PVC pipe without authorization from a supervisor. He testified that the PVC pipe was “spent material” and that such material is always discarded. Mr. Reiter testified that he ultimately returned the PVC pipe in question. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Reiter took the PVC pipe without authorization.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that Michael J. Reiter violated: Section B-13 A (4), conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee; Section B-13 A (27), theft or stealing; and Section B-13 A (33), violation of ECUA rules or guidelines or state or federal law. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2018.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.65
# 5
LATONIA M. ENZOR vs FLORIDA DEVELOPERS, INC., 08-001228 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 12, 2008 Number: 08-001228 Latest Update: Sep. 18, 2008

The Issue Is Respondent, Florida Developers, Inc. an employer as defined in Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2007), for purposes of conferring jurisdiction on the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) to consider the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner Letonia M. Enzor against Respondent?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Latonia Enzor, was employed by Tallahassee Contractors, LLC, as a truck driver sometime in 2006. The exact dates of her employment are not in evidence, but Petitioner's Employment Complaint of Discrimination alleges that the most recent discrimination took place on June 1, 2007. Tallahassee Contractors is a trucking company. Respondent, Florida Developers, Inc. (Florida Developers), is a general contractor and underground utility contractor. Florida Developers has been in the contracting business for 27 years. Frank Williams is President of Florida Developers. Mr. Williams is also a managing partner of Tallahassee Contractors, which has been in business for about two years. Ms. Enzor acknowledges that she did not fill out an employment application with Florida Developers, never received a paycheck from Florida Developers, and was never told that she was an employee of Florida Developers. Ms. Enzor remembers signing some papers that had Florida Developers’ name on it when she was first employed by Tallahassee Contractors. However, the papers themselves nor the nature of any such papers are in evidence. Ms. Enzor believes that Tallahassee Contractors, Florida Developers, and a third company, Sandco, Inc., are interrelated businesses. According to Mr. Williams, the three companies which Ms. Enzor believes are related, are separate companies. This testimony is accepted as credible and found as fact. Any action taken by Mr. Williams regarding Ms. Enzor’s employment with Tallahassee Contractors was in his capacity as a managing partner for Tallahassee Contractors, not as president of Florida Developers. No corporate documents are in evidence. No competent evidence was presented that Respondent and Tallahassee Contractors are highly integrated with respect to ownership and operations. Petitioner also filed Employment Complaints of Discrimination against Tallahassee Contractors and Sandco, Inc., see Latonia Enzor v. Tallahassee Contractors, Inc., DOAH Case No. 08-1227 (Recommended Order entered May 20, 2008), and Latonia Enzor v. Sandco, Inc., DOAH Case No. 08-1229 (Recommended Order of Dismissal entered June 4, 2008).

Recommendation Upon the consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Commission finding that it is without jurisdiction to proceed in this case based upon Petitioner's failure to show that Respondent is "an employer" as defined in Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Latonia Enzor 3535 Roberts Avenue, Number 274 Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Frank Williams, President Florida Developers, Inc. 642 West Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.02
# 6
EMERALD COAST UTILITIES AUTHORITY vs TADAREL S. PAGE, 18-003309 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jun. 27, 2018 Number: 18-003309 Latest Update: Oct. 23, 2018

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the agency action letter dated June 21, 2018.

Findings Of Fact Chapter 2001-324, Laws of Florida, declared the Escambia County Utilities Authority an independent special district with transferred assets and enumerated powers. Chapter 2004-398, Laws of Florida, changed the Escambia County Utilities Authority’s name to ECUA. By law, ECUA provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida, and has the power to appoint, remove and suspend its employees, and fix their compensation within the guidelines of Escambia County Civil Services Rules. ECUA’s mission statement specifies that the Board and employees of ECUA “are committed to providing the highest quality service” and that “ECUA will always provide cost-effective services.” ECUA has adopted standards set forth in the Manual in order to govern employee conduct. During the relevant time period, ECUA employed Mr. Page as the utility service worker in the patch services division (“the patch crew”). Mr. Page acknowledged on October 10, 2016, that a copy of the Manual was made available to him. The patch crew normally works from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., with a 30-minute lunch break. The patch crew also receives two 15-minute breaks each day. Mr. Page would normally begin each workday by reporting to an ECUA building on Sturdevant Street where the patch crew’s trucks are maintained. The patch crew would use one or more of those vehicles to complete the day’s assignments and return them to the Sturdevant Street location at the end of each day. ECUA’s management received information in May of 2018, that members of the patch crew were leaving work early without authorization. This information led ECUA’s management to initiate an investigation. Part of that investigation involved the installation of tamper-proof global positioning devices (“GPS”) in ECUA vehicles. Those devices transmit a vehicle’s precise location to ECUA at two-minute intervals. The GPS devices also inform ECUA whether a vehicle is moving, idle, or stopped. ECUA’s management also hired a private investigator, Terry Willette, to observe and record the activities of the patch crew. Findings Regarding the Allegations from May 10, 2018 On May 10, 2018, Mr. Page received at least four assignments to fill holes at locations in Pensacola. Mr. Page recorded in ECUA’s work tracking system that he spent two hours completing two of those jobs and one hour completing the other two. Mr. Willette followed Mr. Page that day, and his observations contradict those time entries. Mr. Willette observed Mr. Page driving all over Pensacola, stopping on several occasions, and performing significant work at only one location. ECUA has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Page wasted an excessive amount of time on May 10, 2018. Findings Regarding the Allegations from May 11, 2018 The May 11, 2018, GPS report for truck #1624 indicates that it stopped at or near Mr. Page’s residence from approximately 9:21 a.m. to 9:28 a.m. It is possible that Mr. Page used one of his 15-minute breaks to stop at his residence, and there is no evidence that ECUA expressly prohibits employees from stopping at their homes. The preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that Mr. Page violated any Manual provisions on May 11, 2018. Findings Regarding the Allegations from May 24, 2018 The patch crew employees use an electronic timekeeping system to record the amount of hours they work each day. The Manual specifies that every ECUA employee is responsible for verifying the accuracy of those time entries. Mr. Page’s entry for May 24, 2018, indicates he worked eight hours that day. Mr. Willette observed Mr. Page leaving work at 12:59 p.m. on May 24, 2018. Also, one of the ECUA trucks often utilized by Mr. Page was in use from 7:01 a.m. until 12:57 p.m. on May 24, 2018, and was not used again that day. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Page failed to verify the accuracy of his time entry for May 24, 2018.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that Tadarel S. Page violated Section B-3, attendance records; Section B-13 A (4), conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee; Section B-13 A (13), falsification of records; Section B-13 A (18), loafing; Section B-13 A (21), neglect of duty; Section B-13 A (26), substandard quality and/or quantity of work; and Section B-13 A (33), violation of ECUA rules or guidelines or state or federal law. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2018.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.65
# 7
JAMES E. JORDAN vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 83-001186 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001186 Latest Update: May 23, 1984

Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed with the Florida Department of Transportation since 1971. He is a graduate of the University of West Florida, with a degree in business management. Petitioner is 38 years old, with a physical disability which limits his use of his left hand and arm, and his left leg is shorter than his right. In 1979, Petitioner was employed by Respondent in its right-of-way section, as a Right-of-Way Agent III. In that position, he was responsible for the coordination of the Acquisition, Relocation and Property Management sections of Respondent's District III. One of Petitioner's subordinates was H. E. Walls, who was in charge of the Acquisition section. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was J. F. Culpepper, Assistant Right-of-Way Administrator. In April, 1980, a new Right-of-Way Administrator, J. A. Alfes, was assigned to District III. In 1980, and again in 1981, Petitioner filed charges of discrimination against Respondent with the Florida Commission on Human Relations premised upon Petitioner's aforementioned disability. The 1980 charge was resolved through the entry of a settlement agreement. The charge filed in 1981 was premised upon the same disability, but that charge was ultimately dismissed by the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In January, 1981, a hearing was held in Tallahassee, Florida, on one of the charges of discrimination filed by Petitioner. On the day following that hearing, Petitioner was called into Mr. Alfes' office in Chipley, Florida, and was told that the hearing held in Tallahassee had been several hours of "horse shit." On May 18, 1981, Mr. Alfes advised Petitioner of an impending reorganization of the section in which Petitioner was employed. Subsequently, on June 17, 1981, Mr. Alfes told Petitioner that there would be "consequences" as a result of Petitioner's having filed complaints with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In 1981 a reorganization of functions occurred in all six districts statewide of DOT. This reorganization eliminated one classification of position, Right-of-Way Agent III, which Petitioner had held in District III, and elevated the positions at the head of Acquisition and Relocation sections to the administrator level. At the time this reorganization occurred, Petitioner, as previously mentioned, was a Right-of-Way Agent III, and Herbert Walls headed the Acquisition section. Mr. Alfes, Petitioner's immediate superior, recommended that Petitioner be placed in charge of Relocation, and that Mr. Walls, who had been working in Acquisition, be placed in charge of the Acquisition section in light of his experience in that area since 1978. J. F. Culpepper, who occupied the position on DOT's organization chart to whom the Acquisition section, Relocation section, and Property Management section would report, recommended that the Petitioner be placed in charge of the Acquisition section, based upon his belief that Petitioner was better qualified by reason of his real estate training and college degree. Mr. Walls had only a high school diploma. During the period of his employment with DOT, Petitioner had not handled any complete right-of-way acquisition matters, and had never negotiated for DOT in the acquisition of any right-of-way parcels. Petitioner had, however, attended two relocation seminars while employed by DOT. Mr. Walls had been continually engaged in acquisition work for DOT since at least 1978. DOT's District Engineer, Alan Potter, was the DOT employee ultimately responsible for selecting the heads of the Acquisition and Relocation sections. Mr. Potter concurred with the recommendation that Petitioner be placed in charge of the Relocation section, based upon his belief that it was the most important job involved in right-of-way acquisition, and that it required a very thorough and cautious person. Based upon Mr. Potter's evaluation of Petitioner as possessed of high ability, and being very mature and compassionate, Petitioner was placed in charge of the Relocation section. At the time Petitioner was named as head of Relocation and Mr. Walls was placed as head of Acquisition, the two positions were both classified as Right-of-Way Specialist II's, pay grade 22. Later both were reclassified as Right-of-Way Administrator I's, at pay grade 23. The record in this cause establishes that neither position was more prestigious" than the other, or that either position placed the individual holding it in a more favorable posture for promotion or advancement. Subsequently, in the summer of 1981, the reorganization of DOT was completed, with Mr. Walls having been appointed head of Acquisition, with approximately six subordinates. Petitioner became responsible for Relocation, and shared the supervision of a clerical employee with the head of Property Management. After reorganization, Mr. Alfes relocated Petitioner's office in another building 100 feet away from the main office. Petitioner's office was initially located in a passageway and, as a result, Petitioner was required several times a day to make trips to the main building to obtain files necessary to complete his work. In August of 1983, prior to final hearing in this cause, Mr. Alfes retired, and Petitioner's office was relocated in a more spacious office close to the Acquisition section.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the petition for relief, and denying the relief requested therein. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd of May, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: BEN R. PATTERSON, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 4289 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32315 VERNON L. WHITTIER, JR., ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAYDON BURNS BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 JEAN OWEN, ESQUIRE ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS WOODCREST OFFICE CENTER 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD SUITE 240, BUILDING F TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303 DONALD A. GRIFFIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BUILDING F, SUITE 240 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (4) 120.57760.01760.02760.10
# 8
CENTRAL CORPORATION vs. FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 88-001978RU (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001978RU Latest Update: Oct. 19, 1989

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as facts stipulated to by the parties, the following relevant facts are found: Central Corporation, formerly known as TFC Teleservices Corporation, is a provider of alternative operator services (AOS). An AOS provider provides operator assisted long distance telecommunications services to various entities including hotels, motels, universities, hospitals and private pay telephone providers. This new AOS telecommunication industry emerged after 1984 when AT&T ceased paying commissions to hotels for toll-traffic from guests and when the Federal Communications Commission authorized privately-owned pay phones. There are currently nine AOS providers in Florida. Central is authorized by Certificate Number 1528, issued by the PSC on November 21, 1986, to operate as an interexchange carrier within the State of Florida. Central currently operates in Florida under an approved tariff on file with the PSC, which tariff became effective on September 15, 1987, and authorizes Central to charge certain amounts for its services. Prior to the challenged action, the PSC never placed any conditions upon Central's approved tariffed rates. Interexchange companies (IXCs) are companies which provide long distance telephone services. They are certificated by the PSC on a statewide basis and engage in competition with each other. Such competition, along with the PSC's fitness screening and approval of tariffed rates, is considered adequate to protect the public. Consequently, the PSC does not regulate the rates of IXCs, at least minor IXCs including AOS providers. The PSC does not set rate levels for minor IXCs and does not set an authorized rate of return on equity for minor IXCs. Indeed, in accordance with Section 364.337, Florida Statutes, which authorizes the PSC to exempt from the requirements of Chapter 364 a telephone company which is in competition with or duplicates the services of another telephone company, the PSC has placed AOS providers under the separate rules and regulations pertaining to IXCs, which are not rate base regulated. The PSC has never established for any minor IXC a rate base or an authorized or required rate of return. Local exchange telephone companies (LECs) serve a franchised monopoly area. The LEC agrees to provide service indiscriminately to the public without competition, and, in return, the PSC guarantees the LEC the opportunity to earn a fair rate of return designed to emulate what might be achieved in a competitive market. The PSC sets rate bases and rate levels for LECs, and authorizes the rate of return on equity. In other words, unlike IXCs, LECs are rate base regulated utilities. LECs and/or the PSC may initiate rate relief or rate decrease proceedings. Interim relief is often necessary and is authorized by statute and case law due to the regulatory lag time pending the conclusion of the proceedings. Such interim rate relief or interim rate decreases are done on an individual case-by-case basis and are based upon the financial condition of the particular LEC. The PSC has never provided interim rate relief or interim rate decreases on an industry-wide basis. It has set a "generic" rate cap, establishing a 25 cent local call rate for privately-owned pay phones, but that was done on a prospective basis. The PSC has never imposed an industry-wide rate cap, with a requirement to hold subject to refund monies in excess of that cap. At the request of PSC staff, the PSC opened, on December 18, 1987, Docket Number 871394-TP styled "In re: Review of Requirements Appropriate for Alternative Operator Services provided from Public Telephones." This was designated as a "generic" proceeding, and emanated from numerous complaints the PSC had received from end users (i.e., guests of hotels and motels, hospital patients and pay telephone users) who had been charged for alternative operator services. The nature of the complaints included end users being charged for AOS without being aware of using the service, lack of prior knowledge of the rates being charged, inability to use the services of their preferred IXC and inability to access the LEC operator. The most significant complaint, however, was the excessive rate being charged by some AOS providers. The evidence demonstrates that the intrastate long distance rates charged by Central are considerably higher than the rates charged by Southern Bell, an LEC. Central entered an appearance in Docket No. 871394-TP on December 30, 1987. At an Agenda Conference held on February 2, 1988, the PSC voted on various recommendations of its staff. As pertinent to this proceeding, the PSC voted to set an expedited hearing to be held as soon as practicable to determine whether AOS are in the public interest and various other issues concerning the provision of AOS. The PSC also voted to require all AOS providers to place all revenues subject to refund that are generated by charges in excess of the AT&T rate for a comparable call. This vote exceeded the staff's recommendation, which did not include a "hold subject to refund" requirement. At an Agenda Conference held on February 16, 1988, the PSC voted to reconsider the rate cap applicable to AOS providers and to hold the Order reflecting their February 2nd vote pending such reconsideration. At its Agenda Conference held on March 15, 1988, the PSC reconsidered and raised the rate cap amount from the AT&T rate for a comparable call to the LEC rate for a comparable call, thereby decreasing the amount of revenues that AOS providers must hold subject to refund. The action taken on March 15, 1988, was embodied in written Order No. 19095 issued on April 4, 1988. This Order is entitled "Order Setting for Hearing the Issue of Whether Alternative Operator Services are in the Public Interest and Placing Revenues Subject to Refund ..." The remainder of the title relates to "proposed agency action" concerning other requirements for AOS providers, which are not challenged in this proceeding. Order No. 19095 declares that paragraph 7, which requires AOS providers to hold subject to refund all charges collected in excess of the approved rate, is effective February 2, 1988. The Order further recites "We are cognizant of the serious impact this action may have on AOS providers and their customers. However, it is our view that we must take immediate and effective action to remedy the abusive situation we perceive exists at this time. It is in consideration of these conflicting concerns that we have chosen the least drastic action available. This action does not require AOS providers to immediately stop charging current rates. It does not suspend or revoke any certificates of public convenience and necessity. It does not levy any fines or penalties. It merely places revenues subject to refund to allow for the return of these monies if it is subsequently decided that they were generated from inappropriate charges." Although not embodied within the terms of Order No. 19095, the parties stipulated that the hearing to determine public interest is scheduled for August 9-12, 1988. Central requested the PSC to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to making the rate cap take effect, but this request was denied. The rate cap requirement and the disposition of the revenues held by AOS providers pursuant to Order No. 19095 are issues to be determined at the hearing to be held August 9- 12, 1988. The rate cap requirement set forth in Order No. 19095 applies to all AOS providers operating in Florida. Central's current tariff authorizes Central to charge more than the rate cap specified in Order No. 19095. Prior to Order No. 19095, there was no rate cap on AOS providers. Regardless of whether the PSC ultimately orders a refund, the "hold subject to refund" requirement which became effective on February 2, 1988, has immediate and significant adverse impacts upon Central. Central is a relatively new company and must use the revenue it generates on a daily basis. Prior to Order No. 19095, Central was able to rely on the unconditional use of revenues it receives under its approved Florida tariff. If Central continues to charge its current tariffed rates, it will have to set aside the difference between what it bills and the rate cap, place it in escrow and will not be able to utilize those funds. It is estimated that the revenues Central might have to refund if it continues to charge its current rates would between $1.2 and $1.7 million. Nonrecoverable commissions and the cost of a actually making the refund would increase the potential cost of the refund. If Central were to reduce its rates to the LEC rate, it would lose a substantial amount of revenue and does not know where it can make up that loss. Even if this option were chosen today, Central would still have to determine to whom it provided services since February 2, 1988, and what the potential refund would be. Additional staffing and/or computer equipment would be necessary to keep track of prior users and charges. A third option is for Central to withdraw from Florida intrastate operations pending the outcome and conclusions of the August PSC proceedings. Central operates in many states. While its Florida business makes up only 8 to 10 percent of its intrastate revenues, some 40 percent of Central's entire business originates at Florida properties. If Central were to cease paying commissions on intrastate revenues, its intrastate business originating from Florida would go to its competitors. While Central has made the decision not to do business in certain states due to those state's methods of rate regulation, such decisions were made on a prospective basis. Other immediate and adverse impacts upon Central include the administrative costs and burdens associated with separate bookkeeping for its Florida operations, as well as separate books within Florida to segregate the difference between the rate cap and its tariffed rates. Central has already experienced delays in loan financing. Lenders want to wait and see what the PSC does with AOS providers. The valuation of the company is affected due to money taken out of the revenue stream and placed in escrow. Central's financial statement must reflect the contingent liability of potential refunds and full disclosure must be made to the Federal Communication Commission.

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.54120.56120.565120.57120.68120.72366.06458.311 Florida Administrative Code (1) 25-24.485
# 9
REDDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT vs. CENTRAL FLORIDA UTILITIES, INC., AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 82-003242 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003242 Latest Update: Apr. 30, 1985

The Issue The ultimate issue to be resolved at this stage of the proceedings is whether the petition for hearing submitted by RCID was filed in a timely manner. RCID contends that it was entitled to receive actual notice of the application proceeding and to be afforded a point of entry into a formal administrative proceeding. RCID asserts that its petition for formal hearing was filed within the specified period following actual receipt of notice. CFU and the Department contend that actual notice was not required. To the extent that RCID was entitled to actual notice, they contend that it was provided. CFU and the Department assert that the petition for hearing was not filed within the specified time period following receipt of constructive or actual notice.

Findings Of Fact On or about August 2, 1982, CFU filed a permit application with the Department. CFU is seeking a permit that would allow it to modify an existing sewage treatment facility and to discharge effluent from the facility into Bonnet Creek. The proposed facility would be located west of the town of Kissimmee in Osceola County, Florida. RCID is a special tax district. Its boundaries include portions of Osceola and Orange Counties. The facility proposed by CFU is not located within the boundaries of RCID. The point where effluent would be discharged, however, is within the boundaries of RCID. On September 30, 1976, RCID and the Department entered into a Local Program Agreement. The agreement designates RCID as an officially approved local program of the Department in accordance with the provisions of Section 403.182, Florida Statutes. The agreement has remained in effect since its execution. Paragraph 1.4 of the agreement provides: The local programs shall be advised of all applications submitted within the District and drainage areas shown in the Exhibit 1 attached hereto for federal grant assistance, construction, modification, or expansion of any pol- lution control or wastewater treatment system and may submit on a timely basis to the department appropriate recommendations concerning such appli- cations. In Paragraph 2.0, the agreement provides that RCID shall participate in the administration of the Department's permit system within the District's boundaries by, among other things, submitting comments regarding the construction and operation of any domestic or solid waste treatment facilities. Prior to the filing of its application, CFU engaged in lengthy negotiations with Department personnel and filed at least one "Preliminary Application." RCID officials became aware of these negotiations and on July 21, 1981, submitted a letter to the Department specifically requesting that it be notified of any applications to discharge into waters lying within the District. In its letter, RCID Specifically expressed concern about CFU's plans which were being prepared by Boyle Engineering Corporation. During February and March, 1982, representatives of RCID discussed the CFU proposals with CFU and Boyle Engineering representatives. On April 1, 1982, RCID representatives met with personnel of the Department, expressed continued concern about CFU's plans, and specifically requested to be notified if CFU filed a formal application with the Department. After CFU submitted its formal application, the Department requested further data, and on or about September 23, 1982, issued a letter giving notice of the Department's intent to issue the permit. In its letter, the Department directed CFU to publish a "Notice of Proposed Agency Action" in the legal advertisement section of a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the proposed activity is located. The notice of intent letter was directed to CFU, and copies were sent to the Department's Office of General Counsel, the Osceola County Engineer, the Osceola County Health Department, an engineer with Boyle Engineering Corporation, RCID, and the director and general manager of RCID. Copies of the notice of intent letter were sent to all of these persons on September 23, 1982. Each of these persons, except RCID and the director and general manager of RCID, received copies of the intent letter shortly after September 23, 1982. Copies of the intent letter that were forwarded to RCID and to the director and general manager of RCID were forwarded to Post Office Box 36, Lake Buena Vista, Florida. The notices were not returned to the Department. Insufficient evidence was offered to rebut the presumption that the notice that was mailed to RCID was delivered to that post office box. Mail that is delivered to the RCID post office box in Lake Buena Vista is picked up by a person who is a joint employee of RCID and Walt Disney World, the principal landowner within RCID. This person is responsible for delivering mail to the RCID offices. The mail is placed on the desk of the RCID receptionist. The receptionist then directs mail to the appropriate addressee. The notice of intent letter was not received by the RCID receptionist. There was no evidence, however, as to the practices of the person or persons who pick up mail at the Lake Buena Vista post office box and deliver it to the RCID offices. The law indulges a presumption that items placed in the mail are delivered. It is thus presumed that the intent letters forwarded to RCID by the Department were delivered to the Lake Buena Vista post office box. There is no evidence from which it could be concluded what then happened to the notices other than that they did not ultimately reach RCID's office. CFU published the "Notice of Proposed Agency Action" as instructed by the Department in a newspaper of general circulation in Osceola County, Florida, on September 29, 1982. The notice, as appended to the intent letter, provided that substantially affected persons could request a hearing and that the request should be filed in the Office of General Counsel of the Department within fourteen days of publication of the notice. No such requests were filed, and the Department accordingly issued the permit to CFU on October 15, 1982. A copy of the permit was forwarded to RCID and received at the RCID offices on or about October 20, 1982. RCID filed a request for hearing within fourteen days of receiving a copy of the permit. The request for hearing was filed, however, more than fourteen days after the date that the intent letter was delivered to the RCID post office box in Lake Buena Vista, and more than fourteen days after the notice of proposed agency action was published in the newspaper.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Central Florida Utilities, Inc. for a construction permit as described in the agency's proposed action dated March 29, 1984, be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1985.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.60120.68403.182
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer