The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, a certified law enforcement officer, failed to maintain good moral character by knowingly making a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duties, a failure that, if proved, would warrant the imposition of discipline upon Respondent's certificate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Pablo Barrios ("Barrios") is a Florida- certified law enforcement officer and, as such, falls under the regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction of Petitioner Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission ("Commission"). At the time of the final hearing, and at all times relevant to this case, Barrios was employed as a police officer by Florida International University ("FIU"). The events giving rise to this proceeding took place on July 17, 2003. That morning, Barrios attended an in-service training class taught by Sgt. Alfonso. There were about a dozen other FIU police officers in the class. Shortly after the class began, Barrios and Sgt. Alfonso got into an argument over Barrios's use of a digital recorder. (Sgt. Alfonso was apparently offended that Barrios would record the lecture; Barrios claimed that he was merely using the device to keep track of the time.) Sgt. Alfonso asked Barrios to leave the classroom. Barrios did leave, remarking on his way out that if he (Barrios) had intended to turn on the recording device, he would first have told everyone in the "fucking room." Barrios later returned to the classroom and sat in the back. The lesson proceeded to conclusion uneventfully. When the class ended, Capt. Wright entered the room. Someone had reported the verbal altercation between Barrios and Sgt. Alfonso, and Capt. Wright was there to find out what had happened. To that end, Capt. Wright asked each of the officers present to prepare a statement describing the incident and stating specifically whether "improper language" had been used. In response to Capt. Wright's request, Barrios wrote the following statement: I was single[d] out by Sergeant Alfonso for taking out [sic] a personal recorder out of my laptop bag. Capt. Wright considered Barrios's statement to be incomplete. He therefore wrote the following question beneath Barrios's description of the event: Lt. Barrios, was improper language ever used during the incident. Barrios answered the captain's query, in writing, with one word: "No."1 Ultimate Factual Determinations The undersigned infers (and is convinced) that Barrios knew, when presented with Capt. Wright's imprecisely drafted question regarding the use of "improper language," that this interrogatory, though ambiguous and open to interpretation, was meant to require Barrios to either admit or deny using the "f" word during the incident. The undersigned further infers (but is not convinced) that Barrios was likely aware that Capt. Wright would misinterpret Barrios's negative answer as an affirmation that no one (including Barrios) had uttered the word "fuck" or any of its cognates. The undersigned is not clearly convinced, however, that Barrios intended to mislead Capt. Wright.2 Rather, since admitting that his language had been "improper" would have been tantamount to confessing misbehavior,3 Barrios likely intended to deny having engaged in inappropriate behavior. The undersigned is also not clearly convinced that Barrios's statement was false, for two reasons. First, the undersigned is not convinced that Barrios believed his language to have been improper.4 To the contrary, the evidence persuades the undersigned that Barrios subjectively believed his words were justified. It is likely, in other words, that Barrios made what was, for him, a true statement. Second, Barrios's statement has not been clearly and convincingly falsified——that is, shown via ordinary evidence to be objectively untrue. Because the adjective "improper" reflects an opinion or judgment about something, such an opinion could be falsified only if5 (among other things) there were a clear objective standard against which to measure or judge the thing in question.6 The Commission offered no evidence regarding such an objective standard for determining that Barrios's language was improper and hence failed objectively to falsify Barrios's denial that improper language had been used.7 In sum, the Commission failed clearly and convincingly to prove, as was its burden, that Barrios made a "false statement" with the intent to mislead Capt. Wright.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Barrios not guilty of failing to maintain good moral character by knowingly making a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duties. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the testimony of the witnesses, and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact. The Petitioner, Linda D. Griffin, filed a written application for licensure as a real estate salesman in July of 1986. The application was signed by Petitioner on July 10, 1986, and was received by the Florida Real Estate Commission on July 11, 1986. The application form includes an affidavit which, among other things, includes a sworn statement that the answers to the questions on the application are true, correct and complete. The first part of question 6 on the application form reads as follows: "Have you even been convicted of a crime, found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" The Petitioner truthfully and correctly answered this question, "Yes." The remainder or question 6 includes the following instructions to the applicant: "If you answered yes, please state the details including dates and outcome in full. (Use separate sheet if necessary.)" To this portion of question 6 Petitioner answered only, "Worthless bank checks - 1976-1985." Petitioner did not attach a separate sheet with any additional information, nor was additional information in response to this part of question 6 contained elsewhere on the application form. On each of the following dates, the Petitioner was arrested for the crime of issuing checks without sufficient funds: January 17, 1976, July 8, 1982, and August 19, 1983. The disposition of those three arrests is not clear on the record of this case. Specifically, there is no proof that the Petitioner was "convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere" with regard to any of the three previously mentioned arrests. On each of the following dates, the Petitioner was arrested for issuing checks without sufficient funds: May 31, 1984, December 12, 1984, and January 15, 1985. Following each of these arrests, the Petitioner was convicted of the crime of issuing checks without sufficient funds. The convictions were on the following dates: December 13, 1984, January 3, 1985, and April 16, 1985. On June 13, 1984, the Petitioner was arrested for disorderly conduct and criminal mischief. On the same day she was arrested on this charge, the charges were dismissed. On March 6, 1985, the Petitioner was arrested for welfare fraud. On June 5, 1985, she was convicted of welfare fraud. This last-mentioned conviction involved a sum of money of approximately $200. That conviction was based on allegations that the Petitioner had misrepresented the number of people living in her household at the time of applying for energy assistance. Petitioner explained that the application she submitted was correct at the time it was submitted, but shortly thereafter when one of the residents moved to another household, she did not amend the application to reflect the change. As a result of this failure to correct the application, the Petitioner received approximately $200 more welfare assistance than she was entitled to receive. The Petitioner has made restitution on all of the checks which lead to her arrests and/or convictions. The Petitioner's arrest in 1976 occurred in the context of a dispute regarding entitlement to possession of a home in which the Petitioner was residing at that time. Although the Petitioner was not able to clearly explain all of the circumstances, it appears likely that the issuance of the check which lead to the 1976 arrest was more likely the result of a mistake than the result of an intent to unlawfully obtain the property of another. The arrests which took place from 1982 through 1985 occurred during a period of time when there was a great deal of stress in the Petitioners life. During that period of time she was going through a divorce and her husband was experiencing serious difficulties relating to alcohol which, among other things, resulted in the Petitioner receiving very little support money from her husband with which to take care of herself and her three children. Since 1985 those situations have greatly improved. The Petitioner's husband has successfully completed an extensive rehabilitation program and, although they are still separated, he is now working steadily and is providing the petitioner with regular support. The worthless checks written by Petitioner during the Period during 1982 through 1985 were written for such things as clothing and groceries. The Petitioner presently enjoys a reputation in her community as an honest and dependable Person.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order in this case concluding the Petitioner's application of licensure as a real estate salesman be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. M. M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Linda D. Griffin Post Office Box 1752 Lake City, Florida 32056 Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 212, 400 W. Robinson Orlando, Florida 32801 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Suite 212, 400 W. Robinson Orlando, Florida 32801 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts were found: At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent was a licensed Ordinary Life, including Disability Agent, doing business as Steven Miller Insurance and Associates located at 718 Broadway, Suite 2, Daytona Beach, Florida. On June 2, 1983, the Respondent was charged by a Criminal Information in Case No. 83-2219-CC with two (2) felony counts, Count I being presentation of a fraudulent insurance claim, in violation of section 817.234, Florida Statutes, and County II being grand theft of the second degree, in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes. On January 5, 1984, the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the felony offense of Grand Theft of the Second Degree, a Third Degree Felony, Case No. 83-2219-CC, in the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Volusia County, Florida. On January 5, 1984, the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit accepted Respondent's plea of Nolo Contendere and placed Respondent on three (3) years of supervised probation, withholding adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence. On July 8, 1985, Respondent was discharged from probation after successfully completing eighteen (18) months of his three (3) year probationary period. Respondent's testimony was that: (1) his boat, a 24- foot Regal Royal was taken while parked across from his home just prior to June 29, 1982; (2) he reported the theft to the Daytona Beach Police Department on June 29, 1982; (3) he filed an insurance claim several months after reporting the theft to the police and was paid; (4) approximately one (1) year later his boat was found in the possession of his wife's sister and her husband; and (5) he plead nolo contendere to the charge of grand theft on advice of counsel that a plea of nolo contendere was the same as pleading innocent, would not affect his insurance license and the plea would avoid putting a strain on his marriage. Mainly this testimony went unrebutted by the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of facts and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of violating section 626.611(14), Florida Statutes. For such violation, considering the circumstances surrounding the violation, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order suspending the Respondent's license for a period of two (2) years. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 1985. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact No. 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact No. 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact No. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact No. 4 with the exception of the language that "Respondent was sentenced." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 specifically states that sentence was withheld and Respondent was placed on probation. Rejected on a conclusion of law rather than a proposed finding of fact. Adopted in Finding of Fact No. 5 with the exception of the date July 1, 1985. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 shows the order was entered on July 8, 1985. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: (Respondent did not number the paragraphs in his Proposed Findings of Facts but for purposes of this Appendix a number has been assigned to each paragraph.) This information was considered as background information and, therefore, covered in the background portion of this Recommended Order. Adopted in Finding of Fact No. 1. This information was considered as background information and, therefore, was covered in the background portion of this Recommended Order. The information in the first sentence was considered as background information and, therefore, was covered in the background portion of this Recommended Order. The second sentence is Respondent's interpretation of what Petitioner alleges and is not a finding of fact but more a conclusion of law. 5.-6. Other than as adopted in Finding of Fact No. 6, rejected as immaterial, unnecessary and unsupported hearsay. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact Nos. 4 and 5 with the exception of the language "after completing six months he was released." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 and Respondent's testimony on lines 15-19, page 15 of the transcript shows Respondent served eighteen (18) months of his probationary period. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa Santucci, Esquire 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Girtman 1030 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable William Gunter Department of Insurance and Treasurer State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol - Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On Tuesday, April 24, 1979, respondent went to the home of Alberta Cross in Melbourne, Florida, to see Ms. Cross' daughter, Sandra Young, mother of his two children. At the time, respondent was having an argument with Sandra Young. Frank Bell, a friend of Ms. Cross for several years, was at her house when respondent called on Ms. Young. Mr. Bell pointed a gun at respondent and ordered him off the property. Ms. Young threw herself between respondent and Mr. Bell and then left with respondent in the van in which he had arrived. After talking things over with a friend, respondent decided to swear out a warrant for Mr. Bell's arrest. As a result, Mr. Bell was arrested the following day. He was released from jail on bond, on April 26, 1979, a Thursday. Some seven years earlier, Mr. Bell and respondent had confronted one another at Ms. Cross' house. On that occasion, too, Mr. Bell pointed a gun at respondent. Between 5:00 and 5:30 on the afternoon of April 26, 1979, Mr. Bell arrived at the home of Linda Marie Harden. Ms. Harden lived within sight of respondent's father's house. A little before 7:00 o'clock on the evening of April 26, 1979, Mr. Bell left the Harden residence in a 1964 Chevrolet sedan. Both windows on the left hand side of the vehicle were rolled up. The left front door window was held together with tape and could not be rolled down. The left front door could not be opened from the inside of the car. As Mr. Bell turned a corner in front of respondent's father's house, respondent took up position with a shotgun, threw a cinder block at the car, and, when Mr. Bell turned around to see what had caused the noise, fired a single shot which blew out both windows on the left hand side of the car, hit Mr. Bell in the left shoulder, forehead, back of his head, and left eye, knocked him over in his seat, and resulted in his hospitalization for nine days. After the shooting, respondent fled. Respondent could have avoided a confrontation with Mr. Bell by taking cover. Respondent's father and respondent's son were sitting in the front yard with respondent, beside one of two vans parked in the front yard, when respondent first spotted Mr. Bell's car. Respondent's father grabbed his grandson and ran for the house before the shooting. Instead of making a run for the house or taking shelter behind a van, respondent threw the cinder block and fired the shotgun. When the police arrived, they found a pistol on the right hand side of the floor in the back of Mr. Bell's car. Mr. Bell did not point this gun at respondent on April 26, 1979; Mr. Bell did not even see respondent before the shot was fired. As a result of these events, respondent was tried on charges of aggravated battery. In those proceedings, as in these, he raised the defense of self defense. The criminal trial eventuated in an acquittal. Three young people, including two of respondent's former students, witnessed the shooting. News of the incident spread rapidly. The next day, respondent's principal received eight to ten telephone calls from parents with remarks like "Surely you won't let a murderer stay in the classroom." Other parents complained in person and two students mentioned the incident to the principal. Respondent was suspended on April 27, 1979, and subsequently fired, by the Brevard County School Board. After respondent's acquittal, 120 students signed a petition for his reinstatement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Education suspend respondent's teaching certificate for three years. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Holder, Esquire 110 North Magnolia Drive Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C. Anthony Cleveland, Esquire 208 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue for disposition is whether Mary McCarty, Respondent in a complaint to the Florida Commissions on Ethics, is entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees from the complainant, Leslie F. McDermott, pursuant to Section 112.317(8), F.S.
Findings Of Fact Mary McCarty has resided in Delray Beach, Florida for approximately twenty years. She is politically active as a Republican; she served as a Delray Beach city commissioner from 1987 until 1990, and now currently serves as chairperson of the Palm Beach County Commission. William (Bill) Andrews, also a Republican, was elected to the Delray Beach City Commission approximately one year after Ms. McCarty. The two worked together on certain issues, including an issue regarding the firing of the city manager, and more often than not, they voted on the same side. Leslie F. McDermott lives in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County, Florida. He has never resided in Delray Beach. He is employed as an engineer for a computer company and is well known and respected in the community as an active member of the NAACP. He served as president of the south county branch of the NAACP for seven or eight years until recently, and now serves on the executive board of that local branch. Jeanette (Jay) Slavin is a "grass roots" political activist in the south county area. As a Democrat she has been very involved in political campaigns and has openly supported candidates and issues in heated opposition to Mary McCarty. Malcolm Byrd, a Republican, served on the Delray Beach City Commission from 1979 until 1987, and was city manager from 1989-90. At first he supported Mary McCarty, but as city manager he had differing views of how the city should proceed and how the city manager should function. In early 1990, Malcolm Byrd learned that Bill Andrews had attended a Republican fund-raiser in Orlando, with transportation by chartered jet and limousine provided by a third party. Bill Andrews openly discussed the trip and how lavish it was. Andrews displayed a photograph of himself at the event with President Reagan or other noted Republicans. Malcolm Byrd became aware that Andrews had not reported that trip on his financial disclosure form, and shared that information with Jay Slavin. There was also some talk that Mary McCarty had attended the fund-raiser, as Andrews referred to "we" when discussing the trip. Mary McCarty's financial disclosure form for 1990 did not reflect the alleged gifts related to the trip. Jay Slavin had lunch with Leslie McDermott and urged him to file ethics complaints against both Andrews and McCarty. Ms. Slavin had obtained the requisite forms from the commission. She felt that Leslie McDermott's complaint would have more credibility as she, Slavin, was known to be politically opposed to Andrews and McCarty. Leslie McDermott was reluctant at first to file the complaint against McCarty, as the only basis that Jay Slavin gave him was that Bill Andrews said "we" went on the trip, and everyone knew that Mary McCarty frequently attended fund-raisers and political events. Leslie McDermott drafted the complaint based on information from Jay Slavin, and Ms. Slavin typed it for his signature, as he has a visual handicap. Before sending the complaint, McDermott spoke with Malcolm Byrd, who told him that he did not have the evidence on McCarty that he had on Andrews and that he could not encourage him to file on McCarty. McDermott heard rumors from other people who believed she had attended the function, but no one told him they had personal knowledge of the trip or had actually seen McCarty. At the hearing, and during the investigation by the commission, Leslie McDermott refused to divulge the names of those other persons who told him they believed Mary McCarty took the trip. After sending the complaints, McDermott gave Jay Slavin permission to give them to three newspapers which he specified: the Palm Beach Post, the Sun Times and the Fort Lauderdale Sentinel. He personally called the papers and told them that the matters in the complaints needed to be investigated. He also told the reporters that the complaints had no official connection with the NAACP. He considered the three papers to be responsible, non-sensational publications and he had experience in the past with issuing press releases. On February 6, 1992 the Sun-Sentinel published a story with the headline, "ETHICS COMPLAINTS FILED", stating that an NAACP official filed ethics complaints alleging that Mary McCarty and Bill Andrews attended a $1000 a plate fund-raiser paid for by a group of bond brokers, and failed to disclose the gifts. Mary McCarty contacted the NAACP, and Leslie McDermott was chastised for involving the organization. He did not call the newspaper to demand a corrective article as he did not want to "add fuel to the fire". He avowed distress, however, that people associated the issue with the NAACP. Meanwhile, the Ethics Commission conducted its investigation and found that, indeed, Mary McCarty did not attend the event. That was a conclusion that should have been reached by Mr. McDermott prior to his filing the complaint. Instead, on the complaint form, he signed the following statement under oath: COMPLAINT THAT THE COMMISSIONER NAMED ABOVE, THEN A DELRAY BEACH CITY COMMISSIONER DID VIOLATE FLORIDA STATUTE 112 IN THAT THE COMMISSIONER ACCEPTED GIFTS VALUED IN EXCESS OF $100.00 AND FAILED TO REPORT SAME IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE LAW. THE GIFTS WERE PROVIDED BY MEMBERS OF A BOND UNDERWRITING GROUP HEADED BY SMITH BARNEY. THEY INCLUDED: ROUND TRIP TRANSPORTATION ON A CORPORATE JET FROM WEST PALM BEACH TO ORLANDO AND BACK; AND, ROUND TRIP LIMOUSINE SERVICE FROM THE ORLANDO AIRPORT TO THE ORANGE COUNTY CONVENTION AND CIVIC CENTER AND RETURN TO THE AIRPORT; AND, A TICKET TO ATTEND THE $1000 PER PERSON FUND RAISER DINNER BENEFITING GOV. MARTINEZ AND FEATURING PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH. THE FOREGOING GIFTS HAVE AN ESTIMATED VALUE OF $1350 TO 1500 WELL IN EXCESS OF THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. THE COMMISSIONERS FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FORM FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1990 WHICH COVERS THE DATE OF THE SUBJECT EVENT ON FRIDAY APRIL 20 1990 SHOWS NO GIFTS RECEIVED. IN ADDITION TO COMMENTS MADE TO VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE TRIP, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT ALL EXPENSES HAD BEEN PAID BY THE BOND BROKERS, THE COMMISSIONER WAS OBSERVED AT THE EVENT BY NUMEROUS LOCAL OFFICIALS AND RESIDENTS. (Exhibit 1, Complaint dated February 2, 1992) Leslie McDermott did not ask Bill Andrews or Mary McCarty whether she attended the function. He did not contact anyone, including the sponsor of the event, who would likely have personal knowledge of her attendance. Instead, he relied on rumors and indirect reports, all which he knew were based on these tenuous connections: Bill Andrews used the term "we" in bragging about the trip. Mary McCarty frequently attended political events and was politically active. Mary McCarty and Bill Andrews, both Republicans (but not the only Republicans on the city council), often voted alike. Some unnamed persons overheard conversations which made them believe that Bill Andrews and Mary McCarty were on the trip together. Leslie McDermott's explanation that he released the complaint to the press so that an investigation could be conducted is simply not persuasive. He is an educated, articulate and experienced individual. He knew or should have known that public exposure of his complaint would injure the reputation of Ms. McCarty. Despite his own initial misgivings, Mr. McDermott allowed himself to be used by individuals who could only benefit from that injury. His failure, due to hubris or extraordinarily bad judgment, to make a reasonable attempt to check the veracity of the rumors, constitutes the reckless disregard by which malicious intent may be proven. In defending against the complaint and in pursuing relief in this proceeding, Mary McCarty has incurred costs and attorneys fees in the total amount of $12,876.55. Exhibit #4a), b), and c) appropriately itemizes the 50.9 hours and $2696.55 costs incurred. The hourly rate of $200.00 was stipulated as reasonable. Leslie McDermott contests the reasonableness of any time spent and costs incurred after the commission's order finding no probable cause was issued. Based upon the unrefuted testimony of Robert V. Romani, Esquire, an experienced litigator, past-president of the Palm Beach County Bar Association and member of the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar; and after considering relevant case law discussed below, I find that the hours and costs both before and after dismissal of the complaint are reasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics issue its final order awarding fees and costs in the total amount $12,876.55 to Mary McCarty from Leslie McDermott. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5168EC The findings of fact proposed by both parties are substantially adopted here, with the exception of the following findings proposed by Leslie McDermott. Paragraph 13. The "reasonable" appearance or belief as to Ms. McCarty's guilt is rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Paragraph 15. The reason Mr. McDermott presents for signing the complaint is rejected as not credible, in the face of his inconsistent action in presenting the complaint to the press. Paragraphs 16-18 are rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Kenneth D. Stern, Esquire Post Office Box 3878 Boca Raton, Florida 33427-3878 James K. Green, Esquire One Clearlake Centre 250 South Australian Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner's application for licensure should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Financial Services, is the state agency responsible for the licensure of insurance agents in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. On January 6, 2004, Respondent received an application from Petitioner for temporary licensure as a life and health insurance agent. Petitioner answered "no" to the following question on that application: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory [or] country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? At the end of the application, immediately above a space for the applicant's signature and in a section of the application titled "Applicant Affirmation Statement," appears the following language: I do solemnly swear that all answers to the foregoing questions and statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. . . . * * * Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for license and that the facts stated in it are true. I understand that misrepresentation of any fact required to be disclosed through this application is a violation of The Florida Insurance and Administrative Codes and may result in the denial of my application and/or the revocation of my insurance license(s). Pursuant to the instructions on the form, Petitioner signed the application, dated it December 12, 2003, and mailed it to Respondent. As documented by General Court Martial Order No. 17-01 of Sea Control Squadron Three Two at the Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida, obtained by Respondent during the application process, Petitioner, on January 18, 2001, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Distribution of Ecstasy, a Felony, and was found guilty of the offense. Petitioner was sentenced to confinement for a period of 40 months, and reduction to pay grade E-1, and subjected to dishonorable discharge. A portion of the sentence was suspended upon the issuance of the dishonorable discharge, following an order of Rear Admiral Jan C. Gaudio on May 30, 2002. By correspondence to Respondent, received on June 29, 2004, and through his testimony at the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that his attorney at the time informed him that his criminal record would never be seen outside the military. Notwithstanding his attorney’s assurance, Petitioner informed two subsequent employers that he thought he had a felony record. When those employers checked and discovered no convictions, he assumed the records were sealed as his previous attorney had assured him would be the case. Accordingly, he did not disclose the matter on his application. By Notice of Denial dated June 7, 2004, Respondent informed Petitioner that his application was denied for violations of Sections 626.611, 626.621(8), 626.785(1), and 626.831(1), Florida Statutes. Additionally, the denial informed Petitioner of required waiting periods set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042. In Petitioner’s case, he was also informed that a 16-year waiting period would be required before reapplication could be considered by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent acted properly in denying Petitioner’s application. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregg Allen Brewer 9342 Cumberland Station Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32257 Dana M. Wiehle, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Peter Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should pay Petitioner's attorney's fees and costs, and, if so, the amount.
Findings Of Fact Mayor Osborne was the Mayor of Beverly Beach, Florida, during 1999 through 2001. Dr. Milanick was a dentist who owned property immediately north of Beverly Beach, Florida. Dr. Milanick desired that the property be annexed into the town and initiated annexation proceedings before the City of Beverly Beach. Mayor Osborne did not facilitate the requested annexation during the time he served as Mayor of Beverly Beach. Dr. Milanick alleged to the Commission that Mayor Osborne opposed the annexation for personal, financial gain. In order to defend himself against these false allegations, Mayor Osborne retained Robert J. Riggio, Esquire, of the Riggio and Mitchell firm of Daytona Beach. The Original Award of Attorney's Fees An award of attorney's fees and costs in favor of Mayor Osborne was recommended in Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 04-4110E. The Recommended Order stated that the amount of attorney's fees and costs for Mayor Osborne to defend against Dr. Milanick's allegations was $4,976.00. The Commission did not address the amount of attorney's fees and costs in its Final Order, but instead held that Mayor Osborne was not entitled to any award. Subsequently, the Fifth District Court of Appeal found the Commission's Final Order to be erroneous and remanded the matter ". . . for entry of an order making the awards recommended by the ALJ." A Mandate with regard to the Fifth District Court of Appeal issued April 11, 2007. The award recommended by the ALJ was, as stated above, $4,976.00, and that amount should be awarded by the Commission in a Final Order. Appellate Attorney's Fees Mayor Osborne filed a Motion for Petitioner's Appellate Attorneys' Fees and Costs before the Commission on May 10, 2007, noting the Fifth District Court of Appeal, in its Order dated February 16, 2007, stated that, "Appellant's Motion For Attorney's Fees, filed May 16, 2006, is granted and the above- styled cause is hereby remanded to the Commission . . . to determine and assess reasonable attorney's fees for this appeal." The Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed only attorney's fees. However, because Mayor Osborne's Motion sought both attorney's fees and costs, and because the Commission sent that Motion without special directions to the Division of Administrative Hearings for resolution, it is found that the Administrative Law Judge has jurisdiction to recommend awards of both attorney's fees and costs expended in prosecuting the appeal. David C. Robinson, an attorney in Daytona Beach, Florida, testified as an expert on attorney's fees in Volusia County, Florida. He has practiced law in Daytona Beach for 26 years and has testified in other attorney's fees cases. He is familiar with the fees charged by attorneys in the Daytona Beach and Volusia County area. He knows Attorney Robert Riggio, of Daytona Beach, Volusia County, and Attorney Martin Pedata, of Deland, a town that is also located in Volusia County. Mr. Robinson is found to be an expert on the subject of reasonable attorney's fees and costs in Volusia County. Mr. Robinson reviewed the bills and records relating to the fees charged to Mayor Osborne as to the appellate filings made by Mr. Riggio. In doing so he considered the Lodestar approach as described in Florida Patients Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Mr. Robinson opined that the services performed by Mr. Riggio in the appellate proceeding were provided in a manner that an attorney would be reasonably expected to provide. He reviewed the hourly rate charged by Mr. Riggio and stated that the reasonable rate should be $250.00 per hour, but that Mr. Riggio only charged $150.00 per hour. Mr. Riggio's law firm, Riggio and Mitchell, billed Mayor Osborne for 95 hours. A small portion of the work was accomplished by his partner Jerome D. Mitchell. Other work in the amount of 9.4 hours was billed for paralegal work at $40.00 per hour. The 95 hours of attorney work was billed at $150.00 per hour for a total of $14,250.00, and the paralegal work totaled $376.00. Costs amounted to $859.70. This resulted in a total of $14,626.00 for fees and $859.70 in costs. Mayor Osborne paid these charges in full. Mr. Robinson opined that the rate charged and hours expended by Mr. Riggio in the appellate proceeding were appropriate, as were the costs incurred. His testimony is found to be credible. As a result of Mr. Riggio's efforts, Mayor Osborne prevailed in the appeal. It is found that Dr. Milanick caused Mayor Osborne to pay attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $15,485.70. Proving Entitlement to Fees and Costs Subsequent to Dr. Milanick's allegations of misconduct before the Commission, and after an investigation, the Commission, in a Public Report dated September 8, 2004, dismissed the complaint on a finding of no probable cause in the case of Mayor Osborne. Pursuant to Subsection 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, Mayor Osborne was entitled to be reimbursed for the attorney's fees and costs associated with defending himself against Dr. Milanick's allegations. Because Dr. Milanick did not voluntarily remit the fees and costs expended, a hearing was required. A hearing was held in this matter in Daytona Beach, Florida, on May 11, 2005. The hearing in Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 04-4110FE, lasted an entire day. Prior to the hearing, Mayor Osborne engaged the services of Attorney Martin Pedata in addition to those provided by Mr. Riggio. The agreement for representation by Mr. Pedata was reduced to writing on April 6, 2005. The agreement provided that Mayor Osborne would pay Mr. Pedata $250.00 per hour for his services and $75.00 per hour for paralegal services. Mr. Robinson reviewed the bills and records relating to the fees charged to Mayor Osborne for the preparation for and the conduct of the hearing of May 11, 2005. Mr. Robinson stated that the hourly rate of $250.00 was a reasonable one for the type of services provided by Mr. Pedata. He stated that the number of hours expended by Mr. Riggio and Mr. Pedata in connection with this hearing was reasonable. In analyzing this claim he used the Lodestar approach set forth in Rowe. Mr. Riggio and his partner Mr. Mitchell, expended 160.6 hours proving entitlement to fees and costs. Mr. Pedata, as lead attorney in the entitlement case, expended 107 hours. In addition, 54.2 paralegal hours were expended in proving the entitlement case. These hours include the time up to the filing of the appeal with the Fifth District Court of Appeal. These hours also include the time spent before the Commission. As a result of the efforts of Mr. Riggio and Mr. Pedata, Mayor Osborne prevailed in the entitlement hearing, which resulted in a Recommended Order in his favor. Mayor Osborne paid Mr. Riggio and Mr. Pedata a total of $50,840.00 for their services in proving entitlement to attorney's fees. He also paid $2,168.00 for paralegal services. Total costs amounted to $3,764.73, which Mayor Osborne paid. The total fees and costs to Mayor Osborne was $56,772.73. Mr. Robinson opined that the rate charged and hours expended by Mr. Riggio in the appellate proceeding were appropriate, as were the costs incurred. His testimony is found to be credible. It is found that Dr. Milanick was responsible for Mayor Osborne having to pay attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $56,772.73. Additional fees and costs Mr. Riggio presented Mayor Osborne with an invoice in the amount of $2,370.00 for the cost of the current proceeding. However, the Administrative Law Judge is without jurisdiction to address this claim in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics award attorney's fees and costs as follows: The original award of attorney's fees in the amount of $4,976.00. Attorney's fees and costs for appellate attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $15,485.70. Attorney's fees and costs for proving entitlement to fees and costs in the amount of $56,772.73. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Riggio, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 400 South Palmetto Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Kaye Starling Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Dr. Alexander J. Milanick 7250 A1A South St. Augustine Shores, Florida 32080 Phillip C. Claypool, Executive Director and General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James Peterson, Esquire Linzie Bogan, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact Beginning on July 9, 1973, up to and including the date of the hearing, the Respondent, Hal K. Johnson, was a registered real estate salesman under certificate no. 54569, held with the Florida Real Estate Commission. In the January 22, 1973 application which the Respondent, Hal K. Johnson, filed for registration as a real estate salesman, he answered the question no. 9 found therein. Question no. 9 says: "Have you ever been arrested for or charged with, the commission of an offense against the laws of any municipality, state or nation including traffic offenses, without regard to whether sentence has been passed or served, or whether the verdict or judgement has been reversed or set aside or not, or pardon or parole granted. if yes, state details in full. The answer which was given by Hal K. Johnson was, "DWI, December, 1972 & June, 1976, Failure to yield, Dec. 1972". In addition to the offenses indicated in his answer to question no. 9, the Respondent, Hal K. Johnson, had been arrested for a number of other offenses. On September 20, 1955, the Respondent had been arrested for disorderly conduct/drunk. On August 20, 1957, the Respondent had been arrested for driving while intoxicated. On January 28, 1959, the Respondent had been arrested for driving while intoxicated. On February 27, 1959, the Respondent had been arrested for disorderly conduct/drunk. On March 6, 1959, the Respondent had been arrested for disorderly conduct/drunk. On July 1, 1959, the Respondent had been arrested for disorderly conduct/drunk. On August 12, 1961, the Respondent was arrested for disorderly conduct/drunk. On January 17, 1962, the Respondent was arrested for disorderly conduct/drunk. On November 10, 1962, the Respondent was arrested for disorderly conduct/drunk. On September 18, 1963, the Respondent was arrested for having no drivers license. On December 13, 1963, the Respondent was arrested for disorderly conduct/drunk. On March 23, 1967, the Respondent was charged with disorderly conduct/drunk and profane language. On July 30, 1967, the Respondent was charged with disorderly conduct/drunk. On September 4, 1967, the Respondent was charged with reckless operation of motor vehicle, driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages. On June 5, 1968, the Respondent was charged with disorderly conduct/drunk. On July 19, 1968, the Respondent was charged with disorderly conduct/drunk. On April 18, 1972, the Respondent was charged with disorderly conduct/drunk.
Recommendation At the hearing, the Respondent, Hal K. Johnson, did not challenge the facts as presented in the administrative complaint. His intention in appearing at the hearing was to offer mitigation. In the way of mitigation, Mr. Johnson said that he was only given one line to answer the question no. 9, which did not provide him enough room, notwithstanding the fact that he had read the instructions which said that additional information should be provided on a separate sheet. Moreover, Mr. Johnson said that the language of question no. 9, which says "commission of an offense . . .", only calls for just one offense to be listed and he in fact listed three. He also said that he did not put some of the drunk arrests down because now they don't even require you to be arrested, they just take you someplace." In addition, he indicated that he did not know where to get the records of these arrests that had been placed against him. He said he thought that the records of these matters were found in Tallahassee, Florida. The three indications of arrests were also felt, in the mind of the Respondent, to be a sufficient indication of the 20 arrests that had been made. Finally, the Respondent said that he wants to make it clear that he didn't intend to try to make misstatements, although he agrees that he failed to elaborate, which to him was an error of omission not intent. Having considered the explanation offered by Mr. Hal K. Johnson, the Respondent, in view of the facts, it is recommended that his certificate no. 54569, as a registered real estate salesman be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mr. Hal K. Johnson c/o Fowler Realty 8917 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32211
