The Issue Whether Respondent’s rights and benefits under the City of Tampa General Employees’ Retirement Fund (the Fund) are required to be forfeited pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2018).1/
Findings Of Fact The Fund is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. The Fund is charged with administering and managing a pension plan for City employees. Respondent was an employee of the City’s Parks and Recreation Department. Although she began working as a seasonal employee during the summers when she was in college, Respondent began in a permanent capacity as a recreation leader in October 2006. As part of her duties, Respondent was responsible for working in the City’s afterschool and cheerleading program. In Fall 2018, Respondent was responsible for ordering the uniforms for the participants in the cheerleading program. The money for the uniforms was provided to the City by the participants’ parents. Initially, the money was collected by a parent representative who converted it to a pre-paid purchasing card in the amount of $762.00, and submitted the card to Respondent. Respondent was to use the card to order the uniforms for the cheerleaders, and the uniforms were to be delivered to the City’s Parks and Recreation office. Michelle Keeler, Respondent’s supervisor, noticed the uniforms had not arrived at the expected date. On October 26, 2018, she questioned Respondent about the delay. Respondent initially told Ms. Keeler there had been a mistake by the delivery company. At this point, Ms. Keeler, who had supervised Respondent since Respondent had started working at the City, had no reason to suspect Respondent was lying. Over the next few weeks, Ms. Keeler periodically asked Respondent about the status of the cheerleading uniforms and was told there was a problem with the delivery. By mid-November, Ms. Keeler became suspicious and again asked Respondent about the uniforms. Respondent indicated the uniforms had been delivered and left in the office, but were now missing. Respondent suggested to Ms. Keeler that the cleaning crew may have thrown out the box of uniforms. On November 26, 2018, Ms. Keeler called the cheerleading uniform company and discovered no uniforms had been ordered for delivery to the City’s Parks and Recreation Department. The same day, Ms. Keeler confronted Respondent about the uniforms. Respondent insisted she had ordered them, but could not produce any records to show that she had made the order. She was also questioned by another Parks and Recreation supervisor, and gave the same response. Upon further interrogation, Respondent changed her story, admitting she had not actually ordered the uniforms. She claimed the card had been stolen from her. Respondent later provided a written statement to the City, in which Respondent claimed she still had the pre-paid card in her possession, but that the card no longer had any funds. Eventually, Respondent admitted to City staff that she no longer had the funds. On November 30, 2018, the City placed Respondent on suspension, pending an investigation. The City considered the funds collected for the purchase of the uniforms to be City property. Ultimately, the City ordered the missing uniforms and covered the cost. Based on the investigation, the City found Respondent to be in violation of section B28.2A(3)(d)(1) of the City’s Personnel Manual concerning “Moral Turpitude,” prohibiting “[f]alsification, misrepresentation, or material omission of statements, testimony, or any document or record completed in the course of employment or in obtaining employment, including group insurance claims.” The City also found Respondent had violated section B28.2A(3)(d)(11) of the Personnel Manual prohibiting theft or unauthorized removal or use of City property. As a result of its investigation and the violations, the City terminated Respondent on March 12, 2019. At the hearing, Respondent admitted she collected the money for the uniforms, misled City staff about the missing uniforms, and was terminated for theft.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, City of Tampa General Employees’ Retirement Fund enter a final order determining Respondent, Deirdre Williams, has forfeited all of her rights and benefits in the pension plan administered by the Fund, except to the extent of Respondent’s accumulated contributions, if any, as of March 12, 2019. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2019.
Findings Of Fact On or about February 13, 1995, Petitioner, Hillary Sklar, filed Petitioner's Second Amended Petition. Ms. Sklar has challenged the Department's determination that an amendment to the City's comprehensive plan adopted by Ordinance No. 94-2-2 was "in compliance." In the second amended petition Ms. Sklar made the following allegations concerning her standing to institute this proceeding: * * * 2. The Petitioner's address is 11321 Southwest 49th Place, Fort Lauderdale, 33330, in the County of Broward, Florida. * * * 4. On February 8, 1994, the Respondent passed Ordinance NO. 94 -2 -2 authorizing the implement- ation of Land Use Plan Amendment 94 - S - 1. The Land Use Plan Amendment affects property located at 11791 Southwest 49th Street, Cooper City, in the County of Broward. . . . * * * Petitioner's property is located in a section of unincorporated Broward County which abuts and adjoins the property in question. Petitioner's property has been defined by Respondent as an "enclave." Petitioner's property is similarly situated to those of property owners in Cooper City and will be affected more than those property owners located in Cooper City; including, but not limited to, the allegations contained in Paragraphs 10 through 17, inclusive. Petitioner made objections to the ordinance at the February 8, 1994 City Council meeting discussing adoption of the ordinance. . . . * * * Ms. Sklar has still failed to allege that she resides, owns property or operates a business located with a City of Cooper City address or which otherwise is subject to the jurisdiction of the City of Cooper City. The oral objections made by Ms. Sklar were made at a public hearing of the City of Cooper City Council held on February 8, 1994. According to the minutes of that meeting, Ms. Sklar "said the zoning is a done deal and the annexation and sale was a done deal. Why should it be a done deal before the Public Hearing was held, she asked." The factual information contained in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order is hereby incorporated by reference.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's Second Amended Petition, filed by Hillary Sklar. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward R. Curtis, Esquire Bruce Botsford, Esquire 1828 S.E. 1st Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Suzanne H. Schmith Certified Legal Intern Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Silvia Morell Alderman, Esquire Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Dan Stengle, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue The issues are whether the Florida Commission on Ethics (Ethics Commission) has jurisdiction over Counts I and IV of the Advocate's Amended Recommendation, pursuant to section 122.322(1), Florida Statutes; if jurisdiction exists over Count IV, whether Respondent, while a commissioner and vice mayor of the City of Margate (City), violated section 112.313(7), Florida Statutes, by appearing before the City commission on behalf of his employer, which was seeking a beer and wine license for consumption on the premises (2COP); and whether Respondent is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Complaint is on a Ethics Commission form (Form 50) that asks the complainant for a full explanation of the complaint. The complaint form refers twice to documents. The complaint form asks the complainant not to attach copies of lengthy documents; the form assures that, "if they are relevant, your description of them will suffice." The oath printed on the complaint form states: "I . . . do depose on oath or affirmation . . . that the facts set forth in the foregoing complaint and attachments thereto are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief." The Complaint, which is signed and notarized, contains no explanation or narrative, but Complainant attached 11 pages of copies of documents, which are marked as pages 3 through 13. Page three of the Complaint is an article dated March 8, 2012, and posted on MargateNews.net.5/ This article reports that, by a 3-2 vote, the City commission reprimanded Respondent for abusing City credit card privileges, even though Respondent claimed to have repaid any unauthorized charges. The article reports that one commissioner expressed a belief that Respondent misused a City credit card and committed a "few other abuses." At page four of the Complaint is a copy of the City credit card agreement signed by Respondent. Handwritten notations add: "This (i.e., the credit card agreement) states that he (Respondent) cannot use card for personal use in which he did[.] [H]e bought beer and wine for his bar with cash advance. Says he paid it back in cash be has no repcit (sic) for it." All handwritten notes on documents attached to the Complaint and Amended Complaint were made by Complainant.6/ At page five, a MargateNews.net article dated August 16, 2010, reports alleged tax and purchasing violations by McLean's Bar & Grill, which was located at 2160 Mears Parkway. This article mentions other matters, including Respondent's voting a pay raise for City commissioners and a property-tax hike, Respondent's "history of financial instability . . . and fiduciary irresponsibility," and Respondent's two residential evictions from 1996-2006 for lease defaults. At page six is an unsigned, typewritten letter about Respondent. This letter twice charges that Respondent misused a City credit card and also alleges that he failed to repay $15,000 from "a Margate taxpayer"--Complainant--and violated unspecified tax and purchasing laws as to alcoholic beverages. A handwritten note adds: "I read this at the commissioner meeting." Below this note is printed Complainant's name. At pages seven and eight, a MargateNews.net article dated October 30, 2011, states that Complainant had lent Respondent $15,000 for a kitchen addition at McLean's Bar & Grill, but Respondent had failed to repay the loan after the business closed. This article alludes to some bad debts and judgments against Respondent or his businesses, but portions of the article are illegible, and the meaning of these portions of the article is unclear. The same article reports that Respondent was now operating Dave's Tiki Bar, which was located at 238 North State Road 7. Part of this portion of the article is also illegible, but seems to report that Jean LeBlanc, a co-owner with Respondent of a "former Tiki Bar," cancelled the bar's 2COP beer and wine license, effectively closing the bar. To reopen the Tiki Bar, according to the article, Respondent convinced his fellow City commissioners to hold a special meeting of the City commission in August 2011 to grant a 2COP license to "Tiki bar petitioner, Kenneth Suhandron," whom the article describes as Respondent's "partner." The article notes that Respondent abstained from voting due to a conflict of interest. The article states that Respondent acquired the corporate owner of the bar days after the special meeting, so Respondent now holds the temporary 2COP license, even though he had not paid for it. An online update indicates that Respondent paid for the 2COP license on November 1, 2011. At page nine, a MargateNews.net article dated August 20, 2011, describes a special meeting of the City commission on August 15. This article states that Respondent had been managing the Tiki Bar when a disagreement between him and his partner, Mr. LeBlanc, resulted in the cancellation of the bar's 2COP beer and wine license. According to the article, Respondent found a new investor, Mr. Suhandron, to apply for a new 2COP license and called for a special meeting of the City commission to provide the necessary City approval for the applicant to obtain a 2COP license. The article notes that Respondent appeared at the meeting to represent the listed applicant, Mr. Suhandron, but abstained from voting due to a conflict of interest. At pages 10 through 12 are a final summary judgment against Respondent and McLean's Bar & Grill, Inc., for $29,638.60 and a final judgment against Respondent for $20,073.63. At page 13 is an email from Complainant that pertains to the charge of Respondent's misuse of a City credit card. Redacted from the email is reportedly an email that another City commissioner had sent to Complainant, who added a handwritten note to this effect. The Amended Complaint is on the same form as the Complaint and is also notarized.7/ Like the Complaint, the Amended Complaint contains no explanation or narration of the charges, but it contains 41 pages of copies of documents, which are attached as pages A-3 through A-43. At pages A-3 through A-4, a letter dated May 16, 2012, from the Ethics Commission to Complainant focuses on Respondent's alleged failure to repay the $15,000 loan from Complainant and Respondent's misuse of a City credit card. To this letter, Complainant added a handwritten note stating: I cannot prove he use[d] [a City credit card for cash advances] for alcohol. . . for bar but just the cash advance alone is breaking the law over [sentence abruptly ends]. Just last week he got fined again for selling illigiel [sic] beer that he bought from a gas station in his bar[.] It will be in margate news.net next week[. I]f you want I can email you a copy. This man is a con artist. Pages A-5 through A-8 comprise a promissory note evidencing the $15,000 loan from Complainant. Complainant handwrote on the note: "He never gave me 1 payment or any interest payments." Pages A-9 through A-14 are the minutes of a meeting of the City commission on March 7, 2012. The sole handwritten addition to these minutes is at the top of the first page: "Each one of the following [commissioners?] has info on it[. A]ll are highlighted or outlined for your use." According to the minutes, one commissioner stated that she believed that Respondent had misused a City credit card and wanted him to resign, but he refused to respond to her statement or, clearly, to resign. This commissioner asked the City attorney to identify the options available to the City commission. The City attorney informed the commission that there had not been a determination that Respondent had violated the standards of conduct or code of ethics in his use of a City credit card and advised that the City commission could order an investigation, prospectively clarify the restrictions on the use of City credit cards and provide for forfeiture of office for a violation of these restrictions, publicly censure or reprimand a City commissioner, or prohibit a City commissioner from using a City credit card. According to the minutes, another commissioner--the mayor--then stated that what Respondent had done was wrong. The commissioner who had called for Respondent's resignation then asked for an investigation to be conducted by the county Board of Ethics or the Ethics Commission. The mayor responded that either this commissioner or a resident would need to file such a request because the City commission was not in a position to do so itself. A motion to censure Respondent, revoke his City credit card, and order an investigation then failed for the lack of a second. A motion followed to censure Respondent and revoke his City credit card. This motion was amended to add a directive to the City attorney to add restrictions to the use of City credit cards and provide for forfeiture of office for their violation. Prior to a vote on this amended motion, someone made a motion to table the amended motion, but the motion to table failed by a 2-3 vote. The commission then considered the amended motion, which passed 3-2. Respondent voted to table the amended motion and against the amended motion. At pages A-15 through A-21, the minutes of a meeting of the City commission on March 21, 2012, state that Respondent asked the City manager to cancel his City credit card "in light of the recent inquiries on his use of the card." (It appears, though, that the adoption of the March 7 amended motion should already have resulted in the cancellation of Respondent's City credit card.) According to the minutes, Respondent then "apologized for the mistrust the matter had caused" and added that "he did not intentionally misuse his position to mistrust anyone." Reverting to more conventional syntax, Respondent concluded: "He could not change what happened, but he had made it right and said it would not happen again." Complainant drew a box around this paragraph of the minutes, and he drew an arrow pointing to a corner of the box. Later in the meeting, the City commission unanimously agreed to advertise an ordinance restricting the use of City credit cards and providing for the dismissal of any employee violating these restrictions. A handwritten note states that Respondent should nonetheless be removed from office for his misuse of a City credit card because "[h]e used card for cash advances and said he paid city back in cash, but no one has a record of him doing that." Pages A-22 through A-37 are the minutes of a meeting of the City commission on April 18, 2012, and four executed memoranda of voting conflict that appear to have been attached to the minutes. These minutes describe City commission votes on alcoholic beverage licenses as to which Respondent abstained from voting due to his employment, but the establishments seeking City commission approvals appear to have been unrelated to Respondent. As indicated in the joint factual stipulation, at all material times, Respondent served as a commissioner and vice mayor of the City commission, and, as such, Respondent was subject to part III, chapter 112, Florida Statutes. As indicated in the joint factual stipulation, Respondent misused a City credit card. As indicated in the joint factual stipulation, while serving as a commissioner and vice mayor of the City, Respondent represented his employer before the City commission in the employer's application for a license from the City commission. Respondent timely disclosed his employment relationship to the City commission, abstained from voting on the issue, and timely filed a Memorandum of Voting Conflict. Under the circumstances, the appearance of Respondent, as an employee of the Tiki Bar, at the August 15, 2011, special meeting of the City commission did not constitute, or serve as a precursor to, a continuing or frequently recurring conflict between Respondent's private interests and public duties, nor did this appearance impede the full and faithful discharge of Respondent's public duties. The key facts are the lack of significant regulatory jurisdiction of the City commission over the issuance and use of 2COP licenses, the one-time nature of the Tiki Bar's need for City commission approval for its request for a 2COP license, the employment relationship that existed between Respondent and the Tiki Bar, and the absence of any responsibilities imposed on Respondent due to his employment with the Tiki Bar to represent other parties in requests before the City commission.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Ethics Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts II and IV, determining that Respondent violated section 112.313(6) as alleged in Count I, and imposing an administrative fine of $3000, censure, and a reprimand against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2014. 1/ Available at
The Issue Whether Petitioner's "change of status" application should be denied for the reasons set forth in the Notice of Intent to Deny.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner has an undergraduate and master's degree in civil engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology (received in 1962 and 1964, respectively) and a law degree from Emory University (received in 1980). In 1968, Petitioner went into the consulting business, and he has had his own business ever since. Since 1968, Petitioner has been licensed as a professional engineer, at one time or another, in approximately 20 different states, including Florida. He has held his Florida license since 1970. The other states in which he is currently licensed are Georgia, Alabama, New York, and Maryland. Petitioner is licensed to practice law in Georgia, but is on inactive status. Petitioner has been licensed as a real estate broker in Florida since 2001 or 2002. Petitioner has been certified as a general contractor in Florida since 1980. He was the qualifier for McKinney Drilling Company from 1980 until 1994. Since 1994, he has been the qualifier for Pressure Concrete, Inc. (Pressure), which approximately a year ago was purchased by Proshot Concrete, Inc. (Proshot). Petitioner has never received any discipline in connection with any of the professional licenses he has held over the years, including the certification allowing him to engage in general contracting in Florida; nor does he have any criminal record. Petitioner has not undertaken any construction or consulting project that has resulted in a lawsuit, judgment, or lien being filed. Petitioner has not been involved in any project where there has been a default triggering a claim against a payment or performance bond. All of the vendors and suppliers he has used on construction projects have been paid. Petitioner has never filed for bankruptcy. There are no lawsuits now pending against Petitioner. In or around September 2006, Petitioner completed and submitted an application to the Board seeking a "change of status" in his certification to enable him (as a general contractor) to qualify Proshot instead of Pressure. Petitioner used a Board-generated form, DBPR CILB 4363-Change of Status Application From One Business Entity to Another (Form), to apply for such a "change of status." The "Financial Responsibility" section of the Form contained the following questions and accompanying instructions: NOTE: If you answer "Yes" to any of the questions below, you must provide an explanation on DBPR 0060-General Explanatory Description form and attach legal documentation, i.e., satisfaction of lien, judgment, payment schedule, etc. If you have been convicted of a felony, you must submit proof of reinstatement of civil rights. The following persons must answer the financial responsibility questionnaire: Qualifying Agent All Owners/Partners Have you, or a partnership in which you were a partner, or an authorized representative, or a corporation in which you were an officer or an authorized representative ever: Undertaken construction contracts or work that a third party, such as a bonding or surety company, completed or made financial settlements? Had claims or lawsuits filed for unpaid past-due bills by your creditors as a result of construction operations? Undertaken construction contracts or work which resulted in liens, suits, or judgments being filed? (If yes, you must attach a copy of Notice of Lien and any payment agreement, satisfaction, Release of Lien or other proof of payment.) Had a lien filed against you by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service or Florida Corporate Tax Division? Made an assignment of assets in settlement of construction obligations for less than the debts outstanding? Been charged with or convicted of acting as a contractor without a license, or, if licensed as a contractor in this or any other state, been subject to any disciplinary action by a state, county, or municipality? (If yes, you must attach a copy of any state, county, municipal or out- of-state disciplinary order or judgment.) Filed for or been discharged in bankruptcy within the past five years? (If "yes," you must attach a copy of the Discharge Order, Order Confirming Plan, or if a Corporate Chapter 7 case, a copy of the Notice of Commencement.) Been convicted or found guilty of or entered a plea of nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction? Note: If you, the applicant/licensee, have had a felony conviction, proof that your civil rights have been restored will be required prior to Licensure. Petitioner answered "No" to all of these questions, believing, in good faith, that such information was accurate. The final page of the Form contained the following "Attest Statement," which Respondent signed: I have read the questions in this application and have answered them completely and truthfully to the best of my knowledge. I have successfully completed the education, if any, required for the level of licensure, registration, or certification sought. I have the amount of experience required, if any, for the level of licensure, registration, or certification sought. I pledge to comply with the applicable standards of practice upon licensure, registration, or certification. I understand the types of misconduct for which disciplinary proceedings may be initiated. As part of the application process, Petitioner made the necessary arrangements with Advantage Information Services, LLC (Advantage) to directly provide the Board with a credit report. On or about October 26, 2006, Advantage sent the Board a two-page Transunion credit report (Transunion Report) containing Petitioner's "credit profile," along with a one-page report of the results of a "check[]" of public records at the "local, statewide, and national level" (Records Check Report). The Transunion Report revealed a federal tax lien in the amount of $35,100.00 that had been filed against Petitioner in 1997 for unpaid personal income taxes. Petitioner was aware of this lien at the time he filled out the Form, but did not report it in response to Question 4 of the "Financial Responsibility" section because he did not understand the question to ask about liens such as this one which were unrelated to his business activities. The Internal Revenue Service is withholding 15% of Petitioner's monthly Social Security benefit and applying it to reduce the amount Petitioner owes for his unpaid personal federal income taxes. The Records Check Report read as follows: Public records have been checked on a local, statewide, and national level and are incorporated within the report. Additional records are as follows: Cheatham Register of Deeds, TN - Federal Tax Lien Release, 01/11/2005, Case #74147 - Book/Page 131/552 - $30,908.00 - Not Paid. Plaintiff: IRS Walton County Superior Court GA - County Tax Lien, 03/12/1998, $387.00 - Not Paid. Case Number - B3P253C, Book/Page - 3/253 Plaintiff: County Tax Assessor Dekalb County State Court, GA - Civil Judgment, 05/01/1991, $49,283.00 - Not Paid. Case Number - 814497 Plaintiff: Bank South The 1998 Walton County Tax lien noted in the Records Check Report concerned an assessment made on tangible personal property in the form of an airplane owned, not by Petitioner, but by a corporation of which he was the president. The lien did not arise out of any activities in which Petitioner was engaged as a general contractor. The 1991 Dekalb County civil judgment noted in the Records Check Report required Petitioner to repay a bank loan Petitioner had co-signed for a friend. It too had nothing to do with his activities as a general contractor. It was only after the Board had provided Petitioner with a copy of the Records Check Report that Petitioner first became aware of the existence of the 1998 Walton County Tax lien and the 1991 Dekalb County civil judgment.2 As noted above, on April 18, 2007, the Board issued its Notice of Intent to Deny Petitioner's "change of status" application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board find Petitioner qualified for the "change of status" for which he has applied. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2007.
The Issue Pursuant to chapter 287, Florida Statutes, and section 255.25, Florida Statutes,1/ the Department of Management Services (DMS) released an Invitation to Negotiate for a contract to provide tenant broker and real estate consulting services to the State of Florida under Invitation to Negotiate No. DMS-12/13-007 (ITN). After evaluating the replies, negotiating with five vendors, and holding public meetings, DMS posted a notice of intent to award a contract to CBRE, Inc. (CBRE) and Vertical Integration, Inc. (Vertical). At issue in this proceeding is whether DMS’s intended decision to award a contract for tenant broker and real estate consulting services to CBRE and Vertical is contrary to DMS’s governing statutes, its rules or policies, or the ITN’s specifications, or was otherwise clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Based on the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Background5/ DMS released Invitation to Negotiate No. DMS-12/13-007 on March 18, 2013, and released a revised version of the ITN on May 14, 2013, for the selection of a company to provide tenant broker and real estate consulting services to the State of Florida. Thirteen vendors responded to the ITN. The replies were evaluated by five people: Bryan Bradner, Deputy Director of REDM of DMS; Beth Sparkman, Bureau Chief of Leasing of DMS; Rosalyn (“Roz”) Ingram, Chief of Procurement, Land and Leasing of the Department of Corrections; Clark Rogers, Purchasing and Facilities Manager of the Department of Revenue; and Janice Ellison, Section Lead in the Land Asset Management Section of the Department of Environmental Protection. Five vendors advanced to the negotiation stage: Cushman (score of 87), JLL (score of 87), CBRE (score of 87), Vertical (score of 89), and DTZ (score of 86). DTZ is not a party to this proceeding. The negotiation team consisted of Beth Sparkman, Bryan Bradner, and Roz Ingram. Janice Ellison participated as a subject matter expert. DMS held a first round of negotiations and then held a public meeting on July 16, 2013. DMS held a second round of negotiations and then held a second public meeting on August 1, 2013. A recording of this meeting is not available, but minutes were taken. Also on August 1, 2013, DMS posted Addendum 8, the Request for Best and Final Offers. This Addendum contained the notice that “Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in section 120.57(3) . . . shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes.” The vendors each submitted a BAFO. DMS held a final public meeting on August 14, 2013, at which the negotiation team discussed the recommendation of award. All three members of the negotiation team recommended Vertical as one of the two vendors to receive the award. For the second company, two of the three negotiation team members recommended CBRE and one negotiation team member recommended JLL. DMS prepared a memorandum, dated August 14, 2013, describing the negotiation team’s recommendation of award. The memorandum comprises the following sections: Introduction; The Services; Procurement Process (subsections for Evaluations and Negotiations); Best value (subsections for Selection Criteria, Technical Analysis, Price Analysis, and Negotiation Team’s Recommendation); and Conclusion. Attached to the memorandum as Attachment A was a memorandum dated April 30, 2013, appointing the evaluation and negotiation committees, and attached as Attachment B was a spreadsheet comparing the vendors’ BAFOs. DMS posted the Notice of Intent to Award to CBRE and Vertical on August 16, 2013. Cushman and JLL timely filed notices of intent to protest the Intent to Award. On August 29, 2013, JLL timely filed a formal protest to the Intent to Award. On August 30, 2013, Cushman timely filed a formal protest to the Intent to Award. An opportunity to resolve the protests was held on September 9, 2013, and an impasse was eventually reached. On October 10, 2013, DMS forwarded the formal protest petitions to DOAH. An Order consolidating JLL’s protest and Cushman’s protest was entered on October 15, 2013. Scope of Real Estate Services in the ITN Prior to the statutory authority of DMS to procure real estate brokerage services, agencies used their own staff to negotiate private property leases. Section 255.25(h), Florida Statutes, arose out of the legislature’s desire for trained real estate professionals to assist the State of Florida with its private leasing needs. The statutorily mandated use of tenant brokers by agencies has saved the state an estimated $46 million dollars. The primary purpose of the ITN was to re-procure the expiring tenant broker contracts to assist state agencies in private sector leasing transactions. Once under contract, the selected vendors compete with each other for the opportunity to act on behalf of individual agencies as their tenant broker, but there is no guarantee particular vendors will get any business. The core of the services sought in the ITN was lease transactions. The ITN also sought to provide a contract vehicle to allow vendors to provide real estate consulting services, including strategies for long and short-term leases, space planning, and space management as part of the negotiation for private leases. As part of providing real estate consulting services, vendors would also perform independent market analyses (IMAs) and broker opinions of value (BOVs) or broker price opinions (BPOs). In almost all instances, this would be provided at no charge as part of the other work performed for a commissionable transaction under the resulting contract. However, the resulting contract was designed to allow agencies to ask for an IMA or BOV to be performed independently from a commissionable transaction. In addition to the primary leasing transactions, the contract would also allow state agencies to use the vendors for other services such as the acquisition and disposition of land and/or buildings. These services would be performed according to a Scope of Work prepared by the individual agency, with compensation at either the hourly rates (set as ceiling rates in the ITN), set fees for the service/project, or at the percentage commission rate negotiated between the vendor and the individual agency. However, these services were ancillary to the main purpose of the contract, which was private leasing. In Florida, most state agencies are not authorized to hold title to land. However, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) serves as staff for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (“Board”), which holds title to land owned by the State of Florida. In that capacity, DEP buys and sells land and other properties on behalf of the Board. DEP recently began using the current DMS tenant broker contract for acquisitions and dispositions. The process was cumbersome under the current contract, so DEP asked to participate in the ITN in order to make the contract more suitable for their purposes. The ITN was revised to include DEP’s proposed changes, and DMS had Ms. Ellison serve first as an evaluator and later as a subject matter expert. At hearing, Ms. Ellison testified that she was able to participate fully, that her input was taken seriously, and that the proposed contract adequately addressed DEP’s concerns. While DEP anticipated that under the proposed contract it would use more BOVs than it had previously, there was no guarantee that DEP would use the proposed contract. DEP is not obligated to use the contract and maintains the ability to procure its own tenant brokers. Additionally, administration and leadership changes may cause a switch of using in-house agency employees instead of tenant brokers to perform real estate acquisition and disposition services. Specifics of the ITN The ITN directed vendors to submit a reply with the following sections: a cover letter; completed attachments; pass/fail requirements; Reply Evaluation Criteria; and a price sheet. The Reply Evaluation Criteria included Part A (Qualifications) and Part B (Business Plan). Qualifications were worth 40 points, the Business Plan was worth 50 points, and the proposed pricing was worth 10 points. For the Business Plan, the ITN requested a detailed narrative description of how the vendors planned to meet DMS’s needs as set forth in section 3.01, Scope of Work. The ITN requested that vendors describe and identify the current and planned resources and employees to be assigned to the project and how the resources would be deployed. Section 3.01, Scope of Work, states that the primary objective of the ITN is to “identify brokers to assist and represent the Department and other state agencies in private sector leasing transactions.” The ITN states that the contractor will provide state agencies and other eligible users with real estate transaction and management services, which include “document creation and management, lease negotiation and renegotiation, facility planning, construction oversight, and lease closeout, agency real estate business strategies, pricing models related to relocation services, project management services, acquisition services, and strategic consulting.” Id. The ITN also specifies: Other real estate consulting services such as property acquisitions, dispositions, general property consulting, property analysis and promotions, property marketing, property negotiation, competitive bidding or property, property auctions and direct sales or those identified in the reply or negotiation process and made part of the Contract (e.g., financial services, facilities management services, lease v. buy analyses). The ITN lists the following duties the contractor will perform: Act as the state’s tenant broker, to competitively solicit, negotiate and develop private sector lease agreements; Monitor landlord build-out on behalf of state agencies; Provide space management services, using required space utilization standards; Provide tenant representation services for state agencies and other eligible users during the term of a lease; Identify and evaluate as directed strategic opportunities for reducing occupancy costs through consolidation, relocation, reconfiguration, capital investment, selling and/or the building or acquisition of space; Assist with property acquisitions, dispositions, general property consulting, property analysis and promotions, property marketing, property negotiation, competitive bidding property, property auctions and direct sales; and Provide requested related real estate consulting services. The ITN set the commission percentage for new leases at 4 percent for years 1-10 and 2 percent for each year over 10 years; 2 percent for lease renewals, extensions, or modifications; and 2 percent for warehouse or storage space leases. Id. For “other services,” the ITN states: With respect to all other services (e.g., space management services, general real estate consulting services, property acquisitions, dispositions, general property consulting, property analysis and promotions, property marketing, property negotiation, competitive bidding or property, property auctions and direct sales), compensation will be as outlined in an agency prepared Scope of Work and will be quoted based on hourly rates (set as ceiling rates in this ITN), set fees for the service/project or by percentage commission rate as offered and negotiated by the broker and the using agency. The ITN also required that vendors specify the number of credit hours to be given annually to DMS. Each vendor gives a certain number of credit hours at the start of each year under the contract. The state earns additional credit hours as the vendors perform transactions. DMS manages the pool of accumulated credit hours and gives them to individual agencies to use on a case-by-case basis as payment for individual projects. These credit hours are commonly allocated to pay for IMAs and BOVs that are not part of commissionable transactions. With the exception of one legislatively mandated project, DMS has never exhausted its pool of credit hours. The ITN further specified that IMAs and BOVs must be offered at no cost when performed as part of a commissionable transaction. Historically, most IMAs and BOVs are performed as part of a commissionable transaction. They have only been performed separately from a commissionable transaction a handful of times under the current contract, and many of these were still provided at no cost through the allocation of free credit hours available to the agencies. Therefore, most IMAs and BOVs to be performed under the proposed contract will likely be at no cost. The ITN states that points to be awarded under the price criterion will be awarded based on the number of annual credit hours offered and the commission rate paid per transaction per hour of commission received. The ITN further provides that DMS will evaluate and rank replies in order to establish a competitive range of replies reasonably susceptible to award, and then the team will proceed to negotiations. Regarding negotiations, the ITN states: The focus of the negotiations will be on achieving the solution that provides the best value to the state based upon the selection criteria and the requirements of this solicitation. The selection criteria include, but are not limited to, the Respondent’s demonstrated ability to effectively provide the services, technical proposal and price. The Department reserves the right to utilize subject matter experts, subject matter advisors and multi-agency or legislative advisors to assist the negotiation team with finalizing the section criteria. The negotiation process will also include negotiation of the terms and conditions of the Contract. The ITN also states: At the conclusion of negotiations, the Department will issue a written request for best and final offer(s) (BAFOs) to one or more of the Respondents with which the negotiation team has conducted negotiations. At a minimum, based upon the negotiation process, the BAFOs must contain: A revised Statement of Work; All negotiated terms and conditions to be included in Contract; and A final cost offer. The Respondent’s BAFO will be delivered to the negotiation team for review. Thereafter, the negotiation team will meet in a public meeting to determine which offer constitutes the best value to the state based upon the selection criteria. The Department does not anticipate reopening negotiations after receiving BAFOs, but reserves the right to do so if it believes doing so will be in the best interests of the State. The ITN and draft contract permit subcontractors to perform under the contract and provide an avenue for a contractor to add subcontractors by submitting a written request to DMS’s contract manager with particular information. Best and Final Offers After the conclusion of negotiations, the negotiation team requested each vendor to submit a BAFO, to be filled out in accordance with the RBAFO format. The RBAFO noted that each vendor would get a set percentage commission for leasing transactions, but asked vendors to submit their prices for IMAs, BOVs, and BPOs performed outside a commissionable transaction and to submit the number of annual credit hours vendors would give DMS at the start of the new contract. In an effort to increase potential savings to the state, DMS lowered the percentage rates of the commissions for lease transactions in the RBAFO below the rates initially set in the ITN. By selecting only two vendors instead of three, the additional potential volume for each vendor on the contract could support the lower commission rates being requested of tenant brokers. The state would ultimately save money due to the impact of the reduced commissions on the overall economic structure of each lease. Beth Sparkman, Bureau Chief of Leasing of DMS, expounded on the rationale for reducing the number of vendors under the new contract to two: The Court: To me, it’s counterintuitive that having fewer vendors would result in more favorable pricing for the state of Florida; and yet you said that was the anticipated result of reducing the number of vendors from three to two – The Witness: Correct. The Court: -- for the new contract. I’m unclear. Tell me the basis for the team’s anticipation that having fewer vendors would result in better pricing. The Witness: When the original ITN was released, it had the same percentages in there that are under the current contract. And I’ll talk, for context, new leases, which right now is at 4 percent. So the discussion was – and 4 percent is typical of the industry. That’s typical for what the industry pays across the board. So the desire was to reduce the commission, to reduce those commission amounts to drive that percentage down. So we went out with the first BAFO that had a range that said for leases that cost between zero – and I can’t remember – zero and a half million, what would your percentage be? Thinking that when we had a tiered arrangement, those percentages would come down. They really didn’t. So when we sat down as a team and discussed: Well, why didn’t they – and you know, because typical is 4 percent. So we came back and said: Well, if we reduce the percentage on new leases to 3.25 but restrict the reward to two vendors, each vendor has the potential to make as much money as they would have made at 4 percent, but the savings would be rolled back into the state. Each of the five vendors invited to negotiate submitted a BAFO, agreeing as part of their submissions to comply with the terms and conditions of the draft of the proposed contract and agreeing to the lowered set percentage commission rates in the RBAFO. The RBAFO listed selection criteria by which the vendors would be chosen, to further refine the broad criteria listed in the ITN. The RBAFO listed the following nine items as selection criteria: performance measures (if necessary), sliding scale/cap, IMA set fee, broker’s opinion of value, balance of line (can be quoted per hour or lump sum), contract concerns, credit hours (both annual and per deal hour), hourly rates, and vendor experience and capability. CBRE’s BAFO submission followed the format indicated in the RBAFO, but CBRE included an additional section giving its proposed commission rates for acquisitions and dispositions of land. These rates were also submitted by other vendors at other parts of the procurement process, but CBRE was the only vendor to include such rates as part of its BAFO submission. DMS considered this addition a minor irregularity that it waived. In its BAFO submission, Cushman offered a three-tiered approach to its pricing for IMAs and BOVs. For the first tier, Cushman offered to perform IMAs and BOVs for free as part of a commissionable transaction. This is redundant, as the ITN required all vendors to perform IMAs and BOVs at no cost when part of a commissionable transaction. For the second tier, Cushman offered to perform IMAs and BOVs at no cost when the user agency has previously hired Cushman on tenant representative work. Ms. Sparkman testified that this provision was unclear, as Cushman did not define the scope of this provision or what amount of work qualified the agency for free services. For the third tier, Cushman offered to perform IMAs and BOVs for $240 when not part of a commissionable transaction for an agency with which it had never done business. Best Value Determination The five BAFOs were sent to the negotiation team for review on August 8, 2013, and on August 14, 2013, the team met in a public meeting to discuss the BAFOs, consider the selection criteria, discuss the team’s award recommendation, and draft a written award recommendation memorandum. During the August 14, 2013, meeting the team determined that CBRE and Vertical represented the best value to the state, by a majority vote for CBRE and by a unanimous vote for Vertical. Ms. Sparkman stated at the meeting that, from her perspective, CBRE and Vertical represented a better value than the other vendors because they were more forward thinking in their long term business strategies for managing Florida’s portfolio. Also at this meeting, Ms. Sparkman noted that CBRE’s prices for IMAs and BOVs were somewhat high but that she would attempt to convince CBRE to lower its prices during the contract execution phase. This was part of an attempt to equalize costs to ensure user agencies selected vendors based on individual needs rather than cost. However, CBRE represented the best value to the state regardless of whether its pricing changed. At hearing, Ms. Sparkman testified that if CBRE had refused to lower its pricing, DMS would still have signed a contract with them based on the pricing submitted in its BAFO. Ms. Sparkman also stated at the public meeting that if she were unable to come to contract with both CBRE and Vertical, she would arrange for another public meeting to select a third vendor with whom to proceed to the contract execution phase. This statement did not refer to DMS selecting a third vendor to replace CBRE should CBRE refuse to lower its price, but rather reflected the possibility that during the contract execution phase, DMS and either one of the vendors could potentially be unable to sign a contract because the vendor was unwilling to execute the written terms and conditions. The “contract negotiations” referenced during the public meeting are the remaining processes to be worked out during the contract execution phase and are distinct and separate from the negotiation phase. At hearing, Ms. Sparkman testified that in the past, vendors have refused to sign a contract because their legal counsel was unwilling to sign off on what the business representatives agreed to. Thus, if either CBRE or Vertical refused to sign the contract altogether, DMS would potentially have selected a third-place vendor in order to have a second vendor on the contract, according to Ms. Sparkman. International experience weighed in favor of CBRE and Vertical, according to team member comments made at the public meeting. Although the phrase “international experience” was not specifically listed in the selection criteria of the ITN or RBAFO, many vendors highlighted their international experience as part of the general category of vendor experience. Vendor experience and capability is specified in both the ITN and RBAFO as part of the selection criteria. Ms. Sparkman testified that international experience is indicative of high quality general vendor experience because international real estate market trends change more rapidly than domestic market trends. None of the negotiation team members recommended Cushman for a contract award, and in fact, Cushman's name was not even discussed at the award meeting. The Award Memorandum Also during the August 14, 2013, public meeting the negotiation team prepared a memorandum setting forth the negotiation team’s best value recommendation of CBRE and Vertical, and many of its reasons for the recommendation. There was no requirement that the memorandum list every single reason that went into the decision. For example, the memorandum did not state that the team found CBRE and Vertical’s focus on long term strategies more impressive than Cushman’s focus on past performance under the current contract. The award memorandum included a “Selection Criteria” section which simply repeated the nine selection criteria that had been previously identified in the RBAFO. The memorandum then went on to include a section labeled “B. Technical Analysis” that stated: Analysis of pricing is provided in section C below. As to the remaining selection criteria items, the Team identified the following key elements for the service to be provided: Long term strategies Key performance indicators Management of the portfolio Top ranked vendors had comprehensive business plans Pricing on the BOV and IMAs. The selection criteria provided above were used by the Team to make its best value recommendation. Ms. Sparkman testified that while the choice of wording may have been imprecise, the items listed in the Technical Analysis section were simply elaborations of the selection criteria in the ITN and RBAFO, and not new criteria. The first four are subsumed within vendor experience and capability, and the fifth was specifically listed in the RBAFO. Indeed, Cushman’s Senior Managing Director testified at hearing that Cushman had addressed the first four items in their presentation to DMS during the negotiation phase to demonstrate why Cushman should be chosen for the contract. The memorandum failed to note that CBRE had included non-solicited information in its BAFO regarding proposed rates for the acquisition and disposition of land. However, the negotiation team considered CBRE’s inclusion of these proposed rates a minor irregularity that could be waived in accordance with the ITN and addressed in the contract execution phase, since those rates were for ancillary services, and there was no guaranteed work to be done for DEP under that fee structure. The memorandum included a chart, identified as Attachment B, that compared the proposed number of credit hours and some of the pricing for IMAs and BOVs submitted by the vendors in their BAFOs. The chart listed Cushman’s price for IMAs and BOVs as $240 and failed to include all the information regarding the three-tiered approach to IMAs and BOVs Cushman listed in its BAFO. However, Ms. Sparkman testified that the chart was meant to be a side-by-side basic summary that compared similar information, not an exhaustive listing. The Cushman Protest Negotiations After Award of the Contract Cushman alleges that DMS’s selection of CBRE violates the ITN specifications because DMS selected CBRE with the intent of conducting further negotiations regarding price, which provided CBRE with an unfair advantage. Cushman further argues that the procedure of awarding to one vendor and then possibly adding another vendor if contract negotiations fail violates Florida’s statutes and the ITN. Amended Pet. ¶¶ 23, 28 & 31. Section 2.14 of the ITN specifically reserved DMS's right to reopen negotiations after receipt of BAFOs if it believed such was in the best interests of the state. Specifically, section 2.14 A. provides: The highest ranked Respondent(s) will be invited to negotiate a Contract. Respondents are cautioned to propose their best possible offers in their initial Reply as failing to do so may result in not being selected to proceed to negotiations. If necessary, the Department will request revisions to the approach submitted by the top-rated Respondent(s) until it is satisfied that the contract model will serve the state’s needs and is determined to provide the best value to the state. The statements made by Ms. Sparkman at the August 14, 2013, public meeting and in the award memorandum, that DMS would attempt to reduce CBRE's prices for ancillary services during the contract execution process were not contrary to the ITN or unfair to the other vendors. Both Ms. Sparkman and Mr. Bradner, the two negotiation team members who voted to award to CBRE, testified that they recommended CBRE as providing the best value even considering its arguably higher prices for ancillary services. Ms. Sparkman further confirmed that even if CBRE refused to lower its prices during the contract execution phase, DMS would still sign the contract, as CBRE's proposal would still represent the best value to the state. The anticipated efforts to obtain lower prices from CBRE were simply an attempt to obtain an even better best value for the state. Ms. Sparkman also testified that section 2.14 F. allowed continued negotiations, even though it was silent as to timeframe. Paragraph F states: In submitting a Reply a Respondent agrees to be bound to the terms of Section 5 – General Contract Conditions (PUR 1000) and Section 4 – Special Contract Conditions. Respondents should assume those terms will apply to the final contract, but the Department reserves the right to negotiate different terms and related price adjustments if the Department determines that it provides the best value to the state. Ms. Sparkman also cited section 2.14 I. as authority for reopening negotiations following receipt of the BAFO’s. That section provides: The Department does not anticipate reopening negotiations after receiving the BAFOs, but reserves the right to do so if it believes doing so will be in the best interests of the state. Ms. Sparkman’s statement that if DMS failed, for any reason, to successfully contract with either of the two vendors selected, it would consider pulling in another vendor, is not inconsistent with the clear language of the ITN. Selection Criteria Cushman alleges that DMS used criteria to determine the awards that were not listed in the ITN or the RBAFO. Amended Pet. ¶ 25. Section 2.14 E of the ITN established broad selection criteria, stating: The focus of the negotiations will be on achieving the solution that provides the best value to the state based upon the selection criteria and the requirements of this solicitation. The selection criteria include, but are not limited to, the Respondent's demonstrated ability to effectively provide the services, technical proposal and price. The Department reserves the right to utilize subject matter experts, subject matter advisors and multi-agency or legislative advisors to assist the negotiation team with finalizing the selection criteria. The negotiation process will also include negotiation of the terms and conditions of the Contract. (emphasis added). Following the negotiations, and with the assistance of its subject matter expert, the negotiation team provided in the RBAFO additional clarity as to the selection criteria, and identified the "Basis of Award/Selection Criteria" as follows: Performance Measures (if necessary) Sliding scale/cap IMA set fee Broker's opinion of value Balance of line (can be quoted per hour or lump sum) Contract concerns Credit hours (both annual and per deal hour) Hourly rates Vendor experience and capability The foregoing selection criteria, as well as the selection criteria stated initially in the ITN, make clear that pricing was only one of the criteria upon which the award was to be made. Indeed, Cushman's representative, Larry Richey, acknowledged during his testimony that criteria such as "Performance Measures," "Contract Concerns," and "Vendor Experience and Capability" did not refer to pricing, but rather to the expected quality of the vendor's performance if awarded the contract. As the principal draftsman of the ITN and DMS's lead negotiator, Ms. Sparkman explained that the RBAFO's statement of the selection criteria was intended to provide greater detail to the broad selection criteria identified in the ITN, and was used by the negotiation team in making its best value determination. Ms. Sparkman further testified that the best value determination resulted from the negotiation team's lengthy and extensive evaluation of the vendors' initial written replies to the ITN, review of the vendors' qualifications and comprehensive business plans, participation in approximately two and a half hours of oral presentations by each vendor (including a question and answer session with regard to the proposed implementation and management of the contracts), and a review of the vendors' BAFOs. Applying the selection criteria contained in the ITN and the RBAFO, the negotiation team selected Vertical for several reasons, including its performance indicators, employees with ADA certification, computer programs and employee training not offered by other vendors, its presence in Florida, and the strength of its business plan and presentation. Similarly, the negotiation team selected CBRE for an award based on the strength of its ITN Reply, its broad look at long-term strategies, its key performance indicators, the experience and knowledge of its staff, the comprehensiveness of its proposal and business plan, size of its firm, and creative ideas such as use of a scorecard in transactions. Ms. Sparkman observed that both Vertical and CBRE specifically identified the CBRE staff who would manage the state's business and daily transactions, while it was not clear from Cushman's ITN reply and related submissions who would actually be working on the account. Cushman likewise did not discuss out-of-state leases and how such leases were going to be handled, which was a significant concern because DMS considered out-of-state leases to be particularly complex. Ms. Sparkman also noted that with respect to the vendors' business plans, both Vertical and CBRE focused primarily on strategic realignment and plans for the future, whereas Cushman discussed their current transactions at length, but did not demonstrate forward thinking to the negotiation team. Cushman's reply to the ITN also included various discrepancies noted at the final hearing. While Cushman's ITN reply identifies a Tallahassee office, Cushman does not in fact have a Tallahassee office, but instead listed its subcontractor’s office.6/ Additionally, two of the business references presented in Cushman's ITN Reply appear not in fact to be for Cushman, but instead for its subcontractor, Daniel Wagnon, as Cushman's name was clearly typed in above Mr. Wagnon's name after the references were written. Finally, Cushman failed to provide in its ITN Reply the required subcontractor disclosure information for at least one of its "Project Management Partners," Ajax Construction. Based on all of the above, DMS's decision to award contracts to Vertical and CBRE as providing the best value to the state was not arbitrary, capricious, clearly erroneous, or contrary to competition. Simply stated, and as the negotiation team determined, the submissions by Vertical and CBRE were more comprehensive and reasonably found to offer better value to the state than Cushman's submission. Indeed the negotiation team did not even mention Cushman as a potential contract awardee, but instead identified only Vertical, CBRE and JLL in their deliberations as to best value. Cushman's argument that DMS award memorandum improperly relies on the following as "key elements" related to services does not alter this analysis: Long term strategies Key performance indicators Management of the portfolio Top ranked vendors had comprehensive business plans Pricing on the BOV and IMAs. While Ms. Sparkman acknowledged that the choice of language in the memorandum could have been better, it is clear that the foregoing are indeed "elements" of the selection criteria stated in the ITN and RBAFO, as the first four elements plainly relate to the vendors' ability to effectively provide the services, their technical proposal, performance measures, and vendor experience and capability, while the last element relates to the pricing portion of the criteria. Cushman also argues that the award memorandum failed to inform the final decision-maker that Cushman offered IMAs and BOVs at no charge when Cushman was engaged in a commissionable transaction or was performing other work for an agency under the contract. As a result, Cushman asserts, the Deputy Secretary was provided with inaccurate information relating to price. Cushman's argument that the award process was flawed because the pricing chart attached to the award memorandum did not accurately reflect Cushman's proposed pricing is without merit. As Ms. Sparkman testified, the chart was prepared by the negotiation team to provide for the decision-maker an apples-to- apples broad summary comparison of the vendor's proposed pricing for the proposed ancillary services. The chart was not intended to identify all variations or conditions for potential different pricing as proposed by Cushman.7/ Best Value Determination Cushman contends that the negotiation team’s decision to award a contract to CBRE did not result in the best value to the state. Amended Pet. ¶¶ 26, 28 & 29. Cushman further argues that DMS did not meaningfully consider differences in proposed pricing. The failure to consider price for potential ancillary services, Cushman argues, was contrary to competition as it gave an unfair advantage to CBRE whose prices were higher than Cushman’s prices in all but one category. Although pricing for the potential ancillary services was relevant, the ITN's initial scoring criteria made clear that DMS was primarily focused on evaluating the experience and capability of the vendors to provide the proposed services. For this reason, the ITN's initial scoring criteria awarded 90 percent of the points based upon the qualifications and business plan of the vendors, and only 10 percent of the points based on the pricing for potential ancillary services. The negotiation team members testified that this same focus on qualifications and the vendors' business plan continued during the negotiation phase and award decision, although without reliance on the mathematical scoring process utilized during the initial evaluation phase. Nothing in the ITN specifications altered this focus, and the negotiations were directed to gaining a greater understanding of the vendors' proposed services, the qualifications and bios of individuals who would actually do the work, vendors' approach to the work and parameters the vendors would use to evaluate their performance. Pricing remained of relatively minor significance primarily because the RBAFO established a uniform lease commission rate for all vendors, effectively removing pricing as a means to differentiate between the vendors. As a result, vendors were required to quote pricing only for certain potential ancillary services, including IMAs and BOVs, and the number of free credit hours to be provided to the state. Pricing for these potential ancillary services was not considered particularly important, since historically these services were seldom used, and the ITN required all vendors to provide IMAs and BOVs free of charge when related to a commissionable transaction (thereby greatly reducing the impact of any "free" IMA or BOV services). For these reasons, the negotiation team considered the potential ancillary services and pricing for these services not to be significant in the award decision and only incidental to the core purpose and mission of the intended contract, to wit, leasing and leasing commissions. As a result, the negotiation team referred to these potential ancillary services as "balance of line" items which were nominal and added little value to the contract. Notwithstanding Cushman's argument that it should have been awarded the contract because it offered the lowest pricing for these ancillary services, its prices were not in fact the lowest offered by the vendors. Indeed JLL offered to provide all IMA and BOV services (with no preconditions) at no cost. Cushman's pricing for the ancillary services also was not materially different than CBRE's pricing. CBRE's consulting services rates are comparable, if not lower, than Cushman's rates, and the difference between Cushman's and CBRE's proposed charges for IMAs and BOVs is only a few hundred dollars. When considered in terms of the anticipated number of times the ancillary services will be requested (rarely, based on the prior contract), the total "extra" amount to be spent for CBRE's services would be at most a few thousand dollars. The negotiation team reasonably considered this to be insignificant in comparison to the multimillion dollar leasing work which was the core purpose of the intended contract.8/ Because pricing for the potential ancillary services was of lesser significance to DMS's award decision, Cushman's position that DMS should have awarded Cushman a contract based upon its pricing for ancillary services is not consistent with the ITN and does not render DMS's intended awards to Vertical and CBRE arbitrary, capricious, clearly erroneous or contrary to competition. To the contrary, DMS articulated a rational, reasonable and logical explanation for the award. CBRE’s Proposal Non-Responsive to ITN and RBAFO? Cushman alleges that CBRE’s BAFO was not responsive to the ITN and the RBAFO because CBRE included a set rate for acquisitions and dispositions in its proposal. Amended Pet. 30. Since CBRE's BAFO materially deviated from the ITN's specifications, CBRE’s proposal should have been deemed non- responsive and therefore rejected, Cushman argues. The ITN originally requested pricing related only to credit hours as the ITN set the rates for leases. The ITN stated that “other services” would be determined on a case-by- case basis as negotiated by the agencies. However, as part of the ITN process, DMS discussed with the vendors the potential for them to assist the state in the sale and acquisition of property, and what commission rates might be charged for this work. For this reason, CBRE included proposed commission rates for acquisition and disposition services in its BAFO. DMS considered the inclusion of potential rates for acquisitions and dispositions to be a minor irregularity which did not render CBRE's BAFO non-responsive. This determination is consistent with the terms of the ITN, which at section 2.14(g) states "[t]he Department reserves the right to waive minor irregularities in replies." The form PUR 1001 incorporated by reference into the ITN likewise reserves to DMS the right to waive minor irregularities and states: 16. Minor Irregularities/Right to Reject. The Buyer reserves the right to accept or reject any and all bids, or separable portions thereof, and to waive any minor irregularity, technicality, or omission if the Buyer determines that doing so will serve the state's best interests. The Buyer may reject any response not submitted in the manner specified by the solicitation documents. Consistent with the above-cited provisions, the negotiation team noted at its August 14, 2013, meeting that CBRE's inclusion of the proposed rates was not material, and that during the contract execution process, DMS would either exclude the proposed rates from the contract, or possibly include such as a cap for these services. Both of these alternatives were available to DMS given CBRE's commitment to follow the terms of the draft contract, which specifically stated that fees for acquisitions and dispositions would be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Finally, CBRE's inclusion of proposed commission rates for acquisitions and dispositions did not give CBRE an advantage over the other vendors, or impair the competition, because Cushman and JLL also submitted, as part of their ITN responses, proposed commission rates for the acquisition and disposition of property. Do the ITN Specifications Violate Section 255.25? Cushman's final argument is that the ITN specifications, and the proposed contract, violate section 255.25(3)(h)5., Florida Statutes, which states that "[a]ll terms relating to the compensation of the real estate consultant or tenant broker shall be specified in the term contract and may not be supplemented or modified by the state agency using the contract." Cushman's argument has two components. First, Cushman argues that the specifications included at Tab 5, page 13 of the ITN violate the statute by providing: "With respect to all other [ancillary] services, . . . , compensation shall be as outlined in an agency prepared Scope of Work and will be quoted based on an hourly rate (set as ceiling rates in this ITN), set fees for the service/project or by a percentage commission rate as offered and negotiated by the using agency.” Cushman also argues that the language in the award memorandum stating that the BOV rates are "caps" and "may be negotiated down by agencies prior to individual transactions," violates the statute. This latter reference to "caps" correlates to the "ceiling rates" stated in the above quoted ITN specification. Section 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes, requires vendors to file a protest to an ITN’s terms, conditions, or specifications within 72 hours of the release of the ITN or amendment; failure to protest constitutes a waiver of such arguments. DMS included this language with the release of the ITN and each amendment, so Cushman was on notice of its protest rights. Cushman's challenge to the ITN specifications as violating section 255.25 is untimely and has been waived. Having been fully informed of this specification since May 14, 2013, when the revised ITN was published, Cushman could not wait until the ITN process was completed some four months later, and then argue that the ITN specifications do not comply with section 255.25 and must be changed. Such argument plainly constitutes a specifications challenge, and such a challenge is now time-barred. Even were Cushman’s challenge not time-barred, it would still fail. Section 255.25 requires only that "[a]ll terms relating to the compensation of the real estate consultant or tenant broker shall be specified in the term contract," and not that all terms identifying the compensation be specified. The challenged ITN specification, actually added via Addendum 2 at the request of DEP and its subject matter expert, does specify the approved methods by which the state could compensate the vendor, which DMS determined would best be determined on a case-by-case basis. By stating the approved methods which can be used by the state agencies, the ITN specifications and term contract did specify the terms "relating to" the compensation of the vendor, i.e., an hourly rate (set as ceiling rates in the ITN), set fees for the service/project, or a percentage commission rate. DMS established these terms because the exact compensation would best be determined by the state agency on a case-by-case basis in a Statement of Work utilizing one of the specified compensation methods.9/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered denying the petition of Cushman & Wakefield of Florida, Inc., and affirming the Notice of Intent to Award to CBRE, Inc., and Vertical Integration, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2014.
The Issue The issues for determination are: Whether Respondent violated section 112.3135, Florida Statutes,1/ by voting on the appointment and/or advocating for the appointment of her relative to a position within her agency and/or her agency voting to appoint and/or advance her relative and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty? Whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by using her position to appoint her relative to the position of City of Midway Mayor Pro Tem and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty? Whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by using a City of Midway-owned vehicle and/or City of Midway-issued gasoline credit card for personal use and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty? Whether Respondent violated section 112.3148(8), Florida Statutes, by failing to report the gift of the personal use of the City of Midway-owned vehicle and/or the City of Midway-issued gasoline credit card and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty?
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent served as a member of the Midway City Council (City Council). She was initially appointed to the City Council in 2000 and served until 2003. She was subsequently elected to the City Council in 2015 and served until May of 2019. Respondent became the Mayor of the City of Midway in May of 2017. As a member and/or mayor of the City Council, Respondent is subject to article II, section 8, Florida Constitution, and the requirements of part III, chapter 112, Florida Statutes, Code of Ethics. In January 2018, Respondent attended and received ethics training from the Florida League of Cities. That training included information on and examples of nepotism, misuse of position, and the receipt and disclosure of gifts. It also included information about the Commission issuing advisory opinions and how to contact the Commission. Nepotism Allegation The form of government the City of Midway (the City) provided under its Charter is the "Council-Manager Government,” under which all powers of the City are vested in an elected council. The City Council consists of five citizens who are residents of the City and electors eligible to vote in the City elections. From its members, the City Council elects a Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem. The election of the Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem occurs at the first regular council meeting after the City election. According to the Midway City Charter, the Mayor presides at all meetings of the City Council and performs other duties consistent with the office as imposed or designated by the City Council. The Mayor has a voice and vote in the proceedings of the City Council. The Mayor is referred to as Mayor-Councilmember in the execution of any legal instruments or writing or when functioning to meet other duties arising from the general laws of Florida or from the City Charter. The Mayor is recognized as the head of City government for all ceremonial purposes, for service of process, execution of contracts, deeds and other documents. The Mayor may take command of the police and govern the City by proclamation during the times of grave public danger or emergency and the Mayor has the power during such times to appoint additional temporary officers and patrolmen. The power and duties of the Mayor-Councilmember are such as they are conferred upon him/her by the Midway City Charter and no other. The Midway City Charter provides that the Mayor shall: “(a) See that all laws, provisions of this charter, and acts of the council, subject to his/her direction and supervision are faithfully executed; (b) Submit the annual budget message; (c) Summon the appropriate law enforcement officers to suppress civil disturbances and to keep law and other during times of emergency; (d) Make such other reports as the council may require concerning the operations of city departments, offices, and agencies subject to his/her direction in time of emergency; (e) Attend, preside, and vote at all council meetings; (f) Sign contracts on behalf of the city pursuant to the provisions of applicable ordinances; (g) Be recognized as the city official designated to represent the city in all agreements with other governmental entities or certifications to other governmental entities as approved by the vote of the city council; (h) Annually prepare a state of the city message, set forth the agenda for all meetings of the council, name committees of the council, make recommendations of members for city boards to the city council; (i) Perform such other duties as specified in this charter or may be required by council.” The population of the City is less than 4,000 residents. The City Council has land use and/or zoning responsibilities. In April 2016, there was a vacancy on the City Council caused by a Councilmember departing prior to the end of that Councilmember’s term. Respondent’s first cousin, Sam Stevens, wanted to be appointed to the City Council to fill the vacant seat. Prior to any action on the matter, Respondent telephoned Commission legal staff member, Grayden Schafer, Esquire, and inquired whether she would be in violation of the anti-nepotism statute if the Council appointed her first cousin to serve the unexpired remainder of a departing Councilmember's term. Following his telephone conversation with Respondent, on April 21, 2016, Attorney Schafer sent an e-mail to Respondent at rangewanda@yahoo.com, summarizing Respondent’s inquiry and the advice he provided. The last page of that e-mail (Schafer’s E-mail) states: a public official can be held in violation of the anti-nepotism provision if the appointment is made by the collegial body on which she serves, even if she did not participate in the appointment. Given the foregoing, it appears that you can be held in violation of the anti-nepotism statute not only if you directly participate or advocate for your first cousin's appointment but also if the City Council decides on its own to appoint him, regardless of whether you vote or participate. According to Respondent, she did not receive the Schafer E-mail in 2016 and did not see it until after the filing of the complaints initiating this case against Respondent. Regardless of the timing of Respondent’s receipt of Schafer’s E-mail, the evidence is persuasive that the topic was discussed between Respondent and Attorney Schafer, and that, as a result of her telephone conversation with Attorney Schafer in April 2016, Respondent understood that, because of her kinship with Sam Stevens, she could not vote to appoint or advocate to appoint Sam Stevens to the City Council. She also was aware that, even if she recused herself from voting or participating in the discussion to appoint Sam Stevens to the City Council, if the City Council voted to appoint her first cousin to the vacant seat, she would be in violation of the anti-nepotism provision. After her conversation with Attorney Schafer, in April 2016, Respondent advised the City Council of her research and that she had contacted the Commission to inquire as to whether she could vote to appoint her cousin to the City Council. She explained that she could not and would have to resign if he was appointed, even if she did not participate in the vote. Sam Stevens was not appointed to fill the vacant City Council seat in 2016. The next year, Sam Stevens was elected to the City Council during the April 2017 municipal election. He was not elected or appointed by the City Council, but rather was elected by City citizens voting in the election. The following month, at its May 4, 2017, meeting, the City Council considered the issue of electing a Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem as provided by the City Charter. At that meeting, Councilman Colston asked if it was legal for relatives to vote for each other. The minutes of the City Council for that date indicate that “Interim City Attorney Thomas explained he had heard the rumor and did research and it is legal.” Contrary to the City Council minutes, in his deposition testimony, City Attorney Thomas denied that he gave that advice, but rather explained that he opined that Respondent and Councilman Sam Stevens could serve together on the City Council, but could not promote or advocate for one another. Despite his denial, during his interview with the Commission’s investigator, City Attorney Thomas “recalled researching the matter and advising Respondent that it was not a voting conflict for her to vote to appoint her cousin to serve as mayor pro tem." Considering the conflicting evidence, it is found that the preponderance demonstrates that the City Attorney advised that it was not a voting conflict for relatives to vote for each other for Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem. Respondent did not reveal her 2016 conversation with Attorney Schafer to the City Council on May 4, 2017, nor did she provide a copy of Schafer’s E-mail dated April 21, 2016, to either the City Council or the City Attorney prior to the City Council’s votes for Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem. However, at the May 4, 2017, City Council meeting, a citizen confronted Respondent with a copy of Schafer’s E-mail, reading portions of Schafer’s E-mail aloud. Respondent testified that she did not acknowledge an ethical dilemma regarding Attorney Schafer’s opinion because she believed it addressed appointment as opposed to election, and her cousin had been elected a year later, not appointed. Schafer’s E-mail does not address the situation in which both Respondent and her first cousin are elected members of the City Council and whether Respondent can vote to elect him as the Mayor Pro-Tem in that context. At that meeting, Respondent nominated herself to serve as Mayor. Her nomination was seconded by Councilman Smith. Respondent was elected as Mayor when the City Council voted three to two for Respondent to serve as Mayor with Councilman Smith, Councilman Sam Stevens, and Respondent voting “yes,” and Councilman Ronald Colston and Councilwoman Carolyn Francis voting “no.” Respondent, as the Mayor, received an $800 stipend, which is $100 more than the other councilmembers. At that same May 4, 2016, meeting, Councilman Colston nominated Councilwoman Francis to serve as Mayor Pro-Tem. That nomination failed two to three, with Respondent, Councilman Smith, and Councilman Stevens voting “no.” Councilman Smith then nominated Councilman Stevens to serve as Mayor Pro-Tem. The City Council voted three to two for Councilman Stevens to serve as Mayor Pro-Tem with Respondent, Councilman Stevens, and Councilman Smith voting “yes,” and Councilman Ronald Colston and Councilwoman Carolyn Francis voting “no.” According to the City Charter, the Mayor Pro-Tem: “shall preside over the meetings of the council during the absence of the mayor- councilmember, and in general in the absence or the incapacity of the mayor- councilmember, he/she shall do [sic] perform those acts and things provided in this Chapter to be done by the mayor- councilmember. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as to preclude the member succeeding himself or herself as Mayor- Council member.” The City provides no additional compensation for a Councilmember serving as Mayor Pro-Tem. Vehicle Use and Gift Disclosure The City has two vehicles. One is a white Ford Taurus that has air conditioning (Vehicle). The other is a white Ford Taurus with a red stripe that does not have air conditioning. Respondent was given a 2002 MPV Mazda Van by her daughter, Temika Smith, on Mother’s Day in 2016. While serving as Mayor, Respondent had use of the Vehicle for personal use. Respondent began using the Vehicle in September or October 2017 following a hurricane and had access to the Vehicle until she stopped using it in May of 2019. During this time, the Vehicle was generally parked on property adjacent to Respondent’s residence. While Respondent had a set of keys to the Vehicle, there was another set of keys at the City Hall. In addition to Respondent’s access, other city employees or city council members could use the Vehicle. Former City Manager Steele used the Vehicle on occasion during the time that Respondent had access to the Vehicle. When former City Manager Steele wanted to use the Vehicle, she would pick it up from Respondent’s residence and return it to City Hall. Respondent used the Vehicle for a variety of City- related purposes. She used it to travel to Florida League of Cities’ conferences. In addition, she used the Vehicle to attend events in Midway, in Gadsden County, and in Tallahassee, including meetings with the City’s lobbyist and members of the Florida Legislature, as part of her duties and responsibilities as Mayor. Respondent was also observed driving the Vehicle to meetings at the City Hall. Respondent’s personal use of the Vehicle included, but was not limited to, traveling roundtrip between Midway and Tallahassee. She may have had her daughter in the Vehicle on two or three occasions, and on occasion, drove the Vehicle to her daughter’s house in Tallahassee. On one of the occasions when Respondent drove the Vehicle to her daughter’s house in Tallahassee, which occurred on March 15, 2018, Respondent had a run-in with a Midway resident who had followed Respondent to her daughter’s house. The Midway Resident took pictures of the Vehicle at Respondent’s daughter’s house and also the Mazda MPV van, which was without a license plate. On that occasion, Respondent had gone to check on the house because her daughter was out of town. At the final hearing, Respondent admitted that there was a time when the Mazda MPV was in the shop a lot, and, since she had access to the Vehicle, she turned in the Mazda’s tag to save on insurance payments. On another occasion in 2018, Respondent was stopped by a Gadsden County Deputy Sheriff in Midway after midnight for having a tag light out and the incorrect tag on the Vehicle. Respondent had been returning from Tallahassee. No citation was issued with respect to that stop. Other examples presented at the hearing illustrating Respondent’s use of the Vehicle included her transporting a child from Midway to Florida High in Tallahassee, taking a Midway resident from Midway to Tallahassee to drop him at his place of employment, and taking an individual to Liberty County to retrieve that person’s vehicle left when evacuating because of a hurricane. While providing such accommodations is not listed within Respondent’s responsibilities as Mayor or Councilmember, arguably, they served a public purpose. While Respondent had access and use of the Vehicle, the City did not have a vehicle-use policy. The evidence indicates that former City manager Ford also used a City-owned vehicle for personal use. Former City Manager Steele could not recall if any other city employees or city council members had used the Vehicle. Respondent testified that employees of the City’s public works department might also have used the Vehicle. City Councilman Ron Colston testified that he never used the Vehicle. At the May 3, 2018, Midway City Council meeting, Councilman Colston publicly requested that Respondent stop driving the Vehicle, stating that citizens had approached him with concerns about Respondent driving the Vehicle. Minutes of that City Council meeting indicate that Councilman Coston commented that he had received some calls from citizens concerned with Respondent driving the City-owned vehicle and suggested that she should park the Vehicle because of the number of complaints and that it is a liability. In response to that comment, City Attorney Thomas suggested that the City Council come up with some policy and procedures on the use of City vehicles. Respondent did not stop driving the Vehicle at the time of Councilman Colston’s request. By the end of October 2018, the Vehicle needed a tune-up and to have its brakes checked. In October 2018, Respondent started using a rental car when she got a job with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for debris monitoring. Respondent was not reimbursed by FEMA for the rental. In January 2019, Respondent purchased a new vehicle, a 2019 Mitsubishi G4 Mirage. At the time of the final hearing in this case, the City was in the process of developing a policy regarding the use of City vehicles and City Fuel Cards. Respondent did not report the use of the vehicle on her income taxes and did not file a gift disclosure to report her personal use of the City-owned vehicle as a gift. Fuel Card Use and Gift Disclosure Respondent used a City-issued Pilot Travel Center credit card for gasoline for the Vehicle. City-issued Pilot Travel Center credit card #007 (City Fuel Card) was assigned to the Vehicle. The City Fuel Card was the only one numbered #007 and it remained in the Vehicle. While some of the fuel purchases charged to the City Fuel Card were related to City business, Respondent acknowledged that fuel was also purchased using the City Fuel Card during her personal use of the Vehicle. Records of City Fuel Card #007 from November of 2017 through December of 2018 show the following charges: November 2017: -November 1, 2017– 623 Quincy FL- $33.67 -November 5, 2017- 425 Midway FL- $20.71 -November 5, 2017- 4556 Wildwood FL- $20.00 -November 8, 2017- 4556 Wildwood FL- $18.30 -November 9, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $24.72 -November 13, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $21.77 -November 13, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $35.42 -November 20, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $42.68 -November 20, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $30.78 -November 27, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $32.00 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Orlando, Florida, from November 5 through November 8, 2017. As to the multiple charges on November 13, 2017, and November 20, 2017, Respondent explained that she traveled on City business because “we were giving out turkeys during that time.” December 2017: -December 2, 2017– 623 Quincy FL- $30.91 -December 12, 2017– 623 Quincy FL- $34.06 -December 15, 2017– 425 Midway FL- $30.27 -December 22, 2017– 425 Midway FL- $27.03 January 2018: -January 9, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $33.82 -January 17, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $22.03 -January 18, 2018- 4556 Wildwood FL- $18.00 -January 21, 2018- 4556 Wildwood FL- $8.20 -January 22, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $15.50 -January 23, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $8.57 -January 24, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $10.01 -January 26, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $24.00 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Orlando, Florida, during the period from January 18 through 22, 2018. February 2018: -February 2, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $34.26 -February 15, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $32.00 -February 22, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $30.01 March 2018: -March 14, 2018- 425 Midway FL - $31.00 -March 28, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $32.07 April 2018: -April 7, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $25.00 -April 17, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $35.44 -April 28, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $7.52 66. May 2018: -May 14, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $37.01 -May 20, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $29.02 -May 26, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $41.00 67. June 2018: -June 1, 2018– 4556 Wildwood FL- $25.03 -June 2, 2018– 4556 Wildwood FL- $18.02 -June 4, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $20.00 -June 9, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $31.00 -June 15, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $28.04 -June 29, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $33.00 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Orlando, Florida during the period from May 31, 2018, through June 2, 2018. 68. July 2018: -July 18, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $35.06 August 2018: -August 3, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $21.08 -August 14, 2018- 622 St. Lucie FL- $20.01 -August 14, 2018- 091 Jacksonville- $24.00 -August 19, 2018- 624 Dade City FL- $27.02 -August 20, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $19.33 -August 24, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $33.01 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Hollywood, Florida during the period from August 14 through 18, 2018. September 2018: -September 4, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $37.00 -September 13, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $35.50 -September 29, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $36.01 October 2018: -October 10, 2018– 623 Quincy FL- $39.07 November 2018: -November 21, 2018– 623 Quincy FL- $33.07 December 2018: -December 5, 2018– 623 Quincy FL- $18.80 In addition to the fact that some of Respondent’s use of the City Fuel Card to put fuel in the Vehicle included her personal use of the Vehicle, Respondent used the City Fuel Card to purchase gasoline for the Vehicle when she was using the Vehicle for travel on City business, including travel to Florida League of Cities’ conferences in November of 2017, as well as while traveling on City business in and around Midway and Gadsden County, and to and from Tallahassee. Respondent also used the City Fuel Card to pay for gasoline while traveling on City business to attend Florida League of Cities’ conferences in a rental vehicle. These conferences occurred January 18 through 22, 2018; May 31 through June 2, 2018; and August 14 through 18, 2018. There was no evidence presented that Respondent used the City Fuel Card to purchase anything other than fuel for the Vehicle or fuel for a rental car while on business for the City. As the City Fuel Card was kept in the Vehicle, other City Council members or City employees would have had access to the City Fuel Card when they were driving the Vehicle. Respondent did not file a gift disclosure to report her use of the City Fuel Card to put gasoline in the Vehicle on those occasions when she used the Vehicle for personal use.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Respondent, Wanda Range, violated section 112.3135, Florida Statutes, and recommending the imposition of a nominal civil penalty of $1.00 for that violation, and further finding that Respondent Wanda Range did not violate sections 112.313(6), or 112.3148(8), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order Finding Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2019.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is required to pay sales tax on the commission its pays to property owners for the right to place and operate air and vacuum machines at various locations in central Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns coin-operated air and vacuum machines, which it places at numerous convenience store and gas station locations throughout central Florida. The State of Florida, Department of Revenue, is an executive agency of the State of Florida, which is statutorily charged with the administration and enforcement of Florida's sales tax laws. The Department conducted an audit of Petitioner following the discovery of information developed during an audit of another company. It was determined that Petitioner had never registered with the Department of Revenue for sales tax collection or payment. During the audit, the Department determined that Petitioner had not paid sales tax on its out-of- state purchases of air and vacuum machines and equipment valued at approximately $303,429.00. These machines were purchased for use in Florida. The Department assessed sales tax on these purchases. The Petitioner conceded that it owed sales tax on these purchases and did not contest that portion of the assessment. It has paid said taxes. The Department assessed sales tax on payments made by the Petitioner to other companies for the right to place its machines at their business. Petitioner places coin-operated air and vacuum machines on premises of the convenience stores and gas stations under a verbal contract at will in which the land owner receives a portion of the gross receipts from the operation of the machines. Petitioner is solely responsible for the installation of the air and vacuum machines, including providing the electrical tie-in at the site of the machine. The air and vacuum machines are mounted on a six hundred pound concrete pad and transported and placed on the convenience store property. The air and vacuum machines are portable, even after placement at a convenience store, and are removed if Petitioner determines that the location is not sufficiently profitable. The air and vacuum machines are purchased by Petitioner and the air and vacuum machines are owned solely by Petitioner during the period that they are located on a convenience store's premises. Petitioner is solely responsible for regular inspection of the air and vacuum machine and is solely responsible for maintenance of the machines. Petitioner is solely responsible for cleaning the air and vacuum machines at all locations. Also, Petitioner is responsible for all repair work to the machines which are provided at no cost to the owner of the convenience store. Petitioner is entitled to ingress and egress from the property at any time to accomplish these repairs. Petitioner is ultimately responsible for refunding any money to the store operator when an air and vacuum machine fails to work properly. Petitioner is solely responsible for all licensing fees and taxes on the air and vacuum machines. Petitioner carries liability insurance coverage on the air and vacuum machines. On or about June 10, 1988, Petitioner entered into a written contact with Carse Oil Company, Inc., which owned convenience stores in the central Florida area, doing business as Ideal Food Stores. This agreement was in effect for a period of three or four years, including some years during the audit period, beginning September 1, 1988. The agreement, entitled "Air/Water Vacuum Commission Agreement" (hereinafter Agreement) is a contract between Petitioner and Carse Oil Company, Inc., by which Petitioner agreed to place an air and vacuum machine on Carse Oil's property. The written Agreement with Carse Oil Company, Inc. provides for the monthly payment to be made on a date certain each month. The Carse Oil Agreement is complete and contains all of the terms of the contract between the parties as to the duties and obligations of each party under the contract. This written Agreement is representative of the course of dealing with other businesses with which Petitioner entered oral agreements during the period of the audit. Like the Agreement, the oral agreements allowed Petitioner to place its machines at its own cost on the property of a convenience store. The Petitioner does not currently have, and has not ever had any agreements in writing with its customers other than the written Agreement with Carse Oil. Under the written and oral agreements, Petitioner was responsible for coming onto the property to repair its machines. Petitioner is also entitled to come onto the property to remove monies from the cash box located in the machine. Only Petitioner's employees held the key to the money box and were entitled to come onto the property any time to access the money box in the machine. None of Petitioner's customers has a key or other access to the money box located in each air and vacuum machine. Petitioner is solely responsible for calculating the commission payment to a convenience store after collecting the money in the machine. Petitioner is solely responsible for deciding whether to remove an air and vacuum machine from a convenience store's premises if it is unprofitable. With the exception of one customer, Petitioner does not pay a separate amount to the convenience store for the electricity that is used in the operation of the air and vacuum machine. Petitioner's agreements with its customers, including the Agreement with Carse Oil Company, provide for the convenience store to receive each month a percentage of the money collected in the previous month for the operation of the air and vacuum machine(s) located on the store's premises. The air and vacuum machines are equipped with a coin counter. Petitioner is solely responsible for periodically collecting the coins that have accumulated in each air and vacuum machine. The percentage that Petitioner pays to the convenience stores under its agreements with them ranges from 25 percent to 50 percent and are negotiated on an individual basis. Petitioner pays a higher percentage to a convenience store where the revenues generated are relatively higher than the revenues generated by machines at other locations. The payment to the location owner is thus based upon the business derived at a particular location. Thus, as part of the business decision of payment for allowing placement of the machine, Petitioner evaluates the value of the location of the machine and payment is guided by the performance at the location. Payment made by Petitioner is directly connected to the acquisition of the right of placement of the machine, and the location owner is not entitled to receive any compensation once a machine is removed from the premises. The location owner has no responsibility for the cost of placing the machine, the costs of maintenance and cleaning the machine during its placement, the cost of repair of the machine during placement or responsibility for payment of insurance coverage of machines during placement. The location owner involvement is limited to authorization of the use of the property for placement of the machine. The compensation or "commissions" are directly tied to payment for the right to place the machine on the premises of a convenience store. The payment which Petitioner characterized as a revenue sharing arrangement, regardless of the title placed on the agreement between the parties, is based upon the right of placement of the machines on the property of another distinct business entity. Petitioner paid out $613,125.00 during the years under audit based upon its written and oral agreements allowing for the placement of its equipment. The Department assessed sales tax on the payments made as "commissions" to the parties where the machines were placed. The Department assessed sales tax due in the amount of $54,994.40, plus penalty in the amount of $16,539.12 and interest in the amount of $15,643.48, for a total due of $87,177.00. On April 15, 1994, Petitioner paid $18,206.61 on this amount leaving a balance due of $68,970.39. Petitioner does not dispute the Department's mathematical calculations of the total sales dollars upon which the tax assessment is based. Petitioner has not paid sales taxes on the monies it remitted to the convenience stores during the audit period. Petitioner did not seek advice from the Department prior to the assessment as to whether sales tax should have been collected on the business transactions assessed by the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Executive Director enter a Final Order denying the Petition contesting the assessment of tax and impose a sales and use tax audit assessment in the amount of $68,970.39, plus interest. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2131 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact as of the date of this Order. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-31. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Shader, Esquire Shader and Wilson 1750 North Maitland Avenue Maitland, Florida 32751 James F. McAuley, Esquire Elizabeth T. Bradshaw, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Deparment of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Based on a letter dated November 4, AFSCME requested that the School Board of Orange County, Florida, voluntarily recognize it as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for employees of the School Board in a proposed unit of "non-instructional" personnel. AFSCME also expressed its desire to engage "possible neutral third parties" to verify the authenticity of certain authorization cards it possessed. (Employer's Exhibit No. 1) On November 10, Messr. James E. Carroll, Assistant to the Superintendent for Employee Relations, advised AFSCME's Assistant Area Director, Messr. David McGhee, by letter dated November 10, that their formal request had been received and would be placed on the school board agenda on November 14, if, pursuant to board policy, written notification was received within 24 hours prior to preparation of the agenda for the school board's meeting. Employer's Exhibit No. 2) by Letter dated November 14, Messr. McGhee was advised by Dr. L. Linton Deck, Jr., Superintendent, that AFSCME desired to appear before the board at its next regularly scheduled meeting for November 22. (Employer's Exhibit No. 3). By letter dated November 22, the Intervenors by their international representative and international special organizer respectively, A. Gross and Charles Loughran, advised Assistant Superintendent Carroll that the Intervenors were engaging in organizational activities among the board's employees and "[would] be petitioning the board for voluntary recognition in the very near future for an election to be conducted by the Public Employees Relation Commission." Messr. Carroll did not respond to such meeting since, in his opinion, he was of the opinion that the impetus in triggering such request rests with the Intervenors and no further responses were received from the Intervenors' representatives until on or about January 3, as stated above. By letter dated December 29, Messr. Deck sent a memorandum noticing the instant hearing to all principals and work location supervisors to call this matter to the attention of all classified employees at their work locations and for posting in appropriate places. On that same date, Messr. Carroll advised the Intervenors representatives that the school board had requested a hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act for the purpose of determining the appropriate bargaining unit and whether AFSCME had been designated as the exclusive bargaining agent for all classified employees within the appropriate bargaining unit. Attached to such letter was a Notice of Hearing issued by the undersigned dated December 21. (Employer's Exhibit No. 6) On approximately two occasions, Messrs. McGhee and Carroll, representing AFSCME and the Public Employer respectively, met informally to determine whether or not the Public Employer would extend exclusive bargaining representative status to a petitioned for group of classified employees on a voluntary basis. These efforts were unavailing inasmuch as the parties were unable to come to terms on a unit description mutually satisfactory. Thereafter, counsel for the Public Employer advised the board that the more orderly procedure in reaching its decision would be to utilize the procedures set forth in Section 120.50(7)(1) (Employer's Composite Exhibit No. 7) Based on this recommendation from the board's counsel, the petition was forwarded to this Division requesting that a Hearing Officer be assigned to conduct a Section 120.57(1) hearing. At the hearing, AFSCME and the Public Employer jointly stipulated that the appropriate unit of classified employees of the School Board of Orange County, Florida, for purposes of collective bargaining is as follows: All active classified personnel who are pay- types 15 (teacher aides, permanent substitutes, library clerks, office clerks), 17 (school lunchroom assistants), 19 (teacher assistants, instructional clerks, and nurses), 22 (twelve month, eight hour employees), 30 (bus drivers), 40 (bus monitors), and 71 (daily teacher aides in non-public schools); and who are not pay grades 16A, 21A, 13B, 12B, 22D, 14F, 13D, 13C, 14J, 14K, 3D, 27A, 51A, 75A, and 14B; and who do not work at the following work locations: 7300 (Associate Superintendent for Instructional Services), 8200 (Assistant Superintendent for management Services), 8110 (Comptroller), 6600 (Associate Superintendent for Personnel Management), 8205 (Business Word Processing Center Number 4), 8206 (Personnel Word Processing Center Number 5), 8202 (Instructional Word Processing), 8203 (Administrative Word Processing Center Number 2) 8204 (Delaney Word Processing Canter Number 3), 8210 (data Center Operations), 6611 (Instructional Personnel), 6612 (Classified Personnel) 8132 (Payroll Accounting), 8130 (Director of Accounting), 9001 (District Superintendent), 8120 (Food Service Administration), 8131 (General Accounting), 8220 (Research), and 7555 (CETA Administration). All other positions are excluded. (Joint Exhibit No. 1) There is no history of collective bargaining for the subject employees. The evidence reveals that within the stipulated unit, there are approximately 3,054 employees. Excluded from the list of classified employees are approximately 106 cafeteria managers, 2 registered nurses, 29 confidential employees, and approximately 516 regular part-time employees. The evidence reveals that the parties (AFSCME and the Public Employer) stipulated and further agreed to exclude the cafeteria managers based on uncontradicted evidence that cafeteria managers, as part of the their job duties, are called upon to make individual employee assessments, independent decisions and routinely make effective recommendations respecting the hiring and discharge of cafeteria employees. AFSCME and the Public Employer also jointly agreed to exclude approximately 29 "confidential" employees who are assigned to word processing centers and who, during the course of their employment, are privy to confidential employment information respecting other employees. 2/ Also excluded from the stipulated unit were all employees who worked four hours or less daily. The classified employees form the residual group of employees who are non-instructional, administrative, or technical. These part- time employees are largely comprised of administrative secretarial employees who work for associate superintendents, deputy superintendents, assistant superintendents, and other confidential employees who, as stated above, have access to confidential information. PLACEMENT OF PART-TIME EMPLOYEES In resolving unit placement questions, employees' status and tenure are major considerations. The evidence herein reveals that the part-time employees here work within the same unit as those included employees on a regular basis. They therefore have a substantial and continuing interest in the wages, hours and working conditions of full-time unit employees. Farmers Insurance Group, et al, 143 NLRB 240, 244 - 245. In this regard, they like the included employees enjoy the same rate of pay and fringe benefits. Based on the regularity of their employment and the number of hours worked, they cannot seriously be considered part of a "temporary, part-time or casual work force". Fresno Auto Auction, Inc., 167 NLRB 878. And the mere fact that they are called part-time employees does not alter their status as a cohesive group of individuals with a strong mutual interest in their working conditions which, as here, are largely determined by those employees included within the unit. See e.g., Henry Lee Company, 194 NLRB 109. For all these reasons, including the regularity and continuity of employment, the similarity of duties and functions, wages, working conditions and supervision, there is no discernible basis in this record to exclude the part-time employees from the unit. I shall therefore recommend that they be included. AUTHENTICATION OF THE AUTHORIZATION CARDS A local private investigating firm, Brewer and Associates, was commissioned to assist a local attorney, Stephen Weinstein, to authenticate the authorization cards. Attorney Weinstein credibly testified that he was given the authorization cards from AFSCME on January 5, 1978, along with a list of employees which was cross-checked by a list supplied by the list entitled "Recommended Appropriate Bargaining Unit." (See Employer's Exhibit No. 9). Attorney Weinstein and Messrs. Jerry Brewer and Jerry Boltin, employees of Brewer and Associates, cross-checked the lists based on a random sampling of authorization cards from a total of 1,648 authorization cards supplied to attorney Weinstein by AFSCME. 3/ Attorney Weinstein and his associates noted no irregularities or discrepancies in the authorization cards given them by AFSCME which were checked against the employee signatures on file in the public employer's records. These records from which the signatures were taken included employment applications, insurance and payroll deduction forms. The evidence reveals that the expense connected with the authentication of the cards was paid independently by AFSCME. No evidence of any union bias or other interestedness was alleged to have existed on the part of the individuals engaged to authenticate the cards. A copy of the card was introduced which designates AFSCME as the executor's collective bargaining representative in all matters pertaining to rates of pay, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. (AFSCME Exhibit #1). No evidence was introduced tending to show that any other cards were utilized by AFSCME in its organizational efforts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is hereby recommended that the Public Employer submit a list of names and addresses of all of its regular part-time employees which comprised the 516 employees which were excluded from the joint stipulated recommended appropriate bargaining unit and allow AFSCME fourteen(14) days after receipt of such list to demonstrate its majority status. It is recommended that such majority status be demonstrated in the same manner as was demonstrated in the instant proceeding and that AFSCME and the Public Employer jointly engage a neutral third party to authenticate AFSCME's assertion of majority status within the time frame allotted. Finally, upon proof of its majority status in the appropriate unit, as modified herein, it is recommended that the Public Employer voluntarily recognize AFSCME as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for such employees based on the foregoing findings, conclusions and recommendations. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of March, 19788, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the hearing, the following facts are found: The City of Madison employs approximately 60 full time employees who serve under the general supervision of the City Manager, who has identical fringe benefits as all other employees. The City Commission employes the City Manager and is the ultimate authority and decision making body. The City Commission is composed of elected officials who serve without compensation. A representation petition was filed seeking a certificate of representation by Local Union 2865, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining agent for all full time employees of the City of Madison except for professional employees, managerial employees and confidential secretarial employees. The Public Employer refused to grant the request. A consent election was rejected. A Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Petition for Certification was entered into evidence over the objection of the Petitioner and a Motion to Quash said Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Petition for Certification was denied. Testimony was taken as to whether there was such solicitation by managerial employees to initiate the showing of interest. Testimony was taken and final action on the Motion is referred to PERC for action. If the Motion to Dismiss is denied, the determination must be made as to whether the hereinafter enumerated job positions as set forth in Exhibit 3 should be considered managerial and excluded from the unit. No agreement was reached on such employees. Each employee whose job description is set forth in Exhibit 3 works a standard 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. five day work week, but each is expected to get their respective job done and in the event of an emergency work overtime. The City Commission sets the wages and each reports directly to the City Manager. Each has the same fringe benefits except those who need a truck and radio are furnished one for job use only. Each such employee hears grievance matters on those under him and if the problem cannot be worked out, the parties go to the City Manager who acts as final arbitrator and who acts on a recommendation for termination. Each such employee submits a budget and then sits with the City Manager in making up the budget and keeps with the administration of the budget. Each of the following persons have been funded with the job description and entered in Exhibit 3 and testimony from the City Manager indicates that a meeting for clarification and explanation was planned and thereafter a meeting of these nine employees on a monthly basis. The City Manager stated that in the event of a bargaining situation he would call together these employees for indirect and direct input but that he would prefer not to try to negotiate a contract himself inasmuch as this would put him in conflict with employees and that he would rely on these persons for input and any mollification of policy or procedures. (a) Special Project Supervisor. This work involves the direction of a maintenance or construction crew performing road and utility construction and maintenance work. This employee may hire, promote, demote and assign work and is responsible for directing a crew of skilled and unskilled workers in routine maintenance or construction of streets, roadways and utilities. Duties include inspecting equipment and machinery used to ensure proper operation and checking street and roadway utilities for defects or problems. At times this employee may serve as relief equipment operator. He may also perform other duties as required by the City Manager. Four persons work under the Special Project Supervisor but he may obtain help from other departments when necessary. (h) Fire Chief. This employee is directly responsible for protection against fire and for firefighting activities within the jurisdiction. This employee may hire, promote, demote or assign work and is responsible for directing and supervising skilled and unskilled firefighters in the routine maintenance of facilities and equipment. He coordinates the activities of firefighters, inspects station house and equipment, responds to fire alarms and other rescue activities. This employee may also perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (c) Construction Supervisor. This employee directs one or more departments and/or construction crews engaged in the construction of city streets, roadways, bridges and related facilities. The employee may hire, promote, demote and assign work. The work involves the supervision of several types of heavy equipment operators as well as the skilled and unskilled labor activities. The employee may perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (d) Executive Secretary. Excluded as managerial employee. (e) Gas Supervisor. This employee directs the maintenance and construction crew performing gas and utility maintenance and construction. The employee may hire, promote, demote, assign work and is responsible for directing and supervising a crew of skilled and unskilled workers in the routine maintenance of gasolines, services and utilities. Duties include inspecting equipment and checking for defects and when necessary serving as relief operator and supervising the moving of right of ways. This employee may perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (f) Sewage Plant Supervisor. This employee directs the maintenance and construction crew performing sewage plant lines and utility maintenance. The employee may hire, promote, demote, assign work and is responsible for directing and supervising a crew of skilled and unskilled workers in the routine maintenance or construction of sewer or water related facilities. Other duties include inspecting the equipment and machinery used to ensure proper operation and checking for defects or other problems. This employee may perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (g) Water Supervisor. This employee directs the maintenance and construction crew performing water, sewer and utility maintenance. The employee may hire, promote, demote, assign work and is responsible for directing and supervising the crew of skilled and unskilled workers in the routine maintenance and construction of water and sewer facilities and ocher utility services. Duties include inspecting equipment, serving as relief operator when necessary, supervising the moving of right of ways. The employee may perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (h) Grounds Keeper. This is work directing small crews engaged in the care and maintenance of grounds and yards. The employee may hire, promote, demote, assign work and is responsible for the overall maintenance of the grounds and yards in the City. The employee may perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (i) Shop Superintendent-Mechanic. Excluded as a non-managerial employee. (j) Warehouse Supervisor. This employee is involved in the record keeping, inventory control and the operation of the purchasing department. The duties are in general, a bookkeeper and storekeeper. He performs other duties when required by the City Manager. (k) Police Chief. This employee is responsible for the direction and administration of law enforcement activities. He may hire, promote, demote, assign work and is responsible for directing and supervising skilled and unskilled police officers and other activities involved in law enforcement. He is responsible for inspection of the stationhouse and equipment. He responds to calls for assistance. Other duties may be required by the City Manager or Mayor in case of Marshall Law. In accordance with Florida Statute 447.307(3)(a), and Florida Administrative Rule 8H-3.23, no recommendations are submitted. DONE and ENTERED this 30 day of April, 1976. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Cox, Esquire Michaels and Patterson 2007 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Bembry, Esquire Davis, Browning and Hardee Post Office Box 652 Madison, Florida Ben Patterson, Esquire Michaels and Patterson 2007 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward B. Browning, Jr., Esquire Davis, Browning and Hardee Post Office Box 652 Madison, Florida Chairman Public Employee Relations Commission Suite 300, 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
