The Issue At issue is whether interest should be assessed on an award of attorney's fees and costs under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.
The Issue Whether Jacqueline Simone Jackson (Jacqueline), a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). If so, whether Petitioners' settlement of a civil suit against the hospital where Jacqueline was born for negligence associated with her birth bars them from recovery of an award under the Plan. Whether the participating physicians complied with the notice provisions of the Plan.
Findings Of Fact Findings related to compensability Tracie Turner Jackson and Ulysses Bernard Jackson are the natural parents and guardians of Jacqueline Simone Jackson, a minor. Jacqueline was born a live infant on December 8, 1999, at Orlando Regional Healthcare System, d/b/a Arnold Palmer Hospital for Women and Children (Arnold Palmer Hospital), a licensed hospital located in Orlando, Florida, and her birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physicians providing obstetrical services at Jacqueline's birth were Alejandro J. Pena, M.D., and Marc W. Bischof, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, were "participating physician[s]" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, the parties have stipulated, and the proof is otherwise compelling, that Jacqueline suffered a "birth-related neurological injury." Consequently, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, the claim is covered by the Plan. §§ 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. The settlement with Arnold Palmer Hospital In 2002, Tracie Turner Jackson and Ulysses Bernard Jackson, individually and as parents and natural guardians of their minor daughter, Jacqueline Simone Jackson, Plaintiffs, filed a medical malpractice claim arising out of the birth of Jacqueline against Orlando Regional Health Care System, Inc., d/b/a Arnold Palmer Hospital for Women and Children; Alejandro J. Pena, M.D.; Marc W. Bischof, M.D.; Physician Associates of Florida, Inc.; T. Zinkil, R.N.; S. Furgus, R.N.; Nancy Ruiz, R.N.; L. Baker, R.N.; T. Flyn, R.N.; and Nancy Ostrum, R.N., Defendants, in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County, Florida, Case No. 2002-CA-6770 Div. 34. A settlement was reached with Arnold Palmer Hospital, but the case against Dr. Pena, Dr. Bischof, and Physician Associates of Florida, Inc., remained pending.3 Given Petitioners' settlement with Arnold Palmer Hospital, and the provisions of Section 766.304, Florida Statutes (1999)4("An action may not be brought under ss. 766.301- 766.316 if the claimant recovers or final judgment is entered."), Petitioners and Respondent stipulated that "Petitioners are not entitled to any actual payment or award from NICA, even if a finding is made that the claim is compensable and adequate notice was given." (Petitioners' letter of November 18, 2004, filed November 19, 2004, and Respondent's letter of November 16, 2004, filed November 16, 2004.) The notice provisions of the Plan While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners have responded to the physicians' claim of Plan immunity by averring that the participating physicians who delivered obstetrical services at Jacqueline's birth (Doctors Pena and Bischof) failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether either participating physician gave the required notice. O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 757 So. 2d 624, 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)("All questions of compensability, including those which arise regarding the adequacy of notice, are properly decided in the administrative forum.") Accord University of Miami v. M.A., 793 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Tabb v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 880 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). See also Behan v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 664 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). But see All Children's Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Administrative Hearings, 863 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (certifying conflict); Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc. v. Division of Administrative Hearings, 871 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)(same); and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Ferguson, 869 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)(same). At all times material hereto, Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, prescribed the notice provisions of the Plan, as follows: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician, other than residents, assistant residents, and interns deemed to be participating physicians under s. 766.314(4)(c), under the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice form. Signature of the patient acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption that the notice requirements of this section have been met. Notice need not be given to a patient when the patient has an emergency medical condition as defined in s. 395.002(9)(b) or when notice is not practicable. Responding to Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, NICA developed a brochure, titled "Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem" (the NICA brochure), which contained a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the Plan, and distributed the brochure to participating physicians and hospitals so they could furnish a copy of it to their obstetrical patients. (See, e.g., Petitioners' Exhibit 2, the NICA brochure, "This brochure is prepared in accordance with the mandate of [Section] 766.316, Florida Statutes.") Findings related to the participating physicians and notice Mrs. Jackson received her prenatal care at the Longwood Center, one of 7 offices in the Orlando area operated by Physician Associates of Florida (PAF), a group practice comprised of 35 physicians, including 16 obstetrician- gynecologists. (See, e.g., Intervenors' Exhibits 1, 2, 4, and 6.) At the time, four obstetricians staffed the OB-GYN department at the Longwood Office, Dr. Marc Bischof, who provided obstetrical services during Jacqueline's birth; Dr. Robert Bowels; Dr. Peter Perry; and Dr. Jose Lopez-Cintron. However, as a group practice, all obstetricians rotated delivery calls at the hospital, so it was possible, as occurred in this case with Dr. Pena, that a doctor from a different office would participate in the delivery. Notably, all obstetricians associated with PAF were participating physicians in the Plan. On April 12, 1999, Mrs. Jackson presented to the Longwood Center for her initial visit. At the time, consistent with established routine, the receptionist provided Mrs. Jackson with a packet of information that included a number of forms for her to complete and sign, including: a Patient Information form; a Consent for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Antibody Testing form; a Triple Test Form (a screening test for Down's Syndrome); a Prenatal Diagnosis Screening Questionnaire; and a Notice to Obstetrical Patient (to acknowledge receipt of the NICA brochure that was, indisputably, included in the packet). The Notice to Obstetric Patient provided, as follows: NOTICE TO OBSTETRIC PATIENT (See Section 766.316, Florida Statutes) I have been furnished information by Physician Associates of Florida prepared by the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, and have been advised that [5] is a participating physician in that program, wherein certain limited compensation is available in the event certain neurological injury may occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation. For specifics on the program, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA), 1435 Piedmont Drive East, Suite 101, Tallahassee, Florida 32312 1-800-398-2129. I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the brochure prepared by NICA. DATED this day of , 199 . Signature (NAME OF PATIENT) Social Security No.: Attest: (Nurse or Physician) Date: Mrs. Jackson completed each of the forms, including the Notice to Obstetric Patient, by providing the requested information, and then signing and dating the forms. (Petitioners' Exhibit 1). Here, there is no dispute that Mrs. Jackson signed the Notice to Obstetric Patient or that she received a copy of the NICA brochure on her initial visit. There is likewise no dispute that, given the blank space, the notice form was inadequate to provide notice that Dr. Bischof, Dr. Pena, or any obstetrician associated with PAF was a participating physician in the Plan. Rather, what is disputed is whether, as contended by Intervenors, Mrs. Jackson was told during her initial visit that all obstetricians in PAF were participants in the Plan.6 Regarding Mrs. Jackson's initial visit, the proof demonstrates that, following completion of the paperwork, Mrs. Jackson was seen by Nurse Posey for her initial interview. Typically, such visits lasted approximately 45 minutes, with 30 minutes spent reviewing the patient's history, as well as the paperwork she received in the packet, and 15 minutes spent on a physical examination. According to Nurse Posey, she conducted a minimum of two initial prenatal interviews daily, five days a week, and followed the same procedure during each interview. As described by Nurse Posey, during the initial interview she always discussed each form (the Prenatal Diagnosis Screening Questionnaire, the Triple Test Form, Consent for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Antibody Testing form, and the Notice to Obstetric Patient) individually, and when the form had been discussed she would co-sign the form. (Transcript, pp. 65- 68) Moreover, as for the NICA program, Nurse Posey always confirmed that the patient had received the NICA brochure, and told the patient that PAF's obstetrical service was "a group practice; that anyone in the group could do the delivery; and that each member of the group was a participant in the NICA program." (Transcript, pp. 68-70) Finally, Nurse Posey documented her routine through an entry on the prenatal flow sheet (Intervenors' Exhibit 6), which noted she had provided the patient information on the various tests, as well as the NICA brochure and notification. Here, that entry read: "Pt given info on diet, exercise, HIV screening, triple test, NICA pamphlet & notification & cord blood storage." (Petitioners' Exhibit 1, Intervenors' Exhibit 6, and Transcript, pp. 70-78.) In this case, Nurse Posey was confident she had followed her routine, since she would not have co-signed the various documents, such as the Notice to Obstetric Patient, or made the entry on the prenatal flow sheet unless she had done so. In response to the evidence offered by Intervenors on the notice issue, Mrs. Jackson testified there was never a discussion of the NICA program, and she was never told the physicians associated with PAF's obstetrical program were participating physicians in the Plan. However, Mrs. Jackson acknowledged that Nurse Posey questioned her regarding her medical history, and that she explained the Prenatal Diagnosis Screening Questionnaire, the Triple Test Form, and the HIV form. (Transcript, pp. 141-145) As for the Notice to Obstetric Patient, Mrs. Jackson initially denied having read it; then testified she may have read it "briefly," but "didn't go into details" or "seek out specifics"; and finally stated she could not remember reading the form, but could not deny that she may have read it. (Transcript, pp. 150, 151, 156-159) Here, giving due consideration to the proof, it must be resolved that the more persuasive proof supports the conclusion that, more likely than not, Nurse Posey, consistent with her routine, discussed the NICA program with Mrs. Jackson on her initial visit, and informed Mrs. Jackson that the physicians associated with PAF's obstetrical program were participating physicians in the Plan. In so concluding, it is noted that, but for the NICA program, Mrs. Jackson acknowledged Nurse Posey otherwise followed her routine; that it is unlikely, given such consistency, Nurse Posey would not have also discussed the NICA program; that Nurse Posey, as was her routine, co-signed each of the forms she discussed with Mrs. Jackson, including the Notice to Obstetric Patient; that Nurse Posey, as was her routine, documented her activity on the prenatal flow sheet; and that Mrs. Jackson evidenced little recall of the documents she signed or the discussions she had with Nurse Posey. Finally, Nurse Posey's testimony was logical, consistent, and credible, whereas Mrs. Jackson's testimony was often equivocal. Jurisdiction
The Issue Whether birth-related neurological injuries which result in death during the neonatal period2 are covered by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan) and, if so, whether Nicholas Erwin Schur, a deceased minor, otherwise qualifies for coverage under the Plan. Whether the notice requirements of the Plan were satisfied. Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve or, alternatively, must preliminarily resolve, whether there is "clear and convincing evidence of bad faith or malicious purpose or willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety, or property" before a claimant may elect (under the provisions of Section 766.303(2), Florida Statutes) to reject Plan coverage and pursue such a civil suit. What effect, if any, the claimants' settlement with the birthing hospital has on the availability of benefits under the Plan. Whether the participating physician's corporate employers have standing to participate in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Fundamental findings Petitioners, Nicholas J. Schur and Lisa Schur, are the parents and natural guardians of Nicholas Erwin Schur (Nicholas), a deceased minor, and co-personal representatives of their deceased son's estate. Nicholas was born September 20, 1998, at Baptist Medical Center of the Beaches, Inc. (Baptist Medical Center), a hospital located in Jacksonville Beach, Duval County, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Nicholas died on September 24, 1998, during the neonatal period at Baptist Medical Center.4 The physician providing obstetrical services during Nicholas' birth was Marijane Q. Boyd, M.D., who was at all times material hereto a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." Sections 766.302(2) and 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Here, NICA has concluded, and the parties have stipulated, that Nicholas suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," as defined by the Plan. Consequently, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, NICA is of the view that, under the provisions of the Plan, the claim is compensable. NICA's conclusion is grossly consistent with the proof and is, therefore, approved.5 Notice of Plan participation While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners have responded to the health care providers' claim of Plan immunity by contending that the participating physician who delivered obstetrical services at birth (Dr. Marijane Boyd) failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. As for Baptist Medical Center, the parties have stipulated that it provided timely pre-delivery notice as envisioned by the Plan. Consequently, it is only necessary to resolve whether, as alleged by the health care providers, the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied by or on behalf of Dr. Boyd. O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 757 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), and University of Miami v. M.A., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1473a (Fla. 3d DCA June 13, 2001). Pertinent to the notice issue, the proof demonstrates that on or about January 27, 1998, Mrs. Schur sought prenatal care from her existing provider, Cleveland W. Randolph, Jr., M.D., a physician who, together with Samuel A. Christian, M.D., maintained an office for the practice of obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) known as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division I, at 1375 Roberts Drive, Suite 205, Jacksonville Beach, Florida. At the time, Drs. Randolph and Christian, like approximately 40 other obstetricians practicing in the Jacksonville area, were employees/shareholders of North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A. Notably, all obstetricians employed by North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., were "participating physicians" in the Plan. Consistent with that relationship, Mrs. Schur was offered and accepted a "Contract for Obstetrical Services" (on January 27, 1998) which identified North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., as the entity through which Dr. Randolph would be providing obstetrical and post partum care. That agreement provided, inter alia, as follows: North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., provides total obstetrical and post partum care. This includes a physical examination and prenatal care, delivery of the infant and post partum care. Prenatal care includes all office visits and routine lab evaluation related to the pregnancy. Post partum care includes care for problems relating to the pregnancy or delivery and routine examinations, following the delivery up to 12 weeks. North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., agrees to provide availability of a licensed obstetrician on call 24 hours a day in case of emergency. The agreement further established a fee schedule for basic comprehensive obstetrical care, cesarean section, and other obstetrical services. On March 15, 1998, Dr. Randolph notified Mrs. Schur, as well as his other obstetrical patients, that he would no longer deliver babies, and that his "partner, Dr. Sam Christian," would provide that service. Thereafter, on March 23, 1998, Mrs. Schur had a prenatal visit with Dr. Christian (to decide whether she would accept him as her obstetrician) and decided not to continue her care with Dr. Christian (due to his increased patient load). Effective May 19, 1998, Mrs. Schur elected to transfer her obstetrical and post partum care to the offices of Drs. Rebecca Moorhead, Patricia Schroeder, and Marijane Q. Boyd, another small group practice affiliated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A. That office, known as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II, was located in a professional office building adjacent to the building occupied by Doctors Randolph and Christian. While the group practice of Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd was affiliated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A. (North Florida), and they held themselves out to the public as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II, as discussed more fully infra, the principles structured their business relationship through two separate professional associations. Regarding those associations, the proof demonstrated that Doctors Moorhead and Schroeder were employees of North Florida and Dr. Boyd was an employee (the sole employee) of Beaches Obstetrical and Gynecological Practice, Inc. (Beaches OB/GYN).6 Under the terms of a Management Services Agreement, effective August 1, 1997, North Florida (Drs. Moorhead and Schroeder/Beaches-Division II) and Beaches OB/GYN (Dr. Boyd) outlined the manner in which the group practice of Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd would be conducted, as well as how expenses and revenues would be shared. As structured, North Florida agreed to provide billing, administrative and other support services for Beaches OB/GYN (Dr. Boyd) and Beaches OB/GYN agreed that Dr. Boyd would provide her professional services. As compensation for North Florida's services, Beaches OB/GYN agreed to pay what was essentially one-third of the direct operating expenses incurred by North Florida in the operation of the group practice. As for revenue sharing, the agreement contemplated that North Florida and Beaches OB/GYN would receive a share of professional fees received based on the actual professional services provided by North Florida physicians (Drs. Moorhead and Schroeder) and Beaches OB/GYN's provider (Dr. Boyd). While Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd elected to structure their group practice through two professional associations, they otherwise did business as, and held themselves out to the public as, North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II. Notably, the signage on the front door so identified their practice, followed by the names of Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd; and, all paperwork of note likewise identified their practice as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II. Indeed, Mrs. Schur was, at the time, unaware of any entity known as Beaches Obstetrical and Gynecological Practice, Inc.7 Finally, with regard to the manner in which the group practiced, the proof demonstrated that Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd, like many group practices, shared patients, with each patient (including Mrs. Schur) rotating her prenatal care through all three physicians, and shared calls, with each physician on call every third day and every third weekend. With such an arrangement, it was strictly a matter of chance which of the physicians (Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, or Boyd), all of whom were participating physicians in the Plan, would deliver a patient's child. Regarding the notice issue, it is resolved that Mrs. Schur was provided timely notice that the physicians associated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., were participating physicians in the Plan, together with notice as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries provided by the Plan. Such conclusion is based on the more credible proof which demonstrates that on June 15, 1998, when Mrs. Schur presented to the offices of Drs. Moorhead, Schoder, and Boyd, that they had an established routine whereby on a patient's first office visit she would be provided the notice contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes. Here, consistent with that routine, the proof demonstrates that on such date, when she presented for her first office visit, Mrs. Schur was given a form titled NOTICE TO OBSTETRIC PATIENT, which provided: I have been furnished information by North Florida Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A. prepared by the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, and have been advised that North Florida Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A. is a participating practice in that program, wherein certain limited compensation is available in the event certain neurological injury may occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation. For specifics on the program, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA), Barnett Bank Building, 315 South Calhoun Street, Suite 312, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, (904) 488-8191. I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the brochure prepared by NICA. Dated this day of , 19 . Signature (NAME OF PATIENT) Social Security No.: Attest: (Nurse or Physician) Date: Rather than sign the form, Mrs. Schur wrote across it the words "received at Dr. Randolph's." At hearing, Mrs. Schur testified that, although she does not recall the incident, the best explanation she could offer for writing "received at Dr. Randolph's" instead of signing the form was that "someone would have had to tell me to do that . . . [since] I would not have known to write that on there." Such explanation is logical and credible; however, having accepted the explanation for why the entry was made, instead of signing the form, does not detract from the strong inference to be drawn from the entry. Indeed, having written the words "received at Dr. Randolph's" across the form is compelling evidence that, at the time, Mrs. Schur had a clear recollection that, during the period she was under the care of Dr. Randolph, she received notice that the physicians associated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., were participating physicians in the Plan, as well as a copy of the NICA brochure that described the NICA program.8 As further evidence that notice was given, it is observed that established routine at the offices of Drs. Moorhead, Schoder, and Boyd also mandated that when notice was given an item titled "NICA ", and contained within a checklist (titled Plans/Education) on a patient's prenatal record, receive a "?" in the space following the acronym NICA. Notably, at or about the same time Mrs. Schur wrote across the notice "received at Dr. Randolph's" the space following the acronym NICA was annotated to read "? c Dr. Randolph." Given Mrs. Schur's entry on the notice form ("received at Dr. Randolph's"), as well as the established routine, it is reasonable to conclude that such annotation was intended to reflect that Mrs. Schur had received NICA notice when she was a patient of Dr. Randolph.9 While the proof demonstrated that Mrs. Schur received notice, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, that the physicians associated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, Inc., were participants in the Plan, it likewise demonstrated that no separate notice was provided that Dr. Boyd, either individually or as an employee of Beaches Obstetrical & Gynecological Practice, Inc., was a participant in the Plan. However, for reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law which follow, such failure was harmless. The settlement agreement with Baptist Medical Center On June 20, 2001, Nicholas J. Schur and Lisa S. Schur, individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Nicholas Erwin Schur (Claimants) and Baptist Medical Center of the Beaches, Inc., formally resolved all claims or potential claims of the Claimants against Baptist Medical Center and North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., including those matters relating to the pending civil action in the Circuit Court, Duval County, Florida, Case No. 00-01458-CA, Division CV- C; however, the Claimants reserved all claims they had against Marijane Q. Boyd and Beaches Obstetrical and Gynecological Practice, Inc. As consideration for that settlement, the Claimants received the sum of $87,500 and the release and discharge of all claims Baptist Medical Center had against the Claimants arising from the care provided to Nicholas or Mrs. Schur.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Giuliano Gugelmin, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (the Plan). If so, whether the notice requirements of the Plan were satisfied.
Findings Of Fact Mauricio Gugelmin and Stella Gugelmin are the parents and natural guardians of Giuliano Gugelmin (Giuliano), a minor. Giuliano was born a live infant on July 14, 1994, at South Broward Hospital District, d/b/a Memorial Hospital West (the Hospital), a hospital located in Broward County, Florida, and his birth weight was in excess of 2500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services during the birth of Giuliano was Eric N. Freling, M.D., who was at all times material hereto, a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (the Plan), as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who have suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post- delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." Sections 766.302(2) and 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Here, the parties have stipulated that Giuliano suffered a "birth- related neurological injury," as that term is defined by the Plan, and NICA proposes to accept the claim as compensable. The parties' stipulation is grossly consistent with the proof and, consequently, it is resolved that NICA's proposal to accept the claim as compensable is approved. While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners have responded to the health care providers' claim of Plan immunity in the collateral civil action by claiming that the health care providers failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether, as alleged, proper notice was given. Regarding the notice issue, it must be resolved that the proof failed to demonstrate, more likely than not, that Dr. Freling provided Mrs. Gugelmin any notice of his participation in the Plan or any explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the Plan. Indeed, the more compelling proof was to the contrary. Moreover, there was no proof to support a conclusion that Dr. Freling's failure to accord notice was occasioned by a medical emergency or that the giving of notice was otherwise not practicable. While Dr. Freling failed to give notice, the Hospital did, as required by law, provide timely notice to Mrs. Gugelmin as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. That notice included, as required, an explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the Plan, and was given at 11:45 a.m., July 13, 1994, shortly after Mrs. Gugelmin's admission to the hospital (which occurred at approximately 11:22 a.m., July 13, 1994). Giuliano was delivered at 12:25 a.m., July 14, 1994.
The Issue Whether Isabelle Dianderas, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). If so, whether the hospital and the participating physician gave the patient notice, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, or whether notice was not required because the patient had an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes, or the giving of notice was not practicable.
Findings Of Fact Findings related to compensability Maribenny Dianderas and Arturo Dianderas are the natural parents and guardians of Isabelle Dianderas, a minor. Isabelle was born a live infant on October 8, 2002, at Florida Hospital, a hospital located in Orlando, Florida, and her birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Isabelle's birth was Natasha M. Knight, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. Here, the proof is compelling, and uncontroverted, that Isabelle suffered an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in the hospital that rendered her permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. (Joint Exhibits 1-4; Transcript, pages 125-145). Consequently, the record demonstrated that Isabelle suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" and, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, the claim is compensable. §§ 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. The notice issue While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners would prefer to pursue their civil remedies, and avoid a claim of Plan immunity by the healthcare providers in a civil action. Therefore, Petitioners have averred, and requested a finding that, the hospital and the participating physician who delivered obstetrical services at Isabelle's birth, failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. See Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 1997)("[A]s a condition precedent to invoking the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as a patient's exclusive remedy, health care providers must, when practicable, give their obstetrical patients notice of their participation in the plan a reasonable time prior to delivery.") Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied.1 The notice provisions of the Plan At all times material hereto, Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, prescribed the notice requirements of the Plan, as follows: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician, other than residents, assistant residents, and interns deemed to be participating physicians under s. 766.314(4)(c), under the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice form. Signature of the patient acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption that the notice requirements of this section have been met. Notice need not be given to a patient when the patient has an emergency medical condition as defined in s. 395.002(9)(b) or when notice is not practicable. Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes, defines "emergency medical condition" to mean: (b) With respect to a pregnant woman: That there is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery; That a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus; or That there is evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions[2] or rupture of the membranes. The Plan does not define "practicable." However, "practicable" is a commonly understood word that, as defined by Webster's dictionary, means "capable of being done, effected, or performed; feasible." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition (1979). See Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)("When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of words [in a statute] can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary."). The NICA brochure Responding to Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, NICA developed a brochure (as the "form" prescribed by the Plan), titled "Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem" (the NICA brochure), which contained an explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the Plan, and distributed the brochure to participating physicians and hospitals so they could furnish a copy of it to their obstetrical patients. (Joint Exhibit 5). Pertinent to this case, the NICA brochure applicable to Mrs. Dianderas' prenatal care and Isabelle's birth provided: The birth of a baby is an exciting and happy time. You have every reason to expect that the birth will be normal and that both mother and child will go home healthy and happy. Unfortunately, despite the skill and dedication of doctors and hospitals, complications during birth sometimes occur. Perhaps the worst complication is one which results in damage to the newborn's nervous system - called a "neurological injury." Such an injury may be catastrophic, physically, financially and emotionally. In an effort to deal with this serious problem, the Florida Legislature, in 1988, passed a law which created a Plan that offers an alternative to lengthy malpractice litigation processes brought about when a child suffers a qualifying neurological injury at birth. The law created the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA). EXCLUSIVE REMEDY The law provides that awards under the Plan are exclusive. This means that if an injury is covered by the Plan, the child and its family are not entitled to compensation through malpractice lawsuits. CRITERIA AND COVERAGE Birth-related neurological injuries have been defined as an injury to the spinal cord or brain of a live-born infant weighing at least 2500 grams at birth. In the case of multiple gestation, the live birth weight is 2000 grams for each infant. The injury must have been caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, which occurred in the course of labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post delivery period in a hospital. Only hospital births are covered. The injury must have rendered the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. The legislation does not apply to genetic or congenital abnormalities. Only injuries to infants delivered by participating physicians, as defined in s. 766.302(7), Florida Statutes, are covered by the Plan. COMPENSATION Compensation may be provided for the following: Actual expenses for necessary and reasonable care, services, drugs, equipment, facilities and travel, excluding expenses that can be compensated by state or federal government or by private insurers. In addition, an award, not to exceed $100,000 to the infant's parents or guardians. Funeral expenses are authorized up to $1,500. Reasonable expenses for filing the claim, including attorney's fees. NICA is one of only two (2) such programs in the nation, and is devoted to managing a fund that provides compensation to parents whose child may suffer a qualifying birth-related neurological injury. The Plan takes the "No-Fault" approach for all parties involved. This means that no costly litigation is required and the parents of a child qualifying under the law who file a claim with the Division of Administrative Hearings may have all actual expenses for medical and hospital care paid by the Plan. You are eligible for this protection if your doctor is a participating physician in the NICA Plan. If your doctor is a participating physician, that means that your doctor has purchased this benefit for you in the event that your child should suffer a birth-related neurological injury, which qualifies under the law. If your health care provider has provided you with a copy of this informational form, your health care provider is placing you on notice that one or more physician(s) at your health care provider participates in the NICA Plan. (Joint Exhibit 5). Here, Petitioners contend the brochure prepared by NICA was insufficient to satisfy the notice provision of the Plan (which requires that the form "include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan"), because it failed to include an explanation of the civil remedies a patient would forego if she chose a participating provider. (Transcript, pages 11-13). However, neither Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1997), the authority relied upon by Petitioners, nor the notice provision of the Plan, place such an obligation on NICA in the formulation of the brochure. In Galen, supra, the Court had for consideration the following question certified to be of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 766.316, FLORIDA STATUTES (1993), REQUIRES THAT HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS GIVE THEIR OBSTETRICAL PATIENTS PRE-DELIVERY NOTICE OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE FLORIDA BIRTH RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PLAN AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE PROVIDERS' INVOKING NICA AS THE PATIENTS' EXCLUSIVE REMEDY? Id. at 308. In answer to the certified question, the Court held: . . . as a condition precedent to invoking the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as a patient's exclusive remedy, health care providers must, when practicable, give their obstetrical patients notice of their participation in the plan a reasonable time prior to delivery. Id. at 309. The Court reasoned, as follows: Section 766.316 provides in pertinent part: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician . . . under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients thereof as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth- related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. Without exception the district courts of appeal that have addressed the issue have read section 766.316 to require pre-delivery notice . . . . We agree with the district courts that the only logical reading of the statute is that before an obstetrical patient's remedy is limited by the NICA plan, the patient must be given pre-delivery notice of the health care provider's participation in the plan. Section 766.316 requires that obstetrical patients be given notice "as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries." That notice must "include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan." § 766.316. This language makes clear that the purpose of the notice is to give an obstetrical patient an opportunity to make an informed choice between using a health care provider participating in the NICA plan or using a provider who is not a participant and thereby preserving her civil remedies. Turner v. Hubrich, 656 So. 2d 970, 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). In order to effectuate this purpose a NICA participant must give a patient notice of the "no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries" a reasonable time prior to delivery, when practicable. Our construction of the statute is supported by its legislative history. Florida's Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan was proposed by the 1987 Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems. In its November 6, 1987 report, the Task Force recommended adoption of a no-fault compensation plan for birth-related neurological injuries similar to the then newly enacted Virginia plan (1987 Va. Acts Ch. 540). Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems, Medical Malpractice Recommendations 31 (Nov. 6, 1987)(hereinafter Task Force Report). However, the Task Force was concerned that the Virginia legislation did not contain a notice requirement and recommended that the Florida plan contain such a requirement. The Task Force believed that notice was necessary to ensure that the plan was fair to obstetrical patients1 and to shield the plan from constitutional challenge.2 The Task Force explained in its report: The Virginia statute does not require participating physicians and hospitals to give notice to obstetrical patients that they are participating in the limited no- fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. The Task Force recommends that health care providers who participate under this plan should be required to provide reasonable notice to patients of their participation. This notice requirement is justified on fairness grounds and arguably may be required in order to assure that the limited no fault alternative is constitutional. Task Force Report at 34 (emphasis added). Since Florida's NICA plan was the result of the Task Force's report, it is only logical to conclude that the plan's notice requirement was included in the Florida legislation as a result of this recommendation and therefore was intended to be a condition precedent to immunity under the plan. * * * Under our reading of the statute, in order to preserve their immune status, NICA participants who are in a position to notify their patients of their participation a reasonable time before delivery simply need to give the notice in a timely manner. In those cases where it is not practicable to notify the patient prior to delivery, pre- delivery notice will not be required. Whether a health care provider was in a position to give a patient pre-delivery notice of participation and whether notice was given a reasonable time before delivery will depend on the circumstances of each case and therefore must be determined on a case-by-case basis . . . . Accordingly, we answer the certified question as explained herein and approve the decision under review. Id. at 309-311. 1 The Task Force obviously believed that because not all health care providers are required to participate in the NICA plan, fairness requires that the patient be made aware that she has limited her common law remedies by choosing a participating provider. 2 The Task Force also must have recognized that failure to require notice would open the plan up to constitutional attack. For example, the Braniffs argue that if pre- delivery notice is not a condition precedent to immunity under the plan, patients will be deprived of their common law remedies without due process. However, because of our resolution of the notice issue, we need not reach the merit of this procedural due process challenge. Notably, the Court was not asked to resolve, and did not resolve, whether the obligation to provide a form that "include[d] a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan," required an explanation of the civil remedies a patient would forego if she chose a participating provider. Moreover, the unambiguous language the Legislature chose evidences no such intention. Rather, the Plan requires that the form "include a clear ['[f]ree from doubt or confusion']3 and concise ['[e]xpressing much in few words; succinct']4 explanation ['the process of making plain or comprehensible']5 of the patients' rights and limitations under the plan," and does not include an obligation to explain a patient's potential civil remedies at common law or otherwise. Rinella v. Abifaraj, 908 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)("Where the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language is unambiguous, we cannot construe the statute in a manner that would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications."); Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 287 (Fla. 2001)(quoting Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999))("[I]t is a basic principle of statutory construction that Courts 'are not at liberty to add words to statutes that are not placed there by the Legislature.'"); Crutcher v. School Board of Broward County, 834 So. 2d 228, 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)("When a court construes a statute, its goal is to ascertain legislative intent, and if the language of the statute under scrutiny is clear and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction beyond giving effect to the plain meaning of the statutory words."); American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)("Words of common usage should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense."). The brochure prepared by NICA satisfies the legislative mandate. Jackson v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D8676 (Fla. 5th DCA March 24, 2006)("The ALJ properly recognized that NICA developed a pamphlet titled 'Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem.' The pamphlet contains a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the NICA plan, as is required by the terms of the statute.")(petition for rehearing pending). Findings related to the participating physician and notice Mrs. Dianderas received her prenatal care at Loch Haven OB/GYN Group, Orlando, Florida, a group practice comprised of a number of physicians, including Natasha M. Knight, M.D., and dedicated to the practice of obstetrics and gynecology. At the time, Loch Haven, like Florida Hospital, was owned by Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc.; however, patients, including Mrs. Dianderas, were not noticed, by signage or otherwise, of the relationship the business entities shared. On February 14, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas presented to Loch Haven for her initial visit. At the time, consistent with established practice for new obstetric patients, Mrs. Dianderas was given a copy of the NICA brochure, together with a Notice to Obstetric Patient (to acknowledge receipt of the NICA brochure). The Notice to Obstetric Patient provided, as follows: Notice to Obstetric Patient I have been furnished with information by the Loch Haven OB/GYN as prepared by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association and have been advised that the physicians of the Loch Haven OB/GYN Group are participating members in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association. This Plan provides that certain limited compensation is available in event certain birth-related neurological injuries may occur during labor, delivery or post-delivery resuscitation, irrespective of fault. For specifics on the Plan, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation association (NICA), Post office Box 14567, Tallahassee, Florida 32317-04567, (904) 488-8191 or 1- 800-3982129: I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the form brochure prepared and furnished by the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association. Patient Signature Date Print Name Social Security Number D.O.B. Witness Date Mrs. Dianderas completed the form, by providing the requested information (name, social security number, and date of birth), and then signed and dated the form. Beverly Bailey, the medical assistant who saw Mrs. Dianderas on her initial visit, witnessed her signature. Here, Mrs. Dianderas acknowledges she signed the Notice to Obstetric Patient, but has no current recollection of having done so, and has no current recollection of whether she was or was not given a copy of the NICA brochure. (Transcript, pages 39-41 and 54-58). Moreover, Petitioners candidly concede, they can offer no proof to rebut the presumption that the notice provisions were met by the participating physician. (Transcript, pages 9, 55, 56, and 278). Consequently, since the NICA brochure complied with the requirements of Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, the participating physician satisfied the notice provisions of the Plan. However, notwithstanding the common ownership of Loch Haven and Florida Hospital by Adventist, they were separate business entities, and the notice by Loch Haven (on behalf of its physicians) did not satisfy Florida Hospital's obligation to give notice. § 766.316, Fla. Stat. ("Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician . . . shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries."); Board of Regents v. Athey, 694 So. 2d 46, 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)("Under section 766.316 . . . notice on behalf of the hospital will not by itself satisfy the notice requirement imposed on the participating physician(s) involved in the delivery " Conversely, it reasonably follows, notice on behalf of the participating physician will not by itself satisfy the notice requirement imposed on the hospital.) Findings related to the hospital and notice To support an inference that it complied with the notice provisions of the Plan, the hospital offered proof of the practice it followed to provide a copy of the NICA brochure and Notice to Obstetric Patient form (acknowledgment form)6 to each patient who presented to labor and delivery.7 See Tabb v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 880 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Here, Mrs. Dianderas presented to the labor and delivery on two occasions (September 29, 2002, and October 7, 2002), during which the hospital had an opportunity to provide notice, and during which the hospital claims it provided notice.8 With regard to Mrs. Dianderas' first admission, the proof demonstrates that at or about 7:25 p.m., Sunday, September 29, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas, with an estimated delivery date of October 14, 2002, and the fetus at 37+ weeks' gestation, presented to labor and delivery, at Florida Hospital, with complaints of contractions. At the time, the finance window was closed, as it had been since 11:00 p.m., Friday, and would be until 6:00 a.m., Monday, and Mrs. Dianderas was admitted to the triage unit by Cynthia Hall, R.N., the on-duty triage nurse. Notably, Nurse Hall, who was responsible for completing all paperwork associated with Mrs. Dianderas' admission, attended Mrs. Dianderas from 7:25 p.m., until her discharge (after it was resolved Mrs. Dianderas was not in labor) at 12:19 a.m., September 30, 2002, except for a brief period (between 9:17 p.m., and 10:20 p.m.) when Mrs. Dianderas was taken for an ultrasound. With regard to notice, Nurse Hall, who routinely works weekends, testified that it was her practice, during her initial evaluation in triage, to provide the patient a copy of the NICA brochure, as well as an acknowledgment form and Consent to Treatment form to complete and sign. According to Nurse Hall, the forms were routinely signed in her presence, were routinely witnessed by her, and she routinely made a photocopy of the acknowledgment form and placed it on the finance clerk's desk (that was adjacent to her desk), so finance could update their computer records on Monday to reflect that the NICA brochure had been given. The original documents, including the original acknowledgment form, were placed in the patient's chart. Here, Nurse Hall is confident she followed her routine, and Mrs. Dianderas' chart does include a Consent to Treatment form signed by Mrs. Dianderas and witnessed by Nurse Hall. However, the chart does not include a signed acknowledgment form, as it should if Nurse Hall followed her routine practice, and she could offer no explanation for its absence. Also inexplicably, the finance records related to this visit (Intervenors' Exhibit 1A, pages 1 and 2), reveal that at 8:48 p.m. (20:48), September 29, 2002, a finance clerk identified as "RLCEE8" updated Mrs. Dianderas' record to reflect that a copy of the NICA brochure had been provided. Notably, according to Nurse Hall, who was in a position to know, the finance office (in which she would have placed a copy of the acknowledgment form) was not staffed at the time, and she could not explain those entries (which she did not and was not authorized to make). Moreover, at hearing, the hospital made no effort to identify "RLCEE8" or to otherwise explain how these entries occurred. Consequently, given such irregularities it cannot be inferred, with any sense of confidence, that the hospital or Nurse Hall's routine was followed during Mrs. Dianderas' September 29, 2002, admission, or that she was provided a copy of the NICA brochure. With regard to Mrs. Dianderas' second admission, which ultimately led to Isabelle's birth, the proof demonstrates that at 2:00 p.m., October 7, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas, with the fetus at 39 weeks' gestation, presented to labor and delivery, at Florida Hospital, on referral from her obstetrician for a nonstress test (NST), secondary to decreased fetal movement. At the time, the finance window was open, and Iris Miranda, a financial services representative was on duty. With regard to notice, Ms. Miranda testified (by publication of her deposition) regarding the routine she would have followed when Mrs. Dianderas presented to the finance window that afternoon. According to Ms. Miranda, that routine would have included giving Mrs. Dianderas a Consent for Treatment form to sign, as well as a copy of the NICA brochure and an acknowledgment form to sign and give to the nurse in labor and delivery. Here, Ms. Miranda is confident she followed her routine, and Mrs. Dianderas' chart does include a Consent to Treatment form signed by Mrs. Dianderas and witnessed by Ms. Miranda. Moreover, the finance department's records (Intervenors' Exhibit 1B, pages 1 and 2) include a computer entry at 2:03 p.m. (14:03), October 7, 2002, by Ms. Miranda (identified as "IVM76B") noting that a NICA brochure was provided. However, again the chart does not include a signed acknowledgment form, as it should if the hospital's routine was followed, and no compelling explanation for its absences was presented.9 Consequently, given the lack of a reasonable explanation for the irregularities that have been shown regarding the finance department's computer entries, as well as the absence of the acknowledgment form, it cannot be inferred with any sense of confidence that the hospital's routine was followed during Mrs. Dianderas' admission of October 7, 2002, or that Mrs. Dianderas was given a NICA brochure Finally, with regard to the hospital and the notice issue, it is noted that on presentation to Florida Hospital at 2:00 p.m., October 7, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas was not in labor, and insofar as the record reveals she was not thereafter in labor until sometime after her membranes were ruptured, at 4:55 p.m. More particularly, there was no "evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions or rupture of the membranes" from 2:00 p.m., until 4:55 p.m., October 7, 2002. Moreover, there was no proof that, upon admission or until her membranes ruptured, "there [was] inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery" or "[t]hat a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus." Consequently, until 4:55 p.m., when her membranes were ruptured, Mrs. Dianderas did not have an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes, that would have excused the giving of notice. Moreover, there was no proof to support a conclusion that the giving of notice was not practicable. Jurisdiction
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulation of the parties, the following facts are found: Matthew Williams and Joy Williams (Petitioners) are the parents and natural guardians of Jesse Williams (Jesse), and are the “claimants” as defined by section 766.302(3). Jesse incurred a “birth-related neurological injury” as that term is defined in section 766.302(2), on or about December 26, 2018, which was the sole and proximate cause of Jesse’s injury. At birth, Jesse weighed 3,640 grams. Adrienne George, M.D., rendered obstetrical services in Jesse’s delivery, and, at all times material to this proceeding, was a “participating physician” as defined in section 766.302(7). TMH is a hospital located in Tallahassee, Florida, and is the hospital where Jesse was born. TMH is the “hospital” as that term is defined in section 766.302(6). Jesse died on March 28, 2019. Petitioners filed a petition pursuant to section 766.305, seeking compensation from NICA, and that petition is incorporated by reference in its entirety, including all attachments. Any reference made within this document to NICA encompasses, where appropriate, the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan).
The Issue Whether Petitioners' claim qualifies under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. See § 766.309(1)(a) and (b), Fla. Stat.1 Whether notice was accorded the patient (mother) by the healthcare providers, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, or whether the failure to give notice was excused because the patient had an emergency medical condition, as defined in Section 395.002(8)(b), Florida Statutes, or the giving of notice was not practicable.2
Findings Of Fact Krystle-Lyn Arens is the natural mother of Logan Allgood. Keith Allgood is the natural father of Logan Allgood. Logan Allgood was born a live infant on September 2, 2005. Logan Allgood was born at LRMC. There is no dispute that LRMC paid the money and filed its required paperwork in accordance with the NICA Plan so that it constitutes a licensed Florida hospital that is "covered" by the NICA Plan. Logan Allgood's birth weight was 3,963 kilograms.5 Jeffrey Puretz, M.D., delivered obstetrical services in the course of labor, delivery, and resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital. Moreover, there is no longer a dispute among the parties that at all times material, Dr. Puretz and Patricia Richey, ARNP/CNM, were "participating physicians" in the NICA Plan, as defined by Sections 766.302(7) and 766.314(4)(c), Florida Statutes. At all times material, Jeffrey Puretz, M.D., was employed with Lakeland OB/GYN, P.A., d/b/a Central Florida Women's Care. Dr. Puretz provided Ms. Arens a NICA acknowledgment form bearing the Lakeland OB/GYN P.A. letterhead, more than a week after Logan Allgood was born, and Ms. Arens signed it. No party contends that this document or a contemporaneous provision of information about NICA is sufficient pre-delivery notice by which Ms. Arens could make an informed choice of physician or hospital prior to Logan's birth. The exhibits herein show that Logan Allgood suffered a hypoxic ischemic event which occurred in the course of labor and delivery. Each party has stipulated or does not contest that Logan Allgood suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," as defined in Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes, or that the Order entered herein on April 1, 2009, determined that Logan had suffered a "birth-related neurological injury."6 Lakeland OB/GYN, P.A., does business in its own name, housing its medical physicians specializing in obstetrics, at 1733 Lakeland Hills Boulevard, and does business as Central Florida Women's Care in a separate building located four blocks further south at 1525 Lakeland Hills Boulevard, where it houses its certified nurse midwives. Physicians supervise the midwives on a rotating basis. On January 17, 2005, Ms. Arens, who was then age 15 and who had just learned she was pregnant, went with her mother and her child's father to Central Florida Women's Care. This was her first and only contact with either Central Florida Women's Care or Lakeland OB/GYN, P.A., prior to her arrival at the hospital, LRMC, for a full-term delivery on August 30, 2005. She had no appointment, and was told that in order to be seen by a midwife or physician, the provider required that she be interviewed and fill out and sign specific forms. On January 17, 2005, at Central Florida Women's Care, while her mother and Mr. Allgood waited elsewhere in the building, Ms. Arens was interviewed by a licensed practical nurse, Betty Kelly, LPN. Ms. Arens experienced no "hands on" examination by anyone on that date, but she did fill out or provide information for many patient forms, including a genetic screening and infection screening. In Central Florida Women's Care's file, there is an initial physical examination sheet, which is essentially an oral medical history and status provided by Ms. Arens and written down by her or Nurse Kelly. It is not the result of a "hands on" examination, but it may have involved Ms. Arens being weighed. There are notes about plans to bottle- feed her baby; her current medications; her asthma; and her relatives' health issues. There are signed rejections by Ms. Arens of HIV and CF testing. The HIV and CF forms name Central Florida Women"s Care as "a Division of Lakeland OB-GYN, P.A." Ms. Kelly gave her a prescription for prenatal vitamins. Ms. Arens also executed an acknowledgment of receiving a NICA brochure explaining her rights under NICA. The NICA acknowledgment form that Ms. Arens signed, dated, and placed her social security number on at Central Florida Women's Care on January 17, 2005, bore the Central Florida Women's Care letterhead and read: NOTICE TO OBSTETRIC PATIENT RE: NICA PARTICIPATION I have been furnished information by Central Florida Women's Care, prepared by the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, and have been advised that Drs. Alvarez, Puretz, Damian, Caravello, & Nixon and the midwives associated with their practice: Jill Hendry, Patricia Richey, Joan Bardo, Pam Barany and Sheri Small participate in that program, wherein certain limited compensation is available in the event certain neurological injury may occur during labor delivery or resuscitation. For specifics on the program, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA), 1435 Piedmont Drive East, Suite 101, Tallahassee, Florida 32312 telephone number 1 (800) 398-2120. I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the brochure prepared by NICA. (Emphasis added). This form also shows Betty Kelly's signature as witnessing Ms. Arens' signature. Both women acknowledged their signatures. Ms. Arens also acknowledged writing in the date and her social security number, but she could not remember if she received a NICA pamphlet that day or not. According to Ms. Arens, although she was a minor, her mother let her sign all her own papers throughout her pregnancy. On January 17, 2005, Lakeland OB/GYN, P.A., d/b/a Central Florida Women's Care did not bill until a patient was seen by a nurse midwife or medical physician. Ms. Arens left Central Florida Women's Care without seeing one of those professionals. A few days later, she decided not to return because she had decided she wanted physicians, not midwives, overseeing her prenatal care and delivery. (NICA Exhibit 13, page 9). She did not fail to make a another appointment with Central Florida Women's Care because of an informed choice to select a non-participating physician or because of an informed choice to avoid NICA's limitations. Ms. Arens obtained pre-natal care from late January 2005, until May or June 2005, from Exodus Women's Center, a practice unaffiliated with Lakeland OB/GYN, P.A., d/b/a Central Florida Women's Care. Whether or not members of Exodus were NICA participants does not appear in this record. Ms. Arens testified she left Exodus because she wanted a perinatologist. However, the next and last physician Ms. Arens consulted for prenatal care, Dr. Hamagiri Ravi, testified that she was not a perinatologist, and Ms. Arens' mother testified that she, the mother, had selected Dr. Ravi, because Dr. Ravi accepted Medicaid patients, such as Ms. Arens, and would see Ms. Arens quickly. There is no evidence Ms. Arens left Exodus to avoid NICA's limitations. Approximately three months before Logan's birth, Ms. Arens presented to Dr. Ravi to provide her prenatal care. Dr. Ravi is a non-participating physician. Dr. Ravi does not deliver babies. She also does not have privileges at any hospital or provide NICA brochures or counseling. On the first visit, Dr. Ravi has each of her patients sign a document acknowledging that Dr. Ravi will not be her delivering physician. Ms. Arens signed such a form, which read: To whom it may concern This is to inform you that I am very happy to be taking care of all of your prenatal needs at this office. However, I will not be your delivering physician. At the time of delivery you will go to the hospital of your choice to be delivered by the doctor on call. A copy of your records will be provided to you to preregister at the hospital of your choice. For your C-section needs, alternate measures will be arranged with a different physician. By signing below, you agree with the above conditions of prenatal care. Ms. Arens did not pre-register with any hospital for delivery of her child, who was due on August 30, 2005. On August 30, 2005, her due date, Ms. Arens and her mother went to Dr. Ravi's office. Dr. Ravi documented Ms. Arens' blood pressure as elevated to 140/80. Ms. Arens also was suffering from edema, and tests determined there was protein in her urine elevated to +3. Dr. Ravi contacted the obstetrician on-call at LRMC's emergency room and told him Ms. Arens was coming in. She told Ms. Arens to go straight to the LRMC emergency room for evaluation in a hospital setting and for possible induction of labor. Ms. Arens was stable when she left Dr. Ravi's office, but she expected that her child would be delivered when she got to the hospital. Ms. Arens presented to LRMC's emergency room at approximately 5:00 p.m., on August 30, 2005. She was seen in the emergency room by the physician who had relieved the physician to whom Dr. Ravi had spoken by telephone. When Ms. Arens presented to LRMC’s emergency room on August 30, 2005, she had proteinuria and elevated blood pressure. Vaginal examination revealed slight dilation, slight minimal effacement, and no vaginal bleeding. Her water had not yet broken and her membranes were not ruptured. Ms. Arens was not yet in labor. However, Ms. Arens' blood pressure was measured in LRMC's emergency room as 153/76. Lab work was begun. (Emergency Room records). At approximately 6:30 p.m., on August 30, 2005, Ms. Arens was moved to LRMC's labor and delivery floor for continued evaluation, including urine tests. On the labor and delivery floor, she was immediately seen by LRMC's Patient Access Representative, Kim Lepak. Ms. Lepak's normal routine was to provide each new patient with a packet of information specific to that patient's situation. Part of Ms. Lepak's responsibilities included providing each new obstetric patient with a packet that includes a Privacy Act explanation, a Patient's Rights form, and the NICA brochure. Ms. Lepak was also responsible for obtaining the patient's signature on forms that included assignment of benefits, releases, acceptance of financial responsibility, permission for treatment, and a form acknowledging that the patient had received the explanatory NICA brochure. LRMC's NICA acknowledgement form was signed by both Ms. Arens and Ms. Lepak, and dated August 30, 2005. It reads: RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF FLORIDA BIRTH RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION INFORMATION (See Section 766.316, Florida Statutes) I have been furnished information by Lakeland Regional Medical Center prepared by the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, and have been advised that my doctor and all nurse midwives associated with my doctor's practice participate in the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation program, wherein, certain limited compensation is available in the event certain neurological injury may occur during labor, delivery, or resuscitation. For specifics on the program, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA), 1435 East Piedmont Drive, Suite 101, Tallahassee, Florida, 32312, (904) 488-8191. I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the brochure prepared by NICA. (Emphasis added) Ms. Lepak testified that the form also bore an LRMC stamp that had been applied in the emergency room, showing Ms. Arens was assigned by LRMC to CNM Joan Bardo on the labor and delivery floor. LRMC required all physicians and CNMs practicing at LRMC to be NICA "participating physicians," and CNMs were assigned by the hospital on 24-hour shifts in 2005. On their shifts, physicians were on-call, usually in the hospital. Dr. Puretz testified that under these conditions he and his practice rely on the hospital to notify patients of the NICA provisions. Ms. Arens and Ms. Lepak did not specifically recall whether Ms. Arens received the NICA brochure, but both identified their signatures on the acknowledgment form. Ms. Lepak testified that, based on her routine procedure, she would have presented the pamphlet to Ms. Arens, watched Ms. Arens sign the acknowledgment, and finally Ms. Lepak would have signed as a witness to Ms. Arens' signature and added her own witness information after Ms. Arens had signed. On the labor and delivery floor, during August 31, 2005, Ms. Arens' blood pressure readings ran mostly in the 130's/80's, and her urine was monitored. Joan Bardo, CNM, was practicing with Lakeland OB/GYN, P.A., d/b/a Central Florida Women's Care. (See Finding of Fact 16). Nurse Bardo was Ms. Arens' "attending physician" upon Ms. Arens' admission to LRMC's labor and delivery floor sometime around 6:30 p.m., August 30, 2005. Ms. Arens did not begin labor on Nurse Bardo's shift, which ended at 8:00 a.m., August 31, 2005, when she was relieved by Sheri Small, CNM. Sheri Small, CNM, relieved Nurse Bardo. Nurse Small was also practicing with Lakeland OB/GYN P.A. d/b/a Central Florida Women's Care. (See Finding of Fact 16). According to Ms. Small's notes on August 31, 2005, Ms. Arens was administered cervidil to induce labor and on September 1, 2005, was administered pitocin to induce labor. Patricia Richey, CNM, also practiced with Lakeland OB/GYN, d/b/a Central Florida Women's Care in 2005. (See Finding of Fact 16). When she came on the floor at 7:00 a.m., on September 1, 2005, she relieved Nurse Small. Nurse Richey was assigned by LRMC to render care to Ms. Arens. At 10:30 a.m., September 1, 2005, Ms. Arens' contractions were noted by Nurse Richey to be frequent but difficult to monitor. During the last part of Nurse Richey's 12-hour shift, Dr. Puretz, also of Lakeland OB/GYN (see Finding of Fact 16), was her supervising physician. He came on-call in the hospital, beginning between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m., on September 1, 2005. At 2:08 a.m., on September 2, 2005, Ms. Arens was completely dilated and pushing began with contractions every two minutes. At 4:35 a.m., September 2, 2005, Nurse Richey called Dr. Puretz to assist with delivery. Fetal heart tones had increased to 170-180 beats per minute. At 4:45 a.m., September 2, 2005, Nurse Richey notified Dr. Puretz of Ms. Arens' progress and requested evaluation for possible vacuum extraction. Care of Ms. Arens was transferred to Dr. Puretz at approximately 5:00 a.m., September 2, 2005. At that time, he documented that Ms. Arens had a 101-degree temperature and her unborn baby was experiencing mild fetal tachycardia. This was the first time Ms. Arens and Dr. Puretz had been in each other's presence. Upon examination, Ms. Arens was fully dilated. There was an arrest of descent. The baby was wedged in her pelvis. At 5:10 a.m., September 2, 2005, Dr. Puretz evaluated Ms. Arens, and elected to do a Caesarian section delivery, believing that vacuum extraction was not prudent. At 5:35 a.m., September 2, 2005, Ms. Arens was moved, under Dr. Puretz' care, to an operating room, and at 6:15 a.m., Logan was delivered. (See Finding of Fact 10).
The Issue Whether Loren Romine, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). If so, whether Petitioners' recovery, through settlement of a civil action for medical malpractice against the treating obstetrician and hospital, bars them from recovering benefits under the Plan.
Findings Of Fact Findings related to compensability John Romine and Rebecca Romine are husband and wife, as well as the natural parents and court-appointed guardians of the property of Loren Romine (Loren), a minor. Loren was born January 26, 1998, at Columbia Regional Medical Center - Oak Hill, a hospital located in Brooksville, Hernando County, Florida, and her birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Loren's birth was Samir Shakfeh, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who have suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes. See also Section 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Here, the parties have stipulated, and the proof is otherwise compelling, that Loren sustained a "birth-related neurological injury," as that term is defined by the Plan. Findings related to the settlement of the civil action On December 29, 1998, the Romine family served a Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation, pursuant to Section 766.106, Florida Statutes, on Dr. Shakfeh and Columbia Regional Medical Center - Oak Hill. At the conclusion of the 90-day pre-suit screening period, both the doctor and the hospital denied the claim and on April 12, 1999, the Romine family filed suit against the doctor and the hospital in the Circuit Court of Hernando County. That case was styled John Romine and Rebecca Romine, as parents and next friends of Loren Romine, a minor, and John Romine and Rebecca Romine, individually, Plaintiffs, v. HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Columbia Regional Medical Center - Oak Hill, and Samir Shakfeh, M.D., Defendants, Case No. 99-857-CA01-Law. Both the doctor and the hospital denied liability and raised, as an affirmative defense, Plan immunity. Petitioners replied to that defense, and alleged that the doctor and the hospital failed to provide notice as required by the Plan. Section 766.316, Florida Statutes. On November 29, 2000, the hospital filed a Motion to Abate the civil action until the Romines filed a petition for Plan benefits with the Division of Administrative Hearings and an administrative law judge had resolved whether Loren had suffered a compensable injury and whether the doctor and the hospital had complied with the notice provisions of the Plan. O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 757 So. 2d 624, 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)("All questions of compensability, including those which arise regarding the adequacy of notice, are properly decided in the administrative forum.") The Motion to Abate was never set for hearing, and the case proceeded to mediation on December 7, 2000. Following mediation, the Romine family, the doctor, and the hospital, as well as the doctor's and the hospital's malpractice insurance carriers, reached an agreement to settle the civil suit. The settlement provided for an immediate cash payment to John Romine, Rebecca Romine, and Loren Romine, and the purchase of annuities for each of them. The total present value of the settlement was $5,250,000. The written agreement between the Romines and the hospital included the following stipulation: The parties agree that no part of the Settlement is intended to impair in any manner plaintiff's rights to pursue NICA benefits nor is it intended to be a release of any NICA benefits that may be due plaintiffs. It has always been and remains the position of the Defendant that this claim is covered by NICA. The Defendant agrees that it will take no action and refrain from doing anything to defeat or disparage plaintiff's NICA claim in any way . . . . The written settlement agreement between the Romines and the doctor contained a similar stipulation. On or about January 18, 2001, the Romines filed a Petition for Approval and Apportionment of Settlement Involving Minor in the civil suit. And, on or about January 23, 2001, the Guardian Ad Litem filed a written report with the court, and recommended approval of the settlement and apportionment of the settlement as proposed by the Romines. A hearing was held before the trial court on January 26, 2001, and on the same date the trial court entered an order granting the Petition for Approval and Apportionment of Settlement. The order further provided, as follows: 3. Nothing about this settlement is intended by the parties or this Court to limit or reduce the amount of compensation which may be recoverable by the Petitioners or LOREN ROMINE in a subsequent NICA proceeding, or from any other governmental program or private health insuror. NICA was not a party to the settlement agreements entered into between the Romine family and the healthcare providers, nor was it advised of and nor did it participate in the hearing on the Petition for Approval and Apportionment of Settlement. After the settlement was approved by the trial court, the settlement funds were disbursed to the Romines and releases were exchanged. Petitioners filed their claim for benefits under the Plan on June 14, 2001, seeking actual expenses for, inter alia, Loren's medical and hospital care, and a lump sum award to Mr. and Mrs. Romine of $100,000.
The Issue Whether Christian Ross Morrill, Jr., a deceased minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). If so, the amount and manner of payment of an award to the parents, the reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the filing of the claim, including reasonable attorney's fees, and the amount owing for expenses previously incurred. Whether the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the willful and wanton exception to Plan exclusivity, set forth in Section 766.303(2), Florida Statutes (2007).1
Findings Of Fact Stipulated facts Monica Cordero and Christian R. Morrill, Sr., are the natural parents of Christian R. Morrill, Jr. (Christian), a deceased minor. Christian was born a live infant on June 21, 2007, at Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital, a licensed Florida hospital, located in Tarpon Springs, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Christian died June 27, 2007. Obstetrical services were delivered at Christian's birth by Brooke Slaton, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. The participating physician (Dr. Slaton) and the hospital (Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital) complied with the notice provisions of the Plan. Petitioners and NICA have further stipulated, which stipulation Intervenor "does not oppose . . . and intends to offer no evidence to rebut," that Christian suffered a "birth- related neurological injury," as defined by Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes, in that he suffered an injury to the brain or spinal cord caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in the hospital, which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . of a live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams for a single gestation . . . at birth caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, the parties' agreement that Christian suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" is consistent with the objective proof which demonstrates that Christian suffered an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation occurring in the course of labor, delivery, and the immediate postdelivery period that, following withdrawal of life-support at day 6 after birth, resulted in death. Consequently, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, the claim is compensable. §§ 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. The award Where, as here, it has been resolved that a claim is compensable, the administrative law judge is required to make a determination of how much compensation should be awarded. § 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. Pertinent to this case, Section 766.31(1), Florida Statutes, provides for an award of the following items: Actual expenses for medically necessary and reasonable medical and hospital, habilitative and training, family residential or custodial care, professional residential, and custodial care and service, for medically necessary drugs, special equipment, and facilities, and for related travel. However, such expenses shall not include: Expenses for items or services that the infant has received, or is entitled to receive, under the laws of any state or the Federal Government, except to the extent such exclusion may be prohibited by federal law. Expenses for items or services that the infant has received, or is contractually entitled to receive, from any prepaid health plan, health maintenance organization, or other private insuring entity. Expenses for which the infant has received reimbursement, or for which the infant is entitled to receive reimbursement, under the laws of any state or the Federal Government, except to the extent such exclusion may be prohibited by federal law. Expenses for which the infant has received reimbursement, or for which the infant is contractually entitled to receive reimbursement, pursuant to the provisions of any health or sickness insurance policy or other private insurance program. * * * 1. Periodic payments of an award to the parents or legal guardians of the infant found to have sustained a birth-related neurological injury, which award shall not exceed $100,000. However, at the discretion of the administrative law judge, such award may be made in a lump sum. 2. Death benefit for the infant in an amount of $10,000. Reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the filing of a claim under ss. 766.301-766.316, including reasonable attorney's fees, which shall be subject to the approval and award of the administrative law judge. In determining an award for attorney's fees, the administrative law judge shall consider the following factors: The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. The time limitations imposed by the claimant or the circumstances. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services. In this case, Petitioners and NICA have agreed that, should Petitioners elect to accept benefits under the Plan, Monica Cordero and Christian R. Morrill, Sr., as the parents of Christian, be awarded One hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00), pursuant to Section 766.31(1)(b.)1., Florida Statutes, and a death benefit of Ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), pursuant to Section 766.31(1)(b)2., Florida Statutes, all to be paid in lump sum. The parties have further agreed to an award of Two thousand six hundred twenty-five dollars ($2,625.00) for attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in connection with the filing of the claim. Moreover, the parties have agreed no monies are owing for past expenses. Such agreement is reasonable, and it is approved.
The Issue Whether Brianna Renee Joyner, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). Whether the hospital and participating physician provided the patient notice, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes (2005), or whether notice was not required because the patient had an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2005),1 or the giving of notice was not practicable.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated facts Chontee Joyner and David Joyner are the natural parents of Brianna Renee Joyner, a minor. Brianna was born a live infant on February 16, 2006, at Lawnwood Regional Medical Center, a licensed hospital located in Fort Pierce, Florida, and her birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Obstetrical services were delivered at Brianna's birth by William B. King, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired."2 Here, Petitioners and Intervenor took no position on whether Brianna suffered a "birth-related neurological injury." In contrast, NICA was of the view that the record failed to support the conclusion that Brianna's impairments, admittedly substantial, were birth-related. Whether Brianna suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" To address whether Brianna suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," the parties offered a Stipulated Record (Exhibits 1-22), that included the medical records associated with Mrs. Joyner's antepartal course, as well as those associated with Brianna's birth and subsequent development. The parties also offered the deposition testimony of Donald Willis, M.D., a physician board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, and maternal-fetal medicine, and Raymond Fernandez, M.D., a physician board-certified in pediatrics and neurology with special competence in child neurology, who offered opinions as to the likely etiology of Brianna's impairments. Dr. Fernandez examined Brianna on July 31, 2008, and obtained the following history from Mrs. Joyner: Labor was induced at 39 weeks gestation. Her cervix was 1 cm dilated. She was given Cytotec and Pitocin, and overall duration of labor was 31 hours. Epidural anesthesia was given at 24 hours of labor. Towards the end of the labor, contractions occurred one after the other and she pushed for 2 hours. Vacuum extraction was used, but she was stuck, and she was then extracted manually. Brianna was pale and she did not cry after birth. She was given to Mrs. Joyner for "1 second" and then taken to the nursery because of breathing problems. She was transferred to the NICU because of an apneic spell. Subsequent to discharge she was referred to several specialist[s]. She was found to have a small patent ductus arteriosus that was not felt to be significant. The neurosurgeons found no clinically significant spinal abnormalities. She required PE tubes and tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy because of recurrent ear infections and apneic spells. Hearing is normal. Genetics and neurology have not arrived at a specific diagnosis. She has been enrolled in a developmental therapy program through the Early Steps Program, and has improved slowly, but she remains delayed. Brianna sat straight without support at about 13 months of age. She ambulates by scooting in the sitting position, by pulling with her legs and balancing with her arms. She tries to pull up, but only if offered assistance and encouragement by holding her hands. She reaches for objects, manipulates toys but does not play with them meaningfully, although she likes noisy toys. She rarely puts food in her mouth (Cheerios sometimes). She babbles, but no words are spoken. She does not seem to understand spoken language, but does respond to visual cues. She lifts her arms when a shirt is about to be put on. She plays pat-a-cake, but not consistently. Eye contact is improving. She smiles and is loving with family members, and tends to be anxious in the presence of strangers. She bangs blocks together, but does not stack them. She does not engage in imaginative play. She likes to be read to, and helps turn pages. She watches her younger brother and follows him around the house, and laughs when he does funny things. Physical examination revealed the following: Recent weight was 27 pounds. Head circumference 47.25 cm (approximately 20th percentile). . . . Brianna was alert. She was anxious when approached, and comforted by her mother. She did not babble. No words were spoken. Eye contact was limited. She did not point. Mainly, she sat on her mother's lap and stared about the room and sometimes looked at me. There was no indication that she understood basic verbal requests. She did not point to body parts. She was not interested in toys, and pushed them away when offered. There were no specific dysmorphic features. She has 2 hyperpigmented macular-papular skin markings on her back. One is over the thoracic spine, and the other is to the right of midline. Pupils were equal and briskly reactive to light. Eye movement was full. She tracked visually, but eye contact was limited. Face was symmetric. She swallowed well. Low axial and proximal tone, but normal tone distally in extremities. No obvious weakness noted. She sat independently. She stood and took steps, but only with both hands held by her mother. There was no involuntary movement. Deep tendon reflexes 1+ throughout. Liver and spleen were not enlarged. Funduscopic examination was limited, only able to note normal red reflexes and unable to visualize optic nerves. She inconsistently turned toward sounds and when her name was called. Based on his evaluation of July 31, 2008, as well as his review of the medical records, Dr. Fernandez was of the opinion that Brianna was permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. However, with regard to etiology, Dr. Fernandez was of the opinion that Brianna's impairments were, more likely than not, caused by a genetic abnormality, as opposed to a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury. In so concluding, Dr. Fernandez observed that the record did not provide evidence of an acute brain injury due to hypoxia or mechanical trauma during labor and delivery. Rather, he noted: There was mild shoulder dystocia but no evidence of upper extremity weakness. There was some medical instability after delivery but no evidence for an acute encephalopathy. Following a single fluid bolus she was then medically stable and began feeding well by the end of day 1. Hypotonia was noted initially and it has persisted without evolution or evidence of spasticity or involuntary movement. The initial brain CT scan [of February 20, 2006] showed no hemorrhage and later brain MRI [of May 18, 2006] was normal. Finally, Dr. Fernandez pointed to the report of Charles Williams, M.D., a geneticist associated with Shands Children's Hospital at the University of Florida, Division of Pediatric Genetics, where Brianna had been seen because of her developmental delay and austic-like features. That report, following chromosome analyses, identified a chromosome deletion, a genetic abnormality, that in Dr. Fernandez's opinion likely explains Brianna's global delay and physical findings. Dr. Willis reviewed the medical records associated with Mrs. Joyner's antepartal course; those associated with Mrs. Joyner's labor and delivery, including the fetal heart rate monitor strips; and those associated with Brianna's newborn course. Based on that evaluation, Dr. Willis was of the opinion that Brianna did not suffer a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or the immediate postdelivery period. In so concluding, Dr. Willis observed there was no significant fetal distress on the fetal heart monitor during labor; the baby's Apgar scores were normal (8 at one and five minutes); the baby did not require any significant resuscitation at birth (only suctioning and blow-by oxygen); and CT scan of the head on February 20, 2006, was negative, without evidence of hypoxic changes. When, as here, the medical condition is not readily observable, issues of causation are essentially medical questions, requiring expert medical evidence. See, e.g., Vero Beach Care Center v. Ricks, 476 So. 2d 262, 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)("[L]ay testimony is legally insufficient to support a finding of causation where the medical condition involved is not readily observable."); Ackley v. General Parcel Service, 646 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)("The determination of the cause of a non-observable medical condition, such as a psychiatric illness, is essentially a medical question."); Wausau Insurance Company v. Tillman, 765 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)("Because the medical conditions which the claimant alleged had resulted from the workplace incident were not readily observable, he was obligated to present expert medical evidence establishing that causal connection."). Here, the opinions of Doctors Fernandez and Willis were not controverted or shown to lack credibility. Consequently, it must be resolved that the cause of Brianna's impairments was most likely a developmentally based genetic abnormality, as opposed to a "birth-related neurological injury." See Thomas v. Salvation Army, 562 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)("In evaluating medical evidence, a judge of compensation claims may not reject uncontroverted medical testimony without a reasonable explanation."). The notice issue Apart from issues related to compensability, Petitioners have sought an opportunity to avoid a claim of Plan immunity in a civil action, by requesting a finding that the notice provisions of the Plan were not satisfied by the participating physician and the hospital. § 766.309(1)(d), Fla. Stat. See Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 1997)["A]s a condition precedent to invoking the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as a patient's exclusive remedy, health care providers must, when practicable, give their obstetrical patients notice of their participation in the plan a reasonable time prior to delivery."). Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether the health care providers complied with the notice provisions of the Plan. § 766.309(1)(d), Fla. Stat.; Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Florida Division of Administrative Hearing, 948 So. 2d 705, 717 (Fla. 2007)("[W]hen the issue of whether notice was adequately provided pursuant to section 766.316 is raised in a NICA claim, we conclude that the ALJ has jurisdiction to determine whether the health care provider complied with the requirements of section 766.316."). The notice provisions of the Plan At all times material hereto, Section 766.316, Florida Statutes (2005), prescribed the notice requirements of the Plan, as follows: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician, other than residents, assistant residents, and interns deemed to be participating physicians under s. 766.314(4)(c), under the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice form. Signature of the patient acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption that the notice requirements of this section have been met. Notice need not be given to a patient when the patient has an emergency medical condition as defined in s. 395.002(9)(b) or when notice is not practicable. Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), defined "emergency medical condition" to mean: (b) With respect to a pregnant woman: That there is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery; That a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus; or That there is evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions or rupture of the membranes. The Plan does not define "practicable." However, "practicable" is a commonly understood word that, as defined by Webster's dictionary, means "capable of being done, effected, or performed; feasible." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition (1979). See Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)("When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of words [in a statute] can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary."). Resolution of the notice issue When, as here, the Petitioners dispute that the healthcare providers complied with the notice provisions of the Plan, "the burden rest[s] on the health care providers to demonstrate, more likely than not, that the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied." Tabb v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 880 So. 2d 1253, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Here, the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation and Stipulated Record (Exhibits 1-22) provide no such evidence. Consequently, it must be resolved that Lawnwood Regional Medical Center and William B. King, M.D., failed to establish they complied with the notice provisions of the Plan, or that any such failure was excused because the patient presented in an "emergency medical condition" or the giving of notice was otherwise "not practicable."3
