The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is liable for the tax, penalty, and interest assessed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 2836 North Tamiami Trial, Sarasota, Florida. Petitioner primarily engages in the business of selling classic, vintage automobiles. Petitioner sells automobiles for delivery in-state, interstate, and internationally. Petitioner also engages in the business of selling other collectible items, including jukeboxes. Respondent is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Florida sales and use tax pursuant to Sections 20.21 and 213.05, Florida Statutes (1991). (All references to Florida Statutes are to Florida Statutes 1991 unless otherwise stated.) In accordance with Section 212.34, Respondent audited Petitioner's business records for the period from May 1, 1991, through July 31, 1996 (audit period). Respondent determined a deficiency and assessed Petitioner for $114,878.68, including tax, penalty, and interest through January 26, 1999. Respondent assessed tax in the amount of $55,771.16, penalty in the amount of $26,528.02, and interest through January 26, 1999, in the amount of $32,579.50. Additional interest accrues at the daily rate of $20.97. The assessed tax is based on several alleged deficiencies. Some deficiencies involve alleged failures of Petitioner to comply with taxing provisions. Other deficiencies involve alleged failures of Petitioner to comply with the requirements of claimed exemptions. Taxing provisions are construed narrowly against the taxing authority while the provisions authorizing exemptions are construed narrowly against the person claiming the exemption. The assessment against Petitioner includes tax on $51,353.10 in under-reported retail sales for 1994. Respondent compared the gross income reported by Petitioner for the 1994 tax year with the state sales tax revenues reported by Petitioner for the same year and determined that Petitioner under-reported sales tax revenues in the amount of $51,353.10. Mr. Martin Godbey is a corporate officer for Petitioner and a controlling shareholder. Mr. Godbey testified at the hearing. Mr. Godbey testified that $45,000 of the $51,353.10 was not under-reported gross sales in 1994. According to Mr. Godbey, Petitioner's accountant over-reported gross income for purposes of the federal income tax. Petitioner derives some income from providing brokerage services as an liaison between a buyer and seller. Mr. Godbey testified that Petitioner earned $1,400 in 1994 as a broker for the sale of a 1956 Jaguar XJ140 roadster on behalf of an automobile dealership in Virginia. The testimony is that Petitioner introduced the seller and buyer but never possessed the vehicle or delivered the vehicle. The price of the vehicle was approximately $45,000. Mr. Godbey testified that Petitioner's accountant incorrectly reported $45,000 as gross income under the federal income tax law and reported the difference between $45,000 and $1,400 as the cost of goods sold. The testimony of Mr. Godbey was credible and persuasive. However, the testimony was not supported by documentary evidence of Petitioner's federal income tax return or by testimony of Petitioner's accountant. The unsupported testimony of Mr. Godbey does not rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner over-reported gross income for the purpose of the federal income tax rather than under-reported gross sales for the purpose of the state sales tax. The testimony of Mr. Godbey did not explain the difference between the $51,353.10 amount determined by Respondent and $45,000 amount testified to by Mr. Godbey. For the period from 1991 through 1993, Petitioner collected sales tax on retail sales but did not remit the tax to Respondent. Rather, Petitioner paid the tax to two automobile dealers identified in the record as International Antique Motors, Inc. (IAM) and Autohaus Kolar, Inc. (AK). Petitioner registered with Respondent as a dealer sometime in 1991. However, Petitioner did not obtain a retail dealer's license from the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) until late in 1993. From 1991 through most of 1993, Petitioner was licensed by the Department as a wholesale dealer and was not authorized by the Department to engage in retail sales of motor vehicles. Section 320.27(2) prohibited Petitioner from selling motor vehicles at retail and made such sales unlawful. Petitioner asserts that it could not have engaged in retail sales, within the meaning of Section 212.06(2)(c) and (d), because Petitioner had no legal authority to do so. From 1991 through 1993, Petitioner engaged in retail sales within the meaning of Section 212.06(2)(c) and (d). Petitioner engaged in retail sales by selling automobiles at retail in violation of Section 320.27(2). Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner collected sales tax on each sale. Petitioner did not engage in retail sales and collect sales tax on each sale in the capacity of an agent for IAM or AK. Petitioner acted in his own behalf as a principal. IAM and AK had no actual or legal control over the sales conducted by Petitioner. IAM and AK merely processed the title work for each retail sale conducted by Petitioner. Even if Petitioner were an agent for IAM and AK, Petitioner engaged in retail sales as a dealer defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.0066. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code during the audit period.) Petitioner registered the vehicles sold at retail from 1991 through 1993 by way of a business arrangement with IAM and AK. After Petitioner collected sales tax on each retail sale, Petitioner remitted the tax to IAM and AK. IAM and AK then registered the vehicles with the Department. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner paid to IAM and AK the sales tax that Petitioner collected from each customer. Nor does Respondent dispute that the amount of tax Petitioner paid to IAM and AK was sufficient to pay the tax due. Section 212.06(10) requires IAM and AK to issue a receipt for sales tax with each application for title or registration. IAM obtained title or registration for 21 vehicles sold by Petitioner and at issue in this case. AK obtained title or registration for three vehicles at issue in this case. Section 212.06(10) does not operate to create a factual presumption that IAM and AK paid the sales tax due on the 24 vehicles at the time that IAM and AK applied for title or registration of each vehicle. In practice, the receipt issued by dealers with each application for title or registration contains a code indicating that the dealer has collected the tax and will pay the tax in the dealer's ensuing sales tax return. After IAM applied for title or registration for the vehicles evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 4, 6, and 21, IAM remitted taxes to Respondent in an amount sufficient to pay the tax due on those sales by Petitioner. Respondent has no record of any tax deficiencies against IAM. Respondent's admitted policy is to avoid the collection of tax if the tax has already been paid. After IAM applied for title or registration for the vehicles evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, and 7 through 20, IAM remitted taxes to Respondent in an amount that was insufficient to pay the tax due on those sales. Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that IAM remitted to Respondent the taxes that Petitioner collected and paid to IAM in connection with the sales evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, and 7 through 20. Petitioner is not entitled to a set-off of the taxes remitted to Respondent by IAM after the sales evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, and 7 through 20. There is insufficient evidence to show that the taxes remitted by IAM were collected on the sales at issue in this case rather than other sales made by IAM. AK processed three vehicles for Petitioner that are at issue in this case. AK paid to Respondent the sales tax due on the three retail sales at issue. The relevant sales are evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 24 through 26. AK remitted taxes in an amount that was more than sufficient to pay the tax due on those sales by Petitioner. Respondent has no record of a tax deficiency against AK. Respondent's policy is to avoid the collection of tax if tax has already been paid. Several deficiencies are attributable to disallowed exemptions for 16 sales that include 14 vehicles and two jukeboxes. Statutory requirements for exemptions are strictly construed against the person claiming the exemption. Petitioner did not satisfy essential requirements for any of the disallowed exemptions. The exemptions asserted by Petitioner in its PRO are discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1972 Italia Spyder automobile, VIN: 50413414, to a Texas automobile dealership identified in the record as North American Classic Cars/Gene Ponder, of Marshall, Texas (North American). Petitioner claims that the sale to North American is exempt because it is a sale for resale to a non-resident dealer. The sale to North American is not exempt. Petitioner failed to obtain a non-resident dealer affidavit at the time of sale in violation of Section 212.08(10). During the audit, Petitioner obtained a Sales Tax Exemption Affidavit (DR-40) from North American. A DR-40 is not appropriate for a sale for resale to a non-resident dealer. The appropriate affidavit would have required the non-resident dealer to attest that "the motor vehicle will be transported outside of the State of Florida for resale and for no other purpose." Hand written notations on the bill of sale for the Italia Spyder indicate the North American representative took possession of the automobile in Florida. In addition, a hand- written letter to Petitioner indicates that the Italia Spyder was purchased for the private collection of the owner of North American rather than for resale. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1959 Mercedes Benz 190SL automobile, VIN: 12104-10-95012, to Mike Hiller, of Coral Springs, Florida (Hiller). Petitioner claimed, on the bill of sale, that the sale was exempt because it was a sale to a non-resident dealer for resale. The sale to Hiller is not exempt. At the time of the sale, Petitioner failed to obtain a non-resident dealer affidavit or a resale certificate. The bill of lading lists Hiller as an exporter and indicated that Hiller, as the exporter, took possession of the automobile in Florida. The bill of lading does not show unbroken, continuous transportation from the selling dealer to a common carrier or directly out of Florida as required in Section 212.06(5)(b)1. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1959 MGA Roadster, VIN: 54941, to Fabiana Valsecchi, of Rome, Italy. Petitioner claims the sale is exempt as a sale for export. The sale to Valsecchi is not exempt. At the time of the sale, Petitioner failed to obtain a bill of lading, or other shipping documentation that shows unbroken, continuous transportation from Petitioner to a common carrier or directly out of Florida. The bill of sale signed by the purchaser's agent shows that the agent took possession of the automobile in Florida. Petitioner failed to show that the sale was exempt because it was a sale for resale. Petitioner did not provide a resale certificate from the purchaser. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1961 Triumph TR3 automobile, VIN: TS753 38L, to Classic Automobile Investors, Inc., of Germany (Classic). Petitioner claims that the sale is exempt because it was a sale for export. The sale to Classic is not exempt. At the time of sale, Petitioner failed to obtain a bill of lading, or other shipping documentation which shows unbroken, continuous transportation from Petitioner to a common carrier or directly out of Florida. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1947 Bentley MKVI automobile, VIN: B137B, to Mr. Bob Erickson, of Palmetto, Florida. Petitioner failed to collect and remit Local Government Surtax on the sale and owes the uncollected tax. During the audit period, Petitioner sold two jukeboxes and other items of tangible personal property to Mr. C.P. Loontjens. Petitioner claims that the sales are exempt from sales tax because they were sales for export. At the time of the sale, Petitioner failed to obtain documentation from the buyer to show that items sold were delivered to a common carrier or directly delivered outside of Florida. During the audit period, Petitioner was engaged in the business of selling items of tangible personal property other than vehicles and jukeboxes. Petitioner failed to collect and remit sales tax on the sale of these items of tangible personal property. Respondent properly assessed Petitioner for sales tax due on tangible personal property other than vehicles and jukeboxes in the amount of $3,352.50. Vintage rented commercial real property for its business. Rental payments for such real property are subject to sales tax pursuant to Section 212.031. During the audit period, Petitioner failed to pay sales tax on two payments for the commercial rental of real property. Petitioner is liable for use tax on the use of real property during the audit period. Respondent properly assessed Petitioner for additional use tax in the amount of $108.00. Although Petitioner maintained some books and records of sales and purchases, Petitioner failed to maintain adequate records. Respondent properly conducted an audit by sampling Petitioner's available books and records in accordance with Section 212.12(6)(b) but limited the claimed penalty to a delinquent penalty. The trier of fact cannot determine the taxes, interest, and penalty that are due after eliminating the deficiencies found in paragraphs 21 and 24 not to exist in connection with the sales evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 4, 6, 21, and 24 through 26. Only Respondent can make that calculation using the same sampling formula that Respondent used to calculate the tax, interest, and penalty in the assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order ordering Petitioner to pay the tax, interest, and penalty that is due after Respondent recalculates the assessment against Petitioner in accordance with the findings pertaining to Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 4, 6, 21, and 24 through 26. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Martha F. Barrera, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 R. John Cole, II, Esquire Law Offices of R. John Cole, II 46 North Washington Boulevard, Suite 24 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact As a licensed wholesale dealer in cigarettes, respondent filed monthly tax returns on forms furnished by petitioner. The return respondent filed for July of 1977, was notarized on August 10, 1977, and received by petitioner on August 16, 1977. Accompanying the return was respondent's check drawn in favor of petitioner in the amount of $11,927.69. The return for August, 1977, was notarized on September 9, 1977, and received by petitioner on September 12, 1977. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in favor of petitioner in the amount of $12,995.94. The September, 1977, return was notarized on October 14, 1977, and received by petitioner, at the latest, on October 18, 1977. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in favor of petitioner in the amount of $11,845.44. The return for October, 1977, was notarized on November 10, 1977, and received by respondent on November 14, 1977. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $9,891.76. The return for November, 1977, was notarized on December 10, 1977, and received by petitioner on December 13, 1977. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $10,693.80. The return for December, 1977, was notarized on January 10, 1978, and received by petitioner on January 13, 1978. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $16,678.00. The return for January, 1978, was notarized on February 10, 1978, and received by petitioner on February 20, 1978. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $8,657.86. The return for February, 1978, was notarized on March 10, 1978, and received by petitioner on March 13, 1978. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $7,115.49. Beginning in March of 1978, respondent made tax payments whenever its Pitney-Bowes cigarette stamping meter was reset by petitioner's cashier, and payments did not accompany respondent's tax returns thereafter. Respondent's return for March, 1978, was notarized on April 17, 1978, and received by petitioner the following day. The return for April, 1978, was notarized on May 17, 1978, and received by petitioner the same day. The return for May, 1978, was notarized on June 9, 1978, and received by petitioner on June 12, 1978. The return for June, 1978, was notarized on July 10, 1978, and received by petitioner on July 12, 1978. The August, 1978, return was notarized on September 7, 1978, and received by petitioner on September 13, 1978. The September, 1978, return was notarized on October 9, 1978, and received by petitioner on October 11, 1978. The October, 1978, return was notarized on November 7, 1978, and received by petitioner on November 21, 1978. The November, 1978, return was notarized on December 8, 1978, and received by petitioner on December 11, 1978. The December, 1978, return was notarized on January 10, 1979, and received by petitioner the following day. The January, 1979, return was notarized on February 10, 1979, and received by petitioner on February 13, 1979. The February, 1979, return was notarized on March 10, 1979, and received by petitioner on March 20, 1979. The March, 1979, return was notarized on April 10, 1979, and received by Petitioner the following day. The April, 1979, return was notarized on May 10, 1979, and received by petitioner on May 16, 1979. The May, 1979, return was notarized on June 14, 1979, and received by petitioner the following day. The June, 1979, return was notarized on July 24, 1979, and received by petitioner on August 2, 1979. Respondent's check No. 1843, dated March 10, 1977, drawn in petitioner's favor, in the amount of $11,264.20, was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1833, dated January 10, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $16,678.20, was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1259, dated March 30, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor, in the amount of $3,187.57, was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1260, dated March 31, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $105.00 was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1203, dated February 20, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor, in the amount of $2,591.19, was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1261, dated April 17, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor, in the amount of $2,159.32, was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1997, dated November 9, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $617.40, was dishonored by the drawee for the stated reason that respondent's account had been closed. In a post hearing memorandum, petitioner's counsel conceded that respondent had subsequently made all of its checks drawn in favor of petitioner good.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner revoke Respondent's permit as a wholesale cigarette dealer. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F.X. Purnell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gray Tobacco Company, Inc. 8109 N.W. 33rd Street Miami, Florida
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent should grant Petitioner's application for a sales tax exemption certificate as a charitable institution within the meaning of Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for issuing sales tax exemption certificates in accordance with Section 212.08(7). Petitioner is a non-profit, Florida corporation and a charitable organization, within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, for purposes of the federal income tax. On December 29, 1995, Petitioner applied for an exemption from state sales and use tax ("sales tax") as a charitable institution. On February 8, 1996, Respondent denied Petitioner's application. The parties stipulated that Petitioner is a non-profit corporation. The parties further stipulated that the only exemption under which Petitioner may qualify for a sales tax exemption is the exemption for a charitable institution. In order to qualify as a charitable institution, Petitioner must provide one or more of seven services listed in Section 212.08(7). The parties stipulated that the only service Petitioner arguably provides as a charitable institution is that of raising funds for medical research within the meaning of Section 212.08(7)(o)2b(V). It is uncontroverted that Petitioner does not provide medical research directly. Petitioner raises funds for its national organization. The national organization then disburses funds raised by local affiliates. Petitioner failed to submit any competent and substantial evidence showing the disposition of funds by its national organization. Petitioner failed to show that its national organization either provides direct medical research or raises funds for one or more organizations that provide medical research.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and therein DENY Petitioner's request for a sales tax exemption. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1996.
Findings Of Fact High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. (Petitioner) is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of retail sales of marine vessels. Also, Petitioner is a registered retail dealer in the State of Florida. The President of Petitioner is its only corporate officer. On or about September 2, 1993, Petitioner, in the capacity of a broker, sold a motor yacht at retail to Regency Group, Inc. (purchaser), through its representative, for $78,000. The motor yacht is described as a 1988, 41' Amerosport Chris Craft, hull Number CCHEU075E788, and called the "Motivator". At the closing of the sale, on or about September 2, 1993, the purchaser refused to pay the sales tax on the purchase, which was $4,680. However, the purchaser agreed to pay the sales tax after being informed by Petitioner that, without the payment of the sales tax, there could be no closing. The purchaser's representative submitted, at closing, a personal check in the amount of $4,680 for the sales tax. All of the necessary documents were completed for ownership and registration to be transferred to the purchaser. Subsequently, Petitioner received notice from its bank that the check for the sales tax had been dishonored by the purchaser's bank. The purchaser's representative had stopped payment on the check. In October 1993, Petitioner submitted its sales and use tax return for the month of September 1993 to Respondent in which the sale of the yacht was reported. Respondent automatically reviews sales and use tax returns. Respondent's review of Petitioner's return revealed a shortage of sales tax collected in the amount of $4,680.. In January 1994, Respondent issued a notice of tax action for assessment of additional tax in the amount of $4,710, plus interest and penalty, to Petitioner. The $4,710 included the loss of Petitioner's collection allowance of $30, which loss resulted from Petitioner's failure to timely remit all taxes due. Having received the notice of tax action, by letter dated January 20, 1994, Petitioner generally informed Respondent of the circumstances regarding the sales tax shortage, including the dishonored check. Petitioner pointed out, among other things, that Respondent had the authority and the means to collect the tax, while it (Petitioner) had limited means, and suggested, among other things, that Respondent cancel the purchaser's Florida registration of the yacht. On or about January 31, 1994, approximately three months after the check for sales tax was dishonored, Petitioner issued a notice of dishonored check to the purchaser, in which Petitioner requested payment of the sales tax. The notice provided, among other things, that Petitioner could seek criminal prosecution and civil action if the monies were not paid to Petitioner. Having not received the $4,680, Petitioner contacted the local law enforcement agency. After investigation, the law enforcement agency informed Petitioner that a civil action would have to be instituted because the purchaser, through its representative, had indicated that it was not satisfied with the yacht. Although Petitioner engaged the services of an attorney for civil action, no civil action was commenced. Additionally, Petitioner did not engage the services of a collection agency for assistance in collecting the sales tax. Subsequent to its notice of tax action, on or about March 12, 1994, Respondent issued a notice of assessment to Petitioner. The notice of assessment provided, among other things, that Petitioner was being assessed taxes in the amount of $4,710, plus penalty and interest in the amount of $2,342.61, totalling $7,052.61. Petitioner protested the assessment. On February 8, 1995, Respondent issued its notice of reconsideration in which Respondent determined, among other things, that the assessment was appropriate and affirmed the assessment of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. The interest accrues at the rate of $1.55 per day. Petitioner has not remitted any of the assessed tax, including interest and penalty, to Respondent. Petitioner has not identified on its federal tax return the noncollection of the sales tax from the purchaser as a bad debt. Sales tax is part of the total sale price for an item. Respondent considers the sales tax as collectable by a seller in the same manner as any other debt owed by a purchaser to a seller. A retail dealer, who is also a seller, is considered to be an agent for the State in the collection of sales tax. The burden of collecting the sales tax is placed upon the retail dealer by Respondent. Some of Respondent's employees have been sympathetic to Petitioner's tax assessment matter. However, none of the employees indicated to or advised Petitioner that Respondent was or is in error.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming the assessment of sales tax against High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. in the amount of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August 1996.
Findings Of Fact In 1962, the Corporation decided to relocate its corporate offices from Newark, New Jersey, to the State of Florida. Implementing this decision, the Corporation secured a twenty year leasehold interest of an entire floor in the Universal Marion Building in Jacksonville, Florida, under which it was obligated to pay an annual rental of $52,000.00. Within a few months during the year 1962, the decision to relocate was rescinded. During the tax year in question, the Corporation retained a part-time employee in Florida for the sole purpose of attempting to either locate a purchaser of the leasehold interest or to avoid further obligations under the lease by negotiations and settlement with the landlord. This part-time employee received his directions from the corporate offices in Newark, New Jersey. Other than these efforts to relieve the burden of the unused leased premises, the Corporation conducted no commercial activities in the State of Florida during the tax year 1973. Although the Corporation's headquarters were ultimately moved to Jacksonville, in January 1976, the Corporation has never occupied the leased premises in question. In fact, in 1974, the Corporation entered into a sublease with the State of Florida for the duration of the lease. Pursuant to audit, DOR assessed the Corporation an additional $12,616.89 in income tax for the year ended December 31, 1973, using the three-factor formula method of apportionment.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue can levy on petitioner's bank accounts where the petitioner failed to challenge the final sales tax assessment and failed to remit the tax, penalties, and interest due pursuant to the assessment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Forest Hill Convenience, Inc., is a Florida corporation. It owns one convenience store in Palm Beach County, Kwik Stop number 320, and owned a second convenience store in Palm Beach County, One-Stop Food Mart, during the time relevant to this proceeding. Samson Abraham Francis is Forest Hill's President and only corporate officer. In December 1993, at the request of Forest Hill and a third party which was interested in purchasing the convenience stores, Van T. Ho, a Tax Auditor IV with the Department, performed an audit of Forest Hill's books and records for the period October 1, 1992 through November 31, 1993. As a result of the audit, the Department identified sales tax deficiencies. Forest Hill was notified on January 10, 1994, that the audit had revealed a tax deficiency of $1,046.78, exclusive of penalties and interest. On January 11, 1994, Mr. Francis met with Ms. Ho to go over the audit results. On January 13, 1994, Ms. Ho telephoned Mr. Francis and notified him that she had discovered an error in the initial audit and that Forest Hill's sales tax deficiency was $5,217.45, for a total tax liability of $7,354.86, with penalties and accrued interest. Mr. Francis did not object to the revision during this telephone conversation, and Ms. Ho sent Forest Hill the revised audit papers, together with a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated January 18, 1994. In this Notice, Forest Hill was advised that it must submit any objections to the proposed audit changes, in writing, by February 17, 1994, and that, if no objections were filed, a Proposed Notice of Deficiency would issue on March 21, 1994. In a letter dated February 22, 1994, Mr. Francis requested an extension of time to allow Forest Hill's accountant time to review the Notice and the audit papers. Mr. Francis did not register a protest to the tax deficiency identified in the revised audit papers in this letter. A two-week extension was granted. Even though the Department did not receive an objection to the proposed audit changes, it offered, in a letter dated March 25, 1994, to schedule a meeting to resolve any objections Mr. Francis might have to the proposed tax liability. The Department did not receive a response to this letter, and, in a letter dated September 9, 1994, Mr. Francis was advised that the audit file was being forwarded to Tallahassee. A Notice of Proposed Assessment dated October 6, 1994, was sent to Forest Hill via certified United States mail to Mr. Francis's then-current home address. In the Notice, the Department advised Forest Hill that it owed the Department $8,320.21, consisting of $5,217.45 in sales tax, $2,284.02 in penalties, and $818.74 in interest, with additional interest accruing at the rate of $1.72 per day. The Department further advised Forest Hill that, if it did not request informal proceedings, the assessment would become final on December 5, 1995, and that no relief could be granted by the Department, the Division of Administrative Hearings, or the courts beyond sixty days from the date the assessment became final, that is, by February 3, 1995. The Notice was returned to the Department unclaimed after two attempts at delivery. Forest Hill did not timely file a request for informal proceedings to challenge the proposed assessment, and the proposed assessment became a final assessment on December 5, 1994. On January 24, 1995, a Tax Warrant was filed by the Department with the Clerk of Court in Palm Beach County, Florida, and Forest Hill was so advised in a letter dated January 24, 1995. Forest Hill did not challenge the final assessment in circuit court or by petition to the Division Administrative Hearings by the date specified in the Notice of Proposed Assessment. The Department issued a Notice of Delinquent Tax dated March 24, 1995, to Forest Hill's bank. On April 13, 1995, the Department received a letter from Mr. Francis, dated March 9, 1995, protesting the amount of the assessment. In a letter dated May 4, 1995, Linda Howe, the Department's West Palm Beach Collection and Enforcement Administrator, notified Forest Hill that the audit could not be reopened because all protest rights had expired. Ms. Howe advised Forest Hill that it could pursue a compromise with the Department, and she stated that a written request for such relief had to be filed with the Department within fourteen days, during which time she would suspend collection and enforcement action on the warrant. Forest Hill failed to respond to the Department's letter of May 4, 1995, and a Notice to Freeze, dated May 31, 1995, was sent to Great Western Bank in Delray Beach, Florida, freezing Forest Hill's assets in the amount of $9,050.25. Forest Hill did not satisfy the warrant, and, on June 13, 1995, the Department sent the Notice of Intent to Levy via certified United States mail to Forest Hill at its business address. The only basis on which Forest Hill challenges the Notice of Intent to Levy is that the amount of the assessment is incorrect and unfair. Forest Hill has, however, waived any right to contest the correctness or validity of the assessment. The Department followed the procedures established by statute and rule in proceeding to issue a final tax assessment against Forest Hill. Mr. Francis did not participate on Forest Hill's behalf in the informal proceedings offered by the Department to resolve his objections to the correctness of the tax deficiency, nor did he timely request a hearing to contest either the proposed assessment or the final assessment. The Department has met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Forest Hill has an outstanding tax liability in the amount shown on the Notice of Intent to Levy. Forest Hill has failed to prove any ground upon which the Department's proposed levy is defective or illegal. It has, therefore, failed to establish that the Department cannot properly levy on the bank accounts and certificates of deposit subject to the Notice of Freeze and the Notice of Intent to Levy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order upholding the Department's Notice of Intent to Levy and allowing it to proceed with the garnishment of the bank accounts and certificates of deposit owned by Forest Hill Convenience, Inc., in the amount of $8,320.21, including tax, penalties, and interest, together with such interest as has accrued since October 7, 1994. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of March 1996. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March 1996.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") assessment of tax, penalty, and interest against American Import Car Sales, Inc., is valid and correct.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the agency responsible for administering the revenue laws of the State of Florida, including the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use taxes. Petitioner, American Import Car Sales, Inc., is a Florida S-corporation with its principle place of business and mailing address in Hollywood, Florida. Petitioner, during the period of June 1, 2007, through May 31, 2010 ("assessment period"), was in the business of selling and financing new and used motor vehicles. On June 29, 2010, the Department issued to Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records (form DR-840) for sales and use tax for the assessment period. Said notice informed Petitioner that the audit would begin on or around 60 days from the date of the notice and included an attachment identifying the records and information that would be reviewed and should be available when the audit commenced. Specifically, the Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist attachment requested the following: chart of accounts, general ledgers, cash receipts journals, cash disbursement journals, federal income tax returns, county tangible property returns, Florida Sales and Use Tax returns, sales journals, sales tax exemption certificates (resale certificates), sales invoices, purchase invoices, purchase journals, lease agreements for real or tangible property, depreciation schedules, bank and financial statements, detail of fixed asset purchases, and other documents as needed. On the same date, in addition to the Notice of Intent, the Department issued to Petitioner, inter alia, an Electronic Audit Survey, and a Pre-Audit Questionnaire and Request for Information. On September 17, 2010, the auditor requested the following records to review by October 4, 2010: (1) general ledger for the assessment period; (2) federal returns for 2007, 2008, and 2009; (3) lease agreement for the business location; (4) deal folders for the assessment period; (5) all expense purchase invoices for the assessment period; (6) all purchase invoices relating to assets added to the Depreciation Schedule during the assessment period; (7) resale/exemption certificates, shipping documents, and any other exempt sales documentation to support exempt sales during the assessment period; (8) bank statements for the assessment periods; and (9) all worksheets used to prepare monthly sales tax returns for the assessment period. On October 5, 2010, the auditor met with Petitioner's President Joe Levy, Petitioner's Secretary Joanne Clements, and Petitioner's Certified Public Accountant, Steve Levy. At that time, Petitioner provided a hard copy of the 2007 and 2008 general ledger and profit and loss statements. At that time, the auditor again advised Petitioner that the Department needed the federal returns, as well as the completed electronic audit survey and pre-audit questionnaire. On October 5, 2010, the Department and Petitioner signed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment or to File a Claim for Refund (form DR-872). The consent provided that assessments or claims for refunds may be filed at any time on or before the extended statute of limitations, December 31, 2011. On October 18, 2010, Petitioner provided the Department with the completed electronic audit survey and pre-audit questionnaire. Thereafter, Petitioner provided the Department with the following books and records: (1) 2009 "deal folders;" Petitioner's general ledger in Excel format for June 1, 2007, through December 31, 2010; (3) January 2009 through May 2010 bank statements; (4) a listing of exempt sales; and (5) lease agreements with attendant invoices. On August 25, 2011, the Department issued its assessment, entitled a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (form DR-1215)("NOI"). Said notice provided that Respondent owed $2,324,298.42 in tax, $581,074.61 in penalties, and $515,117.04 in interest through August 25, 2011. The NOI addressed Petitioner's alleged failure to collect and remit tax on: (1) certain vehicle sales (audit Exhibit A01-Sales Tax Collected and Not Remitted)1/; (2) vehicle sales with no documentation regarding its exempt status (audit Exhibit A02-Disallowed Exempt Sales)2/; (3) motor vehicle sales where no discretionary tax was assessed (audit Exhibit A03- Discretionary Surtax)3/; and (4) unreported sales (audit Exhibit A04-Unreported Sales). The assessment also related to Petitioner's alleged failure to pay/accrue tax on: (1) taxable purchases (audit Exhibit B01-Taxable Purchases); (2) fixed assets (audit Exhibit B02-Fixed Assets); and (3) commercial rent (Exhibit B03-Commercial Realty). At hearing, Petitioner stipulated that the only component of the NOI remaining at issue pertains to audit Exhibit A04-Unreported Sales, as Petitioner has conceded A01, A02, A03, and all fee schedules. An understanding of audit Exhibit A04, and the assessment methodology employed by the auditor, is articulated in the Department's Exhibit MM, entitled Explanation of Items, which is set forth, in pertinent part, as follows: Reason for Exhibit: The records received for the audit were inadequate. The taxpayer provided bank statements for the period of January 2009 through May 2010. This period was deemed the test period for unreported sales. A review of the bank statements for the test period revealed that sales were underreported. This exhibit was created to assess for sales tax on unreported sales. Source of Information: Sales tax returns and Bank of America bank statements for the test period of January 2009 through May 2010; The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) [sic] was acquired for the period of June 2007 through May 2010. Description of Mathematical Adjustments: The bank statements were reviewed for the period of January 2009 through May 2010. Taxable Sales on sales tax returns, sales tax on sales tax returns, taxable sales on Exhibit on [sic] Exhibit A01, sales tax Exhibit A01 and Exempt Sales on Exhibit A02 was subtracted from Bank Deposits to arrive at unreported sales. See calculations on page 53. Unreported sales for the period of January 2009 through May 2010 were scheduled into this exhibit. A rate analysis of the DMV database resulted in an effective tax rate of 6.2689. Scheduled transactions were multiplied by the effective tax rate of 6.2689 to determine the tax due on the test period. A percentage of error was calculated by dividing the tax due by the taxable sales for each test period. The percentage of error was applied to taxable sales for each month of the audit period which resulted in additional tax due. The auditor's analysis of the test period, applied to the entire assessment period, resulted in a determination that Petitioner owed $1,599,056.23 in tax for unreported sales. On August 25, 2011, the auditor met with Joe and Steve Levy to discuss and present the NOI. At that time, Joe and Steve Levy were advised that Petitioner had 30 days to provide additional documents to revise the NOI. On September 28, 2011, the Department issued correspondence to Petitioner advising that since a response to the NOI had not been received, the case was being forwarded to Tallahassee for issuance of the Notice of Proposed Assessment ("NOPA")(form DR-831). On October 7, 2011, the Department issued the NOPA, which identified the deficiency resulting from an audit of Petitioner's books and records for the assessment period. Pursuant to the NOPA, Petitioner was assessed $2,324,298.42 in tax, $31,332.46 in penalty, and $534,284.54 in interest through October 7, 2011. The NOPA provided Petitioner with its rights to an informal written protest, an administrative hearing, or a judicial proceeding. On December 5, 2011, Petitioner filed its Informal Written Protest to the October 7, 2011, NOPA. The protest noted that the NOPA was "not correct and substantially overstated." The protest raised several issues: (1) that the calculation was primarily based upon bank statement deposits; (2) not all deposits are sales and sources of income; and (3) a substantial amount of the deposits were exempt sales and loans. The protest further requested a personal conference with a Department specialist. On January 10, 2013, Martha Gregory, a tax law specialist and technical assistance dispute resolution employee of the Department, issued correspondence to Petitioner. The documented purpose of the correspondence was to request additional information regarding Petitioner's protest of the NOPA. Among other items, Ms. Gregory requested Petitioner provide the following: [D]ocumentation and explanations regarding the source of income—vehicle sales, loan payments, etc.—for each deposit. For vehicle sales deposits, provide the customer name, vehicle identification number and amount; for loan payments, provide proof of an existing loan and the amount received from the borrower; and for any other deposits, provide documentation of the source of this income. A conference was held with Petitioner on February 7, 2013. At the conference, Ms. Gregory discussed the January 10, 2013, correspondence including the request for information. The Department did not receive the requested information. Following the conference, the Department provided the Petitioner an additional 105 days to provide documentation to support the protest. Again, Petitioner failed to provide the information requested. On June 14, 2013, the Department issued its Notice of Decision ("NOD"). The NOD concluded that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that it was not liable for the tax, plus penalty and interest, on unreported sales as scheduled in audit Exhibit A04, Unreported Sales, as assessed within the compliance audit for the assessment period. Accordingly, the protested assessment was sustained. On July 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration to appeal the Notice of Decision ("POR"). The POR advanced the following issues: (1) the records examined were not the books and records of Petitioner; (2) the audit should be reduced because the auditor's methodology was incorrect; and the Petitioner should be allowed a credit for bad debts taken during the audit period. At Petitioner's request, on October 22, 2013, Petitioner and Ms. Gregory participated in a conference regarding the POR. At the conference, Petitioner requested a 30-day extension to provide documentation in support of Petitioner's POR. No additional documentation was subsequently provided by Petitioner. On April 29, 2014, the Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration ("NOR"). The NOR sustained the protested assessment. Petitioner, on June 30, 2014, filed its Petition for Chapter 120 Hearing to contest the NOR. Petitioner did not file its federal tax returns for the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 until after the Department issued the NOR. Indeed, the federal returns were not filed until June 3, 2014.4/ Ms. Kruse conceded that the auditor's assessment utilized Petitioner's bank statements to determine unreported sales; however, the auditor did not make any adjustments for "unusual items that would have been on the face of the bank statements." Ms. Kruse further acknowledged that the auditor's assessment does not reference Petitioner's general ledger information. Ms. Kruse acknowledged that, for several representative months, the general ledger accurately reported the deposits for the bank statements provided. When presented with a limited comparison of the bank statement and the general ledger, Ms. Kruse further agreed that, on several occasions, deposits noted on the bank statements were probably not taxable transactions; however, the same were included as taxable sales in the auditor's analysis. Ms. Kruse credibly testified that the same appeared to be transfers of funds from one account into another; however, because the Department only possessed the bank statements from one account, and never received the requested "back up information" concerning the other account, the Department could not discern the original source of the funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Department conduct a new assessment of Petitioner's sales and use tax based on a test or sampling of Petitioner's available records or other information relating to the sales or purchases made by Petitioner for a representative period, giving due consideration to Petitioner's available records, including Petitioner's general ledger, to determine the proportion that taxable retail sales bear to total retail sales. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner purchased a used car in Florida in May of 1983 and paid 5 percent sales tax. Petitioner did not title said car in the State of Florida. When Petitioner returned to Maryland, his state of residence, Maryland imposed a 5 percent tax on said car when Petitioner titled said car. Petitioner applied for a sales tax refund to the Department of Revenue in the amount of $225.00. Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to deny said refund application on December 1, 1983. From the exhibits to which the parties stipulated, additional facts are found by the Hearing Officer. A bill of sale indicates that Petitioner purchased a 1979 Buick Regal from Eddy Auto Sales on May 14, 1983. A temporary registration and receipt issued by the State of Maryland on June 17, 1983, shows that Petitioner paid a "title tax" of $222.50 to the State of Maryland. By letter dated January 27, 1984, Agnes Stoicos of the Maryland Department of Transportation indicates that the Maryland tax is a 5 percent excise tax upon the issuance of all original and subsequent certificates of title, and the tax is used primarily for the construction and the maintenance of the Maryland highway system.
The Issue Whether or not, on or about December 2, 1976, investigation revealed that Robert W. Pope, licensed under the Beverage Laws of the State of Florida, failed to file and pay his State Sales Tax for the licensed premises, known as Kitty's, located at 1020, 4th Street, South, St. Petersburg, Florida, in violation of 212, F.S., thereby violating 561.29, F.S.
Findings Of Fact Robert W. Pope is and at all times pertinent to this cause has been the holder of license no. 62-512, series 4-COP, held with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage to trade as Kitty's, located at 1020, 4th Street, South, St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida. When the Respondent, Pope, began to operate the licensed premises he was given a registration sales tax number by the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This number was provided in accordance with 212, F.S. That law required the remittance of the collected sales tax on a month to month basis, the period beginning with the first day of the month and ending with the last day of the month. The remittance was due on the first day of the following month and payable by the 20th day of the following month. Failure to pay by the 20th would result in a 5 percent penalty and 1 percent interest per month. The sales tax remittance due from the licensed premises for July, 1976 through November, 1976 was not made to the Department of Revenue. In December, 1976 the Department of Revenue filed a lien against the licensed premises to collect an amount due at that time of $2,200.66. As an aid to the collection of the account, the Department of Revenue levied the subject liquor license. Subsequently, in February, 1977 the Respondent made a $10,000 initial payment and three monthly installments to satisfy the lien on this licensed premises and another licensed premises which the Respondent owned. At present all taxes due and owing under 212, F.S. are current. The above facts establish that the Respondent failed to comply with the provisions of 212, F.S. pertaining to the remittance of sales tax from the Respondent to the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This violation, thereby subjects the Respondent to the possible penalties of 561.29, F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Robert W. Pope, be required to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $750.00 or have the license no. 62-512, series 4- COP, suspended for a period of 20 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Division of Beverage 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert W. Pope, Esquire 611 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the Stipulation of Facts and documentation attached thereto, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner is registered to do business in Florida and is required to collect and remit sales tax. In January of 1982, petitioner was given written notice of respondent's intent to audit petitioner's books and records for the 1979, 1980, and 1981 fiscal years. The audit apparently occurred during March and April of 1982. On June 16, 1982, the respondent, through Tax Auditor John Felton, issued a "Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes." Petitioner was advised that if it bias aggrieved by the proposed audit changes, it would have until July 16, 1982, "or such additional time as may be authorized by the Department in writing" to contact the office and discuss any problems. Petitioner was further advised that if it did not avail itself of the discussion privilege, the Department would issue a proposed notice of deficiency in the amount of $6,975.68 for delinquent sales taxes, penalty and interest through June 16, 1982. By a form letter dated September 9, 1982, the Department provided the Notice of Proposed Assessment of tax, penalty and interest in the amount of $6,975.68. The form letter stated that, if there were objections to the proposed assessment, petitioner would have until November 9, 1982, or such additional time as may be authorized by the Department in writing, to contest the assessment pursuant to informal protest provisions. These provisions require a written protest postmarked within 60 days of the Proposed Assessment, or a written request within that same period of time for an extension of time to file the written protest. Mr. John Felton, a Tax Auditor for the respondent in California, visited the petitioner's office on September 22, 1982, for a post-audit meeting. Petitioner apparently informed Mr. Felton of the existence of exemption certificates but did not, at that time, have the appropriate documentation for the tax credits. Mr. Felton advised petitioner of the documentation required to support any claimed tax credits. By letter dated October 1, 1982, Mr. Felton enclosed the June 16, 1982 sales tax audit, the September 9, 1982 Notice of Proposed Assessment and advised petitioner's staff accountant as follows: "... You will note that some action must be taken with respect to the Notice of Proposed Assessment by 11/9/82. As soon as you have accumulated your docu- mentation in support of any claimed tax credits, contact me and I will have a revised proposed assessment issued. If I may be of further assistance, please call me at 714-956-4311 (preferably, since I expect to be out of my Sunnyvale office most of October) or 408-737-1405." Petitioner's General Accounting Manager attempted to telephone Mr. Felton on several occasions during the last week of October and the first week of November, 1982. These attempts were unsuccessful. Petitioner does not allege that it mailed any documentation to Mr. Felton or the Department or that it filed a timely written protest or a timely request for an extension of time to file a protest. On November 16, 1982, Mr. Felton called petitioner's staff accountant, who advised Mr. Felton that he would mail documentation supporting the tax credits on or before November 24, 1982. Having received no such documentation, Felton, by inter- office memorandum dated December 10, 1982, recommended to the respondent that the original proposed assessment dated September 9, 1982, be processed. Petitioner was notified by letter dated January 31, 1983, that the prior audit had become final and requesting petitioner to forward its remittance of $7,236.56, said amount consisting of the original assessment plus updated interest.
